A privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing method and system

By decomposing the transformation factor in multi-party security calculation and using multi-party security calculation protocol for iterative transformation, the problem of excessive data transmission is solved, and the traffic volume is reduced and data privacy is protected.

CN113949510BActive Publication Date: 2024-11-08SASI DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY (BEIJING) CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202111204462.1
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2021-10-15
Publication Date
2024-11-08
Estimated Expiration
2041-10-15

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In the multi-party security calculation process, the data transmission volume is too large, resulting in an increase in communication overhead. Especially in the matrix multiplication operation, the transmission volume is mn log|A|, which causes trouble for practical applications.

Method used

By decomposing the transformation factor into private factors and public factors, using the multi-party security calculation protocol to use the iterative transformation process, the participants will independently complete the transformation of the public factor and the transformation of the private factor to reduce the traffic. The specific steps include decomposing the factor to perform the transformation object Iterative transformation, generate shards, and collaborative calculations through protocols to realize the transformation results and share storage.

Benefits of technology

It effectively reduces the traffic volume during multi-party security calculation, avoids the transmission of row and column multiplication terms in matrix multiplication, reduces communication overhead, and protects the privacy and security of data of all parties.

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Abstract

The embodiments of this specification disclose a privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing method and system. The method includes: a first participant owns a private transformation factor, a second participant owns a private transformation object, and the method is executed by the first participant, and includes: decomposing the transformation factor to obtain a transformation sequence containing multiple decomposition factors; the multiple decomposition factors include private factors and public factors, and the public factors are simultaneously held by the second participant; in collaboration with the second participant, the transformation object is iteratively transformed based on the multiple decomposition factors in the transformation sequence in turn, thereby obtaining the first slice of the transformation result; in the process of iteratively transforming the transformation object, the transformation involving the public factor is completed by the participant alone, and the transformation involving the private factor is completed by the participant based on the multi-party secure computing protocol; the transformation result is equal to the result of transforming the transformation object using the transformation factor.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of information security technology, and in particular to a privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing method and system. Background Art

[0002] Secure multi-party computation is also called multi-party secure computation, which means that multiple parties jointly calculate the result of a function without revealing the input data of each party of the function. The result of the calculation is stored in a shared form among multiple parties or disclosed to one or more of the parties. Therefore, through secure multi-party computation, the participating parties can calculate the result of the function without exposing their original data.

[0003] The process of multi-party secure computing involves data transmission between multiple parties. How to reduce the amount of data transmission during the computing process has become an urgent problem that needs to be solved. Summary of the invention

[0004] One aspect of the embodiments of this specification provides a privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing method. In which, the first participant has a private transformation factor, and the second participant has a private transformation object. The method is executed by the first participant, and includes: decomposing the transformation factor to obtain a transformation sequence containing multiple decomposition factors; the multiple decomposition factors include private factors and public factors, and the public factors are simultaneously held by the second participant; in collaboration with the second participant, the transformation object is iteratively transformed based on the multiple decomposition factors in the transformation sequence in turn, thereby obtaining a first slice of the transformation result; in which, in the process of iteratively transforming the transformation object, the transformation involving the public factor is completed by the participant alone, and the transformation involving the private factor is completed by the participant based on the multi-party secure computing protocol; the transformation result is equal to the result of transforming the transformation object using the transformation factor.

[0005] Another aspect of the embodiments of this specification provides a privacy-protected multi-party secure computing system. In which, the first participant has a private transformation factor, and the second participant has a private transformation object. The system is implemented by the first participant, and includes: a transformation factor decomposition module, which is used to decompose the transformation factor to obtain a transformation sequence containing multiple decomposition factors; the multiple decomposition factors include private factors and public factors, and the public factors are held by the second participant at the same time; a first collaborative computing module, which is used to collaborate with the second participant to iteratively transform the transformation object based on the multiple decomposition factors in the transformation sequence in turn, and then obtain the first slice of the transformation result; in which, in the process of iteratively transforming the transformation object, the transformation involving the public factor is completed by the participant alone, and the transformation involving the private factor is completed by the participant based on the multi-party secure computing protocol; the transformation result is equal to the result of transforming the transformation object using the transformation factor.

[0006] Another aspect of an embodiment of the present specification provides a privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing method, wherein a first participant owns a private transformation factor and a second participant owns a private transformation object, and the method is executed by the second participant, and includes: collaborating with the first participant to iteratively transform the transformation object based on multiple decomposition factors in a transformation sequence in sequence, thereby obtaining a second slice of the transformation result; wherein, in the process of iteratively transforming the transformation object, the transformation involving public factors is completed by the participant alone, and the transformation involving private factors is completed by the participant based on a multi-party secure computing protocol; the transformation sequence includes multiple decomposition factors obtained by the first participant decomposing the transformation factor; the multiple decomposition factors include private factors and public factors held by the first participant, and the public factors are also held by the second participant; the transformation result is equal to the result of transforming the transformation object using the transformation factor.

[0007] Another aspect of an embodiment of the present specification provides a privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing system, wherein a first participant owns a private transformation factor and a second participant owns a private transformation object. The system is implemented by the second participant and includes: a second collaborative computing module, used to collaborate with the first participant to iteratively transform the transformation object based on multiple decomposition factors in a transformation sequence in sequence, thereby obtaining a second slice of the transformation result; wherein, in the process of iteratively transforming the transformation object, the transformation involving public factors is completed by the participant alone, and the transformation involving private factors is completed by the participant based on a multi-party secure computing protocol; the transformation sequence includes multiple decomposition factors obtained by the first participant decomposing the transformation factor; the multiple decomposition factors include private factors and public factors held by the first participant, and the public factors are also held by the second participant; the transformation result is equal to the result of transforming the transformation object using the transformation factor.

[0008] Another aspect of an embodiment of the present specification provides a privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing method, wherein a first participant owns a private first transformation factor, and a second participant owns a private first transformation object. The method is performed by the first participant, and includes: decomposing the first transformation factor to obtain a left factor, an intermediate factor, and a right factor; based on the right factor, obtaining a first slice of the right factor transformation result through a privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing method with the second participant based on the first transformation object; the second participant obtains a second slice of the right factor transformation result; based on the intermediate factor and the first slice of the right factor transformation result, obtaining a local slice of the intermediate factor transformation result; based on the intermediate factor, obtaining a local slice of the intermediate factor transformation result through a privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing method with the second participant based on the right factor transformation result The second participant obtains the second shard of the intermediate transformation result through a multi-party secure computing protocol; the second participant obtains the second shard of the intermediate transformation result; based on the left factor, the local shard of the intermediate factor transformation result and the first shard of the intermediate factor transformation result, the local shard of the left transformation result is obtained; based on the left factor, the second participant obtains the first shard of the left transformation result through a privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing method based on the second shard of the intermediate transformation result, and the second participant obtains the second shard of the left transformation result; based on the local shard of the left transformation result and the first shard of the left transformation result, the first shard of the first transformation result is obtained; the first transformation result is equal to the result of transforming the first transformation object by the first transformation factor.

[0009] Another aspect of an embodiment of the present specification provides a privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing method, wherein a first participant owns a private first transformation factor, and the first participant owns a left factor, an intermediate factor, and a right factor obtained by decomposing the first transformation factor; a second participant owns a private first transformation object, and the method is executed by the second participant, and includes: based on the first transformation object, and with the first participant based on the right factor, through a privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing method, obtaining a second slice of the right factor transformation result; the first participant obtains a first slice of the right factor transformation result; based on the second slice of the right factor transformation result, and with the first participant based on the intermediate factor, through a multi-party secure computing protocol, obtaining a second slice of the intermediate transformation result, and at the same time the first participant obtains the first slice of the intermediate transformation result; based on the second slice of the intermediate transformation result, and with the first participant based on the left factor, through a privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing method, obtaining a second slice of the left transformation result, and at the same time the first participant obtains the first slice of the left transformation result; based on the second slice of the left transformation result, obtaining a second slice of the first transformation result; the first transformation result is equal to the result of transforming the first transformation object by the first transformation factor.

[0010] Another aspect of an embodiment of the present specification provides a privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing device including at least one storage medium and at least one processor, wherein the at least one storage medium is used to store computer instructions; and the at least one processor is used to execute the computer instructions to implement a privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing method as described in any one of the above items.

[0011] Another aspect of an embodiment of this specification provides a computer-readable storage medium, which stores computer instructions. When a computer reads the computer instructions in the storage medium, the computer executes the privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing method as described in any one of the above items. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0012] This specification will be further described in the form of exemplary embodiments, which will be described in detail by way of the accompanying drawings. These embodiments are not restrictive, and in these embodiments, the same numerals represent the same structure, wherein.

[0013] Figure 1 is an exemplary application scenario diagram of a privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing system according to some embodiments of this specification;

[0014] Figure 2 is an exemplary interactive flow chart of a privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing method according to some embodiments of this specification;

[0015] Figure 3 is an exemplary interactive flow chart of a first privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing method according to some embodiments of this specification;

[0016] Figure 4 is an exemplary interactive flow chart of a second privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing method according to some embodiments of this specification;

[0017] Figure 5 is an exemplary interactive flow chart for implementing a multi-party secure computing protocol according to some embodiments of this specification;

[0018] Figure 6 is an exemplary module diagram of a first privacy-protected secure computing system according to some embodiments of this specification;

[0019] Figure 7 is an exemplary module diagram of a second privacy-protected secure computing system according to some embodiments of the present specification. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0020] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of this specification, the following is a brief introduction to the drawings required for the description of the embodiments. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some examples or embodiments of this specification. For ordinary technicians in this field, this specification can also be applied to other similar scenarios based on these drawings without creative work. Unless it is obvious from the language environment or otherwise explained, the same reference numerals in the figures represent the same structure or operation.

[0021] It should be understood that the "system", "device", "unit" and / or "module" used herein are a method for distinguishing different components, elements, parts, portions or assemblies at different levels. However, if other words can achieve the same purpose, the words can be replaced by other expressions.

[0022] As shown in this specification and claims, unless the context clearly indicates an exception, the words "a", "an", "an" and / or "the" do not refer to the singular and may also include the plural. Generally speaking, the terms "comprise" and "include" only indicate the inclusion of the steps and elements that have been clearly identified, and these steps and elements do not constitute an exclusive list. The method or device may also include other steps or elements.

[0023] Flowcharts are used in this specification to illustrate the operations performed by the system according to the embodiments of this specification. It should be understood that the preceding or following operations are not necessarily performed precisely in order. Instead, the steps may be processed in reverse order or simultaneously. At the same time, other operations may also be added to these processes, or one or more operations may be removed from these processes.

[0024] A typical application of multi-party secure computing is joint statistical analysis and machine learning of privacy-preserving multi-party data. Multi-party secure computing allows participating parties to calculate statistical results and machine learning results based on the joint data of all parties without exposing their original data. The function of multi-party secure computing can be a statistical operation function, a machine learning model, etc.

[0025] In machine learning, it is often necessary to calculate matrix multiplication by vector. For example, in a multi-party secure computation, one party holds private feature data, which can be represented as a matrix, and the other party holds private model parameters, such as a neural network model, a linear regression model, or a logistic regression model, etc. The model parameters can be represented as a vector or a matrix (for a neural network model, the model parameters can be represented as multiple vectors, each vector corresponding to the weight coefficient of a layer of neurons, or represented as a matrix). Both parties (or participants) can complete the training of the machine learning model or the machine model prediction based on the feature data based on the multi-party secure computation. In some embodiments, both parties can use the feature data and model parameters they hold, with the assistance of a third party (or an assisting party), to perform matrix multiplication of vectors based on the multi-party secure multiplication protocol, and then obtain the model prediction results. When performing calculations based on the multi-party secure multiplication protocol, the communication volume involved includes offline communication volume and online communication volume. Offline communication volume refers to the communication volume between the participating party and the third party, and online communication volume refers to the communication volume between the participating computing parties. Assume that the first party has an m×n matrix and the second party has an n-dimensional vector. In the calculation process based on the multi-party secure multiplication protocol, the offline communication volume of one round of the multi-party secure multiplication protocol is m log|A|, and the online communication volume is mn log|A|+m log|A|, where A is the set or group to which the matrix or vector element belongs, and log|A| represents the number of bits occupied when transmitting an element. Because there is an item mn in the communication volume, the communication volume generated in actual application will be very large, for example, m is 64, n is 5000, and mn=320000.

[0026] Therefore, some embodiments of this specification provide a privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing method and system, which can effectively reduce the communication overhead in the process of multi-party secure computing of matrix multiplication vector based on privacy protection. The technical solutions disclosed in the embodiments of this specification are described in detail below through the explanation of the accompanying drawings.

[0027] Figure 1 This is an exemplary application scenario diagram of a privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing system according to some embodiments of this specification.

[0028] like Figure 1 As shown, the privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing scenario 100 may include a computing device 110 , a computing device 120 , and a network 140 . The computing device 110 and the computing device 120 may be devices of participants in the multi-party secure computing.

[0029] The computing device may include various types of devices with computing capabilities, such as servers, personal computers, etc. In some embodiments, the server may be an independent server or a server group, which may be centralized or distributed. In some embodiments, the server may be regional or remote. In some embodiments, the server may be executed on a cloud platform. For example, the cloud platform may include one or any combination of a private cloud, a public cloud, a hybrid cloud, a community cloud, a decentralized cloud, an internal cloud, etc.

