Electronic signature system, electronic signature method, and program

By integrating a nonce into the message signed with a traceable ring signature, the system ensures signer anonymity and detects double use in electronic cash protocols, addressing the limitations of existing traceable ring signatures in electronic cash protocols.

WO2024241449A1PCT designated stage expired Publication Date: 2024-11-28NT T INC
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Patent Information

Application Number
PCT/JP2023/019025
Authority / Receiving Office
WO · WO
Patent Type
Applications
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2023-05-22
Publication Date
2024-11-28

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing traceable ring signatures fail to detect double use of the same currency token in electronic cash protocols, as they are designed to detect double signatures for different messages within the same session, not for the same message with different event values.

Method used

Incorporating a nonce generated by the recipient into the message signed with a traceable ring signature, where the event value is uniquely determined from the history of the token, ensuring signatures for different messages can be traced when using the same currency token.

Benefits of technology

This approach maintains signer anonymity while enabling detection of double use or unauthorized transactions, ensuring property (2) is preserved even when the same event value is used across multiple legitimate transactions.

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Abstract

An electronic signature system according to one aspect of the present disclosure includes: a creation unit that, by using a currency token T[n-1] representing electronic cash for remittance from a remitter to a remittee and a nonce generated by the remittee, creates a message for remittance of the electronic cash to the remittee and a signature for the message, for which a traceable ring signature is used; and a transmission unit that transmits the message and the signature to a verifier who verifies the signature and executes a transaction relating to remittance. The creation unit creates a message in which there are included a hash value of the currency token T[n-1], a public key of the remittee, and the nonce, and creates the signature by using a signature function in which the hash value of the currency token T[n-1] is employed as an event value.
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Description

Electronic signature system, electronic signature method and program

[0001] The present disclosure relates to an electronic signature system, an electronic signature method, and a program.

[0002] The number of transactions with electronic signatures is increasing, especially for electronic cash. A typical electronic signature has a one-to-one correspondence with a public key for verifying the signature, so it is possible to identify the signer by tracing the public key from the signature attached to each transaction (in other words, the signer can be traced).

[0003] On the other hand, there are an increasing number of usage scenarios where the privacy of signers needs to be protected, and a digital signature called a ring signature is expected to be a useful method. A ring signature is a digital signature that makes it impossible to identify the actual signer among multiple signers (in other words, a digital signature that makes it impossible to identify or trace the actual signer). Furthermore, among ring signatures, there is also a traceable ring signature, which makes it possible to identify or trace the signer only in the event of fraud such as double signing (also called double use of signature or simply double use) (Non-Patent Document 1).

[0004] Fujisaki, E., Suzuki, K. (2007). Traceable Ring Signature. In: Okamoto, T., Wang, X. (eds) Public Key Cryptography - PKC 2007. PKC 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4450. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https: / / doi.org / 10.1007 / 978-3-540-71677-8_13

[0005] However, in existing traceable ring signatures, the trigger for detecting double-spending is a signature for different messages m in the same session (i.e., the same event value). Therefore, while it is effective for detecting double-spending in an electronic voting protocol (a specific example is double voting for different recipients in the same voting session), it cannot be used to detect double-spending in an electronic cash protocol (a specific example is double-spending of the same currency token).

[0006] The present disclosure has been made in view of the above points, and provides a technology that enables double signatures in electronic cash protocols to be detected by traceable ring signatures.

[0007] An electronic signature system according to one aspect of the present disclosure includes a creation unit that creates a message for sending electronic cash to the recipient using a currency token T[n-1] representing electronic cash to be sent from a sender to a recipient and a nonce generated by the recipient, and a signature for the message using a traceable ring signature; and a sending unit that sends the message and the signature to a verifier that verifies the signature and performs a transaction related to the remittance, wherein the creation unit creates a message including a hash value of the currency token T[n-1], the recipient's public key, and the nonce, and creates the signature using a signature function with the hash value of the currency token T[n-1] as an event value.

[0008] A technique is provided that makes dual signatures in electronic cash protocols detectable by traceable ring signatures.

[0009] FIG. 1 is a diagram showing an example of the overall configuration of a remittance system according to the present embodiment. FIG. 2 is a diagram showing an example of the functional configuration of a remittance device according to the present embodiment. FIG. 3 is a diagram showing an example of the functional configuration of a remittance device according to the present embodiment. FIG. 4 is a diagram showing an example of the functional configuration of a verifier device according to the present embodiment. FIG. 5 is a flowchart showing an example of remittance processing according to the present embodiment. FIG. 6 is a diagram showing an example of the hardware configuration of a computer.

[0010] An embodiment of the present invention will be described below.

