ELECTRONIC CIRCUIT AND COMPUTER-IMPLEMENTED METHOD FOR SECURING ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION

Abstract

Provided is an electronic circuit comprising a data storage element, a quantum random number generator, and a communication interface. The electronic circuit is configured to a) provide at least one true random number using the quantum random number generator, b) generate a cryptographic key based on the provided random number and provide it for adapting an encryption method for encrypted communication with a communication partner, c) provide information to the communication partner about the adaptation of the encryption method using the communication interface, and d) generate a block for confirming the adaptation of the encryption method for a blockchain and store the blockchain with the block in the data storage element.

Description

[0001] Provided are an electronic circuit, a computer-readable medium, a method for producing an electronic circuit, a computer-readable interface, a use of an electronic circuit for providing a cryptographic key and / or for securely adapting an encryption method for communication between an IoT device and a communication partner, a use of an electronic circuit for providing a cryptographic key and / or for securely adapting an encryption method for communication between a first military unit and a second military unit, a trusted platform module, a control device for a motor vehicle, a motor vehicle, and a computer network. The embodiments thus lie in particular in the field of cryptography and encrypted electronic communication.

[0002] It is known in the art to generate cryptographic keys based on pseudo-random numbers and to use these cryptographic keys to encrypt electronic communication between multiple communication partners. Symmetric and asymmetric encryption methods can be used for this purpose. Random number generators based on thermal generation of random numbers can be used. However, this often offers only a low degree of entropy and can also be susceptible to manipulation.

[0003] Providing truly random numbers is technically challenging, as deterministic computers cannot readily generate truly random numbers. Using pseudorandom numbers represents a compromise that allows numbers to be provided that appear random at first glance, but ultimately are not truly random numbers. Pseudorandom number generators often pose a security risk if they make the generation of pseudorandom numbers at least partially predictable by manipulating the pseudorandom number generator.

[0004] Furthermore, optical quantum random number generators are known in the prior art, but these cannot be integrated into a semiconductor component.

[0005] In addition, quantum random number generators are known in the prior art in which a photon emitter and a photon detector are arranged side by side. These can only provide quantum random numbers at a low bit rate.

[0006] Furthermore, the current state of the art has the disadvantage that, with increasing computing power available for cracking encryption, the requirements for cryptographic keys and encryption methods become increasingly stringent in order to effectively prevent unwanted decryption of the encrypted data by third parties or to keep the effort at a high level. Accordingly, the requirements for the cryptographic keys and the underlying random numbers for effective encryption are becoming increasingly stringent.

[0007] Furthermore, the current state of the art presents the disadvantage that, even when using cryptographic keys that, in principle, meet high requirements, some types of attacks or decryption attempts by unauthorized persons, such as man-in-the-middle attacks, cannot be effectively defended against, since existing interaction between third parties during the exchange of cryptographic keys for encrypting communication often cannot be effectively detected. Techniques that can reliably enable such detection, however, often require large amounts of data that cannot easily be stored on the internal data storage elements of integrated circuits.

[0008] These limitations prevailing in the state of the art make it difficult to widely use effective encryption of electronic communications and make them vulnerable to attacks, interception and / or manipulation by third parties.

[0009] Particularly in the field of security technology, as well as in the military sector, the desired level of security in the encryption of electronic communications cannot always be achieved using conventional means due to the disadvantages described above.

[0010] This patent application cites the prior art mentioned below: - Dan Boneh's presentation "Auth. Key Exchange" from Stanford University's online cryptography course describes methods for securely exchanging information to encrypt communications; - R. Muth et al. “SmartDHX: Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange with Smart Contracts” describes a Diffie-Hellman key exchange; - EP 3 529 694 relates to a (quantum) random number generator comprising a photon source, one or more photon detectors configured to detect at least one photon belonging to a flux of detected photons generated by the photon source, and electronic sampling means operatively connected to the photon detectors and configured to implement a logical method for extracting a binary sequence based on the arrival time of each of the detected photons. In the random number generator, the photon source and the photon detectors are arranged side by side and integrated into a single semiconductor substrate. - WO 2016 / 016741 A1 relates to a (quantum) random number generator comprising a photon source and one or more SPAD-type photon detectors configured to detect a photon flux equal to λ, the photons being generated by the photon source. The random number generator further comprises electronic sampling means. These electronic sampling means are configured to record the arrival time t of a photon incident on each SPAD photon detector for each of the observation windows Tw, and are also configured to convert the arrival time t into a binary sequence. The photon source and the electronic sampling means are configured such that the product λ*Tw is less than or equal to 0.01. - KANDI, M. A. [et al.]: A Blockchain-based Key Management Protocol for Secure Device-to-Device Communication in the Internet of Things. In: 2020 IEEE I9th International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom), Guangzhou, China, 2020, S. 1868-1873. DOI: 10.1109 / TrustCom50675.2020.00255; - Random number generation. In: Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Bearbeitungsstand: 08.09.2024. URL: https: / / en.wikipedia.org / w / index.php?title=Random_number_generation& oldid=1244727281 [abgerufen am 29.04.2025] - DENNIS, R. [et al.]: A Temporal Blockchain: A Formal Analysis. In: 2016 International Conference on Collaboration Technologies and Systems (CTS), Orlando, FL, USA, 2016, 5.430-437. DOI: 10.11 09 / CTS.201 6.0082 - US 2019 / 0 212 985 A1

[0011] The technical problem is to provide an electronic circuit and a method that are suitable for enriching the state of the art. Optionally, the problem can include providing an electronic circuit and a method that are suitable for increasing security in the encryption of electronic communications and / or simplifying the use of secure encryption and / or simplifying or even enabling the integration of encrypted communications in electronic circuits.

[0012] The problem is solved by the subject matter of the respective independent claims. Optional embodiments are specified in the subclaims and in the description.

[0013] An electronic circuit is provided, comprising a data storage element, a quantum random number generator, and a communication interface. The electronic circuit is configured to provide at least one true random number using the quantum random number generator, and b) generate a cryptographic key based on the provided random number and to provide it for adapting an encryption method for encrypted communication with a communication partner. The electronic circuit is further configured to d) provide information to the communication partner about the adaptation of the encryption method using the communication interface, and e) generate a block for confirming the adaptation of the encryption method for a blockchain and store the blockchain with the block in the data storage element.

[0014] Furthermore, a computer-readable medium is provided which comprises data defining an operating instruction adapted for controlling a semiconductor manufacturing apparatus such that the electronic circuit according to the disclosure is manufactured by means of the semiconductor manufacturing apparatus when the data is output to the semiconductor manufacturing apparatus.

[0015] In addition, a method for producing an electronic circuit according to the disclosure is provided, wherein the method comprises producing the electronic circuit by means of a device for semiconductor production, optionally using a computer-readable medium according to the disclosure.

[0016] Furthermore, a computer-readable interface is provided which comprises an electronic circuit according to the disclosure, wherein the computer-readable interface is configured to be connected to a computer and, in a state connected to the computer, to provide a cryptographic key and / or to enable a secure adaptation of an encryption method for communication of the computer with a communication partner and / or to enable a secure communication connection with the communication partner.

[0017] Furthermore, a use of an electronic circuit according to the disclosure for providing a cryptographic key and / or for securely adapting an encryption method for communication of an IoT device with a communication partner is provided.

[0018] Furthermore, a use of an electronic circuit according to the disclosure for providing a cryptographic key and / or for securely adapting an encryption method for communication between a first military unit and a second military unit is provided.

[0019] In addition, a Trusted Platform Module comprising an electronic circuit according to the disclosure is provided.

[0020] Furthermore, a control device for a motor vehicle comprising an electronic circuit according to the disclosure is provided.

[0021] Furthermore, a motor vehicle with a control device according to the disclosure is provided. The control device can be configured to secure communication between the control device and another component of the motor vehicle and / or with an external communication partner by means of the electronic circuit.

[0022] In addition, a computer network comprising a plurality of network nodes is provided, wherein the plurality of network nodes each have at least one electronic circuit according to the disclosure and wherein the computer network is configured to enable encrypted communication between the network nodes using the electronic circuits of the respective network nodes.

[0023] Furthermore, a computer-implemented method for securing electronic communication with a communication partner is provided. The method comprises providing at least one true random number using the quantum random number generator and generating a cryptographic key based on the provided random number. The method further comprises adapting an encryption method for encrypted communication with the communication partner using the generated random number, providing information about the adaptation of the encryption method to the communication partner via a communication interface, generating a block for confirming the adaptation of the encryption method for a blockchain, and storing the blockchain with the block in a data storage element.

[0024] An electronic circuit can be in the form of an electronic circuit. Optionally, the electronic circuit can be in integrated form. Optionally, the electronic circuit can be designed as an integrated circuit. The electronic circuit can contain all of the aforementioned components and optionally additional components. Optionally, all components of the electronic circuit can be integrated into a housing of the electronic circuit. Optionally, the electronic circuit can have a computing unit that can be configured to carry out the method steps. Optionally, the electronic circuit can be designed as a microcontroller or nanocontroller.

[0025] Optionally, the electronic circuit can be designed monolithically as a semiconductor component.

[0026] A data storage element is a component and / or an element integrated into the electronic circuit which is designed to store electronic data. The data storage element can be designed as a rewritable data storage element and optionally as RAM memory. The data storage element can be designed as flash memory or comprise such a memory. Optionally, the data storage element can be designed to store a data volume of 10 kB or more. Optionally, the data storage element can be designed to store a data volume of 2 MB or less. The data storage element can optionally be designed to store further data in addition to storing the one or more blockchains, although this is not mandatory. Optionally, the data storage element is designed to have sufficient storage capacity for storing the one or more blockchains.However, the data storage element can be designed so that the storage capacity is not larger than necessary in order to have the smallest possible installation space requirement and to be as easy to integrate into the electronic circuit as possible.

[0027] A communication interface can be an interface that enables the electronic circuit to exchange electronic data with a communication partner. The communication interface can optionally conform to a conventional standard for electronic data communication. The communication interface can be designed to enable wireless and / or wired communication. Optionally, the communication interface can conform to one of the following standards: Ethernet, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, or USB.

[0028] Providing a true random number may include generating and outputting the true random number. Providing a true random number may be repeated and / or continuous, so that multiple random numbers and / or a stream of random numbers are provided sequentially over time. The true random number may comprise a bit sequence or be configured as such.

[0029] A cryptographic key can represent a cryptographic key. The cryptographic key can comprise a character string or be configured as such. The cryptographic key is generated based on the provided random number. Optionally, the cryptographic key can correspond to the provided random number. The cryptographic key can be used by the encryption method to modify data that is to be securely provided to the communication partner in such a way that it is encrypted and third parties cannot decrypt the data without knowledge of a corresponding cryptographic key for decryption.

[0030] Adapting the encryption method may include or consist of changing, changing, or renewing the encryption key used for encryption. Adapting the encryption method may occur regularly or irregularly. Adapting the encryption method may offer the advantage of replacing a previously used, potentially compromised, encryption key with another encryption key, preventing unauthorized third parties who might have obtained the previous encryption key and decrypted the transmitted data from decrypting the data in the future.

[0031] The fact that the generated cryptographic key is made available for adapting the encryption method means that the elements entrusted with implementing the encryption method, which may be integrated into the electronic circuit, can use it to implement the encryption method. This provision can optionally be made exclusively internally within the electronic circuit or for other components that are in close communication or physical connection with the electronic circuit. This can offer the advantage of eliminating the need to transmit the generated cryptographic key to external recipients, thus reducing the risk of interception by third parties.

[0032] The information provided to the communication partner regarding the adaptation of the encryption method via the communication interface can represent information that enables the communication partner to adapt the encryption method themselves in order to receive and decrypt encrypted messages after the adaptation of the encryption method. A conventional symmetric or asymmetric encryption method can be used. The information provided to the communication partner optionally does not include the generated cryptographic key. The communication interface can represent the same communication interface via which communication with the communication partner takes place, although this is not mandatory and a different communication interface can optionally be used.

[0033] The fact that the blockchain is stored in the data storage element of the electronic circuit means that computer-readable data comprising a copy of the blockchain is stored in the data storage element encompassed by the data storage element. The blockchain can document a history of adjustments to the encryption method. The blockchain can have a plurality of blocks. Optionally, an adjustment to the encryption method can be confirmed or documented in a separate block of the blockchain. A block can be added to the blockchain for each adjustment to the encryption method. Optionally, further events related to the encryption method can be confirmed or documented in the blockchain.The blockchain can be used to enable authenticity of the blockchain and / or the encryption method and / or adaptation of the encryption method by synchronizing and / or comparing the blockchain with copies of the blockchain from other participants in the blockchain.

[0034] A computer-readable medium is a technical object. The computer-readable medium can be, among other things, any computer-readable storage medium, such as a digital data storage device such as a USB stick, a hard drive, a CD-ROM, an SD card, or an SSD card. The computer-readable medium can be a data signal. This means that the data does not necessarily have to be stored on a computer-readable storage medium, but can also be obtained, for example, via the Internet. The data can comprise a computer program designed or executable as a control program, which includes instructions which, when the computer program is executed by the semiconductor manufacturing device, cause the device to manufacture or produce the entropy source and / or the quantum random number generator and / or the integrated electronic circuit.

[0035] A computer-readable interface is a technical object. A computer-readable interface can represent an external component that can be connected to a computer in order to use functions of the computer-readable interface via the computer-readable interface. Optionally, the computer-readable interface can be designed to enable the computer, when connected to the computer-readable interface, to establish a communication connection with an external communication partner via the computer-readable interface. The computer-readable interface can optionally be embodied as a USB device in order to enable a connection to the computer via a USB interface.

[0036] An IoT device is a device that, as part of the Internet of Things, has an internet connection or a connection to a local network and can optionally establish a communication connection with one or more external third parties via the internet. Optionally, the electronic circuit can be used to encrypt communication over such a communication connection and / or to provide a cryptographic key for such encryption.

[0037] A military unit can be a unit deployable for military purposes that is designed to communicate with other military units. The military unit can comprise one or more personnel or be unmanned. A military unit can be a soldier, a motor vehicle, a weapon system, an aircraft, a watercraft, an underwater vehicle, an explosive device, a measuring probe, or similar. Optionally, the military unit can comprise a combination of several such elements.

[0038] A motor vehicle can be a land vehicle, a watercraft, an aircraft, and / or a spacecraft, such as a car, truck, train, motorcycle, bus, agricultural machinery, tactical vehicle, land-based weapon system, ship, submarine, torpedo, airplane, helicopter, rocket, guided missile, cruise missile, drone, satellite, space station, or similar. The motor vehicle can be designed for manned and / or unmanned and / or remotely piloted operation.

[0039] A control device for a motor vehicle can represent a control device designed for use in a motor vehicle. Optionally, the control device can be designed to perform functions for controlling components of the motor vehicle, such as engine control and / or safety systems. Optionally, the control device can be connected to a CAN bus and / or LIN bus. Optionally, the control device can be configured to establish an encrypted communication connection with other components of the motor vehicle, optionally via a CAN bus and / or LIN bus.

[0040] The features and embodiments mentioned above and explained below are not only to be regarded as disclosed in the respective explicitly mentioned combinations, but are also encompassed by the disclosure content in other technically meaningful combinations and embodiments.

[0041] The fact that the method is computer-implemented means that at least one method step, optionally several method steps, and optionally all method steps can be executed or are executed by a computing unit. The computing unit can have a processor and a storage medium for this purpose. Optionally, the computing unit can be embodied as a computer, a smartphone, a pager, a tablet computer, an embedded system, a microcontroller, a nanocontroller, an integrated circuit, a control unit, or the like.

[0042] A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a cryptographic processor embodied as a chip or integrated circuit designed for cryptographic operations. The Trusted Platform Module can also be referred to as a Trusted Platform Module or TPM. The TPM can be configured to provide hardware-based, security-related functions. The TPM can include multiple physical security mechanisms to increase its tamper resistance. The TPM can be designed to make it difficult or impossible for malware to manipulate the TPM. The TPM can be configured to provide or perform one or more of the following functions: - Generating and storing cryptographic keys and optionally restricting their use; - Storing and / or providing unique RSA keys, which can be permanently stored in the TPM in order to be able to uniquely identify a device in which the TPM is installed; - Carrying out and storing safety measurements of a start-up process of an electronic device in which the TPMA is installed; - Conducting system integrity measurements.

