An encrypted IMSI-based scheme for 802.1x carrier hotspot and Wi-Fi calling authentication

By encrypting the IMSI with a public key and decrypting it with a private key, combined with the EAP-AKA and EAP-SIM protocols, the problem of IMSI being easily leaked during wireless communication authentication is solved, thus achieving the protection of user privacy and communication security.

CN113395693BActive Publication Date: 2024-11-05APPLE INC
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202110684602.3
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2017-10-25
Filing Date
2017-10-27
Publication Date
2024-11-05
Estimated Expiration
2037-10-27

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In existing technologies, the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) is easily exposed during wireless communication authentication, leading to the leakage of user privacy, especially lacking effective protection against active attacks.

Method used

The IMSI is encrypted during transmission using a public-key encryption mechanism. The authentication server decrypts it using the corresponding private key and ensures the privacy of the IMSI through server certificates and key identifiers. Identity protection is achieved during authentication exchange by combining the EAP-AKA and EAP-SIM protocols.

Benefits of technology

It effectively prevents the leakage of IMSI during the authentication process, protects user privacy, enhances resistance to proactive attacks, and ensures communication security.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The present invention is entitled "Encrypted IMSI-Based Scheme for 802.1x Bearer Hotspot and Wi-Fi Calling Authentication". The present disclosure relates to a technology for performing Wi-Fi authentication in a wireless communication system. Public key encryption can be used to enhance the confidentiality of a user's persistent identity in transmission. In some embodiments, in the absence of anonymous or fast re-authentication of the identity, when the EAP client needs to send the user's persistent identity to the server, an RSA-OAEP (SHA-256) encryption scheme can be used to protect the persistent identity. In some embodiments, a server certificate is used to authenticate the iWLAN tunnel to protect the IMSI during the establishment of Wi-Fi calling. Using the methods described herein on both or either the EAP client and server side can provide improved privacy protection.
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Description

[0001] This application is a divisional application of an invention patent application with an application date of October 27, 2017, application number 201711027143.1, and invention name “An encrypted IMSI-based scheme for 802.1x carrier hotspot and Wi-Fi call authentication”. Technical Field

[0002] The present patent application relates to wireless communications, including a technique for performing Wi-Fi authentication in a wireless communication system. Background Art

[0003] The use of wireless communication systems is growing rapidly. In addition, wireless communication technology has evolved from voice communications only to also include the transmission of data such as the Internet and multimedia content. There are many different wireless communication technologies and standards. Some examples of wireless communication standards include GSM, UMTS (e.g., associated with a WCDMA air interface or a TD-SCDMA air interface), LTE, Advanced LTE (LTE-A), HSPA, 3GPP2 CDMA2000 (e.g., 1xRTT, 1xEV-DO, HRPD, eHRPD), IEEE 802.11 (WLAN or Wi-Fi), IEEE 802.16 (WiMAX), Bluetooth, etc.

[0004] The EAP-AKA protocol and the EAP-SIM protocol are used together with 802.1X to authenticate client access to carrier Wi-Fi hotspots. These protocols are also used with IKEv2 / IPsec tunneling technology to provide access to the carrier's internal network to enable features such as Wi-Fi calling.

[0005] Both EAP-AKA and EAP-SIM use the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) as a persistent identity for authentication exchanges. The IMSI is a unique identifier that can be used to track the movement of a device. To protect user privacy, improvements in the area of ​​IMSI protection may be desirable. Summary of the invention

[0006] Embodiments described herein relate to a system, apparatus, and method for providing an identity privacy support mechanism for International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) transmission in an authentication exchange.

[0007] Some embodiments relate to a wireless device comprising one or more antennas, one or more radio components, and one or more processors coupled (directly or indirectly) to the radio components. At least one radio component is configured to perform Wi-Fi communications. The wireless device can perform voice communications and / or data communications, as well as the methods described herein.

[0008] Some embodiments relate to an authentication server comprising one or more antennas, one or more radio components, and one or more processors coupled (directly or indirectly) to the radio components. At least one radio component is configured to perform Wi-Fi communications. The authentication server can perform voice communications and / or data communications, as well as the methods described herein.

[0009] The embodiments included herein propose a solution that eliminates the need for an EAP client to send a persistent identity "in the clear," i.e., in an unencrypted form. In some embodiments, public key encryption may be used to achieve confidentiality of the persistent identity. The wireless device may be configured with a public key of an authentication server so that it may encrypt the persistent identity before sending it to the server. An authentication server in the carrier's home environment may be configured with a corresponding private key. When the server receives the encrypted persistent identity, it may be able to decrypt it using the private key. In some embodiments, encryption of the persistent identity may be employed at the EAP method layer.

[0010] In some embodiments, if the carrier deployment includes multiple authentication servers, the proposal may assume that each of these nodes shares the same key pair. In addition, the wireless device may provide a key identifier to help the authentication server locate the private key to decrypt the persistent identity. For example, the wireless device may be provided with the certificate serial number of the server certificate as the key identifier sent to the authentication server.

[0011] In some embodiments, the UE may be configured to utilize the ePDG to authenticate the iWLAN / IPsec tunnel when establishing Wi-Fi calling using server certificates. In these embodiments, the UE may be pre-configured with one or more server certificates in the bearer setup file, which the UE may compare with the server certificate received from the ePDG to determine that it is communicating with a valid ePDG and not an attacker.

[0012] It should be noted that the techniques described herein may be implemented in and / or used with a number of different types of devices, including but not limited to base stations, access points, cellular telephones, portable media players, tablet computers, wearable devices, and various other computing devices.

[0013] This summary is intended to provide a brief overview of some of the topics described in this document. Therefore, it should be appreciated that the features described above are only examples and should not be considered to narrow the scope or essence of the topics described herein in any way. Other features, aspects, and advantages of the topics described herein will become apparent from the following detailed description, drawings, and claims. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0014] A better understanding of the present subject matter may be obtained when the following detailed description of the embodiments is considered in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

[0015] Figure 1 An exemplary wireless communication system according to some embodiments is shown;

[0016] Figure 2 shows an exemplary simplified block diagram of an authentication server and / or access point device according to some embodiments;

[0017] Figure 3 shows an exemplary simplified block diagram of a wireless user equipment device according to some embodiments;

[0018] Figure 4 An exemplary wireless communication system for implementing Wi-Fi calling according to some embodiments is shown;

[0019] Figure 5 shows an example composition of an encrypted persistent identity message according to some embodiments;

[0020] Figure 6 is a communication flow diagram illustrating an exemplary EAP-AKA authentication process according to some embodiments;

[0021] Figure 7 is a communication flow diagram illustrating an exemplary EAP-AKA authentication process when the client has anonymity and the server requests a persistent identity according to some embodiments;

[0022] Figure 8 is a communication flow diagram illustrating an exemplary identity protection process using encrypted IMSI in the context of Wi-Fi calling according to some embodiments; and

[0023] Fig. 9 A communication flow diagram illustrating an example identity protection process using server certificates in the context of Wi-Fi calling, according to some embodiments.

[0024] Although the features described herein are susceptible to various modifications and alternative forms, specific embodiments thereof are shown by way of example in the drawings and described in detail herein. However, it should be understood that the drawings and detailed description thereof are not intended to limit the invention to the particular forms disclosed, but on the contrary, the intention is to cover all modifications, equivalents, and alternatives falling within the spirit and scope of the subject matter defined by the appended claims. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0025] Priority claim

[0026] This patent application claims priority to U.S. Provisional Patent Application Serial No. 62 / 414,517, filed on October 28, 2016, entitled “Encrypted IMSI Based Solution for 802.1x Carrier Hotspot and Wi-Fi Calling Authentication,” and U.S. Provisional Patent Application Serial No. 62 / 527,538, filed on June 30, 2017, entitled “Protection of the UE Identity During 802.1x Carrier Hotspot and Wi-Fi Calling Authentication,” which are hereby incorporated by reference in their entirety as if fully set forth herein.