[0030] The network 140 connects the components of the system so that the components can communicate with each other. The network between the components in the system may include a wired network and / or a wireless network. For example, the network 140 may include a cable network, a wired network, a fiber optic network, a telecommunications network, an internal network, the Internet, a local area network (LAN), a wide area network (WAN), a wireless local area network (WLAN), a metropolitan area network (MAN), a public switched telephone network (PSTN), a Bluetooth network, a ZigBee network (ZigBee), a near field communication (NFC), a bus within a device, a line within a device, a cable connection, etc. or any combination thereof. The network connection between each two components may be in one of the above-mentioned ways, or in multiple ways.

[0031] In some embodiments, the computing scenario 100 may also include a semi-trusted third-party device 130, which may assist the computing devices of the participants in running a secure computing protocol. For example, the semi-trusted third-party device 130 may generate random numbers, intermediate result shards, calculate shard values, and distribute random numbers and / or shard values ​​to the computing device 110, the computing device 120, etc.

[0032] Figure 2 It is an exemplary interactive flow chart of a privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing method according to some embodiments of this specification, involving data interaction between multiple parties. In some embodiments, process 200 can be interactively executed by the processing devices of the participants (e.g., computing device 110 or computing device 120). For example, process 200 can be stored in a storage device (such as a built-in storage unit of the processing device or an external storage device) in the form of a program or instruction, and the program or instruction can implement process 200 when executed. Process 200 may include the following operations.

[0033] In some embodiments, process 200A can be executed by the first participant in the multi-party secure computing. Process 200B can be executed by the second participant. The first participant and the second participant can be any computing party participating in the computing (for example, computing device 110 or computing device 120). For the sake of convenience of explanation, in the embodiments of this specification, the first participant is mainly used as the step executor for explanation. At the same time, based on the first participant's execution description of the steps, the steps executed by the second participant are briefly described in the explanation process. In some embodiments, the first participant owns a private first transformation factor, and the second participant owns a private first transformation object. Private means that it is not open to users who do not have permission. For example, the private first transformation factor owned by the first participant and the private first transformation object owned by the second participant are not open to each other and the public.

[0034] Step 202A: decompose the first transformation factor to obtain a left factor, a middle factor, and a right factor.

[0035] The first transformation factor may refer to private data owned by the first party. In some embodiments, the first transformation factor may be feature data used by the first party for machine learning model training.

[0036] The left factor, the middle factor and the right factor refer to decomposition factors obtained by decomposing the first transformation factor in a certain manner. After the first transformation factor is decomposed, the left factor, the middle factor and the right factor are obtained in order from left to right.

[0037] In some embodiments, the first transformation factor may be a matrix, and the second transformation factor may be a matrix or a vector. Exemplarily, the first transformation factor may be a 0-1 matrix of m×n (i.e., m rows and n columns). The first transformation object is an n-dimensional vector, and the elements in the vector come from a commutative ring A containing 1. The groups and rings involved in this specification are mathematical concepts that satisfy their general definitions and properties in mathematics. For example, a group satisfies some additive properties such as additive closure, and a commutative ring is a group that satisfies some multiplication properties, such as multiplication closure, multiplication commutative law, etc.

[0038] There is the following theorem:

[0039] Suppose M is an mxn matrix on A, with k1 non-zero rows, k2 non-zero columns, and all non-zero elements are 1, then M can be decomposed as: M = PσQ.

[0040] Among them, the right factor Q is a lxn 0-1 matrix with k2 non-zero columns, one and only one 1 in each row, and the column coordinates of 1 in each row are monotonically non-decreasing. The column coordinates are monotonically non-decreasing, which means that the column coordinates of 1 in each row (or the serial number of the column) are the same or larger than the column coordinates of 1 in the previous row. For example, if the column coordinate of 1 in the first row is 1, then the column coordinate of 1 in the second row is greater than or equal to 1; if the column coordinate of 1 in the second row is 2, then the column coordinate of 1 in the third row is greater than or equal to 2.

[0041] The intermediate factor σ comes from the symmetry group S of order l l , which can be represented as an l×l matrix. A one-to-one mapping of a finite set to itself is called a permutation. The group consisting of all permutations of each element in a finite set of l elements is called an l-order symmetric group. A group can refer to an algebraic structure in mathematics that represents a binary operation that satisfies closure, associativity, has an identity element, and has an inverse element, including an Abelian group, a homomorphism, and a conjugation class. Among them, the multiplication symbol "× or *" (which can be omitted when there is no ambiguity) or the addition symbol "+" can usually be used as the symbol of the binary operation, but it should be noted that the binary operation is not necessarily equivalent to multiplication or addition in the four arithmetic operations. In some embodiments, the rows or columns in the l×l identity matrix (the elements on the diagonal are 1 and the remaining elements are 0) can be randomly swapped to obtain l! different matrices, and these l! matrices constitute the l-order symmetric group S. l , the intermediate factor σ is one of the matrices.

[0042] The left factor P is an mxl 0-1 matrix with k1 non-zero rows, one and only one 1 in each column, and the row coordinates of the 1 in each column are monotonically non-decreasing. The row coordinates are monotonically non-decreasing, which means that the row coordinates of the 1 in each column (or the serial number of the row) are equal to or larger than the row coordinates of the 1 in the previous column. For example, if the row coordinate of the 1 in the first column is 1, then the row coordinate of the 1 in the second column is greater than or equal to 1; if the row coordinate of the 1 in the second column is 2, then the row coordinate of the 1 in the third column is greater than or equal to 2.

[0043] Wherein, m, n, l, k1 and k2 are positive integers.

[0044] In some embodiments, the processing device of the first participant may decompose the first transformation factor to obtain a left factor, an intermediate factor, and a right factor.

[0045] Step 204A, based on the right factor, the second participant obtains a first slice of the right factor transformation result through a first privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing method based on the first transformation object; the second participant obtains a second slice of the right factor transformation result.

[0046] The first transformation object is the private data owned by the second party. In some embodiments, the first transformation object may be a model parameter of a machine learning model owned by the second party.

[0047] In some embodiments, the first transformation factor is an m×n 0-1 matrix, and correspondingly, the first transformation object is an n-dimensional vector, and the elements in the vector come from a 1-containing commutative ring A. A commutative ring may refer to a ring whose multiplication is commutative. A ring is a type of algebraic system that contains two operations (addition and multiplication). The multiplication of elements in a commutative ring satisfies the multiplication closure, the multiplication associative law, the multiplication distributive law, and the multiplication commutative law. For example, for a commutative ring A, any elements a and b therein satisfy ab=ba. A 1-containing commutative ring A means that the elements in A include 1.

[0048] In some embodiments, the first party may, based on the right factor, cooperate with the second party based on the first transformation object, based on Figure 3 The first privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing method shown in the figure calculates the first shard of the right factor transformation result; wherein the right factor is used as the transformation factor of the first privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing method, the first transformation object is used as the transformation object, and the second participant obtains the second shard of the right factor transformation result. The first shard and the second shard refer to data shards that exist in the form of sharing with the first participant and the second participant. For a detailed description of the first privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing method, please refer to this specification. Figure 3 The related descriptions will not be repeated here.

[0049] Correspondingly, the second participant can obtain a second slice of the right factor transformation result by executing step 204B.

[0050] Step 204B, based on the first transformation object, the first participant obtains the second shard of the right factor transformation result through the first privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing method based on the right factor; the first participant obtains the first shard of the right factor transformation result.

[0051] For a detailed description of the calculation process, see Figure 3 The related descriptions will not be repeated here.

[0052] In some embodiments, the first transformation object may be represented by X, and the right factor transformation result may be represented as y=QX.

[0053] Where y represents the right factor transformation result, Q is the right factor, and X is the first transformation vector. Then the first slice of the right factor transformation result can be expressed as y1=(QX)1, the second slice of the right factor transformation result can be expressed as y2=(QX)2, and the right factor transformation result y=y1+y2.

[0054] Step 206A: Obtain a local slice of the intermediate factor transformation result based on the intermediate factor and the first slice of the right factor transformation result.

[0055] In some embodiments, the processing device (first participant) may calculate the intermediate factor and the first slice of the right factor transformation result to obtain a local slice of the intermediate factor transformation result. The calculation method may be to apply the intermediate factor to the first slice of the right factor transformation result. Applying is an abstract generalization of certain operations or processing methods. For example, applying may be to multiply the intermediate factor by the first slice of the right factor transformation result, or other operations, which are not limited in this embodiment.

[0056] In some embodiments, according to the calculation order from right to left, the intermediate factor transformation result can be expressed as Z=σy.

[0057] Among them, Z represents the result of the intermediate factor transformation, σ represents the intermediate factor, and y represents the result of the right factor transformation.

[0058] Substituting y=y1+y2 into it, we can obtain Z=σ(y1+y2)=σy1+σy2.

[0059] Among them, σ is locally owned by the first participant, and y1 is the first slice of the right factor transformation result owned by the first participant. Therefore, σy1 can be calculated by the first participant locally, that is, the local slice of the intermediate factor transformation result.

[0060] Step 208A, based on the intermediate factor, the second participant obtains the first shard of the intermediate transformation result through a multi-party secure computation protocol based on the second shard of the right factor transformation result.

[0061] As described in the above embodiment, the intermediate transformation result can be expressed as σy=σy1+σy2, where σy1 can be directly calculated by the first participant locally, and σy2 can be calculated by the first participant based on the intermediate factor and the second shard of the right factor change result of the second participant through a multi-party secure computing protocol.

[0062] In some embodiments, the first party can, based on a multi-party secure computation protocol, apply the intermediate factor to the second slice of the right factor transformation result to obtain the first slice (σy2)1 of the intermediate transformation result; the second party can obtain the second slice (σy2)2 of the intermediate transformation result by executing step 208B.

[0063] Step 208B, based on the second shard of the right factor transformation result, the first participant obtains the second shard of the intermediate transformation result through a multi-party secure computing protocol based on the intermediate factor.

[0064] In some embodiments, the slice σy2 of the intermediate transformation result obtained by the collaborative calculation of the first participant and the second participant can be expressed in a shared form as σy2=(σy2)1+(σy2)2. Among them, the private intermediate factor σ of the first participant is used as the input data g of the multi-party secure computing protocol, and the second slice y2 of the right factor transformation result privately obtained by the second participant is used as the input data a of the multi-party secure computing protocol. For a detailed description of the multi-party secure computing protocol, please refer to this specification. Figure 5 The related descriptions will not be repeated here.

[0065] Step 210A, obtaining a local slice of the left transformation result based on the left factor, the local slice of the intermediate factor transformation result, and the first slice of the intermediate factor transformation result.

[0066] When the transformation of the first transformation factor to the first transformation object can be expressed as MX=PσQX, through the steps in the above embodiments, σQX has been calculated, that is, σQX=σy=σ(y1+y2)=σy1+(σy2)1+(σy2)2, where the first participant holds σy1, (σy2)1, and the second participant holds (σy2)2.

[0067] Applying the left factor to the calculated σQX can obtain the left transformation result, such as,

[0068] PσQX=P(σy1+(σy2)1+(σy2)2)=P(σy1+(σy2)1)+P(σy2)2

[0069] Among them, the left factor is P, the local slice of the intermediate factor transformation result is σy1, and the first slice of the intermediate factor transformation result is (σy2)1, all of which are owned by the first participant. Therefore, the first participant can directly calculate P(σy1+(σy2)1) locally, that is, the local slice of the left transformation result.

[0070] Step 212A, based on the left factor, together with the second participant, based on the second slice of the intermediate transformation result, obtains the first slice of the left transformation result through a second privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing method.

[0071] In some embodiments, the left transformation result is P(σy1+(σy2)1)+P(σy2)2, where P(σy1+(σy2)1) is a local slice of the left transformation result, which can be calculated. In P(σy2)2, P is the left factor, which is held by the first party; (σy2)2 is the second slice of the intermediate transformation result, which is held by the second party. Each of them will not disclose it to the other party. Therefore, part of the left transformation result P(σy2)2 needs to be collaboratively calculated by the first party and the second party based on a multi-party secure computing protocol.

[0072] In some embodiments, the P(σy2)2 portion of the left transform result may be expressed as P(σy2)2=(P(σy2)2)1+(P(σy2)2)2.

[0073] Among them, (P(σy2)2)1 is the first slice of the left transformation result, which is held by the first participant; (P(σy2)2)2 is the second slice of the left transformation result, which is held by the second participant.

[0074] In some embodiments, 9p9σy2)2)1 can be calculated by the first participant based on the left factor and the second participant based on the second slice of the intermediate transformation result through a second privacy-preserving multi-party secure computation method. (P9σy2)2)2 can be calculated by the second participant by executing step 212B.

[0075] Step 212B, based on the second shard of the intermediate transformation result, the first participant obtains the second shard of the left transformation result through a second privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing method based on the left factor.

[0076] When executing the second privacy-preserving multi-party secure computation method, the left factor is used as the transformation factor, and the second slice of the intermediate transformation result is used as the transformation object. For a detailed description of the second privacy-preserving multi-party secure computation method, please refer to Figure 4 The related descriptions will not be repeated here.