[0043] The TPM can be integrated into an electronic device to provide security functions, particularly the functions mentioned above, to the device. Optionally, an electronic circuit according to the disclosure can be combined with a conventional Trusted Platform Module chip.

[0044] The disclosure offers the advantage of providing secure and effective encryption of electronic communications. In particular, by combining the use of true random numbers instead of pseudo-random numbers, which are not based on true random numbers, the ability to regularly adapt the encryption method, and securing the adaptation of the encryption method through a blockchain, a very wide range of attacks and attempts to circumvent the encryption method without authorization can be thwarted. The disclosure also offers the advantage that, optionally, unauthorized circumvention of the encryption can be completely prevented, or that, should a successful attempt at circumvention occur, this can be immediately detected, and the encryption and / or the communication connection and / or the communication partner can be identified as untrustworthy.

[0045] By providing genuine random numbers through a quantum random number generator, it is possible to use technical means and optionally artificial intelligence to anticipate numbers that are not based on true randomness for a future planned adaptation of the encryption method, and to allow a cryptographic key based on this number to be guessed or otherwise determined by unauthorized third parties.

[0046] By adapting the encryption method, a repeated change of the cryptographic key can be provided. This offers the advantage that in the event that an unauthorized third party succeeds in circumventing the encryption and decrypting the transmitted communication, the encryption is renewed and the unauthorized third party no longer has a suitable key to decrypt the communication. By adapting the encryption method, an unauthorized third party can thus incur the effort of circumventing the encryption again when attempting to circumvent the encryption. In particular, regular adaptation of the encryption, optionally a regular change of the cryptographic key, can make it impossible for an unauthorized third party to circumvent the encryption method at such short intervals in order to be able to decrypt the communication in a timely manner.

[0047] The use of a blockchain with blocks to confirm the adjustment of the encryption method also offers the advantage of successfully thwarting man-in-the-middle attacks or significantly increasing the effort required for a man-in-the-middle attack. Because an adjustment of the encryption method and optionally a change of the cryptographic key is confirmed or documented in the blockchain by a corresponding block, and a comparison and / or synchronization of the blockchains of multiple participants in the blockchain can take place, an attacker would have to modify the copies of the blockchain of all participants to thwart the detection of a man-in-the-middle attack.However, since the number of blockchain participants and thus the number of blockchain copies can be very large, an attacker would need to manipulate all copies of the blockchain, which may be located on devices unknown to the attacker. This may be impossible or require considerable effort due to the number of copies and the unknown storage locations. Furthermore, the use of blockchain can offer the advantage that if the blockchain is manipulated, it would require manipulation not just of a single block of the blockchain but of the entire blockchain, since the entire history of the blockchain can optionally be incorporated into each block of the blockchain.The blockchain can therefore offer the advantage that, through decentralized storage of copies of the blockchains and their regular comparison and / or synchronization, possible attacks and manipulation attempts, such as man-in-the-middle attacks, can be detected promptly and the encryption and / or the communication and / or one or more communication partners can be classified as compromised.

[0048] The disclosure also offers the advantage that the provision of the true random numbers, the means for providing the cryptographic key, and the means for generating and storing the blockchain can be provided by the electronic circuit itself. This in turn offers the advantage that an electronic circuit according to the disclosure can be used to effectively adapt encryption methods in electronic devices that can establish communication connections to communication partners. In particular, the disclosure offers the advantage that, particularly when the electronic circuit is provided as an integrated circuit, the electronic circuit can be integrated into other electronic devices and / or electronic circuits, such as another microcontroller, computer, smartphone, motor vehicle, etc. As a result, the respective devices orelectronic circuits are enhanced with the ability to provide effective and secure encryption of communications.

[0049] Furthermore, the disclosure offers the advantage that the electronic circuit can be retrofitted into existing devices and / or electronic circuits. Optionally, this can be achieved by connecting the electronic device and / or an electronic circuit to an electronic circuit embodied as a separate component according to the disclosure. This connection allows the functionality of the existing electronic device and / or the existing electronic circuit to be expanded to include functions for adapting the encryption, thus significantly improving the security against interception of communications.

[0050] Furthermore, the disclosure offers the advantage that the disclosed provision of the possibility for adapting the encryption can optionally be fully integrated monolithically into a semiconductor component. This minimizes the space required and creates the possibility of integrating an electronic circuit according to the disclosure into small electronic devices and existing electronic circuits.

[0051] Furthermore, the disclosure offers the advantage of being able to provide the possibility of adapting the encryption with low technical complexity and / or low manufacturing costs. This allows a large number of electronic devices and / or electronic circuits to be expanded ex works and / or subsequently at low cost to include a secure adaptation of the encryption method. The low costs can promote widespread adoption, which can significantly improve the security of electronic communications in general.

[0052] Furthermore, the invention offers the advantage that, by combining several aspects of encryption and communication security, a very high level of security can be provided, allowing even highly classified information to be transmitted securely. This can offer the advantage that a functionality according to the disclosure can be used to adapt encryption in the military sector or in other areas where highly sensitive information must be transmitted.

[0053] Furthermore, the disclosure offers the advantage that a zero-trust network can be created by locally generating the random numbers, since it is not necessary to generate the random numbers at a central location and then transmit them to the clients.

[0054] The electronic circuit can be embodied as an integrated electronic circuit. This can offer the advantage that the electronic circuit can be provided in a compact design and / or as a single and optionally self-contained component. Optionally, this offers the advantage of easily integrating the integrated electronic circuit into another electronic device and / or another electronic circuit. Optionally, a circuit board of another electronic circuit can be populated with an electronic circuit according to the disclosure and / or a semiconductor component can be configured such that an electronic circuit according to the disclosure is integrated into the semiconductor component.

[0055] The data storage element can be integrated into the integrated electronic circuit as an internal data storage element. The data storage element can be integrated into the electronic circuit as a monolithically integrated data storage element. This can facilitate a compact design and / or cost-effective production of the electronic circuit.

[0056] Optionally, the quantum random number generator and / or the communication interface can be integrated into the integrated electronic circuit. This can facilitate a compact design and / or cost-effective production of the electronic circuit. The quantum random number generator can comprise a monolithically integrated entropy source, which can be designed to utilize randomly occurring events to generate the random number.

[0057] The data storage element can be designed to provide a storage capacity of at least 10 kB and optionally a maximum of 2 MB for storing the at least one blockchain. The selected size of the data storage element can represent a compromise between sufficient storage capacity and the smallest possible installation space requirement. Smaller storage capacities are also optionally possible if particularly limited installation space is available. Larger storage capacities are also optionally possible if ample installation space is available for the data storage element.

[0058] The quantum random number generator can be configured to provide random numbers with a data stream of at least 10 kbps, optionally at least 50 kbps, optionally at least 100 kbps, and optionally at least 500 kbps. This can offer the advantage that the random numbers can be provided in a sufficient quantity and / or length to generate a new cryptographic key at short intervals and / or to generate the cryptographic key with long random numbers.

[0059] Steps c) and d), optionally steps a) to d), can be performed repeatedly. This can provide the opportunity to repeatedly generate the cryptographic key and, optionally, to adapt the encryption method. This can reduce or shorten the time periods for which one and the same cryptographic key is used, which reduces the risk of unauthorized circumvention of the encryption method and minimizes the amount of potentially unauthorized decrypted data. The repeated generation of the cryptographic key can be based on one or more existing random numbers and / or one or more newly generated random numbers.The electronic circuit can thus be configured to repeatedly adapt the encryption method by repeatedly performing steps c) and d), optionally by repeatedly performing steps a) to d). The electronic circuit can be configured to adapt the encryption method at regular and / or irregular time intervals. The time intervals can be 48 hours or shorter, optionally 24 hours or shorter, optionally 12 hours or shorter, optionally 6 hours or shorter, optionally 3 hours or shorter, optionally 1 hour or shorter, optionally 30 minutes or shorter, optionally 10 minutes or shorter, optionally 5 minutes or shorter, optionally 2 minutes or shorter, and optionally 1 minute or shorter. This can significantly increase the effort required for unauthorized decryption of the encrypted transmitted information by an unauthorized third party.

[0060] The encryption method can be implemented as a symmetric and / or asymmetric encryption method. Optionally, conventional encryption methods known in the prior art can be used. This can offer the advantage that the functionality disclosed for adapting the encryption method can be combined with conventional methods and systems, thereby enhancing the conventional methods and systems and increasing their security.

[0061] Optionally, the information can be provided via the adaptation of the encryption method according to a Diffie-Hellman key exchange method.

[0062] The electronic circuit can be configured to perform a key selection and / or key exchange, optionally a Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange, with the communication partner on the generated cryptographic key using the information provided to the communication partner via the communication interface regarding the adaptation of the encryption method. This offers the advantage that the cryptographic key itself does not need to be transmitted, but rather only information that prevents a third party, who might intercept the communication without authorization, from intercepting and / or using the cryptographic key.

[0063] The electronic circuit can further be configured to generate the cryptographic key based on the at least one random number such that the cryptographic key has a length of at least 128 characters, optionally at least 256 characters, optionally at least 512 characters, optionally at least 1,024 characters, and optionally at least 2,048 characters. This can significantly increase the technical effort required to crack the cryptographic key and thus provide a high degree of security.

[0064] The electronic circuit can further be configured to generate the cryptographic key based on the at least one random number such that the random number used for this purpose, provided by the quantum random number generator, has a length of at least 16 bits, optionally at least 32 bits, optionally at least 64 bits, optionally at least 128 bits, optionally at least 256 bits, and optionally at least 512 bits. This can significantly increase the technical effort required to anticipate the random number and / or crack the cryptographic key and thus provide a high degree of security.

[0065] Generating the block to confirm the adjustment of the encryption method for the at least one blockchain may include generating a hash value to confirm the adjustment of the encryption method. The block may optionally consist of the hash value. A block may represent an entry or a segment of the blockchain.

[0066] The electronic circuit can further be configured to e) partially or completely synchronize the blockchain with a copy of the blockchain of another participant in the blockchain and / or to compare it with a copy of the blockchain of another participant in the blockchain and, based on the synchronization and / or the comparison, assess the trustworthiness of the encryption method and / or the adaptation of the encryption method and / or the communication partner. This can offer the advantage of testing and ensuring the reliability and / or integrity of the encryption method, the communication, and / or the communication partner in a decentralized manner. This can make manipulation of the encryption method significantly more difficult, as it may be necessary for an attacker to manipulate a large number of blockchains, if possible, in order to remain undetected.This can be made even more difficult by the fact that the attacker may not know all the storage locations of the copies of the blockchain with which a comparison and / or synchronization takes place.

[0067] The communication partner can be another participant in the blockchain. The electronic circuit can be configured to partially or completely synchronize and / or compare the blockchain with the communication partner's copy of the blockchain in feature e). This can simplify the synchronization and / or comparison and integrate it into the communication with the communication partner.

[0068] The electronic circuit can further be configured to f) prevent communication with the communication partner and / or provide information about an anomaly in the encryption method, provided that the assessment of the trustworthiness of the encryption method and / or the adaptation of the encryption method and / or the communication partner concludes that the trustworthiness of the encryption method and / or the adaptation of the encryption method and / or the communication partner may have been compromised. In other words, an anomaly in the synchronization and / or comparison of the blockchain with a copy of another participant in the blockchain can be interpreted as an indication of a compromise of the encryption method and / or trigger the initiation of predetermined security measures. This can increase security.

[0069] The electronic circuit can further be configured to generate the block and / or the hash value for the blockchain such that the block and / or the hash value, and optionally the entire blockchain, are encrypted and / or stored in encrypted form in the internal data storage element. The electronic circuit can be configured to encrypt the block and / or the hash value and / or the blockchain using at least one of the random numbers provided by the random number generator and / or to store it in encrypted form. This can further complicate manipulation of the blockchain and increase security.

[0070] The electronic circuit is further configured to delete the blockchain containing the blocks for confirming the encryption method adjustment from the data storage element upon the occurrence of a predetermined event and replace it with a new blockchain of shorter length and / or smaller data volume. This can offer the advantage of limiting the data volume of the blockchain and thus the storage space required for the blockchain in the data storage element. This thus offers the advantage of storing a blockchain on a data storage element with only a very limited storage capacity.This can enable or simplify the storage of the blockchain in an integrated data storage element, particularly if the data storage element is integrated into an integrated electronic circuit and can only be provided with a very limited storage capacity due to the limited available space. This can therefore be particularly advantageous in that mobile electronic devices with an electronic circuit according to the disclosure, which must be small in size, can also be enabled to store the blockchain on the integrated data storage element.

[0071] The predetermined event can optionally occur when the blockchain reaches a predetermined length and / or a predetermined data volume. Alternatively or additionally, other events can be defined at which the predetermined event occurs, such as the expiration of a predetermined period of time and / or a predetermined number of blockchain blocks and / or a predetermined number of encryption method adjustments.

[0072] The electronic circuit can be configured to partially or completely release the storage space occupied by the blockchain when the blockchain is deleted from the data storage element, optionally for storing the new blockchain. This can limit or prevent an increase in the blockchain's data volume and prevent the blockchain from overfilling the data storage element. This can enable the use of the blockchain even when only limited storage capacity is available.

[0073] The electronic circuit is further configured to generate a block for a higher-level blockchain to confirm the replacement of the blockchain with the new blockchain of shorter length and / or size, and to store the higher-level blockchain with the generated block in the internal data storage element. The higher-level blockchain can thus be used to secure, document, or confirm a change in those blockchains that document, confirm, or secure the adjustments to the encryption methods. Optionally, a block is added to the higher-level blockchain for each change in the blockchain.This allows the history of changes in the blockchains to be traced, while the total storage space required for the blockchains can be kept low and, in particular, significantly lower than would be required for the continuous use of a single blockchain for the adjustments of the encryption over the lifetime of the electronic circuit.

[0074] The electronic circuit can further be configured to generate the block for confirming the adaptation of the encryption method as a block for a first blockchain and as a block for a second blockchain, and to store the first blockchain and the second blockchain with the respectively generated block in the internal data storage element. In other words, the electronic circuit can be configured to generate or store two or more blockchains in parallel in order to document, secure, or confirm the adaptations of the encryption method.

[0075] The electronic circuit can further be configured to use the first blockchain and the second blockchain in parallel, with staggered start and end times of use. In other words, the two blockchains can differ in terms of the start and end times of their use, so that the blockchains optionally differ at least in their first and / or last block. This means that a block that optionally documents a specific adaptation of the encryption method is not always the first block of all blockchains, nor is it always the last block of all blockchains.

[0076] The electronic circuit can be configured to use the first blockchain and the second blockchain each up to a predetermined length and / or up to a predetermined data volume, wherein the respective end of use occurs when the predetermined length and / or the predetermined data volume of the first or second blockchain is reached. The electronic circuit can be configured to delete the first blockchain upon reaching the end of use of the first blockchain and replace the first blockchain with a new first blockchain of smaller length and / or size, and to delete the second blockchain upon reaching the end of use of the second blockchain and replace the second blockchain with a new second blockchain of smaller length and / or size.

[0077] The electronic circuit can further be configured to continue using the second blockchain when the first blockchain is deleted and replaced upon the first blockchain's end of use, and to continue using the first blockchain when the second blockchain is deleted and replaced upon the second blockchain's end of use. This can offer the advantage that all blockchains can be limited in terms of the required storage space, yet at least one additional blockchain is available even when one of the blockchains is changed, which documents at least part of the history of the encryption adjustments.

