Apparatus and method for verifying forgery of medical image

Abstract

Provided are an apparatus and method for verifying forgery of a medical image using a hash value based on meta information of the medical image.SOLUTION: The forgery verification apparatus 400 includes a memory configured to store patient-specific DICOM files and a processor functionally connected to the memory, and the processor is configured to, when issuance of a DICOM file is requested, search for the requested DICOM file among the patient-specific DICOM files, generate an issuance number associated with the issuance, extract a part of meta information of the DICOM file, generate a first hash value using the part of the meta information and the issuance number, and store the first hash value in the memory in association with the issuance number. While providing a copy of a DICOM file to an external storage device, a first hash value is inserted into a designated tag area of the copy as forgery verification information.SELECTED DRAWING: Figure 1

Description

[Technical Field]

[0001] Various embodiments disclosed herein relate to techniques for verifying data forgery and alteration. [Background technology]

[0002] Clinical diagnosis plays a major role in patient treatment, and its reliance on it is expected to become even greater in the future. Clinical diagnosis is performed using various medical imaging devices such as X-ray, computer tomography (CT), and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI).

[0003] If necessary (e.g., changing hospitals, proving illness), patients can receive their own clinical diagnosis data after verifying their identity. For example, patients can receive medical video materials from hospitals to share their treatment status or verify their medical history. Hospitals usually issue medical video CDs after verifying the identity of patients who visit. [Prior art documents] [Patent documents]

[0004] [Patent Document 1] Japanese Patent Application Publication No. 2019-139750 [Patent Document 2] Special Publication No. 2021-533468 Summary of the Invention [Problem to be solved by the invention]

[0005] However, because medical video CDs are not verified for forgery or alteration, there is no way to verify the authenticity of other people's medical video materials when they are submitted for military exemption. Furthermore, while some hospitals will send medical video materials by mail, they are handled as regular mail and therefore are at risk of being lost or copied during delivery.

[0006] The various embodiments disclosed herein aim to provide an apparatus and method for verifying forgery or alteration of medical images, which can verify forgery or alteration using a hash value based on meta information of the medical images. [Means for solving the problem]

[0007] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the device for verifying forgery and alteration includes a memory for storing patient-specific DICOM files and a processor functionally connected to the memory. When a request for issuance of a DICOM file is received, the processor searches for the requested DICOM file from among the patient-specific DICOM files, generates an issue number associated with the issuance, extracts some information from meta information of the DICOM file, generates a first hash value using the some information and the issue number, and provides a copy of the DICOM file to an external storage device while inserting the first hash value into a designated tag area of ​​the copy as forgery and alteration verification information.

[0008] In addition, a forgery / alteration verification device according to an embodiment disclosed in the present specification includes a memory for storing verification data including an issue number and an overall hash value of a patient-specific DICOM file, and a processor functionally connected to the memory. When the processor receives a verification request for a first DICOM file stored in an external storage device, the processor extracts a pre-registered first hash value and a first issue number from a designated tag area of ​​the first DICOM file, generates a first hash value to be verified using some information of meta information of the first DICOM file, and compares the pre-registered first hash value with the first hash value to be verified, thereby performing a primary verification of whether the first DICOM file is forged or altered. [Effects of the Invention]

[0009] According to various embodiments disclosed herein, forgery and alteration can be verified using a hash value based on meta information of medical images. In addition, various advantages that can be directly or indirectly understood through this specification can be provided. [Brief explanation of the drawings]

[0010] [Figure 1] 1 shows a configuration diagram of a system for verifying forgery and alteration of medical images according to an embodiment. [Figure 2] 1 shows a configuration diagram of an apparatus for verifying forgery and alteration of video according to an embodiment. [Figure 3] 1 shows an example of using a DICOM file according to one embodiment. [Figure 4] 1 shows a flowchart of a method for verifying forgery or alteration of medical images according to an embodiment. [Figure 5] 1 shows a flowchart of a method for verifying forgery or alteration of medical images according to an embodiment. [Figure 6] 10 illustrates an example of providing a verification result according to an embodiment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

[0011] 1 is a block diagram of a system for verifying forgery / alteration of medical images according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0012] Referring to FIG. 1, the counterfeit / alteration verification system according to one embodiment may include a database 100, an external storage device 250, a first external electronic device 200, a second external electronic device 300, and a counterfeit / alteration verification device 400.

[0013] According to one embodiment, the database 100 is a database for storing medical data and can store patient-specific DICOM files in association with patient information. The DICOM files may have a "*.DCM" extension in accordance with the DICOM International Convention. The database 100 can also store verification data related to verifying the authenticity of issued DICOM files.

