Recovery key to unlock the data storage device
Through the recovery key unlocking mechanism, the generation and use of authorized data is solved, and the complex and insecure encryption technology in the prior art is achieved, and the high security and user-friendliness of data storage devices are achieved.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202080007106.8
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2020-01-09
- Filing Date
- 2020-06-24
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-08
- Estimated Expiration
- 2040-06-24
AI Technical Summary
The encryption technology of existing data storage devices is complex and insecure, making it difficult for users to use effectively, and the storage of keys and passwords is unsafe, resulting in the exposure of confidential data.
The recovery key unlocking mechanism is adopted, and by generating recovery private keys and public keys, authorized data is generated based on these keys, and decrypted through specific communication channels, ensuring that only authorized devices can unlock the data storage device.
Improves user experience and ensures data security. Even if the device is stolen, it is difficult to decrypt encrypted data stored on the device, enhancing security without affecting user convenience.
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Figure CN113383511B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present disclosure relates to data storage devices that can be unlocked using a recovery key. Background Art
[0002] Data encryption enables relatively safe storage on data storage devices, such as block data storage devices that can be connected via a universal serial bus (USB) cable. However, the user experience is often disappointing because the setup of passwords, keys, etc. is cumbersome and complicated for technically unskilled users. If encryption is used, the storage of keys and passwords is often unsafe. Therefore, many users do not effectively use existing encryption technologies, resulting in exposure of confidential data. Summary of the invention
[0003] The present disclosure provides a data storage device that can be unlocked using a recovery key. Although the data storage device provides the recovery key to a registered manager device, another recovery manager device that has not yet registered does not have to provide the recovery key itself to the data storage device. However, the recovery manager device can become registered with full access rights even if the recovery key is the only information available to the recovery manager device. The data storage device does not adopt an access control list-based system, such as a general-purpose operating system. Instead, if the appropriate key is available, data objects can be decrypted regardless of whether the user or connected device has a specific role. In this sense, access to data objects (such as keys, user content data, or configuration data) is managed by cryptographic methods.
[0004] The present invention discloses a data storage device including a data path and an access controller. The data path includes: a data port configured to transmit data between a host computer system and the data storage device; a non-volatile storage medium configured to store encrypted user content data; and an encryption engine connected between the data port and the storage medium and configured to decrypt the encrypted user content data stored on the storage medium using an encryption key in response to a request from the host computer system. The access controller is configured to: generate a recovery private key; generate encrypted authorization data based on the recovery private key; store the encrypted authorization data in a data repository; send data indicating the recovery private key to a manager device; receive a recovery public key calculated based on the recovery private key from the recovery manager device through a communication channel different from the data path; decrypt the encrypted authorization data based on the recovery public key; generate a challenge to the recovery manager device based on the decrypted authorization data; send the challenge to the recovery manager device through a communication channel different from the data path; receive a response to the challenge from the recovery manager device through the communication channel; and enable decryption of the encrypted user content data based at least in part on the response.
[0005] In some embodiments, the recovery private key is stored on the recovery manager device and the response is based on the recovery private key stored on the recovery manager device.
[0006] In some embodiments, the manager key enables configuration of the access controller to enable decryption of encrypted user content data.
[0007] In some embodiments, the manager key enables registration of an authorized device with an access controller to enable decryption of encrypted user content data in response to the authorized device being connected to the data storage device.
[0008] In some embodiments, registration of an authorized device includes creating an entry in a data repository as further encrypted authorization data based on a public key associated with the authorized device; the entry includes an encrypted user key calculated based on a manager key; and the access controller is configured to determine the encryption key based on the user key.
[0009] In some embodiments, the encrypted authorization data based on the recovered private key has a first structure that is identical to a second structure of the encrypted authorization data based on a public key associated with an authorization device that is authorized to unlock the data storage device by responding to a challenge generated by an access controller.
[0010] In some embodiments, the first structure and the second structure include corresponding public key fields, and the access controller is configured to store the recovery public key in the public key field of the first structure and store the public key associated with the authorized device in the public key field of the second structure.
[0011] In some embodiments, the user key can be derived directly from the manager key.
[0012] In some embodiments, the access controller is further configured to determine a manager key based at least in part on the response to enable decryption of the encrypted user content data.
[0013] In some embodiments, the access controller is further configured to determine the encryption key based on the manager key.
[0014] In some embodiments, the encrypted authorization data includes metadata encrypted by a pre-authorization metadata encapsulation key that can be derived from a recovery public key.
[0015] In some embodiments, the access controller is configured to derive the pre-authorization metadata encapsulation key by performing a key derivation function using the recovered public key as input.
[0016] In some embodiments, the access controller is further configured to perform a key derivation function using the authorized device slot key as another input.
[0017] In some embodiments, the authorized device slot key is stored in plain text on the data repository.
[0018] In some embodiments, the access controller is configured to generate a challenge to the recovery manager device based on the metadata; and the encrypted authorization data includes a manager key encrypted by an unlocking secret that is derivable from the response to enable decryption of the encrypted user content data.
[0019] In some embodiments, the metadata includes an elliptic curve public key corresponding to the temporary unlocking key; and the unlocking secret is based on the temporary unlocking key.
[0020] In some embodiments, the access controller is configured to delete the authorization data other than the encrypted authorization data generated based on the recovery private key in response to enabling decryption.
[0021] In some embodiments, the recovery common is calculated by the access controller and the recovery manager device.
[0022] A method for unlocking a data storage device storing encrypted user content data is disclosed herein. The method includes: generating a recovery private key; generating encrypted authorization data based on the recovery private key; storing the encrypted authorization data in a data repository; sending data indicating the recovery private key to a manager device; receiving a recovery public key calculated based on the recovery private key from the recovery manager device through a communication channel; decrypting the encrypted authorization data based on the recovery public key; generating a challenge to the recovery manager device based on the decrypted authorization data; sending the challenge to the recovery manager device through the communication channel; receiving a response to the challenge from the recovery manager device through the communication channel; and enabling decryption of the encrypted user content data based at least in part on the response.
[0023] A data storage device is disclosed herein, which includes a device for generating a recovery private key; a device for generating encrypted authorization data based on the recovery private key; a device for storing the encrypted authorization data in a data repository; a device for sending data indicating the recovery private key to a manager device; a device for receiving a recovery public key calculated based on the recovery private key from the recovery manager device via a communication channel; a device for decrypting the encrypted authorization data based on the recovery public key; a device for generating a challenge to the recovery manager device based on the decrypted authorization data; a device for sending the challenge to the recovery manager device via the communication channel; a device for receiving a response to the challenge from the recovery manager device via the communication channel; and a device for enabling decryption of encrypted user content data based at least in part on the response. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0024] Non-limiting examples will now be described with reference to the following drawings:
[0025] Figure 1 A data storage device according to one embodiment is shown.
[0026] Figure 2 According to one embodiment, Figure 1 A section of the configuration memory of a data storage device.
[0027] Figure 3 According to one embodiment, Figure 1 The control flow between the authorization device and the access controller.
[0028] Figure 4 A certificate issued by a data storage device and sent by an authorization device to the data storage device to unlock the data storage device is shown according to one embodiment.
[0029] Figure 5 A method for unlocking a data storage device using a recovery key according to one embodiment is shown. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0030] Figure 1 1 shows a data storage device (DSD) 100 including a data path 101 and an access controller 102 according to one embodiment. The data path 101 includes a wired data port 103, which is connected to the Figure 1104 and DSD 100. In other embodiments, the data path 101 includes a wireless data port (not shown) for wirelessly transmitting data between the host computer system 104 and the DSD 100. The DSD 100 is registered with the host computer system 104 as a large-capacity data storage device that provides functionality to the operating system of the host computer system 104 of a block data storage device. The DSD 100 also includes a non-transitory storage medium 105 for storing encrypted user content data, noting that user content data is data that a user typically wants to store on the DSD, such as files including image files, documents, video files, etc. The storage medium can be a solid-state drive (SSD), a hard disk drive (HDD) with a rotating disk, or other non-volatile storage medium. In addition, the storage medium can be a block data storage device, which means that the user content data is written to the storage medium 105 in the form of blocks and read from the storage medium 105 in the form of blocks.
[0031] Command Set
[0032] In one example, the storage medium 105 includes an encryption engine 106 in the form of an application specific integrated circuit and / or a programmable integrated circuit that encrypts data to be stored on the storage medium 105 and decrypts data to be read from the storage medium 105. In such examples, the storage medium may provide a Small Computer System Interface (SCSI) or Advanced Technology Attachment (ATA) command set in accordance with the optical specification of the Trusted Computing Group (TCG).