[0077] Step 214A, obtaining a first slice of a first transformation result based on the local slice of the left transformation result and the first slice of the left transformation result; the first transformation result is equal to the result of transforming the first transformation object by the first transformation factor.

[0078] Exemplarily, following the example in the above steps, the first slice of the first transformation result can be expressed as P(σy1+(σy2)1)+(P(σy2)2)1; the second slice of the first transformation result can be expressed as (P(σy2)2)2, which is obtained by the second participant.

[0079] In some embodiments, the first participant may add the local slice of the left transformation result and the first slice of the left transformation result to obtain the first slice of the first transformation result P(σy1+(σy2)1)+(P(σy2)2)1.

[0080] In some embodiments, the second participant may obtain a second fragment of the first transformation result by executing step 214B.

[0081] Step 214B: obtaining a second slice of the first transformation result based on the second slice of the left transformation result.

[0082] In some embodiments, the second participant may directly use the second slice of the left transformation result as the first slice of the first transformation result.

[0083] Figure 3 It is an exemplary interactive flow chart of the first privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing method shown in some embodiments of this specification, involving data interaction between multiple parties. In some embodiments, process 300 can be executed by a processing device (e.g., computing device 110 or computing device 120). For example, process 300 can be stored in a storage device (such as a built-in storage unit of the processing device or an external storage device) in the form of a program or instruction, and the program or instruction can implement process 300 when executed. Process 300 may include the following operations.

[0084] In some embodiments, when the first participant has a private transformation factor and the second participant has a private transformation object, the first participant can calculate the transformation result in the manner of step 300A described in the following embodiment and the second participant can calculate the transformation result in the manner of step 300B described in the following embodiment. The transformation result is equal to the result of transforming the transformation object using the transformation factor. The transformation can be understood to be calculated based on the transformation factor and the transformation object, and the calculation method can include but is not limited to four arithmetic operations, for example, the transformation can be matrix multiplication.

[0085] In some embodiments, the transformation factor may be obtained by decomposing the first transformation factor, that is, the transformation factor may be a part of the decomposition result of the first transformation factor. For more information about the first transformation factor, see Figure 2 In some embodiments, the transformation factor may be a right factor Q obtained by decomposing the first transformation factor, and the transformation object may be the first transformation object X.

[0086] Step 302A, decomposing the transformation factor to obtain a transformation sequence including multiple decomposition factors; the multiple decomposition factors include private factors and public factors, and the public factors are simultaneously held by the second participant.

[0087] The decomposition factor may refer to a decomposition item obtained by decomposing the transformation factor. In some embodiments, the multiple decomposition factors may include private factors and public factors. The private factor refers to a factor held only by the first participant, and the public factor may be held by the second participant in addition to the first participant. Exemplarily, when the transformation factor is represented by a matrix, it may be decomposed into a form of multiplication of multiple matrices, and the multiple matrices obtained by the decomposition are the decomposition factors.

[0088] In some embodiments, the first participant may decompose the transformation factor according to a preset decomposition rule. Exemplarily, a result of decomposing the transformation factor may be as follows.

[0089] When the first party has the transformation factors, such as the matrix Q, it can be decomposed according to Lemma 1.

[0090] Lemma 1: There exists σ1∈S n ,σ2∈S l , so that the transformation factor Q can be decomposed into the following form.

[0091] Q=∫σ2Jδσ1

[0092] Among them, ∫, σ2, J, δ, and σ1 respectively represent multiple decomposition factors obtained after decomposition, which are the first decomposition factor σ1, the second decomposition factor δ, the third decomposition factor J, the fourth decomposition factor σ2, and the fifth decomposition factor ∫ in order from right to left.

[0093] Among them, S n , S l They represent the n-order symmetry group and the l-order symmetry group respectively. For the definition of symmetry group, please refer to Figure 2 The relevant description of is not repeated here. The first decomposition factor σ1 can be represented as an n×n matrix, and the fourth decomposition factor σ2 can be represented as an l×l matrix. The third factor represents the k2×k2 identity matrix, the second factorization factor

[0094] Among them, the second decomposition factor δ, the third decomposition factor J and the fifth decomposition factor ∫ will not change with the change of Q, that is, these decomposition factors will not carry the information of the transformation factor Q, so they can be shared with the second participant, and these factors can also be called public factors. The first decomposition factor σ1 and the fourth decomposition factor σ2 change with the change of Q. These factors will carry the information of the transformation factor Q, so they are private to the first participant.

[0095] After decomposing the transformation factors, the first participant can cooperate with the second participant based on the multiple decomposition factors obtained by the decomposition to iteratively transform the transformation object based on the multiple decomposition factors in the transformation sequence in turn, thereby obtaining a first slice of the transformation result, and the second participant obtains a second slice of the transformation result. The transformation result is equal to the result of transforming the transformation object using the transformation factors.

[0096] Among them, in the process of iterative transformation of the transformation object, the transformation involving public factors is completed by the participants alone, and the transformation involving private factors is completed by the participants based on the multi-party secure computing protocol.

[0097] In some embodiments, the transformation sequence may include the five decomposition factors in the above example. Exemplarily, the process of sequentially transforming the transformation object based on multiple decomposition factors may be as shown in the following embodiment.

[0098] The first decomposition factor is a private factor, and the first participant can calculate and obtain the first fragment of the first iterative transformation result by executing step 304A.

[0099] Step 304A, based on the first decomposition factor, together with the second participant, based on the transformation object, through a multi-party secure computing protocol, obtain a first fragment of the first iterative transformation result.

[0100] The first iterative transformation result may refer to a result obtained by applying the first decomposition factor to the transformation object.

[0101] In some embodiments, the first participant may collaboratively calculate with the second participant based on the transformation object X based on the first decomposition factor σ1 through a multi-party security protocol to obtain a first iterative transformation result. The first iterative transformation result may exist between the first participant and the second participant in the form of and sharing. The first slice of the first iterative transformation result is held by the first participant, and the second slice of the first iterative transformation result is held by the second participant.

[0102] In some embodiments, the second participant may obtain a second slice of the first iterative transformation result by executing step 304B.

[0103] Step 304B: Based on the transformation object, the first participant obtains a second fragment of the first iterative transformation result through a multi-party secure computing protocol based on the first decomposition factor.

[0104] In some embodiments, the transformation may be a matrix multiplication. Therefore, the first iterative transformation result may be expressed as σ1X=(σ1X)1+(σ1X)2, where (σ1X)1 is the first slice of the first iterative transformation result held by the first participant, and (σ1X)2 is the second slice of the first iterative transformation result held by the second participant.

[0105] When executing the multi-party secure computation protocol in the current iterative transformation process, the first decomposition factor σ1 is used as the input data g, and the transformation object X is used as the input data a. For more information about the multi-party secure computation protocol, please refer to Figure 5 The related descriptions will not be repeated here.

[0106] Step 306A: Obtain a first slice of a second iterative transformation result based on the second decomposition factor and the first slice of the first iterative transformation result.

[0107] In some embodiments, the second decomposition factor is an n×n matrix, with diagonal elements being 1, elements in the i+1th row and ith column being -1, and the remaining elements being 0, where i is an integer from 1 to (n-1).

[0108] The second iterative transformation result may refer to a result obtained by applying the second decomposition factor δ to the first iterative transformation result. The second iterative transformation result may be expressed as δσ1X=δ((σ1X)1+(σ1X)2).

[0109] Further expansion of it can be obtained as δσ1X=δ(σ1X)1+δ(σ1X)2, where δ is a common factor that can be held by both the first and second parties. Therefore, δ(σ1X)1 can be directly calculated locally by the first party, that is, the first slice of the second iterative transformation result; the second slice of the second iterative transformation result δ(σ1X)2 can be calculated locally by the second party based on the second decomposition factor and the second slice of the first iterative transformation result.

[0110] In some embodiments, the second participant may obtain a second fragment of the second iteration result by executing step 306B.

[0111] Step 306B: Obtain a second slice of the second iterative transformation result based on the second decomposition factor and the second slice of the first iterative transformation result.

[0112] The second slice of the second iterative transformation result can be directly calculated by the second participant locally.

[0113] Step 308A: Obtain a first slice of a third iterative transformation result based on the third decomposition factor and the first slice of the second iterative transformation result.

[0114] In some embodiments, the third decomposition factor is a l×n matrix, and the diagonal elements of the matrix block composed of the common elements of the first k2 rows and the first k2 columns are 1, and the remaining elements are 0.

[0115] The third iterative transformation result may refer to the result of applying the third decomposition factor J to the second iterative transformation result. In some embodiments, the third iterative transformation result may be expressed as Jδσ1X=J(δ(σ1X)1+δ(σ1X)2)=Jδ(σ1X)1+Jδ(σ1X)2.

[0116] The third decomposition factor J is a common factor, which can be held by both the first and second parties. Then the first slice of the third iterative transformation result represented by Jδ(σ1X)1 in the above example can be directly calculated by the first party based on the third decomposition factor and the first slice of the second iterative transformation result; the second slice of the third iterative transformation result represented by Jδ(σ1X)2 can be directly calculated by the second party based on the third decomposition factor and the second slice of the second iterative transformation result.

[0117] Specifically, the second participant may obtain the second slice of the third iterative transformation result by executing step 308B.

[0118] Step 308B: obtaining a second slice of the third iterative transformation result based on the third decomposition factor and the second slice of the second iterative transformation result.

[0119] Step 310A: obtaining a local slice of a fourth iterative transformation result based on the fourth decomposition factor and the first slice of the third iterative transformation result.

[0120] In some embodiments, the fourth decomposition factor is from a symmetry group of order l, represented by an l×l matrix.

[0121] The fourth iterative transformation result may refer to a result of applying the fourth decomposition factor to the third iterative transformation result.

[0122] In some embodiments, since the fourth decomposition factor σ2 is a private factor held by the first participant, the second participant cannot obtain relevant information about the fourth decomposition factor σ2. Therefore, the fourth decomposition factor σ2 acting on the calculation process of the third iterative transformation result involves collaborative calculation with the second participant. Specifically, the fourth iterative transformation result can be expressed in the following form.

[0123] σ2Jδσ1X=σ2(Jδ(σ1X)1+Jδ(σ1X)2)=σ2Jδ(σ1X)1+σ2Jδ(σ1X)2

[0124] Among them, 2 is the fourth decomposition factor, which is held by the first participant, and Jδ(σ1X)1 is the first fragment of the third iterative transformation result, which is also held by the first participant.

[0125] In some embodiments, the first participant may calculate the local slice σ2Jδ(σ1X)1 of the fourth iterative transformation result locally directly based on the fourth decomposition factor and the first slice of the third iterative transformation result.

[0126] Step 312A, based on the fourth decomposition factor, together with the second participant based on the second fragment of the third iterative transformation result, obtain the first fragment of the fourth iterative transformation result through a multi-party secure computing protocol.

[0127] Based on the description in step 310A, it can be known that the fourth iterative transformation result can be composed of two parts, one part is the local slice of the fourth iterative transformation result obtained by the first participant directly calculated locally, and the other part is obtained by the first participant and the second participant collaboratively calculated, and the other part can be expressed as σ2Jδ(σ1X)2.

[0128] Among them, the fourth decomposition factor σ2 is held by the first participant, and the second fragment Jδ(σ1X)2 of the third iterative transformation result is held by the second participant. Therefore, the first participant and the second participant can calculate the other part of the fourth iterative transformation result based on the data they own and the multi-party secure computing protocol. The calculation result can still exist between the first participant and the second participant in the form of sharing, as shown below.

[0129] σ2Jδ(σ1X)2=(σ2Jδ(σ1X)2)1+(σ2Jδ(σ1X)2)2

[0130] Among them, (σ2Jδ(σ1X)2)1 represents the first slice of the fourth iterative transformation result, which is held by the first participant; (σ2Jδ(σ1X)2)2 represents the second slice of the fourth iterative transformation result, which is held by the second participant.

[0131] In some embodiments, the second participant may obtain a second slice of the fourth iterative transformation result by executing step 312B.

[0132] Step 312B, based on the second fragment of the third iterative transformation result, the first participant obtains the second fragment of the fourth iterative transformation result through a multi-party secure computing protocol based on the fourth decomposition factor.

[0133] In the current round of iterative transformation, when executing the multi-party secure computation protocol, the fourth decomposition factor is used as the input data g, and the second fragment of the third iterative transformation result is used as the input data a. For more information about the multi-party secure computation protocol, see Figure 5 The related descriptions will not be repeated here.

[0134] Step 314A: obtaining a first slice of the transformation result based on the fifth decomposition factor, the local slice of the fourth iterative transformation result, and the first slice of the fourth iterative transformation result.

[0135] In some embodiments, the fifth decomposition factor is an l×l matrix, wherein the diagonal elements and the elements below the diagonal are 1, and the remaining elements are 0.

[0136] Continuing with the description in the above steps, the transformation result can be expressed as QX = ∫σ2Jδσ1X. Substituting the fourth iterative transformation result obtained in the above steps into it, we can get: QX = ∫σ2Jδσ1X = ∫(σ2Jδ(σ1X)1+σ2Jδ(σ1X)2), and expanding it to get: QX = ∫σ2Jδ(σ1X)1+∫σ2Jδ(σ1X)2 = ∫σ2Jδ(σ1X)1+∫(σ2Jδ(σ1X)2)1+∫(σ2Jδ(σ1X)2)2.

