Vehicle communication encryption method and device, vehicle, storage medium and program product
By generating a new platoon communication key in the vehicle platoon and conducting encrypted communication, the problem of information interception and tampering in V2X communication is solved, ensuring the safety of autonomous vehicles.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202111118651.7
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2021-09-24
- Publication Date
- 2026-01-02
- Estimated Expiration
- 2041-09-24
AI Technical Summary
In autonomous vehicle platooning, the lack of encryption measures in V2X communication makes remote control information vulnerable to interception and tampering by third parties, affecting the safety of autonomous vehicles and potentially causing traffic accidents.
When a new vehicle platoon is formed, a first random number is generated and a second random number is received. A new platoon communication key is created using a preset key generation algorithm, and encrypted communication is performed based on this key. The key is updated to respond to the merging of new vehicles.
It effectively prevents vehicle interaction information from being stolen and tampered with by third parties, ensures that autonomous vehicles drive according to the correct information, and improves the safety of vehicles in the platoon.
Smart Images

Figure CN114679722B_ABST
Abstract
Description
TECHNICAL FIELD
[0001] Embodiments of the present disclosure relate to the technical field of vehicle communication encryption, and in particular to a vehicle communication encryption method and device, a vehicle, a storage medium and a program product. BACKGROUND
[0002] With the development of V2X communication technology and automatic driving technology, more and more vehicles use V2X for communication between vehicles. One of the most widely used scenarios is vehicle automatic driving platoon. For example, a lead vehicle is manually driven, and a following vehicle automatically drives by receiving historical trajectory information and remote control information of the lead vehicle through V2X.
[0003] Currently, in the scenario of vehicle automatic driving platoon, V2X communication is usually not encrypted, or only authenticated through V2X-CA. This communication mode has the risk of remote control information being intercepted by a third party. Once intercepted and analyzed by a third party, the remote control information of the automatic driving vehicle can be forged, thereby affecting the steering, braking or parking functions of the automatic driving vehicle, and further causing traffic accidents. SUMMARY
[0004] Embodiments of the present disclosure provide a vehicle communication encryption method, device, vehicle, storage medium and program product, which can effectively prevent the interaction information between vehicles from being stolen and tampered with by a third party, avoid the dangerous situation caused by the automatic driving vehicle in the vehicle platoon driving according to the tampered information, and improve the safety of the automatic driving vehicle in the vehicle platoon.
[0005] In a first aspect, embodiments of the present disclosure provide a vehicle communication encryption method for a first vehicle in a new vehicle platoon, which comprises:
[0006] In the process of a target vehicle joining an original vehicle platoon to form a new vehicle platoon, a first random number is generated, and a second random number sent by a second vehicle in the new vehicle platoon is received;
[0007] A new platoon communication secret key is generated according to the first random number, the second random number and a preset secret key generation algorithm;
[0008] Communication is performed with other vehicles in the new vehicle platoon based on the generated new platoon communication secret key.
[0009] In a second aspect, embodiments of the present disclosure provide a vehicle communication encryption device for a first vehicle in a new vehicle platoon, which comprises:
[0010] A random number obtaining module is configured to generate a first random number in the process of a target vehicle joining an original vehicle platoon to form a new vehicle platoon, and receive a second random number sent by a second vehicle in the new vehicle platoon;
[0011] a key generation module, configured to generate a new platoon communication key according to the first random number, the second random number and a preset key generation algorithm;
[0012] an encrypted communication module, configured to communicate with other vehicles in the new vehicle platoon based on the generated new platoon communication key.
[0013] In a third aspect, the embodiments of the present disclosure provide a vehicle, comprising a memory, a processor and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, and the processor implements the method of the first aspect when executing the computer program.
[0014] In a fourth aspect, the embodiments of the present disclosure provide a computer readable storage medium, which stores a computer program, and the computer program is executable by a processor to implement the method of the first aspect.
[0015] In a fifth aspect, the embodiments of the present disclosure provide a computer program product, comprising a computer program, and the computer program is executable by a processor to implement the method of the first aspect.
[0016] The vehicle communication encryption method, device, vehicle, storage medium and program product provided by the embodiments of the present disclosure, in the process of the target vehicle joining the original vehicle platoon to form a new vehicle platoon, the first vehicle in the new vehicle platoon generates a first random number, and receives a second random number sent by a second vehicle in the new vehicle platoon; a new platoon communication key is generated according to the first random number, the second random number and a preset key generation algorithm; and communication is performed with other vehicles in the new vehicle platoon based on the generated new platoon communication key. According to the embodiments of the present disclosure, the communication in the vehicle platoon is encrypted by using the platoon communication key, and if a new vehicle joins the original vehicle platoon to form a new vehicle platoon, the platoon communication key is updated, so that even if the remote control information is intercepted by a third party, the third party cannot analyze and fake the remote control information of the autonomous vehicle, and therefore, the functions such as steering, braking or parking of the autonomous vehicle are not affected. It can be seen that the embodiments of the present disclosure can effectively prevent the interactive information between vehicles from being stolen and tampered by a third party, avoid the situation that the autonomous vehicle in the vehicle platoon drives according to the tampered information and causes danger, and improve the safety of the autonomous vehicle in the vehicle platoon. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS
[0017] Figure 1 FIG. 1 is an application environment diagram of the vehicle communication encryption method in one embodiment;
[0018] Figure 2 FIG. 1 is an application environment diagram of the vehicle communication encryption method in one embodiment;
[0019] Figure 3Fig. 2 is a flowchart of a vehicle communication encryption method in another embodiment;
[0020] Figure 4 Fig. 1 is a flowchart of mutual trust authentication in an embodiment;
[0021] Figure 5 Fig. 2 is a flowchart of mutual trust authentication in another embodiment;
[0022] Figure 6 Fig. 3 is a flowchart of a vehicle communication encryption method in another embodiment;
[0023] Figure 7 Fig. 4 is a structural block diagram of a vehicle communication encryption device in an embodiment;
[0024] Figure 8 Fig. 5 is a structural block diagram of a vehicle communication encryption device in another embodiment;
[0025] Figure 9 Fig. 6 is a structural block diagram of a vehicle communication encryption device in another embodiment;
[0026] Figure 10 Fig. 7 is an internal structure diagram of a vehicle in an embodiment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0027] In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the embodiments of the present disclosure clearer, the embodiments of the present disclosure are further described in detail below with reference to the drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are only used to explain the embodiments of the present disclosure and do not limit the embodiments of the present disclosure.
