Wireless network handover method and apparatus

Abstract

The application discloses a wireless network switching method, in which a requesting device and a target access device directly generate a message integrity check key through a domain key, and verify an integrity check code based on the message integrity check key, so that identity authentication of both sides is realized; when the identity authentication of both sides is passed, a session key is generated by combining the domain key and random numbers of both sides, so that the switching process is simplified, and safe and efficient network switching is realized. The application also discloses corresponding requesting devices and access devices.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the field of communication, and in particular to a wireless network switching method and a requesting device and an access device. BACKGROUND

[0002] With the development of mobile terminal devices such as mobile phones and tablet computers, wireless communication technology has gradually become one of the mainstream communication technologies. In a wireless communication network, the coverage of a wireless access device is limited, and therefore, during movement, switching of the wireless access device often occurs, and the time delay generated during the switching process directly affects the communication experience.

[0003] When a mobile terminal device accesses a wireless communication network for the first time, a complete initial identity authentication process needs to be performed with a wireless access device, which can be referred to as initial mobility association. The wireless access device with which the mobile terminal device is associated for the first time is referred to as an initial access device, and the mobile terminal device can be referred to as a requesting device. During the initial mobility association process, the requesting device and the initial access device perform identity authentication and key negotiation. When the requesting device switches from a currently associated wireless access device to a new wireless access device during movement, a switching process needs to be performed, and the new wireless access device is referred to as a target access device.

[0004] Based on this, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 series of specifications provides a fast switching mechanism. Under the premise of enabling the fast switching mechanism, the mechanism adopts a hierarchical key scheme, specifically, identity authentication is performed between a requesting device (Station, STA) and an authentication authorization accounting server (Authentication Authorization Accounting Server, AAA Server), and a master key is generated, which is sent to an access point (Access Point, AP), and then hierarchical derivation is performed.

[0005] Specifically, the 0th, 1st, and 2nd level keys are derived during initial authentication, and then the 1st and 2nd level keys are re-derived when network switching occurs. Since there can be multiple access devices in the network, the 1st and 2nd level keys need to be re-derived each time the switching occurs, which complicates the network switching process and reduces the efficiency of wireless network switching. SUMMARY

[0006] Therefore, the application provides a wireless network switching method, wherein a request device and a target access device verify an integrity check code based on a message integrity check key derived from a domain key, so as to realize identity authentication of the other party, and when the identity authentication is passed, a session key is generated directly by using the domain key and random numbers of the two parties, which is used for secure communication between the two parties after the switching is successful, and the first and second level keys do not need to be derived again, so that the switching process is simplified and the switching efficiency is improved. The application also provides a corresponding request device and an access device.

[0007] The first aspect of the application provides a wireless network switching method, and the method comprises the following steps:

[0008] The target access device receives a first random number, an identity of the request device, an identity of a selected domain key in a domain key group generated by the request device when the request device is initially associated with a mobile domain, and a first integrity check code, acquires the corresponding domain key according to the identity of the selected domain key, generates a message integrity check key based on the domain key, and the message integrity check key is used for verifying the first integrity check code.

[0009] When the first integrity check code is verified, the target access device adds the identity of the request device to an association list, generates a second random number, and generates a session key based on the domain key, the first random number and the second random number, and the session key is used for secure communication between the request device and the target access device after the switching is successful.

[0010] The request device receives a second random number sent by the target access device, a first random number sent by the target access device, an identity of the target access device and a second integrity check code, and when the first random number received by the request device is consistent with the first random number sent by the request device, the second integrity check code is verified according to the message integrity check key determined by the request device based on the domain key.

[0011] When the second integrity check code is verified, a session key is generated based on the domain key, the first random number and the second random number.

[0012] The request device receives an association state code, and when the association state code indicates that the association is successful, it is determined that the switching is successful.

[0013] The second aspect of the application provides a request device, and the request device comprises the following steps:

[0014] The sending module is configured to send, to the target access device, a first random number generated by the requesting device, an identity of the requesting device, an identity of a selected domain key in a domain key group generated by the requesting device when initially associated with a mobile domain, and a first integrity check code;

[0015] The receiving module is configured to receive a second random number, the first random number, an identity of the target access device, a second integrity check code, and an association status code sent by the target access device, wherein the second random number is generated by the target access device when the first integrity check code is verified to be correct;

[0016] The verifying module is configured to, when the association status code indicates that the association is successful and the first random number received by the requesting device is consistent with the first random number sent by the requesting device, verify the second integrity check code according to the message integrity check key determined by the requesting device based on the domain key.

[0017] The generating module is configured to, when the second integrity check code is verified to be correct, generate a session key based on the domain key, the first random number, and the second random number, so as to implement network switching.

[0018] The third aspect of the present application provides an access device, which comprises:

[0019] The receiving module is configured to receive a first random number, an identity of the requesting device, an identity of a selected domain key in a domain key group generated by the requesting device when initially associated with a mobile domain, and a first integrity check code sent by the requesting device.

[0020] The generating module is configured to obtain a corresponding domain key according to the identity of the selected domain key, and generate a message integrity check key based on the domain key.

[0021] The verifying module is configured to verify the first integrity check code according to the message integrity check key.

[0022] The generating module is further configured to, when the first integrity check code is verified to be correct, add the identity of the requesting device to an association list, generate a second random number, and generate a session key based on the domain key, the first random number, and the second random number, wherein the session key is used to implement secure communication between the requesting device and the access device after switching succeeds.

[0023] The sending module is configured to send, to the access device, a second random number, the first random number, an identity of the access device, a second integrity check code, and an association status code, wherein the association status code is used to indicate whether the association of the requesting device is successful or unsuccessful.

[0024] From the above technical solution, the embodiments of the present application have the following advantages:

[0025] In the wireless network switching, the request device can select a domain key from the domain key group generated when the initial mobile domain is associated, and directly generate a message integrity check key according to the domain key, and use the message integrity check key to calculate the fields interacted with the target access device to generate a first integrity check code. In this way, when the target access device receives the first random number, the identity of the request device, the identity of the selected domain key and the first integrity check code sent by the request device, the target access device can directly obtain the corresponding domain key according to the identity of the domain key, and generate a message integrity check key based on the domain key, and use the message integrity check key to verify the first integrity check code, so as to realize the identity authentication of the target access device to the request device; when the verification is passed, the target access device adds the identity of the request device to the association list, generates a second random number, and generates a session key based on the domain key and the random numbers of both parties, so as to realize the secure communication between the request device and the target access device after the switching is successful.

[0026] Similarly, the request device can receive the first random number, the identity of the target access device and the second integrity check code sent by the target access device, and when the first random number received by the request device is consistent with the first random number sent, the message integrity check key generated in the same way as the target access device is used to verify the second integrity check code, so as to realize the identity authentication of the request device to the target access device; when the verification is passed, the session key is generated in the same way as the target access device. Wherein, the request device receives the association status code indicating the association success, and determines that the switching is successful.

[0027] In the above method, the request device and the target access device directly generate a message integrity check key through a domain key, and verify the integrity check code based on the message integrity check key, so as to realize the identity authentication of both parties, and when the identity authentication of the other party is passed, a session key is generated by using the domain key and the random numbers of both parties, which simplifies the switching process and realizes the safe and efficient network switching. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0028] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application or the prior art, the following will briefly introduce the drawings needed to be used in the embodiments or the prior art description. Obviously, the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present application, and those skilled in the art can obtain other drawings according to these drawings without creating any creative labor.

[0029] Figure 1 The flowchart of the wireless network switching method in the embodiments of the present application;

[0030] Figure 2 Flow chart of the wireless network switching method in the WLAN scenario in the embodiment of the present application;

[0031] Figure 3 Signaling flow chart of the initial mobile domain association in the embodiment of the present application;

[0032] Figure 4 Flow chart of the derived domain key group in the embodiment of the present application;

[0033] Figure 5 Flow chart of another derived domain key group in the embodiment of the present application;

[0034] Figure 6A Flow chart of the wireless network switching method in the embodiment of the present application; Figure 2 Flow chart of the wireless network switching method in the embodiment of the present application;

[0035] Figure 6B Flow chart of the wireless network switching method in the embodiment of the present application; Figure 2 Flow chart of the wireless network switching method in the embodiment of the present application;

[0036] Figure 7 Structure diagram of the requesting device in the embodiment of the present application;

[0037] Figure 8 Structure diagram of the access device in the embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0038] In the wireless communication network, taking the WLAN as an example, the access device, i.e. the AP, converts the wired telecommunication signal into the wireless telecommunication signal and sends it out, forms the coverage of the wireless network, and serves as the bridge between the wired network and the wireless network, accesses the wireless network to the Ethernet and other wired networks, and the requesting device STA in the coverage area of the wireless network can be connected to the network through the AP.

[0039] In order to expand the coverage area, the APs can be interconnected. With the movement of the user, the STA often needs to switch between the APs and maintain the network connection. With the increasingly strict requirement on the delay of the STA switching between the APs, the IEE802.11 series of specifications proposes a fast switching mechanism based on the hierarchical key. When there is a switching demand, the identity authentication is performed between the STA and the AAA Server to generate the master key, then the AAA Server sends the master key to the AP, and the hierarchical derivation is performed. The 1st and 2nd level keys need to be derived again in each switching process, which leads to the complicated switching process and affects the switching efficiency.

[0040] To solve the above technical problems, the application provides a wireless network switching method. In the method, a STA generates a domain key group when performing initial mobile domain association, selects a domain key from the domain key group when the STA is ready to switch from a current AP to a target AP, and generates a message integrity check key; the STA sends an identity of the selected domain key to the target AP, and the target AP obtains the domain key based on the identity, so that the target AP generates the same message integrity check key based on the domain key. In this way, the STA and the target AP can both verify the integrity check code by using the message integrity check key, so as to realize identity authentication of each other. When the authentication is passed, a session key can be generated based on the domain key and random numbers of both sides, so as to realize network switching under the condition that the identity of the other party is legal. Since the session key can be directly generated by using the domain key, the first and second level keys do not need to be re-derived, so that the number of key derivation in the switching process is reduced, the switching process is simplified, the switching speed is accelerated, and the switching efficiency is improved.