[0137] The fifth decomposition factor ∫ is a public factor, which can be held by both the first and second parties. The local slice of the fourth iterative transformation result is σ2Jδ(σ1X)1, and the first slice of the fourth iterative transformation result is (σ2Jδ(σ1X)2)1. The first party can calculate the fifth decomposition factor with the local slice of the fourth iterative transformation result and the first slice of the fourth iterative transformation result to obtain the first slice of the transformation result ∫σ2Jδ(σ1X)1+∫(σ2Jδ(σ1X)2)1.

[0138] In some embodiments, the second participant may obtain a second fragment of the transformation result by executing step 314B.

[0139] Step 314B: obtaining a second slice of the transformation result based on the fifth decomposition factor and the second slice of the fourth iterative transformation result.

[0140] In some embodiments, the second participant may apply the fifth decomposition factor to the second slice of the fourth iterative transformation result to obtain the second slice of the transformation result ∫(σ2Jδ(σ1X)2)2.

[0141] In some embodiments of the present specification, the calculation results of the transformation factor Q and the transformation object X calculated by the privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing method can be expressed as QX=∫σ2Jδ(σ1X)1+∫(σ2Jδ(σ1X)2)1+∫(σ2Jδ(σ1X)2)2=∫σ2Jδσ1X.

[0142] Figure 4 It is an exemplary interactive flow chart of the second privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing method shown in some embodiments of this specification, involving data interaction between multiple parties. In some embodiments, process 400 can be executed by a processing device (e.g., device 110 or device 120). For example, process 400 can be stored in a storage device (such as a built-in storage unit of the processing device or an external storage device) in the form of a program or instruction, and the program or instruction can implement process 400 when executed. Process 400 may include the following operations.

[0143] In some embodiments, the transformation factor may be a left factor P obtained by decomposing the first transformation factor, and the transformation object may be a second slice of the intermediate transformation result obtained by the second participant in process 300 .

[0144] In some embodiments, the first participant may also decompose the transformation factor to obtain multiple decomposition factors.

[0145] Lemma 2: There exists σ1∈S l ,σ2∈S m , so that the transformation factor P can be decomposed into the following form.

[0146] P=σ2δKσ1∫

[0147] Among them, σ2, δ, K, σ1, and ∫ respectively represent multiple decomposition factors obtained after decomposition, which are the first decomposition factor ∫, the second decomposition factor σ1, the third decomposition factor K, the fourth decomposition factor δ, and the fifth decomposition factor σ2 in order from right to left.

[0148] Among them, S l , S m They represent the l-order symmetry group and the m-order symmetry group respectively, where the second decomposition factor σ1 can be represented as an l×l matrix, and the fifth decomposition factor σ2 can be represented as an m×m matrix. The third factor represents the k1×k1 unit matrix, the fourth factorization factor Among them, the first decomposition factor ∫, the third decomposition factor K and the fourth decomposition factor δ are public factors, and the second decomposition factor σ1 and the fifth decomposition factor σ2 are private factors.

[0149] The first participant may execute process 400A to obtain a first slice of the transformation result; the second participant may execute process 400B to obtain a second slice of the transformation result. The transformation result may be a result of transforming the transformation object by the transformation factor. In some embodiments, the transformation may be a matrix multiplication.

[0150] Step 401B: obtaining a first iterative transformation result based on the first decomposition factor and the transformation object.

[0151] The first decomposition factor is an l×l matrix, and the diagonal elements and the elements below the diagonal are 1, and the remaining elements are 0. The first decomposition factor is also ∫ in the above example. In some embodiments, since the first decomposition factor ∫ is a public factor and the transformation object X is held by the second participant, the second participant can directly calculate the first iterative transformation result as ∫X.

[0152] Step 402A, based on the second decomposition factor, together with the second participant, based on the first iterative transformation result, obtain a first fragment of the second iterative transformation result through a multi-party secure computing protocol.

[0153] In some embodiments, the second decomposition factor is from a symmetric group of order l, represented as an l×l matrix.

[0154] The second iterative transformation result may refer to the result of applying the second decomposition factor σ1 to the first iterative transformation result. In some embodiments, the second iterative transformation result may be expressed as σ1∫X.

[0155] The second iterative transformation result calculated by the first party and the second party based on the multi-party secure computation protocol can exist in the form of sum and sharing between the two parties, for example, σ1∫X=(σ1∫X)1+(σ1∫X)2, wherein the first party obtains the first slice (σ1∫X)1 of the second iterative transformation result, and the second party obtains the second slice (σ1∫X)2 of the second iterative transformation result.

[0156] In some embodiments, the second participant may obtain a second slice of the second iterative transformation result by executing step 402B.

[0157] Step 402B, based on the first iterative transformation result, obtain a second fragmentation of the second iterative transformation result through a multi-party secure computing protocol with the first participant based on the second decomposition factor.

[0158] In the current round of iterative transformation, when executing the multi-party secure computation protocol, the second decomposition factor is used as the input data g, and the first iterative transformation result is used as the input data a. For details about the multi-party secure computation protocol, please refer to Figure 5 The related descriptions will not be repeated here.

[0159] In some embodiments, the decomposition factors obtained by decomposing the transformation sequence may include 5 decomposition factors, wherein the second decomposition factor and the fifth decomposition factor are private factors, and the remaining decomposition factors are public factors. The 5 decomposition factors may be as shown above, that is, P = σ2δKσ1∫. The first participant may continue to obtain the first slice of the transformation result by executing steps 404A to 412A, and correspondingly, the second participant may continue to obtain the second slice of the transformation result by executing steps 404B to 412B.

[0160] Step 404A: obtaining a first slice of a third iterative transformation result based on the third decomposition factor and the first slice of the second iterative transformation result.

[0161] In some embodiments, the third decomposition factor is an m×l matrix, and the diagonal elements of the matrix block composed of the common elements of the inverse k1 rows and the inverse k1 columns are 1, and the remaining elements are 0.

[0162] The third iterative transformation result may refer to a result of applying the third decomposition factor K to the second iterative transformation result.

[0163] In some embodiments, the third iterative transformation result can be expressed as Kσ1∫X=K((σ1∫X)1+(σ1∫X)2), which can be decomposed into Kσ1∫X=K(σ1∫X)1+K(σ1∫X)2.

[0164] Since the third decomposition factor K is a common factor, the first participant and the second participant can directly calculate the slices of the third iterative transformation result based on their respective data. The first calculation party calculates the first slice K(σ1∫X)1 of the third iterative transformation result, and the second participant calculates the second slice K(σ1∫K)2 of the third iterative transformation result.

[0165] In some embodiments, the second participant may obtain a second slice of the third iterative transformation result by executing step 404B.

[0166] Step 404B: obtaining a second slice of the third iterative transformation result based on the third decomposition factor and the second slice of the second iterative transformation result.

[0167] Step 406A: Obtain a first slice of a fourth iterative transformation result based on the fourth decomposition factor and the first slice of the third iterative transformation result.

[0168] In some embodiments, the fourth decomposition factor is an m×m matrix, the diagonal elements are 1, the element in the i+1th row and ith column is -1, and the remaining elements are 0, and i is an integer from 1 to (m-1).

[0169] The fourth iterative transformation result may refer to a result of applying the fourth decomposition factor to the third iterative transformation result.

[0170] In some embodiments, the fourth iterative transformation result can be expressed as δKσ1∫X. Expanding it, that is, substituting the first slice of the third iterative transformation result and the second slice of the third iterative transformation result into it, we can obtain δKσ1∫X=δ(K(σ1∫X)1+K(σ1∫X)2)=δK(σ1∫X)1+δK(σ1∫X)2.

[0171] δK(σ1∫X)1 is the first slice of the fourth iterative transformation result, and δK(σ1∫X)2 is the second slice of the fourth iterative transformation result. Since the fourth decomposition factor δ is a common factor, both the first party and the second party can hold it. Therefore, both the first party and the second party can calculate the corresponding slice of the fourth iterative result locally.

[0172] In some embodiments, the second participant may obtain a second slice of the fourth iterative transformation result by executing step 406B.

[0173] Step 406B: obtaining a second slice of a fourth iterative transformation result based on the fourth decomposition factor and the second slice of the third iterative transformation result.

[0174] Step 408A: obtaining a local slice of the fifth iterative transformation result based on the fifth decomposition factor and the first slice of the fourth iterative transformation result.

[0175] In some embodiments, the fifth decomposition factor is a private factor, which is held by the first party, and the second party is not aware of the fifth decomposition factor.

[0176] In some embodiments, the fifth decomposition factor is from a symmetric group of order m, represented as an m×m matrix.

[0177] The fifth iterative transformation result may refer to a result of applying the fifth decomposition factor to the fourth iterative transformation result.

[0178] For example, the fifth decomposition factor is σ2, the fourth iterative transformation result is δKσ1∫X, and the fifth iterative transformation result can be expressed as σ2δKσ1∫X. Substituting the slices of the fourth iterative result into it, we can get:

[0179] σ2δKσ1∫X=σ2(δK(σ1∫X)1+δK(σ1∫X)2)=σ2δK(σ1∫X)1+σ2δK(σ1∫X)2

[0180] Among them, the fifth decomposition factor σ2 is a private factor, and the first slice σ2δK(σ1∫X)1 of the fourth iterative transformation result is held by the first participant. Therefore, σ2δK(σ1∫X)1 can be directly calculated by the first participant locally. σ2δK(σ1∫X)1 is the local slice of the fifth iterative transformation result. σ2δK(σ1∫X)2 is another part of the fifth iterative transformation result, which exists in the first participant and the second participant in the form of sharing. The calculation method can be seen in the description of step 410A later.

[0181] Step 410A, based on the fifth decomposition factor, together with the second participant based on the second fragment of the fourth iterative transformation result, obtain the first fragment of the fifth iterative transformation result through a multi-party secure computing protocol, and the second participant obtains the second fragment of the fifth iterative transformation result.

[0182] As mentioned above, another part of the fifth iterative transformation result can be expressed as σ2δK(σ1∫X)2, where the fifth decomposition factor σ2 is held by the first participant, and the second fragment δK(σ1∫X)2 of the fourth iterative transformation result is held by the second participant. The first participant and the second participant can perform calculations based on the multi-party secure computation protocol. At this time, the fifth decomposition factor is used as input data g, and the second fragment of the fourth iterative transformation result is used as input data a. For more information about the multi-party secure computation protocol, please refer to Figure 5 The relevant description will not be repeated here.

[0183] In some embodiments, the calculation result of the fifth decomposition factor σ2 and the second slice δK(σ1∫X)2 of the fourth iterative transformation result can be expressed as σ2δK(σ1∫X)2=(σ2δK(σ1∫X)2)1+(σ2δK(σ1∫X)2)2.

[0184] Among them, (σ2δK(σ1∫X)2)1 represents the first slice of the fifth iterative transformation result, which is obtained by the first participant; (σ2δK(σ1∫X)2)2 represents the second slice of the fifth iterative transformation result, which is obtained by the second participant.

[0185] In some embodiments, the second participant may obtain a second slice of the fifth iterative transformation result by executing step 410B.

[0186] Step 410B, based on the second fragment of the fourth iterative transformation result, the first participant obtains the second fragment of the fifth iterative transformation result through a multi-party secure computing protocol based on the fifth decomposition factor.

[0187] Step 412A: Based on the local slice of the fifth iterative transformation result and the first slice of the fifth iterative transformation result, obtain the first slice of the transformation result.

[0188] In some embodiments, the first participant may obtain the first slice of the transformation result by summing the local slice of the fifth iterative transformation result and the first slice of the fifth iterative transformation result.

[0189] Exemplarily, the first slice of the transformation result can be expressed as σ2δK(σ1∫X)1+(σ2δK(σ1∫X)2)1, which is held by the first party.

[0190] Correspondingly, the second participant can obtain the second fragment of the transformation result by executing step 412B.

[0191] Step 412B: obtaining a second slice of the transformation result based on the second slice of the fifth iterative transformation result.

[0192] In some embodiments, the second participant may directly use the second slice (σ2δK(σ1∫X)2)2 of the fifth iterative transformation result as the second slice of the transformation result.

[0193] In some embodiments of the present specification, the transformation factor P and the transformation object The product of can be expressed as It may be the second slice of the intermediate transformation result in process 200 .

[0194] In the above-mentioned embodiment, the first participant and the second participant execute the multi-party secure computation protocol multiple times to obtain the result and the shared shard. The specific content of the multi-party secure computation protocol in some embodiments is described in detail below.

[0195] Figure 5 It is an exemplary interactive flow chart for implementing a multi-party secure computing protocol according to some embodiments of this specification, involving data interaction between multiple parties. In some embodiments, process 500 can be executed by a processing device (e.g., computing device 110 or computing device 120). For example, process 500 can be stored in a storage device (e.g., a built-in storage unit of a processing device or an external storage device) in the form of a program or instruction, and the program or instruction can implement process 500 when executed. Process 500 may include the following operations.

[0196] In some embodiments, when the transformation (calculation) of private factors is involved in the process of calculating the transformation result, the first party may implement the multi-party secure computation protocol by following the operations shown in step 500A and the second party may implement the multi-party secure computation protocol by following the operations shown in step 500B.