[0028] First, before specifically introducing the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present disclosure, the technical background or technical evolution context based on which the embodiments of the present disclosure are introduced. At present, in the scene of automatic driving vehicles in vehicle platoon, V2X communication usually has no encryption, or only through V2X-CA authentication, this communication mode has the risk of remote control information being intercepted by a third party. Once intercepted and analyzed by a third party, the remote control information of the automatic driving vehicle can be forged, thereby affecting the functions such as steering, braking or parking of the automatic driving vehicle, and further causing traffic accidents.
[0029] The technical scheme provided in the present application comprises the following steps: in the process of a target vehicle joining an original vehicle platoon to form a new vehicle platoon, a first random number is generated, and a second random number sent by a second vehicle in the new vehicle platoon is received; a new platoon communication key is generated according to the first random number, the second random number, and a preset key generation algorithm; and communication is performed with other vehicles in the new vehicle platoon based on the generated new platoon communication key. According to the embodiments of the present application, the communication in the vehicle platoon is encrypted by using the platoon communication key, and if a new vehicle joins the original vehicle platoon to form a new vehicle platoon, the platoon communication key is updated, so that the interaction information between vehicles can be effectively prevented from being stolen and tampered with by a third party, the situation that the autonomous vehicle in the vehicle platoon travels according to the tampered information and causes danger is avoided, and the safety of the autonomous vehicle in the vehicle platoon is improved.
[0030] The technical scheme related to the embodiments of the present application will be described below in combination with the scenario to which the embodiments of the present application are applied.
[0031] The vehicle communication encryption method provided in the embodiments of the present application can be applied in an application environment as shown in Figure 1 The application environment comprises vehicles 101 in an original vehicle platoon, and a vehicle 102 joining the original vehicle platoon to form a new vehicle platoon. The vehicles can perform V2X communication, and the vehicles include but are not limited to motor vehicles with an autonomous driving function, and the V2X communication includes but is not limited to DSRC (Dedicated Short Range Communication) and C-V2X (Cellular Vehicle-to-Everything). The embodiments of the present application do not limit the communication mode between the vehicles and the communication mode between the vehicles and the server.
[0032] In one of the embodiments, a communication component is further arranged on each vehicle, and the communication component can communicate with a server through a wireless network. The server can be implemented by an independent server or a server cluster composed of multiple servers. The embodiments of the present application do not limit the communication mode between the vehicles and the server.
[0033] In one of the embodiments, as shown in Figure 2 A vehicle communication encryption method is provided, and the method is applied to a first vehicle in a new vehicle platoon as shown in Figure 1 The method comprises the following steps:
[0034] In step 201, in the process of a target vehicle joining an original vehicle platoon to form a new vehicle platoon, a first random number is generated, and a second random number sent by a second vehicle in the new vehicle platoon is received.
[0035] The first vehicle is any vehicle in the new vehicle platoon, and the second vehicle is any vehicle in the new vehicle platoon except the first vehicle.
[0036] In the process of the target vehicle joining the new vehicle platoon of the original vehicle platoon component, the first vehicle generates a first random number, the second vehicle generates a second random number, the second vehicle sends the second random number to the first vehicle, and the first vehicle receives the second random number sent by the second vehicle.
[0037] The present embodiment does not limit the way in which the first vehicle generates the first random number and the second vehicle generates the second random number.
[0038] Step 202: generating a new platoon communication key according to the first random number, the second random number, and a preset key generation algorithm.
[0039] The first vehicle stores a preset key generation algorithm, and after receiving the second random number, the first vehicle generates a new platoon communication key according to the first random number generated by itself, the received second random number, and the preset key generation algorithm.
[0040] The present embodiment does not limit the preset key generation algorithm, which can be preset by a vehicle operation organization. Different vehicle operation organizations set different preset key generation algorithms. In this way, the first vehicle in different vehicle operation organizations generates different new platoon communication keys according to the first random number, the second random number, and the preset key generation algorithm.
[0041] Step 203: communicating with other vehicles in the new vehicle platoon based on the generated new platoon communication key.
[0042] After the first vehicle generates the new platoon communication key, it communicates with other vehicles in the new vehicle platoon based on the new platoon communication key. Specifically, the first vehicle encrypts the communication content using the new platoon communication key, and then sends the encrypted communication content to other vehicles in the new vehicle platoon. After receiving the encrypted communication content, the other vehicles in the vehicle platoon decrypt the communication content using the new platoon communication key.
[0043] In the above embodiments, in the process that the target vehicle merges into the original vehicle platoon to form a new vehicle platoon, a first vehicle in the new vehicle platoon generates a first random number, and receives a second random number sent by a second vehicle in the new vehicle platoon; a new platoon communication key is generated according to the first random number, the second random number, and a preset key generation algorithm; and the first vehicle communicates with other vehicles in the new vehicle platoon based on the generated new platoon communication key. According to the embodiments of the present application, the communication in the vehicle platoon is encrypted by using the platoon communication key, and if a new vehicle merges into the original vehicle platoon to form a new vehicle platoon, the platoon communication key is updated, so that even if the remote control information is intercepted by a third party, the third party cannot analyze and counterfeit the remote control information of the autonomous vehicle, and therefore, the functions such as steering, braking, and parking of the autonomous vehicle are not affected. It can be seen that, by using the embodiments of the present application, the interaction information between vehicles can be effectively prevented from being stolen and tampered by a third party, and the situation that the autonomous vehicle in the vehicle platoon drives according to the tampered information to cause danger is avoided, and the safety of the autonomous vehicle in the vehicle platoon is improved.
[0044] In one embodiment, as shown in FIG. 10, based on the above embodiments, the embodiments of the present application can further include the following steps. Figure 3
[0045] Step 204, the first vehicle in the new vehicle platoon receives encrypted indication information sent by a third vehicle in the new vehicle platoon.
[0046] The encrypted indication information is encrypted based on the new platoon communication key generated by the third vehicle.
[0047] The third vehicle in the new vehicle platoon generates the new platoon communication key, and encrypts the indication information by using the new platoon communication key to obtain the encrypted indication information. Then, the third vehicle sends the encrypted indication information to the first vehicle, and the first vehicle receives the encrypted indication information sent by the third vehicle.
[0048] The indication information can be a finish message, which is not limited in the embodiments of the present application.
[0049] Step 205, the encrypted indication information is decrypted by using the new platoon communication key generated by the first vehicle.
[0050] After receiving the encrypted indication information, the first vehicle decrypts the encrypted indication information by using the generated new platoon communication key.