[0014] According to one embodiment, the database 100 may include a first storage device for storing medical data and a second storage device for storing verification data. The first and second storage devices may be different devices or may be included in different devices. The database 100 may also be included in the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400.

[0015] According to an embodiment, the external storage device 250 may include at least one of a CD for recording the medical data (DICOM file) to be issued or a memory connected to the first external electronic device 200. The external storage device 250 may store the DICOM file into which the forgery / alteration verification information is inserted under the control of the first external electronic device 200 or the forgery / alteration verification device 400.

[0016] According to one embodiment, the first external electronic device 200 may be a terminal of a first user requesting the issuance of medical data. For example, the first external electronic device 200 may be a computing terminal used by a medical professional (e.g., an administrative staff member). The first external electronic device 200 may transmit a request for issuance of a DICOM file to the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 along with patient information entered by the medical professional. As another example, the first external electronic device 200 may be a computing terminal used by a subject (subject of the DICOM file). In this case, the first external electronic device 200 may connect to a first website related to the online issuance of medical data. The first external electronic device 200 may obtain the patient information entered by the subject and transmit a request for issuance of a DICOM file including the patient information to the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 via the first website.

[0017] According to one embodiment, the first external electronic device 200 can store a DICOM file issued under the control of the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 in the external storage device 250. For example, when issuing a DICOM file online (e.g., through a homepage), the first external electronic device 200 can obtain a password from the second user and send it to the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400. In this case, the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 can encrypt and compress the issued DICOM file using the obtained password and issue the encrypted compressed file to the first external electronic device 200. For example, the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 can encrypt and compress a DICOM file group including multiple DICOM files using one password and generate one DICOM file group as one compressed file. The first external electronic device 200 can then download the encrypted compressed file from the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 and store (or record) it in the external storage device 250. The encrypted compressed file can be decrypted by entering a password registered by the user. As another example, when a DICOM file is issued offline (e.g., by a medical professional at a medical institution), the first external electronic device 200 can store the DICOM file issued by the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 in the external storage device 250.

[0018] According to one embodiment, the second external electronic device 300 may be a terminal requesting verification of forgery / alteration of medical data. For example, the second external electronic device 300 may be a computing terminal used by a user (e.g., a Military Manpower Administration employee) involved in verifying medical data. The second external electronic device 300 may connect to a second website related to medical data verification and transmit a forgery / alteration verification result for the DICOM file to the forgery / alteration verification device 400 via the second website. After the forgery / alteration verification device 400 completes the forgery / alteration verification, the second external electronic device 300 may obtain the forgery / alteration verification result for the DICOM file and output it on a display. The first and second websites may be, for example, different web pages on the same site. Alternatively, the first and second websites may be multiple websites each dedicated to issuing or verifying.

[0019] First, the process of issuing a DICOM file by the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 will be described.

[0020] According to one embodiment, when the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 receives a DICOM file issuance request from the first external electronic device 200, it can search for a DICOM file group corresponding to the issuance request among the patient-specific DICOM files from the medical database 100. For example, when first patient information (e.g., resident ID number, medical department, examination date, etc.) is obtained through the input interface, the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 can search the database 100 for a DICOM file corresponding to the first patient information.

[0021] According to one embodiment, the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 may generate a first issue number associated with the issued DICOM file and extract some information from the meta information of the searched DICOM file group. The counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 may generate a first hash value for primary verification using the extracted part of the information and the first issue number. The part of the information may include, for example, at least one of first patient information and issuer information of the DICOM file group (e.g., hospital name, issue date, etc.).

[0022] The forgery / alteration verification device 400 can insert a first hash value as forgery / alteration verification information into a designated tag area of ​​the copy while providing a copy of the DICOM file group to the external storage device 250. The designated tag area can be, for example, a user-defined tag area (e.g., 0x0011) of the DICOM file. The forgery / alteration verification device 400 can generate a second hash value for secondary verification based on each individual copy DICOM file of the DICOM file group.

[0023] The counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 can store the second hash value in the database 100 as verification data of the copy in association with the first issue number.

[0024] According to the above-described embodiment, a medical image may be composed of a DICOM file group including a plurality of DICOM files. The issue number may include a serial number for each DICOM file and an original number for the DICOM file group. In this case, the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 may calculate a first hash value for each DICOM file based on the original number and the serial number for each DICOM file. In this case, different anti-counterfeit information (first hash value) may be inserted into each DICOM file.

[0025] According to various embodiments, when a DICOM file is issued online, the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 can obtain a compression password from the first user, compress the DICOM file using the obtained password, and store (or record) the compressed file in the external storage device 250 via the first external electronic device 200.