[0033] Program code stored on the cryptographic engine 106 enables the cryptographic engine 106 to receive, interpret, and execute commands received from the host computer system 104. For example, the cryptographic engine 106 may be configured to implement a standard ATA or Serial ATA (SATA) and / or ATA Packet Interface (ATAPI) command set, which is available from Technical Committee T13, noting that the same functionality may be implemented within TCG Opal, SCSI, and other proprietary architectures. The command set includes a READ SECTORS command, with the command input being a count of sectors and a starting sector (note that "sector" is used synonymously with "block" herein). Thus, there is a corresponding write command. It should be noted that a data storage device driver is installed on the host computer system 104. The data storage device driver (not shown) uses the command set to provide advanced services to the operating system, such as file read functions. In some examples, the data storage device driver is a generic driver provided as part of the operating system, and does not support device-specific cryptographic commands, because the cryptographic functionality is hidden from the host computer system 104 and is handled internally within the DSD 100, as described below. This means that no additional driver needs to be installed to use the full functionality disclosed herein.
[0034] The command set provided by the encryption engine 106 to the data port 103 (but not forwarded to the host computer system 104) may include a command set from the ATA SECURITY feature set. Specifically, the command set may include the command SECURITY SETPASSWORD or a corresponding command from TCG Opal to set a password for reading user content data and writing user content data to the storage medium 105.
[0035] In this sense, the encryption engine 106 is connected between the data port 103 and the storage medium 105, and is configured to use the encryption key to encrypt the user content data to be stored on the storage medium 105 and decrypt the encrypted user content data stored on the storage medium 105 in response to a request from the host computer system 104. In some examples, the ATASECURITY feature set is only used by the data port 103, and not by the host 104. That is, the access controller 102 provides the necessary input for the data port 103 to issue the ATASECURITY command to the encryption engine 106. For example, the access controller 102 can provide the key to the data port 103, and then the data port 103 forwards the key to the encryption engine 106 via the SECURITY SET PASSWORD command. The interface between the access controller 102 and the data port 103 can be an inter-integrated circuit (I2C) bus, which is particularly useful in the case where the bus has been implemented in an existing chip. However, many other communication architectures can be used, including bus architectures, point-to-point architectures, serial architectures, parallel architectures, memory-based architectures, and other architectures.
[0036] Please note that if Figure 1 The separation of functions in the dedicated chip shown is only one possible exemplary implementation. Therefore, functions can be further combined or split. For example, the data port 103 can be integrated with the access controller 102 into a single chip with a single core. In other cases, the data port 103 and the access controller 102 can be integrated with the encryption engine 106 into a single dedicated chip with a single core. Of course, all chips can have multiple cores.
[0037] In one example, the following components are used:
[0038] Data port 103: USB 3.1 Gen 2 10 Gigabit per second (Gb / s) interface
[0039] Access Controller 102: nRF52840 System-on-Chip (SoC) from Nordic Semiconductor
[0040] Note that for the functionality disclosed herein, the access controller 102 plays a primary role and will be described in more detail below, again noting that in other examples, tasks may be split into separate chips. When reference is made to the "configuration" of the access controller 102 or the access controller 102 is "configured" to perform a certain step, this should be understood to refer to program code stored on a program memory (not shown for clarity) on a non-volatile memory in the DSD 100 and executed by the access controller 102.
[0041] In other examples, some or all of the steps disclosed herein may be performed by hardware circuits without program code. Specifically, for performance and security reasons, cryptographic primitives may be implemented by dedicated hardware circuits. For example, particularly computationally demanding commands (such as elliptic curve multiplication or exponentiation) may be implemented by an arithmetic logic unit (ALU) specifically designed for that calculation, so that the calculation can be performed in a single or fewer number of processor cycles than using a sequential program in a general-purpose microcontroller. It should also be noted that the chips included in the DSD 100 are microcontrollers, which means that in this context, they do not run under an operating system that provides a hardware abstraction layer, but rather program code acts directly on hardware circuits. Although elliptic curve encryption is used as an example in this article for computational efficiency and security reasons, it should be noted that other public key cryptographic systems, such as the Rivest-Shamir-Adelman (RSA) cryptographic system, may also be used.
[0042] return Figure 1 In addition to the host computer system 104, there are multiple devices located external to the DSD 100 and that play a role in unlocking the DSD 100 and providing keys to the encryption engine 106, so that the plaintext decrypted data can ultimately be provided to the host computer system 104.
[0043] Specifically, there is a first manager device 110, which in most examples is a mobile phone. An application (app) installed on the manager device 110 performs the following steps. As such, the following steps may be implemented in software by the manufacturer of the DSD 100 and distributed to the manager devices 110 via a commonly accessible application store (such as Apple's App Store or Google Play). The application installed on the manager device 110 performs the steps of acquiring ownership of the DSD 100, at which point all data on the DSD 100 is erased or otherwise rendered inaccessible. For example, the data may be cryptographically erased by securely deleting all encryption keys stored on the DSD 100.
[0044] For simplicity, the present disclosure describes the steps as being simply performed by the manager device 110 if they are implemented by an application. The manager device 110 sets up the DSD 100, which means generating various different keys to support the processes disclosed herein. The manager device 110 registers the user device 111 with the DSD, so that the user device 111 is subsequently referred to as an "authorized device" 111. In most examples, the authorized device 111 is also a mobile phone, which has an application installed that implements the steps described as being performed by the authorized device 111. However, other types of devices can be used as authorized devices, which will be explained below with respect to beacons and key cards.
[0045] Taking Ownership
[0046] After purchase, unpacking, and powering up, the first step in using the DSD 100 is to install the application on the manager device 110 and register the device as a manager device 110. For this process, the manager device 110 obtains a unique identifier for the DSD from the DSD. This unique identifier is called an identity key (IDK). Figure 1 In the example shown, the identity key is encoded as a quick response (QR) code 112 that is attached to the outer surface of the DSD 100. An application installed on the manager device 110 has access to the camera and has a software module that extracts the encoded information from the image of the QR code 112. The manager device 110 captures the image of the QR code 112 using the camera and decodes the identity key of the DSD 100 from the QR code. In one example, the QR code encodes a uniform resource locator (URL). In this case, a universal application can capture the QR code, which then automatically directs the phone to an application store where the application can be downloaded. The URL also includes the identity key so that once the application is installed, the application can decode the identifier.
[0047] In another example, the manager device 110 may read another tag or NFC chip attached to or integrated with the DSD 100 to obtain the identity key. Then, using the identity key, the manager device 110 may initiate communication with the DSD 100 and, in particular, the access controller 102, such as wirelessly (e.g., via Bluetooth).
[0048] Registration of authorized devices
[0049] Once the DSD 100 is initially configured during the acquisition process, the manager device 110 registers the authorized device 111. Typically, there may be multiple authorized devices registered with a single DSD 100, so the manager device 110 registers the authorized device as one of the multiple authorized devices. More specifically, the access controller 102 receives a public key associated with a private key stored on the user device 111 from the manager device 110. The manager device 110 itself may have received the public key from the user device 111 via email, by scanning a QR code displayed on the user device 111, or in any other manner. At this point, the device 111 is not yet authorized, and is therefore referred to simply as "user device 111". Once the user device 111 is authorized, it is referred to as "authorized device 111". The access controller 102 creates authorization data indicating that the user device 111 is an authorized device (described below) and stores the authorization data associated with the public key on the configuration memory 115 to register the user device 111 as one of the multiple authorized devices. This means that keys and other data associated with the authorizing device 111 are created and stored as described below. The user can then use the authorizing device 111 to unlock the DSD 100 simply by placing the authorizing device 111 within wireless communication range (e.g., Bluetooth range). Again, the steps performed by the authorizing device 111 are encoded in an application installed on the authorizing device 111. Depending on configuration parameters, the user may be required to unlock the authorizing device 111 before the DSD 100 can be unlocked.
[0050] More specifically, the access controller 102 has access to a non-volatile configuration data repository, such as configuration memory 115, which may be flash memory external to the access controller 102 (but may equally be integrated into the access controller 102). The configuration memory 115 may also store program code that implements the steps described herein as being executed by the access controller 102. It is noted that some of the examples herein are configured to assume that an attacker may easily isolate and read out the contents of the configuration memory 115, but should not be able to use that information to decrypt user content data. That is, in those examples, no keys are permanently stored in plain text on the configuration memory 115 or elsewhere on non-volatile memory in the DSD 100.