[0051] Correspondingly, step 203 includes: if the decryption is successful, communicating with other vehicles in the new vehicle platoon based on the generated new platoon communication key.
[0052] If the first vehicle successfully decrypts the encrypted indication information, the indication information can be obtained, and then the first vehicle can communicate with other vehicles in the new vehicle platoon based on the generated new platoon communication key.
[0053] It can be understood that the first vehicle successfully decrypting the encrypted indication information indicates that the new platoon communication key generated by the first vehicle is the same as the new platoon communication key generated by the third vehicle, that is, the first vehicle and the third vehicle unify the encryption mode.
[0054] In the above embodiment, the first vehicle in the new vehicle platoon receives the encrypted indication information sent by the third vehicle in the new vehicle platoon, and decrypts the encrypted indication information according to the new platoon communication key generated by the first vehicle. In the embodiment of the present disclosure, the vehicles in the new vehicle platoon all use the new platoon communication key for encryption and decryption processing, so as to ensure that each vehicle in the new vehicle platoon can perform subsequent communication based on the new platoon communication key.
[0055] In one embodiment, the first vehicle is a lead vehicle in the original vehicle platoon, and the second vehicle is a target vehicle. The above steps of generating the first random number and receiving the second random number sent by the second vehicle in the new vehicle platoon can include: the lead vehicle generating the first random number according to an original platoon communication key used for communication between vehicles in the original vehicle platoon, and receiving the second random number sent by the target vehicle.
[0056] In the process of the target vehicle joining the original vehicle platoon to form the new vehicle platoon, the lead vehicle generates the first random number according to the original platoon communication key used by the original vehicle platoon; at the same time, the target vehicle generates the second random number and sends the second random number to the lead vehicle; and the lead vehicle receives the second random number sent by the target vehicle.
[0057] Then, the lead vehicle generates the new platoon communication key according to the first random number, the second random number, and a preset key generation algorithm, and communicates with the target vehicle and a following vehicle in the original vehicle platoon based on the generated new platoon communication key.
[0058] In the above embodiment, the lead vehicle in the original vehicle platoon generates the first random number according to the original platoon communication key used for communication between vehicles in the original vehicle platoon, and receives the second random number sent by the target vehicle, so that the lead vehicle in the original vehicle platoon can generate the new platoon communication key, and communicate with other vehicles in the new vehicle platoon based on the new platoon communication key after the new vehicle platoon is formed. Through the embodiment of the present disclosure, in the case of a new vehicle joining, the lead vehicle updates the platoon communication key, so that the platoon communication key is updated, thereby effectively preventing the interaction information between vehicles from being stolen and tampered by a third party, avoiding the situation that the autonomous vehicle in the vehicle platoon drives according to the tampered information and causes danger, and improving the safety of the autonomous vehicle in the vehicle platoon.
[0059] In one embodiment, the third vehicle is a following vehicle in the target vehicle and / or the original vehicle platoon, and the step of receiving the encrypted indication information sent by the third vehicle in the new vehicle platoon can include: the lead vehicle receiving the encrypted indication information sent by the following vehicle and / or the target vehicle.
[0060] The lead vehicle generates a new platoon communication key, and the following vehicle in the target vehicle and the original vehicle platoon also generates the new platoon communication key.
[0061] The target vehicle encrypts the indication information using the new platoon communication key to obtain encrypted indication information, and sends the encrypted indication information to the lead vehicle. The lead vehicle receives the encrypted indication information sent by the target vehicle, and decrypts the encrypted indication information using the new platoon communication key to obtain the indication information.
[0062] The following vehicle in the original vehicle platoon encrypts the indication information using the new platoon communication key to obtain encrypted indication information, and sends the encrypted indication information to the lead vehicle. The lead vehicle receives the encrypted indication information sent by the following vehicle in the original vehicle platoon, and decrypts the encrypted indication information using the new platoon communication key to obtain the indication information.
[0063] In the above embodiment, the lead vehicle receives the encrypted indication information sent by the following vehicle and / or the target vehicle. If the lead vehicle successfully decrypts the encrypted indication information using the new platoon communication key, it indicates that the lead vehicle and the following vehicle and / or the target vehicle use the same new platoon communication key. Therefore, subsequent communication can be performed using the new platoon communication key, ensuring that the interaction information between vehicles is not tampered with, thereby ensuring the safety of vehicle driving.
[0064] In one embodiment, as shown in FIG. 6, before receiving the second random number sent by the target vehicle, the embodiment of the present disclosure can further include: Figure 4
[0065] Step 301, the lead vehicle of the original vehicle platoon establishes point-to-point encrypted communication with the target vehicle.
[0066] In the process of the target vehicle joining the original vehicle platoon to form a new vehicle platoon, the lead vehicle performs bidirectional authentication with the target vehicle through a preset communication mode to establish point-to-point encrypted communication; wherein the preset communication mode includes ssl / tls mode or V2X-CA.
[0067] Wherein, the ssl / tls mode is used to establish point-to-point encrypted communication with the target vehicle, which can use the following steps:
[0068] Step one, the target vehicle sends a client hello message, which carries information including: the ssl / tls version list supported by the target vehicle, supported encryption algorithm, supported data compression algorithm and random number A.
[0069] Step two, the leading vehicle responds to a server hello message, which carries information including: the ssl / tls version number adopted by negotiation, session id, random number B, server digital certificate (server CA) and client certificate authentication request.
[0070] Step three, the target vehicle verifies the server digital certificate, and if the verification is passed, sends random number C and client digital certificate (client CA). The random number C is called pre-master-key, and the random number C is encrypted using the public key in the client digital certificate and sent out. At the same time, the target vehicle also encrypts a random number D using the private key and sends it together with the client digital certificate.
[0071] Step four, the leading vehicle verifies the client digital certificate, and generates a dynamic secret key master-key according to the above random numbers, and sends a finish message to the target vehicle using the dynamic secret key.
[0072] Step five, the target vehicle generates a dynamic secret key master-key according to the same random numbers, and sends a finish message to the leading vehicle using the dynamic secret key.
[0073] Step six, the leading vehicle decrypts the encrypted finish message sent by the target vehicle using the dynamic secret key, and the target vehicle decrypts the encrypted finish message sent by the leading vehicle using the dynamic secret key. If both the leading vehicle and the target vehicle decrypt successfully, the handshake is successful, and the leading vehicle and the target vehicle establish a point-to-point encrypted communication, and the communication secret key is the above dynamic secret key master-key.