[0041] In order to make the technical solutions of the application clearer and easier to understand, the following will be described in detail in combination with specific embodiments.

[0042] Referring to the flowchart of the wireless network switching method shown in Figure 1 The method comprises the following steps.

[0043] In S101, the target access device receives a first random number sent by a requesting device, an identity of the requesting device, an identity of a selected domain key in a domain key group generated by the requesting device when performing initial mobile domain association, and a first integrity check code, obtains a corresponding domain key according to the identity of the selected domain key, and generates a message integrity check key based on the domain key.

[0044] The domain key group generated by the requesting device when performing initial mobile domain association can be used to realize wireless network switching. The domain key group can comprise a plurality of domain keys, and the requesting device can select a domain key from the domain key group to perform network switching. In consideration of security, the requesting device can select different domain keys in each switching process.

[0045] The first integrity check code received by the target access device is obtained by the requesting device by using a message integrity check algorithm on fields including the first random number sent by the requesting device, the identity of the requesting device, and the identity of the selected domain key in the domain key group generated by the requesting device when performing initial mobile domain association. The target access device can obtain the corresponding domain key according to the identity of the selected domain key. The target access device generates the message integrity check key based on the domain key, which is the same as the way of generating the message integrity check key by the requesting device. The target access device verifies the first integrity check code by using the message integrity check key.

[0046] In a specific implementation, the target access device can first search for the domain key according to the identifier of the domain key, and when the search fails, request the domain key from the initial access device based on the identity of the initial access device obtained from the requesting device.

[0047] In some possible implementation manners, the target access device can first request the domain key from the initial access device when the requesting device switches to the target access device for the first time, and when the requesting device switches to another access device and then switches back to the target access device, the target access device can obtain the domain key locally. Of course, considering security, the time or the number of times of obtaining the same domain key can also be limited, for example, the domain key cannot be obtained after being stored locally for more than 5 minutes, or the domain key cannot be obtained after being obtained locally for more than 3 times.

[0048] In another possible implementation manner, the target access device can obtain the domain key group when switching for the first time, so that in subsequent switching processes, the corresponding domain key can be obtained locally directly, and the network switching can be implemented by using the domain key.

[0049] When the domain key is used to generate the message integrity check key, the requesting device selects the domain key, and the target access device can determine the domain key based on the identifier of the domain key. The requesting device and the target access device specify the domain key as the base key BK, and use BK as the protocol key PK used in the authentication process, and generate the message integrity check key, that is, the protocol integrity key MTK, based on PK by using a key derivation algorithm negotiated or preset by both parties, which can be a pseudo-random algorithm or a hash algorithm. In a specific implementation, the requesting device or the target access device can generate MTK based on PK and a selected first string.

[0050] S102: When the first integrity check code is verified, the target access device adds the identity of the requesting device to an association list, generates a second random number, and generates a session key based on the domain key, the first random number and the second random number.

[0051] When the first integrity check code is verified, it indicates that the identity of the requesting device is authenticated by the target access device, and the target access device can add the identity of the requesting device to an association list to associate the target access device with the requesting device. The association list can be a storage area in the target access device, used to store the identity of the requesting device that passes the identity verification, and the form of the association list is not limited in the present application.

[0052] In addition, the target access device also generates a second random number, and the target access device can generate a session key according to the domain key, the first random number and the second random number, for realizing secure communication between the requesting device and the target access device after the handover is successful.

[0053] Of course, if the first integrity check code fails to pass the verification, it indicates that the target access device fails to authenticate the identity of the requesting device, and the target access device can end the current verification process and stop the handover.

[0054] S103: The requesting device receives the second random number sent by the target access device, the first random number sent by the target access device, the identity of the target access device, the second integrity check code and the association status code. When the first random number received by the requesting device is consistent with the first random number sent by the requesting device, the second integrity check code is verified according to the message integrity check key determined by the requesting device based on the domain key.

[0055] Similar to the first integrity check code, the second integrity check code received by the requesting device is calculated by the target access device based on the message integrity check key and using the message integrity check algorithm on the fields including the second random number sent by the target access device, the first random number sent by the target access device and the identity of the target access device. Therefore, the requesting device can determine the message integrity check key based on the domain key, and verify the second integrity check code using the message integrity check key.

[0056] S104: When the second integrity check code passes the verification, the requesting device generates a session key based on the domain key, the first random number and the second random number.

[0057] When the second integrity check code passes the verification, it indicates that the requesting device passes the authentication of the identity of the target access device, and the requesting device can generate a session key according to the domain key, the first random number and the second random number in the same way as the target access device.

[0058] S105: When the requesting device receives the association status code, if the association status code indicates that the association is successful, it is determined that the handover is successful.

[0059] Specifically, after determining that the identity of the requesting device passes the authentication and that both parties generate a session key, the target access device sends an association status code representing the success or failure of the association to the requesting device. The requesting device receives the association status code, and if the association status code indicates that the association is successful, it is determined that the handover is successful. The requesting device can perform data interaction with the target access device.

[0060] It is understood that the wireless network switching method provided in this application can be applied to any wireless network, including cellular networks, wireless local area networks, wireless metropolitan area networks, etc.

[0061] It should be noted that fields exchanged between the target access device and the requesting device, such as the first random number, the identity of the requesting device, the identifier of the domain key selected in the domain key group generated by the requesting device during the initial mobile domain association, the first integrity check code, or the second random number, the identity of the target access device, the second integrity check code, and the association status code, can be carried in management messages used to transmit signaling information. For example, in a wireless local area network, they can be carried in a management frame; in a personal area network, they can be carried in a command frame; and in a mobile communication network, they can be carried in a signaling frame. On the one hand, management messages are existing messages in the network. If these interaction fields are not carried in management messages, additional data type messages need to be sent separately, which increases the number of message interactions. Therefore, if these fields are carried in management messages, the number of message interactions can be reduced, improving the efficiency of interaction. On the other hand, if these fields are carried in management messages, the session key and message integrity verification key can be obtained as early as possible, which can protect management messages and improve their security. If they are carried in data messages, the time point for obtaining the above keys will be delayed, thus making it impossible to protect management messages.

[0062] As can be seen from the above, the embodiments of this application provide a wireless network handover method, in which the requesting device and the target access device directly generate a message integrity verification key through the domain key, and verify the integrity verification code based on the message integrity verification key, thereby realizing the identity authentication of both parties. When the identity authentication of the other party is successful, the session key is generated by combining the domain key with the random numbers of both parties, which simplifies the handover process and realizes a secure and efficient network handover.

[0063] For ease of understanding, the following explanation uses a Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) as an example.

[0064] A WLAN can include multiple access points (APs) as access devices. A requesting device (STA) can switch from the current AP to the target AP. The requesting device (STA) can be a mobile phone, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a tablet computer, or other terminal devices. Of course, the requesting device (STA) is not limited to the above devices.

[0065] The following is combined Figure 2 This application provides a wireless network handover method, which includes:

[0066] S201: The STA sends a fast handover authentication request message to the target AP.

[0067] The fast handover authentication request message includes an MDE field and a first fast handover information element (FTIE) field. The MDE field identifies support of fast handover, which includes a mobile domain identifier (MDID) and fast handover capability policy information. The first FTIE field includes a first random number (Nonce) generated by the STA STA , an identity (ID) of the STA STA , an identity (Keyname) of a selected domain key in a domain key group generated by the STA when initially associating with a mobile domain STA , and a first integrity check code (MacTag) STA1 (MTK).

[0068] It should be noted that each AP in a wireless network usually periodically broadcasts its own MDE field, and the STA carries the received MDE field broadcast by the target AP in the fast handover authentication request message when it needs to access the target AP.

[0069] The MacTag STA1 (MTK) is a message integrity check key generated by the STA based on the selected domain key, and is calculated by using a message integrity check algorithm on other fields in the fast handover authentication request message except the MacTag STA1 (MTK). When the receiver holds the selected domain key, the message integrity check key can be generated based on the domain key, and the receiver locally calculates other fields in the fast handover authentication request message except the MacTag STA1 (MTK) based on the message integrity check key, and compares the calculation result with the MacTag STA1 (MTK), so as to verify the MacTag STA1 (MTK), thereby achieving identity authentication of the STA by the target AP.

[0070] Therefore, the fast handover authentication request message can also carry an identity (ID) of an initial access device InitAP . In this way, when the target AP does not find the selected domain key locally, the initial AP can be requested for the domain key according to the ID InitAP .

[0071] Of course, the first FTIE field can also include security capability parameter information (SecurityCapabilities) supported by the STA STA , so as to be used by the target AP to select corresponding security capability parameters. The SecurityCapabilities STASpecifically, it may include identity authentication suites, symmetric encryption algorithms, hash algorithms, key exchange algorithms and / or key derivation algorithms supported by the STA. The target AP can select the algorithm used to generate the session key based on the above algorithms, such as the first key derivation algorithm.

[0072] In some possible implementations, the fast switch verification request message may also include a security information element field to identify supported security features, through which security policies can be negotiated. In one example, the security information element field could be the WAPI security information element field, i.e., WAPI[BKID].

[0073] S202: The target AP determines the message integrity verification key pair MacTag based on the domain key. STA1 (MTK) performs verification. If the verification passes, execute S203.

[0074] Specifically, the target AP receives the MacTag. STA1 After (MTK), a message integrity verification key is generated based on the domain key. This message integrity verification key is then used to verify the message integrity of the fast handover verification request message, excluding the MacTag. STA1 Perform local calculations on fields other than (MTK), and compare the results with MacTag. STA1 If the MTK matches, the STA identity verification is successful and the subsequent process can be executed; if they do not match, the STA identity verification fails and the handover process can be terminated.

[0075] S203: Target AP will ID STA Add to the associated list and generate a second random number (Nonce). newAP Based on the domain key and the first random number Nonce STA and the second random number Nonce newAP Generate a session key.