[0078] The electronic circuit can further be configured to release the memory space occupied by the first and / or second blockchain in the data storage element, optionally for a new first and / or second blockchain, when the first and / or second blockchain is deleted. This can enable efficient use of the available memory space. Furthermore, it can enable the use of blockchains to secure encryption even when the memory capacity of the data storage element is limited. Furthermore, this can offer the advantage that the blockchains can be stored internally in the electronic circuit and do not need to be outsourced to external data storage devices. This allows a high degree of security to be achieved.

[0079] The computer-readable medium can further be configured such that the data comprises a digital representation of the electronic circuit, such that the integrated electronic circuit is manufactured using the digital representation with the operating instructions when the data is output to the semiconductor manufacturing device. Manufacturing the electronic circuit using the semiconductor manufacturing device according to the operating instructions can comprise manufacturing the electronic circuit on a wafer in a semiconductor process, optionally in a CMOS semiconductor process, a BiCMOS semiconductor process, or a semiconductor process for bipolar components, optionally using bipolar CMOS technology.

[0080] Furthermore, the disclosure includes a method for producing an electronic circuit according to the disclosure, wherein the method includes producing the electronic circuit by means of a device for semiconductor production, optionally using a computer-readable medium according to the disclosure.

[0081] The use of an electronic circuit according to the disclosure for providing a cryptographic key and / or for securely adapting an encryption method for communication between a first military unit and a second military unit can be designed such that the first and / or second military unit comprises or is designed as one of the following elements: a soldier; a military vehicle; an unmanned military vehicle; a weapon system; a missile; an explosive device; a mine; an element of a military swarm; an agent of a multi-agent system; a measuring probe and / or reconnaissance probe; a command center; a control device; and a satellite.

[0082] By using the disclosed encryption adaptation to encrypt communications between military units, interception and / or manipulation of transmitted information can be made more difficult. This can have the advantage of making it more difficult for adversaries to disrupt the operations of military units and / or counterattack them, thus increasing the effectiveness of military units and / or their survivability on a battlefield.

[0083] The quantum random generator used by the method for adapting encryption to secure electronic communication with a communication partner and / or used by the electronic circuit can comprise a monolithically integrated entropy source, wherein the entropy source comprises a photon source configured to emit photons, wherein the photon source comprises a first outer shell, wherein the first outer shell is formed by a first base surface, a first cover surface, and at least one first side surface connecting the first base surface and the first cover surface. Furthermore, the monolithic entropy source can comprise a photon detector configured to detect the photons emitted by the photon source, wherein the first base surface of the photon source is arranged facing the photon detector.In addition, the quantum random generator may comprise an electronic circuit configured to generate a random bit as a function of an output signal of the entropy source and optionally output the generated random bit, wherein a characteristic of the output signal of the entropy source depends on a temporal frequency of the photons detected by the photon detector.

[0084] Furthermore, the disclosure includes an electronic circuit comprising a data storage element and a communication interface, wherein the electronic circuit is configured to provide information to the communication partner about the adaptation of the encryption method by means of the communication interface and to generate a block for confirming the adaptation of the encryption method for a blockchain and to store the blockchain with the block in the data storage element.

[0085] The electronic circuit is configured to delete the blockchain containing the blocks confirming the encryption method adjustment from the data storage element upon the occurrence of a predetermined event and to replace it with a new blockchain of shorter length and / or smaller data volume. The predetermined event can occur when the blockchain reaches a predetermined length and / or a predetermined data volume. The electronic circuit can be configured to partially or completely release the storage space occupied by the blockchain upon deletion of the blockchain from the data storage element, optionally for storing the new blockchain.The electronic circuit may be configured to generate a block for a parent blockchain to confirm the replacement of the blockchain with the new blockchain of smaller length and / or size and to store the parent blockchain with the generated block in the internal data storage element.

[0086] Alternatively or additionally, the electronic circuit can further be configured to generate the block for confirming the adaptation of the encryption method as a block for a first blockchain and as a block for a second blockchain, and to store the first blockchain and the second blockchain with the respectively generated block in the internal data storage element. The first blockchain and the second blockchain can be used in parallel with staggered start and end of use. The electronic circuit can be configured to use the first blockchain and the second blockchain each up to a predetermined length and / or up to a predetermined data volume, wherein the respective end of use occurs when the predetermined length and / or the predetermined data volume of the first or second blockchain is reached.The electronic circuit can be configured to delete the first blockchain when the end of use of the first blockchain is reached and to replace the first blockchain with a new first blockchain of shorter length and / or size, and to delete the second blockchain when the end of use of the second blockchain is reached and to replace the second blockchain with a new second blockchain of shorter length and / or size. The electronic circuit can further be configured to continue using the second blockchain when the end of use of the first blockchain is reached and to continue using the first blockchain when the end of use of the second blockchain is reached. When the first and / or second blockchain is deleted, the method can optionally use the storage space occupied by the first or second blockchain in the data storage element for a new first or second blockchain.second blockchain. Analogous to the electronic circuit configured according to the above, the disclosure includes methods for adapting an encryption with the respective steps.

[0087] All disclosure provided is to be considered equally disclosed for the electronic circuit, the computer-readable medium, the method for producing an electronic circuit, the computer-readable interface, the use of an electronic circuit for providing a cryptographic key and / or for securely adapting an encryption method for communication of an IoT device with a communication partner, the use of an electronic circuit for providing a cryptographic key and / or for securely adapting an encryption method for communication of a first military unit with a second military unit, the trusted platform module, the control device for a motor vehicle, the motor vehicle, and the computer network.

[0088] Further details and advantages will now be explained in more detail using the following examples and optional embodiments with reference to the figures.

[0089] They show: Fig. 1A shows a computer-implemented method for adapting encryption to secure electronic communication with a communication partner according to an optional embodiment; Fig. 1B illustrates a switch of blockchains according to an optional embodiment; Fig. 1C illustrates a change of blockchains according to another optional embodiment; Fig. 2 an electronic circuit according to an optional embodiment; Fig. 3 a computer-readable storage medium according to an optional embodiment; Fig. 4 a computer-readable interface according to an optional embodiment; Fig. 5 a motor vehicle according to an optional embodiment; Fig. 6 a trusted platform module according to an optional embodiment; Fig. 7 a computer network according to an optional embodiment; Fig. 8 a military unit according to an optional embodiment; Fig. 9 a manufacturing method according to an optional embodiment; Fig. 10 is a schematic representation of a BCD substrate provided by a method for providing deep pn junctions in a BCD process and a TCAD representation of the resulting dopant distribution; Fig. 11 is a schematic representation of an exemplary first embodiment of an entropy source in a cross-sectional view; Fig. 12 is a schematic representation of an exemplary second embodiment of the entropy source in a cross-sectional view; Fig. 13 is a schematic representation of an exemplary third embodiment of the entropy source in a cross-sectional view; Fig. 14 a graphical representation of the dependence of a) the SPAD current and b) the ratio between SPAD current and Zener current as a function of the Zener blocking voltage at different SPAD blocking voltages (less than, equal to, greater than the breakdown voltage) within the entropy source from the Fig. 11 to 13; Fig. 15 a schematic representation of a quantum random generator with the entropy source from the Fig. 11 to 13; Fig. 16 a schematic representation of an exemplary layout of an integrated electronic circuit with the entropy source from the Fig. 11 to 13 and / or the quantum random generator from Fig. 15 in a plan view; and Fig. 17 a schematic representation of a system with the entropy source from the Fig. 11 to 13 and / or the quantum random generator from Fig. 15 and a crypto engine, optionally at least partially formed in the form of the microelectronic integrated circuit 500 from Fig. 16.

[0090] In the following figures, identical or similar elements in the various embodiments are designated by identical reference numerals for the sake of simplicity.

[0091] Fig. 1A schematically illustrates a computer-implemented method 100 for securing electronic communication with a communication partner according to an optional embodiment.

[0092] The method 100 comprises providing 102 at least one true random number by means of the quantum random number generator.

[0093] The method 100 further comprises generating 104 a cryptographic key based on the provided random number.

[0094] In addition, the method 100 comprises adapting 106 an encryption method for providing encrypted communication with the communication partner using the generated random number.

[0095] Furthermore, the method 100 comprises providing 108 information to the communication partner about the adaptation of the encryption method by means of a communication interface.

[0096] Furthermore, the method 100 comprises generating 110 a block 150a for confirming the adaptation of the encryption method for a blockchain and storing 112 the blockchain 150 with the block 150a in a data storage element 202. Generating 110 the block for confirming the adaptation of the encryption method for the at least one blockchain 150 may comprise generating a hash value for confirming the adaptation of the encryption method.

[0097] Furthermore, the method may include synchronizing and / or comparing 114 the blockchain 150 partially or completely with a copy of the blockchain of another participant of the blockchain, as well as assessing 116 a trustworthiness of the encryption method and / or the adaptation of the encryption method and / or the communication partner based on the synchronization and / or the comparison.

[0098] The communication partner may be another participant of the blockchain 150 and step 114 may include partially or completely synchronizing and / or comparing the blockchain with the copy of the communication partner's blockchain.

[0099] Furthermore, the method 100 may comprise preventing 118 communication with the communication partner and / or providing 120 information about an abnormality in the encryption method, provided that the assessment 116 of the trustworthiness of the encryption method and / or the adaptation of the encryption method and / or of the communication partner concludes that the trustworthiness of the encryption method and / or the adaptation of the encryption method and / or of the communication partner may have been compromised.

[0100] The electronic circuit 200 can further be configured to generate the block and / or the hash value for the blockchain in step 110 such that the block 150a and / or the hash value and optionally the entire blockchain 150 are encrypted and / or stored in encrypted form in the internal data storage element 202. The electronic circuit can further be configured to encrypt the block 150a and / or the hash value and / or the blockchain 150 using at least one of the random numbers provided by the random number generator and / or to store them in encrypted form.

[0101] The method 100 may further comprise, in a step 120, deleting the blockchain 150 with the blocks 150a for confirming the adaptation of the encryption method from the data storage element upon the occurrence of a predetermined event and replacing it with a new blockchain of shorter length and / or smaller data volume. The predetermined event may occur when the blockchain reaches a predetermined length and / or a predetermined data volume. Upon deleting the blockchain from the data storage element, the storage space occupied by the blockchain may be partially or completely released, optionally for storing the new blockchain.

[0102] Optionally, the method 100 includes a step 122 in which a block is generated for a parent blockchain to confirm the replacement of the blockchain with the new blockchain of smaller length and / or size, and the parent blockchain with the generated block is stored in the internal data storage element.

[0103] Steps 120 and 122 are shown schematically in Fig. 1B. Arrow 160 indicates the progress of the encryption adjustments and can be viewed as a timeline. A first blockchain 150 with blocks 150a and a second blockchain 152 with blocks 152a are used sequentially one after the other. When the first blockchain 150 reaches its end of use, it is deleted, and the second blockchain 152 continues to be used. The change between blockchains 150 and 152, and optionally the deletion of blockchain 150, is documented or confirmed in a block 154a of the parent blockchain 154.

[0104] Alternatively or additionally, the method 100 can generate the block 150a, 152a for confirming the adaptation of the encryption method as block 150a for a first blockchain 150 and as block 152a for a second blockchain 152 in step 110, and store the first blockchain 150 and the second blockchain 152 with the respectively generated block 150a, 152a in the internal data storage element 202 in step 112. In this case, the method 100 can use the first blockchain 150 and the second blockchain 152 in parallel with a temporally staggered start and end of use (see Fig. 1C). The first blockchain 150 and the second blockchain 152 can optionally each be used up to a predetermined length and / or up to a predetermined data volume, with the respective end of use occurring upon reaching the predetermined length and / or the predetermined data volume of the first blockchain 150 or second blockchain 152.

[0105] Upon reaching the end of use of the first blockchain, the method 100 can, in step 124, delete the first blockchain 150 and replace the first blockchain 150 with a new first blockchain (or a third blockchain) of shorter length and / or size, and upon reaching the end of use of the second blockchain, delete the second blockchain 152 and replace the second blockchain 152 with a new second blockchain (or a fourth blockchain) of shorter length and / or size. Replacing the blockchains with new blockchains does not necessarily have to occur immediately upon or after the deletion of the respective blockchain, but can occur at a later time, as long as the new blockchain is available at the end of use of the other blockchain or, optionally, before the beginning of the overlap area 170.

[0106] When deleting and replacing 124 the first blockchain 150 upon the occurrence of the end of use of the first blockchain 150, the method can continue to use the second blockchain 152, and when deleting and replacing 124 the second blockchain 152 upon the occurrence of the end of use of the second blockchain 152, the method can continue to use the new first blockchain 150 or a third blockchain. When deleting 124 the first and / or second blockchain 150, 152, the storage space occupied by the first or second blockchain 150, 152 in the data storage element 202 is released, optionally for a new first or second blockchain, or a third or fourth blockchain.

[0107] Step 124 is in Fig. 1C is schematically illustrated. Arrow 160 indicates the progress of the encryption adjustments and can be viewed as a timeline. A first blockchain 150 with blocks 150a and a second blockchain 152 with blocks 152a are used in parallel in an overlap area 170. When the first blockchain 150 reaches its end of use, it is deleted, and only the second blockchain 152 continues to be used. Furthermore, a third blockchain (not shown) can then be created, which can then continue to be used when the second blockchain 152 reaches its end of use, when the second blockchain is deleted. This development can be continued as often as desired, so that at least one blockchain is available at any time, and towards the end of the service life, another blockchain is ready to be replaced. The overlap area can optionally consist of only one block or be omitted entirely.

[0108] Fig. Figure 2 shows a schematic representation of an electronic circuit 200 according to an optional embodiment. The electronic circuit 200 includes a data storage element 202, a quantum random number generator 204, and a communication interface 206.

[0109] The electronic circuit 200 is configured to a) provide at least one true random number by means of the quantum random number generator 204.

[0110] Furthermore, the electronic circuit 200 is configured to b) generate a cryptographic key based on the provided random number and to provide it for adapting an encryption method for encrypted communication with a communication partner.

[0111] In addition, the electronic circuit 200 is configured to c) provide information to the communication partner about the adaptation of the encryption method via the communication interface 206; and d) generate a block for confirming the adaptation of the encryption method for a blockchain and store the blockchain with the block in the data storage element 202.

[0112] The electronic circuit 200 can be designed as an integrated electronic circuit.

[0113] The data storage element 202 can be integrated into the integrated electronic circuit 200 as an internal data storage element.

[0114] The quantum random number generator 204 and the communication interface 206 can be integrated into the integrated electronic circuit 200. The quantum random number generator 204 can include a monolithically integrated entropy source 208. The quantum random number generator 204 can be configured to provide random numbers with a data stream of at least 10 kbit / s, optionally at least 50 kbit / s, optionally at least 100 kbit / s, and optionally at least 500 kbit / s.

[0115] The data storage element 202 can be integrated into the electronic circuit 200 as a monolithically integrated data storage element 202. The data storage element 202 can be configured to provide a storage space of at least 10 kB and optionally a maximum of 2 MB for storing the at least one blockchain.

[0116] The electronic circuit 200 can be configured to repeatedly perform steps c) and d), optionally steps a) to d). The electronic circuit 200 can be configured to repeatedly perform the adaptation of the encryption method by repeatedly performing steps c) and d), optionally repeating steps a) to d). The electronic circuit 200 can be configured to repeatedly perform the adaptation of the encryption method at regular and / or irregular time intervals. The time intervals can be 48 hours or shorter, optionally 24 hours or shorter, optionally 12 hours or shorter, optionally 6 hours or shorter, optionally 3 hours or shorter, optionally 1 hour or shorter, optionally 30 minutes or shorter, optionally 10 minutes or shorter, optionally 5 minutes or shorter, optionally 2 minutes or shorter, and optionally 1 minute or shorter.The encryption method can be designed as a symmetric and / or asymmetric encryption method.

[0117] The electronic circuit 200 can be configured to perform a key selection and / or a key exchange, optionally a Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange, on the generated cryptographic key with the communication partner using the information provided to the communication partner about the adaptation of the encryption method by means of the communication interface 206.