[0074] Step 302, mutual trust authentication with the target vehicle based on point-to-point encrypted communication.
[0075] The leading vehicle performs mutual trust authentication with the target vehicle based on point-to-point encrypted communication, that is, in the mutual trust authentication process between the leading vehicle and the target vehicle, the above dynamic secret key is used to encrypt and decrypt the interactive information between the leading vehicle and the target vehicle.
[0076] As shown in Figure 5 , the mutual trust authentication process can include the following steps:
[0077] Step 3021, receiving a mutual trust authentication request sent by the target vehicle based on point-to-point encrypted communication.
[0078] The mutual trust authentication request carries at least one of vehicle operation organization information of the target vehicle, a communication protocol version, and an entry purpose.
[0079] In the mutual trust authentication process, the target vehicle generates a mutual trust authentication request according to at least one of vehicle operation organization information of the target vehicle, a communication protocol version, and an entry purpose, encrypts the mutual trust authentication request by using a dynamic secret key, and sends the encrypted mutual trust authentication request to a lead vehicle in the original vehicle platoon.
[0080] The lead vehicle receives the encrypted mutual trust authentication request sent by the target vehicle, decrypts the mutual trust authentication request by using the dynamic secret key, and obtains the mutual trust authentication request. Then, the lead vehicle determines whether the mutual trust authentication request meets a first preset authentication condition. If the mutual trust authentication request meets the first preset authentication condition, step 3022 is performed. If the mutual trust authentication request does not meet the first preset authentication condition, the target vehicle is rejected.
[0081] Step 3022, in a case where it is determined that the mutual trust authentication request meets the first preset authentication condition, mutual trust authentication is performed with the target vehicle based on point-to-point encrypted communication.
[0082] The first preset condition includes at least one of the following: the original vehicle platoon agrees to form a new vehicle platoon with the target vehicle, the vehicle operation organization information of the target vehicle is preset vehicle operation organization information, the communication protocol version of the target vehicle is a supported communication protocol version, and the entry purpose is not prohibited.
[0083] The lead vehicle can make at least one of the following determinations: whether the original vehicle platoon agrees to form a new vehicle platoon with the target vehicle, whether the vehicle operation organization information of the target vehicle is preset vehicle operation organization information, whether the communication protocol version of the target vehicle is a supported communication protocol version, and whether the entry purpose of the target vehicle is prohibited. If at least one of the following conditions is met: the original vehicle platoon agrees to form a new vehicle platoon with the target vehicle, the vehicle operation organization information of the target vehicle is preset vehicle operation organization information, the communication protocol version of the target vehicle is a supported communication protocol version, and the entry purpose is not prohibited, it is determined that the mutual trust authentication request meets the first preset authentication condition, and mutual trust authentication can be performed with the target vehicle.
[0084] The process of mutual trust authentication between the lead vehicle and the target vehicle can include: receiving vehicle information sent by the target vehicle based on point-to-point encrypted communication; and in a case where it is determined that the vehicle information meets a second preset authentication condition, mutual trust authentication is passed. The second preset authentication condition includes: detecting that a user inputs a confirmation instruction according to the vehicle information; or sending the vehicle information to a server and receiving determination information fed back by the server according to the vehicle information.
[0085] For example, the target vehicle sends vehicle information to the lead vehicle based on point-to-point encrypted communication, and the lead vehicle displays the vehicle information of the target vehicle after receiving the vehicle information of the target vehicle. Then, the lead vehicle detects the instruction input by the user, and if it is detected that the user inputs a confirmation instruction according to the vehicle information, it is determined that the vehicle information meets the second preset authentication condition, and the mutual trust authentication is passed. If it is detected that the user inputs a rejection instruction according to the vehicle information, it is determined that the vehicle information does not meet the second preset authentication condition, and the mutual trust authentication is failed, and the target vehicle is rejected to join.
[0086] For another example, the target vehicle sends vehicle information to the lead vehicle based on point-to-point encrypted communication, and the lead vehicle sends the vehicle information to the server after receiving the vehicle information of the target vehicle. The server verifies the vehicle information of the target vehicle, and if the verification is passed, feeds back determination information to the lead vehicle. The lead vehicle receives the determination information fed back by the server, determines that the vehicle information meets the second preset authentication condition, and the mutual trust authentication is passed. If the server verification is failed, feeds back rejection information to the lead vehicle. The lead vehicle receives the rejection information fed back by the server, determines that the vehicle information does not meet the second preset authentication condition, and the mutual trust authentication is failed, and the target vehicle is rejected to join.
[0087] In the above embodiments, the lead vehicle of the original vehicle platoon establishes point-to-point encrypted communication with the target vehicle, and performs mutual trust authentication with the target vehicle based on the point-to-point encrypted communication. In the embodiments of the present disclosure, the point-to-point encrypted communication established by the lead vehicle and the target vehicle can avoid the interaction information between the lead vehicle and the target vehicle being tampered with, so as to cause the lead vehicle to perform mutual trust authentication with a third vehicle. Further, the mutual trust authentication between the lead vehicle and the target vehicle can ensure that the vehicle to be joined is safe and reliable, so as to avoid the third vehicle being added to the new vehicle platoon, and further avoid the interaction information between the vehicles being tampered with to cause traffic accidents and other dangers.
[0088] In one embodiment, the first vehicle is a target vehicle, and the second vehicle is a lead vehicle in an original vehicle platoon. The above steps of generating a first random number and receiving a second random number sent by a second vehicle in a new vehicle platoon can include: the target vehicle generates the first random number; and the lead vehicle sends the second random number. The second random number is generated by the lead vehicle according to an original platoon communication key used for communication between vehicles in the original vehicle platoon.
[0089] In the process of the target vehicle joining the original vehicle platoon to form a new vehicle platoon, the target vehicle generates a first random number, and the lead vehicle in the original vehicle platoon generates a second random number according to an original platoon communication key used by the original vehicle platoon. Then, the lead vehicle in the original vehicle platoon sends the second random number to the target vehicle, and the target vehicle receives the second random number sent by the lead vehicle.
[0090] After generating a first random number and receiving a second random number, the target vehicle generates a new platoon communication key based on the first random number, the second random number, and a preset key generation algorithm, and then communicates with each vehicle in the new vehicle platoon based on the new platoon communication key.