[0011] <Trace Conditions for Traceable Ring Signatures> A traceable ring signature (Non-Patent Document 1) is a digital signature that has the following two properties (1) and (2).

[0012] (1) In a situation where there are multiple signers, it is not possible to identify the signers (i.e., to trace the signers). In other words, the signers are anonymous.

[0013] (2) If a double signature is used, the signer can be identified.

[0014] The second property (2) above can be more precisely stated as follows: if the same signer generates signatures for different messages with the same event value, the signer can be identified. Here, the event value is public information that the signer can freely determine.

[0015] Note that if the same signer generates a signature for the same message with the same event value, the two signatures are combined. Signatures with different event values ​​are not combined or identified.

[0016] <Problems when applying traceable ring signatures to electronic cash protocols> Consider the case of paying electronic cash using an electronic cash protocol. For example, let T[n-1] be the currency token to be used. In this case, the currency token T[n] generated when paying the currency is defined as follows. Note that n is an index or the like that represents the history of the token.

[0017] T[n] = ((H(T[n-1]), PKu2), S[n]) S[n] = Sign((H(T[n-1]), PKu2), SKu1) Here, S[n] is the signature for the currency token T[n], H(·) is a hash function, SKu1 is the sender's private key, PKu2 is the receiver's public key, and Sign(·) is the signature function. Note that "remittance" may also be called "payment," and "receipt" may also be called "receipt," etc.

[0018] In the above currency payment example, the payer (more precisely, their pseudonym) can be identified from the public key PKu1. Therefore, we consider applying traceable ring signatures (Non-Patent Document 1) to the signature function part in the above currency payment example. This is because the property (1) of traceable ring signatures makes it possible to provide anonymity to the signer.

[0019] However, if traceable ring signatures are simply applied, it may be impossible to identify the sender if he or she makes an unauthorized payment (for example, a double payment using a double signature), and this will result in the failure to meet property (2). This will be explained in detail below.

[0020] Assuming double spending, the currency tokens generated when paying currency are T[n] and T[n]' as follows.

[0021] T[n] = ((H(T[n-1]), PKu2), S[n]) S[n] = TRS_Sign_e((H(T[n-1]), PKu2), SKu1) T'[n] = ((H(T[n-1]), PKu3), S'[n]) S'[n] = TRS_Sign_e'((H(T[n-1]), PKu3), SKu1) Here, SKu1 is the sender's private key, PKu2 and PKu3 are the recipient's public keys. Also, TRS_Sign_e is the signature function for a traceable ring signature with an event value of e, and TRS_Sign_e' is the signature function e' for a traceable ring signature with an event value of e.

[0022] If PKu2≠PKu3, the messages to be signed are different, but if PKu2=PKu3, the messages to be signed are the same between double-spending transactions. Therefore, traceable ring signatures (Non-Patent Document 1) cannot detect double-spending, and do not have the above property (2). This is because the above property (2) is that if the same signer generates signatures for different messages with the same event value, the signer can be identified.

[0023] Furthermore, while the signer can freely set the event value, if the same event value is used for all payments, the sender can be identified from multiple legitimate remittances by the same sender, which may result in the loss of the above property (1).

[0024] <Proposed Method> When applying traceable ring signatures (Non-Patent Document 1) to the signature function part in the above currency payment example, the above properties (1) and (2) are obtained by the following (a) and (b).

[0025] (a) The recipient sends a nonce to the sender, and this nonce is included in the message to be signed. This allows a different message to be signed for each remittance.

[0026] (b) The signer (sender) does not decide the event value at the time of remittance, but rather the event value is uniquely determined from the history of tokens up to that point.

[0027] Specifically, the currency token T[n] generated when paying currency is as follows:

[0028] T[n] = ((H(T[n-1]), PKu2, nonce_u2), S[n]) S[n] = TRS_Sign_e((H(T[n-1]), PKu2, nonce_u2), SKu1) e = H(T[n-1]) Here, nonce_u2 is the nonce generated by the payee.

[0029] This allows for tracking of the signer when duplicate use occurs, since different messages with the same event value are signed by the same signer. In other words, the above properties (1) and (2) are met.

[0030] As a specific example, let us assume a double spend and the following two currency tokens T[n] and T[n]' are generated when paying currency.

[0031] T[n]=((H(T[n-1]), PKu2, nonce_u2), S[n]) S[n]=TRS_Sign_e((H(T[n-1]), PKu2, nonce_u2), SKU1) e=H(T[n-1]) T'[n]=((H(T[n-1]), PKu3, nonce_u3), S'[n]) S'[n]=TRS_Sign_e'((H(T[n-1]), PKu3, nonce_u3), SKu1) e'=H(T[n-1]) Here, SKu1 is the private key of the sender, PKu2 and PKu3 are the public keys of the receiver, nonce_u2 is a nonce generated by the receiver who has the public key PKu2, and nonce_u3 is a nonce generated by the receiver who has the public key PKu3.