[0051] Once the encryption keys are provided in plain text, they are stored only in volatile memory (not shown). This means that powering down the DSD 100 erases all encryption keys stored in plain text. Additional circuitry may be provided to reset all residual charge upon power down, power up, or external reset, making it physically impossible to recover any information from the volatile memory in practice. In many cases, a user disconnecting the USB cable from the host computer system 104 results in a power down and erase of all volatile memory. In other examples, a secondary power supply is used that requires disconnection to power down the DSD 100 to delete the volatile memory.
[0052] Challenge-Response
[0053] The configuration memory 115 has data stored thereon that is specific to the registered authorization device 111. This data may be referred to as an identifier of the authorization device 111 or as a public key associated with a corresponding private key stored on the authorization device 111. The public key may be a "transmission public key" (TPK) and is generated by the authorization device 111 when the application is first started by executing the elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) primitive ECC-Pub ({transmission private key}). (Recall that, although elliptic curve cryptography is used as an example in this article for reasons of computational efficiency and security, it should be noted that other encryption techniques may also be used.) The corresponding private key is stored on the authorization device 111. The access controller 102 is configured to use an identifier (e.g., a transmission public key) or to generate and store an additional public key to generate a challenge to the authorization device 111. It should be noted here that the challenge is unique because each challenge is different, so that subsequent challenges are different from any previous challenges. As described below, this is achieved by multiplying the stored data by a random blinding factor. The access controller 102 then sends the challenge to the authorization device 111 over a communication channel that is different from the data path. For example, the data path may include a wired USB connection, while the communication channel between the access controller 102 and the authorization device 111 is a wireless (eg, Bluetooth) connection.
[0054] In one example, a re-registration process is performed in response to the authorization device first connecting to the DSD 100 after the authorization data is created and stored on the configuration memory 115 in association with the public key of the authorization device 111 received from the manager device 110. During the re-registration process, the DSD 100 updates the authorization data and, as described below, may request that the authorization device 111 generate an unlock public key (and a corresponding unlock private key) in addition to transmitting the public key. The authorization device 111 then provides the unlock public key to the access controller 102.
[0055] This has the following advantages: two corresponding private keys (transmission private key and unlocking private key) can be stored separately on the authorization device, and the two keys can have different access policies. For example, even if the authorization device 111 is locked (e.g., by screen lock or timeout), the transmission public key can be accessed at any time to allow continuous communication between the authorization device 111 and the DSD 100. However, in order to unlock the DSD 100, the access policy of the unlocking private key may require the user to unlock the authorization device 111, enter a personal identification number (PIN), provide biometrics or other authentication. In this way, a stolen authorization device cannot unlock the DSD 100. Since unlocking the DSD 100 is only performed once when the DSD 100 is powered on, the increased security does not significantly reduce user convenience.
[0056] Authorized device 111 may calculate a response to the challenge that cannot be calculated by any other device not registered with the DSD. More specifically, a device that does not have access rights to the data corresponding to the identifier stored on configuration memory 115 cannot calculate the correct response. For example, authorized device 111 calculates the response to the challenge using a stored unlock private key associated with a corresponding unlock public key stored on configuration memory 115.
[0057] The access controller 102 receives a response to the challenge from the authorization device 111 via the communication channel. It should be noted here that if the access controller 102 simply verifies the response to the challenge and, upon success, reads the encryption key from the configuration memory 115, the encryption key will be stored in plain text, which is undesirable because it will enable an attacker to deassemble the DSD 100 and read the key from the configuration memory 115 to access the user content data stored on the storage medium 105.
[0058] Calculate the key
[0059] Therefore, instead, the access controller 102 computes the encryption key based at least in part on the response from the authorization device 111. This means that the encryption key is not a pure function of the response, but involves other values as described in more detail below. In summary, the encryption key is stored in encrypted form on the configuration memory 115, and the calculation of the secret to decrypt the encryption key is enabled based on the response of the private key stored on the authorization device.
[0060] Throughout this disclosure, reference may be made to the "encapsulation" of a key, which simply means that a key is encrypted by another key (i.e., by a "secret"). In many cases of "encapsulation", the encryption is symmetric, such that there is a single secret (key) that can decrypt the encrypted key (there is no public key associated with the secret). In one example, the symmetric encryption uses Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) primitives.
[0061] Finally, the access controller 102 provides the encryption key to the encryption engine 106 (via the data port 103 in this example) to decrypt the encrypted user content data stored on the storage medium 105 of the DSD 100. As described above, once the access controller 102 has calculated the encryption key, the access controller 102 provides the encryption key in plain text to the data port 103, and the data port 103 issues a SECURITY SET PASSWORD command including the encryption key to the encryption engine 106.
[0062] Note that where reference is made to "unlocking" the device, this may refer to the entire process described above, including the challenge, the response to the challenge, and the sending of an encryption key to the encryption engine 106 to allow a plain text read command issued by the host computer system. In other examples, the challenge and the response to the challenge are considered part of a separate "connection" step. During the following "unlock" step, the access controller 102 then sends the encryption key to the data port 103 to allow access to the user content data.
[0063] It is worth noting that, in addition to this, it is possible for an attacker to eavesdrop on the transmission of the key from the access controller 102 to the data port 103 and then to the encryption engine 106. However, the transmission of the key is not over a public network, so such eavesdropping would require gaining access to and disassembling the unlocked DSD without removing power from the DSD 100. This scenario can be discarded as a threat because in this scenario, the user content data is available on the host computer system 104 anyway. In other words, while the DSD 100 is connected and unlocked, the data is available to both the legitimate user and the attacker. But once the user disconnects the DSD from the host computer system 104, such an eavesdropping attack is no longer possible. Therefore, this attack will not be considered further.
[0064] For the sake of completeness, it is noted that once the encryption engine 106 has received the encryption key, the host computer system 104 can issue a normal READ SEGMENT command and transparently access the encrypted data without any perceptible difference to accessing an unencrypted device. This is particularly true if the encryption engine has a hardware encryption module to achieve encryption and decryption at or above the read and write speeds of the storage medium 105 and / or data port 103. However, the user can disconnect the DSD 100 to lock it. In this way, the DSD 100 can be carried by the user through an unsecured location where the DSD 100 may be lost or stolen, but it is difficult for others to decrypt the encrypted user content data stored on the storage medium 105. If the user has the DSD, the user can connect it to the second host computer system 116, conveniently unlock the DSD 100 using the user's authorized device 111 (e.g., a phone), and easily access the encrypted user content data stored on the storage medium 105.
[0065] For user convenience, data port 103 may be configured so that if the DSD is locked, it registers with host computer system 104 as a large-capacity data storage device with no storage media present, similar to an SSD card reader with no card inserted. Once an authorized device 111 is connected to DSD 100 and DSD 100 is unlocked, data port 103 switches to the storage media present, similar to a card reader with an SSD card inserted. Such a configuration will prevent the host computer system 104 operating system from generating any warnings about data being inaccessible or access being denied. Instead, all user interactions will be performed by an application installed on the authorized device, which is fully controlled by the manufacturer of the DSD, so the user experience can be optimized. Figure 1 As shown, there may also be mobile phones acting as authorization devices 117 and 118.
[0066] Beacons and key fobs
[0067] Consider Again Figure 1, it can be seen that there are additional devices, such as beacons 120 and key fobs 121. These devices may also be considered "authorized devices" because they may operate substantially the same as the authorized device 111. Prior to initial registration by the manager device 110, these devices are referred to as "devices to be authorized." When reference is made to "user devices" herein (primarily describing the mobile phone 111 prior to initial registration), this also applies to the beacons 120 and key fobs 121, unless otherwise noted, such as where user input is required. The beacons 120 and key fobs 121 also have their own securely stored private keys so that they can respond to challenges specific to one beacon or key fob. However, since there is no user input for the beacons 120 and key fobs 121, the initiation of communication may be slightly different. More specifically, the beacons 120 and key fobs 121 may periodically send announcements to broadcast their presence, and the DSD 100 then initiates communication with the beacons 120 and / or key fobs 121, which prompts them to send their transmission public keys. This is in contrast to the authorization device 111 which sends a transmission public key to the DSD 100 to initiate communication.
[0068] In another example, the beacon 120 is in a deactivated state when it is powered on and needs to be activated by the manager device 110 or the authorization device 111. This activation may follow a similar process to unlocking the DSD 100. That is, the manager device 110 or the authorization device 111 or both register with each beacon 120 using its transmission public key and respond to a challenge as described herein. Thus, a device may register with one of the beacons 120 and / or the key fob 121 as a manager device or an authorization device without registering with the DSD 100 itself. If the response to the challenge is valid, the beacon 120 unlocks the DSD 100. In yet another example, the beacons 120 register with each other such that the manager device 110 and / or the authorization device 111 need only activate one of the beacons 120 and the remaining beacons automatically activate. In other words, the activation is "propagated" through the beacon network as long as the beacons are within range of each other.