[0091] In the above embodiment, the target vehicle generates a first random number and receives a second random number sent by the lead vehicle. During this process, the target vehicle and the lead vehicle exchange random numbers so that the same new formation communication key can be generated based on the generated random number, the received random number, and a preset key generation algorithm. This ensures that subsequent communications are encrypted using the same new formation communication key, thereby ensuring that the interaction information between the target vehicle and the lead vehicle is not tampered with.
[0092] In one embodiment, the third vehicle is a lead vehicle, and the step of receiving encrypted instruction information sent by the third vehicle in the new vehicle formation may include: the target vehicle receiving the encrypted instruction information sent by the lead vehicle.
[0093] After generating a new formation communication key, the lead vehicle in the original vehicle formation encrypts the instruction information using the new key to obtain encrypted instruction information, and then sends the encrypted instruction information to the target vehicles. The target vehicles receive the encrypted instruction information sent by the lead vehicle, decrypt it using the generated new formation communication key, and obtain the instruction information.
[0094] In the above embodiment, the target vehicle receives encrypted instruction information sent by the lead vehicle. If the encrypted instruction information is successfully decrypted using the new formation communication key, it indicates that the target vehicle and the lead vehicle have the same new formation communication key, and subsequent communication can be conducted using the new formation communication key. This ensures that the interactive information between vehicles is not tampered with, thereby guaranteeing safe vehicle operation.
[0095] In one embodiment, the first vehicle is a follower vehicle in the original vehicle platoon, and the second vehicle is a lead vehicle in the original vehicle platoon. The steps of generating the first random number and receiving the second random number sent by another vehicle in the new vehicle platoon may include: the follower vehicle generating the first random number based on the original platoon communication key used for inter-vehicle communication in the original vehicle platoon; and receiving the second random number sent by the lead vehicle, wherein the second random number is sent by the target vehicle to the lead vehicle.
[0096] During the process of the target vehicle merging into the original vehicle formation to form a new vehicle formation, the following vehicles in the original formation generate a first random number based on the original formation's communication key; the target vehicle generates a second random number and sends it to the lead vehicle in the original formation; subsequently, the lead vehicle sends the second random number to the following vehicles in the original formation. The following vehicles receive the second random number sent by the lead vehicle.
[0097] Then, the following vehicle generates a new platoon communication key according to the first random number, the second random number and a preset key generation algorithm, and communicates with other vehicles in the new vehicle platoon based on the new platoon communication key.
[0098] In the above embodiment, the following vehicle generates the first random number according to the original platoon communication key used for communication between vehicles in the original vehicle platoon, and receives the second random number sent by the leading vehicle. In this process, the following vehicle obtains two random numbers, and can generate the same new platoon communication key as the leading vehicle and the target vehicle according to the two random numbers and the preset key generation algorithm, so as to ensure that subsequent communication can be encrypted by using the new platoon communication key, and further ensure that the interactive information between the target vehicle and the leading vehicle is not tampered with, and the vehicle can be safely driven.
[0099] In one embodiment, the third vehicle is the leading vehicle in the original vehicle platoon, and the step of receiving the encrypted indication information sent by the third vehicle in the new vehicle platoon can include that the following vehicle receives the encrypted indication information sent by the leading vehicle.
[0100] After the leading vehicle in the original vehicle platoon generates the new platoon communication key, the leading vehicle encrypts the indication information by using the new platoon communication key to obtain the encrypted indication information, and then sends the encrypted indication information to the following vehicle in the original vehicle platoon. The following vehicle in the original vehicle platoon receives the encrypted indication information sent by the leading vehicle, and decrypts the encrypted indication information by using the generated new platoon communication key to obtain the indication information.
[0101] In the above embodiment, the following vehicle in the original vehicle platoon receives the encrypted indication information sent by the leading vehicle, and if the encrypted indication information is successfully decrypted by using the new platoon communication key, it indicates that the new platoon communication key of the following vehicle is the same as that of the leading vehicle, and the following vehicle can use the new platoon communication key for subsequent communication. In this way, it can be ensured that the interactive information between vehicles is not tampered with, so as to ensure that the vehicle can be safely driven.
[0102] In one embodiment, as shown in Figure 6 , a vehicle passing encryption method is provided to Figure 1 In order to illustrate, the vehicle platoon in the original vehicle platoon can include the following steps:
[0103] Step 401, the leading vehicle in the original vehicle platoon performs bidirectional authentication with the target vehicle by using a preset communication mode to establish point-to-point encrypted communication.
[0104] The preset communication mode includes ssl / tls mode or V2X-CA. The target vehicle is integrated into the original vehicle platoon to form a new vehicle platoon.
[0105] For example, the original vehicle platoon includes vehicle A and vehicle B, where vehicle A is a lead vehicle and vehicle B is a following vehicle. Vehicle C is a target vehicle to be incorporated into a new vehicle platoon with vehicle A and vehicle B. Vehicle A and vehicle C perform mutual authentication, establish point-to-point encrypted communication, and obtain a secret key Key1. Subsequent communication between vehicle A and vehicle C uses the secret key Key1.
[0106] At step 402, the lead vehicle receives a mutual authentication request sent by the target vehicle based on the point-to-point encrypted communication.
[0107] The mutual authentication request carries at least one of vehicle operation organization information of the target vehicle, a communication protocol version, and an entry purpose.
[0108] For example, vehicle C encrypts the mutual authentication request using the secret key Key1 and sends the encrypted mutual authentication request to vehicle A. Vehicle A receives the encrypted mutual authentication request sent by vehicle C, decrypts the encrypted mutual authentication request using the secret key Key1 to obtain the mutual authentication request. Then, vehicle A determines whether the mutual authentication request meets a first preset authentication condition. If the mutual authentication request meets the first preset authentication condition, step 403 is performed. If the mutual authentication request does not meet the first preset authentication condition, vehicle C is rejected.
[0109] At step 403, the lead vehicle receives vehicle information sent by the target vehicle based on the point-to-point encrypted communication when it is determined that the mutual authentication request meets the first preset authentication condition.
[0110] The first preset condition includes at least one of the original vehicle platoon agreeing to form a new vehicle platoon with the target vehicle, the vehicle operation organization information of the target vehicle being a preset vehicle operation organization information, the communication protocol version of the target vehicle being a supported communication protocol version, and the entry purpose not being prohibited.
[0111] For example, vehicle A determines that the mutual authentication request meets the first preset authentication condition. Then, vehicle C encrypts the vehicle information using the secret key Key1 and sends the encrypted vehicle information to vehicle A. Vehicle A receives the encrypted vehicle information, decrypts the encrypted vehicle information using the secret key Key1 to obtain the vehicle information. Then, vehicle A determines whether the vehicle information meets a second preset authentication condition. If the vehicle information meets the second preset authentication condition, step 404 is performed. If the vehicle information does not meet the second preset authentication condition, vehicle C is rejected.