[0118] The electronic circuit 200 may further be configured to generate the cryptographic key based on the at least one random number such that the cryptographic key has a length of at least 128 characters, optionally at least 256 characters, optionally at least 512 characters, optionally at least 1,024 characters, and optionally at least 2,048 characters.

[0119] The electronic circuit 200 is further configured to generate the cryptographic key on the basis of the at least one random number such that the random number used for this purpose and provided by the quantum random number generator 204 has a length of at least 16 bits, optionally at least 32 bits, optionally at least 64 bits, optionally at least 128 bits, optionally at least 256 bits, and optionally at least 512 bits.

[0120] The electronic circuit may further be configured to e) partially or completely synchronize the blockchain 150 with a copy of the blockchain 150 of another participant of the blockchain and / or to compare it with a copy of the blockchain of another participant of the blockchain 150 and to assess the trustworthiness of the encryption method and / or the adaptation of the encryption method and / or the communication partner on the basis of the synchronization and / or the comparison.

[0121] Fig. 3 shows a schematic representation of a computer-readable medium 300 comprising data 302 defining operating instructions adapted for controlling a semiconductor manufacturing apparatus such that the electronic circuit 200 is manufactured by the semiconductor manufacturing apparatus when the data is output to the semiconductor manufacturing apparatus.

[0122] The data 302 may include a digital representation of the electronic circuit 200 such that the operating instructions manufacture the integrated electronic circuit 200 using the digital representation when the data 302 is output to the semiconductor manufacturing apparatus.

[0123] The fabrication of the electronic circuit 200 by means of the device for semiconductor fabrication according to the operating instructions can comprise fabricating the electronic circuit 200 on a wafer in a semiconductor process, optionally in a CMOS semiconductor process, a BiCMOS semiconductor process, a semiconductor process for bipolar components, optionally using bipolar CMOS technology.

[0124] Fig. 4 schematically illustrates a computer-readable interface comprising an electronic circuit 200 according to an optional embodiment, wherein the computer-readable interface is configured to be connected to a computer 402 and, when connected to the computer 402, to provide a cryptographic key and / or to enable secure adaptation of an encryption method for communication between the computer and a communication partner 404 and / or to enable a secure communication connection with the communication partner 404. The communication partner 404 can be embodied as a computer and optionally have a similar computer-readable interface 400.

[0125] Fig. 5 shows a schematic representation of a motor vehicle 500 according to an optional embodiment, wherein the motor vehicle 500 has a control device 502 according to an optional embodiment. The control device 502 has an electronic circuit 200 according to the Fig. 2. The control device 502 can be configured to secure communication between the control device 502 and another component of the motor vehicle 500 and / or with an external communication partner by means of the electronic circuit 200.

[0126] Fig. 6 shows a Trusted Platform Module 600 according to an optional embodiment, wherein the Trusted Platform Module 600 comprises an electronic circuit 200 according to the Fig. 2 shown optional embodiment.

[0127] Fig. 7 shows a schematic representation of a computer network 700 according to an optional embodiment comprising a plurality of network nodes 702, wherein the plurality of network nodes 702 each have at least one electronic circuit 200 according to the Fig. 2, and wherein the computer network 700 is configured to enable encrypted communication between the network nodes 702 using the electronic circuits 200 of the respective network nodes 702. The network nodes can optionally be configured as computers.

[0128] Fig. Figure 8 shows a military unit 800 according to an optional embodiment with an electronic circuit 200 according to the Fig. 2 shown embodiment.

[0129] Fig. 9 schematically illustrates a manufacturing method 900 according to an optional embodiment for manufacturing an electronic circuit 200, characterized in that the method 900 comprises manufacturing 902 the electronic circuit 200 by means of a device for semiconductor manufacturing, optionally using a computer-readable medium according to the Fig. 3 shown embodiment.

[0130] The following description with reference to the Fig. Figures 10 to 16 describe a quantum random generator according to optional embodiments, as well as an entropy source according to optional embodiments, which may be included in the quantum random generator. Such a quantum random generator may be used in the disclosed and claimed subject matter, although this is not mandatory and the claimed subject matter is not limited to the described embodiments.

[0131] Fig. 10 shows a schematic representation of a (BCD) substrate 110* provided with a method for providing deep pn junctions 50* and 52* in a BCD process and a TCAD representation of the resulting dopant distribution.

[0132] The method for producing deep pn junctions 50* and 52* in a BCD process may include providing a carrier substrate 49*.

[0133] The method may include introducing a first dopant to form a first region 22* (e.g., NBL) of the first conductivity type (negative for NBL) into a surface S of the carrier substrate 49*.

[0134] The method may comprise introducing a second dopant to form a second region 32* (e.g., PBL) of the second conductivity type (positive for PBL) into the surface S of the carrier substrate 49*, wherein the first region 22* (NBL) and the second region 32* (PBL) at least partially overlap.

[0135] The method may comprise growing an epitaxial layer 48* on the surface S of the carrier substrate 49*, wherein the first region 22* (NBL) and the second region 32* (PBL) spread by diffusion of the first dopant and the second dopant in the epitaxial layer 48* and thereby form a (first) pn junction 50* located in the epitaxial layer 48*.

[0136] In the illustration, the first region 22* is a deep NBL layer, and the second region 32* is a deep PBL layer. However, the order can be reversed, so that the first region 22* can also be a deep PBL layer, and the second region 32* can be a deep NBL layer.

[0137] By adjusting the diffusion lengths of the individual dopants, the layer sequence of the pn junctions 50* and 52* can also be reversed, for example, Fig. 10* also the NBL and PBL layers at the pn junction 50* and 52* are swapped.

[0138] The method can offer the advantage that the first region 22* (NBL) and the second region 32* (PBL) at least partially overlap. Optionally, immediately after the introduction of the second dopant, in a plan view of the surface S of the carrier substrate 49*, the first region 22* or the second region 32* can completely overlap the other region 32*, 22*. Therefore, in the embodiment shown, immediately after the introduction of the second dopant to form the second region 32* (PBL), the second region 32* (PBL) lies completely in the first region 22* (NBL) in a plan view of the surface S of the carrier substrate 49*. In order to form a pn junction 50* located in the epitaxial layer, the first and second dopant can have different diffusion properties in the carrier substrate 49* and / or in the epitaxial layer 48*.Optionally, the second dopant in the second region 32* (PBL), as shown, may have a higher diffusion mobility (and thus diffusion length) in the carrier substrate 49* and in the epitaxial layer 48* than the first dopant in the first region 22* (NBL).

[0139] To enhance diffusion, the carrier substrate 49* can be heated after the introduction of the first dopant and / or the second dopant. After the growth of the epitaxial layer 48*, the carrier substrate 49* can be heated to enhance dopant diffusion.

[0140] In the presented method, the first dopant and / or the second dopant can be introduced either maskless or using a mask process. In the BCD wafer shown, a complete overlap of the first region 22* (NBL) with a single second region 32* (PBL) can be assumed. Conventionally, however, the first and second regions 22* and 32* are formed spatially separated from one another. In particular, their distance is generally chosen to be at least large enough that no overlapping regions are created even after the individual dopants have diffused out.

[0141] The TCAD (Technology Computer-Aided Design, TCAD) representation provided below the schematic diagram shows, by way of example, a dopant distribution within the contacted substrate 110* for simulating a corresponding integrated diode structure. Due to the double structure shown in this embodiment, with an upper pn junction 50* in the epitaxial layer 48* and a lower (second) pn junction 52* in the carrier substrate 49*, the side view shown results in an effective constriction of the n-type region (NBL) enclosed in the area of ​​the pn junctions 50* and 52* by the two p-type regions (PBL) surrounding this n-type region (NBL). Both pn junctions 50*, 52* can be configured to provide mutually independent SPADs with a doping density and field strength distribution suitable for generating an avalanche effect.

[0142] Using appropriate (semiconductor) substrates 110*, which are suitable for use in BCD technologies, particularly deep-lying SPADs (“deepSPADs”) can thus be created. Sufficient installation space remains above the provided SPADs for the integration of further optoelectronic components. Therefore, a Zener avLED formed above the deep-lying SPAD can be used to realize a particularly compact, vertically constructed entropy source 401*, in which individual photons 58* are emitted by the Zener avLED as photon sources 55* in the direction of the upper pn junction 50*, optionally vertically downwards, and are thus provided for detection by a SPAD formed as a single-photon detector 54* directly below the Zener avLED at the upper pn junction 50* (see Fig. 11 to 13 with corresponding figure descriptions).

[0143] Fig. 11 shows a schematic representation of an exemplary first embodiment of a (vertical) monolithically integrated entropy source 401*.

[0144] The entropy source 401* may include a substrate 110* with a carrier substrate 49* and an epitaxial layer 48*. The epitaxial layer 48* may include a first pn junction 50* and / or a third pn junction 554*. The carrier substrate 49* may include a second pn junction 52*.

[0145] The entropy source 401* comprises a photon source 55* configured to emit photons 58*. For this purpose, the photon source 55* comprises a third pn junction 554* formed from a third p-layer 46* and a third n-layer 45*, wherein the third p-layer 46* and the third n-layer 45* are in contact with one another. The photon source 55*, or more precisely its pn junction 554*, comprises a first outer shell, wherein the first outer shell is formed by a first base surface 551*, a first cover surface 552*, and at least one first side surface 553* connecting the first base surface 551* and the first cover surface 552*. The first base surface 551* can have the same surface area as the first cover surface 552*. The first base surface 551* may have a larger or smaller surface area than the first cover surface 552*.A normal vector perpendicular to the first base surface 551* can be parallel to a normal vector perpendicular to the first cover surface 552*. The third pn junction 554* can have a cylindrical shape. A height of the cylinder can be parallel to the normal vectors. The height of the cylinder can be smaller, optionally by a multiple, than a radius of the first base surface 551* and / or the first cover surface 552*. The third pn junction 554* can be a thin layer.

[0146] The entropy source 401* comprises a photon detector 54* configured to detect the photons 58* emitted by the photon source 55*. For this purpose, the photon detector 54* comprises a first pn junction 50* formed from a first p-layer 32* and a first n-layer 22*, wherein the first p-layer 32* and the first n-layer 22* are in contact with one another. The photon detector 54*, more precisely its first pn junction 50*, comprises a second outer shell, wherein the second outer shell is formed by a second base surface 541*, a second cover surface 542*, and at least one second side surface 543* connecting the second base surface 541* and the second cover surface 542*. The second base surface 541* may have the same surface area as the second cover surface 542*. The second base surface 541* may have a larger or smaller surface area than the first cover surface 542*.A normal vector perpendicular to the second base surface 541* can be parallel to a normal vector perpendicular to the second cover surface 542*. The first pn junction 50* can have a cylindrical shape. A height of the cylinder can be parallel to the normal vectors. The height of the cylinder can be smaller, optionally by a multiple, than a radius of the second base surface 541* and / or the second cover surface 542*. The first pn junction 50* can be a thin layer.

[0147] The first base surface 541* of the third pn junction 554* of the photon source 55* is arranged facing the second base surface 541* of the first pn junction of the photon detector 55*. This means that the normal vector perpendicular to the second base surface 541* is parallel to the normal vector perpendicular to the first base surface 551*. The distance between the first base surface 551* and the second base surface 541* is shorter than the distance between the first cover surface 552* and the second base surface 541*.

[0148] The photon source 55* can be a silicon LED and / or a single photon source, optionally a SPAD or an avalanche Zener diode, whereby the avalanche Zener diode optionally has a breakdown voltage of less than 10 V.

[0149] The photon detector 55* comprises an absorption region 10*, 47* configured and arranged to absorb the photons 58* emitted by the photon source 55* such that the absorption region 10*, 47* generates, optionally exactly, one electron-hole pair for each photon 58*. The absorption region 10*, 47* is in contact with the first pn junction 50* (and the third pn junction 554*). The first pn junction 50* is configured to generate a charge avalanche due to the generated electron-hole pair. The photon detector 54* is configured to detect the respective photon 58* emitted by the photon source 55* based on the generated charge avalanche.

[0150] The photon detector 54* may comprise a single-photon detector, optionally a single-photon avalanche diode, optionally a SPAD.

[0151] The absorption region 10*, 47* comprises or consists of a p-doped substrate which completely covers the surface facing the photon source 55*, ie the second base surface 541*, of the first pn junction 50*.

[0152] The absorption region 10*, 47* is in contact with the photon source 55*, here the p-doped substrate 46* of the third pn junction 554* of the photon source 55*.

[0153] The photon detector 55* comprises a second pn junction 52* formed from a second p-layer 32* and the first n-layer 22*, wherein the second p-layer 32* and the first n-layer 22* are in contact with each other.

[0154] The entropy source 401* comprises a metal layer 53*, optionally together with an internal silicide layer or a silicide layer facing towards a surface O, which shields the entropy source 401* from the outside.

[0155] The entropy source 401* may comprise at least two anodes 124*, 134* for the photon source 55* and the photon detector 54*, which may be conductively connected to one another via the metal layer 53*.

[0156] The photon source 55* and / or the photon detector 54*, optionally the entropy source 401* as a whole, can be rotationally symmetrical along an axis. The axis can run parallel to the above-described normal vectors, which are perpendicular to the first and / or second base surfaces 541*, 551* and / or perpendicular to the surface O.

[0157] The entropy source 401* can be manufactured using BCD technology.

[0158] An upper and / or lower side of the entropy source 401* can be mirrored at least in the region of the photon source 55* and / or the photon detector 54* and / or comprise a light-blocking layer.

[0159] During operation of the entropy source 401*, photons 58* can be emitted at the third pn junction 554* of the photon source 55* at random time intervals, so that the photons 58* leave the third pn junction 554* of the photon source 55* via its first base area 551* in the direction of the second base area 541* of the first pn junction of the photon detector 54*, form an electron-hole pair in the absorption region 10*, 47* and trigger a charge avalanche at the first pn junction 50*.

[0160] In detail, the vertical entropy source 401*, as defined in the document presented here, can be characterized by a vertical arrangement of the photon source 55* relative to the photon detector 54*. The horizontal is defined by the surface O of the semiconductor substrate 110* with the epitaxial layer 48*. The connecting line of the centers of gravity of the vertical arrangement of the photon source 55* and the photon detector 54* is thus arranged vertically relative to the surface O of the substrate 49* with the epitaxial layer 48*, where vertical here can be understood as a relatively soft angle of more than 30°, optimally 90°, of this line relative to the surface O. The monolithically integrated entropy source 401* shown comprises the photon source 55* and the photon detector 54*, wherein the photon source 55* and the photon detector 54* can be arranged vertically one above the other in a common substrate 110* made of a semiconductor material.Optionally, the photon source 55* is a single-photon source configured to provide only a single photon or a few photons 58* at a time (so-called single-photon source). Optionally, the photon source 55* is a light-emitting avalanche Zener diode (Zener-avLED) operating at an operating point below or near the breakdown voltage. Optionally, the photon detector 54* is a single-photon detector, such as a single-photon avalanche diode.

[0161] The entropy source 401* may be formed in a (BCD) substrate 110* using BCD technology. The substrate 110* may include the carrier substrate 49* and the epitaxial layer 48* grown on the carrier substrate 49*. The pn junctions 50*, 52* may be formed as described with reference to Fig. 10. The photon detector 55* can comprise an avalanche region formed in a region around the upper pn junction 50* of the photon detector 54* and an absorption region 10*, 47* with a high-voltage p-type well 10* and a p-type well 47* for converting photons into electron-hole pairs, wherein the absorption region 10*, 47* can directly adjoin the regions 22*, 32* forming the deep pn junction 50*. The fully formed high-voltage p-type well 10* can enable optimal connection of the deep pn junction 50* from the anode 124*, 134*.

[0162] The upper deep pn junction 50* of the photon detector 54* can be formed between a deep n-layer 22*, which serves or acts as a cathode 132*, and a deep p-layer 32* directly adjacent to the deep n-layer 22*. The absorption region 10*, 47* can directly adjoin the deep p-layer 32* and can essentially be formed as a p-region (optionally comprising an intrinsic region). The anode 46* (p-) of the uppermost or third pn junction 554* can be connected via the p-region 47* to a p+ region 51*, wherein the anode 32* of the middle or second pn junction 50* can also be connected via the region 10* and the region 47* to the p+ region 51*.