[0069] Note that the only information that authorized devices 111, 117, 118, 120, and 121 provide to manager device 110 for registration is a public key for each device. In other words, each device provides its own public key that corresponds to a private key securely stored on that device. Therefore, if an attacker intercepts the initial communication between one of devices 111, 117, 118, 120, and 121 and manager device 110, the only information the attacker can obtain is the public key. As the name implies, the public key is not a secret and can be well known. Therefore, the attacker does not gain any advantage. In addition, manager device 110 cannot use the public key to access anything else related to the authorized device. For example, a manager device cannot decrypt or unlock any other data storage device with which other manager devices have registered the authorized device.
[0070] The access controller 102 receives the public key of the authorized device from the manager device 110 and generates authorization data. The access controller 102 stores the authorization data on the configuration memory 115 and waits for the authorized device to connect for the first time. At the first connection, the access controller 102 performs a challenge-response to the authorized device and, upon success, updates the authorization data to indicate that the authorized device is now fully registered. This first connection process is referred to herein as "re-registration," and details of generating authorization data and re-registration are provided below.
[0071] Elliptic Curve Cryptography
[0072] In one example, the challenge generated by the DSD 100 and sent to the authorization device 111 is based on elliptic curve cryptography. This has the advantage of shorter keys, resulting in more efficient communication and storage. In addition, a large number of phones currently on the market provide dedicated elliptic curve cryptographic functions within a secure hardware module. The secure hardware module securely stores the user's private keys and executes cryptographic primitives within the secure hardware module without the keys leaving the secure hardware module and being sent to a general-purpose processor core, where the keys may be subject to unauthorized retrieval attacks. In one embodiment, the secure hardware module includes an independent processor that executes its own microkernel that cannot be directly accessed by the operating system or any program running on the phone. The secure hardware module may also include a non-volatile storage device for storing a 256-bit elliptic curve private key. In one embodiment, the secure hardware module is a Secure Enclave coprocessor available on some Apple devices.
[0073] Authorized device data record
[0074] Figure 2 1 shows a cross section of configuration memory 115 according to one embodiment. More specifically, Figure 2 A record 201 in the configuration memory 115 is shown, which is associated with one of the multiple authorized devices and is referred to herein as "authorization data". Additional data records for additional authorized devices are schematically indicated as empty dashed boxes, but details are not considered when they operate in a similar manner to record 201. Specifically, each additional data record includes authorization data, which is generated by the access controller 102 in response to receiving a public key of a user device from the manager device 110, and then updated during the first connection of the user device (hereinafter referred to as "authorized device"). For convenience, the data structure of the configuration memory 115 is referred to as a "table" including one or more "records", each of which relates to a registered authorized device and each record has multiple fields. However, it should be noted that other data structures can be used, such as JavaScript Object Notation (JSON), Extensible Markup Language (XML), binary format, etc. In one example, each entry has a fixed length, and the table has a fixed number of rows (i.e., entries). In the present disclosure, a "record" may also be referred to as a "row" or "entry".
[0075] Record 201 includes a field for a pre-authorization key 202, which is used in response to the first connection of the authorized device 111 to the DSD 100. During this first connection, the access controller 102 performs a number of steps referred to as "re-registration," as described in more detail below. The pre-authorization key 202 is generated by an identifier of the authorized device 111 (e.g., a transmission public key). For example, the access controller 102 can generate the pre-authorization key 202 by applying a key derivation function together with an authorized device slot key to the derivation function, the key derivation function using the x-coordinate of the transmission public key as an input parameter, the authorized device slot key as a salt value. The authorized device slot key can be a pseudo-random number (e.g., 16 bytes) stored on the configuration memory 115, and can be used to encrypt data in an authorized device certificate so that only the issuing DSD 100 can recover the information.
[0076] At this point, it can be said that the records stored on the configuration memory 115 are indexed by the pre-authorization key 202 based on the identifier of the authorized device (e.g., the transmission public key). Figure 4 As described, during re-registration, the index of record 201 may be stored as a slot number in the certificate and the pre-authorization key 202 may be replaced with a random value at this time to make the configured DSD indistinguishable from a new device leaving the factory even in possession of the transport public key.
[0077] Record 201 also includes fields for a first copy of a metadata encapsulation key (MWK) 203 and a pre-authorization metadata encapsulation key (PMWK) 214. Some of the fields in record 201 are encrypted, which are indicated by double-line boxes, where a single solid box within the double-line box indicates a "payload", such as metadata encapsulation key 203 and pre-authorization metadata encapsulation key 214. The corresponding encryption key used to encrypt the payload is noted at the bottom of the double-line box. Thus, for example, metadata encapsulation key 203 is encrypted by authorized device metadata key (ADMK) 204. It should be noted that each encrypted box may include an additional random number concatenated with the payload data. This ensures that even possession of encrypted data (such as the transmission public key of an authorized device) cannot distinguish the encrypted entry from the random data.
[0078] The record 201 also includes a field for authorized device metadata (ADM) 205, which is a concatenation of a device type 206 (e.g., recovery key, key fob, beacon, phone, computer, watch, etc.), a role of the device 207 (e.g., administrator or user), a name of the device 208 (e.g., "John's phone"), a transport public key 209, unlock key metadata 210 (e.g., whether a fingerprint, PIN, or key restriction is required for unlocking), a temporary public key 211, and an unlock public key 212. In one embodiment, the temporary public key 211 is an elliptic curve public key generated from a random temporary private key (EPK) using an elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) primitive ECC-Pub (EUK). The temporary private key is not stored on the configuration memory 115 or on the authorized device 111, but is discarded after the temporary public key is created. This means that the temporary private key is not stored on non-volatile memory, but only on volatile memory. Therefore, a power failure to the memory results in a complete and irrecoverable loss (e.g., destruction) of the temporary private key. The unlock public key 212 corresponds to the unlock private key stored on the authorizing device 111 , and is generated by the authorizing device 111 and provided to the access controller 102 .
[0079] The authorized device metadata (concatenated with an additional random number) is encrypted by a metadata encapsulation key (MWK) 213, which is also stored in encrypted form at 203. The primary purpose of storing the encrypted metadata encapsulation key 203 in the record 201 is to allow an administrator user with access rights to the authorized device metadata key 204 to access the encrypted authorized device metadata 205. If the manager does not have access to the metadata encapsulation key, the manager will not be able to retrieve any information from the DSD 100 about which authorized devices are currently registered. In one example, the authorized device metadata key 204 is a single key for all authorized devices and is stored encrypted by the manager key. The manager key can be a pseudo-random value (e.g., 32 bytes) and is generated by the access controller 102 in response to the storage medium 105 being erased. The manager key is encrypted and stored for each paired manager device 110 / 114.
[0080] Record 201 also includes a field for a second copy of the device role 220 concatenated with a second copy of the user key 221 and the metadata encapsulation key 222. Note that the roles 207 / 220 and metadata encapsulation keys 203 / 222 are stored in two copies that are identical but encrypted using different keys. The purpose of storing two copies of the roles 207 / 220 is to enable the access controller 102 to verify the roles during connection (in response to the authorization device metadata being decrypted) and during unlocking (in response to the user key 221 being decrypted). The purpose of storing the first copy of the metadata encapsulation key 203 is to provide it to manager devices that have access rights to the authorization device metadata keys. The purpose of the second copy of the metadata encapsulation key 222 is to provide it to pre-authorized devices during the first connection. The concatenated values 220, 221, 222 are encrypted together by a temporary unlocking secret (EUS) 223, which is initially generated by the Diffie-Hellman method using a temporary private key corresponding to the temporary public key 211 and the unlocking public key 212. The temporary unlocking secret 223 can be recovered using the temporary public key 211 and the associated unlocking private key stored on the authorized device 111 and corresponding to the unlocking public key 212. In other words, the temporary unlocking secret 223 can be generated when the authorized device 111 is first connected to the DSD 100 using the temporary private key and the unlocking public key 212. Note that the temporary private key itself is not stored, but the temporary unlocking secret 223 can still be recovered as described above. This means that the user key 221 can be decrypted based on the response from the authorized device. Note that the user key 221 is the same for all authorized devices and can be used to decrypt user content data. This does not necessarily mean that the user key itself decrypts the user content data. There may also be a key that the user key decrypts and the final key decrypts the user content data. The terms "decrypting user content data using a key" and "enabling decryption of user content data" refer to indirect encryption via multiple keys in a chain. In contrast, "key decryption data" refers to directly decrypting data using a key, such as modular multiplication of encrypted data with a key. Here, user key 221 is used to indirectly decrypt data and can be the starting point of a chain of keys that are decrypted in sequence until, at the end, the chain ends at the key that decrypts the user content data. Although in most examples disclosed herein, temporary unlocking secret 223 decrypts user key 221, encryption keys can also be derived from responses to challenges in other ways. For example, responses to challenges can be used directly as encryption keys to decrypt user content data.