[0197] In some embodiments, the multi-party secure computing protocol may be a G-module interactive computing protocol. The participants in the G-module interactive computing protocol include two parties, one of which has input data g belonging to a finite group G, and the other party has input data a belonging to a finite G-module group, or an Abelian group. There exists a mapping of the action of the finite group G on the finite G-module group to the finite G-module group that satisfies the distribution ratio. The computing task of the G-module interactive computing protocol is that the two parties collaboratively calculate the action of g on a, and the action result is stored in the two parties in the form of and shared shards.

[0198] It should be noted that the effect of the finite group G on the finite G-module group can be interpreted as that there is a mapping G×A→A, then the image of (g, a) under the mapping is called the effect of g on a, denoted as ga. In some embodiments, the effect may be multiplication, such as matrix multiplication. The input data g and the input data a may be a single value, or a matrix or a vector. When the input data g and the input data a are matrices or vectors, the input data g belonging to the finite group G means that the elements in g belong to the finite group G, and the input data a belonging to the finite G-module group means that the elements in a belong to the finite G-module group.

[0199] In some embodiments, the participants of the multi-party secure computation protocol may be the first participant and the second participant in this specification. The input data g may correspond to the private factor or the intermediate factor in the embodiment of this specification, and the input data a may correspond to the transformation object or the result of iterative transformation in the embodiment of this specification, or may be the second slice of the right factor transformation result.

[0200] Step 502A, obtain the random decomposition factor and the first slice of the first intermediate result.

[0201] Step 502B, obtain the random object and the second slice of the first intermediate result.

[0202] In some embodiments, the first shard of the first intermediate result of the first party and the second shard of the first intermediate result of the second party are a sum of shared shards of the result of transforming the random object based on the random decomposition factor.

[0203] In some embodiments, the random decomposition factor is a random matrix h whose elements belong to a finite group G, corresponding to the aforementioned input data g, and the random object is a random vector e whose elements belong to a commutative ring A containing 1, wherein the commutative ring A satisfies the properties of a finite G-module group, and thus the random vector e corresponds to the aforementioned data a. In some embodiments, the random decomposition factor and the random object may be randomly generated by a third party (the third party may be a semi-trusted third-party device, for example, a third-party semi-trusted device 130). For example, the third party generates the elements in the random matrix h and the random vector e through a preset random number seed, and then obtains the random decomposition factor and the random object.

[0204] In some embodiments, the third party may calculate the product of the random decomposition factor h and the random object e to obtain a result of transforming the random object based on the random decomposition factor. The product result belongs to a finite G-module group. Further, the third party may decompose the product result to obtain a first slice of the first intermediate result and a second slice of the first intermediate result, and the two slices also belong to a finite G-module group.

[0205] Afterwards, the third party may send the random decomposition factor and the first shard of the first intermediate result to the first participant, and send the random object and the second shard of the first intermediate result to the second participant. With h representing the random decomposition factor and e representing the random object, the sum of the shards of the operation can be expressed as: d0+d1=he. Then, the third party sends the random decomposition factor h and the first shard d0 of the first intermediate result to the first participant; and sends the random object b and the second shard d1 of the first intermediate result to the second participant.

[0206] Since the elements of the random decomposition factor h belong to the finite group G, the elements of the first slice d0 of the first intermediate result, the random object e and the second slice d1 of the first intermediate result belong to the finite G-module group, assuming that the random decomposition factor h comes from the n-order symmetric group and the random object is an n-dimensional vector, the data transmission volume or communication volume in step 502A and step 502B is log|G|+3nlog|A|. |G| represents the number of elements in the G group, and |A| represents the number of elements in the commutative ring. Log can represent the logarithm operation with base 2, log|G| represents the number of bits required to transmit the data g, and log|A| represents the number of bits required to transmit the elements in the commutative ring A. For the n-order symmetric group, the number of elements is n!, so the communication volume can be written as logn! +3nlog|A|

[0207] In order to reduce the amount of data transmission in step 502, in some embodiments, the parties may generate random numbers based on a random number seed using a pseudo-random number algorithm. In the pseudo-random number algorithm, a set of pseudo-random data seeds need to be pre-set, and each party then generates a set of random numbers based on the preset random number seeds. When the same random number seed is input, the generated random number sequence is also the same. As an example, each party generates 5 random numbers based on the same random number seed, then the random numbers generated by each party correspond to the same, such as the first random number of one party is the same as the first random number of the other party.

[0208] Specifically, the first participant has the first random number seed and the third random number seed, the second participant has the second random number seed and the fourth random number seed, and the third party has the first to fourth random number seeds. In some embodiments, the first participant can generate multiple random numbers through the first random number seed as elements of the random matrix h, thereby obtaining random decomposition factors, and generate multiple random numbers through the preset third random number seed as elements in the first slice d0 of the first intermediate result, thereby obtaining the first slice d0 of the first intermediate result. The second participant can generate multiple random numbers through the second random number seed as elements of the random vector e, thereby obtaining a random object. The third party can generate h, e and d0 correspondingly through the first random number seed, the second random number seed and the third random number seed, and obtain the second slice d1 of the first intermediate result based on d1=he-d0, so the second participant can obtain the second slice d1 of the first intermediate result from the third party. At this time, the second participant holds the random object b and the second slice d1 of the first intermediate result, completing the distribution of random numbers and slices. In some alternative embodiments, the first shard d0 of the first intermediate result may be obtained by the first participant from a third party, and the second shard d1 of the first intermediate result may be generated by the second participant using the preset random object seed.

[0209] In the process of distributing random numbers and fragments using a pseudo-random number algorithm, only one party obtains the first fragment d0 of the first intermediate result or the second fragment d1 of the first intermediate result from a third party. Therefore, the transmission amount of step 502 is only nlog|A|, which can further reduce the system transmission overhead.

[0210] Step 504A, sending first transmission data to the second participant.

[0211] Step 504B: sending second transmission data to the first participant.

[0212] Step 506A, obtaining the second transmission data of the second participant.

[0213] Step 506B: Obtain the first transmission data of the first participant.

[0214] The first transmission data is obtained by performing a superposition transformation on the inverse of the random decomposition factor based on the private factor.

[0215] The private factor is the private data owned by the first participant, that is, the input data g. For example, the private factor can be the intermediate factor in process 200, the first factor and the fourth factor in process 300, or the second factor and the fifth factor in process 400. The random factor h comes from the same group as the private factor. The inverse of the random factor h can be expressed as h -1, then the first transmission data f can be obtained based on gh -1 Get, g is the private factor, the first transmission data f = gh -1 In some embodiments, the first party may send the first transmission data f to the other party via the network.

[0216] In some embodiments, the second transmission data may be obtained based on a difference between the random object and the transformed object, or based on a difference between the random object and a second slice of a result of a previous iterative transformation.

[0217] The second transmission data i is obtained based on ae, and the input data a is the second slice of the transformation object or the transformation result of the previous round of iteration. The random object e has the same dimension as the input data a.

[0218] Specifically, when the current transformation is the first round of iterative transformation, the second transmission data can be obtained based on the difference between the random object and the transformation object. When the current transformation is not the first round of iterative transformation, the second transmission data can be obtained based on the difference between the random object and the result of the previous round of iterative transformation or the second transmission data can be obtained based on the difference between the random object and the second slice of the result of the previous round of iterative transformation.

[0219] Exemplarily, in process 200, the second transmission data is the difference between the second slice of the right factor transformation result and e. In the first round of iterative transformation of process 300, the second transmission data can be expressed as i=Xe, where X is the transformation object. In the fourth round of iterative transformation of process 300, the second transmission data is the difference between the second slice of the third round of iterative transformation result and e. In the second round of iterative transformation of process 400, the second transmission data is the difference between the first round of iterative transformation result and e. In the fifth round of iterative transformation of process 400, the second transmission data is the difference between the second slice of the fourth round of iterative transformation result and e.

[0220] In some embodiments, the first participant may obtain the second transmission data from the second participant through the network, and execute steps 508A to 512A to obtain the first slice of ga. The second participant may obtain the first transmission data from the first participant through the network, and execute steps 510B and 512B to obtain the second slice of ga. In some embodiments, ga may also represent the iterative transformation result of the iterative transformation of process 200, process 300 or process 400 calling process 500. For example, ga may represent the result of the transformation of the second slice of the right factor transformation result by the intermediate factor in process 200, or the result of the transformation of the transformation object by the first decomposition factor in process 300, or the result of the transformation of the second slice of the third iterative transformation result by the fourth decomposition factor in process 300, or the result of the transformation of the first iterative transformation result by the second decomposition factor in process 400, or the result of the transformation of the second slice of the fourth iterative transformation result by the fifth decomposition factor in process 400.

[0221] Step 508A: transform the second transmission data based on the private factor to obtain a second intermediate transformation result.

[0222] In some embodiments, the transformation method may be to apply the private factor g to the second transmission data i to obtain a second intermediate transformation result. The second intermediate transformation result may be represented as gi.

[0223] Step 510A: transform the first slice of the first intermediate result based on the first transmission data to obtain a third intermediate transformation result.

[0224] In some embodiments, the transformation method may be to apply the first transmission data f to the first slice d0 of the first intermediate result to obtain a third intermediate transformation result. The third intermediate transformation result may be represented as fd0.

[0225] Step 512A: obtaining a first slice of the current round of iterative transformation results based on the second intermediate transformation result and the third intermediate transformation result.

[0226] In some embodiments, the first slice c0 of the current round of iterative transformation result can be represented by the sum of the second intermediate transformation result and the third intermediate transformation result. That is, the first slice c0 of the current round of iterative transformation result is obtained based on gi+fd0.

[0227] Step 510B: transform the second slice of the first intermediate result based on the first transmission data to obtain a fourth intermediate transformation result.

[0228] In some embodiments, the transformation method may be to apply the first transmission data f to the second slice d1 of the first intermediate result to obtain a fourth intermediate transformation result. The fourth intermediate transformation result may be represented as fd1.

[0229] Step 512B: Based on the fourth intermediate transformation result, obtain a second slice of the current round of iterative transformation result.

[0230] The second participant can obtain the second fragment c1 of the current round of iterative transformation result based on fd1, and (c0, c1) is the current round of iterative transformation result. The principle of this protocol can be expressed as:

[0231] ga=c0+c1=(gi+fd0)+fd1=g(ae)+gh -1 d0+gh -1 d1

[0232] =g(ae)+gh -1 he.

[0233] It can be seen from the above steps that during the execution of the multi-party secure computing protocol, when one party generates data, the data of the other party does not need to be involved. Therefore, full duplex can be achieved, that is, the two parties can send data to each other at the same time, reducing the number of interactions and reducing the impact of system delay. Taking the first round of iterative transformation in process 300 as an example, when the first participant sends the first transmission data to the second participant, the communication volume generated is logn! , and when the second participant sends the second transmission data to the first participant, the communication volume generated is nlog|A|. Therefore, the communication volume of the first round of iterative transformation implemented by the multi-party secure computing protocol in process 300 is logn! +2nlog|A|. By analogy, the communication volume generated by the intermediate iterative transformation process in process 200 can be calculated as logl! +2llog|A|. The communication volume of the fourth round of iterative transformation implemented by the multi-party secure computing protocol in process 300 is logl! +2llog|A|. The communication volume of the second round of iterative transformation implemented by the multi-party secure computing protocol in process 400 is logl! +2llog|A|. The communication volume of the fifth round of iterative transformation implemented by the multi-party secure computation protocol in process 400 is logm! +2mlog|A|.

[0234] Accordingly, it can be determined that the communication volume involved in process 300 is 2+1)log|A|+log1! +logn!, and the communication volume involved in process 400 is 2+1)log|A|+logm! +log1!. The communication volume involved in process 200 mainly includes the communication volume when calculating with the second participant based on the right factor, the middle factor and the left factor, wherein the communication volume when calculating with the second participant based on the right factor is the same as process 300; the communication volume when calculating based on the left factor and the transformation result of the second participant is the same as process 400, so the total communication volume in process 200 is 2(m+n+31)log|A|+logm! logn! +3log1!. It can be directly seen from the above communication volume that the communication volume in all communication processes does not contain mn items. Compared with the communication volume caused by multiplying two items, the communication volume required in the technical solution disclosed in the embodiment of this specification can be effectively reduced in actual application.

[0235] It should be noted that the above description of each process is only for example and explanation, and does not limit the scope of application of this specification. For those skilled in the art, various modifications and changes can be made to the process under the guidance of this specification. However, these modifications and changes are still within the scope of this specification. For example, changes to the process steps of this specification, such as adding preprocessing steps and storage steps. For another example, the steps of the first participant and the second participant can be performed simultaneously or non-simultaneously.

[0236] Figure 6 is an exemplary module diagram of a first privacy-protected secure computing system according to some embodiments of this specification. Figure 6 As shown, the system 600 may include a transform factor decomposition module 610 and a first collaborative computing module 620 .

[0237] The transform factor decomposition module 610 may be used to decompose the transform factor to obtain a transform sequence including a plurality of decomposition factors.

[0238] In some embodiments, the plurality of decomposition factors include private factors and public factors, and the public factors are simultaneously held by the second party.

[0239] The first collaborative computing module 620 may be used to collaborate with the second participant to iteratively transform the transformation object based on a plurality of decomposition factors in the transformation sequence in sequence, thereby obtaining a first slice of the transformation result.

[0240] In some embodiments, during the iterative transformation of the transformation object, the transformation involving public factors is completed by the participating party alone, and the transformation involving private factors is completed by the participating party based on a multi-party secure computing protocol; the transformation result is equal to the result of transforming the transformation object using the transformation factors.