[0163] In the illustrated embodiment, the respective anodes 124*, 134* of the photon source 55* and the photon detector 54* are combined. These can then be electrically contacted, for example, via the shared metallization 53* on the surface O of the substrate 110*. A shared and continuous metallization 53* can also provide shielding against the radiation of electromagnetic waves from above. The associated cathodes 122*, 132* are each individually designed, for example, and can be electrically contacted via a first associated further metallization 141*.

[0164] The entropy source 401* can be designed as a circular structure (corresponding to a spatial rotation of the shown representation plane around an imaginary central axis in the vertical direction). However, other designs of the entropy source 401* are also possible.

[0165] Fig. 12 shows a schematic representation of an exemplary second embodiment of the entropy source 401*. Fig. 12 corresponds largely to the embodiment shown in the Fig. 11 and described above. The reference numerals and their respective assignment to individual features therefore apply accordingly.

[0166] In the second embodiment, the absorption region 10*, 47*, which has the p-doped substrate, is formed such that it only partially covers the surface or second base area 541* of the first pn junction 50* facing in the direction of the photon source 55* and forms a channel extending from this second base area 541* of the first pn junction 50* in the direction of the photon source 55*, which channel is laterally delimited by an n-doped substrate 29*.

[0167] This means that, in comparison to the first embodiment, the high-voltage p-well 10* is structurally tapered and an additional (weakly) n-doped region 29* is provided. The high-voltage p-well 10* of the absorption region 10*, 47* forms a channel between the Fig. 11 and the (deep-lying) p-layer 32* of the second pn junction 50*. The channel's surroundings are defined by the (lightly) n-doped region 29*. Through the channel, the deep-lying upper pn junction 50* is electrically connected to the upper pn junction 45*, 46* without an additional punch through the n-doped region 29* and is irradiated with photons 58* by the photon source 54*.

[0168] Fig. 13 shows a schematic representation of an exemplary third embodiment of the entropy source 401*. The third embodiment shown largely corresponds to the one shown in the Fig. 11 and Fig. 12 and described above. The reference numerals and their respective assignment to individual features therefore apply accordingly.

[0169] However, the absorption region 10*, 47* has (or consists of) an n-doped substrate 29* which completely covers the base surface 541* of the first pn junction 50* facing the photon source 55*.

[0170] In comparison to the second embodiment, the third embodiment does not include a channel-shaped high-voltage p-well 10* in the absorption region 10*, 47*. The weakly n-doped region 29* formed in the epitaxial layer 48* extends over the entire lower region between the second pn junction 50* and the photon source 54*. In this respect, compared to the second embodiment, the high-voltage p-well 10* in this region has been structurally replaced by the (weakly) n-doped region 29*. The deep upper pn junction 50* is thus only connected to the photon source 54* after an additional punch through the weakly n-doped region 29*, which results in a decoupling of possibly several entropy sources 401* arranged side by side in parallel.

[0171] Fig. Figure 14 shows a graphical representation of the dependence of a) the SPAD current and b) the ratio between SPAD current and Zener current as a function of the Zener reverse voltage at various SPAD reverse voltages (less than, equal to, or greater than the breakdown voltage) within the entropy source 401*. The dependence shown under a) clearly shows that the SPAD current increases exponentially with the Zener reverse voltage in the range from 5.6 V to 6.6 V. This applies to all operating modes of the SPAD, i.e., below its own breakdown voltage (< VBD, linear range), close to the breakdown voltage (~ VBD, avalanche range), as well as above the breakdown voltage (> VBD), and thus also in Geiger operation.

[0172] The lower curve shown under b) (< VBD) shows that the measured current ratio between the SPAD current and the Zener current for various Zener reverse voltages in the range 5.8 to 6.6 V is approximately 1:4000. In the SPAD breakdown voltage range (~ VBD), the ratio increases to values ​​around 1:10. This is due to the so-called multiplication factor of the SPAD, which leaves the linear range in the breakdown voltage range. The upper curve shows the corresponding ratio for the SPAD operated above the corresponding breakdown voltage (> VBD) (approximately 1:1). This means that when the SPAD is operated above the corresponding breakdown voltage (> VBD), the generated photocurrent and the Zener current of the Zener avLED are approximately equal, and a clear measurement signal can be measured by coupling photons to the SPAD.

[0173] Fig. 15 shows a schematic representation of a quantum random number generator 400* for generating and outputting a digital random number sequence, e.g. in the form of a random bit stream ZBS (see also Fig. 17) and / or, optionally by means of a finite state machine 404.8*, a random bit data word 418*.

[0174] The quantum random generator 400* is described in more detail below.

[0175] The quantum random number generator 400* includes the entropy source 401* described above. The entropy source 401* of the quantum random number generator 400* can be supplied via a supply voltage line V ENT , which can be connected to a voltage converter 408*, ​​is supplied with a voltage relative to a reference potential on a reference potential line GND.

[0176] An output signal or voltage signal 405* generated by the entropy source 401* can be used in an analog-to-digital converter (ADC) 403*, which can optionally be connected via a reference voltage line V REF can be supplied, is first digitized and passed as a digital output signal 407* to a pulse extension circuit 406*.

[0177] The output signal 405* of the entropy source 401* can be obtained, for example, by positively biasing the region 45* relative to the region 51* (via breakdown voltage). This enables the third pn junction 554* to emit the photons 58*. The region 22* is positively biased relative to the region 32* (in reverse direction). If the third pn junction 554* emits a photon 58* and this photon 58* is detected by the second pn junction 50*, then a current pulse can be tapped at the cathode 132*, which in turn can be converted into a voltage pulse. This voltage pulse can correspond to the output signal 405* of the entropy source 401*.

[0178] The supply voltage line V ENT and / or the reference voltage line V REFcan be monitored via a voltage monitor 413*, whereby the voltage converter 408* and / or the voltage monitor 413* can be supplied with voltage via a positive supply voltage line VDD relative to the reference potential on the reference potential line GND. The voltage converter 408* can be connected to the voltage monitor 413* via a voltage converter line 421*.

[0179] Pulse extension circuit 406* may be a monostable multivibrator (MF). The monostable multivibrator can be used to extend a pulse on the digital output signal line 407* of ADC 403* depending on a specific predefined system clock, for example, to a time length of at least one clock period of the system clock.

[0180] A synchronized voltage signal 415*, e.g., a pulse with a certain minimum length, can be output by the pulse extension circuit 406* and optionally passed to a pseudorandom number generator 404.3*.

[0181] The pseudorandom number generator 404.3* can be a time-to-pseudorandom number converter (TPRC). This can be a single-stage or multi-stage converter. For example, the TPRC can comprise an analog instrument, a time-to-analog converter (TAC), and / or an analog-to-pseudorandom number converter (APRC). The TPRC can comprise a feedback shift register that, depending on its design, shifts its values ​​one place to the left or right with each clock pulse of the system clock and feeds the feedback value of a predefined feedback polynomial into the released bit. The feedback polynomial can be a simple primitive feedback polynomial. One advantage of such a TPRC is its speed and small chip area, as well as the fact that it is difficult for an attacker to measure its success.Instead of the TPRC, a time-to-digital converter (TDC) can also be used. This typically consists of a binary start-stop counter that is started with a first pulse of the synchronized voltage signal 415* and stopped with a second pulse of the synchronized voltage signal 415*. The pseudorandom number generator 404.3* can be connected (optionally directly) to an internal data bus 419*. An output signal 410* of the pseudorandom number generator 404.3* can also be fed to an entropy extraction unit 404.4*.

[0182] To generate the output signal 410* of the pseudorandom number generator 404.3*, starting with a starting value (a so-called seed value) of the pseudorandom number generator 404.3*, exactly one pseudorandom number of the pseudorandom number generator 404.3* can be assigned (bijectively) to each clock pulse of the system clock starting from a falling edge of the synchronized voltage signal 415*, ie the time position of the relevant clock pulse of the system clock after the falling edge of the synchronized voltage signal 415* can then be deduced from the value of the pseudorandom number.

[0183] Thus, a pseudorandom number generator 404.3* can be used. One advantage of this can be that even if an attacker successfully introduces a disturbance into the synchronized voltage signal 415*, the randomness of the quantum random bit at the output 411* of the entropy extraction 404.4* is only marginally disturbed, since the attacker would have to know the corresponding feedback polynomial of the pseudorandom number generator 404.3*. The feedback polynomial can, for example, be randomly selected from a multitude of possibilities. The same applies to the seed value of the pseudorandom number generator 404.3*, which an attacker would then also have to determine. A further advantage of a pseudorandom number generator 404.3* instead of a simple digital counter is the smaller space requirement of the feedback logic using a simple primitive feedback polynomial compared to a binary counter.If the linear feedback shift register of the pseudorandom number generator is long enough, each clock pulse between two pulses of the voltage signal 405* generated by the entropy source 401* is typically assigned a unique pseudorandom number.

[0184] Entropy extraction 404.4* can be used to detect an error (i.e., an undesired state) in the output signal 410* of pseudorandom number generator 404.3*. For this purpose, entropy extraction 404.4* can comprise two linear feedback shift registers that can be compared with one another via a comparator. Conventional binary counters can therefore be dispensed with here as well. Depending on the register depth, feedback can also be achieved via simple primitive polynomials as generator polynomials or feedback polynomials. The length of the linear feedback shift registers can be freely adjustable. Long shift registers generally exhibit good random statistics or random distribution. Shorter shift registers permit a high data rate. The use of shift registers here can have the advantage that few gates are required, the logical depth of the circuits can be small, and thus the clock rate can be high.This makes the probability of two identical numbers occurring low and the random bit rate high.

[0185] A corresponding method for entropy extraction can provide that two values ​​of the output signal 410* of the pseudorandom number generator 404.3* are first determined and stored in the shift register of the entropy extraction 404.4*. If two values ​​are stored in the shift register of the entropy extraction 404.4*, the entropy extraction 404.4* can compare these two values. The values ​​in the shift registers of the entropy extraction 404.4* thus include a first value and a second value, both of which were determined by the pseudorandom number generator 404.3*. The entropy extraction 404.4* can then evaluate the two values. If the first value is smaller than the second value and the difference between the first value and the second value is greater than a minimum difference ε, the entropy extraction 404.4* can set the value of its output 411* to a first logical value.If the first value is greater than the second value and the difference between the first value and the second value is greater than the minimum difference ε, the entropy extraction 404.4* can set its output 411* to a second logical value that is different from the first logical value. If the difference between the first value and the second value is less than the minimum difference ε, the entropy extraction 404.4* can discard the first value and the second value. In such a case, the entropy extraction 404.4* can cause a so-called watchdog 404.5* to increment an error counter by a first error counter increment. The first error counter increment can be negative. Conversely, the entropy extraction 404.4* can decrement the error counter of the watchdog 404.5* by a second error counter increment if the difference between the first value and the second value is greater than the minimum difference ε.The second error counter step size can be equal to the first error counter step size. The respective logical value (e.g., 0 or 1) to which the entropy extraction 404.4* sets its output 411* corresponds to a random number. Since the entropy extraction 404.4* continuously outputs random numbers via its output, this creates a random number stream ZBS. This random number stream ZBS can be used for a crypto engine 800*, as described in more detail later.

[0186] The watchdog 404.5* can be connected to the internal data bus 419* as a transport medium for the random bit stream ZBS. The internal data bus 419* can, for example, be connected to a crypto engine 800* and / or one or more memories and / or one or more CPUs (see also the description of Fig. 17). The watchdog 404.5* can be connected to the voltage monitor 413* via one or more, optionally digital input / output signal lines 414*. The watchdog 404.5* can monitor voltage values ​​determined by the voltage monitor 413*. The voltage monitor 413* can be configured to determine and / or monitor one or more voltages in the quantum random number generator 400*, and optionally also one or more voltages within a respective application circuit, such as the crypto engine 800* and / or a system 1000*. The voltage monitor 413* can be, for example, an ADC.

[0187] One task of watchdog 404.5* can be to monitor the entropy quality of the random numbers at output 411* of entropy extraction 404.4*, which form the random bit stream ZBS. Watchdog 404.5* can be configured to detect at least three defined error cases. Watchdog 404.5* can forward valid quantum random bits 411*, generating a seed value S, via a line 412* to a (backup) pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) 404.6*, which can have another linear feedback shift register. Watchdog 404.5* can prevent the use of the valid quantum random bits by a finite state machine 404.8*. This is connected here, for example, to the internal data bus 419*. If an error occurs, the Watchdog 404.5* can set certain error bits for further evaluation, which another bus participant (e.g.a microcontroller (MCU)) can read and / or write via an external data bus DB, a data bus interface DBIF and the internal data bus 419*.

[0188] For example, if the watchdog 404.5* detects an error in the quantum random number generator 400*, it can place the quantum random number generator 400* into an emergency mode. To do this, the watchdog 404.5* can, for example, B. set a selection signal 416* of a signal multiplexer 404.7* downstream of the random number generation such that the signal multiplexer 404.7* applies the pseudorandom number PRN of the optional PRNG 404.6* in the form of a stream of pseudorandom bits via a pseudorandom signal line 417* to the input of the finite state machine 404.8* instead of the random numbers RN at the output 411* of the entropy extraction 404.4* as a replacement for the at least potentially erroneous random number RN of the output 411* of the entropy extraction 404.4*.

[0189] The optional additional linear feedback shift register of the PRNG 404.6* can be configured to generate pseudorandom numbers PRN. The seed value S can contain the last valid quantum random bits of the output 411* of the entropy extraction 404.4*. The watchdog 404.5* can then apply or output these last valid quantum random bits 411* to the input of the optional PRNG 404.6*. The seed value S can thus be used as a random, secure starting value for a generator polynomial of the feedback of the optional additional linear feedback shift register of the PRNG 404.6* for generating the pseudorandom number PRN and signaling it via the pseudorandom signal line 417*. The generator polynomial and the degree of the generator polynomial can be freely selected. The optional backup pseudo-random number generator 404.6* can enable the provision of secure random numbers, at least temporarily, in the event of an error.

[0190] The finite-state machine 404.8* can be configured to receive the random numbers forming the random bit stream ZBS or, optionally, the pseudorandom number PRN (optionally at the output of the signal multiplexer 404.7*) and, based thereon, to generate at least one quantum random data word 418*. Optionally, via a pseudorandom signal line 417*, the quantum random data word 418* can be written by the machine 404.8* into a memory 404.9*, optionally a volatile memory (RAM) or a FIFO (First In - First Out) memory. It is conceivable that the machine 404.8* sets a finish flag 404.10* via the internal data bus 419* as soon as the quantum random data word 418* has been written into the memory 404.9*. A processor (MCU) can then access memory 404.9*, for example, and read the quantum random data word 418* and use it, for example, for encryption.This means that in addition to or alternatively to the random bit data stream ZBS, the crypto engine 800* (see . Fig. 17) can also use the quantum random data word 418* for encryption. The description below with reference to the random bit data stream ZBS therefore applies analogously to the quantum random data word 418*.

[0191] Fig. 16 shows a schematic representation of an exemplary layout of an integrated electronic circuit 500* with the quantum random number generator 400* with the entropy source 401* in a pad frame 503* in a top view.

[0192] The integrated electronic circuit 500*, for example, a microcontroller with a CPU, may have an inner region 505*. Subcircuits of the integrated electronic circuit 500* may be located in the inner region 505*.

[0193] The inner region 505* may be surrounded by a wiring region 504*. Supply voltage lines, data bus lines, and / or other lines may be routed or located in the wiring region 504*.

[0194] The wiring area 504* and the inner area 505* of the integrated electronic circuit 500* may be surrounded by a pad frame 503* (also referred to as a pad edge). The pad frame 503* may include connection pads 502* (optionally for electrical bonds and / or other electrical connections).