[0081] This distribution of keys and metadata enables configuration in which the entire configuration information about authorized devices, manager devices, and other aspects is stored on the DSD 100 itself. However, the authorized devices require the keys stored on the corresponding authorized devices to unlock the DSD 100. If an unregistered user who does not have access to any keys wants to access the entire configuration of the device, such as retrieving a list of registered devices, the unregistered user will only need the recovery key to register as a manager device and gain access to the manager key. The DSD 100 can then use the manager key to provide the entire contents of the configuration memory 115 to the new manager device. In addition, there may be two manager devices, and both can register or remove authorized devices. Other manager devices will be able to obtain configuration updates by synchronizing their own records with the data stored on the configuration memory 115. In some examples, the DSD 100 is configured to erase the records 201 of all authorized devices (but not delete the user content data or user keys 221, which may be stored in encrypted form as another copy on the configuration memory 115, separate from the records 201 and other entries) if the recovery key is used to gain access, but this is a policy decision.
[0082] Figure 3 The control flow 300 between the authorization device 111 and the access controller 102 according to one embodiment is shown. First, the authorization device 111 initiates the connection method by sending 301 its transmission public key. This step can be easily replayed by an attacker. The access controller 102 then replies 302 with a request for a certificate, and in response to the request, the authorization device 111 sends 303 the certificate previously obtained from the access controller 102 through the re-registration process.
[0083] Certificate
[0084] Figure 4 A certificate 400 is shown that is issued by a data storage device 100 and sent to the data storage device by an authorization device 111 to unlock the data storage device, according to one embodiment. In this example, the certificate 400 includes a plurality of type-length-value (TLV) fields, where the type value indicates the kind of field that is part of the certificate, the length is the size of the value field (usually in bytes), and the value is a variable-sized series of bytes that contains the data for that portion of the certificate.
[0085] The certificate 400 begins with a TLV atom which indicates the type of certificate that follows. This is called the certificate role 401 and has a 2-byte value to indicate that this is an authorized device certificate.
[0086] The certificate 400 belongs to a certificate chain. The access controller 102 uses the chain to verify and authenticate the certificate 400. In order to indicate which chain the certificate 400 belongs to, the certificate 400 has a 4-byte root certificate identifier (ID) 402. The certificate identifiers of each certificate in the certificate chain are the same. Unmatched certificate identifiers indicate invalid certificates. In one example, the root certificate identifier indicates whether the certificate chain is a production or development certification chain. In other examples, other groups may be indicated by corresponding certificate identifiers.
[0087] Certificate 400 also includes a 1-byte indicator of certificate depth 403. The depth of a certificate is defined as its distance from the root certificate within the certificate chain. The root certificate is defined to have a depth of zero. When processing a given certificate chain, the depth field is verified to ensure the integrity of the chain.
[0088] The certificate 400 also includes a 64-byte certificate transport public key 404. Each certificate is represented / indexed via the transport public key. Each type of public key will have its own dedicated tag type. That is, the tag type will represent the cipher suite used to generate the transport public key, such as the P-256 cipher suite.
[0089] The certificate 400 also includes a data field 405 (explained below) and is authenticated via a signature 406. The access controller 102 receives the certificate 400 and verifies the signature before trusting or using any of the contents of the certificate. To enable signature verification, a 64-byte signer public key 407 is provided as part of the certificate. The signature 406 itself is 64 bytes in length and is calculated over all previous TLVs 401-405, 407 encountered within the certificate, regardless of whether they are recognized by the specific implementation. More specifically, the signature 406 is derived from a hash of the certificate data. The specific data of the signature is certificate-related, but contains all TLVs used to represent the certificate, including unrecognized TLVs. The key used to generate the signature is a logical identity key and is associated with the signer public key 407.
[0090] Data field 405 includes slot number 410, which indicates the index of record 201 within configuration memory 115. Data field 405 also includes another copy of metadata encapsulation key 411 (in addition to Figure 2 The data field 405 is encrypted using the Authorized Device Slot Key (ADSK) 412, which is a 16-byte pseudo-random value stored in the configuration memory 115 and is used to encrypt the data in the Authorized Device Certificate so that only the issuing DSD 100 can recover the information.
[0091] Unlocking data storage devices
[0092] return Figure 3If the authorizing device 111 wishes to unlock the DSD 100, the authorizing device 111 sends 303 to the access controller 102 a certificate 400 including the encrypted metadata wrapping key (MWK) 213 / 411. The certificate 400 also includes a slot number 410, which is an index of the record 201 in the configuration memory 115.
[0093] The access controller 102 decrypts 304 the data field 405 using the authorized device slot key stored in the configuration memory 115 and extracts the slot number and the metadata encapsulation key. The access controller 102 then queries the configuration memory 115 to read 305 the appropriate record 201 from the configuration memory 115 and decrypts 306 the authorized device metadata 205 using the metadata encapsulation key. This generates a temporary public key 211, which may also be referred to as an identifier of the authorized device, which uniquely identifies the authorized device because the temporary public key 211 is cryptographically associated with an unlocking private key stored only on the authorized device 111. The access controller 102 may perform additional checks 307, such as verifying that the transport public key 209 included in the authorized device metadata 205 matches the transport public key 404 provided in the certificate 400. In addition, the access controller 102 verifies the role 401 against a set of valid values and associates the role with the connection. This means that the access controller 102 knows the current role (authorized device or manager device) for the duration of the connection. For example, the access controller 102 stores a parameter value indicating the role 401 provided in the certificate on a volatile memory. If any of the foregoing checks fail, the authorized device is considered revoked and an error is issued to that effect. Otherwise, the connection attempt is successful and the access controller 102 sends 308 a connection confirmation message to the authorized device 111.
[0094] At this stage, the authorization device 111 is connected and the unlocking process begins 319 by the authorization device 111 sending 320 an unlock request to the access controller 102. The unlock request includes an unlock public key associated with a private key stored on the secure hardware module of the authorization device. The access controller 102 matches 321 the received unlock public key with the unlock public key 212 stored in the authorization device metadata record 205. Next, the access controller 102 generates 322 a new blind value (also called an unlock blind key (UBK)), which is essentially a temporary private scalar and is randomly generated.
[0095] The access controller 102 then generates a challenge based on the identifier of the authorized device (e.g., the temporary public key 211) multiplied by the unlocking blind key (UBK). More specifically, the access controller 102 multiplies 323 the temporary public key 211 by the unlocking blind key, returning the complete X and Y coordinates of the result, noting that this operation is performed on an elliptic curve. The access controller 102 then sends 324 the X and Y coordinates to the authorized device 111 as a challenge. Note here that the challenge is based on the identifier of the authorized device 111 because the temporary public key is a factor of the multiplication that derives the challenge. Note also that for each unlock request (i.e., 320), a different unlocking blind key is generated to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.
[0096] In addition, the access controller 102 calculates 325 the inverse of the unlocking blinding key (UBK -1 ). The access controller 102 may calculate the inverse of the unlocking blind key while waiting for a response from the authorization device 111.
[0097] The authorization device 111 calculates a response to the challenge by multiplying 326 the challenge by an unlock private key that is stored in a secure hardware module of the authorization device and corresponds to the unlock public key 212 stored on the configuration memory 115. This may involve the execution of a cryptographic primitive that may be executed entirely within a secure hardware module within the authorization device 111. The authorization device 111 then sends the result back in a response message 327. The access controller 102 multiplies 328 the returned result by the inverse of the unlock blinding key to calculate a temporary unlock secret (EUS) 223.
[0098] In mathematical notation, P represents the temporary public key, and k represents the Figure 3 The access controller 102 calculates 323 the product k*P and sends it 324 to the authorization device 111. The authorization device 111 multiplies 326 the challenge with the unlocking private key j to calculate j*k*P and returns 327 the result to the access controller 102. The access controller 102 compares the response to the inverse k of the unlocking blind key. -1 Multiply 238 to calculate
[0099] k -1 *j*k*P
[0100] Due to the commutativity of elliptic curves, it is equal to j*P
[0101] (i.e., k -1 *j*k*P=k*k -1 *j*P=j*P).