[0032] This results in signatures for different messages with the same event value H(T[n-1]) (i.e., when the same currency token is used), so that the signer can be traced due to the above property (2).

[0033] Below, we will explain a remittance system 1 that can remit electronic cash using the above-mentioned proposed method. In the following, the list of public keys of ring members in a traceable ring signature is defined as L = {PK1, ..., PKn}. The sender's public key PKu1 is included in the public key list L (i.e., PKu1∈L). On the other hand, the recipient's public keys PKu2, PKu3, etc. may or may not be included in the public key list L. In other words, the recipient may or may not be a ring member.

[0034] <Remittance System> An example of the overall configuration of a remittance system 1 according to this embodiment is shown in Figure 1. As shown in Figure 1, the remittance system 1 according to this embodiment includes multiple remittance device(s) 10, one or more remittance recipient device(s) 20, and one or more verifier device(s) 30. These devices are communicatively connected via a communication network 40, which may include, for example, the Internet.

[0035] The remitter device 10 is a computer or computer system used or managed by the remitter (signer). Each signer is a ring member. Each signer is not limited to a specific person, but may be, for example, a settlement institution such as a bank or financial institution.

[0036] The receiver device 20 is a computer or computer system used or managed by the receiver. The receiver is not limited to a specific person, but may be, for example, a settlement institution such as a bank or financial institution.

[0037] The verifier device 30 is a computer or computer system used or managed by a party (hereinafter also referred to as a verifier) ​​that verifies the signature and, if the verification is successful, executes the remittance transaction. For example, if the electronic cash protocol uses a blockchain, the verifier device 30 may be a node or the like that constitutes a blockchain network.

[0038] The remitter device 10, the receiver device 20, and the verifier device 30 can be realized, for example, by a PC (personal computer), a general-purpose server, a smartphone, a tablet terminal, a wearable device, etc.

[0039] <Example of Functional Configuration> Hereinafter, an example of the functional configuration of the remittance device 10, the remittance receiver device 20, and the verifier device 30 included in the remittance system 1 according to this embodiment will be described.

[0040] <<Remitter Device 10>> An example of the functional configuration of the remitter device 10 according to this embodiment is shown in Figure 2. As shown in Figure 2, the remitter device 10 according to this embodiment includes a currency token creation unit 101 and a transaction issuing unit 102. These units are implemented, for example, by one or more programs installed in the remitter device 10, which are executed by a computing device such as a CPU (Central Processing Unit). The remitter device 10 according to this embodiment also includes a memory unit 103. The memory unit 103 is implemented, for example, by a storage device such as a hard disk drive (HDD), a solid state drive (SSD), or a flash memory.

[0041] The currency token creation unit 101 creates a currency token including a message and its signature, using the nonce received from the money recipient device 20. Specifically, the currency token creation unit 101 creates a currency token T[n] to be generated when paying currency as follows:

[0042] T[n] = ((H(T[n-1]), PKu2, nonce_u2), S[n]) S[n] = TRS_Sign_e((H(T[n-1]), PKu2, nonce_u2), SKu1) e = H(T[n-1]) Here, (H(T[n-1]), PKu2, nonce_u2) is the message and S[n] is the signature. Also, H(·) is a hash function, SKu1 is the private key of the sender, PKu2 is the public key of the recipient, TRS_Sign_e is the signature function of a traceable ring signature with an event value of e, and nonce_u2 is the value of the nonce received from the recipient device 20.

[0043] The transaction generator 102 generates a remittance transaction that includes the currency token T[n]. That is, the transaction generator 102 creates the remittance transaction and sends it to the verifier device 30.

[0044] The storage unit 103 stores various information required for creating currency tokens, issuing remittance transactions, etc. (for example, one's own private key SKu1, traceable ring signature public key list L, etc.).

[0045] For simplicity, the above currency token T[n] does not include information about the ring, but strictly speaking, information about the ring needs to be included in the currency token for signature verification. In other words, more strictly, the currency token creation unit 101 needs to create, for example, the following currency token T[n]:

[0046] T[n] = ((H(T[n-1]), H(L), PKu2, nonce_u2), S[n]) S[n] = TRS_Sign_e((H(T[n-1]), H(L), PKu2, nonce_u2), SKu1) e = H(T[n-1]) Note that the public key list L may be entered directly instead of H(L). In the above example, the hash value H(L) of the public key list is entered to reduce the size of the currency token T[n].