[0112] At step 404, the mutual authentication is passed when it is determined that the vehicle information meets the second preset authentication condition.
[0113] The second preset authentication condition comprises: detecting that the user inputs a confirmation instruction according to the vehicle information; or sending the vehicle information to the server and receiving determination information fed back by the server according to the vehicle information.
[0114] In step 405, the lead vehicle generates a first random number according to a previous platoon communication key used for communication between vehicles in a previous vehicle platoon, and receives a second random number sent by the target vehicle.
[0115] For example, the vehicle A generates a random number Key2 according to the previous platoon communication key, the vehicle C generates a random number Key3, and sends the random number Key3 to the vehicle A. The vehicle A receives the random number Key3 sent by the vehicle C. Meanwhile, the vehicle A sends the random number Key2 to the vehicle C, and the vehicle C receives the random number Key2 sent by the vehicle A. In this process, the vehicle A and the vehicle C realize random number exchange.
[0116] In step 406, the lead vehicle generates a new platoon communication key according to the first random number, the second random number and a preset key generation algorithm.
[0117] For example, the vehicle A generates a new platoon communication key new-platoon-key according to the random number Key2, the random number Key3 and the preset key generation algorithm. Meanwhile, the vehicle C also generates a new platoon communication key new-platoon-key according to the random number Key2, the random number Key3 and the preset key generation algorithm.
[0118] In step 407, the lead vehicle receives encrypted indication information sent by the target vehicle.
[0119] The encrypted indication information is encrypted based on the new platoon communication key generated by the target vehicle.
[0120] For example, the vehicle C encrypts the indication information finish by using the new platoon communication key new-platoon-key to obtain encrypted indication information, and sends the encrypted indication information to the vehicle A. The vehicle A receives the encrypted indication information sent by the vehicle C. Meanwhile, the vehicle A also encrypts the indication information finish by using the new platoon communication key new-platoon-key to obtain encrypted indication information, and sends the encrypted indication information to the vehicle C. The vehicle C receives the encrypted indication information sent by the vehicle A.
[0121] In step 408, the lead vehicle decrypts the encrypted indication information according to the generated new platoon communication key.
[0122] For example, vehicle A decrypts the encrypted indication information sent by vehicle C according to the new platoon communication key new-platoon-key. Meanwhile, vehicle C decrypts the encrypted indication information sent by vehicle A according to the new platoon communication key new-platoon-key.
[0123] At step 409, if the decryption is successful, the vehicle communicates with other vehicles in the new vehicle platoon based on the generated new platoon communication key.
[0124] For example, vehicle A decrypts the encrypted indication information sent by vehicle C successfully, and vehicle C decrypts the encrypted indication information sent by vehicle A successfully, which indicates that the new platoon communication key of vehicle A and vehicle C is the same, and the encryption mode is the same. Therefore, vehicle A and vehicle C can communicate based on the new platoon communication key new-platoon-key.
[0125] Vehicle A also sends the random number Key3 generated by vehicle C to vehicle B, and vehicle B generates a random number Key2 according to the original platoon communication key. Then, vehicle B generates a new platoon communication key new-platoon-key according to the random number Key2, the random number Key3 and the preset secret key generation algorithm. Next, vehicle B encrypts the indication information finish to obtain encrypted indication information by using the new platoon communication key new-platoon-key, and sends the encrypted indication information to vehicle A. Meanwhile, vehicle A also encrypts the indication information finish to obtain encrypted indication information by using the new platoon communication key new-platoon-key, and sends the encrypted indication information to vehicle B. Vehicle A and vehicle B both decrypt the encrypted indication information, and the decryption is successful, which indicates that the new platoon communication key of vehicle B, vehicle A and vehicle C is the same, and the encryption mode is the same. Then, vehicle A sends a start signal to vehicle B and vehicle C, and vehicle A, vehicle B and vehicle C use the new platoon communication key new-platoon-key to communicate.
[0126] In the above embodiment, the lead vehicle in the original vehicle platoon first establishes a point-to-point encrypted communication with the target vehicle to be incorporated, so that the interaction information between the lead vehicle and the target vehicle to be incorporated is ensured not to be tampered with. Then, the lead vehicle and the target vehicle to be incorporated perform mutual trust authentication, so that the target vehicle to be incorporated is ensured to be safe and reliable. After the mutual trust authentication, the lead vehicle and the target vehicle to be incorporated exchange random numbers, and generate a new platoon communication secret key according to the random number generated by the lead vehicle, the exchanged random number, and a preset secret key generation algorithm. Then, the lead vehicle and the target vehicle to be incorporated both encrypt the indication information by using the new platoon communication secret key, and send the encrypted indication information to each other. Subsequently, the lead vehicle and the target vehicle to be incorporated both decrypt the received encrypted indication information by using the new platoon communication secret key. If the decryption is successful, it indicates that the new platoon communication secret keys of the lead vehicle and the target vehicle to be incorporated are the same, and the encryption manners are the same, and the subsequent encrypted communication can be performed by using the new platoon communication secret key. Then, the lead vehicle sends the random number generated by the target vehicle to be incorporated to the following vehicle, the following vehicle also generates a new platoon communication secret key, and verifies the new platoon communication secret key by using the encrypted indication information. Finally, the lead vehicle notifies the target vehicle to be incorporated and the following vehicle to use the new platoon communication secret key. Through the embodiment of the present disclosure, the communication in the vehicle platoon is encrypted by using the platoon communication secret key, and if a new vehicle is incorporated into the original vehicle platoon to form a new vehicle platoon, the platoon communication secret key is updated. In this way, the interaction information between the vehicles can be effectively prevented from being stolen and tampered with by a third party, and the situation that the autonomous vehicles in the vehicle platoon travel according to the tampered information to cause danger can be avoided, and the safety of the autonomous vehicles in the vehicle platoon is improved.
[0127] It should be understood that, although Figures 2 to 6 the steps in the flowchart of FIG. 1 are shown in a sequential order, such that each step necessarily occurs after the preceding step, the steps do not necessarily occur in this order. Unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the steps can occur in any order. Moreover, Figures 2 to 6 at least some of the steps in the flowchart of FIG. 1 can include multiple steps or stages, which do not necessarily occur in the same time period, and can occur in different time periods. The order of the steps or stages in the steps can not necessarily be sequential, but can be round-robin or alternating with at least some of the steps or stages in other steps or stages.