[0076] In practical implementation, the target AP is based on the domain key and Nonce. STA and Nonce newAP The information, including the first key derivation algorithm determined by the security capability parameters selected by the target access device, generates a session key. This session key can be used to enable secure communication between the requesting device and the target access device after a successful handover.

[0077] Furthermore, the target AP can add the identities of both parties when calculating the session key to increase its complexity and thus enhance security. Specifically, the target AP can use the domain key and Nonce... STA Nonce newAP ID STA and IDnewAP The session key is calculated using the first key derivation algorithm based on the information included.

[0078] S204: The target AP sends a fast handover verification response message to the STA.

[0079] The quick switch verification response message includes the MDE field and the second FTIE field, the second FTIE field including the Nonce. newAP Nonce STA ID newAP And the second integrity check code MacTag newAP1 (MTK).

[0080] MacTag newAP1 (MTK) is the message integrity verification key generated by the target AP based on the domain key. It utilizes a message integrity verification algorithm to verify the integrity of the message, excluding the MacTag, in the fast handover verification response message. newAP1 It is generated by calculating other fields besides (MTK).

[0081] In some possible implementations, the second FTIE field may also include SecurityCapabilities. newAP The Security Capabilities newAP Carry the security capability parameters selected by the target AP so that the STA can make informed decisions based on those security capabilities. newAP Determine the algorithm used by the target AP when generating the session key, i.e., the first key derivation algorithm.

[0082] S205: When the STA receives the Nonce STA With the Nonce sent STA When consistent, the message integrity verification key determined by the STA based on the domain key is used to verify the MacTag. newAP1 (MTK) performs verification. If verification passes, proceed to step S206.

[0083] Specifically, STA received MacTag newAP1 After (MTK), the message integrity verification key pair includes the MacTag from the fast switch verification response message. newAP1 Perform local calculations on fields other than (MTK), and compare the results with MacTag. newAP1 (MTK) comparison can achieve MacTag comparison. newAP1The target AP identity authentication passes, and the subsequent process can be performed; if not consistent, the target AP identity authentication fails, and the switching process can be ended.

[0084] S206: The STA generates the session key according to the information including the domain key, the Nonce STA and the Nonce newAP , and the first key derivation algorithm determined by the Security Capabilities newAP .

[0085] Specifically, the target AP indicates the first key derivation algorithm adopted by the STA by carrying the Security Capabilities newAP in the fast switching verification response message. In this way, the STA generates the session key according to the Nonce STA itself generates, the Nonce newAP received, and the domain key, and the first key derivation algorithm. Wherein, the generation of the session key means that the identity authentication is completed, and the subsequent switching process can be performed.

[0086] In actual application, the session key can be generated by the STA first, or by the target AP first, or by both the STA and the target AP simultaneously. The embodiments of the present application do not limit this.

[0087] S207: Before the reassociation deadline arrives, the STA sends a reassociation request message to the target AP.

[0088] The reassociation deadline is the deadline agreed by the STA and the target AP, and can be the time when the preset association period arrives after the fast switching verification request message is sent. For example, the preset association period is one minute, and the reassociation deadline can be one minute after the fast switching verification request message is sent.

[0089] It can be understood that a WLAN can include multiple APs, and the multiple APs belong to the same basic service set. When the STA is switched from an AP of the WLAN to a target AP, the process of associating the WLAN with the target AP can be referred to as reassociation.

[0090] After the identity authentication is completed, the STA can send a re-association request message before a re-association deadline arrives, and if the target AP does not receive the re-association request message sent by the STA before the re-association deadline arrives, the target AP can consider that the STA gives up re-associating with the target AP, and in this case, the target AP can delete the session key. When the STA subsequently requests to switch to the target AP again, the above S201 to S206 are re-executed to negotiate and generate a session key.

[0091] The re-association request message includes the MDE field and a third FTIE field, and the third FTIE field includes the Nonce STA and a third integrity verification code MacTag STA2 (MTK).

[0092] The Nonce STA2 (MTK) is calculated by the STA based on a message integrity verification key and using a message integrity verification algorithm on other fields in the re-association request message except the MacTag STA2 (MTK).

[0093] S208: The target AP sends a re-association response message to the STA.

[0094] After the target access device receives the re-association request message sent by the requesting device, the freshness and integrity of the re-association request message need to be verified, and after the verification is passed, a re-association response message is sent to the STA.

[0095] Specifically, the target AP can verify whether the Nonce STA in the re-association request message is consistent with the Nonce STA in the fast switching verification request message, and if they are consistent, it indicates that the re-association request message is fresh, and the target AP can continue to verify the MacTag STA2 (MTK). Specifically, the message integrity verification key can be used to locally calculate other fields in the re-association request message except the MacTag STA2 (MTK), and the calculation result is compared with the MacTag STA2 (MTK) to achieve the verification of the MacTag STA2 (MTK). If the verification is passed, the integrity verification of the re-association request message is passed, and at this time the target AP can send a re-association response message.

[0096] The re-association response message includes the MDE field, an association status code Status Code field, and a fourth FTIE field, the Status Code field includes an association status code Status Code, which is specifically used to identify association success or failure, and the fourth FTIE field includes the Nonce newAP and the fourth integrity verification code MacTag newAP2 (MTK).

[0097] Wherein, MacTag newAP2 (MTK) is generated by the target AP based on the message integrity verification key and using the message integrity verification algorithm to calculate the other fields in the re-association response message except MacTag newAP2 (MTK).

[0098] S209: When the association status code field indicates that the re-association is successful, the Nonce newAP in the re-association response message is consistent with the Nonce newAP in the fast handover verification response message, and the MacTag newAP2 (MTK) verification is passed, the STA and the target AP open the respective corresponding controlled ports.

[0099] Specifically, if the re-association response message represents re-association success, that is, the value of the Status code field is 0, and the freshness and integrity of the re-association response message are verified, that is, the Nonce newAP consistency verification is passed, and the MacTag newAP2 (MTK) verification is passed, it represents that the STA switches to the target AP, at this time, the STA and the target AP can open the respective corresponding controlled ports to interact with the business data through the controlled ports.

[0100] Wherein, the verification of MacTag newAP2 (MTK) can be locally calculated by using the message integrity verification key to include other fields in the re-association response message except MacTag newAP2 (MTK), and comparing the calculation result with MacTag newAP2 (MTK), thereby realizing the verification of MacTag newAP2 (MTK).

[0101] It should be noted that the order of the fields in each message exchanged between the STA and the target AP in the present application is not limited (the same below).

[0102] In consideration of the security of the data in the interaction process, in the subsequent service data exchange process, the STA and the target AP can generate encrypted session data by encrypting the session data using the negotiated session key, and transmit the encrypted session data through the controlled port. The receiver decrypts the encrypted session data using the session key, thereby realizing secure communication between the STA and the target AP.

[0103] As can be seen from the above, the embodiment of the application provides a wireless network switching method. The STA selects a domain key from the domain key group generated by initial mobile domain association, generates a message integrity check key based on the domain key, verifies the integrity check code using the message integrity check key, realizes identity authentication of the STA and the target AP, and directly generates a session key using the domain key after the authentication is passed, which is used for secure communication of the network after switching. The method reduces the number of key derivation, simplifies the wireless network switching process, and improves the switching efficiency.

[0104] In Figure 2 In the embodiment shown in the figure, when the STA quickly switches to the target AP, a session key is quickly generated using a domain key, and the generation of the domain key can be realized by initial mobile domain association of the STA. The initial mobile domain association process and the process of generating the domain key are described in detail below in combination with specific embodiments.

[0105] Referring to Figure 3 , the initial mobile domain association process between the STA and the initial access device (i.e. the initial AP) is as follows:

[0106] S301: The STA sends a link verification request message to the initial access device (i.e. the initial AP).

[0107] The link verification request message can be increased according to actual needs to carry the corresponding fields as needed.

[0108] S302: The initial AP sends a link verification response message to the STA.

[0109] The link verification response message can also be increased according to actual needs to carry the corresponding fields as needed.

[0110] Specifically, the link verification response message can carry a link state field. If the link state field indicates that the link verification is successful, the STA sends an association request message to the initial AP to request association with the initial AP. The association request message includes the MDE field and the security information element field, and the content of the MDE field is consistent with the content of the MDE field of the initial AP.

[0111] S303: The initial AP receives the association request message.

[0112] Specifically, after receiving the association request message, the initial AP first checks the content of the MDE field. If the content of the MDE field matches that of the initial AP, the initial AP allows the STA to associate, otherwise, the initial AP rejects the association. It should be noted that in some cases, such as the association request message contains the MDE field, but the security information element does not indicate the fast handover authentication and key management suite, the initial AP can reject the association. The fast handover authentication and key management suite indicates that the association needs to perform fast handover initial mobile domain association.

[0113] S304: The initial AP generates an association response message according to the association result of the STA, and returns the association response message to the STA.

[0114] Specifically, the initial AP packs the MDE field, the association status code field and the fifth FTIE field to generate an association response message, wherein the fifth FTIE field includes the identity ID of the initial AP InitAP In this way, the STA can not only obtain the association result with the initial AP, but also obtain the identity ID of the initial AP InitAP So that subsequent switching APs can request domain keys and the like from the initial AP according to the ID InitAP

[0115] As shown in Figure 3 If the association result indicates that the association is successful, the STA and the initial AP perform an initial authentication operation. The initial authentication operation is specifically implemented based on authentication message interaction. The authentication message specifically includes the MDE, the security information element, the fifth FTIE field and the TIE field. The TIE field specifically includes the reassociation deadline TIE[ReassociationDeadline] and the key lifetime TIE[Keylifetime]. The STA and the initial AP generate a domain key group composed of multiple domain keys after successful authentication.

[0116] Further, the initial AP can report the domain key group to the key management server (AKS). In order to improve the switching efficiency, the AKS can be resident in the initial AP, so that the domain key can be directly obtained from the initial AP when the domain key is obtained. In addition, when other APs (such as target APs requested by the STA to switch) obtain the domain key, the key can be transmitted through a pre-established secure channel to ensure the security of the key.