[0026] According to various embodiments, the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 may calculate a third hash value for each searched DICOM file (original DICOM file), and may calculate a first hash value based on the third hash value, the first issue number, and some extracted information. In this case, the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 may also store the third hash value in a tag area designated in a copy of the DICOM file.

[0027] Next, the process of verifying forgery / alteration of a DICOM file by the forgery / alteration verification device 400 will be described.

[0028] According to one embodiment, the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 may receive a verification request for the first DICOM file stored in the external storage device 250 from the second external electronic device 300. In this case, the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 may provide the second external electronic device 300 with a first website (or application) related to the verification of the first DICOM file through a web browser.

[0029] The second external electronic device 300 can access the first website and execute a web browser to extract a pre-registered first hash value and a first issue number from a designated tag area of ​​the first DICOM file to be verified. The second external electronic device 300 can also generate a first hash value to be verified based on a portion of the meta information of the first DICOM file stored in the external storage device 250. According to one embodiment, the first verification can be performed by comparing the first hash value to be verified with the pre-registered first hash value. If the first hash value to be verified matches the pre-registered first hash value, the second external electronic device 300 can notify the second external electronic device 300 that the first verification of the first DICOM file has been completed. In this way, the forgery / alteration verification device 400 according to one embodiment provides verification of the first DICOM file on a browser-by-browser basis, allowing the second external electronic device 300 to perform the first verification by itself without having to transmit or receive data for verifying the first DICOM file to or from the forgery / alteration verification device 400. Therefore, in one embodiment, the first verification for checking for forgery or alteration of DICOM files can be carried out very quickly, and crude forgery or alteration at the level of simply exchanging DICOM files of other users can be quickly filtered out, and second verification can be performed only for DICOM files that have been elaborately forged or altered by experts.

[0030] On the other hand, if the first hash value to be verified does not match the pre-registered first hash value, the second external electronic device 300 can inform the second external electronic device 300 that the first DICOM file has been forged or altered.

[0031] According to one embodiment, the forgery / alteration verification device 400 can perform a second verification on a first DICOM file that has undergone a first verification. For example, the forgery / alteration verification device 400 can generate a second hash value to be verified using an individual file of the first DICOM file to be verified. The forgery / alteration verification device 400 can obtain a pre-registered second hash value (the hash value of the first DICOM file stored in the database 100) corresponding to the first issue number from the verification data in the database 100. The forgery / alteration verification device 400 can compare the second hash value to be verified with the pre-registered second hash value to perform a second verification of whether the first DICOM file is forged or altered.

[0032] If the second hash value to be verified matches the pre-registered second hash value, the forgery / alteration verification device 400 can determine that the DICOM file to be verified is not forged or altered. On the other hand, if the second hash value to be verified does not match the pre-registered second hash value, the forgery / alteration verification device 400 can determine that the first DICOM file to be verified is forged or altered.

[0033] According to one embodiment, the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 may provide the verification result of the first DICOM file to the second external electronic device 300. For example, if the integrity of the first DICOM file is verified in the first and second verifications, the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 may provide a successful verification of the first DICOM file to the second external electronic device 300. As another example, if the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 determines that the first DICOM file is forged or altered in the first or second verifications, it may provide a failed verification to the second external electronic device 300.

[0034] According to various embodiments, when verifying multiple DICOM files (DICOM file groups) for one patient, it is possible to determine whether there are differences in patient information between the DICOM files and display this information to the verifier, and also verify whether some of the DICOM files have been tampered with. For example, if a DICOM file for Lee Soon-shin is mixed into a DICOM file group for Hong Gil-dong, it can display the patient information for Hong Gil-dong and Lee Soon-shin, making verification easier. In other words, it can verify the case where a video of Lee Soon-shin, a cancer patient, is added to a video of a healthy Hong Gil-dong.

[0035] A specific example of DICOM forgery / alteration verification according to an embodiment will now be described.

[0036] To verify the forgery or alteration of DICOM files submitted by military service obligors, the Military Manpower Administration staff can connect to a designated second website through the second external electronic device 300. The second external electronic device 300 can upload the first DICOM file(s) dragged and dropped into a specific area of ​​the second website designated by the Military Manpower Administration staff, and request the forgery or alteration verification device 400 to verify the forgery or alteration of the DICOM file(s).

[0037] The second external electronic device 300 first performs a first forgery / alteration verification, and if the first verification is passed, the second forgery / alteration verification device 400 transmits the issue number extracted from the first DICOM file and hash information of the first DICOM file to perform a second forgery / alteration verification.