[0027] Acronyms

[0028] Various acronyms are used throughout this patent application. The definitions of the most prominent acronyms used that may appear throughout this patent application are as follows:

[0029] UE: User Equipment

[0030] AP: Access Point

[0031] BS: Base Station

[0032] DL: Downlink (from BS to UE)

[0033] UL: Uplink (from UE to BS)

[0034] TX:Transmission / Transmit

[0035] RX:Reception / Receive

[0036] LAN: Local Area Network

[0037] WLAN: Wireless LAN

[0038] RAT: Radio Access Technology

[0039] the term

[0040] The following is a glossary of terms used in this disclosure:

[0041] Memory medium – any of various types of non-transitory memory devices or storage devices. The term “memory medium” is intended to include installation media, such as CD-ROM, floppy disk, or tape devices; computer system memory or random access memory, such as DRAM, DDR RAM, SRAM, EDO RAM, Rambus RAM, etc.; non-volatile memory, such as flash memory, magnetic media, such as hard disk or optical storage device; registers, or other similar types of memory elements, etc. The memory medium may also include other types of non-transitory memory, or a combination thereof. In addition, the memory medium may be located in a first computer system that executes a program, or may be located in a different second computer system connected to the first computer system via a network such as the Internet. In the latter case, the second computer system may provide program instructions to the first computer for execution. The term “memory medium” may include two or more memory media that may reside in different locations, such as different computer systems connected via a network. The memory medium may store program instructions (e.g., presented as a computer program) that may be executed by one or more processors.

[0042] Carrier Medium—storage media as described above and physical transmission media such as a bus, network, and / or other physical transmission media that transport signals such as electrical, electromagnetic, or digital signals.

[0043] Computer system - any of various types of computing or processing systems, including a personal computer system (PC), a mainframe computer system, a workstation, a network appliance, an Internet appliance, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a television system, a grid computing system, or other devices, or combinations of devices. In general, the term "computer system" can be broadly defined as any device (or combination of devices) that includes at least one processor that executes instructions from a memory medium.

[0044] Mobile device (or mobile station) - any of various types of computer system devices that are mobile or portable and use WLAN communications to perform wireless communications. Examples of mobile devices include mobile phones or smart phones (e.g., iPhone TM , based on Android TM phones), and tablets such as iPads TM 、Samsung Galaxy TM etc. Various other types of devices would fall into this category if they include Wi-Fi or both cellular and Wi-Fi communication capabilities, such as laptop computers (e.g., MacBooks TM ), portable gaming devices (e.g., Nintendo DSTM , PlayStation Portable TM 、Gameboy Advance TM , iPhone TM ), portable Internet devices and other handheld devices, and wearable devices such as smart watches, smart glasses, headphones, pendants, earbuds, etc. In general, the term "mobile device" can be broadly defined to include any electronic, computing and / or communication device (or combination of devices) that is easily transported by a user and capable of wireless communication.

[0045] Wireless device (or wireless station) – Any of various types of computer system devices that use WLAN communications to perform wireless communications. As used herein, the term “wireless device” may refer to a mobile device as defined above or a stationary device such as a stationary wireless client or wireless base station. For example, a wireless device may be any type of wireless station of an 802.11 system, such as an access point (AP) or a client station (STA or UE). Other examples include televisions, media players (e.g., AppleTV TM ,Roku TM , Amazon FireTV TM , Google Chromecast TM etc.), refrigerators, washing machines, thermostats, etc.

[0046] User Equipment (UE) (or "UE device") - any of various types of computer system devices that are mobile or portable and that perform wireless communications. Examples of UE devices include mobile phones or smart phones (e.g., iPhones). TM , based on Android TM phones), portable gaming devices (e.g., Nintendo DS TM , PlayStation Portable TM 、Gameboy Advance TM , iPod TM ), laptops, wearable devices (e.g., smart watches, smart glasses), PDAs, portable Internet devices, music players, data storage devices, or other handheld devices, etc. In general, the term "UE" or "UE device" can be broadly defined to include any electronic, computing and / or communication device (or combination of devices) that is convenient for a user to transport and capable of wireless communication.

[0047] WLAN - The term "WLAN" has the full scope of its ordinary meaning and includes at least a wireless communication network or RAT that is served by WLAN access points and provides connectivity to the Internet through these access points. Most modern WLANs are based on the IEEE 802.11 standard and are marketed under the name "Wi-Fi". The term "Wi-Fi" is used synonymously with WLAN. WLAN networks are distinct from cellular networks.

[0048] Processing element - refers to various embodiments of digital circuits that perform functions in a computer system. Additionally, a processing element may refer to various embodiments of analog or mixed-signal (a combination of analog and digital) circuits that perform a function (or functions) in a computer or computer system. Processing elements include, for example, circuits such as integrated circuits (ICs), ASICs (application specific integrated circuits), portions or circuits of individual processor cores, entire processor cores, individual processors, programmable hardware devices such as field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), and / or larger portions of systems including multiple processors.

[0049] Automatic – refers to an action or operation performed by a computer system (e.g., software executed by a computer system) or device (e.g., circuit, programmable hardware element, ASIC, etc.) without user input directly specifying or performing the action or operation. Thus, the term "automatic" is in contrast to manual performance or specification of an operation by a user, where the user provides input to directly perform the operation. An automatic process may be initiated by input provided by a user, but the subsequent "automatic" performance of the action is not specified by the user, such as not being performed "manually," where the user specifies each action to be performed. For example, a user filling out an electronic form by selecting each field and providing input specifying information (e.g., by typing in information, selecting checkboxes, radio selections, etc.) is manually filling out the form, even though the computer system must update the form in response to the user action. The form may be automatically filled out by a computer system, where the computer system (e.g., software executing on the computer system) analyzes the fields of the form and fills out the form without any user input specifying the answers to the fields. As shown above, a user may invoke automatic filling of a form but not participate in the actual filling of the form (eg, the user does not manually specify answers to fields, but rather they are automatically completed). This specification provides various examples of operations that are automatically performed in response to actions taken by a user.

[0050] Concurrency - refers to parallel execution or progress, wherein tasks, processes, signal transmissions, message transmissions, or programs are performed in an at least partially overlapping manner. For example, concurrency can be achieved using "strong" or strict parallelism, wherein tasks are (at least partially) executed in parallel on corresponding computing elements, or using "weak parallelism", wherein tasks are executed in an interleaved manner, such as by time multiplexing of execution threads.

[0051] Configured to - Various components may be described as being "configured to" perform one or more tasks. In such contexts, "configured to" is a broad statement that generally means "having a structure" that performs one or more tasks during operation. Thus, a component may be configured to perform a task even when the component is not currently performing the task (e.g., a set of electrical conductors may be configured to electrically connect a module to another module even when the two modules are not connected). In some contexts, "configured to" may be a broad statement that generally means "having a circuit" that performs one or more tasks during operation. Thus, the component may be configured to perform a task even when the component is not currently turned on. Typically, the circuitry that forms the structure corresponding to "configured to" may include hardware circuitry.

[0052] For ease of description, various components may be described as performing one or more tasks. Such descriptions should be interpreted to include the phrase "configured to". The description of a component configured to perform one or more tasks is intended to explicitly not invoke 35 U.S.C. §112(f) for the interpretation of that component.

[0053] Figure 1 -Wireless communication system

[0054] Figure 1 An exemplary (and simplified) wireless communication system according to some embodiments is shown. Note that Figure 1 The system is only one example of a possible system, and the embodiment may be implemented in any of a variety of systems as desired.

[0055] As shown, the exemplary wireless communication system includes a user device 106 that wirelessly communicates with an access point 104, which in turn is coupled to an authentication server (AS) 100 via a network 102. The user device may be referred to herein as a "user equipment" (UE). The network 102 may be, for example, a core network of a cellular service provider, a telecommunications network (such as a public switched telephone network (PSTN)), and / or the Internet among various possibilities.

[0056] AS 100 may include hardware to enable communications via a network with access point 104. AS 100 may be configured to authenticate a communication session between UE 106 and access point 104, thereby facilitating communications between UE 106 and network 102.