[0047] Furthermore, the public key list L must be included in a currency key certificate, and the currency key certificate must be transmitted together with the currency token T[n]. That is, the transaction issuing unit 102 must issue a remittance transaction that includes, for example, the currency token T[n] and the currency key certificate.

[0048] However, for simplicity, the information about the ring included in the currency token T[n] and the currency key certificate will be omitted below.

[0049] <<Payment Receiver Device 20>> Fig. 3 shows an example of the functional configuration of the payment receiver device 20 according to this embodiment. As shown in Fig. 3, the payment receiver device 20 according to this embodiment has a nonce generation unit 201. The nonce generation unit 201 is realized, for example, by a processing unit such as a CPU that executes one or more programs installed in the payment receiver device 20. The payment receiver device 20 according to this embodiment also has a memory unit 202. The memory unit 202 is realized, for example, by a storage device such as an HDD, SSD, or flash memory.

[0050] The nonce generation unit 201 generates a nonce and sends it to the remitter device 10. Note that the nonce may be, for example, a random value or a random number.

[0051] The storage unit 202 stores information (for example, a seed) for generating a nonce.

[0052] <Verifier Device 30> Fig. 4 shows an example of the functional configuration of the verifier device 30 according to this embodiment. As shown in Fig. 4, the verifier device 30 according to this embodiment includes a signature verification unit 301 and a transaction execution unit 302. These units are realized, for example, by a processing unit such as a CPU that executes one or more programs installed in the verifier device 30. The verifier device 30 according to this embodiment also includes a storage unit 303. The storage unit 303 is realized, for example, by a storage device such as an HDD, SSD, or flash memory.

[0053] The signature verification unit 301 uses the public key list L of the traceable ring signature to verify the signature S[n] included in the remittance transaction received from the remitter device 10. The public key list L used for signature verification can be identified, for example, from information about the ring included in the currency token T[n] (for example, H(L)).

[0054] If the signature verification unit 301 successfully verifies the signature S[n], the transaction execution unit 302 executes the remittance transaction, thereby realizing an actual remittance transaction from the remitter to the recipient.

[0055] The storage unit 303 stores information necessary for signature verification and the like (for example, the public key list L of the traceable ring signature).

[0056] <Remittance Processing> The remittance processing according to this embodiment will be described below with reference to FIG.

[0057] First, the nonce generation unit 201 of the money receiver device 20 generates a nonce and sends it to the money sender device 10 (step S101). The method of transmission is not particularly limited, and the nonce may be transmitted via the communication network 40 or by other methods (e.g., short-range wireless communication, reading of code information, etc.).

[0058] The currency token creation unit 101 of the remitter device 10 uses the nonce received from the remitter device 20 to create a currency token T[n] that includes the message and its signature (step S102). That is, the currency token creation unit 101 creates the following currency token T[n]:

[0059] T[n] = ((H(T[n-1]), PKu2, nonce_u2), S[n]) S[n] = TRS_Sign_e((H(T[n-1]), PKu2, nonce_u2), SKu1) e = H(T[n-1]) Note that nonce_u2 is the value of the nonce received from the money receiver device 20.

[0060] The transaction issuing unit 102 of the remitter device 10 issues a remittance transaction including the currency token T[n] created in step S102 (step S103). For example, if the electronic cash protocol uses a blockchain, the transaction issuing unit 102 sends the remittance transaction to the verifier device 30, which is a node that constitutes the blockchain network.

[0061] The signature verification unit 301 of the verifier device 30 verifies the signature S[n] included in the remittance transaction received from the remitter device 10 using the public key list L of the traceable ring signature (step S104). For details of the signature verification method, please refer to Non-Patent Document 1, etc.

[0062] If the signature verification in step S104 is successful, the transaction execution unit 302 of the verifier device 30 executes the remittance transaction (step S105), thereby realizing the actual remittance transaction from the remitter to the recipient.

[0063] <Hardware Configuration Example> The remittance device 10, remittance receiver device 20, and verifier device 30 included in the remittance system 1 according to this embodiment are realized, for example, by the hardware configuration of a computer 500 shown in Fig. 6. The computer 500 shown in Fig. 6 comprises an input device 501, a display device 502, an external I / F 503, a communication I / F 504, a RAM (Random Access Memory) 505, a ROM (Read Only Memory) 506, an auxiliary storage device 507, and a processor 508. Each of these pieces of hardware is communicatively connected via a bus 509.