[0117] It should be noted that after the initial mobile domain association is successful, the STA and the initial AP can open their respective controlled ports to perform secure session and data transmission, and Qos resource allocation.

[0118] ​During the initial mobile domain association process, after successful authentication between the STA and the initial AP, the STA and the initial AP can determine a base key. This base key can be a key obtained through Diffie-Hellman (DH) or SM2 exchange. In shared key mode, this base key can also be a pre-shared key. Then, based on the base key, the STA and the initial AP use the second key derivation algorithm negotiated by them to derive the extended master key EMK. The STA and the initial AP then use their respective identity identifiers (IDs) to further derive the key. STA and ID InitAP ) and / or the STA and the random number generated by the initial AP (Nonce) STA and Nonce InitAP The domain key group is generated by combining the extended master key (EMK) with the extended master key (EMK).

[0119] This application provides two implementation methods for extended master keys. The specific implementation methods for deriving extended master keys are described below.

[0120] One implementation method is to derive the extended master key based on an asymmetric key negotiation mechanism, see [link to relevant documentation]. Figure 4 STA and AP negotiate a key Z using a key negotiation algorithm, such as the Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) algorithm or the SM2 algorithm based on elliptic curve cryptosystems. Then, they concatenate their respective identifiers, their respective random numbers, and a second string jointly selected by STA and AP. Based on the concatenation result and key Z, they derive the extended main key (EMK) using a second key derivation algorithm. The extended main key EMK can be specifically represented as KDF(Z, ID). STA ||ID InitAP ||Nonce STA ||Nonce InitAP The second string is a fixed string jointly selected by the STA and AP, used as a specific parameter derived from the extended master key. "||" indicates concatenation.

[0121] Another implementation method is to derive the extended master key based on the pre-shared key mechanism, see [link to relevant documentation]. Figure 5, the STA and the AP pre-determine a pre-shared key (Pre-Shared Key, PSK), as an example, the PSK can be a password, then the STA and the AP can concatenate a Key calculated by the ECDH or SM2 key exchange protocol in the key negotiation process, an identity of the STA and the AP respectively, a random number generated by the STA and the AP respectively, and a third string selected by the STA and the AP together, derive an extended master key EMK from the concatenation result and the PSK by using a second key derivation algorithm, and the extended master key EMK can be specifically represented as KDF (PSK, Key||ID STA ||ID InitAP || Nonce STA ||Nonce InitAP ||third string), wherein the third string is a fixed string selected by the STA and the AP together, as a specific parameter for deriving the extended master key, and "||" represents concatenation.

[0122] In a possible implementation, based on the above-mentioned extended master key, the process of generating a domain root key DRK (s) and a domain key KEY (s) is as follows:

[0123] DRK = PRF (EMK, ID STA ||ID InitAP || Nonce STA ||Nonce InitAP ||key lable||fourth string)

[0124] Wherein, Key lable is a printable string less than 255 bytes, indicating the use of the DRK, and Key lable can adopt the label-string@domain format. For each DRK, the Key lable is different. The fourth string is a fixed string selected by the STA and the AP together, as a specific parameter for deriving the domain root key.

[0125] The generation process of the domain key is specifically as follows:

[0126] KEY = PRF (DRK, ID STA ||ID InitAP || Nonce STA ||Nonce InitAP ||key lable||fifth string)

[0127] Wherein, the Key lable is a printable string less than 255 bytes, indicating the use of the KEY in the DRK range, and the Key lable can adopt the label-string@domain format. For each KEY, the Key lable is different. The fifth string is a fixed string selected by the STA and the AP together, as a specific parameter for domain key derivation. According to the needs of the application, multiple domain keys can be derived, i.e. a domain key group is formed.

[0128] Wherein, each DRK and KEY has a unique name DRKName and KEYName, and the generation process of DRKName and KEYName is shown as follows:

[0129] DRKName=KDF(EMKName, key lable|"EMK"|"\0"|length), wherein EMKName is the name of the corresponding extended master key;

[0130] KEYName=KDF(DRKName, key lable|"EMK"|"\0"|length), wherein DRKName is the domain root key name derived in the previous step.

[0131] When the STA switches between the APs in the same extended service set (ESS) mobile domain range, the fast switching mechanism can be used to reduce the switching delay and ensure the continuity of the service data link.

[0132] Wherein, the process of the STA initially associating with an AP in a mobile domain and establishing a connection with the AP is called fast switching initial mobile domain association, and the STA can subsequently re-associate to other APs in the same mobile domain range by using the fast switching protocol.

[0133] The STA executes the fast switching protocol when switching from the currently associated AP to the target AP, Figure 2 The wireless network switching method described in the embodiments can be specifically divided into the following two implementation manners according to the different fast switching message transmission manners:

[0134] One way is over-the-air mode, the STA communicates with the target AP directly through the link authentication protocol; the other way is over-the-DS mode, the STA communicates with the target AP through the currently associated AP. Specifically, the STA communicates with the current AP encapsulated in the active frame (i.e. Action frame), and the current AP forwards the information to the target AP. The message interaction between the current AP and the target AP can be encapsulated in the Extensible Encapsulation Protocol (EEP) data security channel.

[0135] For the over-the-air mode, please refer to Figure 6A , the STA and the target AP use the over-the-air fast switching protocol, i.e. over-the-air FT protocol. The STA and the target AP use the FT authentication process based on the domain key, and securely negotiate the session key by exchanging Nonce STA and Nonce AP . The session key is negotiated before re-association, which can protect the subsequent re-association process and optional resource request process.

[0136] In the specific implementation, the STA encapsulates the fast switching authentication request message in the link authentication request frame according to the link authentication protocol, so as to interact with the target AP. As shown in Figure 6A , the STA and the target AP use the following message interaction to implement the over-the-air fast switching process:

[0137] S601: The STA sends a fast switching authentication request message to the target AP, and the fast switching authentication request message is encapsulated in a link authentication request frame.

[0138] The fast switching authentication request message includes an FT AA field, a security information element field [BKID], an MDE field, and a first FT IE field. The first FT IE field includes Nonce STA , ID STA , ID InitAP , KEYname STA , Securitycapabilites STA and a first integrity check code MacTag STA1 (MTK). The FT AA field is used to identify the link authentication algorithm as the fast switching identity authentication algorithm.

[0139] Since the fast handover authentication request message is encapsulated in the link authentication request frame, the frame header of the link authentication request frame needs to carry the address information of the target AP. The source address (SA) field of the frame header should be set to the MAC address of the STA, and the destination address (DA) field of the frame header should be set to the basic service set identity (BSSID) of the target AP.

[0140] The definitions of information elements and their subfields in the link verification request frame can be found in security-related specifications such as ISO / IEC 8802-11.

[0141] The ID InitAP It is mainly used when the target AP cannot find the domain key, based on this ID. InitAP Request a domain key from the initial AP. The target AP uses KEYname. STA The value and other information in the link verification request frame are used to find the corresponding key. If the target AP does not have a keyname... STA The identifier key can then be used based on the ID. InitAP Obtain the domain key corresponding to the key name. After receiving the new key from the STA, the target AP should delete the previous domain key between itself and the STA.

[0142] Among them, the MacTag STA1 (MTK) is a message integrity verification key (MTK) generated by the STA based on the selected domain key. It utilizes a message integrity verification algorithm to verify the integrity of the message, excluding the MacTag, within the fast handover verification request message. STA1 It is generated by calculating other fields besides (MTK).

[0143] When the target AP receives a message carrying a MacTag STA1 When the target AP receives a fast handover verification request message (MTK), it uses the message integrity verification key MTK to verify the integrity of the message, excluding the MacTag. STA1 Fields other than (MTK) are calculated locally, and the results are compared with the received MacTag. STA1 If the MTK (Message Integrity Verification Key) is compared with the target AP's MTK, and they match, the verification passes. At this point, the target AP can execute the step of generating a session key using the first key derivation algorithm determined by the security capability parameters selected by the target access device. If they do not match, the verification fails, the target AP ends the handover process, and can further return a prompt message to the STA. The method for generating the MTK is already described in [the original text]. Figure 2 The examples have been described accordingly, and will not be repeated here.

[0144] Since the message integrity check key is generated based on the domain key, only a legitimate STA can access the target AP. If the STA is not a legitimate STA, it cannot obtain the domain key, and thus cannot generate the message integrity check key based on the domain key. In this way, the STA cannot generate a correct first message integrity check code MacTag STA1 (MTK). If the MacTag STA1 (MTK) verification passes, it indicates that the STA is a legitimate STA, and the identity of the STA is authenticated by the target AP. If the MacTag newAP1 (MTK) verification fails, it indicates that the STA is not a legitimate STA, and the identity of the STA is not authenticated by the target AP.

[0145] The target AP can generate a session key according to a first key derivation algorithm selected by the target AP based on the Nonce STA , the KEYname STA , the Nonce newAP , and the identity ID STA of the requesting device, the identity ID newAP of the target access device, and the security capabilities Security capabilites newAP selected by the target access device. Correspondingly, the target AP carries ID newAP in the second FTIE field, so that the STA calculates the session key based on the information including the ID newAP .

[0146] If the content of the MDE received by the target AP does not match the content of the MDE field of the target AP, the target AP should reject the link verification request. If the ID InitAP in the first FTIE field is invalid, the AP should reject the link verification request. If the security information element in the link verification request frame contains an invalid KEYname STA and the AP has determined that it is an invalid KEYname STA , the AP should reject the verification request. If the STA selects a different unicast cipher suite in the security information element than that associated with the initial mobility domain, the AP rejects the verification request. After rejecting the verification request, the STA can retry the link verification request.

[0147] S602: The target AP sends a fast switching verification response message to the requesting device STA, the fast switching verification response message including an FTAA field, a security information element field [BKID], an MDE field, and a second FTIE field, the second FTIE field including a Nonce newAP , a NonceSTA ID newAP Security capabilities newAP1 and MacTag newAP1 (MTK).