[0128] In one embodiment, as shown in FIG. 1, Figure 7 a vehicle communication encryption apparatus for a first vehicle in a new vehicle platoon is provided, comprising:
[0129] a random number obtaining module 501, configured to generate a first random number in a process in which a target vehicle is incorporated into an original vehicle platoon to form a new vehicle platoon, and receive a second random number sent by a second vehicle in the new vehicle platoon;
[0130] The key generation module 502 is configured to generate a new platoon communication key according to the first random number, the second random number, and a preset key generation algorithm.
[0131] The encrypted communication module 503 is configured to perform communication with other vehicles in the new vehicle platoon based on the generated new platoon communication key.
[0132] In one of the embodiments, as shown in Figure 8 The apparatus further includes:
[0133] The information receiving module 504 is configured to receive encrypted indication information sent by a third vehicle in the new vehicle platoon, the encrypted indication information being encrypted based on a new platoon communication key generated by the third vehicle.
[0134] The decryption module 505 is configured to decrypt the encrypted indication information based on the new platoon communication key generated by the first vehicle.
[0135] Correspondingly, the encrypted communication module 503 is specifically configured to perform communication with other vehicles in the new vehicle platoon based on the generated new platoon communication key if the decryption is successful.
[0136] In one of the embodiments, the first vehicle is a lead vehicle in an original vehicle platoon, and the second vehicle is a target vehicle. The random number obtaining module is specifically configured to generate the first random number based on an original platoon communication key used for communication between vehicles in the original vehicle platoon, and receive a second random number sent by the target vehicle.
[0137] In one of the embodiments, the third vehicle is a target vehicle and / or a following vehicle in the original vehicle platoon. The information receiving module is specifically configured to receive encrypted indication information sent by the following vehicle and / or the target vehicle.
[0138] In one of the embodiments, as shown in Figure 9 The apparatus further includes:
[0139] The encrypted communication establishment module 506 is configured to establish point-to-point encrypted communication with the target vehicle.
[0140] The mutual trust authentication module 507 is configured to perform mutual trust authentication with the target vehicle based on the point-to-point encrypted communication.
[0141] In one of the embodiments, the mutual trust authentication module 507 is specifically configured to receive a mutual trust authentication request sent by the target vehicle based on the point-to-point encrypted communication; the mutual trust authentication request carries at least one of vehicle operation organization information of the target vehicle, a communication protocol version, and a purpose of entering a queue; in a case where it is determined that the mutual trust authentication request meets a first preset authentication condition, the mutual trust authentication is performed with the target vehicle based on the point-to-point encrypted communication; the first preset condition includes at least one of that the original vehicle platoon agrees to form a new vehicle platoon with the target vehicle, that the vehicle operation organization information of the target vehicle is preset vehicle operation organization information, that the communication protocol version of the target vehicle is a supported communication protocol version, and that the purpose of entering the queue is not prohibited.
[0142] In one of the embodiments, the mutual trust authentication module 507 is specifically configured to receive vehicle information sent by the target vehicle based on the point-to-point encrypted communication; in a case where it is determined that the vehicle information meets a second preset authentication condition, the mutual trust authentication is passed; the second preset authentication condition includes that the user inputs a confirmation instruction according to the vehicle information, or that the vehicle information is sent to a server and the determination information fed back by the server according to the vehicle information is received.
[0143] In one of the embodiments, the encrypted communication establishment module 506 is specifically configured to perform bidirectional authentication with the target vehicle through a preset communication mode to establish the point-to-point encrypted communication.
[0144] The preset communication mode includes an ssl / tls mode or a V2X-CA.
[0145] In one of the embodiments, the first vehicle is the target vehicle, the second vehicle is a lead vehicle in the original vehicle platoon, the random number obtaining module 501 is specifically configured to generate a first random number, and receive a second random number sent by the lead vehicle; the second random number is generated by the lead vehicle based on an original platoon communication key used for communication between vehicles in the original vehicle platoon.
[0146] In one of the embodiments, the third vehicle is the lead vehicle, and the information receiving module 504 is specifically configured to receive encrypted indication information sent by the lead vehicle.
[0147] In one of the embodiments, the first vehicle is a following vehicle in the original vehicle platoon, the second vehicle is a lead vehicle in the original vehicle platoon, and the random number obtaining module 501 is specifically configured to generate a first random number according to an original platoon communication key used for communication between vehicles in the original vehicle platoon, and receive a second random number sent by the lead vehicle; the second random number is sent by the target vehicle to the lead vehicle.
[0148] In one of the embodiments, the third vehicle is the lead vehicle, and the information receiving module 504 is specifically configured to receive encrypted indication information sent by the lead vehicle.
[0149] The specific limitations of the vehicle communication encryption device can refer to the limitations of the vehicle communication encryption method described above, which will not be repeated here. Each module in the vehicle communication encryption device described above can be implemented by software, hardware and their combination. The above-mentioned modules can be embedded in or independent of the processor in the vehicle in hardware form, or stored in the memory in the vehicle in software form, so as to be called and executed by the processor to perform the operations corresponding to each module.
[0150] Figure 10 is a block diagram of a server 1400 according to an exemplary embodiment. Referring to Figure 10 , the server 1400 includes a processing component 1420, which further includes one or more processors, and a memory resource represented by a memory 1422, for storing instructions or computer programs, such as application programs, executable by the processing component 1420. The application programs stored in the memory 1422 can include one or more modules each corresponding to a set of instructions. In addition, the processing component 1420 is configured to execute the instructions to perform the method of vehicle communication encryption described above.
[0151] The server 1400 can also include a power supply component 1424 configured to perform power management of the device 1400, a wired or wireless network interface 1426 configured to connect the device 1400 to a network, and an input / output (I / O) interface 1428. The server 1400 can operate based on an operating system stored in the memory 1422, such as Window 14 14erverTM, Mac O14 XTM, UnixTM, LinuxTM, FreeB14DTM or the like.
[0152] In an exemplary embodiment, a storage medium including instructions, such as the memory 1422 including instructions, is also provided, and the instructions can be executed by the processor of the server 1400 to complete the above method. The storage medium can be a non-transitory computer readable storage medium, such as ROM, random access memory (RAM), CD-ROM, magnetic tape, floppy disk and optical data storage device, etc.