[0064] The input device 501 is, for example, a keyboard, a mouse, a touch panel, a physical button, etc. The display device 502 is, for example, a display, a display panel, etc. Note that the computer 500 does not necessarily have to have at least one of the input device 501 and the display device 502, for example.

[0065] The external I / F 503 is an interface with an external device such as a recording medium 503a. The computer 500 can read from and write to the recording medium 503a via the external I / F 503. Examples of the recording medium 503a include a flexible disk, a CD (Compact Disc), a DVD (Digital Versatile Disk), an SD memory card (Secure Digital memory card), and a USB (Universal Serial Bus) memory card.

[0066] The communication I / F 504 is an interface for connecting the computer 500 to a communication network. The RAM 505 is a volatile semiconductor memory (storage device) that temporarily stores programs and data. The ROM 506 is a non-volatile semiconductor memory (storage device) that can store programs and data even when the power is turned off. The auxiliary storage device 507 is a storage device (storage device) such as an HDD, SSD, or flash memory. The processor 508 is an arithmetic device such as a CPU.

[0067] The remitter device 10, receiver device 20, and verifier device 30 included in the remittance system 1 according to this embodiment can realize the various processes described above by having, for example, the hardware configuration of a computer 500 shown in Figure 6. Note that the hardware configuration of the computer 500 shown in Figure 6 is merely an example, and the hardware configuration of the computer 500 is not limited to this. For example, the computer 500 may have multiple auxiliary storage devices 507 or multiple processors 508, may not have some of the hardware shown in the figure, or may have various hardware other than the hardware shown in the figure.

[0068] <Summary> As described above, in the remittance system 1 according to this embodiment, when a traceable ring signature is applied to an electronic cash protocol, a nonce generated by the recipient is included in the message to be signed, and an event value is uniquely determined from the history of the currency token. This ensures the anonymity of the signer (property (1) above) and the traceability of fraudulent use such as double spending (property (2) above). Therefore, for example, it is possible to trace fraudulent use while ensuring the anonymity of the signer when paying currency.

[0069] The present invention is not limited to the above-described specifically disclosed embodiments, and various modifications, changes, and combinations with known technologies are possible without departing from the scope of the claims.

[0070] 1 Remittance system 10 Remitter device 20 Recipient device 30 Verifier device 40 Communication network 101 Currency token creation unit 102 Transaction issuing unit 103 Memory unit 201 Nonce generation unit 202 Memory unit 301 Signature verification unit 302 Transaction execution unit 303 Memory unit 500 Computer 501 Input device 502 Display device 503 External I / F 503a Recording medium 504 Communication I / F 505 RAM 506 ROM 507 Auxiliary storage device 508 Processor 509 Bus

Claims

1. An electronic signature system comprising: a creation unit that creates a message for sending the electronic cash to the payee and a signature for the message using a traceable ring signature, using a currency token T[n-1] representing electronic cash to be sent from a sender to a payee and a nonce generated by the payee; and a sending unit that transmits the message and the signature to a verifier that verifies the signature and performs a transaction related to the remittance, wherein the creation unit creates a message including a hash value of the currency token T[n-1], the payee's public key, and the nonce, and creates the signature using a signature function with the hash value of the currency token T[n-1] as an event value.

2. The electronic signature system according to claim 1, wherein the creation unit creates the message and the signature as a currency token T[n], and the transmission unit transmits the currency token T[n].

3. The electronic signature system according to claim 1 or 2, wherein the creation unit creates the message further including information regarding a public key list of ring members of the traceable ring signature.

4. The electronic signature system according to claim 3, wherein the information about the public key list is a hash value of the public key list.

5. An electronic signature method in which a computer executes the following steps: a creation step of creating a message for sending electronic cash to the payee, and a signature for the message using a traceable ring signature, using a currency token T[n-1] representing electronic cash to be sent from a sender to a payee, and a nonce generated by the payee; and a transmission step of sending the message and the signature to a verifier who verifies the signature and performs a transaction related to the remittance, wherein the creation step creates a message including a hash value of the currency token T[n-1], the payee's public key, and the nonce, and creates the signature using a signature function with the hash value of the currency token T[n-1] as an event value.

6. A program that causes a computer to execute the following steps: a creation step of creating a message for sending electronic cash to the recipient using a currency token T[n-1] representing electronic cash to be sent from a sender to a recipient and a nonce generated by the recipient, and a signature for the message using a traceable ring signature; and a transmission step of sending the message and the signature to a verifier who verifies the signature and performs the transaction related to the remittance, wherein the creation step creates a message including a hash value of the currency token T[n-1], the recipient's public key, and the nonce, and creates the signature using a signature function with the hash value of the currency token T[n-1] as an event value.

Citation Information

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