[0102] The access controller 102 then decrypts 329 the user key 221 using j*P as a temporary unlocking secret (i.e., key). That is, the access controller 102 uses the temporary unlocking secret to decrypt the user key 221 stored on the DSD 100, which was encrypted using the temporary unlocking secret. More specifically, the access controller 102 decrypts 329 the user key, which then decrypts 330 the "user drive key", which is then ultimately sent 331 to the encryption engine 106 via a TCG command. That is, the user drive key can be generated by the access controller 102 using a key derivation function based on the user key. The user drive key is a TCG credential used to unlock the DSD 100, and can be equivalent to the "encryption key" described herein. In the case of Opal, this is the User2 credential.
[0103] Note that a temporary unlock secret is generated during the re-registration process by deriving a symmetric key from the results of an Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman process using an unlock private key and an unlock public key 212 stored on the authorized device 111. The resulting key is used to encrypt the user key 221, but is not stored in the DSD 100. Instead, the key is regenerated each time an authorized device requests unlocking of the DSD 100, as described above.
[0104] In another example, in the above formula, the unlock private key j can be replaced by the product of the unlock private key and a value derived from the pass code. The unlock private key will still be stored in the secure hardware module of the authorized device, but the unlock private key alone will not be able to decrypt the user content data stored on the DSD 100. Instead, the user needs to enter the pass code to calculate the response to the challenge and send 327 the response. This will simply replace j with the product of the pass code value and j above. The DSD will ignore this change because the temporary unlock secret 223 will be generated in the same manner as above from the perspective of the access controller 102.
[0105] Registration and Re-registration
[0106] Please note that Figure 2 The data record 201 shown is shown after the authorization device 111 has completed the re-registration process and is allowed to decrypt the encrypted user content data. Again, there are three steps in general: First, the manager device 110 registers the user device 111 once, making it one of the multiple authorization devices. Second, when connecting to the access controller 102 for the first time, the authorization device 111 re-registers once to complete the generation of the keys involved. Third, the authorization device 111 subsequently connects to the access controller 102 to unlock the DSD 100. This third step can occur multiple times.
[0107] During an (initial) registration step initiated by the manager device 110, the access controller 102 receives from the manager device 110 a public key corresponding to a private key stored on the user device 111. In response, the access controller 102 creates authorization data similar to Figure 2 1, except that the unlock public key 212 field holds the transmission public key 209 (as received from the manager device 110) since the unlock public key has not yet been generated. The access controller 102 generates a pre-authorization key 202, which is essentially an index used to locate the record 201. The pre-authorization key is generated by a key generation function using the x-coordinate of the received transmission public key 209 and a salt value. The salt value may be an authorized device slot key, which may be a 16-byte pseudo-random value generated during the "take ownership" process, stored on the configuration memory 115, and not shared with the authorized device. In this way, the salt may be different after each "factory reset", such as each time a manager device takes ownership of the DSD 100.
[0108] Creating the authorization data stored in record 201 also includes generating a metadata encapsulation key 222, such as by generating a 16-byte pseudo-random value. Access controller 102 stores the metadata encapsulation key in field 222. In addition, access controller 102 generates a temporary unlocking secret 223 and encrypts role 220 (e.g., "authorized device"), user key 221, and new metadata encapsulation key 222 using temporary unlocking secret 223. Access controller 102 then generates temporary public key 211 from temporary unlocking secret 223 and discards temporary unlocking secret 223.
[0109] Recall that during the (initial) registration step initiated by the manager device 110, the access controller 102 creates a Figure 2 Authorization data in data record 201. Figure 2 In contrast, the authorized device metadata 205 is not encrypted by the new metadata encapsulation key, but by the pre-authorized metadata encapsulation key, because the actual metadata encapsulation key 222 is not yet available to the authorized device 111. The pre-authorized metadata encapsulation key may be the same as the pre-authorized key 202 at this stage or generated separately. It should be noted that the pre-authorized metadata encapsulation key that now encrypts the authorized device metadata 205 may only be generated by the access controller 102, and not provided by the authorized device 111, because the authorized device 111 does not have access to the authorized device slot key used to generate the pre-authorized metadata encapsulation key.
[0110] Thus, in response to the authorization device 111 first connecting with the access controller 102, the authorization device 111 sends its transport public key to the access controller 102. The access controller 102 uses the transport public key and the stored authorization device slot key to generate the pre-authorization key 202. The access controller 102 may then search the configuration memory 115 for the pre-authorization key 202 to retrieve the record 201. The access controller 102 may also use the pre-authorization key as a pre-authorization metadata encapsulation key to decrypt the authorization device metadata 205.
[0111] As described above, the access controller 102 generates a challenge using the temporary public key 211 and the unlock blind key. The access controller 102 then creates the temporary unlock secret 223 from the response. Note that only the authorized device 111 with the private key corresponding to the transmission public key 209 can create a valid response. This means that even if an attacker disassembles the configuration memory 115 and reads the authorized device slot key to generate the pre-authorization metadata encapsulation key to decrypt the temporary public key 211, the attacker will still not be able to generate the temporary unlock secret 223.
[0112] The access controller 102 verifies the response by checking that the response acts as a temporary unlocking secret 223, and in response, updates the authorization data in the record 201. More specifically, the access controller 102 checks whether the field 212 for the unlocking public key is the same as the transmission public key 209. In response to the two being the same (as described above), the access controller 102 requests a new unlocking public key from the authorization device 111 and stores the returned key as the unlocking public key 212.
[0113] The access controller further decrypts the metadata encapsulation key 222 generated during registration by the manager device 110. At this stage, the access controller 102 may regenerate the temporary unlocking secret 223, the encryption role 220, the user key 221, and the metadata encapsulation key 222, regenerate and store the temporary public key 211, and discard the temporary unlocking secret 223. Finally, the access controller encrypts the authorized device metadata 205 using the metadata encapsulation key 222, and overwrites the pre-authorization key 202 with a random value so that the configuration memory 115 cannot be distinguished from random data even when holding the transmission public key and / or the unlocking public key. This ends the update and registration process of the authorization data stored in the record 201. Therefore, the authorized device 111, which is one of the multiple authorized devices, is now allowed to decrypt the encrypted user content data through the above-mentioned unlocking step.
[0114] The above process involving creation and updating of authorization data enables multiple authorized devices to register using only their public keys during a first step of registration by manager device 110. In this way, there is no need to share secret information that could be intercepted and used to maliciously unlock the user's other devices.
[0115] Recovery Key
[0116] When taking ownership of DSD 100, access controller 102 generates a recovery key and provides the recovery key to manager device 110. The recovery key may then be stored on secure storage 113 or printed on paper and locked away. Finally, recovery manager device 114 may use the recovery key to assume the administrator role previously held by manager device 110.
[0117] More specifically, the recovery key is associated with a recovery key record 250 stored in the configuration memory 115, which is also referred to as authorization data. In this example, the recovery key record 250 has the same data structure as the authorization device record 201, which means that the same fields appear in both records 201 / 250. In one example, the first record in the configuration memory 115 is assigned to the recovery key. In this recovery key record 250, the pre-authorization key 252 is a random value because the recovery key record 250 is known to be the first record, so no index is required. In addition, the authorization device metadata 255 is encrypted using the pre-authorization metadata encapsulation key 263. It should be noted that, as described above, the access controller 102 generates the pre-authorization metadata encapsulation key 263 based on the transmission public key 259 (in this example, the recovery public key) and the authorization device slot key (not shown) stored separately from the record 201 / 250 on the configuration memory 115 (by performing a key generation function, where the input is the x-coordinate of the transmission public key as key material and the authorization device slot key as a salt). The difference between pre-authorization metadata encapsulation key 263 and pre-authorization metadata encapsulation key 214 is that they are generated using their corresponding public transport keys 259 and 209, respectively. Pre-authorization metadata encapsulation key 264 is also stored in record 250 and is encrypted by authorized device metadata key 254 along with metadata encapsulation key 253, which metadata encapsulation key can be the same as the pre-authorization metadata encapsulation key. A second copy of metadata encapsulation key 272 is stored encrypted by temporary unlocking secret 273 along with manager key 271 and role (not used for recovery key entry) 270. It should be noted that metadata encapsulation keys 253 and 272 and a copy of pre-authorization metadata encapsulation key 264 are not necessary for the process disclosed herein and can be replaced by random data. In this example, they are not random data so that these values are consistent with authorized device record 201.
