Information processing device, information processing method, and information processing program
By integrating access log collection and tampering detection functions in the information processing device, early detection of tampering with Web server contents has solved the problem of difficulty in time discovering tampered URLs in the prior art, and timely discovery and prevention of tampering with Web server contents has been achieved.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN201980047327.5
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2018-07-26
- Filing Date
- 2019-07-25
- Publication Date
- 2024-12-03
- Estimated Expiration
- 2039-07-25
AI Technical Summary
The existing technology is difficult to detect content tampering in web servers in the early stage, resulting in the fact that formal websites become harmful websites after being attacked by malicious third parties, and it is difficult to detect tampered URLs in a timely manner.
By integrating the access log collection unit, database and tamper detection unit in the information processing device, the access log of the user terminal is collected and checked with the pre-registered malicious URL, the difference between the connection destination URL and the access source URL is detected in the early stage. Detect content tampering and issue notifications to the administrator.
It realizes early detection and notification of tampering with Web server content, prevents malicious behaviors such as puddle-style attacks in the short term, and improves the administrator's defense capabilities.
Smart Images

Figure CN112424778B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to an information processing device, an information processing method, and an information processing program. Background Art
[0002] The Web server is used to store the content created and updated by the administrator of the management server, and return the content according to the request from the user terminal.
[0003] However, the Web server is installed with various software including OS, and uses these software to create content, support updates, and communicate with user terminals, etc. Once these software have loopholes (security weaknesses), malicious third parties may exploit these loopholes to launch attacks on the server (for example, SQL injection).
[0004] If the malicious third party attack is successful, it will invade the server and launch a watering hole attack by intentionally tampering with the content. A watering hole attack is a network attack method in which a malicious third party pre-tampers with regular websites that users may normally visit through the Internet, and induces the user terminals visiting regular websites to malicious websites that will download malware.
[0005] In order to prevent access to malicious URLs that download malware, it is important to obtain more malicious URLs in advance. In the past, there was a technology disclosed that has an execution device that virtually executes a malware file obtained based on a URL obtained through a user's communication log, etc. When executing the malware, the destination URL that the malware file will communicate with is obtained, and the URL of the connection destination is collected as a blacklist.
[0006] [Patent Literature]
[0007] [Patent Document 1] Japanese Patent Application Publication No. 2014-179025
[0008] However, even if it is possible to detect many malicious URLs that download malware sites or lead to phishing sites, it is difficult to immediately detect the tampered URLs of legitimate websites when the content corresponding to legitimate websites is intentionally tampered with and the user is attacked and redirected to malicious websites after visiting legitimate websites.
[0009] Therefore, the administrator of the server corresponding to the legitimate website cannot notice the tampering of the content at an early stage, resulting in the legitimate website being turned into a website harmful to users without being noticed.
[0010] The present invention has been made in view of such circumstances, and an object of the present invention is to provide an information processing device, an information processing method, and an information processing program capable of detecting content tampering in a Web server at an early stage. Summary of the invention
[0011] The present invention relates to an information processing device, comprising: an access log collection unit, which collects access logs when a user terminal requests content from a Web server; a database, which pre-registers malicious URLs; and a tampering detection unit, which checks a connection destination URL corresponding to the connection destination of the user terminal with the database, and detects tampering of the content when the connection destination URL is consistent with the malicious URL.
[0012] Effects of the Invention
[0013] According to the information processing device, information processing method, and information processing program of the present invention, it is possible to detect content tampering in a Web server at an early stage. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0014] Figure 1 is a configuration diagram showing an example of the structure of the information processing device involved in the first embodiment.
[0015] Figure 2(A) is a diagram for explaining the access process when a URL redirection is used to connect to a URL different from the requested destination URL after a request is issued by a user terminal, and Figure 2(B) is an example diagram showing the access log extracted in the log extraction unit of the information processing device.
[0016] FIG. 3(A) is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a URL stored in a database, and FIG. 3(B) is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a notification destination to send a notification to an administrator associated with a benign URL.
[0017] Figure 4 This is a flowchart showing an example of the information processing method involved in the first embodiment.
[0018] Figure 5(A) is an example of a drive-by download attack, which shows an access flow chart when the html data managed by the Web server of Company A is tampered with by a malicious third party and is requested in the state of a referrer with a specific search website. Figure 5(B) is an access flow chart when the html data is requested without going through the search website.