[0148] Among them, Nonce STA Used for consistency verification, specifically, the STA can transmit the received Nonce. STA With local Nonce STA If the comparison is successful and the two keys match, the STA can then execute the step of generating the session key using the first key derivation algorithm determined by the security capability parameters selected by the target AP.

[0149] Similar to the Fast Switch Authentication Request message, the second FTIE field in the Fast Switch Authentication Response message can also carry a second integrity checksum MacTag. newAP1 (MTK), so STA can be on MacTag newAP1 After the (MTK) verification is successful, the step of generating a session key using the first key derivation algorithm determined by the security capability parameters selected by the target access device is executed.

[0150] Specifically, MacTag newAP1 (MTK) is the message integrity verification key (MTK) negotiated between the target AP and the STA, used to verify the integrity of the message, excluding the MacTag, in the fast handover verification response message. newAP1 The calculations are generated from fields other than (MTK). After receiving the fast handover verification response message, the STA uses the message integrity verification key to verify the information in the fast handover verification response message, excluding the MacTag. newAP1 Fields other than (MTK) are calculated locally and then compared with the received MacTag. newAP1 If the STA and the target AP are compared (MTK), the verification is successful, thus enabling the STA to authenticate the target AP and allowing the STA to perform subsequent steps. If they are inconsistent, the verification fails and the handover process can be terminated.

[0151] Since the aforementioned message integrity verification key is generated based on the domain key, only legitimate APs can obtain the domain key. If the target AP is not a legitimate AP, it cannot obtain the domain key, and therefore cannot generate the message integrity verification key and the second message integrity check code MacTag based on that key. newAP1 (MTK). In other words, if MacTag newAP1 If the (MTK) verification passes, it indicates that the target AP is a legitimate AP, and the STA has successfully authenticated the target AP's identity; if the MacTag...newAP1 If the MTK verification fails, it indicates that the target AP is not a legal AP, and the identity authentication of the STA to the target AP fails.

[0152] The target AP carries Security Capabilities newAP indicating the first key derivation algorithm adopted by the STA, and the STA generates the session key by using the first key derivation algorithm according to the Nonce STA , the Nonce newAP , and the domain key. STA STA InitAP STA STA STA2 and a third integrity verification code MacTag STA2 (MTK).

[0153] S603: Before the re-association deadline arrives, the STA sends a re-association request message to the target AP.

[0154] The re-association request message includes a security information element field [BKID], an MDE field, and a third FTIE field, and the third FTIE field includes the Nonce STA , the ID STA , the ID InitAP , the KEYname STA , the Security capabilites STA , and a third integrity verification code MacTag STA2 (MTK).

[0155] The MacTag STA2 (MTK) is generated by the STA based on the message integrity verification key and by using a message integrity verification algorithm on other fields in the re-association request message except the MacTag STA2 (MTK).

[0156] S604: The target AP sends a re-association response message to the STA.

[0157] After the target access device receives the re-association request message sent by the requesting device, it needs to verify the freshness and integrity of the re-association request message, and sends a re-association response message to the STA after the verification passes.

[0158] Specifically, the target AP can verify whether the Nonce STA in the re-association request message is consistent with the Nonce STA in the fast switching verification request message. If they are consistent, it indicates that the re-association request message is fresh, and the target AP can continue to verify the MacTag STA2(MTK) in the re-association request message, and comparing the result with MacTag STA2 (MTK) in the re-association response message, the verification of MacTag STA2 (MTK) can be realized. If the verification is passed, the integrity of the re-association request message is verified, and the target AP can send a re-association response message. STA2

[0159] The re-association response message includes a security information element field [BKID], an MDE field, an association status code Status Code field, and a fourth FTIE field. The Status Code field includes an association status code Status Code, which is specifically used to identify the success or failure of association. The fourth FTIE field includes Nonce newAP , Nonce STA , ID newAP , Securitycapabilites newAP , and the fourth integrity verification code MacTag newAP2 (MTK).

[0160] Wherein, MacTag newAP2 (MTK) is generated by the target AP based on the message integrity verification key and using the message integrity verification algorithm to calculate the fields in the re-association response message except MacTag newAP2 (MTK).

[0161] S605: When the association status code field indicates that the re-association is successful, the Nonce newAP in the re-association response message is consistent with the Nonce newAP in the fast handover verification response message, and the MacTag newAP2 (MTK) verification is passed, the STA and the target AP open their respective corresponding controlled ports.

[0162] Specifically, if the re-association response message indicates that the re-association is successful, i.e., the value of the Status code field is 0 (herein, only as an example, obviously, other ways can also be used to indicate the success of re-association), and the freshness and integrity of the re-association response message are verified, i.e., the consistency verification of Nonce newAP is passed, and the MacTag newAP2 (MTK) verification is passed, it indicates that the STA switches to the target AP, and at this time, the STA and the target AP can open their respective corresponding controlled ports to interact with business data through the controlled ports.​

[0163] wherein the verification of the MacTag newAP2 (MTK) can be implemented by calculating the message integrity check key of other fields in the re-association response message except the MacTag newAP2 (MTK) locally, and comparing the calculation result with the MacTag newAP2 (MTK) to achieve the verification of the MacTag newAP2 (MTK).

[0164] For the distributed system mode, the STA and the AP interact by using the over-the-DS FT protocol. The STA encapsulates the fields in the fast switching verification request message including the first FTIE field in an action frame, and sends the fast switching verification request message to the target AP in the form of forwarding message by the current AP, and receives the fast switching verification response message sent by the target AP in the form of forwarding message by the current AP.

[0165] For details, please refer to Figure 6B , the STA and the AP use the following message interaction to implement the over-the-DS fast switching:

[0166] S611: The STA sends a fast switching verification request message to the target AP, the fast switching verification request message is encapsulated in an FT REQUEST frame, and the fast switching verification request message includes a STA address, a target AP address, a security information element field [BKID], an MDE field and a first FTIE field, the first FTIE field includes a Nonce STA , an ID STA , an ID InitAP , a KEYname STA , a Security capabilites STA and a MacTag STA1 (MTK).

[0167] Wherein the STA Address field in the fast switching verification request message should be set as the MAC address of the STA, and the Target AP Address field in the fast switching verification request message should be set as the BSSID of the target AP.

[0168] Wherein the MacTag STA1 (MTK) is the message integrity check key MTK generated by the STA based on the selected domain key, and the message integrity check algorithm is used to calculate the message integrity check key of other fields in the fast switching verification request message except the MacTagSTA1 (MTK) outside the other fields in the message to generate.

[0169] When the target AP receives the fast handover verification request message carrying the MacTag STA1 (MTK), the target AP calculates the other fields in the message except the MacTag STA1 (MTK) locally using the message integrity check key MTK, and compares the calculation result with the received MacTag STA1 (MTK). If they are consistent, the verification is passed, and the target AP can perform the step of generating a session key using the first key derivation algorithm determined by the security capability parameter selected by the target access device. If they are not consistent, the verification is failed, the target AP ends the handover process, and can further return a prompt information to the STA. The generation method of the message integrity check key MTK has been described in the Figure 2 embodiment, which will not be repeated here.

[0170] Since the above message integrity check key is generated based on the domain key, only a legitimate STA can access the target AP. If the STA is not a legitimate STA, it cannot obtain the domain key, and further cannot generate the message integrity check key based on the domain key. In this way, the STA cannot generate the correct first message integrity check code MacTag STA1 (MTK). If the MacTag STA1 (MTK) verification is passed, it indicates that the STA is a legitimate STA, and the identity of the STA is authenticated by the target AP. If the MacTag newAP1 (MTK) verification is failed, it indicates that the STA is not a legitimate STA, and the identity of the STA is not authenticated by the target AP.

[0171] The target AP can generate a session key using the first key derivation algorithm determined by the security capability parameter Security capabilites STA selected by the target access device according to the Nonce STA , the KEYname newAP , the Nonce STA , and the identity ID newAP of the requesting device, and the identity ID newAP of the target access device. Correspondingly, the target AP carries ID newAP in the second FTIE field, so that the STA can calculate the session key according to the information including ID newAP .

[0172] If the target AP receives a MDE whose content does not match the MDE field content of itself, the target AP shall reject the link verification request. If the first FTIE field contains an invalid ID InitAP , the AP shall reject the link verification request. If the security information element in the link verification request frame contains an invalid KEYname STA and the AP has determined that it is an invalid KEYname STA , the AP shall reject the verification request. If the STA selects a different unicast cipher suite in the security information element than the one associated with the initial mobility domain, the AP rejects the verification request. After rejecting the verification request, the STA can retry the link verification request.

[0173] S612: The target AP sends a fast handover verification response message to the STA, the fast handover verification response message is encapsulated in an FT RESPONSE frame, the fast handover verification response message includes a STA address, a TargetAP address, a Status code, a security information element field [BKID], a MDE field and a second FTIE field, the second FTIE field includes a NoncenewAP, a NonceSTA, an ID newAP , security capabilities newAP and a MacTag newAP1 (MTK).

[0174] If the ID InitAP carried in the fast handover verification request message received by the target AP corresponds to an initial AP that is unreachable, the target AP sets the Status code to 28 (herein, only an example, obviously, the initial AP unreachable can also be represented in other ways), and the target AP can limit the STA to re-associate to the target AP.

[0175] The STA address field in the fast handover verification response message shall be set to the MAC address of the STA, and the TargetAP address field in the fast handover verification response message shall be set to the BSSID of the target AP.

[0176] Wherein, the Nonce STA is used for consistency verification, specifically, the STA can compare the received Nonce STA with a local Nonce STA , if consistent, the verification is passed, and the STA can perform the step of generating the session key using the first key derivation algorithm determined by the security capability parameter selected by the target access device.