[0118] The authorized device metadata 255 includes a device type 256 (e.g., "recovery key"), a role (not used) 257, a name (not used) 258, and a recovery public key 259, which is the public key corresponding to the recovery private key sent to the manager device 110. Note that the field holding the recovery public key holds the transmission public key in the entries for the authorized device and the manager device. The authorized device metadata 255 also includes an unlocking key metadata (not used) 260 and a public key ECC-Pub (EUK) 261 corresponding to the public key used to generate the temporary unlocking secret 273. Finally, the authorized device metadata 255 includes an unlocking public key 262 that is the same as the transmission public key (i.e., the recovery public key).
[0119] As described above, a recovery key is a private key that has a corresponding public key that can be calculated from the private key. However, it is desirable that the recovery private key (RPK) is not transmitted in clear text at the time of recovery because there is no secure communication channel. Therefore, the user obtains the recovery private key (such as printed on paper) and enters the recovery private key into a recovery manager device 114 (which is not yet registered or known to the DSD 100). Similar to how the manager device 110 and the authorization device 111 (including the beacon 120 and the key card 121) send their corresponding transmission public keys to the access controller 102 to unlock the DSD 100, the recovery manager device 114 calculates the recovery public key from the private recovery key (such as ECC-Pub (RPK)) and sends the recovery public key to the access controller 102.
[0120] In contrast to the process involving the manager device 110 and the authorization device 111 (including the beacon 120 and the key fob 121), the recovery manager device 114 does not have stored credentials because it only has a public recovery key and a private recovery key available. Therefore, the recovery manager device 114 cannot provide an index to its corresponding record 201 in the configuration memory 115. Therefore, it is useful that the recovery key record 250 is the first entry in the configuration memory 115. This means that the access controller 102 receives the recovery public key, generates the corresponding pre-authorization metadata encapsulation key 263 and attempts to decrypt the authorization device metadata 255. If this attempt is successful, the access controller 102 obtains the device type 256 and the recovery public key 259, which should be "recovery key", which can be verified against the recovery public key provided by the recovery manager device 114. The role field 257 can be "manager device" because the manager key field 271 holds the manager key. The unlock public key 262 can be the same as the recovery public key 259.
[0121] Once the authorized device metadata 255 is decrypted, the access controller 102 sends a challenge to the recovery manager device 114, as described above. That is, the access controller 102 generates a blind value and uses the blind value together with the ECC-Pub (EUK) 261 to calculate the challenge. The response enables the access controller 102 to calculate the temporary unlocking secret 273, which decrypts the manager key 271. With the manager key 271 available, the access controller 102 can now read and change all configuration data stored on the configuration memory 115, and therefore, the recovery manager device 114 has obtained full administrator access rights. In one example, the user key 221 is derived directly from the manager key 271 through a key derivation function without further secret input, which means that it is always possible to calculate the user key when the manager key 271 is available. Since the user key 221 decrypts the user drive key (not shown) as described above, it can be said that the access controller 102 enables the decryption of encrypted user content data based on the response from the recovery manager device 114.
[0122] In one example, when the recovery public key is provided, the access controller 102 deletes all records 201 of the authorized device. This prevents users from distributing the recovery key as a convenient means for granting access rights to colleagues, etc. In another example, the access controller 102 creates a new record similar to the record 201 for the recovery manager device 114 when decrypting the manager key 271. That is, the access controller 102 requests a new transmission public key 209 and a new unlocking public key 212, and encrypts the manager key in the field 221 by a new temporary unlocking secret 223. The access controller 102 may also generate a new recovery private key. It should be noted that the recovery public key is not "public" in the sense of being broadcast or known to the public. The recovery public key is calculated by the recovery manager device 114 and sent to the access controller 102 once. The recovery public key is named "public key" because it is calculated using the public key generation function ECC-Pub. However, even if the recovery public key is published and known to an attacker, the attacker can derive the pre-authorization metadata encapsulation key and decrypt the authorized device metadata 205, thereby distinguishing the configuration memory 115 from random data. However, all the attacker will see is that there is an entry for the recovery key. This entry exists for every DSD 100 that has taken ownership in the past (and may even be generated at the factory and overwritten on the "take ownership"). The attacker is not shown that any authorized device has been registered.
[0123] After assuming the new manager role (by creating manager device record 201), the recovery manager device 114 may create additional entries for one or more authorized devices based on their public keys, as described above. Note also that a new manager key may be regenerated in response to receiving the recovery public key and decrypting the manager key 271, which will automatically render all authorized device entries unusable because they stored the previous user key, which is now different from the user key derived from the new manager key. In response to generating the new manager key, the access controller 102 decrypts the user drive key (not shown) using the previous user key, temporarily stores the user drive key on volatile memory and encrypts the user drive key using the new user key. The access controller 102 will also overwrite the authorized device entries to be maintained using the new user key.
[0124] Note that while some of the above operations render authorized device entries unusable, the previous (now invalid) user key may still be decrypted. This may result in attempts to decrypt user content data using an incorrect encryption key, which may result in invalid data (garbage / random) being returned to the host computer system 104. To prevent this, the entry randomization bitmap may provide a bit for each entry that indicates whether the entry is valid.
[0125] Method for unlocking using the recovery key
[0126] Figure 5 A method 500 for unlocking a data storage device 100 is shown according to one embodiment. The method begins with the access controller 102 generating 501 a recovery private key, such as by generating a random value or a 32-byte randomly generated elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) private key. In the examples disclosed herein, the recovery private key is not stored on a non-volatile memory in the data storage device. The access controller 102 also generates 502 encrypted authorization data 250 based on the recovery private key and stores 502 the encrypted authorization data on a data repository. Figure 2 In the example of , the access controller 102 calculates the recovery public key from the recovery private key, and the authorization data 250 includes the recovery public key 259 corresponding to the recovery private key, which is encrypted by the pre-authorization metadata encapsulation key 263 derived from the recovery public key. Therefore, the authorization data 250 is said to be "based on" the recovery private key. The access controller 102 then sends 503 data indicating the recovery private key to the manager device 110 registered with the DSD 100. The data indicating the recovery key should then be securely stored by the manager user, such as printed on paper and locked in a safe. The data indicating the recovery key can be the recovery key itself in plain text or other data that allows the recovery private key to be unambiguously derived, such as a mnemonic code or sentence also known as a seed phrase.
[0127] The manager device 110 performs the following operations: Figure 2 The DSD 100 is registered in the form of an entry as shown and described above, which includes an encrypted manager key instead of the user key 221, noting that the user key can be derived directly from the manager key. The three aforementioned steps 501, 502 and 503 are performed during or shortly after the "take ownership" process, such as after the manager device 110 has been registered. Then, when the manager device 110 is lost or stolen and it is necessary to restore access to the DSD 100 by using the recovery key, the following steps are performed.
[0128] When the user wishes to restore access, the user installs the application onto their recovery manager device 114 (which has not been registered as such), such as a phone, as previously described, and enters the recovery private key from a paper printout. The application may store the recovery private key in a secure hardware module of the recovery manager device 114 and calculate a recovery public key corresponding to the entered recovery private key. The application then connects to the DSD 100 and sends the calculated recovery public key to the access controller 102. As disclosed herein, the connection may be wireless, such as using Bluetooth. Thus, the access controller 102 receives 504 the recovery public key calculated based on the recovery private key from the recovery manager device 114 via a communication channel different from the data path 101. The access controller 102 may then decrypt 505 the encrypted authorization data based on the recovery public key by deriving a pre-authorization metadata encapsulation key using the authorized device slot key stored on the configuration memory 115. This decryption provides a public key ECC-Pub (RPK) that enables the access controller 102 to generate 506 a challenge for the recovery manager device 114 based on the decrypted authorization data as described above with respect to the authorization device 111. Accordingly, the access controller sends 507 the challenge to the recovery manager device 114 over a communication channel distinct from the data path 101. The recovery manager device 114 computes a response based on the stored recovery private key (entered by the user) and corresponding to the unlocking private key described above. Subsequently, the access controller receives 508 the response to the challenge from the recovery manager device 114 over the communication channel. Finally, the access controller enables 509 the decryption of the encrypted user content data based at least in part on the response. That is, the access controller 102 uses the response to compute a temporary unlocking secret 273 that decrypts the manager key 271, which enables the direct derivation of the user key 221, which decrypts the user drive key (not shown), which decrypts the user content data (possibly with further keys in the chain).