[0057] AS 100 and UE 106 may be configured to communicate over a transmission medium using any of a variety of radio access technologies (RATs), also referred to as wireless communication technologies or telecommunication standards, such as GSM, UMTS (WCDMA, TD-SCDMA), LTE, Advanced LTE (LTE-A), 3GPP2 CDMA2000 (e.g., 1xRTT, 1xEV-DO, HRPD, eHRPD), etc.

[0058] In addition, one or more access points, such as access point 104, may be communicatively coupled to ASS 100 and UE 106. These may include devices configured to provide a wireless local area network (WLAN) to support cellular network offload and / or to provide wireless communication services by other means as Figure 1 An access point is shown as part of a wireless communication system. Such a WLAN may be configured to operate in accordance with any of a variety of communication standards, such as the various IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi) standards.

[0059] Note that the UE 106 is capable of communicating using multiple wireless communication standards. For example, the UE 106 may be configured to communicate using two or more of GSM, UMTS, CDMA2000, WiMAX, LTE, LTE-A, WLAN, Bluetooth, one or more global navigation satellite systems (GNSS, such as GPS or GLONASS), one and / or more mobile television broadcast standards (e.g., ATSC-M / H or DVB-H), etc. Other combinations of wireless communication standards (including more than two wireless communication standards) are also possible.

[0060] Figure 1 Any or all of the network 102, authentication server 100, access point 104, and / or UE 106 shown in FIG. 1 may be configured to implement or support specific implementations of some or all of the methods described herein.

[0061] In some embodiments, as described further below, UE 106 may be configured to perform a method for performing Wi-Fi authentication for accessing a carrier network Wi-Fi access point using authentication information received from a server operated by the same carrier network.

[0062] Figure 2 -Authentication Server / Access Point Block Diagram

[0063] Figure 2 An exemplary block diagram of an access point (AP) 104 is shown. Note that Figure 2 The block diagram of the AP is only one example of a possible system. As shown, the AP may include a processor 204 that can execute program instructions for the AP. The one or more processors 204 may also be coupled (directly or indirectly) to a memory management unit (MMU) 240 or other circuit or device, which may be configured to receive addresses from the one or more processors 204 and convert those addresses to locations in memory (e.g., memory 260 and read-only memory (ROM) 250).

[0064] The AP may include at least one network port 270. The network port 270 may be configured to couple to a wired network and provide multiple devices, such as UE 106, with access to the Internet. For example, the network port 270 (or an additional network port) may be configured to couple to a local area network such as a home network or an enterprise network. For example, the port 270 may be an Ethernet port. The local area network may provide a connection to an additional network such as the Internet.

[0065] The AP may include at least one antenna 234 that may be configured to operate as a wireless transceiver and may be further configured to communicate with the UE 106 via wireless communication circuitry 230. The one or more antennas 234 communicate with the wireless communication circuitry 230 via a communication chain 232. The communication chain 232 may include one or more receive chains, one or more transmit chains, or both. The wireless communication circuitry 230 may be configured to communicate via Wi-Fi or WLAN (e.g., 802.11).

[0066] The AP may be configured to act as an access point to provide an infrastructure mode 802.11 network to wireless stations in the vicinity of the AP. Additionally or alternatively, the AP may be configured to act as a peer station to perform peer-to-peer communications with nearby wireless stations. In some embodiments, as further described below, the AP may be configured to perform and / or support the execution of a method for a wireless device to perform Wi-Fi authentication to access a carrier network Wi-Fi access point.

[0067] Authentication server (AS) 100 may be configured similarly to access point 104. However, in some embodiments, the AS may not be configured with wireless communication circuitry 230, communication link 232, or antenna 234. In other words, the AS may communicate directly with network 102 through its network port 270. Other embodiments involving authentication servers having wireless communication capabilities are also possible.

[0068] Figure 3 -UE device block diagram

[0069] Figure 3An exemplary simplified block diagram of a user equipment (UE) device, a mobile device or mobile station, and / or a wireless device or wireless station, which may be referred to herein as UE 106, is shown. As shown, UE 106 may include a system on a chip (SOC) 300, which may include parts for various purposes. The SOC 300 may be coupled to various other circuits of UE 106. For example, UE 106 may include various types of memory (e.g., including NAND flash memory 310), a connector interface (I / F) (or dock) 320 (e.g., for coupling to a computer system, a docking station, a charging station, etc.), a display 360, cellular communication circuitry 330 (such as for LTE, GSM, etc.), and short-range to medium-range wireless communication circuitry 329 (e.g., Bluetooth TM and WLAN circuitry). The UE 106 may also include one or more smart cards incorporating SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) functionality, such as one or more UICCs (one or more Universal Integrated Circuit Cards) 345. The cellular communication circuitry 330 may be coupled to one or more antennas, such as antennas 335 and 336 as shown. The short-range to medium-range wireless communication circuitry 329 may also be coupled to one or more antennas, such as antennas 337 and 338 as shown. Alternatively, in addition to or in lieu of being coupled to antennas 337 and 338, the short-range to medium-range wireless communication circuitry 329 may be coupled to antennas 335 and 336. The short-range to medium-range wireless communication circuitry 329 may include multiple receive chains and / or multiple transmit chains for receiving and / or transmitting multiple spatial streams in a configuration such as a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO).

[0070] As shown, the SOC 300 may include a display circuit 304 and one or more processors 302, which may perform graphics processing and provide display signals to a display 360, and which may execute program instructions for the UE 106. The one or more processors 302 may also be coupled to a memory management unit (MMU) 340 and / or other circuits or devices (such as the display circuit 304, the cellular communication circuit 330, the short-range wireless communication circuit 329, the connector interface (I / F) 320, and / or the display 360), which may be configured to receive addresses from the one or more processors 302 and convert those addresses to locations in a memory (e.g., a memory 306, a read-only memory (ROM) 350, a NAND flash memory 310). The MMU 340 may be configured to perform memory protection and page table translation or setup. In some embodiments, the MMU 340 may be included as part of the one or more processors 302.

[0071] As described herein, the UE 106 may include hardware components and software components for implementing the features described herein, including, for example, using an International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) to perform Wi-Fi authentication for accessing a carrier network Wi-Fi access point. The processor 302 of the UE 106 may be configured to implement part or all of the features described herein, for example, by executing program instructions stored on a memory medium (e.g., a non-transitory computer-readable memory medium). Alternatively (or in addition), the processor 302 may be configured as a programmable hardware element, such as an FPGA (field programmable gate array) or as an ASIC (application-specific integrated circuit). Alternatively (or in addition), in combination with one or more of the other components 300, 304, 306, 310, 320, 330, 335, 340, 345, 350, 360, the processor 302 of the UE 106 may be configured to implement part or all of the feature parts described herein.

[0072] Furthermore, as described herein, processor 302 may include one or more processing elements. Thus, processor 302 may include one or more integrated circuits (ICs) configured to perform the functions of processor 302. Furthermore, each integrated circuit may include circuits (e.g., a first circuit, a second circuit, etc.) configured to perform the functions of processor 302.

[0073] In addition, as described herein, the cellular communication circuit 330 and the short-range / medium-range wireless communication circuit 329 may each include one or more processing elements. In other words, one or more processing elements may be included in the cellular communication circuit 330, and one or more processing elements may be included in the short-range / medium-range wireless communication circuit 329. Therefore, each of the cellular communication circuit 330 and the short-range / medium-range wireless communication circuit 329 may include one or more integrated circuits (ICs) configured to perform the functions of the cellular communication circuit 330 and the short-range / medium-range wireless communication circuit 329, respectively. In addition, each integrated circuit may include a circuit (e.g., a first circuit, a second circuit, etc.) configured to perform the functions of the cellular communication circuit 330 and the short-range / medium-range wireless communication circuit 329.

[0074] Figure 4 - Wireless communication system for Wi-Fi calling

[0075] Figure 4An exemplary wireless communication system that can implement Wi-Fi calling according to some embodiments is shown. As shown, a mobile device 106 can communicate with a cellular network via a cellular base station 102. The cellular base station 102 can communicate with a serving gateway (SGW). The SGW is responsible for handover with neighboring base stations. The SGW is coupled to a packet data network (PDN) gateway or PGW. The PGW operates to interface between cellular and Wi-Fi networks. The SGW and PGW are included together in an evolved packet core (EPC).