[0038] The counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 displays personal information (e.g., name, gender, date of birth) confirmed in the process of checking whether the first DICOM file is counterfeit or altered, thereby enabling the Military Manpower Administration staff to compare it with the ID card they have confirmed.

[0039] In this way, the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 according to one embodiment adds counterfeit / alteration verification information to medical data (DICOM file) that has not been separately verified for counterfeit / alteration, and then supports counterfeit / alteration verification based on the counterfeit / alteration verification information of the medical data, thereby verifying that the medical data is not being illegally used for military service exemption, etc.

[0040] In addition, since the forgery / alteration verification device 400 according to one embodiment may require a long time to verify forgery / alteration based on a DICOM file, the second external electronic device 300 can filter the DICOM file once in the first verification and then verify the DICOM file in the second verification.

[0041] FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating the configuration of an apparatus for verifying forgery and alteration of an image according to an embodiment.

[0042] Referring to FIG. 2, the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 according to one embodiment may include at least one of a first processor 410, a first memory 430, an input interface device 450, an output interface device 460, and a storage device 440, which communicate with each other via a bus 470. The counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 may further include a first communication device 420 connected to a network. In one embodiment, the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 may omit some components or include additional components. Furthermore, although some of the components of the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 may be combined into a single entity, the functions of the corresponding components before the combination may still be performed. For example, the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 may include a first device providing a DICOM file issuance service and a second device providing a DICOM file counterfeit / alteration verification service. In this specification, the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 will be described as providing both the DICOM file issuance service and the counterfeit / alteration verification service in a single computing device. However, the present invention is not limited to this example.

[0043] The first memory 430 and the storage device 440 may include various types of volatile or non-volatile memory. For example, the first memory 430 may include a read only memory (ROM) and a random access memory (RAM). In one embodiment, the first memory 430 may be located inside or outside the first processor 410, and may be connected to the first processor 410 through various known means. The first memory 430 may store various data used by at least one component (e.g., the first processor 410) of the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400. The data may include, for example, input data or output data for software and associated instructions. For example, the first memory 430 may store at least one instruction and data for providing a DICOM file issuance / counterfeit / alteration verification service.

[0044] The first communication device 420 can support the establishment of a communication channel or a wireless communication channel between the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 and another device (e.g., the first and second external electronic devices 300) and the performance of communication through the established communication channel. The communication channel can include at least one communication channel selected from the group consisting of LAN, FTTH, xDSL, WiBro, Wireless LAN, Wi-Fi, Ultra Wideband (UWB), 3G, 4G, and 5G. The first communication device 420 can communicate using known communication methods such as CDMA, GSM, W-CDMA, TD-SCDMA, WiBro, LTE, and EPC.

[0045] The first processor 410 can control at least one other component (e.g., hardware or software component) of the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 and can perform various data processing or calculations. The first processor 410 can include, for example, at least one of a central processing unit (CPU), a graphics processing unit (GPU), a microprocessor, an application processor, an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or a field programmable gate array (FPGA), and can have multiple cores. The first processor 410 can be a central processing unit (CPU) or a semiconductor device that executes instructions stored in the first memory 430 or the storage device 440.

[0046] According to one embodiment, the first processor 410 may receive a request for issuance of a DICOM file from a user (e.g., medical staff or patient) through the input interface device 450 or the first communication device 420. The first processor 410 may directly receive a user's issuance request through the input interface device 450, or may receive an issuance request from the first external electronic device 200. In one embodiment, the first processor 410 may receive first patient information (e.g., resident ID number, patient registration number) along with the request for issuance of the DICOM file. The first processor 410 may further receive type information (e.g., medical department, examination date, or examination name) of the DICOM file requested for issuance.

[0047] According to an embodiment, when the first processor 410 receives the issuance request, it can search for a DICOM file corresponding to the first patient information among the patient-specific DICOM files in the medical database 100 based on the first patient information (or the first patient information and type information). In addition, when the first processor 410 receives the issuance request, it can generate a first issuance number.

[0048] According to one embodiment, the first processor 410 may generate forgery / alteration verification information based on at least some of the meta information of the searched DICOM file. For example, the first processor 410 may generate a first hash value (forgery / alteration verification information) using at least some of the meta information of the DICOM file and a first issue number. The part of the information may include, for example, at least one of first patient information and the issuer of the DICOM file group (e.g., hospital name). Additionally, the first processor 410 may generate a first hash value for primary verification by further using a hash value (third hash value) of each searched DICOM file. Additionally, the first processor 410 may generate a first hash value for primary verification by further using other information (e.g., issue date) of the searched DICOM file.