[0241] In some embodiments, the first decomposition factor in the transformation sequence is a private factor. The first collaborative computing module 620 can also be used to obtain a first shard of the first iterative transformation result based on the first decomposition factor and the transformation object through a multi-party secure computing protocol with the second participant, and the second participant obtains a second shard of the first iterative transformation result.

[0242] In some embodiments, the transformation sequence includes 5 decomposition factors, wherein the first decomposition factor and the fourth decomposition factor are private factors, and the remaining decomposition factors are public factors. The first collaborative computing module 620 can also be used to obtain the first slice of the second iterative transformation result based on the second decomposition factor and the first slice of the first iterative transformation result; obtain the first slice of the third iterative transformation result based on the third decomposition factor and the first slice of the second iterative transformation result; obtain the local slice of the fourth iterative transformation result based on the fourth decomposition factor and the first slice of the third iterative transformation result; and obtain the first slice of the fourth iterative transformation result based on the second slice of the third iterative transformation result through a multi-party secure computing protocol with the second participant based on the fourth decomposition factor, and the second participant obtains the second slice of the fourth iterative transformation result; obtain the first slice of the transformation result based on the fifth decomposition factor, the local slice of the fourth iterative transformation result, and the first slice of the fourth iterative transformation result.

[0243] In some embodiments, the transformation factor is a 0-1 matrix of lxn, with k2 non-0 columns, one and only one 1 in each row, and the column coordinate of 1 in each row is monotonically non-decreasing; the transformation object is an n-dimensional vector, and the elements in the vector come from the commutative ring A containing 1; the transformation is matrix multiplication; wherein n, l and k2 are positive integers.

[0244] The second decomposition factor is an n×n matrix, and the diagonal elements are 1, the elements in the i+1th row and the i-th column are -1, and the remaining elements are 0, and i is an integer from 1 to (n-1); the third decomposition factor is an l×n matrix, and the diagonal elements of the matrix block composed of the common elements of the first k2 rows and the first k2 columns are 1, and the remaining elements are 0; the fifth decomposition factor is an l×l matrix, and the diagonal elements and the elements below the diagonal are 1, and the remaining elements are 0; the first decomposition factor comes from the n-order symmetric group and is represented as an n×n matrix; the fourth decomposition factor comes from the l-order symmetric group and is represented as an l×l matrix.

[0245] In some embodiments, the first decomposition factor in the transformation sequence is a public factor, and the second decomposition factor is a private factor. The first collaborative computing module 620 can also be used to obtain a first shard of the second iterative transformation result based on the second decomposition factor and the second participant based on the first iterative transformation result through a multi-party secure computing protocol, and the second participant obtains a second shard of the second iterative transformation result; the first iterative transformation result is obtained by the second participant based on the first decomposition factor and the transformation object.

[0246] In some embodiments, the transformation sequence includes 5 decomposition factors, of which the second decomposition factor and the fifth decomposition factor are private factors, and the remaining decomposition factors are public factors. The first collaborative computing module 620 can also be used to obtain the first slice of the third iterative transformation result based on the third decomposition factor and the first slice of the second iterative transformation result; obtain the first slice of the fourth iterative transformation result based on the fourth decomposition factor and the first slice of the third iterative transformation result; obtain the local slice of the fifth iterative transformation result based on the fifth decomposition factor and the first slice of the fourth iterative transformation result; and obtain the first slice of the fifth iterative transformation result based on the second slice of the fourth iterative transformation result through a multi-party secure computing protocol with the second participant based on the fifth decomposition factor, and the second participant obtains the second slice of the fifth iterative transformation result; obtain the first slice of the transformation result based on the local slice of the fifth iterative transformation result and the first slice of the fifth iterative transformation result.

[0247] In some embodiments, the transformation factor is an mxl 0-1 matrix with k1 non-0 rows, one and only one 1 in each column, and the row coordinates of the 1 in each column are monotonically non-decreasing; the transformation object is an l-dimensional vector, and the elements in the vector come from a commutative ring containing 1; the transformation is a matrix multiplication; wherein m, l and k1 are positive integers.

[0248] In some embodiments, the first decomposition factor is an l×l matrix, and the diagonal elements and the elements below the diagonal are 1, and the remaining elements are 0; the third decomposition factor is an m×l matrix, and the diagonal elements of the matrix block composed of the common elements of the reciprocal k1 rows and the reciprocal k1 columns are 1, and the remaining elements are 0; the fourth decomposition factor is an m×m matrix, the diagonal elements are 1, the elements in the i+1th row and the i-th column are -1, and the remaining elements are 0, and i is an integer from 1 to (m-1); the second decomposition factor comes from the l-order symmetric group and is represented as an l×l matrix; the fifth decomposition factor comes from the m-order symmetric group and is represented as an m×m matrix.

[0249] In some embodiments, when the transformation of private factors is involved, in order to implement a multi-party secure computing protocol, the first collaborative computing module can also be used to: obtain a random decomposition factor and a first slice of a first intermediate result; the first slice of the first intermediate result and the second slice of the first intermediate result of the second participant are the result of transforming a random object based on the random decomposition factor and a shared slice; send the first transmission data to the second participant; the first transmission data is obtained by superimposing the inverse of the random decomposition factor based on the private factor; obtain the second transmission data of the second participant; when the current transformation is the first round of iterative transformation, the second transmission data is obtained based on the difference between the random object and the transformed object; when the current transformation is not the first round of iterative transformation, the second transmission data is obtained based on the difference between the random object and the result of the previous round of iterative transformation, or the second transmission data is obtained based on the difference between the random object and the second slice of the result of the previous round of iterative transformation; transform the second transmission data based on the private factor to obtain a second intermediate transformation result; transform the first slice of the first intermediate result based on the first transmission data to obtain a third intermediate transformation result; based on the second intermediate transformation result and the third intermediate transformation result, obtain the first slice of the result of the current round of iterative transformation.

[0250] In some embodiments, the random decomposition factor is a random matrix h whose elements belong to a finite group G, and the random object is a random vector e whose elements belong to a commutative ring A containing 1; the result of transforming the random object based on the random decomposition factor is obtained based on the product of the random decomposition factor h and the random object e; the first transmission data f is obtained based on gh -1 Obtained, g is the private factor; the second transmission data i is obtained based on xe, a is the transformation object or the previous round of iterative transformation result or the second slice of the previous round of iterative transformation result; the first slice c0 of the current round of iterative transformation result is obtained based on gi+fd0, d0 is the first slice of the first intermediate result.

[0251] The random decomposition factor and the first slice of the first intermediate result are obtained from a third party.

[0252] The random decomposition factor is generated by the first participant using a preset first random number seed, and the random object is generated by the second participant using a preset second random number seed; the first shard d0 of the first intermediate result is generated by the first participant using a preset third random number seed, and the second shard d1 of the first intermediate result is obtained by the second participant from a third party, or the first shard d0 of the first intermediate result is obtained by the first party from a third party, and the second shard d1 of the first intermediate result is generated by the second participant using a preset fourth random number seed.

[0253] Figure 7 is an exemplary module diagram of a second privacy-protected secure computing system according to some embodiments of this specification. Figure 7 As shown, the system 700 may include a second collaborative computing module 710 .

[0254] The second collaborative computing module 710 can be used to collaborate with the first participant to iteratively transform the transformation object based on multiple decomposition factors in the transformation sequence in turn, thereby obtaining a second slice of the transformation result.

[0255] The first participant has a private transformation factor, and the second participant has a private transformation object.

[0256] In some embodiments, during the iterative transformation of a transformation object, the transformation involving public factors is completed by the participant alone, and the transformation involving private factors is completed by the participant based on a multi-party secure computing protocol; the transformation sequence includes a plurality of decomposition factors obtained by the first participant decomposing the transformation factor; the plurality of decomposition factors include private factors and public factors held by the first participant, and the public factors are simultaneously held by the second participant; the transformation result is equal to the result of transforming the transformation object using the transformation factor.

[0257] In some embodiments, the first decomposition factor in the transformation sequence is a private factor; the second collaborative computing module 710 can also be used to obtain, based on the transformation object, and with the first participant based on the first decomposition factor, through a multi-party secure computing protocol, a second fragment of the first iterative transformation result, while the first participant obtains the first fragment of the first iterative transformation result.

[0258] In some embodiments, the transformation sequence includes 5 decomposition factors, of which the first decomposition factor and the fourth decomposition factor are private factors, and the remaining decomposition factors are public factors; the second collaborative computing module 710 can also be used to obtain the second slice of the second iterative transformation result based on the second decomposition factor and the second slice of the first iterative transformation result; obtain the second slice of the third iterative transformation result based on the third decomposition factor and the second slice of the second iterative transformation result; based on the second slice of the third iterative transformation result, obtain the second slice of the fourth iterative transformation result through a multi-party secure computing protocol with the first participant based on the fourth decomposition factor, and the first participant obtains the first slice of the fourth iterative transformation result at the same time; obtain the second slice of the transformation result based on the fifth decomposition factor and the second slice of the fourth iterative transformation result.

[0259] In some embodiments, the first decomposition factor in the transformation sequence is a public factor, and the second decomposition factor is a private factor; the second collaborative computing module 710 can also be used to obtain a first iterative transformation result based on the first decomposition factor and the transformation object; based on the first iterative transformation result, the first participant obtains a second fragment of the second iterative transformation result based on the second decomposition factor through a multi-party secure computing protocol, and the first participant obtains the first fragment of the second iterative transformation result.

[0260] In some embodiments, the transformation sequence includes 5 decomposition factors, of which the second decomposition factor and the fifth decomposition factor are private factors, and the remaining decomposition factors are public factors; the second collaborative computing module 710 can also be used to obtain the second slice of the third iterative transformation result based on the third decomposition factor and the second slice of the second iterative transformation result; obtain the second slice of the fourth iterative transformation result based on the fourth decomposition factor and the second slice of the third iterative transformation result; obtain the second slice of the fifth iterative transformation result based on the second slice of the fourth iterative transformation result, through a multi-party secure computing protocol with the first participant based on the fifth decomposition factor; obtain the second slice of the transformation result based on the second slice of the fifth iterative transformation result.

[0261] In some embodiments, when the transformation of private factors is involved, in order to implement a multi-party secure computing protocol, the steps performed by the second collaborative computing module 710 include: obtaining a random object and a second slice of the first intermediate result; the first slice of the first intermediate result of the first participant and the second slice of the first intermediate result are a shared slice of the result of transforming the random object based on the random decomposition factor; sending second transmission data to the first participant; when the current transformation is the first round of iterative transformation, the second transmission data is obtained based on the difference between the random object and the transformed object; when the current transformation is not the first round of iterative transformation, the second transmission data is obtained based on the difference between the random object and the result of the previous round of iterative transformation, or the second transmission data is obtained based on the difference between the random object and the second slice of the result of the previous round of iterative transformation; obtaining the first transmission data of the first participant; the first transmission data is obtained by the first participant performing a superposition transformation on the inverse of the random decomposition factor based on the private factor; transforming the second slice of the first intermediate result based on the first transmission data to obtain a fourth intermediate transformation result; and obtaining the second slice of the result of the current round of iterative transformation based on the fourth intermediate transformation result.

[0262] In some embodiments, the random decomposition factor is a random matrix h whose elements belong to a finite group G, and the random object is a random vector e whose elements belong to a commutative ring A containing 1; the result of transforming the random object based on the random decomposition factor is obtained based on the product of the random decomposition factor h and the random object e; the first transmission data f is obtained based on gh-1 Obtained, g is the private factor; the second transmission data i is obtained based on xe, a is the transformation object or the previous round of iterative transformation result or the second slice of the previous round of iterative transformation result; the second slice c1 of the current round of iterative transformation result is obtained based on fd1, d1 is the second slice of the first intermediate result.

[0263] In some embodiments, the random object and the second fragment of the first intermediate result are obtained from a third party.

[0264] In some embodiments, the random decomposition factor is generated by the first participant through a preset first random number seed, and the random object is generated by the second participant through a preset second random number seed; the first shard d0 of the first intermediate result is generated by the first participant through a preset third random number seed, and the second shard d1 of the first intermediate result is obtained by the second participant from a third party, or the first shard d0 of the first intermediate result is obtained by the first party from a third party, and the second shard d1 of the first intermediate result is generated by the second participant through a preset fourth random number seed.

[0265] For a detailed description of each module of the system shown above, please refer to the flowchart section of this specification, for example, Figures 2 to 5 Related instructions.

[0266] It should be understood that Figure 6 and Figure 7 The system and its modules shown can be implemented in various ways. For example, in some embodiments, the system and its modules can be implemented by hardware, software or a combination of software and hardware. Among them, the hardware part can be implemented using dedicated logic; the software part can be stored in a memory and executed by an appropriate instruction execution system, such as a microprocessor or a dedicated design hardware. Those skilled in the art will understand that the above methods and systems can be implemented using computer executable instructions and / or included in a processor control code, such as a carrier medium such as a disk, CD or DVD-ROM, a programmable memory such as a read-only memory (firmware), or a data carrier such as an optical or electronic signal carrier. Such code is provided on the system and its modules of this specification. Not only can the hardware circuits such as ultra-large-scale integrated circuits or gate arrays, semiconductors such as logic chips, transistors, or programmable hardware devices such as field programmable gate arrays, programmable logic devices, etc. be implemented, it can also be implemented with software such as executed by various types of processors, and it can also be implemented by a combination of the above hardware circuits and software (for example, firmware).