[0019] Figure 6 It is a structural diagram showing an example of the structure of the information processing device involved in the second embodiment.
[0020] Figure 7This is a flowchart showing an example of the information processing method involved in the second embodiment.
[0021] Figure 8 is a configuration diagram showing an example of the configuration of an information processing apparatus involved in the third embodiment.
[0022] Fig. 9 This is a flowchart showing an example of the information processing method involved in the third embodiment. Specific embodiments
[0023] (First embodiment)
[0024] Next, embodiments of the present invention will be described based on the drawings.
[0025] First, the overall structure will be described.
[0026] The user terminal 11 is connected to the Web server 12 via the Internet and requests the content in the Web server 12 determined by the URL. Then, the content returned from the Web server 12 is displayed via the Web browser. As the content, various data such as html data, image data, and pdf files can be cited. Figure 1 In , html data is exemplified as the content.
[0027] The web server 12 returns the content requested by the user terminal 11 to the user terminal 11 .
[0028] The administrator terminal 13 is a computer that can be connected to the Web server 12, and the administrator creates and updates the content.
[0029] The information processing device 10 according to the present embodiment detects content tampering corresponding to the user's access source URL by checking the access log collected from the user terminal 11 with the database 16 in which malicious URLs are pre-registered.
[0030] The information processing device 10 collects access logs related to connection information of the user terminal 11 to the Web server 12. The information processing device 10 may directly obtain the access logs from the user terminal 11, or, when the user terminal 11 is connected to the Web server 12 via a proxy server for controlling connection to the Internet, obtain the access logs from the proxy server. In addition, the access logs may be obtained at a firewall that controls communication with the user terminal 11 as an entrance and exit to an external network. The access logs may also be obtained via separate servers that collect access logs from the user terminal 11 at any time.
[0031] In addition, Figure 1Although only one user terminal 11 is described in FIG. 1 , the information processing device 10 may be connected to a plurality of user terminals 11 and collect access logs from each user terminal 11 .
[0032] Next, a specific configuration of the information processing apparatus 10 according to the first embodiment will be described.
[0033] The information processing device 10 includes an access log collection unit 14 , a log extraction unit 15 , a database 16 , a tampering detection unit 19 , and a tampering notification unit 20 .
[0034] The functions of each unit constituting the information processing device 10 can also be implemented by using a processor to execute a specified program code, and are not limited to such software processing. For example, they can also be implemented by hardware processing such as ASIC, or by a combination of software and hardware processing.
[0035] The access log collection unit 14 collects access logs when the user terminal 11 requests content from the Web server 12. The access log collection unit 14 collects, as access logs, identification information (e.g., IP address) for identifying the user terminal 11 when the user terminal 11 connects to the Web server 12, the access source URL, the connection destination URL, the name of the Web browser used to access the content, the access time, and the like.
[0036] The access source URL refers to the URL used to request content from the user terminal 11. The connection destination URL refers to the URL to which the user terminal 11 actually connects after requesting the content. Usually, the URL accessed by the user terminal 11 to request content is consistent with the URL to which the user terminal 11 actually connects after the request. That is, the access source URL is consistent with the connection destination URL.
[0037] On the other hand, after the user terminal 11 issues a request, if the URL is redirected (the reference destination of the URL is automatically changed) and the user terminal 11 is automatically connected to a URL different from the requested destination URL, the URL of the content requested by the user terminal 11 and the URL actually connected after the request will not be consistent. That is, the access source URL and the connection destination URL are inconsistent.
[0038] FIG. 2(A) is a diagram for explaining an access flow when, after the user terminal 11 issues a request, the user terminal 11 is connected to a URL different from the request destination URL by URL redirection.
[0039] The user terminal 11 accesses "http: / / www.aaa.com / aaa.html" as the access source URL, and requests the content "aaa.html" from the Web server 12. Then, the user terminal 11 receives the http response. Then, the user terminal 11 is redirected by the URL to "http: / / www.ccc.com / ccc.html", and requests the content "ccc.html" from the Web server 50. The user terminal 11 obtains the ccc.html data from the connection destination URL. In this way, when the user terminal 11 is connected to a URL inconsistent with the request destination URL by URL redirection, inconsistency between the access source URL and the connection destination URL occurs.