[0076] As shown, the mobile device 106 may also communicate with an access point (AP) 104, which in this embodiment may be a WiFi access point presenting a Wi-Fi network. The AP may be configured to exchange EAP messages with the UE via EAPOL. The Wi-Fi access point 104 may be coupled to an evolved packet data gateway (ePDG) via a network such as the Internet. The ePDG is used in network functions of a 4G mobile core network (referred to as the evolved packet core (EPC) mentioned above and other mobile networks such as 5G networks). The ePDG may serve as an interface between an EPC network that can use non-secure access and a non-3GPP network such as Wi-Fi and a femtocell access network. In some embodiments, the ePDG may be more generally any type of packet data gateway (PDG).

[0077] In some embodiments, the AP 104 and the ePDG may be further communicatively coupled to the AAA server 100 via the Internet. The AP 104 may be configured to exchange EAP messages with the AAA server via the RADIUS / DIAMETER protocol. In some embodiments, the ePDG may be configured to communicate with the AAA server 100 (e.g., via the Internet) to facilitate the authentication process between the UE and the AAA server 100 (e.g., in the case of Wi-Fi calling). In other embodiments, any combination of the AP 104, the AAA server 100, and / or the ePDG may be collocated such that the corresponding collocated components may be configured to communicate directly.

[0078] The PGW may be coupled to an IMS (IP Multimedia Subsystem) server. The IMS server may include a computer system having a processor and a memory that performs various functions as described herein. The IMS server may implement an IMS service layer. The IMS server may also implement a proxy call session control function (P-CSCF). The P-CSCF may act as an entry point to the IMS domain and may act as an outbound proxy server for a mobile device. The mobile device may attach to the P-CSCF before performing an IMS registration and initiating a SIP session. The P-CSCF may be located in the home domain of the IMS operator, or may be located in a visited domain where the mobile device is currently roaming.

[0079] The IMS server may be coupled to other networks such as a public switched telephone network (PSTN) or other type of communications network, for example, for communicating with other communications devices, such as a standard POTS phone (shown), another mobile device, etc.

[0080] Client access authentication

[0081] When a user of a UE wishes to connect to a Wi-Fi hotspot (Wi-Fi access point), the user is typically required to authenticate his identity, for example to determine whether the UE is an authenticated UE of the Wi-Fi network. EAP-AKA (Extensible Authentication Protocol-Authentication and Key Agreement) and EAP-SIM (Extensible Authentication Protocol-Subscriber Identity Module) protocols are used together with 802.1X to authenticate client access to the carrier Wi-Fi hotspot. These protocols are also used with IKEv2 / IPsec tunneling technology to provide access to the operator's internal network to implement features such as Wi-Fi calling.

[0082] Both EAP-AKA and EAP-SIM use the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) as a persistent identity during the authentication exchange process. The IMSI is a unique identifier that can be used to track the movement of a device. Protecting the IMSI from untrusted exposure can be important for protecting user privacy.

[0083] Both EAP-SIM and EAP-AKA provide for the use of "anonymity" to hide the identity on all authentication exchanges except the first one. This operation is described in RFC (Request for Comments) 4186 Section 12.2 for EAP-SIM and RFC4187 Section 12.1 for EAP-AKA. The server can generate an anonymity for the client, associate it with the IMSI, and securely transmit the next anonymity for the client to use in its next authentication attempt. The client can remember the anonymity, and from then on, the client can continue to use the anonymity instead of the IMSI. As a result, any device that passively sniffs the wireless traffic after the first exchange will not see the IMSI. Unfortunately, using anonymity in this way may not protect against active attacks.

[0084] To provide mitigation against active attacks, an option to implement conservative peer mode is introduced. Conservative peer mode is described in Section 4.1.6 of RFC 4187 and Section 4.2.6 of RFC 4186. A conservative EAP peer implements a configurable lifetime of anonymity, meaning that it will not present the IMSI in response to a server request for a persistent ID until the anonymity lifetime expires.

[0085] In some current implementations, some situations cause the EAP client to send its persistent identity in clear text. These situations may include, for example, when the EAP client does not have an anonymous or fast reauthentication identity, or when the EAP authentication server does not recognize the anonymity presented by the EAP client and requests a persistent identity.

[0086] Because this persistent identity may never change, revealing it can help gather information about the identity and location of the user. It is important to provide an identity privacy support mechanism that ensures that the EAP exchange never reveals the IMSI to a passive or active attacker.

[0087] Encrypting IMSI

[0088] In some embodiments, it may be advantageous to eliminate the need for the EAP client to send the persistent identity in plain text. The term "in plain text" here refers to transmission without encryption or scrambling mechanisms for security purposes. The client can use anonymous or fast reauthentication identities when available, and can provide confidentiality of the persistent identity in other situations when required by the server.

[0089] Embodiments described herein relate to systems, apparatus, and methods for providing identity privacy support mechanisms for IMSI transmissions in authentication exchanges.

[0090] In some embodiments, public key encryption may be used to achieve confidentiality of the persistent identity. The wireless device may be configured with the public key of the authentication server so that it can encrypt the persistent identity before sending it to the server. The authentication server in the carrier's home environment may be configured with the corresponding private key.

[0091] When the server receives the encrypted persistent identity, it may be able to decrypt it using the private key. In some embodiments, if the carrier deployment consists of multiple authentication servers, it may be assumed that each of these nodes shares the same key pair. In addition, the wireless device may provide a key identifier to help the authentication server locate the private key to decrypt the persistent identity. For example, the wireless device may be provided with the certificate serial number of the server certificate as the key identifier to send to the authentication server.

[0092] In some embodiments, if the authentication server fails to decrypt the IMSI, the server may be configured to send an EAP-Request / AKA Notification packet with the AT_NOTIFICATION code "General failure" (16384) to terminate the EAP exchange. This may be desirable, for example, to indicate to the EAP client that the server was unable to decrypt the IMSI, so that the EAP client can take appropriate measures (as described in further detail below) to update its public key. For example, more details describing this process can be found in RFC4187, Section 4.1.7.

[0093] Encryption of the persistent identity may be employed at the EAP method layer. In this case, the authentication server may have to rely on client identity determination supported at the EAP-AKA or EAP-SIM layer. For example, for EAP-AKA, the authentication server may use the EAP-Request / AKA-Identity message to obtain the client's identity. The EAP-Response / AKA-Identity may reveal the NAI field to enable routing of the packet to the correct authentication server.

[0094] Mechanism for configuring public keys

[0095] In the above embodiments, the UE may be required to be initially configured with the public key of the carrier bundle. In addition, the carrier may choose to use a key identifier. The UE may continue to use the public key configured in the bundle until it receives an updated public key from a carrier-hosted server. In some embodiments, the UE may use HTTPS (Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure) to perform periodic checks against the carrier-hosted server to check whether the public key has been updated. In some embodiments, the URL (Uniform Resource Locator) for the carrier-hosted server may also be included in the carrier bundle.

[0096] Figure 5 - Example composition of an encrypted persistent identity message

[0097] Figure 5 An exemplary encoding format that can be used by the UE and the authentication server to encrypt the IMSI or other persistent identity is shown. The encoding format can be used by the authentication server to distinguish between encrypted and unencrypted persistent identities.

[0098] exist Figure 5 The first ASCII (American Standard Code for Information Interchange) character in the message shown in ("\0" as shown) can take any of the following values, with the following meanings:

[0099] "\0" (ASCII NULL character) => encrypted IMSI

[0100] "0" (ASCII value 30 hexadecimal) => EAP-AKA IMSI

[0101] "1" (ASCII value 31 hexadecimal) => EAP-SIM IMSI

[0102] "6" (ASCII value 36 hexadecimal) => EAP-AKA'IMSI

[0103] As known to those skilled in the art, the EAP-AKA' protocol may be similar to EAP-AKA in many respects, but with better security. In some embodiments, an encrypted persistent identity may be encoded. This field may follow the first ASCII character only if the first character is "\0". The data may represent a base64-encoded encrypted persistent identity. Using an RSA (Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman) key size of 2048 bits and RFC4648 compatible with Base64 encoding, the data may be represented by 345 ASCII characters.

