Heterogeneous wireless sensor network predistribution key management method

A wireless sensor and sensor network technology, applied in wireless communication, network topology, electrical components, etc., can solve the problems of poor survivability of the q-composite scheme, large node resource consumption, and key duplication, etc., and achieves key duplication. The effect of less likelihood, reduced storage requirements, and improved security

CN106993287AInactive Publication Date: 2017-07-28HEILONGJIANG UNIV
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Patent Information

Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Current Assignee / Owner
Publication Date
2017-07-28
Estimated Expiration
Not applicable · inactive patent

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Abstract

The invention discloses a heterogeneous wireless sensor network predistribution key management method, relates to the network predistribution key management method and aims at solving the problem that according to an E-G scheme, the network security is relatively low and a possibility that key repetition occurs is relatively high, according to a q-composite scheme, the destroy-resistance is relatively poor as the number of damaged nodes is increased, according to a single key space scheme, cost and occupation of resources of nodes are relatively high, and according to a traditional isomorphic WSN key management scheme, a heterogeneous feature of the nodes is not taken into consideration and certain limitations exist. A process comprises the steps of S1, establishing an HWSN cluster model; S2, establishing an SAAP scheme under the HWSN cluster model established in the S1; and S3, adding a new node in the network after the SAAP scheme is established in the S2. The method is applied to the field of network predistribution key management.
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Description

technical field

[0001] The present invention relates to a network pre-distributed key management method. Background technique

[0002] With the wide application of wireless sensor network, its security problem also emerges as the times require. The security mechanisms of wireless sensor networks include secure routing, secure positioning, topology management, and data fusion. Key management is the basic problem of wireless sensor network security. Since WSN security has attracted people's attention, isomorphic WSN key management has become a hot research topic. The basic random key pre-distribution scheme, referred to as the E-G scheme, is simple to implement, with low computational complexity and low storage requirements. The scheme is based on probability, so the network security is low, and the possibility of key duplication in this scheme is high. The q-composite scheme proposed by Chan et al. is an improvement to the E-G scheme. When the number of damaged nodes in th...

Examples

specific Embodiment approach 1

[0025] Specific implementation mode 1: The specific process of the heterogeneous wireless sensor network pre-distributed key management method of this embodiment is as follows:

[0026] Step 1. Build the HWSN cluster model;

[0027] HWSN is a heterogeneous wireless sensor network;

[0028] Step 2: Under the HWSN cluster model constructed in Step 1, establish a SAAP scheme; the process is:

[0029] The SAAP scheme is an asymmetric pre-distributed key management scheme based on Schnorr identity authentication;

[0030] Step 21. Establish the Schnorr identity authentication stage;

[0031] Step 22: On the basis of step 21, establish a key pre-distribution stage;

[0032] Step 23: On the basis of step 21 and step 22, the legal authentication node in the network enters the shared key discovery stage;

[0033] Step 24: After performing Step 23, if the LN node has not established a pairing key with a neighbor node, enter the cluster head-based pairing key setting stage;

[0034]...

specific Embodiment approach 2

[0036] Embodiment 2: The difference between this embodiment and Embodiment 1 is that the HWSN cluster model is constructed in the step 1; the specific process is:

[0037] Assume that both CH (cluster head node) and LN (normal node) are randomly and evenly distributed in the network, where CH is an energy-aggregating cluster head. In the process of sensor network initialization, each cluster head node CH broadcasts a Hello message to its nearby LN nodes with maximum power and random delay. After the LN node receives the Hello message from one or G cluster head nodes CH, it passes The cluster head selection method selects the CH with the strongest signal strength as the cluster head (the CH with the strongest signal in the Hello packet received by the LN as the cluster head), and each LN node records the Hello packets received from the CHs of other cluster head nodes. When the cluster head selection fails, other cluster head nodes CH will act as backup cluster heads;

[0038] ...

specific Embodiment approach 3

[0042] Embodiment 3: The difference between this embodiment and Embodiment 1 or 2 is that: the Schnorr identity authentication stage is established in step 21; the specific process is:

[0043] In order to further enhance the security of the network, before the shared key stage, each LN node in the cluster must be authenticated first;

[0044] Step 211: Initialize the sensor network according to the HWSN cluster model constructed in step 1;

[0045] The sensor network initialization process is divided into two steps:

[0046] (1) Select the public parameters of the sensor network;

[0047] The sensor network selects two prime numbers p and q, and p and q satisfy q|p-1, q≥2 140 ,p≥2 512 , the sensor network is Choose a prime number g of order q, and g q ≡1(modp);

[0048] q|p-1 means that q is a prime factor of order p-1;

[0049] (2) Node selection key in sensor network;

[0050] Any LN node A in the sensor network, at node A according to the random principle at Z p Se...