[0040] The log extracting unit 15 extracts access logs when the connection destination URL corresponding to the connection destination of the user terminal 11 and the access source URL corresponding to the content request destination are different, that is, the two URLs do not match, from the access logs collected by the access log collecting unit 14 .
[0041] FIG. 2(B) is a diagram showing an example of access records extracted by the record extraction unit 15 of the information processing device 10. As shown in FIG.
[0042] As shown in FIG. 2(B) , the log extracting unit 15 extracts, for each user ID (IP address) for identifying the user terminal 11 , the connection destination URL to which the user terminal 11 actually connects and the access source URL accessed by the user to request content.
[0043] The database 16 has a malicious URL storage unit 17 in which malicious URLs are pre-registered, and a benign URL storage unit 18 in which benign URLs are pre-registered. In the following embodiment, in the database 16, URLs are correspondingly classified into benign or malicious for classification registration, but IP addresses may also be correspondingly classified into benign or malicious for classification registration.
[0044] Malicious URLs are harmful URLs that may cause the user terminal 11 to download malicious content such as viruses, phishing (fraudulent) websites, etc., and may induce the user terminal 11 to download malicious files and connect to a website. On the other hand, benign URLs are URLs that are harmless to the user terminal 11. In the database 16, registered URLs are classified into malicious or benign categories and stored.
[0045] The database 16 stores a notification destination sent to the administrator terminal 13 (or administrator) corresponding to each benign URL for managing the content corresponding to the benign URL. As a notification destination, for example, an email address can be cited. The notification destination is used to notify the administrator that tampering has occurred when content tampering is detected.
[0046] Fig. 3(A) is a diagram showing an example of URLs stored in the database 16. As shown in Fig. 3(A), each URL registered in the database 16 is classified as benign or malicious and the classification information is stored.
[0047] Fig. 3(B) is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a notification destination sent to an administrator associated with a benign URL. As shown in Fig. 3(B), each registered benign URL stores a notification destination email address sent to an administrator who manages the content corresponding to the benign URL.
[0048] Back to Figure 1 Continue with the explanation.
[0049] The tampering detection unit 19 obtains from the log extraction unit 15 a log that the connection destination URL corresponding to the connection destination of the user terminal 11 extracted by the log extraction unit 15 is inconsistent with the access source URL corresponding to the request destination of the content. Then, the connection destination URL, which is the actual connection destination of the user terminal 11, is checked with the database 16. When the connection destination URL is consistent with the malicious URL, the content tampering corresponding to the access source URL is detected. In addition, in the database 16, when the IP address is classified into benign or malicious and the category is registered, the content tampering is detected when the IP address corresponding to the connection destination URL is consistent with the malicious IP address.
[0050] Usually, when a user visits a legitimate website, the access source URL is consistent with the actual connection destination URL of the user terminal 11, and any URL is a benign URL. Therefore, when the connection destination URL is inconsistent with the access source URL, and the connection destination URL is consistent with a malicious URL, it is determined that the connection with the legitimate website has been intentionally changed, and the legitimate website has been tampered with, that is, the content corresponding to the access source URL has been tampered with.
[0051] In addition, when a regular Web site intentionally redirects the user terminal 11 accessing the Web site, it can be assumed that the access source URL is inconsistent with the actual destination URL. In this case, since the destination URL can not be consistent with the malicious URL, the tampering of the content can not be detected.
[0052] If tampering is detected, the tampering notification unit 20 will send a notification that tampering has occurred to the administrator of the Web server 12 corresponding to the content in which tampering was detected. Specifically, the notification destination of the administrator terminal 13 (or administrator) that manages the content corresponding to the benign URL is used to notify the occurrence of tampering. In addition, as a method of sending a notification to the administrator, it is not necessary to pre-save the notification destination of the administrator terminal 13. The administrator's access destination can be retrieved based on the access source URL corresponding to the content in which tampering was detected, and then the administrator of the Web server 12 is notified that tampering has occurred. For example, the domain part is extracted from the access source URL, and the notification destination is searched by linking the domain part with " / content / ", " / info / ", etc., which are generally used in the inquiry destination (contact destination) URL, and the administrator of the Web server 12 is notified that tampering has occurred based on the notification destination.