[0104] In some embodiments, a Key Identifier Attribute Value Pair (AVP) may be encoded. The Key Identifier AVP may represent data that helps the server locate a private key to decrypt the persistent identity. This field may be optional, and if present, it may be separated from the encrypted persistent identity using a "," (ASCII comma) character. The Key Identifier AVP may be presented in an ASCII string with the format of "name=value" terminated by a null character. For example, if the client wishes to send a certificate serial number to the authentication server, it may be formatted as "CertificateSerialNumber=12345".

[0105] In the absence of either anonymous or fast re-authentication identities, the EAP client may use an anonymous username modified with the appropriate NAI (Network Access Identifier) ​​field in the EAP-Response / Identity packet. In some embodiments, the anonymous username may be in the format of anonymous@ <nai-realm>.

[0106] When receiving the EAP-Request / AKA-Identity packet from the server, the client may send the encrypted persistent identity with a NUL ASCII character ("\0") as a prefix character. The EAP client may form a buffer containing the persistent username and may encrypt the buffer using the RSA public key of the authentication server. The EAP client may encrypt the persistent identity using the RSA-OAEP (RSA-Optimized Asymmetric Encryption Patch) encryption scheme, which may ensure that the encrypted username is unique each time it is generated and may avoid generating another persistent and traceable identifier for the user. This may, for example, avoid the need to translate identities between clients.

[0107] In some embodiments, the RSA-OAEP encryption scheme with SHA-256 (Secure Hash Algorithm-256) hashing can be used. As described in Section 7.1 of RFC 3447, with the RSA-OAEP encryption scheme, it is computationally infeasible to obtain complete or partial information about a message from a ciphertext, and it is computationally infeasible to generate valid ciphertext without knowing the corresponding message. Therefore, chosen ciphertext attacks may not be effective against plaintext-aware encryption schemes such as RSA-OAEP. The 2048-bit RSA key size and the SHA-256 hash function can support encryption of plaintext data up to 190 bytes in length.

[0108] In some embodiments, it may be desirable to explicitly transmit the identifier of the public key that the EAP client is using to encrypt. In these embodiments, the client may populate the key identifier data along with the encrypted persistent identity. The EAP client may be configured with attribute names and values ​​in a printable string format so that it can send this data to the authentication server.

[0109] In some embodiments, an RSA key size of 2048 bits may be used, where the encrypted buffer may be 256 bytes. Since EAP-AKA and EAP-SIM do not support segmentation, using a key size of 2048 bits may be advantageous in keeping the packet size constrained so as not to exceed the maximum transmission unit (MTU) of the lower layers below. The client may then use Base64 encoding of the encrypted bytes to convert the buffer into printable characters. Section 4 of RFC 4648 may be followed for Base64 encoding. Base64 encoding the encrypted data may provide a string of 345 ASCII characters.

[0110] In some embodiments, the authentication server may receive an anonymous identity, a fast reauthentication identity, a plaintext persistent identity, or an encrypted persistent identity in the AT_IDENTITY attribute in the EAP-Response / AKA-Identity packet. If the server supports anonymous or fast reauthentication identities, it may look up the received username in its anonymous / fast reauthentication table. If a match is found, the identity may continue to be used for authentication. If no match is found, it may be necessary to distinguish between an encrypted username and an unencrypted username. In order to distinguish between an encrypted IMSI and an unencrypted IMSI, the server may use a mechanism based on Section 4.1.16 of RFC 4187 and Section 4.2.1.6 of RFC 4186. The persistent username may be in the format of <"0"|IMSI> for EAP-AKA, where the character "|" indicates concatenation, and for EAP-SIM, it may be in the format of <"1"|IMSI>. If the server finds that the first character is "0" or "1", it knows that the IMSI is plain text and can continue to read the remaining digits of the IMSI and continue with authentication. But if the first character is "\0", the server knows that the client has sent encrypted data. The server can first read the string of 345 ASCII characters following the "\0" ASCII character. This string of 345 ASCII characters can be the encrypted persistent identity encoded in Base64. The first server can perform Base64 decoding to obtain the encrypted data. If a "," character is found after the encrypted persistent identity data, the server can use the encoding format described above to read the key identifier value and use the key identifier to locate the private key. The server can use the appropriate private key to RSA decrypt the data to obtain plain text data representing a 16-character ASCII string. The format of the IMSI can follow the same format rules specified in Section 4.1.1.6 of RFC 4187 and Section 4.2.1.6 of RFC 4186.

[0111] Figure 6 -EAP-AKA authentication process

[0112] Figure 6 is an exemplary message flow illustrating EAP-AKA authentication. Figure 6 The above is shown for EAP-AKA authentication, but those skilled in the art can understand how to adjust for EAP-SIM authentication. Figure 6 method.

[0113] At 602, an 802.11 connection (association) is generated between the UE 106 and the WLAN access point 104. In some exemplary embodiments, the UE may be used by an EAP client. In some embodiments, the connection may be generated by any of a variety of short-range wireless communication technologies, such as Wi-Fi. For example, a user carrying a mobile device (or UE) may enter an area served by a Wi-Fi hotspot. The mobile device may detect a beacon transmitted by a Wi-Fi hotspot and may attempt to automatically connect to the Wi-Fi hotspot.

[0114] At 604, after the connection is established in 602, an EAP request / identity message is transmitted from the access point to the UE. The EAP request / identity message may be used to initiate an authentication process for the UE.

[0115] At 606, the EAP-Response / Identity packet may be transmitted by the UE to the 3GPP AAA server 100 via the WLAN access point. More specifically, the UE may wirelessly transmit the EAP-Response / Identity packet to the Wi-Fi access point, and the Wi-Fi access point in turn provides the EAP-Response / Identity packet to the AAA server. The EAP-Response / Identity packet may include an anonymous username beginning with "0" or "1" to help the network route the EAP authentication to the appropriate AAA server supporting EAP-AKA or EAP-SIM, respectively. If it is desired to use a prefix value other than "0" or "1", the EAP client may be configured for this. For example, if the network requires a prefix of "999", the EAP client may be configured for this so that it may send an EAP-Response / Identity packet with the identity "999"| <anonymous> @ <nairealm>Use of this prefix value may be limited to EAP-Response / Identity packets.

[0116] At 608, the EAP request / AKA identity packet may be transmitted by the 3GPP AAA server to the UE via the WLAN access point. The EAP request / AKA identity packet may include an "AT_ANY_ID_REQ" attribute. The AT_ANY_ID_REQ attribute may request the encrypted IMSI from the UE.

[0117] At 610, an EAP response / AKA identity packet containing an encrypted identity (eg, an encrypted IMSI or another encrypted identity) may be transmitted by the UE to a 3GPP AAA server via a WLAN access point. Figure 6 In the example shown in , the EAP response / AKA identity packet may include an AT_IDENTITY attribute, where the encrypted IMSI is transmitted in the form of AT_IDENTITY="\0"|<encrypted identity>.

[0118] At 612, an EAP request / AKA challenge packet including AT_RAND, AT_AUTN, and AT_MAC attributes may be transmitted by the 3GPP AAA server to the UE via the WLAN access point. These attributes are part of the standard EAP-AKA protocol and EAP-SIM protocol and their descriptions may be found in, for example, RFC4186 and RFC 4187.

[0119] An EAP response / AKA challenge packet including AT_RES and AT_MAC attributes may be transmitted by the UE to the 3GPP AAA server via the WLAN access point at 614. These attributes are part of the standard EAP-AKA protocol and EAP-SIM protocol and their descriptions may be found in, for example, RFC 4186 and RFC4187.

[0120] At 616, an EAP success message may be transmitted by the 3GPP AAA server to the WLAN access point indicating that the authentication process was successful, whereby the UE will become authorized.