[0177] Similar to the Fast Switch Authentication Request message, the second FTIE field in the Fast Switch Authentication Response message can also carry a second integrity checksum MacTag. newAP1 (MTK), so STA can be on MacTag newAP1 After the (MTK) verification is successful, the step of generating a session key using the first key derivation algorithm determined by the security capability parameters selected by the target access device is executed.

[0178] Specifically, MacTag newAP1 (MTK) is the message integrity verification key (MTK) negotiated between the target AP and the STA, used to verify the integrity of the message, excluding the MacTag, in the fast handover verification response message. newAP1 The calculations are generated from fields other than (MTK). After receiving the fast handover verification response message, the STA uses the message integrity verification key to verify the information in the fast handover verification response message, excluding the MacTag. newAP1 Fields other than (MTK) are calculated locally and then compared with the received MacTag. newAP1 If the STA and the target AP are compared (MTK), the verification is successful, thus enabling the STA to authenticate the target AP and allowing the STA to perform subsequent steps. If they are inconsistent, the verification fails and the handover process can be terminated.

[0179] Since the aforementioned message integrity verification key is generated based on the domain key, only legitimate APs can obtain the domain key. If the target AP is not a legitimate AP, it cannot obtain the domain key, and therefore cannot generate the message integrity verification key and the second message integrity check code MacTag based on that key. newAP1 (MTK). In other words, if MacTag newAP1 If the (MTK) verification passes, it indicates that the target AP is a legitimate AP, and the STA has successfully authenticated the target AP's identity. If the MacTag... newAP1 If the (MTK) verification fails, it indicates that the target AP is not a legitimate AP, and the STA fails to authenticate the target AP.

[0180] The target AP carries Security Capabilities in the fast handover authentication response message. newAP The first key derivation algorithm used by the STA is indicated by the Nonce. STA Nonce newAP The session key is generated using the domain key and a first key derivation algorithm. The generation of the session key signifies that identity authentication is complete and subsequent handover procedures can proceed.

[0181] The fast handover verification response message and the fast handover verification response message are sent between the STA and the current AP through a wireless interface and then forwarded to the target AP.

[0182] It should be noted that the frame format of the FT REQUEST frame and the FT RESPONSE frame is not limited in the embodiment.

[0183] It should be noted that when the MDE field of the target AP contains Fast BSS Transition over DS set to 0, the STA cannot start the over-the-DS authentication mode (only for example, and the STA cannot start the over-the-DS authentication mode can also be represented in other ways), and the over-the-air authentication mode can be used at this time.

[0184] S613: Before the reassociation deadline arrives, the STA sends a reassociation request message to the target AP.

[0185] The reassociation request message includes a security information element field [BKID], an MDE field, and a third FTIE field, and the third FTIE field includes the Nonce STA , ID STA , ID InitAP , KEYname STA , Security capabilites STA and a third integrity check code MacTag STA2 (MTK).

[0186] Wherein, MacTag STA2 (MTK) is calculated by the STA based on the message integrity check key and using the message integrity check algorithm on other fields in the reassociation request message except MacTag STA2 (MTK).

[0187] S614: The target AP sends a reassociation response message to the STA.

[0188] After the target access device receives the reassociation request message sent by the requesting device, the freshness and integrity of the reassociation request message need to be verified, and the reassociation response message is sent to the STA after the verification is passed.

[0189] Specifically, the target AP can verify the Nonce STA in the reassociation request message with the Nonce STA in the fast handover verification request message.If consistent, it indicates that the re-association request message is fresh, and the target AP can continue to verify the MacTag STA2 (MTK). Specifically, the message integrity check key can be used to locally calculate the fields in the re-association request message except the MacTag STA2 (MTK), and the calculation result is compared with the MacTag STA2 (MTK) to achieve the verification of the MacTag STA2 (MTK). If the verification is passed, the integrity of the re-association request message is verified, and the target AP can send a re-association response message.

[0190] The re-association response message includes a security information element field [BKID], an MDE field, an association status code Status Code field, and a fourth FTIE field. The Status Code field includes an association status code Status Code, which is specifically used to identify the success or failure of association. The fourth FTIE field includes a Nonce newAP , a Nonce STA , an ID newAP , a Securitycapabilites newAP , and a fourth integrity check code MacTag newAP2 (MTK).

[0191] The MacTag newAP2 (MTK) is generated by the target AP based on the message integrity check key and using the message integrity check algorithm to calculate the fields in the re-association response message except the MacTag newAP2 (MTK).

[0192] S615: When the association status code field indicates that the re-association is successful, the Nonce newAP in the re-association response message is consistent with the Nonce newAP in the fast switching verification response message, and the MacTag newAP2 (MTK) verification is passed, the STA and the target AP open their respective controlled ports.

[0193] Specifically, if the re-association response message indicates that the re-association is successful, i.e., the value of the Status code field is 0 (herein, only for example, obviously, other ways can also be used to indicate the success of re-association), and the freshness and integrity of the re-association response message are verified, i.e., the consistency verification of the Nonce newAP is passed, and the MacTag newAP2If the verification of the MTK is passed, the STA is represented to switch to the target AP, at which time the STA and the target AP can open their respective controlled ports to interact with each other through the controlled ports.

[0194] wherein the MacTag newAP2 The verification of the MTK can be implemented by using a message integrity check key to locally calculate other fields in the re-association response message except the MacTag newAP2 The verification of the MTK can be implemented by using a message integrity check key to locally calculate other fields in the re-association response message except the MacTag newAP2 The verification of the MTK can be implemented by using a message integrity check key to locally calculate other fields in the re-association response message except the MacTag newAP2 The verification of the MTK can be implemented by using a message integrity check key to locally calculate other fields in the re-association response message except the MacTag

[0195] The above is a specific implementation of the wireless network switching method provided by the embodiments of the present application. Based on this, the embodiments of the present application also provide a corresponding device. In the following, the above-mentioned device provided by the embodiments of the present application will be introduced from the perspective of functional modularization.

[0196] Referring to the structural schematic diagram of the request device shown in Figure 7 The request device 700 comprises:

[0197] The sending module 710 is configured to send, to the target access device, the first random number generated by the request device, the identity of the request device, the identity of the selected domain key in the domain key group generated by the request device when initially associating with the mobility domain, and the first integrity check code.

[0198] The receiving module 720 is configured to receive the second random number, the first random number, the identity of the target access device, and the second integrity check code sent by the target access device, wherein the second random number is generated by the target access device when the first integrity check code is verified to be correct.

[0199] The verification module 730 is configured to, when the first random number received by the request device is consistent with the first random number previously sent by the request device, verify the second integrity check code according to the message integrity check key determined by the request device based on the domain key.

[0200] The generation module 740 is configured to, when the second integrity check code is verified to be correct, generate a session key based on the domain key, the first random number, and the second random number.

[0201] The determination module 750 is configured to, when receiving the association status code sent by the target access device, determine that the switching is successful if the association status code represents that the association is successful.

[0202] Optionally, the number of domain keys in the domain key group is greater than 1.

[0203] Optionally, the field in which the target access device and the requesting device interact is carried in a management class message used to transmit signaling information.

[0204] Optionally, the wireless network is a wireless local area network.

[0205] The sending module 710 is specifically configured to:

[0206] send a fast handover verification request message to the target access device, the fast handover verification request message comprising a mobile domain information element (MDE) field and a first fast handover information element (FTIE) field, the MDE field identifying support for fast handover, and the first FTIE field comprising a first random number generated by the requesting device, an identification of a domain key selected from a domain key group generated by the requesting device when initially associating with a mobile domain, and a first integrity check code;

[0207] The receiving module 720 is specifically configured to:

[0208] receive a fast handover verification response message sent by the target access device, the fast handover verification response message comprising the MDE field and a second FTIE field, the second FTIE field comprising the second random number, the first random number, an identity of the target access device, and a second integrity check code;

[0209] The sending module 710 is further configured to:

[0210] send a re-association request message to the target access device before a re-association deadline arrives, the re-association request message comprising the MDE field and a third FTIE field, the third FTIE field comprising the first random number and a third integrity check code;

[0211] The receiving module 720 is further configured to:

[0212] receive a re-association response message sent by the target access device, the re-association response message comprising the MDE field, an association status code field, and a fourth FTIE field, the fourth FTIE field comprising the second random number and a fourth integrity check code;

[0213] The requesting device 700 further comprises:

[0214] a control module configured to open a controlled port of the requesting device when the association status code field identifies successful re-association, the second random number in the re-association response message is consistent with the second random number in the fast handover verification response message, and the fourth integrity check code passes verification.

[0215] Optionally, the first FTIE field further comprises an identity of the requesting device, and the second FTIE field further comprises an identity of the target access device.

[0216] The generating module 740 is specifically configured to:

[0217] According to the first random number, the domain key, the second random number, the identity of the requesting device, and the identity of the target access device, a first key derivation algorithm selected by the target access device using a security capability parameter determines a respective corresponding session key.

[0218] Optionally, the generating module 740 is further configured to encapsulate the fast handover verification request message in a link verification request frame; or,

[0219] encapsulate the fast handover verification request message in an active frame.

[0220] If the fast handover verification request message is encapsulated in the active frame, the sending module is further configured to send the fast handover verification request message to the target access device in the form of forwarding a message through a current access device, and the receiving module is further configured to receive the fast handover verification response message sent by the target access device in the form of forwarding a message through the current access device, the fast handover verification response message being encapsulated in the active frame.

[0221] Optionally, the generating module 740 is further configured to:

[0222] After successfully associating with the initial access device, a second key derivation algorithm is used to derive an extended master key according to a base key determined by an asymmetric key agreement mechanism or a pre-shared key mechanism.

[0223] According to the identity of the requesting device and the initial access device and / or the random number generated by the requesting device and the initial access device, and the extended master key, the domain key group is generated.