[0053] Next, the operation of the information processing apparatus 10 according to the first embodiment will be described.
[0054] Figure 4 is a flowchart of the information processing method involved in the first embodiment (see appropriately). Figure 1 ).
[0055] The access log collection unit 14 acquires an access log to the Internet from the user terminal 11 ( S10 ).
[0056] The log extracting unit 15 extracts, from the access log from the user terminal 11 , a log in which the connection destination URL actually connected to the user terminal 11 does not match the access source URL corresponding to the request destination of the content ( S11 ).
[0057] The tampering detection unit 19 checks the connection destination URL in the database 16 to determine whether the connection destination URL is consistent with the malicious URL. When the connection destination URL is consistent with the malicious URL, the content tampering corresponding to the access source URL is detected (S12, S13: YES, S14). On the other hand, if it is inconsistent, the tampering detection unit 19 determines that no content tampering has occurred (S13: NO, end).
[0058] If tampering is detected, the tampering notification unit 20 notifies the administrator of the Web server 12 corresponding to the content in which the tampering is detected that tampering has occurred (S15). In addition, the access source URL corresponding to the content in which the tampering is detected can be stored as a malicious URL in the database 16. If the URL has been previously classified as a benign URL, it is reclassified as a malicious URL.
[0059] As described above, the information processing device 10 according to the first embodiment can detect tampering in the Web server 12 at an early stage by checking the access log collected from the user terminal 11 with the database 16 in which malicious URLs are pre-registered, and can notify the administrator of the Web server 12 that content tampering has occurred. As a result, the administrator can notice content tampering in the Web server 12 at an early stage, thereby ending attacks by malicious third parties such as watering hole attacks in a short period of time.
[0060] (Second embodiment)
[0061] First, an example of a drive-by download attack using a watering hole attack is described using FIG5. Assuming that the html data (aaa.html) managed by the Web server 12 of Company A is tampered with by a malicious third party, when aaa.html is requested in a state with a reference page of a specific search site, a special redirection script is embedded in aaa.html to perform URL redirection to the malicious third-party Web server 50. The reference page refers to the URL accessed before conversion to the URL connected on the client terminal 11.
[0062] As shown in FIG. 5(A), when a user enters a keyword associated with Company A on the search site X, the URL of the content of Company A based on the keyword is displayed on the user terminal 11. Then, the user requests aaa.html from the Web server 12 of Company A on the user terminal 11. At this time, the user terminal 11, which has been accessed in a state of having a reference page of the search site X, is induced by the Web server 50 managed by a malicious third party through the redirection script embedded in aaa.html, thereby obtaining ccc.html having malicious content.
[0063] On the other hand, as shown in FIG5(B), when the user terminal 11 issues a request for aaa.html without searching the site X, aaa.html is obtained from the Web server 12 of Company A without executing the embedded redirection script. In this way, when the URL is directly accessed, such as by a bookmark, the script is not executed, and the URL redirection is executed only when the client terminal 11 is accessed through the search site. Therefore, for administrators who usually do not access through the search site, even if tampering occurs, it is difficult to detect, resulting in a delay in the detection of tampering.
[0064] In the information processing device 10 involved in the second embodiment, when the actual connection destination URL of the user terminal 11 is consistent with the malicious URL, the information processing device 10 directly requests access to the source URL, that is, verifies the connection destination URL by requesting content without a reference page.
[0065] Figure 6 2 is a diagram showing an example of the configuration of the information processing device 10 according to the second embodiment. Figure 6 In the first embodiment ( Figure 1 ) The parts with common structures or functions are indicated by the same reference numerals and repeated descriptions are omitted. Hereinafter, the connection destination URL extracted from the access log is referred to as the "first connection destination URL", and the connection destination URL when the access source URL is directly requested in the access verification unit 21 is referred to as the "second connection destination URL" to distinguish them.
[0066] The log extracting unit 15 extracts access logs in which the first connection destination URL corresponding to the connection destination of the user terminal 11 and the access source URL corresponding to the request destination of the content do not match from the access logs collected by the access log collecting unit 14 .
[0067] The access verification unit 21 checks the first connection destination URL in the database 16, and if the first connection destination URL matches the malicious URL, directly requests the access source URL extracted from the access log to the Web server 12. When executing this direct request, the access verification unit 21 compares the second connection destination URL with the access source URL.