[0195] The entropy source 401* and / or the quantum random number generator 400* can be arranged entirely or at least substantially in the pad frame 503*, more precisely between at least two connection pads 502*. This may be possible because gaps between the individual connection pads 502* cannot be filled with electronic circuit components. However, these gaps must still be processed during the manufacture of the integrated electronic circuit 500* and can therefore incur manufacturing costs. Placing the entropy source 401* and / or the quantum random number generator 400* entirely or at least substantially in the pad frame 503* can therefore reduce the additional costs for their provision.

[0196] At least the photon source 55* and / or the photon detector 54* can be placed or arranged in the pad frame 503* (optionally between two connection pads 502*). Furthermore, the ADC 403*, the voltage converter 408* for powering the entropy source 403*, the pulse extension circuit 406*, and / or other analog components of the quantum random generator 400* can be placed in the pad frame 503* (optionally between two connection pads 502*).

[0197] Fig. 17 shows a schematic representation of a system for encrypted communication 1000* with a quantum random number generator, optionally the quantum random number generator 400* described above, a crypto engine 800* and a data interface 600*.

[0198] The system 1000* is connected to an external data processing device or an external computer system 700*, optionally a microprocessor or an MCU, via the data interface 600* and a data bus 601*.

[0199] The quantum random number generator 400* has at least the entropy source 401* described above. The quantum random number generator 400* can be the quantum random number generator 400* described above, ie the quantum random number generator 400* can, in addition to the entropy source 401*, have one or more of the sources described above with reference to Fig. 14. The above description also applies analogously to the system 1000*. Insofar as individual units of the quantum random number generator 400* are related to Fig. 17 below, this description also applies to the quantum random number generator 400* described above.

[0200] The quantum random number generator 400* is configured to output the random bit data stream ZBS generated as described above to the crypto engine 800*.

[0201] The crypto engine 800* can be configured to encrypt a first random bit portion of the random bit data stream ZBS into an encrypted random bit data stream VZS. For this purpose, the crypto engine 800* can use a key that can be stored in a memory 801* of the crypto engine 800*.

[0202] The MCU 700* may be configured to retrieve encrypted random bits as encrypted random numbers via the data bus 601* and the data interface 600*.

[0203] The crypto engine 800* may be configured to decrypt encrypted commands from the external computer system 700* to the system 1000*, which the MCU 700* outputs to the system 1000* via the data bus 601* and the interface 600*.

[0204] The crypto engine 800* can be configured to output the decrypted commands to the system 1000* or to use them itself if the crypto engine 800* itself is the recipient of such a decrypted command. This allows the MCU 700* to securely control the system 1000*.

[0205] The watchdog 404.5* or a similar device may be configured to monitor an entropy of the random bit stream ZBS, an operating voltage of the entropy source 401* and / or the voltage converter 408*, ​​which provides the supply voltage VSUP for the entropy source 401*, an externally applied supply voltage and / or a supply voltage device CLV for supply voltage of the digital device parts for correct function or correct values.

[0206] Further monitoring circuits 1001* may be configured to detect further anomalies.

[0207] A voltage pre-regulator 1002* may be configured to supply additional voltage regulators with electrical energy and to keep the current constant (to exclude side channels via the power consumption).

[0208] A test interface 1003* can enable a manufacturing test.

[0209] That means, Fig. Figure 17 shows a schematic representation of a system for encrypted communication 1000* with a quantum random number generator, optionally the quantum random number generator 400* described above, a crypto engine 800*, and a data interface 600*. The system 100* is connected to an external data processing device, optionally a microprocessor or MCU 700*, via the data interface 600* and a data bus 601*. The quantum random number generator 400* has at least the entropy source 401* described above.

[0210] In detail, the quantum random number generator 400* generates a random bit stream ZBS of random bits that are used in the crypto engine 800* for key generation and / or other cryptographic operations. The entropy source 401* described above enables a high random bit rate in the random bit stream ZBS, which improves the security of the cryptographic operations of the crypto engine 800*.

[0211] The Quantum Random Number Generator 400* can enable a high random bit rate, which can form the basis for secure cryptographic operations. This high random bit rate can significantly increase security against quantum attacks. The high random bit rate can ensure high security and efficiency by forming the basis for fast and secure key generation and encryption operations.

[0212] The crypto engine 800* can have an encryption unit 801* configured to generate at least one cryptographic key based on a first random bit portion of the random bit stream ZBS. The encryption unit 801* can be configured to encrypt data that the system 1000* sends to other bus users via a data bus 600* in the form of an output data stream VZS based on the generated key. Encryption can be performed in the crypto engine 800* using a computer- and / or machine-implemented algorithm.

[0213] The Crypto Engine 800* can optionally be implemented entirely as a computer-implemented device.

[0214] The crypto engine 800* may have a memory 802*. The computer-implemented encryption algorithm, more precisely the program code, may be stored in the memory 801*, at least temporarily.

[0215] The crypto engine 800* may include a CPU 803*. When executing the computer-implemented algorithm, the CPU 803* may execute the algorithm's program code stored in memory 802*. This may result in a technical effect in the form of secure encryption of data that the system 1000* sends to another bus participant (e.g., the MCU 700*) via the data bus 601*. The CPU 803* is not to be understood exclusively as a component of the crypto engine 800*, but may also be part of the system 1000* and / or the quantum random number generator 400*.

[0216] The data sent or output by system 1000* may include a second random bit portion of random bit stream ZBS. The intersection of the first set of the first random bit portion of random bit stream ZBS and the second set of the second random bit portion of random bit stream ZBS may be empty or zero, so that no random bits are sent from system 1000* to other bus devices (e.g., MCU 700*) of data bus 601* that system 1000* used to encrypt the data.

[0217] The quantum random number generator 400* can have an entropy module—also called a watchdog 404.5*—which can be configured to monitor the entropy of the random bits of the random bit stream ZBS generated by the quantum random number generator 400* or of random data derived therefrom. The entropy module 404.5* can be configured to determine and / or monitor a measured value for a predetermined parameter of the entropy of the random bits of the random bit stream ZBS. Such measured values ​​can be, for example, a mean value, a standard deviation, etc. The entropy module 404.5* can be configured to compare the measured value with a permissible value range and to take a predetermined countermeasure if the measured value lies outside the permissible value range. In this way, the entropy module 404.5* ensure that sufficient randomness is present to guarantee secure cryptographic operations using the random bits of the random bit stream ZBS. If necessary, the entropy module 404.5* can also require reasonable deviations from randomness from a security-practical perspective. For example, it can invert the random bit stream ZBS for the subsequent random bits of the random bit stream ZBS whenever the quantum random number generator 400* has generated a predetermined number of consecutive random bits in the random bit stream ZBS with the same logical content. Optionally, this function of deliberately deviating from an ideal random bit stream ZBS can be switched on and off via the data interface 601* of the system 1000* using an encrypted write command to a register or a flag of the quantum random number generator 400* or one of its device components. The entropy module 404.5* can perform this monitoring using a computer- and / or machine-implemented algorithm. The program code of the computer-implemented algorithm can be stored in a memory 404.9* of the quantum random number generator 400*. The program code can be executed by a CPU of the quantum random number generator 400 or the system 1000*. The use of an entropy module 404.5* can provide the advantage of increased security of the cryptographic processes of the crypto engine 800* and improved usability of the random bits of the random bit stream ZBS of the quantum random number generator 400*.

[0218] The quantum random number generator 400* can include a filter module—also referred to as entropy extraction 404.4*. The filter module 404.4* of the quantum random number generator 400* can be configured to improve the statistical properties of the random bits of the random bit stream ZBS by removing systematic patterns and / or ensuring the uniform distribution of the random bits. A computer- and / or machine-implemented algorithm can also be used here (whereby the above description with regard to the algorithms applies analogously). Optionally, the filter module is part of a control logic. The filter module 404.4* can offer the advantage of optimizing the random bits of the random bit stream ZBS for cryptographic applications. Optionally, the filter module 404.5* comprise a digital high-pass filter which limits the ideal white noise of an ideal random bit data stream towards low frequencies, which has the effect of avoiding too many consecutive random bits in the random bit stream ZBS of the same logical content.

[0219] The system 100* can comprise an interface unit—also referred to as a data bus interface 600*—which can be configured to enable encrypted communication between the system 1000*, more specifically the crypto engine 800*, and an external system connected as bus participants to a common data bus 601*. The interface unit 600* can be configured to support at least one or more different communication protocols. This can enable the use of the system 1000* in different networks. Optionally, the interface unit 600* can be configured for this purpose via a voltage level at designated external terminals and / or via special cryptographic commands. The interface unit 600* can ensure that encrypted data VZS can be securely transmitted by the system 1000* and thus by the crypto engine 800*.The control of the communication protocols can comprise a computer- and / or machine-implemented algorithm (whereby the above description with regard to the algorithms applies analogously) and / or software programs (unless explicitly stated otherwise herein, computer-implemented also means machine-implemented). This allows secure data transmission between quantum random number generator 400* and / or crypto engine 800* and / or other bus participants (e.g., MCU 700*) of the shared data bus 601* to be achieved.The data that the system 1000* and / or the crypto engine 800* transmits as part of the system 1000* to other bus participants 700* of the data bus 601* can again comprise the said second random bit portion of the random bits of the random bit stream ZBS of the quantum random number generator 400* and / or status information of the quantum random number generator 400* and / or its device parts and / or status information of the crypto engine 800* and / or status information of other device parts of the system 1000*. The data that the system 1000* and / or the crypto engine 800* receive from other bus participants (e.g. MCU 700*) via the data bus 601* may again include the said control data for configuring the quantum random number generator 400* and / or the crypto engine 800*.

[0220] The system 1000* and / or the crypto engine 800* and / or the quantum random number generator 400* may include one or more CPU cores and / or one or more memories in which program code for a computer- and / or machine-implemented emulation of device parts of the system 1000* and / or the crypto engine 800* and / or the quantum random number generator 400* and / or other device parts of the system 1000* is stored, at least temporarily.

[0221] During operation of the system 1000*, the quantum random number generator 400* can continuously generate random bits of the random bit stream ZBS.

[0222] The generated random bits can be monitored by the entropy module 404.5* to ensure that they actually have sufficient entropy.

[0223] The monitored random bits can be filtered by the filter module 404.4*, optionally to ensure that they do not contain any systematic patterns, are evenly distributed and / or do not include any random structures that could ultimately result in the random sending of messages in plaintext over a certain period of time.

[0224] The first random bit portion of the filtered random bits can be supplied to the encryption unit 801* of the crypto engine 800*, which uses the random bits of the first filtered random bit portion to generate cryptographic keys and / or to encrypt data of the system 1000*.

[0225] The interface unit 600* can ensure the secure transmission of encrypted data to external systems or other bus devices (e.g. MCU 700) of the external data bus 601*.

[0226] The cooperation of these device components can ensure high security of the System 1000* and the Crypto Engine 800*, since the generated random bits are highly random and the cryptographic operations are therefore very difficult to compromise.

[0227] The crypto engine 800* may include a key management unit 804*. The key management unit 804* may be configured to manage the generated cryptographic keys, store them, and / or make them available to the required processes or units that require them. This has the advantage of securely managing the keys of the crypto engine 800*.

[0228] The system 1000* may include a line control unit configured to monitor signals on communication lines running between the various modules of the system 1000* and / or the crypto engine 800*. This can ensure that data integrity is maintained.

[0229] The performance control unit can be part of a so-called watchdog of the System 1000*, which monitors the correct functioning of the System 1000* (health check) and, if necessary, detects attacks or measures the probability of an attack currently taking place and, if necessary, determines a corresponding measured value.

[0230] It is conceivable that the crypto engine 800* is implemented as a post-quantum crypto engine or includes one. The crypto engine 800* can thus be protected against attacks by quantum computers and, if applicable, modern artificial intelligence algorithms. The crypto engine 800* and / or the system 1000* can include a post-quantum coprocessor 805* for this purpose. The post-quantum coprocessor PQK can be defined as a special processor designed to execute computer- and / or machine-implemented post-quantum cryptography algorithms. Optionally, the post-quantum coprocessor 805* is a device part of the crypto engine 800*. The post-quantum coprocessor 805* can also be a device part of the system 1000* and interact with the crypto engine 800*. This allows for increased resistance to quantum attacks.

[0231] The Crypto Engine 800* and / or the System 1000* may use one or more of the following methods for PQC encryption: ‚BIKE1-L1-CPA‘, ‚BIKE1-L3-CPA‘, ‚BIKE1-L1-FO‘, ‚BIKE1-L3-FO‘, ‚Kyber512‘, ‚Kyber768‘, ‚Kyber1024‘, ‚Kyber512-90s‘, ‚Kyber768-90s‘, ‚Kyber1024-90s‘, ‚LEDAcryptKEM-LT12‘, ‚LEDAcrypt-KEM-LT32‘, ‚LEDAcryptKEM-LT52‘, ‚NewHope-512-CCA‘, ‚NewHope-1024-CCA‘, ‚NTRU-HPS-2048-509‘, ‚NTRU-HPS-2048-677‘, ‚NTRU-HPS-4096-821‘, ‚NTRU-HRSS-701‘, ‚LightSaber-KEM‘, ‚Saber-KEM‘, ‚FireSaber-KEM‘, ‚BabyBear‘, ‚BabyBearEphem‘, ‚Mama-Bear‘, ‚MamaBearEphem‘, ‚PapaBear‘, ‚PapaBearEphem‘, ,FrodoKEM-640-AES', ‚FrodoKEM-640-SHAKE‘, ‚FrodoKEM-976-AES‘, ‚FrodoKEM-976-SHAKE‘, ‚FrodoKEM-1344-AES‘, ‚FrodoKEM-1344-SHAKE‘, ‚SIDH-p434‘, ‚SIDH-p503‘, ‚SIDH-p610‘, ,SIDH-p751', ‚SIDH-p434-compressed‘, ‚SIDH-p503-compressed‘, ‚SIDH-p610-compressed‘, ‚SIDH-p751-compressed‘, ‚SIKE-p434‘, ‚SIKE-p503‘, ‚SIKE-p610‘, ‚SIKE-p751‘, ‚SIKE-p434-compressed‘, ‚SIKE-p503-compressed‘, ‚SIKE-p610-compressed‘, ‚SIKE-p751-compressed‘.

[0232] The Crypto Engine 800* and / or the System 1000* can use one or more of the following PQC signature methods for signing data messages: ‚DILITHIUM_2‘, ‚DILITHIUM_3‘, ‚DILITHIUM_4‘, ‚MQDSS-31-48‘, MQDSS-31-64', SPHINCS+-Haraka-128f-robust', SPHINCS+-Haraka-128f-simple', ‚SPHINCS+-Haraka-128s-robust‘, ‚SPHINCS+-Haraka-128s-simple‘, ‚SPHINCS+-Haraka-192f-robust‘, ‚SPHINCS+-Haraka-192f-simple‘, ‚SPHINCS+-Haraka-192s-robust‘, ‚SPHINCS+-Haraka-192s-simple‘, ‚SPHINCS+-Haraka-256f-robust‘, ‚SPHINCS+-Haraka-256f-simple‘, ‚SPHINCS+-Haraka-256s-robust‘, ‚SPHINCS+-Haraka-256s-simple‘, ‚SPHINCS+-SHA256-128f-robust‘, ,SPHINCS+-SHA256-128f-simple', ‚SPHINCS+-SHA256-128s-robust‘, ‚SPHINCS+-SHA256-128s-simple‘, ‚SPHINCS+-SHA256-192f-robust‘, ‚SPHINCS+-SHA256-192f-simple‘, ‚SPHINCS+-SHA256-192s-robust‘, ‚SPHINCS+-SHA256-192s-simple‘, ‚SPHINCS+-SHA256-256f-robust‘, ‚SPHINCS+-SHA256-256f-simple‘, ‚SPHINCS+-SHA256-256s-robust‘, ‚SPHINCS+-SHA256-256ssimple‘, ‚SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-128f-robust‘, ‚SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-128f-simple‘, ‚SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-128s-robust‘, ‚SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-128s-simple‘, ‚SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-192f-robust‘,'SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-192fsimple', 'SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-192s-robust', 'SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-192s-simple', 'SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-256f-robust', 'SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-256fsimple', 'SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-256s-robust', 'SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-256s-simple',m'picnic L1_FS', 'picnic_L1_UR', 'picnic_L3_FS', 'picnic_L3_UR', 'picnic_L5_FS', 'picnic_L5_UR', 'picnic2_L1_FS', 'picnic2_L3_FS', 'picnic2_L5_FS', 'qTesla-pI', 'qTesla-p-III'.,

[0233] The second random bit portion of the random bit stream ZBS can be used to generate the relevant signatures and keys.