[0267] It should be noted that the above description of the privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing system and its modules is only for the convenience of description and does not limit this specification to the scope of the embodiments cited. It can be understood that for those skilled in the art, after understanding the principle of the system, it is possible to arbitrarily combine the modules or form a subsystem to connect with other modules without deviating from this principle. For example, in some embodiments, the transform factor decomposition module 610 and the first collaborative computing module 620 can be different modules in a system, or a module can implement the functions of two or more of the above modules. For example, the transform factor decomposition module 610 and the first collaborative computing module 620 can be two modules, or a module can have both decomposition and calculation functions. For example, each module can share a storage module, or each module can have its own storage module. Such variations are all within the scope of protection of this specification.

[0268] The beneficial effects that may be brought about by the embodiments of this specification include but are not limited to: (1) the communication volume involved in the calculation process will not involve the row-column multiplication terms of the matrix, which greatly reduces the communication overhead involved in the matrix-vector multiplication calculation process; (2) calculation based on the multi-party secure computing protocol can effectively protect the privacy security of the data owned by each participant.

[0269] It should be noted that different embodiments may produce different beneficial effects. In different embodiments, the beneficial effects that may be produced may be any one or a combination of the above, or any other beneficial effects that may be obtained.

[0270] The basic concepts have been described above. Obviously, for those skilled in the art, the above detailed disclosure is only for example and does not constitute a limitation of this specification. Although not explicitly stated here, those skilled in the art may make various modifications, improvements and corrections to this specification. Such modifications, improvements and corrections are suggested in this specification, so such modifications, improvements and corrections still belong to the spirit and scope of the exemplary embodiments of this specification.

[0271] At the same time, this specification uses specific words to describe the embodiments of this specification. For example, "one embodiment", "an embodiment", and / or "some embodiments" refer to a certain feature, structure or characteristic related to at least one embodiment of this specification. Therefore, it should be emphasized and noted that "one embodiment" or "an embodiment" or "an alternative embodiment" mentioned twice or more in different positions in this specification does not necessarily refer to the same embodiment. In addition, certain features, structures or characteristics in one or more embodiments of this specification can be appropriately combined.

[0272] In addition, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that various aspects of this specification may be illustrated and described by a number of patentable categories or situations, including any new and useful process, machine, product or combination of substances, or any new and useful improvements thereto. Accordingly, various aspects of this specification may be performed entirely by hardware, entirely by software (including firmware, resident software, microcode, etc.), or by a combination of hardware and software. The above hardware or software may be referred to as "data blocks", "modules", "engines", "units", "components" or "systems". In addition, various aspects of this specification may be represented as a computer product located in one or more computer-readable media, which includes computer-readable program code.

[0273] A computer storage medium may include a propagated data signal containing computer program code, for example, in baseband or as part of a carrier wave. The propagated signal may be in a variety of forms, including electromagnetic, optical, etc., or a suitable combination. A computer storage medium may be any computer-readable medium other than a computer-readable storage medium, which can be connected to an instruction execution system, device or apparatus to communicate, propagate or transmit the program for use. The program code on the computer storage medium may be transmitted via any suitable medium, including radio, cable, fiber optic cable, RF, or similar media, or any combination of the above media.

[0274] The computer program code required for the operation of each part of this specification can be written in any one or more programming languages, including object-oriented programming languages ​​such as Java, Scala, Smalltalk, Eiffel, JADE, Emerald, C++, C#, VB.NET, Python, etc., conventional procedural programming languages ​​such as C language, Visual Basic, Fortran 2003, Perl, COBOL 2002, PHP, ABAP, dynamic programming languages ​​such as Python, Ruby and Groovy, or other programming languages. The program code can be run entirely on the user's computer, or run on the user's computer as an independent software package, or run partially on the user's computer and partially on a remote computer, or run entirely on a remote computer or server. In the latter case, the remote computer can be connected to the user's computer through any network form, such as a local area network (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN), or connected to an external computer (e.g., via the Internet), or in a cloud computing environment, or used as a service such as software as a service (SaaS).

[0275] In addition, unless explicitly stated in the claims, the order of the processing elements and sequences described in this specification, the use of alphanumeric characters, or the use of other names are not intended to limit the order of the processes and methods of this specification. Although the above disclosure discusses some invention embodiments that are currently considered useful through various examples, it should be understood that such details are only for illustrative purposes, and the attached claims are not limited to the disclosed embodiments. On the contrary, the claims are intended to cover all modifications and equivalent combinations that are consistent with the essence and scope of the embodiments of this specification. For example, although the system components described above can be implemented by hardware devices, they can also be implemented only by software solutions, such as installing the described system on an existing server or mobile device.

[0276] Similarly, it should be noted that in order to simplify the description disclosed in this specification and thus help understand one or more embodiments of the invention, in the above description of the embodiments of this specification, multiple features are sometimes combined into one embodiment, figure or description thereof. However, this disclosure method does not mean that the features required by the subject matter of this specification are more than the features mentioned in the claims. In fact, the features of the embodiments are less than all the features of the single embodiment disclosed above.

[0277] In some embodiments, numbers describing the number of components and attributes are used. It should be understood that such numbers used in the description of the embodiments are modified by the modifiers "about", "approximately" or "substantially" in some examples. Unless otherwise specified, "about", "approximately" or "substantially" indicate that the numbers are allowed to vary by ±20%. Accordingly, in some embodiments, the numerical parameters used in the specification and claims are approximate values, which may change according to the required features of individual embodiments. In some embodiments, the numerical parameters should take into account the specified significant digits and adopt the general method of retaining digits. Although the numerical domains and parameters used to confirm the breadth of their range in some embodiments of this specification are approximate values, in specific embodiments, the setting of such numerical values ​​is as accurate as possible within the feasible range.

[0278] Each patent, patent application, patent application publication, and other materials, such as articles, books, specifications, publications, documents, etc., cited in this specification are hereby incorporated by reference in their entirety. Except for application history documents that are inconsistent with or conflicting with the contents of this specification, documents that limit the broadest scope of the claims of this specification (currently or later attached to this specification) are also excluded. It should be noted that if the descriptions, definitions, and / or use of terms in the materials attached to this specification are inconsistent or conflicting with the contents described in this specification, the descriptions, definitions, and / or use of terms in this specification shall prevail.

[0279] Finally, it should be understood that the embodiments described in this specification are only used to illustrate the principles of the embodiments of this specification. Other variations may also fall within the scope of this specification. Therefore, as an example and not a limitation, alternative configurations of the embodiments of this specification may be considered consistent with the teachings of this specification. Accordingly, the embodiments of this specification are not limited to the embodiments explicitly introduced and described in this specification.

Claims

1. A privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing method, wherein: The first participant owns a private transformation factor, and the second participant owns a private transformation object. The method is executed by the first participant, and includes: Decomposing the transformation factor to obtain a transformation sequence including a plurality of decomposition factors; the plurality of decomposition factors include private factors and public factors, and the public factors are simultaneously held by the second participant; Cooperating with the second participant, sequentially iteratively transforming the transformation object based on the multiple decomposition factors in the transformation sequence, thereby obtaining a first slice of the transformation result; wherein, in the process of iteratively transforming the transformation object, the transformation involving the public factors is completed by the participant alone, and the transformation involving the private factors is completed by the participant based on a multi-party secure computing protocol; The transformation result is equal to the result of transforming the transformation object using the transformation factor; The transformation factor is private data of the first participant, the transformation object is private data of the second participant, and the decomposition factor refers to a decomposition item obtained by decomposing the transformation factor.

2. The method according to claim 1, wherein the first decomposition factor in the transformation sequence is a private factor; The step of cooperating with the second participant to iteratively transform the transformation object based on a plurality of decomposition factors in the transformation sequence in order to obtain a first slice of the transformation result includes: Based on the first decomposition factor, the first fragment of the first iterative transformation result is obtained through a multi-party secure computing protocol with the second participant based on the transformation object, and the second participant obtains the second fragment of the first iterative transformation result.

3. The method according to claim 2, wherein the transformation sequence comprises 5 decomposition factors, wherein the first decomposition factor and the fourth decomposition factor are private factors, and the remaining decomposition factors are public factors; The step of cooperating with the second participant to iteratively transform the transformation object based on the multiple decomposition factors in the transformation sequence in order to obtain a first slice of the transformation result further includes: Based on the second decomposition factor and the first slice of the first iterative transformation result, obtain the first slice of the second iterative transformation result; Based on the third decomposition factor and the first slice of the second iterative transformation result, obtain a first slice of the third iterative transformation result; Obtaining a local slice of a fourth iterative transformation result based on the fourth decomposition factor and the first slice of the third iterative transformation result; and based on the fourth decomposition factor, obtaining, with the second participant based on the second fragment of the third iterative transformation result, a first fragment of the fourth iterative transformation result through a multi-party secure computing protocol, and the second participant obtaining the second fragment of the fourth iterative transformation result; Based on the fifth decomposition factor, the local slice of the fourth iterative transformation result, and the first slice of the fourth iterative transformation result, a first slice of the transformation result is obtained.

4. The method according to claim 2 or 3, wherein the transformation factor is a 0-1 matrix of lxn, with k2 non-0 columns, one and only one 1 in each row, and the column coordinate of 1 in each row is monotonically non-decreasing; the transformation object is an n-dimensional vector, and the elements in the vector come from a commutative ring A containing 1; the transformation is a matrix multiplication; wherein, n, l and k2 are positive integers.

5. The method according to claim 4, wherein the second decomposition factor is an n×n matrix, and the diagonal elements are 1, the elements in the i+1th row and the ith column are -1, and the remaining elements are 0, and i is an integer from 1 to (n-1); the third decomposition factor is an l×n matrix, and the diagonal elements of the matrix block composed of the common elements of the first k2 rows and the first k2 columns are 1, and the remaining elements are 0; The fifth decomposition factor is an l×l matrix, and the diagonal elements and the elements below the diagonal are 1, and the remaining elements are 0; The first factorization comes from the n-order symmetric group, represented by an n×n matrix; The fourth factorization comes from the symmetry group of order l, represented by an l×l matrix.

6. The method according to claim 1, wherein the first decomposition factor in the transformation sequence is a public factor and the second decomposition factor is a private factor; The step of cooperating with the second participant to iteratively transform the transformation object based on a plurality of decomposition factors in the transformation sequence in order to obtain a first slice of the transformation result includes: Based on the second decomposition factor, the second participant obtains the first fragment of the second iterative transformation result through a multi-party secure computing protocol based on the first iterative transformation result, and the second participant obtains the second fragment of the second iterative transformation result at the same time; the first iterative transformation result is obtained by the second participant based on the first decomposition factor and the transformation object.

7. The method according to claim 6, wherein the transformation sequence comprises 5 decomposition factors, wherein the second decomposition factor and the fifth decomposition factor are private factors, and the remaining decomposition factors are public factors; The step of cooperating with the second participant to iteratively transform the transformation object based on the multiple decomposition factors in the transformation sequence in order to obtain a first slice of the transformation result further includes: Based on the third decomposition factor and the first slice of the second iterative transformation result, obtain a first slice of the third iterative transformation result; Based on the fourth decomposition factor and the first slice of the third iterative transformation result, obtain a first slice of the fourth iterative transformation result; Based on the fifth decomposition factor and the first slice of the fourth iterative transformation result, obtain a local slice of the fifth iterative transformation result; and obtaining, based on the fifth decomposition factor, a first fragment of a fifth iterative transformation result through a multi-party secure computing protocol with the second participant based on the second fragment of the fourth iterative transformation result, and the second participant obtaining the second fragment of the fifth iterative transformation result; Based on the local slice of the fifth iterative transformation result and the first slice of the fifth iterative transformation result, a first slice of the transformation result is obtained.

8. The method according to claim 6 or 7, wherein the transformation factor is an mxl 0-1 matrix with k1 non-zero rows, each column has one and only one 1, and the row coordinates of the 1 in each column are monotonically non-decreasing; the transformation object is an l-dimensional vector, and the elements in the vector come from a commutative ring containing 1; the transformation is a matrix multiplication; wherein, m, l and k1 are positive integers.

9. The method according to claim 8, wherein the first decomposition factor is an l×l matrix, and the diagonal elements and the elements below the diagonal are 1, and the remaining elements are 0; the third decomposition factor is an m×l matrix, and the diagonal elements of the matrix block composed of the common elements of the reciprocal k1 rows and the reciprocal k1 columns are 1, and the remaining elements are 0; the fourth decomposition factor is an m×m matrix, the diagonal elements are 1, the elements of the i+1th row and the ith column are -1, and the remaining elements are 0, and i is an integer from 1 to (m-1); The second factorization comes from the symmetry group of order l, represented as an l×l matrix; The fifth factorization comes from the m-order symmetry group, represented by an m×m matrix.