[0121] Figure 7 -Use anonymity for EAP-AKA authentication process

[0122] Figure 7 FIG. 1 is an exemplary message flow for EAP-AKA authentication when the client has anonymity and the server requests a persistent identity. The client may have previously received anonymity from the authentication server during a previous authentication process. Figure 7 The above is shown for EAP-AKA authentication, but those skilled in the art can understand how to adjust for EAP-SIM authentication. Figure 7 method.

[0123] At 702, an 802.11 connection is generated between the UE 106 and the WLAN access point 104. In some embodiments, the UE may be used by an EAP client. In some embodiments, the connection may be generated through any of a variety of short-range wireless communication technologies such as Wi-Fi.

[0124] At 704, an EAP Request Identity message is transmitted from the access point to the UE. The EAP Request Identity message may be used to initiate an identity authentication process of the UE.

[0125] At 706, the EAP response / identity packet is transmitted from the UE via the access point to the 3GPP AAA server 100. The EAP response / identity packet may contain an anonymous and may be configured to read <pseudonym>@<NAI Realm> .

[0126] At 708, the EAP request / AKA identity packet may be transmitted by the 3GPP AAA server to the UE via the WLAN access point. The EAP request / AKA identity packet may include an "AT_ANY_ID_REQ" attribute. The AT_ANY_ID_REQ attribute may request the encrypted IMSI from the UE.

[0127] At 710, the EAP response / AKA identity packet containing the anonymized AKA may be transmitted by the UE to the 3GPP AAA server via the WLAN access point. Figure 7 In the example shown in , the EAP response / AKA identity packet may include an AT_IDENTITY attribute, where "AT_Identity=" <pseudonym>@<NAI Realm> " to transmit anonymously.

[0128] At 712, the EAP request / AKA identity packet may be transmitted by the 3GPP AAA server to the UE via the WLAN access point. The EAP request / AKA identity packet may include an "AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ" attribute. The AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ attribute may include a request for an encrypted persistent ID from the UE. In some embodiments, the request for an encrypted persistent ID may be in response to an anonymity expiration. In other embodiments, the request for an encrypted persistent ID may be in response to the 3GPP AAA server not recognizing the anonymity transmitted at step 706.

[0129] At 714, an EAP response / AKA identity packet including the encrypted identity (e.g., and the encrypted IMSI or another encrypted identity) may be transmitted by the UE to the 3GPP AAA server via the WLAN access point. The response at 714 may be an EAP response / AKA identity packet, which may include an AT_IDENTITY attribute, in which the encrypted IMSI is transmitted in the form of "AT_IDENTITY="\0"|<encrypted identity>".

[0130] At 716, an EAP request / AKA challenge packet including AT_RAND, AT_AUTN, and AT_MAC attributes may be transmitted by the 3GPP AAA server to the UE via the WLAN access point. These attributes are part of the standard EAP-AKA protocol and EAP-SIM protocol and their descriptions may be found in, for example, RFC4186 and RFC 4187.

[0131] The EAP response / AKA challenge packet including the AT_RES and AT_MAC attributes may be transmitted by the UE to the 3GPP AAA server via the WLAN access point at 718. These attributes are part of the standard EAP-AKA protocol and EAP-SIM protocol and their descriptions may be found in, for example, RFC 4186 and RFC4187.

[0132] At 720, an EAP success message may be transmitted by the 3GPP AAA server to the WLAN access point indicating that the authentication process was successful, whereby the UE will become authorized.

[0133] Wi-Fi Calling using IKEv2 protocol

[0134] In some embodiments, Wi-Fi calling by a UE uses the IKEv2 protocol to establish an IPSec tunnel with an evolved packet data gateway (ePDG). In these embodiments, the UE may be referred to as an IKEv2 client. In some embodiments, an IKEv2 exchange uses an International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) as an IKE identifier in an authentication exchange. Although the IKE identifier may be sent within an encrypted tunnel, the tunnel may not be authenticated. In this case, an IKEv2 key may be negotiated with an attacker. Once the key is calculated, both the client and the attacker may have access to the key to decrypt the IKEv2 session. If the client then uses the encrypted IKEv2 tunnel to share the IMSI with the attacker, the attacker may easily decrypt the packet using his previously calculated key and extract the IMSI from the IKE AUTH packet. This exposes the IMSI to an active attacker.

[0135] In the current implementation, the IKEv2 client may send the IMSI as the IKE identifier before authentication. Because the IMSI is a persistent identity and never changes, revealing it before authentication may enable passive and / or active attackers to gather information about the user's identity and location. The embodiments described below provide an identity privacy support mechanism that ensures that the IKEv2 exchange never reveals the IMSI to passive or active attackers.

[0136] Figure 8 - for Wi-Fi calling Encrypted IMSI

[0137] Figure 8 is an exemplary message flow illustrating identity protection using encrypted IMSI in the case of Wi-Fi calling. In some embodiments, a user may be making a phone call that is normally completed over a cellular communication network. In this case, the user experience may be improved (i.e., because the cellular signal is poor or to preserve cellular data) to instead convert the voice signals into packets for transmission over the Wi-Fi network. Incoming voice signals may also be received as IP packets. The process of transmitting a voice call by converting voice data into digital packets is generally referred to as VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol). The case of performing VoIP via a Wi-Fi access point is generally referred to as Wi-Fi calling. Figure 8 The above is shown for Wi-Fi calling using the EAP-AKA protocol, but it can be understood by those skilled in the art how to adjust it for the EAP-SIM protocol. Figure 8 method.

[0138] For the case of Wi-Fi calling, the UE may have established a secure connection with the WLAN access point at Layer 2 of the networking stack. In this case, when initiating a Wi-Fi call, an authentication process may have to be performed between the UE and an evolved packet data gateway (ePDG) at Layer 3 of the networking stack.

[0139] At 802, an IKE_SA_INIT packet may be transmitted by UE 106 to the ePDG. Figure 4 A detailed description of the communication system between the UE and the ePDG can be found in the description of . In some embodiments, the UE can be used by an EAP client. The IKE_SA_INIT packet can be used to request an encrypted tunnel between the UE and the ePDG.

[0140] At 804, an IKE_SA_INIT packet may be transmitted by the ePDG to the UE. Transmitting the IKE_SA_INIT packet to the UE may be used to establish an encrypted tunnel between the UE and the ePDG. The IKE_SA_INIT packet is a part of the standard EAP-AKA protocol and the EAP-SIM protocol and may be described in detail in, for example, RFC 7296. It may be appreciated that all subsequent communications between the UE and the ePDG may be encrypted by the encrypted tunnel from steps 806-820.

[0141] At 806, an IKE_AUTH ID i packet may be transmitted by the UE to the ePDG using an anonymous username that begins with "0" or "1". If it is desired to use a prefix value other than "0" or "1", this may be configured by the EAP client for this purpose. For example, if the network requires a prefix of "999", this may be configured by the EAP client.

[0142] At 808, the ePDG may transmit an IKE_AUTH EAP Request / Identity packet to the UE. The EAP Request Identity message may be used to initiate an authentication process for the UE.

[0143] At 810, an IKE_AUTH EAP response / identity packet may be transmitted by the UE to the 3GPP AAA server 100 via the ePDG with an anonymous username starting with "0" or "1" to help the network route the EAP authentication to the appropriate AAA server supporting EAP-AKA or EAP-SIM, respectively. If it is desired to use a prefix value other than "0" or "1", the EAP client may be configured for this. For example, if the network requires a prefix of "999", the EAP client may be configured for this so that it may send an IKE_AUTH EAP response / identity packet with an anonymous username starting with "0" or "1" to help the network route the EAP authentication to the appropriate AAA server supporting EAP-AKA or EAP-SIM, respectively. <anonymous> @ <nairealm>Use of this prefix value may be limited to EAP-Response / Identity packets.

[0144] At 812, the EAP request / AKA identity packet may be transmitted by the 3GPP AAA server to the UE via the ePDG. The EAP request / AKA identity packet may include an "AT_ANY_ID_REQ" attribute. The EAP request / AKA message may be used to initiate the UE's identity authentication process. The AT_ANY_ID_REQ attribute may request an encrypted IMSI from the UE.