[0224] Optionally, the sending module 710 is further configured to:

[0225] send an association request message to the initial access device, the association request message comprising the MDE field, and the content of the MDE field being consistent with the content of the MDE field of the initial access device itself;

[0226] The receiving module is further configured to:

[0227] receive an association response message sent by the initial access device, the association response message including the MDE field, an association status code field and a fifth FTIE field, the association status code field being used to identify whether the request device and the initial access device are associated successfully or not, and the fifth FTIE field including an identity of the initial access device;

[0228] The generating module is further configured to:

[0229] If the association status code field indicates that the association is successful, the request device and the initial access device perform an identity authentication operation, and generate the domain key group after the authentication is successful.

[0230] Optionally, the request device 700 further includes:

[0231] a releasing module, configured to release the association with the initial access device if the authentication is not successful.

[0232] Next, refer to a structural schematic diagram of an access device provided by an embodiment of the present application, the access device 800 includes:

[0233] a receiving module 810, configured to receive a first random number, an identity of a request device, an identity of a selected domain key in a domain key group generated by the request device when the request device is associated with an initial mobile domain, and a first integrity verification code;

[0234] a generating module 820, configured to acquire a corresponding domain key according to the identity of the selected domain key, and generate a message integrity verification key based on the domain key;

[0235] a verifying module 830, configured to verify the first integrity verification code according to the message integrity verification key;

[0236] The generating module 820 is further configured to, when the first integrity verification code is verified successfully, add the identity of the request device to an association list, generate a second random number, and generate a session key based on the domain key, the first random number and the second random number, the session key being used to realize secure communication between the request device and the access device after a handover is successful.

[0237] a sending module 840, configured to send a second random number, the first random number, an identity of the access device, a second integrity verification code and an association status code to the access device, the association status code being used to identify whether the request device is associated successfully or not.

[0238] Optionally, fields interacted by the access device and the request device are carried in a management class message used to transmit signaling information.

[0239] Optionally, the wireless network is a wireless local area network.

[0240] The receiving module 810 is specifically configured to:

[0241] receive a fast handover verification request message sent by the requesting device, the fast handover verification request message comprising a mobile domain information element (MDE) field and a first fast handover information element (FTIE) field, the MDE field identifying that fast handover is supported, and the first FTIE field comprising a first random number generated by the requesting device, an identification of a domain key selected from a domain key group generated by the requesting device when initially associating with a mobile domain, and a first integrity check code;

[0242] The sending module 840 is specifically configured to:

[0243] send a fast handover verification response message to the requesting device, the fast handover verification response message comprising the MDE field, an association status code field, and a second FTIE field, the second FTIE field comprising the second random number, the first random number, an identity of the access device, and a second integrity check code;

[0244] The receiving module 810 is further configured to:

[0245] receive a re-association request message sent by the requesting device, the re-association request message comprising the MDE field and a third FTIE field, the third FTIE field comprising the first random number and a third integrity check code;

[0246] The verification module 830 is further configured to:

[0247] verify whether the first random number in the re-association request message is consistent with the first random number in the fast handover verification request message, and if so, verify the third integrity check code by using the message integrity check key,

[0248] The sending module 840 is further configured to:

[0249] after the third integrity check code is verified, send a re-association response message to the requesting device, the re-association response message comprising the MDE field, the association status code field, and a fourth FTIE field, the fourth FTIE field comprising the second random number and a fourth integrity check code;

[0250] The access device 800 further comprises:

[0251] The control module is configured to open a controlled port of the access device when the association status code field indicates a re-association success, the second random number in the re-association response message is consistent with the second random number in the fast handover verification response message, and the fourth integrity check code is verified to be correct.

[0252] Optionally, the first FTIE field further includes an identity of the initial access device.

[0253] The access device 800 further includes:

[0254] The search module is configured to request the domain key from the initial access device according to the identity of the initial access device when the domain key is not found.

[0255] Optionally, the first FTIE field further includes an identity of the requesting device, and the second FTIE field further includes an identity of the access device.

[0256] The generation module 820 is specifically configured to:

[0257] generate, according to the first random number, the domain key, the second random number, the identity of the requesting device, and the identity of the access device, a respective session key by using a first key derivation algorithm determined by a security capability parameter selected by the access device.

[0258] Optionally, the access device is an initial access device, and the generation module 820 is further configured to:

[0259] derive an extended master key by using a second key derivation algorithm according to a base key determined by an asymmetric key agreement mechanism or a pre-shared key mechanism.

[0260] generate the domain key group according to the identity of the two parties and / or the random number generated by the two parties, and the extended master key.

[0261] Optionally, the receiving module 810 is further configured to:

[0262] receive an association request message sent by the requesting device in an initial access stage, the association request message including the MDE field, and the content of the MDE field being consistent with the content of the MDE field of the initial access device itself.

[0263] The sending module 840 is further configured to:

[0264] send an association response message to the requesting device, the association response message comprising the MDE field, an association status code field and a fifth FTIE field, the association status code field being used to identify whether the requesting device is successfully associated with the initial access device or not, and the fifth FTIE field comprising an identity of the initial access device;

[0265] The generating module 820 is further configured to:

[0266] If the association status code field indicates that the association is successful, perform an identity authentication operation, and generate the domain key group after successful authentication.

[0267] Those skilled in the art can clearly understand that, for the convenience and brevity of description, the specific working process of the system, device and unit described above can refer to the corresponding process in the foregoing method embodiments, which will not be repeated here.

[0268] In several embodiments provided in the present application, it should be understood that the disclosed apparatus and method can be implemented in other ways. For example, the apparatus embodiments described above are only schematic, for example, the division of the modules is only a logical function division, and actual implementation can have another division manner, for example, a plurality of modules can be combined or integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed. In addition, the coupling or direct coupling or communication connection between the shown or discussed each other can be indirect coupling or communication connection through some interfaces, devices or modules, which can be electrical, mechanical or other forms.

[0269] The modules described as separate components can or can not be physically separated, and the components shown as modules can or can not be physical units, that is, they can be located in one place, or can be distributed on a plurality of network units. According to actual needs, part or all of the units can be selected to achieve the purpose of the embodiment scheme.

[0270] It should be understood that in the present application, "at least one" refers to one or more, and "multiple" refers to two or more. "And / or" is used to describe the relationship between the associated objects, which means that there can be three kinds of relationships, for example, "A and / or B" can represent three cases: only A exists, only B exists, and A and B exist at the same time, where A and B can be singular or plural. The character " / " generally represents a "or" relationship between the associated objects. "At least one of the following" or similar expressions means any combination of these items, including any combination of single or multiple items. For example, at least one of a, b or c can mean a, b, c, "a and b", "a and c", "b and c", or "a and b and c", where a, b, and c can be single or multiple.

[0271] The above-described and above-embodied examples are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present application, and are not limited thereto. Although the present application has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing examples, those skilled in the art should understand that the technical solutions described in the foregoing examples can still be modified, or some technical features can be replaced by equivalents. The modification or replacement does not change the essence of the corresponding technical solution beyond the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application.

Claims

1. A wireless network handover method, characterized by, The method comprises: The target access device receives a first random number sent by a requesting device, an identity of the requesting device, an identity of a selected domain key in a domain key group generated by the requesting device when initially associating with a mobile domain, and a first integrity check code, acquires a corresponding domain key according to the identity of the selected domain key, generates a message integrity check key based on the domain key to verify the first integrity check code, the number of domain keys in the domain key group is greater than 1, and the first integrity check code is obtained by the requesting device based on the message integrity check key and calculation of fields including the first random number, the identity of the requesting device, and the identity of the selected domain key; When the first integrity check code is verified, the target access device adds the identity of the requesting device to an association list, generates a second random number, and generates a session key based on the domain key, the first random number, and the second random number, the session key being used to realize secure communication between the requesting device and the target access device after handover is successful; The requesting device receives a second random number sent by the target access device, a first random number sent by the target access device, an identity of the target access device, and a second integrity check code, and when the first random number received by the requesting device is consistent with the first random number sent by the requesting device, the second integrity check code is verified by the message integrity check key determined by the requesting device based on the domain key; When the second integrity check code is verified, a session key is generated based on the domain key, the first random number, and the second random number; The requesting device receives an association status code, and when the association status code indicates that association is successful, it is determined that handover is successful.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein, Fields interacted by the target access device and the requesting device are carried in a management class message used for transmitting signaling information.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein, The wireless network is a wireless local area network; the method specifically comprises: The requesting device sends a fast handover verification request message to the target access device, the fast handover verification request message comprising a mobile domain information element (MDE) field and a first fast handover information element (FTIE) field, the MDE field indicating that fast handover is supported, and the first FTIE field comprising a first random number generated by the requesting device, an identity of a selected domain key in a domain key group generated by the requesting device when initially associating with a mobile domain, and a first integrity check code; The target access device sends a fast handover verification response message to the requesting device, the fast handover verification response message comprising the MDE field and a second FTIE field, the second FTIE field comprising the second random number, the first random number, an identity of the target access device, and the second integrity check code; Before the re-association deadline arrives, the requesting device sends a re-association request message to the target access device, the re-association request message comprising the MDE field and a third FTIE field, the third FTIE field comprising the first random number and a third integrity check code; The target access device verifies whether the first random number in the re-association request message is consistent with the first random number in the fast handover verification request message, and if so, verifies the third integrity check code by using the message integrity check key, and after verification, sends a re-association response message to the requesting device, the re-association response message comprising the MDE field, an association status code field and a fourth FTIE field, the fourth FTIE field comprising the second random number and a fourth integrity check code; When the association status code field identifies that the re-association is successful, the second random number in the re-association response message is consistent with the second random number in the fast handover verification response message, and the fourth integrity check code is verified, the requesting device and the target access device open their respective corresponding controlled ports.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein, The first FTIE field further comprises an identity of the initial access device; The target access device further requests the domain key from the initial access device according to the identity of the initial access device when the domain key is not found.

5. The method of claim 3, wherein, The first FTIE field further comprises an identity of the requesting device, and the second FTIE field further comprises an identity of the target access device; The requesting device and the target access device generate their respective session keys by using a first key derivation algorithm determined by the security capability parameter selected by the target access device according to the first random number, the domain key, the second random number, the identity of the requesting device and the identity of the target access device.