[0234] The crypto engine 800* and / or the system 1000* may include a (quantum-resistant) key generator 806*. This key generator 806* is optionally part of the crypto engine 800* and / or the system 1000* and may be configured to generate a key that is (according to the current state of the art) resistant to quantum attacks. The quantum-resistant key generator 806* can achieve this by using random bits from the first random bit portion of the random bit stream ZBS for key generation. This allows secure, quantum-resistant keys to be generated.

[0235] The quantum random number generator can be designed to provide a random bit rate of the random bit stream ZBS that is high enough to generate quantum-resistant keys.

[0236] These keys can be generated by the quantum-resistant key generator 806* and then used by the post-quantum coprocessor 805* to encrypt the data transmitted by the system 1000* and / or its crypto engine 800* and / or its device components.

[0237] The interface unit 600* may be configured to ensure that the quantum-resistant keys are transmitted securely.

[0238] This ensures the security of data transmission to and from the System 1000*.

[0239] The System 1000* can be designed for applications that require high computing power, such as high-frequency trading systems or other time-critical applications.

[0240] The system 1000* and / or the crypto engine 800* may include a parallel encryption processor 807*. This parallel encryption processor 807* may enable the crypto engine 800* to perform multiple encryption operations simultaneously to minimize processing time. The system may include more than one CPU and / or more than one quantum random number generator 400* to operate or perform the encryption operations, optionally implemented as algorithms. This may have the advantage of enabling the system 1000* to process data more quickly.

[0241] System 1000* may include a (fast) clock line 808* (or a clock line 808* operating at a higher frequency than the other clock lines). Clock line 808* may be configured to synchronize an operation of parallel encryption processor 807* with the other modules of crypto engine 800* and / or system 1000*. This may prevent delays. This may result in desired synchronization.

[0242] The quantum random number generator 400* can provide the required random bits at a high random bit rate, which are forwarded directly to the parallel encryption processor 807*. The parallel encryption processor 808* can be configured to use these random bits to perform parallel encryption operations. The clock line 808* can be configured to ensure that the operations of the device parts of the system 1000* are synchronized. Performing the parallel encryption by the parallel encryption processor 807* can offer the advantage of increasing the processing speed of the system 1000*. This can provide high computing power and enable the simultaneous execution of multiple cryptographic operations, which can be advantageous in time-critical applications.

[0243] An energy-efficient crypto engine 800* can be provided, e.g., for use in a mobile device (e.g., smartphone, tablet, etc.) and / or an IoT system.

[0244] The crypto engine 800* and / or the system 1000* may include an energy-saving module 809*. This energy-saving module 809* may be configured to monitor and / or regulate energy consumption of the system 1000* and / or the crypto engine 800*. It is conceivable that the energy-saving module 809* is configured to deactivate unused modules of the system 1000* and / or the crypto engine 800* and / or reduce their power. This may achieve a desired energy saving.

[0245] It is conceivable that system 1000* receives encrypted commands via data bus 601* that restrict and / or stop the generation of random bits. System 1000* may also have a power-down pin, for example, to reduce power consumption. This can be advantageous, among other things, because entropy source 401* may require increased voltages. This, in turn, can optimize power consumption.

[0246] The crypto engine 800* and / or the system 1000* may include a (low-power) clock line 810*, i.e., a dedicated clock line operating at a (lower) frequency (or a frequency that is low or small compared to the other frequencies used). This may reduce power consumption.

[0247] Function and interaction: The internal random number generator (RNG) operates either in a low-power mode with lower energy consumption and typically a lower random bit rate (which can then be zero) or in a normal operating mode with increased energy consumption and a higher random bit rate. The low-power clock line ensures that only the necessary random bits are generated. The low-power clock line synchronizes the operations of the RNG and the crypto engine (KE) at low energy consumption. The technical effect of this variant is a significant reduction in energy consumption while maintaining the security of cryptographic operations.

[0248] Advantages: This variant is particularly suitable for use in battery-operated devices as it reduces energy consumption to a minimum.

[0249] Disadvantages: The reduced performance may not be sufficient in applications that require high computing power.

[0250] A security-focused Crypto Engine 800* can be deployed. The Crypto Engine 800* can meet the highest security requirements.

[0251] The crypto engine 800* and / or the system 1000* may include a security monitor 811*. The security monitor 811* may be configured to continuously monitor a state of the quantum random number generator 400*, the crypto engine 800* and / or the other device parts of the system 1000*. The security monitor 811* may be configured to shut down and / or reconfigure the quantum random number generator 400*, the crypto engine 800* and / or other device parts of the system 1000* in the event of a (detected) attack and / or error and / or put them into a predetermined secure mode and / or an emergency mode. The security module 811* may be configured to provide one or more bus participants (e.g.the MCU 700*) on the data bus 601* to signal such an incident (for example, via an interrupt line and / or via an interrupt line in conjunction with setting a specific register flag and / or via an interrupt in conjunction with setting a specific register value in a register of the system 1000* and / or by setting a specific register and / or flag value in a register of the system 1000*). This can improve and ensure the security of the entire crypto engine 800* and the system 1000*. The security monitor 811* can be part of the watchdog 404.5* described above, which performs the health check. The security monitor 811* can be implemented entirely or at least in significant parts in hardware in order to reduce its susceptibility to manipulation.

[0252] The crypto engine 800* and / or the system 1000* may include a (secure) communication unit 812*, which may be configured to ensure encrypted and / or tap-proof communication via the interface 600*, optionally all external interfaces of the system 1000*. Secure communication can thereby be achieved.

[0253] Encrypted or secure communications can refer to the use of technologies and procedures that ensure the confidentiality and integrity of information during transmission. Such communication technologies protect messages from unauthorized access, interception, and / or tampering by third parties.

[0254] Encryption can be understood as the process by which a message (plaintext) is converted into unreadable text (ciphertext) using an algorithm. An unauthorized third party who intercepts the message cannot read it without the appropriate decryption key. Examples of encryption methods include symmetric encryption (e.g., AES) and / or asymmetric encryption (e.g., RSA).

[0255] The quantum random number generator 400* can continuously supply random bits, which can be monitored for their integrity by the security monitor 811*. The communication unit 812* can ensure that (all external) data transmissions via the data bus 601* are encrypted and / or protected against eavesdropping attempts. A high level of security for the crypto engine 800* and the system 1000* can be achieved through computer- and / or machine-implemented monitoring algorithms of the security monitor 811* and / or encryption software of the communication unit 812*.

[0256] Each of the modules can be implemented in hardware and / or software. The control of one, several, or all of the modules described herein can be performed by one or more computer- and / or machine-implemented algorithms. A CPU of the quantum random number generator 400*, the crypto engine 800*, and / or the CPU of the system 1000* can be configured to execute a respective program code of the algorithm(s). The algorithm(s) can be stored in a memory of the quantum random number generator 400*, the crypto engine 800*, and / or the CPU of the system 1000*. Control is also understood to mean closed-loop control, i.e., control with feedback variable.

[0257] The following disclosure relates to the quantum random generator according to an optional embodiment, as well as an entropy source that may be included in the quantum random generator. One or more quantum random generators, which may optionally have the optional features presented below, may be included in an electronic circuit and / or used in a disclosed method and / or integrated into the otherwise disclosed subject matter, although this is not mandatory. The optional features of the quantum random generator and the entropy source are specified in the following clauses: 1. Quantum random number generator (400*), characterized in that the quantum random number generator (400*) comprises: - a monolithically integrated entropy source (401*), wherein the entropy source (401*) comprises: - a photon source (55*) configured to emit photons (58*), the photon source (55*) comprising: - a first outer shell, wherein the first outer shell is formed by a first base surface (551*), a first cover surface (552*) and at least one first side surface (553*) connecting the first base surface (551*) and the first cover surface (552*), and - a photon detector (54*) designed to detect the photons (58*) emitted by the photon source (55*), - wherein the first base surface of the photon source (55*) is arranged facing the photon detector (54*), and - an electronic circuit configured to generate a random bit (411*) in dependence on an output signal (405*) of the entropy source (401*), and optionally to output the generated random bit (411*), - wherein a characteristic of the output signal (405*) of the entropy source (401*) depends on a temporal frequency of the photons (58*) detected by the photon detector (54*). 2. Entropy source (401*) according to clause 1, characterized in that the photon detector (54*) comprises: - a second outer shell, wherein the second outer shell is formed by a second base surface (541*), a second cover surface (542*) and at least one second side surface (543*) connecting the second base surface (541*) and the second cover surface (542*), - wherein the first base surface (541*) of the photon source (55*) is arranged facing the second base surface (541*) of the photon detector (55*). 3. Monolithically integrated entropy source (401*), optionally for a quantum random number generator (400*), where the entropy source (401*) comprises: - a photon source (55*) designed to emit photons (58*), and - a photon detector (54*) configured to detect the photons (58*) emitted by the photon source (55*), the photon detector (54*) comprising: - a second outer shell, wherein the second outer shell is formed by a second base surface (541*), a second cover surface (542*) and at least one second side surface (543*) which connects the second base surface (541*) and the second cover surface (542*) to one another, characterized in that - the second base surface (541*) of the photon detector (54*) is arranged facing the photon source (55*). 4. Entropy source (401*) according to one of the preceding clauses, characterized in that the photon source (55*) is a silicon LED and / or a single photon source, optionally a SPAD or an avalanche Zener diode, wherein the avalanche Zener diode optionally has a breakdown voltage of less than 10 V. 5. Entropy source (401*) according to one of the preceding clauses, characterized in that the photon source (55*) comprises: - a third pn junction (554*) formed from a third p-layer (46*) and a third n-layer (45*), - wherein the third p-layer (46*) and the third n-layer (45*) are optionally in contact with each other. 6. Entropy source (401*) according to one of clauses 1 to 5, characterized in that the photon detector (54*) comprises a single-photon detector, optionally a single-photon avalanche diode, optionally a SPAD. 7. Entropy source (401*) according to one of clauses 1 to 6, characterized in that the photon detector (55) comprises: - a first pn junction (50*) formed from a first p-layer (32*) and a first n-layer (22*), - wherein the first p-layer (32*) and the first n-layer (22*) are optionally in contact with each other. 8. Entropy source (401*) according to clause 7, characterized in that the photon detector (55*) comprises: - an absorption region (47*) designed and arranged to absorb the photons (58*) emitted by the photon source (55*) such that the absorption region (47*) generates, optionally exactly, one electron-hole pair per photon (58*), - wherein the absorption region (47*) is in contact with the first pn junction (50*) and the first pn junction (50*) is designed to generate a charge avalanche due to the generated electron-hole pair, and - the photon detector (54*) is designed to detect the respective photon (58*) emitted by the photon source (55*) based on the generated charge avalanche. 9. Entropy source (401*) according to clause 8, characterized in that the absorption region (47*) has or consists of a p-doped substrate (10*) which completely covers a surface of the first pn junction (50*) facing in the direction of the photon source (55*). 10. Entropy source (401*) according to clause 8, characterized in that the absorption region (47*) has a p-doped substrate (10*) which only partially covers a surface of the first pn junction (50*) facing the photon source (55*) and forms a channel extending from this surface of the first pn junction (50*) in the direction of the photon source (55*), which channel is laterally delimited by an n-doped substrate (29*). 11. Entropy source (401*) according to clause 8, characterized in that the absorption region (47*) has or consists of an n-doped substrate (29*) which completely covers a surface of the first pn junction (50*) facing in the direction of the photon source (55*). 12. Entropy source (401*) according to one of clauses 8 to 11, characterized in that the absorption region (47*) is in contact with the photon source (55*), optionally a p-doped substrate (46*) of the photon source (55*). 13. Entropy source (401*) according to one of clauses 1 to 12, characterized in that the photon detector (55*) comprises: - a second pn junction (52*) formed from a second p-layer (32*) and a further or the first n-layer (22*), - wherein the second p-layer (32*) and the further or the first n-layer (22*) are optionally in contact with each other. 14. Entropy source (401*) according to one of clauses 1 to 13, characterized in that the entropy source (401*) has a metal layer (53*), optionally together with an internal silicide layer, which shields the entropy source (401*) from the outside. 15. Entropy source (401*) according to clause 14, characterized in that the entropy source (401*) has at least two anodes (124*, 134*) for the photon source (55*) and the photon detector (54*), which are conductively connected to one another via the metal layer (53*). 16. Entropy source (401*) according to one of the preceding clauses, characterized in that the photon source (55*) and / or the photon detector (54*), optionally the entropy source (401*) as a whole, is rotationally symmetrical along an axis which is perpendicular to the first and / or the second base surface (541*, 551*). 17. Entropy source (401*) according to one of the preceding clauses, characterized in that the entropy source (401*) is manufactured using BCD technology. 18. Entropy source (401*) according to one of clauses 1 to 17, characterized in that the entropy source (401*) comprises: - a substrate (110*) with a carrier substrate (49*) and an epitaxial layer (48*), - wherein, as far as referring back to any one of claims 7 to 13, the epitaxial layer (48*) has the first pn junction (50), and, as far as referring back to claim 13, the carrier substrate (49*) has the second pn junction (52*). 19. Entropy source (401*) according to one of clauses 1 to 18, characterized in that an upper and / or lower side of the entropy source (401*) is mirrored at least in the region of the photon source (55*) and / or the photon detector (54*) and / or comprises a light-blocking layer. 20. Quantum random number generator (400*) according to one of the preceding clauses, characterized in that the quantum random number generator (400*) comprises a pseudorandom number generator (404.3*) which is designed to generate a digital output signal (410*) based on the output signal (405*) of the entropy source (401*) and an optionally predetermined or adjustable generator polynomial. 21. Quantum random number generator (400*) according to clause 20, characterized in that the quantum random number generator (400*) comprises an entropy extraction (404.4*) configured to generate the random bit (411*) based on the digital output signal (410*) of the pseudorandom number generator (404.3*). 22. Quantum random number generator (400*) according to clause 21, characterized in that the entropy extraction (404.4*) is designed to generate the random bit (411*) in which: - determines a first value and a second value of the digital output signal (410*), - sets a value of an output of the random bit generation unit (404.4*) to a first logical value if the first value of the digital output signal (410*) is smaller than the second value of the digital output signal (410*) and the difference between the first value of the digital output signal (410*) and the second value of the digital output signal (410*) is greater than a minimum difference (ε), - to set the value of the output of the random bit generation unit (404.4*) to a second logical value if the first value of the digital output signal (410*) is greater than the second value of the digital output signal (410*) and the difference between the first value of the digital output signal (410*) and the second value of the digital output signal (410*) is greater than the minimum difference (ε). 23. Quantum random number generator (400*) according to clause 22, characterized in that the random bit generation unit (404.4*) is designed to discard the first value of the digital output signal (410*) and the second value of the digital output signal (410*) of the digital signal (410*) if a difference between the first and the second value is smaller than a predetermined minimum difference (ε). 24. Quantum random number generator (400*) according to clause 23, characterized in that the quantum random number generator (400*) comprises a monitoring unit (404.5*) configured to monitor the output of the random bit generation unit, optionally to detect a malfunction of the quantum random number generator (400*) when a number of discarded values ​​of the random bit generation unit (404.4*) exceeds a predetermined limit. 25. Integrated electronic circuit (500*), characterized in that the circuit (500*) comprises a quantum random number generator (400*) according to one of the preceding clauses, wherein the integrated electronic circuit (500*) is optionally a microelectronic integrated circuit. List of reference symbols 100 Computer-implemented method for securing electronic communication with a communication partner 102 - 124 process steps 150 first blockchain 150a block of the first blockchain 152 second blockchain 152a Block of the second blockchain 154 higher-level blockchain 154a Block of the parent blockchain 160 Direction of travel 170 Overlap 200 electronic circuit 202 Data storage element 204 Quantum random number generator 206 Communication interface 208 Entropy Source 300 computer-readable medium 302 data 400 computer-readable interface 402 computers 404 communication partners 500 motor vehicles 502 Control device 600 Trusted Platform modules 700 computer network 702 network nodes 800 military units 900 manufacturing processes 902 Process step 10* p doped substrate 29* n area (HVNW / NEPI) 22* first area (e.g. NBL) 32* second area (e.g. PBL) 45* n+ area (N+) 46* p+ area (PBODY) 47* Absorption area 48* epitaxial layer 49* Carrier substrate 51* p+ area (P+) 50* first pn junction 52* second pn junction 53* Metallization or metal layer 54* Photon detector 541* floor space 542* deck area 543* Side surface / Shell surface 55* Photon source 551* floor space 552* deck area 553* Side surface / Shell surface 554* third pn junction 58* photon(s) 110* Substrat 122* Cathode photon source 132* Cathode photon detector 124*, 134* Anode 141* Metallization 142* Metallization 400* Quantum Random Number Generator 401* Entropy source 403* Analog-to-digital converter 404.3* Pseudorandom number generator 404.4* Entropy extraction or filter module 404.6* (Backup) Pseudo-Random Number Generators 404.7* Signal multiplexer 404.8* finite automaton 404.9* Memory 404.10* Finish Flag 405* Entropy source output signal 406* Pulse extension circuit 407* Output signal analog-to-digital converter 408* Voltage converter 410* Output signal of the pseudorandom number generator 411* Output entropy extraction or filter module 412* Watchdog / (Backup) Pseudo-Random Number Generator Line 413* Voltage monitor 414* Input / output signal lines 415* synchronized voltage signal 416* Selection signal 418* Quantum random data word 419* internal data bus 421* Voltage transformer cable 500* integrated electronic circuit 501* Frame / Outer Edge 502* Connection pad 503* Pad frame 504* Wiring area 505* inner area 600* Data interface 601* external data bus 700* external data processing device 800* Crypto Engine 801* Crypto engine memory 802* Memory 803* CPU 804* Key management unit 805* Post-Quantum Coprocessor 806* (quantum-resistant) key generator 807* (parallel) encryption processor 808* (fast) clock line 809* Energy saving module 810* (Low-energy) clock line 811* Security Monitor 812* (secured) communication unit 1000* System for encrypted communication 1001* Monitoring circuits 1002* Voltage pre-regulator 1003* Test interface VDD supply voltage line V ENT Supply voltage line V REF Reference voltage line GND reference potential line ZBS random bit (data) stream VZS encrypted random bit stream O Surface of the substrate S Surface of the carrier substrate