[0145] At 814, an IKE_AUTH EAP Response / AKA Identity packet containing an encrypted identity (eg, an encrypted IMSI or another encrypted identity) may be transmitted by the UE to the 3GPP AAA server via the ePDG. Figure 8 In the example shown in , the EAP response / AKA identity packet may include an AT_IDENTITY attribute, where the encrypted IMSI is transmitted in the form of AT_IDENTITY="\0"|<encrypted identity>.

[0146] At 816, an EAP request / AKA challenge packet including AT_RAND, AT_AUTN and AT_MAC attributes may be transmitted by the 3GPP AAA server to the UE via the ePDG. These attributes are part of the standard EAP-AKA protocol and EAP-SIM protocol and their descriptions may be found in, for example, RFC 4186 and RFC 4187.

[0147] The IKE_AUTH EAP response / AKA challenge packet including the AT_RES and AT_MAC attributes may be transmitted by the UE to the 3GPP AAA server via the ePDG at 818. These attributes are part of the standard EAP-AKA protocol and the EAP-SIM protocol and their descriptions may be found in, for example, RFC 4186 and RFC 4187.

[0148] At 820 , the 3GPP AAA server may send an EAP success message to the ePDG to indicate that the authentication process is successful, and then the ePDG may send an IKE_AUTH EAP success message to the UE.

[0149] At 822, an IKE_AUTH message may be sent by the UE to the ePDG, and at 824, an IKE_AUTH message may be sent by the ePDG to the UE, whereby an iWLAN / IPsec tunnel will be established between the UE and the ePDG.

[0150] Fig. 9 -Wi-Fi calling IKEv2 scheme for privacy protection

[0151] Fig. 9 1 is a message flow diagram illustrating identity protection without encrypted IMSI in the case of Wi-Fi calling using the Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) protocol. In some embodiments, it may be desirable to complete identity protection for the UE and implement an out-of-band mechanism to manage public keys for encryption and decryption of the IMSI when initiating Wi-Fi calling without involving a 3GPP AAA server at each step of the authentication process. For example, in Figure 8 In the flowchart of , the ePDG largely acts as a pass-through entity, as it mainly forwards messages between the UE and the 3GPP AAA server. If some authentication steps can be performed directly between the UE and the ePDG (e.g., without directly involving the AAA server), the authentication process can be simplified and easier to deploy.

[0152] In some embodiments, the IMSI may be provided within the encrypted tunnel only after authenticating the IKEv2 server.

[0153] At 902, an IKE_SA_INIT packet may be transmitted by UE 106 (eg, the UE may be an IKEv2 client) to the ePDG. Figure 4 A detailed description of the communication system between the UE and the ePDG can be found in the description of . In some embodiments, the UE can be used by an EAP client. The IKE_SA_INIT packet can be used to request an encrypted tunnel between the UE and the ePDG.

[0154] At 904, an IKE_SA_INIT packet may be transmitted by the ePDG to the UE. Transmitting the IKE_SA_INIT packet to the UE may be used to establish an encrypted connection between the UE and the ePDG. The IKE_SA_INIT packet may be part of the standard EAP-AKA protocol and the EAP-SIM protocol, detailed descriptions of which may be found, for example, in RFC 7296. It may be appreciated that all subsequent communications between the UE and the ePDG from steps 906-920 may be encrypted by the encrypted connection.

[0155] At 906, the UE may transmit an IKE_AUTH IDi packet to the ePDG using an anonymous username. For example, the IKE_AUTH IDi packet may be structured as " <anonymous> @ <nairealm>”. The anonymous username may be carrier configurable such that each anonymous username corresponds to a specific wireless carrier. In some embodiments, the UE may be pre-configured with one or more anonymous IDs that each correspond to a specific wireless carrier. For example, the UE may be pre-configured to be carrier bound stored in a carrier setting file of the UE, the carrier setting file storing the anonymous IDs and the associated wireless carriers. In these embodiments, the anonymous username may be used to inform the ePDG which wireless bearer the UE is attempting to use to establish a Wi-Fi call, so that the ePDG knows which AAA server to contact during the authentication process. In other words, the anonymous username may act as a server identifier that is used to inform the ePDG which server certificate to transmit to the UE.

[0156] In some embodiments, excessively large certificate sizes may result in undesirable IP fragmentation. In these embodiments, the methods described herein may be configured to support RFC 7383 in the same manner as IKEv2 performs large message fragmentation. In these embodiments, a large message (e.g., a large server certificate) may be replaced with a series of smaller messages.

[0157] In some embodiments, the IKE_AUTH IDi packet may optionally include a certificate request message (CERTREQ). The CERTREQ may inform the ePDG that the UE is configured to accept server certificates according to the following steps. In some embodiments, the UE may be configured to send CERTREQs on a server-by-server basis (e.g., the UE may send CERTREQs only when establishing a Wi-Fi call with a server that requires sending CERTREQs). In some embodiments, if it is determined that the UE is not configured to accept server certificates, the ePDG may employ an alternative authentication method. For example, the ePDG may fall back to a standard authentication method, or the ePDG may employ an authentication method using an encrypted IMSI, as described in detail elsewhere in this disclosure.

[0158] In some embodiments, at 908, the ePDG may respond to the received IKE_AUTH IDi packet by sending an IKE_AUTH response EAP request / AKA identity packet to the UE. The EAP request / AKA message may be used to initiate an identity authentication process for the UE. The EAP request / AKA identity packet may include an authentication payload that includes a server certificate. The server certificate may be a unique identifier (e.g., a symbol or a string of digits) that uniquely identifies a 3GPP AAA server to be involved in a Wi-Fi call. In some embodiments, the server certificate may be issued by a certificate authority (CA). In some embodiments, the UE may be pre-configured (e.g., in a carrier setting file) with one or more server certificates corresponding to one or more AAA servers, respectively. For example, the UE may be pre-configured with a carrier bundle stored in a carrier setting file of the UE, which stores server certificates and associated AAA servers. In various embodiments, the carrier bundle containing the server certificate may be the same carrier bundle or a different carrier bundle as used to configure an anonymous ID associated with one or more wireless carriers for the UE.

[0159] At 910, the UE may compare the received server certificate to a pre-configured server certificate associated with the server through which the UE is attempting to establish Wi-Fi calling. If the received server certificate matches the server certificate in the UE's bearer settings, the UE may transmit an IKE_AUTH EAP Response / Identity packet containing the IMSI to the ePDG, which in turn may be forwarded to the 3GPP AAA server as a DIAMETER-EAP-Request packet with the username as the identity (e.g., using the DIAMETER protocol). Fig. 9 In the example shown in , the EAP Response / AKA Identity Packet may <imsi>@NAIRealm. Because the UE has received a valid server certificate from the ePDG before it sent the IMSI, the UE can confirm that the endpoint is a valid ePDG and not an active attacker.

[0160] At 912, an EAP-Request / AKA-Challenge packet (e.g., Diameter-EAP-Answer) including an AT_RAND attribute, an AT_AUTN attribute, and an AT_MAC attribute may be transmitted by the 3GPP AAA server to the UE via the ePDG. These attributes are part of the standard EAP-AKA protocol and the EAP-SIM protocol, and their descriptions may be found in, for example, RFC 4186 and RFC 4187.

[0161] At 914, an IKE_AUTH EAP Response / AKA Challenge packet including the AT_RES attribute and the AT_MAC attribute may be transmitted by the UE to the ePDG, which may be forwarded to the 3GPP AAA server as a Diameter-EAP-Request packet. These attributes are part of the standard EAP-AKA protocol and the EAP-SIM protocol, and their descriptions may be found in, for example, RFC 4186 and RFC 4187.

[0162] At 916, an EAP success message indicating a success of the authentication process may be transmitted by the 3GPP AAA server to the ePDG as a Diameter-EAP-Answer, followed by an IKE_AUTH EAP success message being transmitted by the ePDG to the UE.