10. According to the method of claim 1, when the transformation of the private factor is involved, in order to implement the multi-party secure computing protocol, the steps performed by the first participant include: Obtain the random decomposition factor and the first slice of the first intermediate result; The first shard of the first intermediate result and the second shard of the first intermediate result of the second participant are the result of transforming the random object based on the random decomposition factor and the shared shard; Sending first transmission data to the second participant; the first transmission data is obtained by performing a superposition transformation on the inverse of the random decomposition factor based on a private factor; Acquire second transmission data of the second participant; when the current transformation is the first round of iterative transformation, the second transmission data is obtained based on the difference between the random object and the transformed object; when the current transformation is not the first round of iterative transformation, the second transmission data is obtained based on the difference between the random object and the result of the previous round of iterative transformation, or the second transmission data is obtained based on the difference between the random object and the second slice of the result of the previous round of iterative transformation; Transform the second transmission data based on the private factor to obtain a second intermediate transformation result; Transform the first slice of the first intermediate result based on the first transmission data to obtain a third intermediate transformation result; Based on the second intermediate transformation result and the third intermediate transformation result, a first slice of the current round of iterative transformation results is obtained.

11. The method according to claim 10, wherein the random decomposition factor is a random matrix h whose elements belong to a finite group G, and the random object is a random vector e whose elements belong to a commutative ring A containing 1; The result of transforming the random object based on the random decomposition factor is obtained based on the product of the random decomposition factor h and the random object e; The first transmission data f is based on the obtained gh -1 Get, g is the private factor; The second transmission data i is obtained based on xe, and a is the transformation object or the previous round of iterative transformation result or the second slice of the previous round of iterative transformation result; The first slice c0 of the current round of iterative transformation result is obtained based on gi+fd0, and d0 is the first slice of the first intermediate result.

12. The method according to claim 10, wherein: The random decomposition factor and the first slice of the first intermediate result are obtained from a third party.

13. The method of claim 10, wherein: The random decomposition factor is generated by the first participant through a preset first random number seed, and the random object is generated by the second participant through a preset second random number seed; The first shard d0 of the first intermediate result is generated by the first participant using a preset third random number seed, and the second shard d1 of the first intermediate result is obtained by the second participant from a third party, or the first shard d0 of the first intermediate result is obtained by the first party from a third party, and the second shard d1 of the first intermediate result is generated by the second party using a preset fourth random number seed.

14. A privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing system, wherein: The first participant owns a private transformation factor, the second participant owns a private transformation object, and the system is implemented by the first participant, which includes: A transformation factor decomposition module, used for decomposing the transformation factor to obtain a transformation sequence including a plurality of decomposition factors; the plurality of decomposition factors include private factors and public factors, and the public factors are simultaneously held by the second participant; A first collaborative computing module is used to collaborate with the second participant to iteratively transform the transformation object based on the multiple decomposition factors in the transformation sequence in turn, thereby obtaining a first slice of the transformation result; wherein, in the process of iteratively transforming the transformation object, the transformation involving public factors is completed by the participant alone, and the transformation involving private factors is completed by the participant based on a multi-party secure computing protocol; The transformation result is equal to the result of transforming the transformation object using the transformation factor; The transformation factor is private data of the first participant, the transformation object is private data of the second participant, and the decomposition factor refers to a decomposition item obtained by decomposing the transformation factor.

15. A privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing device, the device comprising at least one processor and at least one storage device, the storage device being used to store instructions, and when the at least one processor executes the instructions, the device causes the device to implement a method as described in any one of claims 1-13.

16. A privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing method, wherein: The first participant owns a private transformation factor, and the second participant owns a private transformation object. The method is executed by the second participant, and includes: Cooperating with the first participant, iteratively transforming the transformation object based on multiple decomposition factors in the transformation sequence in turn, thereby obtaining a second slice of the transformation result; wherein, in the process of iteratively transforming the transformation object, the transformation involving public factors is completed by the participant alone, and the transformation involving private factors is completed by the participant based on a multi-party secure computing protocol; The transformation sequence includes a plurality of decomposition factors obtained by the first participant decomposing the transformation factor; the plurality of decomposition factors include a private factor held by the first participant and a public factor, and the public factor is also held by the second participant; The transformation result is equal to the result of transforming the transformation object using the transformation factor; The transformation factor is private data of the first participant, the transformation object is private data of the second participant, and the decomposition factor refers to a decomposition item obtained by decomposing the transformation factor.

17. The method according to claim 16, wherein the first decomposition factor in the transformation sequence is a private factor; The step of cooperating with the first participant to iteratively transform the transformation object based on a plurality of decomposition factors in the transformation sequence in order to obtain a second slice of the transformation result includes: Based on the transformation object, the first participant obtains the second fragment of the first iterative transformation result through a multi-party secure computing protocol based on the first decomposition factor, and the first participant obtains the first fragment of the first iterative transformation result.

18. The method according to claim 17, wherein the transformation sequence comprises 5 decomposition factors, wherein the first decomposition factor and the fourth decomposition factor are private factors, and the remaining decomposition factors are public factors; The step of cooperating with the first participant to iteratively transform the transformation object based on the multiple decomposition factors in the transformation sequence in order to obtain a second slice of the transformation result further includes: Based on the second decomposition factor and the second slice of the first iterative transformation result, obtain a second slice of the second iterative transformation result; Based on the third decomposition factor and the second slice of the second iterative transformation result, obtain the second slice of the third iterative transformation result; Based on the second fragment of the third iterative transformation result, the first participant obtains the second fragment of the fourth iterative transformation result through a multi-party secure computing protocol based on the fourth decomposition factor, and the first participant obtains the first fragment of the fourth iterative transformation result; Based on the fifth decomposition factor and the second slice of the fourth iterative transformation result, a second slice of the transformation result is obtained.

19. The method according to claim 16, wherein the first decomposition factor in the transformation sequence is a public factor and the second decomposition factor is a private factor; The step of cooperating with the first participant to iteratively transform the transformation object based on a plurality of decomposition factors in the transformation sequence in order to obtain a second slice of the transformation result includes: Obtaining a first iterative transformation result based on the first decomposition factor and the transformation object; Based on the first iterative transformation result, the first participant obtains the second fragment of the second iterative transformation result through a multi-party secure computing protocol based on the second decomposition factor, and the first participant obtains the first fragment of the second iterative transformation result.

20. The method according to claim 19, wherein the transformation sequence comprises 5 decomposition factors, wherein the second decomposition factor and the fifth decomposition factor are private factors, and the remaining decomposition factors are public factors; The step of cooperating with the first participant to iteratively transform the transformation object based on the multiple decomposition factors in the transformation sequence in order to obtain a second slice of the transformation result further includes: Based on the third decomposition factor and the second slice of the second iterative transformation result, obtain the second slice of the third iterative transformation result; Obtaining a second slice of a fourth iterative transformation result based on the fourth decomposition factor and the second slice of the third iterative transformation result; Based on the second shard of the fourth iterative transformation result, the first participant obtains the second shard of the fifth iterative transformation result through a multi-party secure computing protocol based on the fifth decomposition factor; Based on the second slice of the fifth iterative transformation result, a second slice of the transformation result is obtained.

21. The method according to claim 16, when it comes to the transformation of private factors, in order to implement the multi-party secure computing protocol, the steps performed by the second participant include: Get the random object and the second slice of the first intermediate result; The first shard of the first intermediate result of the first participant and the second shard of the first intermediate result are the result of transforming the random object based on the random decomposition factor and the shared shard; sending second transmission data to the first participant; When the current transformation is a first-round iterative transformation, the second transmission data is obtained based on a difference between the random object and the transformation object; when the current transformation is not a first-round iterative transformation, the second transmission data is obtained based on a difference between the random object and a result of a previous-round iterative transformation, or the second transmission data is obtained based on a difference between the random object and a second slice of a result of a previous-round iterative transformation; Acquire first transmission data of the first participant; the first transmission data is obtained by the first participant performing a superposition transformation on the inverse of the random decomposition factor based on a private factor; transforming the second slice of the first intermediate result based on the first transmission data to obtain a fourth intermediate transformation result; Based on the fourth intermediate transformation result, a second slice of the current round of iterative transformation result is obtained.

22. The method according to claim 21, wherein the random decomposition factor is a random matrix h whose elements belong to a finite group G, and the random object is a random vector e whose elements belong to a commutative ring A containing 1; The result of transforming the random object based on the random decomposition factor is obtained based on the product of the random decomposition factor h and the random object e; The first transmission data f is based on the obtained gh -1 Get, g is the private factor; The second transmission data i is obtained based on xe, and a is the transformation object or the previous round of iterative transformation result or the second slice of the previous round of iterative transformation result; The second slice c1 of the current round of iterative transformation result is obtained based on fd1, and d1 is the second slice of the first intermediate result.

23. The method of claim 21, wherein: The random object and the second fragment of the first intermediate result are obtained from a third party.

24. The method of claim 21, wherein: The random decomposition factor is generated by the first participant through a preset first random number seed, and the random object is generated by the second participant through a preset second random number seed; The first shard d0 of the first intermediate result is generated by the first participant using a preset third random number seed, and the second shard d1 of the first intermediate result is obtained by the second participant from a third party, or the first shard d0 of the first intermediate result is obtained by the first party from a third party, and the second shard d1 of the first intermediate result is generated by the second party using a preset fourth random number seed.

25. A privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing system, wherein: The first participant owns a private transformation factor, the second participant owns a private transformation object, and the system is implemented by the second participant, which includes: The second collaborative computing module is used to collaborate with the first participant to iteratively transform the transformation object based on multiple decomposition factors in the transformation sequence in turn, thereby obtaining a second slice of the transformation result; wherein, in the process of iteratively transforming the transformation object, the transformation involving public factors is completed by the participant alone, and the transformation involving private factors is completed by the participant based on a multi-party secure computing protocol; The transformation sequence includes a plurality of decomposition factors obtained by the first participant decomposing the transformation factor; the plurality of decomposition factors include a private factor held by the first participant and a public factor, and the public factor is also held by the second participant; The transformation result is equal to the result of transforming the transformation object using the transformation factor; The transformation factor is private data of the first participant, the transformation object is private data of the second participant, and the decomposition factor refers to a decomposition item obtained by decomposing the transformation factor.

26. A privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing device, the device comprising at least one processor and at least one storage device, the storage device being used to store instructions, and when the at least one processor executes the instructions, the device causes the device to implement a method as described in any one of claims 16-24.

27. A privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing method, wherein: The first participant owns a private first transformation factor, and the second participant owns a private first transformation object. The method is executed by the first participant, and includes: Decomposing the first transformation factor to obtain a left factor, an intermediate factor, and a right factor; Based on the right factor, the second participant obtains a first slice of the right factor transformation result through the method described in any one of claims 1 to 7 and claims 10 to 13 based on the first transformation object; the second participant obtains a second slice of the right factor transformation result; Based on the intermediate factor and the first slice of the right factor transformation result, obtain a local slice of the intermediate factor transformation result; Based on the intermediate factor, the second participant obtains the first shard of the intermediate transformation result through a multi-party secure computing protocol based on the second shard of the right factor transformation result; the second participant obtains the second shard of the intermediate transformation result; Obtaining a local slice of a left transformation result based on the left factor, the local slice of the intermediate factor transformation result, and the first slice of the intermediate factor transformation result; Based on the left factor, together with the second participant, based on the second slice of the intermediate transformation result, obtain a first slice of the left transformation result by the method according to any one of claims 1 and claims 6 to 13, and the second participant obtains a second slice of the left transformation result; Based on the local slice of the left transformation result and the first slice of the left transformation result, a first slice of the first transformation result is obtained; the first transformation result is equal to the result of transforming the first transformation object by the first transformation factor.

28. The method of claim 27, wherein the first transformation factor is a 0-1 matrix, the first transformation object is a vector, and the transformation is matrix multiplication.

29. The method of claim 27, wherein the first transformation factor is an m×n 0-1 matrix, the first transformation object is an n-dimensional vector, and the elements in the vector are from a commutative ring A containing 1; and the transformation is a matrix multiplication; The right factor is a 0-1 matrix of lxn, with k2 non-0 columns, one and only one 1 in each row, and the column coordinate of 1 in each row is monotonically non-decreasing; the transformation object is an n-dimensional vector, and the elements in the vector come from a commutative ring A containing 1; The intermediate factors come from the l-order symmetric group and are represented as l×l matrices; The left factor is an mxl 0-1 matrix with k1 non-zero rows, each column has one and only one 1, and the row coordinate of the 1 in each column is monotonically non-decreasing; in, m, n, l, k1 and k2 are positive integers.

30. A privacy-preserving multi-party secure computing method, wherein: The first participant owns a private first transformation factor, and the first participant owns a left factor, a middle factor, and a right factor obtained by decomposing the first transformation factor; The second participant owns a private first transformation object, and the method is executed by the second participant, which includes: Based on the first transformation object, and based on the right factor, the first participant obtains a second slice of the right factor transformation result through the method described in any one of claims 16 to 18 and claims 21 to 24; the first participant obtains a first slice of the right factor transformation result; Based on the second shard of the right factor transformation result, the first participant obtains the second shard of the intermediate transformation result through a multi-party secure computing protocol based on the intermediate factor, and the first participant obtains the first shard of the intermediate transformation result; Based on the second slice of the intermediate transformation result, the first participant obtains the second slice of the left transformation result based on the left factor through the method according to any one of claims 16 and claims 19 to 24, and the first participant obtains the first slice of the left transformation result; Based on the second slice of the left transformation result, a second slice of the first transformation result is obtained; the first transformation result is equal to the result of transforming the first transformation object by the first transformation factor.