[0049] According to one embodiment, the first processor 410 may insert the first hash value into a designated tag area of ​​the copy as information for verifying forgery or alteration while transmitting a copy of the DICOM file to the first external electronic device 200 (or the external storage device 250). The designated tag area may be, for example, a user-defined tag area of ​​the DICOM file. The first processor 410 may further insert other characteristic information (e.g., issue number, issuer information) into the designated tag area as information for verifying forgery or alteration.

[0050] According to one embodiment, the first processor 410 may generate a second hash value based on the individual copy of the DICOM file into which the forgery / alteration verification information has been inserted. In one embodiment, the first processor 410 may store verification data including the first issue number and the second hash value in the database 100 for verifying forgery / alteration of the issued DICOM file.

[0051] According to one embodiment, the issued DICOM file may be composed of multiple DICOM files included in a DICOM file group. In this case, the issue number may include a serial number for each DICOM file and an original number (or unique number) for the DICOM file group. Therefore, the first processor 410 may calculate a first hash value for each DICOM file using the original number and the serial number for each DICOM file and insert the calculated first hash value into each DICOM file. In this case, the first hash value for each DICOM file may be different from the other DICOM files in the DICOM file group.

[0052] According to an embodiment, when the first processor 410 issues a DICOM file online in response to an online request from the first external electronic device 200, the first processor 410 may compress (encrypt) a copy of the DICOM file based on a password transmitted from the first external electronic device 200 and transmit the compressed copy to the first external electronic device 200. In this case, the first external electronic device 200 may compress the copy of the DICOM file using the password and then store the compressed copy in the external storage device 250.

[0053] The following explains how to verify forgery and alteration.

[0054] According to one embodiment, the second external electronic device 300 may include an input / output module 310, a second memory 320, and a second processor 330. The input / output module 310 may include an input module such as a keyboard, a display, and a communication module. In one embodiment, the second memory 320 may be located inside or outside the second processor 330, and may be connected to the second processor 330 through various known means. The second memory 320 may store various data used by at least one component (e.g., the second processor 330) of the second external electronic device 300. The data may include, for example, input data or output data for software and associated instructions. For example, the second memory 320 may store at least one instruction and data for primary verification of DICOM file forgery or alteration. The second processor 330 may control at least one other component (e.g., hardware or software component) of the second external electronic device 300 and perform various data processing or calculations. The second processor 330 may include, for example, at least one of a central processing unit (CPU), a graphics processing unit (GPU), a microprocessor, an application processor, an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or a field programmable gate array (FPGA), and may have multiple cores. The second processor 330 may be a central processing unit (CPU) or a semiconductor device that executes instructions stored in the second memory 320.

[0055] According to one embodiment, in the first verification process, the first processor 410 may provide the second external electronic device 300 with a first website related to the first counterfeit / alteration verification. In this case, the second processor 330 of the second external electronic device 300 may access the first website and extract a pre-registered first hash value and a first issue number from a designated tag area of ​​the first DICOM file through its web browser. The designated tag area may be at least a portion of a user-definable tag area. The second processor 330 may also generate a first hash value to be verified based on a portion of the meta information of the first DICOM file. The second processor 330 may perform the first verification by comparing the first hash value to be verified with the pre-registered first hash value. If the first verification results in a discrepancy between the first hash value to be verified and the pre-registered first hash value, the second processor 330 of the second external electronic device 300 may notify the I / O module 310 that the first DICOM file has been counterfeited or altered.

[0056] Meanwhile, if the first hash value to be verified matches the pre-registered first hash value, the second external electronic device 300 (second processor 330) can perform secondary verification of the first DICOM file. The second external electronic device 300 can generate a second hash value to be verified using the entire first DICOM file to be verified. The second external electronic device 300 can transmit the generated second hash value to the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 via the input / output module 310.

[0057] The first processor 410 can obtain a pre-registered second hash value corresponding to the first issue number from the verification data in the database 100. The first processor 410 can receive a request for a second forgery / alteration verification for the first DICOM file from the second external electronic device 300 through the input interface device 450 or the first communication device 420. Upon confirming the verification request, the first processor 410 can perform a final verification of whether the first DICOM file is forged or altered through the second forgery / alteration verification.

[0058] For example, the forgery / alteration verification device 400 can perform a second verification of whether the first DICOM file is forged or altered by comparing the second hash value to be verified received from the second external electronic device 300 with a pre-registered second hash value. If the second hash value to be verified matches the pre-registered second hash value, the first processor 410 can determine that the first DICOM file for which forgery / alteration verification is requested is not forged or altered. On the other hand, if the second hash value to be verified does not match the pre-registered second hash value, the first processor 410 can determine that the first DICOM file for which forgery / alteration verification is requested is forged or altered.