[0163] At 918, an IKE_AUTH message may be transmitted by the UE to the ePDG, and at 920, an IKE_AUTH message may be transmitted by the ePDG to the UE, whereby an iWLAN / IPsec tunnel will be established between the UE and the ePDG.

[0164] The following numbered paragraphs describe additional embodiments of the invention.

[0165] In one embodiment, a method for performing an authentication procedure between a user equipment device (UE) and an authentication server is described. The method includes transmitting a first server certificate from a packet data gateway (PDG) to the UE via a WLAN access point. The UE compares the first server certificate with a second server certificate stored on the UE, wherein the second server certificate is associated with the authentication server.

[0166] In this embodiment, in response to a determination that the first server certificate matches the second server certificate, the UE transmits an International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) associated with the UE to the PDG via the WLAN access point for forwarding to the authentication server.

[0167] In one embodiment, the UE sends a server certificate to the PDG, wherein the server certificate is associated with the authentication server, and wherein the first server certificate is transmitted in response to the PDG receiving the server certificate.

[0168] In one embodiment, the server certificate includes a certificate request indicating that the UE is configured to receive a first server certificate.

[0169] In one embodiment, the authentication process enables Wi-Fi calling with a remote party using the Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) protocol.

[0170] In one embodiment, the UE is configured to connect to a WLAN access point to transmit packetized voice data to a cellular packet data gateway via the WLAN access point;

[0171] In one embodiment, the authentication process is performed when the UE connects to the WLAN access point.

[0172] The embodiments of the present disclosure may be implemented in any of a variety of forms. For example, some embodiments may be implemented as computer-implemented methods, computer-readable storage media, or computer systems. Other embodiments may be implemented using one or more custom-designed hardware devices such as ASICs. Other embodiments may be implemented using one or more programmable hardware elements such as FPGAs.

[0173] In some embodiments, a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium may be configured such that it stores program instructions and / or data, wherein if the program instructions are executed by a computer system, the computer system is caused to perform a method, such as any one of the method embodiments described herein, or any combination of the method embodiments described herein, or any subset of any method embodiments described herein, or any combination of such subsets.

[0174] In some embodiments, a wireless device (or wireless station) may be configured to include a processor (or a group of processors) and a memory medium, wherein the memory medium stores program instructions, wherein the processor is configured to read the program instructions from the memory medium and execute the program instructions, wherein the program instructions are executable to enable the wireless device to implement any of the various method implementations described herein (or any combination of the method implementations described herein, or any subset of any method implementations described herein or any combination of such subsets). The device may be implemented in any of a variety of forms.

[0175] Although the above embodiments have been described in considerable detail, numerous variations and modifications will become apparent to those skilled in the art once the above disclosure is fully appreciated. It is intended that the following claims be interpreted to encompass all such variations and modifications.< / imsi> < / nairealm> < / anonymous> < / nairealm> < / anonymous> < / pseudonym> < / pseudonym> < / nairealm> < / anonymous>

Claims

1. A method performed by a user equipment device UE, the UE being configured to communicate with a first radio access network, the method comprising: An initial authentication process is performed by the first radio access network with a third generation partnership project 3GPP network, the initial authentication process comprising: Encrypting the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI); and The encrypted IMSI is transmitted in an encoded format to the 3GPP network via the first radio access network, wherein the encoded format includes a public key identifier used in generating the encrypted IMSI. 2 . The method according to claim 1 , wherein the communication between the UE and the 3GPP network uses any one of EAP-AKA or EAP-SIM protocols.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein during the initial authentication procedure or a subsequent authentication procedure, the IMSI is not sent unencrypted from the UE via the first radio access network.

4. The method according to claim 1, further comprising: connecting to the first radio access network to transmit packetized voice data to a cellular packet data gateway through the first radio access network; Wherein the initial authentication procedure is performed during connection to the first radio access network.

5. The method according to claim 1, further comprising: storing an anonymous message for transmission to the 3GPP network via the first radio access network, The initial authentication process is performed in response to the expiration of the anonymity.

6. The method of claim 1 , wherein encrypting the IMSI comprises using a public key, The method further comprises: performing a subsequent authentication process after the initial authentication process, Wherein the IMSI is encrypted into a unique encrypted IMSI at each subsequent authentication process.

7. The method of claim 1, wherein the 3GPP network comprises a 3GPP network entity for performing authentication, wherein the 3GPP network comprises a 5G network.

8. The method of claim 1, wherein the first radio access network is coupled to the 3GPP network via an interface, The method further comprises: before transmitting the encrypted IMSI to the 3GPP network via the first radio access network, establishing an encrypted tunnel with the interface, The transmission of the encrypted IMSI uses the encryption tunnel.

9. A method performed by a 3rd Generation Partnership Project 3GPP network entity for performing authentication, the 3GPP network entity being configured to communicate with a first radio access network, the method comprising: Performing initial authentication on a user equipment device UE through the first radio access network, the initial authentication comprising: receiving an encrypted International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) in an encoded format from the UE via the first radio access network, wherein the encoded format includes a public key identifier used to generate the encrypted IMSI; decrypting the IMSI received from the UE; and The UE is authenticated based on the decrypted IMSI.

10. The method according to claim 9, further comprising: receiving an anonymous message from the UE via the first radio access network, Wherein the initial authentication is performed in response to expiration of the anonymity.

11. The method of claim 9, wherein the IMSI is encrypted using a public key pair, The method further comprises: performing subsequent authentication after performing said initial authentication, Wherein the IMSI is encrypted into a unique encrypted IMSI at each subsequent authentication.

12. A 3rd Generation Partnership Project 3GPP network entity for performing authentication, comprising: at least one network connection configured to communicate with a first radio access network; Storage media; and At least one processor coupled to the memory medium and the at least one network connection and configured to perform the operations of the method according to any one of claims 9-11.

13. A method performed by a user equipment device UE, the UE being configured to communicate with a first radio access network, the first radio access network being a non-3rd Generation Partnership Project 3GPP access network, the first radio access network being coupled to a 3rd Generation Partnership Project 3GPP network via an interface, the method comprising: Performing an initial authentication process with the 3GPP network through the first radio access network, the initial authentication process further comprising: exchanging Internet Key Exchange Security Association Initial (IKE) SAINIT packets with the interface via the first radio access network; receiving a first server certificate from the interface via the first radio access network after exchanging the IKE SA INIT packets; sending an IKE_AUTH ID i packet to the interface using an anonymous username, wherein the anonymous username serves as a server identifier and the server identifier is associated with the 3GPP network, and wherein the first server certificate is received in an IKE_AUTH response EAP request / AKA identity packet in response to sending the server identifier; Determining that the first server certificate is valid; and In response to determining that the first server certificate is valid, transmitting an identity associated with the UE to the interface via the first radio access network for forwarding to the 3GPP network, wherein the identity includes an encrypted International Mobile Subscriber Identity IMSI in an encoded format, wherein the encoded format includes a public key identifier used in generating the encrypted IMSI.

14. The method according to claim 13, wherein the server identifier comprises a certificate request indicating that the UE is configured to receive the first server certificate, and Wherein the first server certificate is segmented into a series of smaller messages.

15. The method of claim 13, wherein the initial authentication process enables Wi-Fi calling with a remote party.

16. The method of claim 13, wherein the initial authentication process uses Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) protocol between the UE and the interface.

17. The method according to claim 13, further comprising: connecting to the first radio access network to transmit packetized voice data to a cellular packet data gateway through the first radio access network, Wherein the initial authentication procedure is performed during connection to the first radio access network.

18. The method of claim 13, wherein determining that the first server certificate is valid comprises comparing the first server certificate to a second server certificate stored on the UE, and wherein the second server certificate is associated with a 3GPP authentication server of the 3GPP network.

19. A user equipment device UE, comprising: at least one antenna; wireless communications circuitry communicatively coupled to the at least one antenna; and At least one processor is communicatively coupled to the wireless communication circuit and is configured to perform the method according to any of claims 1-8 and 13-18.

20. A computer program product comprising program instructions which, when executed by one or more processors, perform the method according to any one of claims 1-11 and 13-18.