[0068] The tampering detection unit 19 detects tampering of the content when the access source URL and the second connection destination URL match each other through comparison by the access verification unit 21 .
[0069] In the collected access logs, even if the access source URL is inconsistent with the first connection destination URL, and even if the first connection destination URL is consistent with the malicious URL, when the access source URL is directly requested to the Web server 12, if the second connection destination URL is consistent with the access source URL, it means that the connection to the regular website has been intentionally changed due to the access method, that is, it is determined that tampering with the regular website has occurred, that is, the content corresponding to the access source URL has been tampered with.
[0070] On the other hand, when the access source URL is inconsistent with the second connection destination URL through comparison by the access verification unit 21, and the second connection destination URL is consistent with the malicious URL after the user terminal 11 is redirected to the malicious third-party Web server 50 by the URL, it is detected that the content has been tampered with. When the second connection destination URL is inconsistent with the malicious URL, although the connected second connection destination URL is harmless, since it is not confirmed whether the content corresponding to the access source URL has been tampered with, the administrator of the information processing device 10 verifies the access source URL again to finally confirm whether the content has been tampered with.
[0071] Next, the operation of the information processing apparatus 10 according to the second embodiment will be described.
[0072] Figure 7 is a flowchart showing an example of the information processing method involved in the second embodiment (see as appropriate). Figure 6 ).
[0073] First, the access log collection unit 14 obtains an access log to the Internet from the user terminal 11 ( S20 ).
[0074] The log extraction unit 15 extracts a log in which an access source URL corresponding to the content requested by the user does not match a first connection destination URL actually connected to the user terminal 11 from the access log acquired by the user terminal 11 ( S21 ).
[0075] The access verification unit 21 determines whether the first connection destination URL matches a malicious URL ( S22 ).
[0076] Then, when the first connection destination URL is consistent with the malicious URL, the access verification unit 21 directly accesses the access source URL to the Web server 12 without a reference page, and obtains the second connection destination URL (S22: YES, S23). When the first connection destination URL is inconsistent with the malicious URL, the administrator of the information processing device 10 verifies the access source URL again to confirm whether the content is tampered (S22: NO, S28).
[0077] When the re-verification result confirms that tampering has occurred, the administrator of the information processing device 10 saves the access source URL corresponding to the content as a malicious URL in the database 16, and notifies the administrator of the content corresponding to the access source URL that tampering has occurred. If tampering has not been confirmed, the access source URL is saved in the database 16 as a benign URL.
[0078] When the access source and the second connection destination URL match through comparison by the access verification unit 21, the tampering detection unit 19 detects tampering of the content corresponding to the access source URL (S24: YES, S26).
[0079] On the other hand, when the access source URL and the second connection destination URL are inconsistent after comparison by the access verification unit 21, when the second connection destination URL is consistent with the malicious URL after the user terminal 11 is redirected to a malicious third-party Web server 50 due to the URL, content tampering is detected (S24: NO, S25: YES, S26).
[0080] In addition, when the access source URL and the second connection destination URL do not match through comparison by the access verification unit 21, when the second connection destination URL does not match the malicious URL, the administrator of the information processing device 10 verifies the access source URL again to confirm whether the content has been tampered with.
[0081] When the re-verification result confirms that tampering has occurred, the administrator of the information processing device 10 saves the access source URL corresponding to the content and the second connection destination URL that is inconsistent with the malicious URL during access verification as malicious URLs in the database 16, and notifies the administrator of the content corresponding to the access source URL that tampering has occurred. On the other hand, when tampering has not been confirmed, the access source URL is saved as a benign URL in the database 16.
[0082] Finally, when tampering is detected, the tampering notification unit 20 sends a notification (S27) to the administrator of the content corresponding to the access source URL that tampering has occurred. In addition, the access source URL corresponding to the content in which tampering is detected can be stored as a malicious URL in the database 16. For a URL that has been classified as a benign URL, its category is changed to a malicious URL.