6. The method of claim 3, wherein, The fast handover verification request message is encapsulated in a link verification request frame; or The fast handover verification request message is encapsulated in an activity frame. If the fast handover verification request message is encapsulated in the activity frame, the requesting device sends the fast handover verification request message to the target access device in the form of forwarding a message through a current access device, and receives the fast handover verification response message sent by the target access device in the form of forwarding a message through the current access device, the fast handover verification response message being encapsulated in the activity frame.

7. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that, The method further comprises: After the requesting device and the initial access device are successfully associated, a second key derivation algorithm is used to derive an extended master key according to a base key determined by an asymmetric key agreement mechanism or a pre-shared key mechanism; The requesting device and the initial access device further generate the domain key group according to the identity of both parties and / or the random number generated by both parties, and the extended master key.

8. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that, The requesting device and the initial access device perform initial mobile domain association by the following way: The request device sends an association request message to the initial access device, the association request message including an MDE field, and the content of the MDE field is consistent with the content of the MDE field of the initial access device itself; The initial access device sends an association response message to the request device, the association response message including the MDE field, an association status code field and a fifth FTIE field, the association status code field being used to identify whether the association of the request device and the initial access device is successful or not, and the fifth FTIE field including the identity of the initial access device; If the association status code field identifies that the association is successful, the request device and the initial access device perform an identity authentication operation, and generate the domain key group after the authentication is successful.

9. The method of claim 8, wherein, The method further includes: If the authentication is not successful, the request device cancels the association relationship with the initial access device.

10. A requesting device, comprising: includes: The sending module is configured to send, to the target access device, a first random number generated by the request device, an identity of the request device, an identity of a selected domain key in a domain key group generated by the request device when the request device is associated with an initial mobile domain, and a first integrity check code, the number of domain keys in the domain key group being greater than 1, and the first integrity check code being obtained by performing calculation on fields including the first random number, the identity of the request device and the identity of the selected domain key based on a message integrity check key; The receiving module is configured to receive a second random number, the first random number, an identity of the target access device and a second integrity check code sent by the target access device, the second random number being generated by the target access device when the first integrity check code is verified to be correct; The verification module is configured to, when the first random number received by the request device is consistent with the first random number sent by the request device, verify the second integrity check code according to the message integrity check key determined by the request device based on the domain key; The generation module is configured to, when the second integrity check code is verified to be correct, generate a session key based on the domain key, the first random number and the second random number; The determination module is configured to, when receiving an association status code sent by the target access device, determine that the handover is successful if the association status code represents that the association is successful.

11. The requesting device of claim 10, wherein, The fields interacted by the target access device and the request device are carried in a management class message used for transmitting signaling information.

12. The requesting device of claim 10, wherein, The sending module is specifically configured to: send a fast handover verification request message to the target access device, the fast handover verification request message including an MDE field and a first FTIE field, the MDE field identifying that fast handover is supported, and the first FTIE field including the first random number generated by the request device, the identity of the selected domain key in the domain key group generated by the request device when the request device is associated with the initial mobile domain and the first integrity check code; The receiving module is specifically configured to: receive a fast handover verification response message sent by the target access device, the fast handover verification response message comprising the MDE field and a second FTIE field, the second FTIE field comprising the second random number, the first random number, an identity of the target access device, and a second integrity check code; the sending module is further configured to: send a re-association request message to the target access device before the re-association deadline arrives, the re-association request message comprising the MDE field and a third FTIE field, the third FTIE field comprising the first random number and a third integrity check code; the receiving module is further configured to: receive a re-association response message sent by the target access device, the re-association response message comprising the MDE field, an association status code field, and a fourth FTIE field, the fourth FTIE field comprising the second random number and a fourth integrity check code; the requesting device further comprises: a control module configured to open a controlled port of the requesting device when the association status code field indicates that the re-association is successful, the second random number in the re-association response message is consistent with the second random number in the fast handover verification response message, and the fourth integrity check code passes the verification.

13. The requesting device of claim 12, wherein, the first FTIE field further comprises an identity of the requesting device, and the second FTIE field further comprises an identity of the target access device; the generating module is specifically configured to: generate respective session keys according to the first random number, the domain key, the second random number, the identity of the requesting device, the identity of the target access device, and a first key derivation algorithm determined by a security capability parameter selected by the target access device.

14. The requesting device of claim 12, wherein, the generating module is further configured to encapsulate the fast handover verification request message in a link verification request frame, or encapsulate the fast handover verification request message in an activity frame; if the fast handover verification request message is encapsulated in the activity frame, the sending module is further configured to send the fast handover verification request message to the target access device in the form of forwarding a message through a current access device, and the receiving module is further configured to receive the fast handover verification response message sent by the target access device in the form of forwarding a message through the current access device, the fast handover verification response message being encapsulated in the activity frame.

15. The requesting device according to any of claims 10 to 14, characterized in that, the generating module is further configured to: after successful association with an initial access device, derive an extended master key by using a second key derivation algorithm based on a base key determined by an asymmetric key agreement mechanism or a pre-shared key mechanism; generate the domain key group based on the identity of the requesting device and the initial access device and / or random numbers generated by the requesting device and the initial access device, and the extended master key.

16. The requesting device according to any of claims 10 to 14, characterized by the sending module is further configured to: send an association request message to the initial access device, the association request message comprising an MDE field, the content of the MDE field being consistent with the content of an MDE field of the initial access device itself; the receiving module is further configured to: receive an association response message sent by the initial access device, the association response message including the MDE field, an association status code field and a fifth FTIE field, the association status code field being used to identify whether the requesting device is successfully associated with the initial access device or not, and the fifth FTIE field including an identity of the initial access device; the generating module is further configured to: if the association status code field identifies that the association is successful, the requesting device and the initial access device perform an identity authentication operation, and generate the domain key group after the authentication is successful.

17. The requesting device of claim 16, wherein, The requesting device further comprises: a releasing module configured to release the association with the initial access device if the authentication is not successful.

18. An access device, comprising: comprises: a receiving module configured to receive a first random number, an identity of the requesting device, an identity of a selected domain key in a domain key group generated by the requesting device when the initial mobile domain is associated, and a first integrity check code, a number of domain keys in the domain key group being greater than 1, and the first integrity check code being calculated by the requesting device based on a message integrity check key on fields including the first random number, the identity of the requesting device and the identity of the selected domain key; a generating module configured to obtain a corresponding domain key according to the identity of the selected domain key, and generate the message integrity check key based on the domain key; a verifying module configured to verify the first integrity check code according to the message integrity check key; the generating module is further configured to, when the first integrity check code is verified, add the identity of the requesting device to an association list, generate a second random number, and generate a session key based on the domain key, the first random number and the second random number, the session key being used to realize secure communication between the requesting device and the access device after the switching is successful; a sending module configured to send a second random number, the first random number, an identity of the access device, a second integrity check code and an association status code to the access device, the association status code being used to identify whether the requesting device is successfully associated or not.

19. The access device of claim 18, wherein, The fields exchanged between the access device and the requesting device are carried in a management class message used to transmit signaling information.

20. The access device of claim 18, wherein, The receiving module is specifically configured to: receive a fast switching verification request message sent by the requesting device, the fast switching verification request message including a mobile domain information element (MDE) field and a first fast switching information element (FTIE) field, the MDE field identifying that the fast switching is supported, and the first FTIE field including a first random number generated by the requesting device, an identity of a selected domain key in a domain key group generated by the requesting device when the initial mobile domain is associated and the first integrity check code; the sending module is specifically configured to: sending a fast handover verification response message to the requesting device, the fast handover verification response message comprising the MDE field, an association status code field and a second FTIE field, the second FTIE field comprising the second random number, the first random number, an identity of the access device and the second integrity check code; the receiving module is further configured to: receive a re-association request message sent by the requesting device, the re-association request message comprising the MDE field and a third FTIE field, the third FTIE field comprising the first random number and a third integrity check code; the verifying module is further configured to: verify whether the first random number in the re-association request message is consistent with the first random number in the fast handover verification request message, and if so, verify the third integrity check code by using the message integrity check key, the sending module is further configured to: after the third integrity check code is verified, send a re-association response message to the requesting device, the re-association response message comprising the MDE field, the association status code field and a fourth FTIE field, the fourth FTIE field comprising the second random number and a fourth integrity check code; the access device further comprises: a control module configured to open a controlled port of the access device when the association status code field indicates that the re-association is successful, the second random number in the re-association response message is consistent with the second random number in the fast handover verification response message, and the fourth integrity check code is verified.

21. The access device of claim 20, wherein, the first FTIE field further comprises an identity of an initial access device; the access device further comprises: a searching module configured to request the domain key from the initial access device according to the identity of the initial access device when the domain key is not found.

22. The access device of claim 20, wherein, the first FTIE field further comprises an identity of the requesting device, and the second FTIE field further comprises an identity of the access device; the generating module is specifically configured to: generate respective session keys by using a first key derivation algorithm determined by the security capability parameter selected by the access device according to the first random number, the domain key, the second random number, the identity of the requesting device and the identity of the access device.

23. The access device of any of claims 18 to 22, wherein, the domain key group is generated by: deriving an extended master key by using a second key derivation algorithm according to a base key determined by a non-symmetrical key agreement mechanism or a pre-shared key mechanism; generating the domain key group according to the identity of the requesting device and an initial access device and / or random numbers generated by the requesting device and the initial access device, and the extended master key.

24. The access device of any of claims 18 to 22, wherein, the domain key group is generated by: in an initial access stage, an initial access device receives an association request message sent by a requesting device, the association request message comprising an MDE field, the content of the MDE field being consistent with the content of an MDE field of the initial access device itself; The initial access device sends an association response message to the requesting device, the association response message comprising the MDE field, an association status code field and a fifth FTIE field, the association status code field being used to identify whether the requesting device is successfully associated with the initial access device or not, and the fifth FTIE field comprising the identity of the initial access device; If the association status code field identifies a successful association, the initial access device performs an identity authentication operation, and generates the domain key group after successful authentication.

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