[0059] According to an embodiment, the first processor 410 may provide the second verification result to a second user (eg, a verification requester) through the output interface device 460 or the second external electronic device 300 .

[0060] According to various embodiments, once the first processor 410 has completed the second verification, it may provide the second external electronic device 300 with personal information (e.g., name, gender, date of birth) confirmed in the process of verifying whether the first DICOM file is forged or altered. In this case, the second external electronic device 300 may output the personal information to assist the second user in comparing it with the identity of the person who submitted the first DICOM file. For example, the first processor 410 may extract the date of birth, name, and gender of the patient information from the meta information of the first DICOM file and output the extracted patient information through the second external electronic device 300. This may assist the second user in comparing it with the input patient information (or the identity on the submitter's ID or certificate). As another example, the first processor 410 may check the first issuance number in the meta information of the first DICOM file and obtain from the database 100 the resident registration number corresponding to the first issuance number of the first DICOM file. The first processor 410 may compare the obtained resident registration number with the input resident registration number.

[0061] In various embodiments, if the pre-registered patient information does not match the input patient information, the first processor 410 or the second user may determine that the first DICOM file is forged or altered.

[0062] In this way, the forgery / alteration verification device 400 according to one embodiment adds forgery / alteration verification information to medical data (DICOM file) that has not been separately verified for forgery / alteration, and then supports forgery / alteration verification based on the forgery / alteration verification information of the medical data, thereby preventing medical data from being illegally used for military service exemption, etc.

[0063] In addition, since the forgery / alteration verification device 400 according to one embodiment may require a long time to verify forgery / alteration based on the entire DICOM file, the second external electronic device 300 can filter the DICOM file once in the first verification and then verify the DICOM file in detail in the second verification.

[0064] FIG. 3 shows an example of the use of a DICOM file according to one embodiment.

[0065] 3, a DICOM file 30 according to an embodiment may include a file meta information area 31 and an object instance area 32. The counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 may insert a first hash value into a tag area designated in the file meta information area 31. The counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 may further insert other characteristic information (e.g., issue number, issuer information) into the designated tag area. The designated tag area may be, for example, a user-defined tag area (e.g., Ox0011) of the DICOM file.

[0066] FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating a method for verifying forgery or alteration of a medical image according to an embodiment.

[0067] Referring to FIG. 4, in operation 410, the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 may receive a DICOM file issuance request from the first external electronic device 200.

[0068] In operation 420, the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 may obtain patient information related to the issuance request from the first external electronic device 200. For example, the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 may obtain patient information included in the DICOM file verification request.

[0069] In operation 430, the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 can search the database 100 for a DICOM file corresponding to the acquired patient information.

[0070] In operation 440, the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 may generate an issue number associated with the issuance of the DICOM file. If the DICOM file belongs to a DICOM file group containing multiple DICOM files, the issue number may include an original number assigned to the DICOM file group and a serial number for each DICOM file.

[0071] In operation 450, the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 can generate a first hash value using a part of the meta information of the DICOM file and the issue number.

[0072] In operation 460, the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 may insert a first hash value into a designated tag area of ​​the copy while providing a copy of the DICOM file to the first external electronic device 200. The first hash value may be used for primary counterfeit / alteration verification of the copy of the DICOM file.

[0073] In operation 470, the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 can generate a second hash value for each individual file using the individual copy of the DICOM file into which the first hash value has been inserted.

[0074] In operation 480, the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 may store the second hash value associated with the issue number as verification data for the copy of the DICOM file in the database 100. The first hash value may be used for secondary counterfeit / alteration verification for the copy of the DICOM file.

[0075] FIG. 5 is a flowchart illustrating a method for verifying forgery or alteration of a medical image according to an embodiment.

[0076] Referring to FIG. 5, in operation 510, the second external electronic device 300 may confirm that DICOM file validation has been requested.

[0077] In operation 520, the second external electronic device 300 may extract the first hash value from the DICOM file.

[0078] In operation 530, the second external electronic device 300 may generate a first hash value using some of the meta-information of the DICOM file.

[0079] In operation 540, the second external electronic device 300 may verify whether the generated first hash value matches the extracted first hash value and can pass the primary verification.

[0080] If it is confirmed in operation 540 that the primary verification has been passed, the second external electronic device 300 can generate a second hash value (second hash value to be verified) of the individual DICOM file in operation 550.

[0081] In operation 550, the second external electronic device 300 extracts the issue number from the DICOM file to be verified, calculates a second hash value of the DICOM file, and transmits the issue number and the second hash value to the forgery / alteration verification device 400.