[0083] As described above, the information processing device 10 according to the second embodiment can detect tampering of the Web server 12 early and correctly by requesting content from the access source URL without using a referral page and performing verification of the connection destination. In this way, the administrator can notice the clever tampering behavior of a malicious third party intentionally changing the connection destination URL according to the method of accessing the Web site at an early stage, thereby ending clever attacks by malicious third parties such as drive-by download attacks in a short period of time.
[0084] (Third Embodiment)
[0085] Figure 8 FIG. 1 is a diagram showing an example of the configuration of the information processing device 10 according to the third embodiment. Figure 8 In the first embodiment ( Figure 1 ) Parts having a common structure or function are represented by the same figure marks, and repeated descriptions are omitted.
[0086] In the information processing device 10 according to the third embodiment, when a URL not registered in the database 16 is extracted from the access log, the unclassified URL is parsed and classified, and whether the content has been tampered with is detected based on the classification result.
[0087] The log extraction unit 15 detects an unclassified URL that does not match the URL registered in the database 16 from the collected access logs.
[0088] The URL analysis unit 22 analyzes whether the unclassified URL is a malicious URL, and registers the unclassified URL as either a good URL or a malicious URL.
[0089] As a method for parsing unclassified URLs, for example, an unclassified URL is accessed and, in a virtual environment capable of executing the obtained executable file, the unclassified URL is parsed to determine whether it is a malicious URL based on the result after executing the file. Specifically, a hash function (Hash) belonging to a malicious file is saved in advance, and the unclassified URL is parsed to determine whether the file obtained after comparison with the hash function value is a malicious file. In addition, commonly used antivirus software can also be used to access the unclassified URL, and the unclassified URL can be parsed to determine whether the obtained executable file is malware.
[0090] It is also possible to obtain the domain of harmless benign URLs in advance, classify unclassified URLs containing the domain as benign, and classify URLs not containing the domain as malicious URLs. In addition, the administrator of the information processing device 10 can also change the category of unclassified URLs registered as benign or malicious.
[0091] When the access source URL is consistent with a benign URL, and the connection destination URL is consistent with a malicious URL, and the category of the URL changes from benign to malicious, the tampering detection unit 19 detects whether the content has been tampered with. If the content has not been tampered with, the URL is converted from a benign URL to a malicious URL, so the content can be determined to be tampered with by the category transfer from benign to malicious.
[0092] Next, the operation of the information processing apparatus 10 according to the third embodiment will be described.
[0093] Fig. 9 is a flowchart showing an example of the information processing method involved in the third embodiment (see as appropriate) Figure 8 ).
[0094] The access log collection unit 14 acquires the access log to the Internet from the user terminal 11 ( S30 ).
[0095] The log extracting unit 15 extracts a log in which the access source URL corresponding to the content requested by the user does not match the connection destination URL actually connected to the user terminal 11 from the access log acquired by the user terminal 11 ( S31 ).
[0096] The log extraction unit 15 compares the connection destination URL with the database 16, and extracts an unclassified URL whose connection destination URL is not registered in the database (S32).
[0097] The URL analysis unit 22 analyzes whether the extracted unclassified URL is a malicious URL, and classifies the unclassified URL as either benign or malicious (S33).
[0098] The tampering detection unit 19 determines which category the access source URL and the connection destination URL belong to in the database. When the access source URL is classified as a benign category and the connection destination URL is classified as a malignant category, and when the category from the access source URL to the connection destination URL changes from benign to malignant, the tampering detection unit 19 detects tampering of the content corresponding to the access source URL (S34: YES, S35).
[0099] On the other hand, when the categories from the access source URL to the connection destination URL remain benign, it is determined that no tampering has occurred (S34: NO, end).
[0100] Finally, when tampering is detected, the tampering notification unit 20 notifies the administrator of the content corresponding to the access source URL that tampering has occurred (S37). In addition, the access source URL corresponding to the content detected to be tampered can be stored in the database 16 as a malicious URL. For a URL that already belongs to a benign URL, the category is changed to a malicious URL.
[0101] The information processing device 10 involved in the third embodiment classifies the unclassified URL into malicious URLs and uses the classification results to detect tampering. Although malicious URLs are always increasing, it takes time to discover them and it is difficult to detect malicious websites immediately and comprehensively, by classifying the unclassified URLs that are not registered in the database 16 into malicious URLs, it is possible to detect tampering of the Web server 12 at an early stage.