[0129] Registering a Data Storage Device
[0130] Data port 103 registers as a block data storage device with host computer system 104. For example, a Universal Serial Bus (USB) device provides information in the form of a USB device descriptor. The USB device descriptor contains relevant information about the device. Therefore, in an embodiment where the data storage device is connected to the host computer system via a USB connection, the data storage device registers as a block data storage device with the host computer system by configuring its USB device descriptor to indicate that the data storage device is a block data storage device.
[0131] The USB device descriptor provides structured information about the USB device, such as the device class, supported protocols, device type, manufacturer, and other configuration parameters. The operating system of the host computer can obtain the USB device descriptor of the data storage device by sending various standard control requests (e.g., GET_DESCRIPTOR requests) to the data storage device. In response to receiving these requests, the data storage device provides the USB_DEVICE_DESCRIPTOR to the host computer system, thereby registering the data storage device as a block data storage device to the host computer system. The host computer interprets the USB_DEVICE_DESCRIPTOR to determine the configuration and capabilities of the data storage device. The host computer system can then store information about the data storage device in a register of the operating system of the host computer system.
[0132] It will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that many variations and / or modifications may be made to the above-described embodiments without departing from the broad general scope of the present disclosure. The embodiments of the present invention are therefore to be considered in all aspects as illustrative and not restrictive.
Claims
1. A data storage device comprising: The data path includes: a data port configured to transfer data between a host computer system and the data storage device; a non-volatile storage medium configured to store encrypted user content data; and an encryption engine connected between the data port and the non-volatile storage medium, wherein the encryption engine is configured to decrypt the encrypted user content data stored on the non-volatile storage medium using an encryption key in response to a request from the host computer system; and Access the controller, which is configured to: In response to the manager device's registration process: Generate a recovery private key; generating encrypted authorization data based on the recovery private key, wherein the encrypted authorization data includes a recovery key record for unlocking a manager key; storing the encrypted authorization data in a data repository configured to be accessed by the access controller; and sending data indicative of the recovered private key to the manager device, wherein: the manager device being configured to authorize at least one user device to unlock the data storage device to enable decryption of the encrypted user content data; The data indicative of the recovery private key is configured to: to the Recovery Manager device; and deriving, by the recovery manager device, the recovery private key; and The recovery manager device is a different device from the manager device; and During the recovery process: receiving a recovery public key from the recovery manager device over a communication channel distinct from the data path, wherein the recovery manager device is configured to calculate the recovery public key from the recovery private key; decrypting the encrypted authorization data based on the recovered public key; generating a challenge to the recovery manager device based on the decrypted authorization data; sending the challenge to the recovery manager device via the communication channel distinct from the data path; receiving a response to the challenge from the recovery manager device over the communication channel; and Based at least in part on the response and the recovery key record, enabling the recovery manager device to authorize at least one user device to unlock the data storage device to enable decryption of the encrypted user content data.
2. The data storage device of claim 1, wherein the recovery private key is stored on the recovery manager device, and the response is based on the recovery private key stored on the recovery manager device.
3. The data storage device of claim 2, wherein the manager key is configured to enable configuration of the access controller to enable decryption of the encrypted user content data.
4. The data storage device of claim 3, wherein in response to an authorization device being connected to the data storage device, the manager key is configured to enable registration of the authorization device with the access controller to enable decryption of the encrypted user content data.
5. The data storage device according to claim 4, wherein: The registration of the authorization device includes creating an authorization device record entry in the data repository as further encrypted authorization data based on a public key associated with the authorization device; The authorized device record entry includes an encrypted user key calculated based on the manager key; and The access controller is further configured to determine the encryption key based on the user key.
6. The data storage device according to claim 5, wherein: The recovery key record has a first structure that is identical to a second structure of the encrypted authorization data; and The second structure of encrypted authorization data includes the authorization device record entry based on the public key associated with the authorization device, the authorization device being authorized to unlock the data storage device by responding to a challenge generated by the access controller.
7. The data storage device according to claim 6, wherein: The first structure and the second structure include corresponding public key fields; and The access controller is further configured to store the recovered public key in the public key field of the first structure and to store the public key associated with the authorization device in the public key field of the second structure.
8. The data storage device of claim 5, wherein the user key is directly derivable from the manager key.
9. The data storage device of claim 1, wherein the access controller is further configured to determine the manager key based at least in part on the response to enable decryption of the encrypted user content data.
10. The data storage device of claim 1, wherein the access controller is further configured to determine the encryption key based on the manager key.
11. The data storage device of claim 1, wherein the encrypted authorization data comprises metadata encrypted by a pre-authorization metadata encapsulation key derivable from the recovery public key.
12. The data storage device of claim 11, wherein the access controller is further configured to derive the pre-authorization metadata encapsulation key by performing a key derivation function using the recovered public key as input.
13. The data storage device of claim 12, wherein the access controller is further configured to perform the key derivation function using an authorized device slot key as another input.
14. The data storage device of claim 13, wherein the authorized device slot key is stored in plain text on the data repository.
15. The data storage device of claim 11, wherein: The access controller is further configured to generate the challenge to the recovery manager device based on the metadata encrypted by the pre-authorization metadata encapsulation key; and The manager key is encrypted by an unlocking secret that is derivable from the response to enable decryption of the encrypted user content data.
16. The data storage device of claim 15, wherein: The metadata encrypted by the pre-authorization metadata encapsulation key includes an elliptic curve public key corresponding to a temporary unlocking key; and The unlocking secret is based on the temporary unlocking key.
17. The data storage device of claim 1, wherein the access controller is further configured to delete authorization data other than the encrypted authorization data generated based on the recovery private key in response to enabling decryption.
18. The data storage device of claim 1, wherein the recovery public key is calculated by the access controller and the recovery manager device; and The recovery private key is not stored in non-volatile memory by the access controller.
19. A method for unlocking a data storage device storing encrypted user content data, the method comprising: In response to the manager device's registration process: Generating a recovery private key by the data storage device; generating, by the data storage device, encrypted authorization data based on the recovery private key, wherein the encrypted authorization data includes a recovery key record for unlocking a manager key; storing, by the data storage device, the encrypted authorization data in a data repository of the data storage device; as well as Data indicative of the recovered private key is sent by the data storage device to the manager device, wherein: the manager device being configured to authorize at least one user device to unlock the data storage device to enable decryption of the encrypted user content data; The data indicative of the recovery private key is configured to: to the Recovery Manager device; and deriving, by the recovery manager device, the recovery private key; and The recovery manager device is a different device from the manager device; and During the recovery process: receiving, by the data storage device from the recovery manager device over a communication channel, a recovery public key, wherein the recovery manager device is configured to calculate the recovery public key from the recovery private key; decrypting, by the data storage device, the encrypted authorization data based on the restored public key; generating, by the data storage device, a challenge to the recovery manager device based on the decrypted authorization data; sending, by the data storage device via the communication channel, the challenge to the recovery manager device; receiving, by the data storage device from the recovery manager device over the communication channel, a response to the challenge; and Based at least in part on the response and the recovery key record, decryption of the encrypted user content data is enabled by enabling the recovery manager device to authorize at least one user device to unlock the data storage device.
20. A data storage device comprising: The data path includes: a data port configured to transfer data between a host computer system and the data storage device; a non-volatile storage medium configured to store encrypted user content data; and an encryption engine connected between the data port and the non-volatile storage medium, wherein the encryption engine is configured to decrypt the encrypted user content data stored on the non-volatile storage medium using an encryption key in response to a request from the host computer system; means for generating a recovery private key in response to a registration process of a manager device; means for generating encrypted authorization data based on the recovery private key in response to generating the recovery private key, wherein the encrypted authorization data comprises a recovery key record for unlocking a manager key; means for storing said encrypted authorization data in a data repository of said data storage device in response to generating said encrypted authorization data; means for sending data indicative of the recovery private key to the manager device in response to generating the recovery private key, wherein: the manager device being configured to authorize at least one user device to unlock the data storage device to enable decryption of the encrypted user content data; The data indicative of the recovery private key is configured to: to a recovery manager device; and deriving, by the recovery manager device, the recovery private key; and The recovery manager device is a different device from the manager device; means for receiving a recovery public key from the recovery manager device over a communication channel during a recovery process, wherein the recovery manager device is configured to calculate the recovery public key from the recovery private key; means for decrypting the encrypted authorization data based on the recovery public key in response to receiving the recovery public key; means for generating a challenge to the recovery manager device based on the decrypted authorization data; means for sending the challenge to the recovery manager device via the communication channel; means for receiving a response to the challenge from the recovery manager device via the communication channel; and Means for enabling decryption of the encrypted user content data by enabling the recovery manager device to authorize at least one user device to unlock the data storage device based at least in part on the response and the recovery key record.