[0082] In operation 560, the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 obtains the issue number and the second hash value to be verified from the second external electronic device 300, and can obtain the pre-registered second hash value corresponding to the issue number from the database 100.

[0083] In operation 565, the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 can check whether the second hash value to be verified received from the second external electronic device 300 matches the pre-registered second hash value.

[0084] In operation 570, it can be determined whether the second verification has passed based on whether the second hash value to be verified matches a pre-registered second hash value.

[0085] If it is confirmed in operation 570 that the second verification has been passed, the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 can inform the second external electronic device 300 in operation 580 that the DICOM file is not counterfeit or altered.

[0086] If the second external electronic device 300 determines in operation 540 that the primary verification has not been passed, it can notify the user that the DICOM file is a forged or altered file in operation 590. Alternatively, if the counterfeit / alteration verification device 400 determines in operation 580 that the secondary verification has not been passed, it can notify the user that the DICOM file is a forged or altered file through the second external electronic device 300 in operation 590.

[0087] FIG. 6 illustrates an example of providing a verification result according to an embodiment.

[0088] Referring to FIG. 6, the second external electronic device 300 according to an embodiment can verify whether the recipient (issuer), patient ID, patient name, gender, patient date of birth, original ID, serial number, and file name of the remaining DICOM files, excluding seven of the total 9,721 files included in one DICOM file group, match. If the second external electronic device 300 determines in steps 1 and 2 that the recipient and original ID are not provided in the first verification results, it can indicate forgery or falsification by displaying a different color (e.g., steps 1 to 7 in FIG. 6) for the forged or altered DICOM file. Therefore, the second user can visually compare the personal information included in the DICOM file verification results with the identity of the DICOM file submitter to verify whether the submitter has plagiarized the DICOM file. Furthermore, the second external electronic device 300 according to an embodiment can provide a breakdown of errors for all the submitted files. If the requested DICOM file type is two or more, it can verify that the DICOM file does not represent a single person's video material (DICOM file). This allows the second user to visually confirm that the file to be verified contains another person's video material (DICOM file).

[0089] The various embodiments and terms used herein are not intended to limit the technical features described herein to specific embodiments, but should be understood to encompass various modifications, equivalents, or alternatives of the embodiments. In connection with the description of the drawings, similar reference numerals may be used to refer to similar or related components. The singular form of a noun corresponding to an item may include one or more of the item, unless the relevant context clearly dictates otherwise. In this specification, phrases such as "A or B," "at least one of A and B," "at least one of A or B," "A, B, or C," "at least one of A, B, and C," and "at least one of A, B, or C" each include any one of the items listed in the corresponding phrase or all possible combinations thereof. Terms such as "first," "second," "initial," or "second" are used simply to distinguish a corresponding element from other corresponding elements and do not limit the corresponding element in other aspects (e.g., importance or order). When a (e.g., first) component is referred to as "coupled" or "coupled" to another (e.g., second) component, with or without the terms "functionally" or "communicatively," it means that the component can be coupled to the other component directly (e.g., by wire), wirelessly, or through a third component.

[0090] As used herein, the term "module" may include a unit implemented in hardware, software, or firmware, and may be used interchangeably with terms such as logic, logic block, component, or circuit. A module may be an integrated component or the smallest unit or portion of such a component that performs one or more functions. For example, according to one embodiment, a module may be implemented in the form of an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC).

[0091] Various embodiments of the present specification may be embodied as software (e.g., a program) including one or more instructions stored in a storage medium (e.g., internal or external memory) readable by a machine (e.g., a counterfeit / alteration verification device). For example, a processor (e.g., first processor 410) of a machine (e.g., counterfeit / alteration verification device 400) can retrieve and execute at least one of the one or more instructions stored in the storage medium. This allows the machine to operate to perform at least one function according to the retrieved at least one instruction. The one or more instructions may include code generated by a compiler or code executable by an interpreter. The machine-readable storage medium may be provided in the form of a non-transitory storage medium. Here, "non-transitory" simply means that the storage medium is a tangible device and does not contain signals (e.g., electromagnetic waves). This term does not distinguish between data being stored semi-permanently or temporarily on the storage medium.

[0092] According to one embodiment, methods according to various embodiments disclosed herein may be provided in a computer program product. The computer program product may be traded as a commodity between a seller and a buyer. The computer program product may be distributed in the form of a machine-readable storage medium (e.g., a compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM)) or may be distributed online (e.g., downloaded or uploaded) through an application store (e.g., Play Store™) or directly between two user devices (e.g., smartphones). In the case of online distribution, at least a portion of the computer program product may be at least temporarily stored or temporarily generated in a machine-readable storage medium, such as the memory of a manufacturer's server, an application store server, or an intermediary server.