[0102] According to the information processing apparatus involved in each of the above-mentioned embodiments, by checking the access log collected from the user terminal 11 with the database in which malicious URLs are pre-registered, it is possible to detect tampering in the web server at an early stage, and to notify the administrator of the web server 12 that the content has been tampered with at an early stage. In this way, the administrator can detect tampering in the web server 12 at an early stage, and can end attacks by malicious third parties such as watering hole attacks in a short period of time.
[0103] In addition, the program executed by the information processing device 10 is pre-installed in a storage circuit such as a ROM. Alternatively, the program may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium such as a CD-ROM, CD-R, memory card, DVD, floppy disk, etc. in an installable or executable file. The program executed by the control device 11 may also be stored in a computer connected to a network such as the Internet and provided by downloading via the network.
[0104] The descriptions in the above-mentioned embodiments and modifications and the illustrations disclosed in the drawings are only examples for explaining the invention described in the claims, and therefore the invention described in the claims is not limited by the contents disclosed in the above-mentioned embodiments or drawings. The description in the initial claims of this application is only an example, and the description in the claims can be appropriately changed according to the description in the specification, drawings, etc.
[0105] Explanation of symbols
[0106] 10…information processing device; 11…user terminal; 12…Web server; 13…administrator terminal; 14…access log collection unit; 15…log extraction unit; 16…database; 17…malicious URL storage unit; 18…benign URL storage unit; 19…tampering detection unit; 20…tampering notification unit; 21…access verification unit; 22…URL parsing unit; 50…Web server of a malicious third party.
Claims
1. An information processing device, characterized in that: include: The access log collection unit collects access logs when the user terminal requests content from the Web server; Database, pre-register malicious URLs; a tampering detection unit that checks a first connection destination URL extracted from the access log and corresponding to a connection destination of the user terminal with the database; as well as The access verification unit directly requests the access source URL extracted from the access log to the Web server when the first connection destination URL is consistent with the malicious URL, and compares the access source URL with the second connection destination URL in the direct request. Here, when the access source URL matches the second connection destination URL when the direct request is made by the access verification unit through comparison by the access verification unit, the tampering detection unit detects tampering of the content.
2. The information processing device according to claim 1, characterized in that include: The log extracting unit extracts, from the access logs collected by the access log collecting unit, access logs in which an access source URL corresponding to a request destination of the content does not match the first connection destination URL.
3. The information processing device according to claim 1, characterized in that include: The tampering notification unit, when detecting the tampering, notifies an administrator of the Web server corresponding to the content in which the tampering is detected that the tampering has occurred.
4. The information processing device according to claim 1, characterized in that: in, extracting unclassified URLs that are inconsistent with the URLs registered in the database from the collected access logs, The database pre-registers the benign URL and the malicious URL together, and the information processing device includes: The URL parsing unit, after parsing whether the unclassified URL is a malicious URL, registers the unclassified URL as one of the benign URL and the malicious URL.
5. The information processing device according to claim 1, characterized in that: in, The database pre-registers the benign URL and the malicious URL together, and when the access source URL matches the benign URL but the first connection destination URL matches the malicious URL, and the classification of the URL changes from benign to malicious, the tampering detection unit detects tampering of the content.
6. An information processing method, characterized in that: Include: The step of collecting access logs when a user terminal requests content from a Web server; Steps to pre-register malicious URLs in the database; checking a first connection destination URL extracted from the access log corresponding to the connection destination of the user terminal with the database; as well as When the first connection destination URL is consistent with the malicious URL, a step of directly requesting the access source URL extracted from the access log to the Web server, and comparing the access source URL with the second connection destination URL in the direct request; as well as A step of detecting falsification of the content when the access source URL matches the second connection destination URL in the direct request through the comparison in the comparing step.
7. An information processing program product, characterized in that: Make the computer realize: The function of collecting access logs when user terminals request content from Web servers; Function to pre-register malicious URLs in the database; checking a first connection destination URL extracted from the access log corresponding to the connection destination of the user terminal with the database; When the first connection destination URL matches the malicious URL, a function of directly requesting the access source URL extracted from the access log to the Web server and comparing the access source URL with the second connection destination URL in the direct request; as well as A function for detecting falsification of the content when the access source URL matches the second connection destination URL in the direct request through comparison by the comparison function.