Claims

[1] Electronic circuit (200), comprising - a data storage element (202); - a quantum random number generator (204); and - a communication interface (206); characterized by , that the electronic circuit (200) is set up for this purpose: a) to provide at least one true random number using the quantum random number generator (204); b) to generate a cryptographic key based on the provided random number and to make it available for adapting an encryption method for encrypted communication with a communication partner (404); c) to provide information to the communication partner about the adaptation of the encryption method via the communication interface (206); and d) to generate a block (150a) to confirm the adaptation of the encryption method for a blockchain (150) and to store the blockchain (150) with the block (150a) in the data storage element (202); wherein the electronic circuit (200) is further configured to: - to delete the blockchain (150) containing the blocks (150a) confirming the adaptation of the encryption method upon the occurrence of a predetermined event from the data storage element (202) and to replace it with a new blockchain (152) of shorter length and / or lower data volume; and - to generate a block (154a) for a parent blockchain (154) to confirm the replacement of the blockchain (150) by the new blockchain (152) of shorter length and / or size, and to store the parent blockchain (154) with the generated block (154a) in the internal data storage element (202). [2] Electronic circuit (200) according to claim 1, wherein the electronic circuit (200) is designed as an integrated electronic circuit (200). [3] Electronic circuit (200) according to claim 2, wherein the data storage element (202) is integrated into the integrated electronic circuit (200) as an internal data storage element (202). [4] Electronic circuit (200) according to claim 2 or 3, wherein the quantum random number generator (204) and the communication interface (206) are integrated into the integrated electronic circuit (200). [5] Electronic circuit (200) according to one of claims 2 to 4, wherein the data storage element (202) is integrated into the electronic circuit (200) as a monolithically integrated data storage element (202). [6] Electronic circuit (200) according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the quantum random number generator (204) comprises a monolithically integrated entropy source (208). [7] Electronic circuit (200) according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the data storage element (202) is configured to provide a storage space of at least 10 kB and optionally a maximum of 2 MB for storing the at least one blockchain (150). [8] Electronic circuit (200) according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the quantum random number generator (204) is configured to provide random numbers with a data stream of at least 10 KBit / s, optionally at least 50 KBit / s, optionally at least 100 KBit / s and optionally at least 500 KBit / s. [9] Electronic circuit (200) according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the electronic circuit (200) is configured to perform steps c) and d), optionally steps a) to d), repeatedly. [10] Electronic circuit (200) according to claim 9, wherein the electronic circuit (200) is configured to repeatedly perform the adaptation of the encryption method by repeatedly performing steps c) and d), optionally by repeatedly performing steps a) to d). [11] Electronic circuit (200) according to claim 10, wherein the electronic circuit (200) is configured to perform the adjustment of the encryption method at regular and / or irregular intervals. [12] Electronic circuit (200) according to claim 11, wherein the time intervals are 48 hours or less, optionally 24 hours or less, optionally 12 hours or less, optionally 6 hours or less, optionally 3 hours or less, optionally 1 hour or less, optionally 30 min or less, optionally 10 min or less, optionally 5 min or less, optionally 2 min or less, and optionally 1 min or less. [13] Electronic circuit (200) according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the encryption method is designed as a symmetric and / or asymmetric encryption method. [14] Electronic circuit (200) according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the electronic circuit (200) is configured to perform a key selection and / or key exchange, optionally a Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange, with the communication partner (404) using the information provided to the communication partner (404) via the adaptation of the encryption method by means of the communication interface (206) on the generated cryptographic key. [15] Electronic circuit (200) according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the electronic circuit (200) is further configured to generate the cryptographic key based on the at least one random number such that the cryptographic key has a length of at least 128 characters, optionally at least 256 characters, optionally at least 512 characters, optionally at least 1,024 characters and optionally at least 2,048 characters. [16] Electronic circuit (200) according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the electronic circuit (200) is further configured to generate the cryptographic key based on the at least one random number such that the random number used for this purpose, provided by the quantum random number generator (204), has a length of at least 16 bits, optionally at least 32 bits, optionally at least 64 bits, optionally at least 128 bits, optionally at least 256 bits and optionally at least 512 bits. [17] Electronic circuit (200) according to one of the preceding claims, wherein generating the block (150a) to confirm the adaptation of the encryption method for the at least one blockchain (150) comprises generating a hash value to confirm the adaptation of the encryption method. [18] Electronic circuit (200) according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the electronic circuit is further configured to: e) to synchronize the blockchain (150) partially or completely with a copy of the blockchain (150) of another participant in the blockchain (150) and / or to compare it with a copy of the blockchain (150) of another participant in the blockchain (150) and to assess the trustworthiness of the encryption method and / or the adaptation of the encryption method and / or the communication partner on the basis of the synchronization and / or the comparison. [19] Electronic circuit (200) according to claim 18, wherein the communication partner (404) is another participant in the blockchain (150) and wherein the electronic circuit (200) is configured to synchronize and / or compare the blockchain (150) partially or completely with the copy of the blockchain (150) of the communication partner (404) in feature e). [20] Electronic circuit (200) according to claim 18 or 19, wherein the electronic circuit (200) is further configured to: f) to stop communication with the communication partner (404) and / or to provide information about an anomaly in the encryption method if the assessment of the trustworthiness of the encryption method and / or the adaptation of the encryption method and / or the communication partner (404) concludes that the trustworthiness of the encryption method and / or the adaptation of the encryption method and / or the communication partner (404) may be compromised. [21] Electronic circuit (200) according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the electronic circuit (200) is further configured to generate the block (150) and / or the hash value for the blockchain (150) such that the block (150a) and / or the hash value and optionally the entire blockchain (150) are encrypted and / or are stored encrypted in the internal data storage element (202). [22] Electronic circuit (200) according to claim 21, wherein the electronic circuit (200) is configured to encrypt and / or store the block (150a) and / or the hash value and / or the blockchain (150) using at least one of the random numbers provided by the quantum random number generator (204). [23] Electronic circuit (200) according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the predetermined event occurs when the blockchain (150) reaches a predetermined length and / or a predetermined data volume. [24] Electronic circuit (200) according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the electronic circuit (200) is configured to partially or completely release the storage space occupied by the blockchain, optionally for storing the new blockchain, when the blockchain (150) is deleted from the data storage element. [25] Electronic circuit (200) according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the electronic circuit (202) is further configured to generate the block (150a) for confirming the adaptation of the encryption method as a block (150a) for a first blockchain (150) and as a block (152a) for a second blockchain (152) and to store the first blockchain (150) and the second blockchain (150) with the respective generated block (150a, 152a) in the internal data storage element (202). [26] Electronic circuit (200) according to claim 25, wherein the electronic circuit (200) is further configured to use the first blockchain (150) and the second blockchain (152) in parallel with staggered start and end times of use. [27] Electronic circuit (200) according to claim 25 or 26, wherein the electronic circuit (200) is configured to use the first blockchain (150) and the second blockchain (152) each up to a predetermined length and / or up to a predetermined data volume, wherein the respective end of use occurs upon reaching the predetermined length and / or the predetermined data volume of the first or second blockchain (150, 152). [28] Electronic circuit (200) according to claim 27, wherein the electronic circuit (200) is configured to delete the first blockchain (150) when the end of its useful life is reached and to replace the first blockchain with a new first blockchain of shorter length and / or size, and to delete the second blockchain (152) when the end of its useful life is reached and to replace the second blockchain with a new second blockchain of shorter length and / or size. [29] Electronic circuit (200) according to claim 28, wherein the electronic circuit (200) is further configured to continue using the second blockchain (152) when the first blockchain (150) is deleted and replaced at the end of its use, and to continue using the first blockchain (150) when the second blockchain (152) is deleted and replaced at the end of its use. [30] Electronic circuit (200) according to one of claims 28 and 29, wherein the electronic circuit (200) is further configured to release the storage space occupied by the first and / or second blockchain (150, 152) in the data storage element (202), optionally for a new first and / or second blockchain (150, 152), when the first and / or second blockchain (150, 152) is deleted. [31] Computer Readable Medium (300), characterized by, that the computer-readable medium (300) comprises data (302) defining an operating instruction adapted for controlling a semiconductor manufacturing device, such that the electronic circuit (200) according to any one of claims 1 to 30 is manufactured by means of the semiconductor manufacturing device when the data are output to the semiconductor manufacturing device. [32] Computer-readable medium (300) according to claim 31, characterized by , that the data (302) comprise a digital representation of the electronic circuit (200), so that the integrated electronic circuit (200) is manufactured using the digital representation with the operating instructions when the data (302) are output to the semiconductor manufacturing apparatus. [33] Computer-readable medium (300) according to claim 31 or 32, characterized by, that the manufacture of the electronic circuit (200) by means of the semiconductor manufacturing device in accordance with the operating instructions includes: - Manufacturing the electronic circuit on a wafer in a semiconductor process, optionally in a CMOS semiconductor process, a BiCMOS semiconductor process, a semiconductor process for bipolar devices, optionally using the Bipolar CMOS technique. [34] Method (900) for manufacturing an electronic circuit (200) according to any one of claims 1 to 30, characterized by , that the procedure (900) includes: - Manufacturing (902) the electronic circuit (200) using a semiconductor manufacturing device, optionally using a computer-readable medium (300) according to one of claims 33 to 35. [35] Computer-readable interface (400) comprising an electronic circuit (200) according to any one of claims 1 to 30, wherein the computer-readable interface (400) is configured to be connected to a computer (402) and, in a state connected to the computer (402), to provide a cryptographic key and / or to enable a secure adaptation of an encryption method for communication between the computer (402) and a communication partner (404) and / or to enable a secure communication connection with the communication partner (404). [36] Use of an electronic circuit (200) according to any one of claims 1 to 30 for providing a cryptographic key and / or for securely adapting an encryption method for communication between an IoT device and a communication partner (404). [37] Use of an electronic circuit (200) according to any one of claims 1 to 30 for providing a cryptographic key and / or for securely adapting an encryption method for communication between a first military unit (800) and a second military unit (800). [38] Use according to claim 37, wherein the first and / or second military unit (800) comprises or is configured as one of the following elements: - a soldier; - a military vehicle; - an unmanned military vehicle; - a weapon system; - a missile; - an explosive device; - a mine; - an element of a military swarm; - an agent of a multi-agent system; - a measuring probe and / or reconnaissance probe; - a command center; - a control device; and - a satellite. [39] Trusted Platform-Module (600) comprising an electronic circuit (200) according to any one of claims 1 to 30. [40] Control device (502) for a motor vehicle (500) comprising an electronic circuit (200) according to any one of claims 1 to 30. [41] Control device (502) according to claim 40, wherein the control device (502) is configured to secure communication between the control device and another component of the motor vehicle and / or an external communication partner by means of the electronic circuit (200) and / or to provide an adaptation of an encryption to secure the communication. [42] Motor vehicle (500) comprising a control device (502) according to claim 40 or 41. [43] Computer network (700) comprising several network nodes (702), wherein the several network nodes (702) each have at least one electronic circuit (200) according to any one of claims 1 to 30 and wherein the computer network (700) is configured to enable encrypted communication between the network nodes (702) using the electronic circuits (200) of the respective network nodes (702). [44] Computer-implemented method (100) for adapting an encryption to secure electronic communication with a communication partner (404), characterized by , that the procedure (100) includes: - Providing (102) at least one true random number using the quantum random number generator (204); - Generating (104) a cryptographic key based on the provided random number; - Adapting (106) an encryption method for encrypted communication with the communication partner using the generated random number; - Providing (108) information to the communication partner about the adaptation of the encryption method via a communication interface; and - Generating (110) a block to confirm the adaptation of the encryption method for a blockchain and storing (112) the blockchain with the block in a data storage element. - Deleting the blockchain (150) containing the blocks (150a) to confirm the adjustment of the encryption method upon the occurrence of a predetermined event from the data storage element (202) and replacing the blockchain (150) with a new blockchain (152) of shorter length and / or lower data volume; and - Generating a block (154a) for a parent blockchain (154) to confirm the replacement of the blockchain (150) by the new blockchain (152) with a shorter length and / or size and storing the parent blockchain (154) with the generated block (154a) in the internal data storage element (202). [45] Electronic circuit (200) according to any one of claims 1 to 30, characterized by , that the quantum random number generator includes (204, 400*): - a monolithically integrated entropy source (401*), wherein the entropy source (401*) comprises: - a photon source (55*) configured to emit photons (58*), wherein the photon source (55*) comprises: - a first outer shell, wherein the first outer shell is formed by a first base (551*), a first top surface (552*) and at least one first side surface (553*) connecting the first base (551*) and the first top surface (552*), and - a photon detector (54*) designed to detect the photons (58*) emitted by the photon source (55*), - wherein the first base surface of the photon source (55*) is arranged facing the photon detector (54*), and - an electronic circuit designed to generate a random bit (411*) depending on an output signal (405*) of the entropy source (401*), and optionally to output the generated random bit (411*), - wherein a manifestation of the output signal (405*) of the entropy source (401*) depends on a temporal frequency of the photons (58*) detected by the photon detector (54*).

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