[0093] Components according to various embodiments of the present specification may be implemented in the form of software or hardware, such as a digital signal processor (DSP), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), or an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), to perform a specific function. The term "component" is not limited to software or hardware; each component may be configured to reside on an addressable storage medium or to execute one or more processors. For example, components may include components such as software components, object-oriented software components, class components, and task components, as well as processes, functions, attributes, procedures, subroutines, program code segments, drivers, firmware, microcode, circuits, data, databases, data structures, tables, arrays, and variables.

[0094] According to various embodiments, each of the aforementioned components (e.g., modules or programs) may comprise one or more entities. According to various embodiments, one or more of the aforementioned components or operations may be omitted, or one or more additional components or operations may be added. Alternatively or additionally, multiple components (e.g., modules or programs) may be integrated into a single component. In such cases, the integrated component may perform one or more functions of each of the multiple components in the same or similar manner as performed by the corresponding component of the multiple components prior to the integration. According to various embodiments, operations performed by modules, programs, or other components may be performed sequentially, in parallel, iteratively, or heuristically, or one or more of the operations may be performed in a different order, omitted, or one or more additional operations may be added.

Claims

1. In medical image forgery and falsification verification equipment, a memory for storing patient-specific DICOM files; and a processor operatively coupled to the memory; The processor: When a request for issuing a DICOM file is made, the DICOM file corresponding to the request is searched for among the patient-specific DICOM files, generating an issue number associated with the issue and extracting a portion of the meta information of the DICOM file; generating a first hash value using the part of information and the issue number; and inserting the first hash value as forgery / alteration verification information into a designated tag area of ​​the copy while providing a copy of the DICOM file to an external storage device.

2. The processor: generating a second hash value for each copy of the DICOM file; 2. The medical image counterfeit / alteration verification device according to claim 1, wherein the second hash value is stored in the memory in association with the issue number.

3. The part of the information is:

2. The medical image forgery / alteration verification device according to claim 1, wherein the information includes at least one of the requested patient information and the destination of the searched DICOM file.

4. The processor: calculating a third hash value for each of the retrieved DICOM files; 2. The medical image forgery / alteration verification device according to claim 1, wherein the first hash value is calculated based on the third hash value, the issue number, and the part of the information.

5. The processor: providing a plurality of DICOM files including the DICOM file in response to the request; the issue number includes a serial number of each of the DICOM files and an original number of all of the plurality of DICOM files; The medical image forgery / alteration verification device according to claim 1 , wherein the processor calculates the first hash value of each of the DICOM files based on the original number and the serial number of each of the DICOM files.

6. The processor:

2. The medical image forgery / alteration verification device of claim 1, further comprising: a compression password obtained from the requester along with the request; a copy of the DICOM file compressed using the obtained password; and a copy of the DICOM file stored in the external storage device.

7. In medical image forgery and falsification verification equipment, a memory for storing verification data including the issue number of the patient-specific DICOM file and a hash value of the individual file; and a processor operatively coupled to the memory; The processor: When a verification request for a first DICOM file stored in an external storage device is received, a first hash value and a first issue number that are pre-registered are extracted from a designated tag area of ​​the first DICOM file; generating a first hash value to be verified using a portion of the meta information of the first DICOM file; A medical image forgery / falsification verification device, characterized in that it performs primary verification of whether the first DICOM file is forged or falsified by comparing the pre-registered first hash value with the first hash value to be verified.

8. The processor: generating a second hash value to be verified for the first DICOM file; obtaining a pre-registered second hash value of a DICOM file corresponding to the first issue number from the verification data; 8. The medical image forgery / falsification verification device according to claim 7, characterized in that secondary verification of forgery / falsification of the first DICOM file is performed by comparing the second hash value to be verified with the second hash value registered in advance.

9. the first DICOM file is one of a plurality of DICOM files included in a first DICOM file group, and the first issue number includes a serial number of each DICOM file and an original number of the first DICOM file group; The medical image counterfeit / alteration verification device of claim 7, characterized in that the processor obtains the pre-registered first hash value corresponding to the original number and the serial number of each of the DICOM files from the verification data.

10. The processor:

10. The medical image counterfeit / alteration verification device of claim 7, further comprising: acquiring personal information together with the verification request; and verifying whether the first DICOM file has been counterfeited or altered by comparing the personal information acquired during or before the first verification with patient information corresponding to the first issue number.

Images