[0153] In an exemplary embodiment, a computer program product is also provided, which, when executed by a processor, can implement the above method. The computer program product includes one or more computer instructions. When loaded and executed on a computer, these computer instructions can implement part or all of the above method according to the flow or function described in the embodiments of the present disclosure.
[0154] Those skilled in the art can understand that all or part of the processes in the above-mentioned embodiment methods can be completed by instructing the relevant hardware through a computer program. The computer program can be stored in a non-volatile computer readable storage medium, and when the computer program is executed, the processes of the above-mentioned embodiments of the method can be included. Any reference to memory, storage, database or other medium used in each embodiment provided by the embodiments of the present disclosure can include at least one of non-volatile and volatile memory. Non-volatile memory can include read-only memory (ROM), magnetic tape, floppy disk, flash memory or optical memory, etc. Volatile memory can include random access memory (RAM) or external cache memory. As an illustration but not limitation, the RAM can be in various forms, such as static random access memory (SRAM) or dynamic random access memory (DRAM), etc.
[0155] Any combination of the technical features of the above embodiments can be made. In order to make the description simple, all possible combinations of each technical feature in the above embodiments are not described, however, as long as the combination of the technical features does not exist, it should be considered as the scope of the present disclosure.
[0156] The above embodiments only express several embodiments of the present disclosure, and the description is more specific and detailed, but it should not be understood as a limitation on the scope of the patent. It should be noted that for ordinary skilled in the art, without departing from the concept of the present disclosure, a number of modifications and improvements can be made, which are within the scope of the present disclosure. Therefore, the scope of protection of the patent of the present disclosure should be subject to the appended claims.
Claims
1. A vehicle communication encryption method characterized by, A method for a first vehicle in a new vehicle platoon, the method comprising: establishing a point-to-point encrypted communication with a target vehicle during a process in which the target vehicle is incorporated into an original vehicle platoon to form the new vehicle platoon; performing mutual trust authentication with the target vehicle based on the point-to-point encrypted communication; generating a first random number and receiving a second random number sent by a second vehicle in the new vehicle platoon, wherein the first random number or the second random number is generated based on an original platoon communication key used for inter-vehicle communication in the original vehicle platoon; generating a new platoon communication key according to the first random number, the second random number, and a preset key generation algorithm; communicating with other vehicles in the new vehicle platoon based on the generated new platoon communication key; wherein the mutual trust authentication with the target vehicle based on the point-to-point encrypted communication comprises: receiving a mutual trust authentication request sent by the target vehicle based on the point-to-point encrypted communication, wherein the mutual trust authentication request carries at least one of vehicle operation organization information, a communication protocol version, and an entry purpose of the target vehicle; performing mutual trust authentication with the target vehicle based on the point-to-point encrypted communication if it is determined that the mutual trust authentication request meets a first preset authentication condition, wherein the first preset authentication condition includes at least one of the original vehicle platoon agreeing to form the new vehicle platoon with the target vehicle, the vehicle operation organization information of the target vehicle being preset vehicle operation organization information, the communication protocol version of the target vehicle being a supported communication protocol version, and the entry purpose not being prohibited.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein, Before the communicating with other vehicles in the new vehicle platoon based on the generated new platoon communication key, the method further comprises: receiving encrypted indication information sent by a third vehicle in the new vehicle platoon, the encrypted indication information being encrypted based on a new platoon communication key generated by the third vehicle; decrypting the encrypted indication information according to the new platoon communication key generated by the first vehicle; correspondingly, the communicating with other vehicles in the new vehicle platoon based on the generated new platoon communication key comprises: if the decryption is successful, communicating with other vehicles in the new vehicle platoon based on the generated new platoon communication key.
3. The method of claim 2, wherein, The first vehicle is a lead vehicle in the original vehicle platoon, and the second vehicle is the target vehicle, and the generating the first random number and receiving the second random number sent by the second vehicle in the new vehicle platoon comprises: generating the first random number based on the original platoon communication key used for inter-vehicle communication in the original vehicle platoon and receiving the second random number sent by the target vehicle.
4. The method of claim 3, wherein, The third vehicle is a following vehicle in the original vehicle platoon and / or the target vehicle, and the receiving the encrypted indication information sent by the third vehicle in the new vehicle platoon comprises: receiving the encrypted indication information sent by the following vehicle and / or the target vehicle.
5. The method of claim 1, wherein, The mutual trust authentication with the target vehicle based on the point-to-point encrypted communication comprises: receive vehicle information sent by the target vehicle based on the point-to-point encrypted communication; in a case where it is determined that the vehicle information meets a second preset authentication condition, mutual trust authentication is passed; the second preset authentication condition includes: detecting that a user inputs a confirmation instruction according to the vehicle information; or sending the vehicle information to a server and receiving determination information fed back by the server according to the vehicle information.
6. The method of claim 1, wherein, the point-to-point encrypted communication established with the target vehicle includes: performing bidirectional authentication with the target vehicle through a preset communication mode to establish the point-to-point encrypted communication; the preset communication mode includes ssl / tls or V2X-CA.
7. The method of claim 2, wherein, the first vehicle is the target vehicle, the second vehicle is a lead vehicle in the original vehicle platoon, the first random number is generated, and a second random number sent by a second vehicle in the new vehicle platoon is received, including: generating the first random number; receiving the second random number sent by the lead vehicle; the second random number is generated by the lead vehicle according to an original platoon communication secret key used for communication between vehicles in the original vehicle platoon.
8. The method of claim 7, wherein, the third vehicle is the lead vehicle, and the encrypted indication information sent by the third vehicle in the new vehicle platoon is received, including: receiving the encrypted indication information sent by the lead vehicle.
9. The method of claim 2, wherein, the first vehicle is a following vehicle in the original vehicle platoon, the second vehicle is a lead vehicle in the original vehicle platoon, the first random number is generated, and a second random number sent by a second vehicle in the new vehicle platoon is received, including: generating the first random number according to an original platoon communication secret key used for communication between vehicles in the original vehicle platoon; receiving the second random number sent by the lead vehicle; the second random number is sent by the target vehicle to the lead vehicle.
10. The method of claim 9, wherein, the third vehicle is the lead vehicle, and the encrypted indication information sent by the third vehicle in the new vehicle platoon is received, including: receiving the encrypted indication information sent by the lead vehicle.
11. A vehicle communication encryption device, characterized by comprising: the device for a first vehicle in a new vehicle platoon includes: an encrypted communication establishment module configured to establish a point-to-point encrypted communication with a target vehicle during a process in which the target vehicle is incorporated into an original vehicle platoon to form the new vehicle platoon; a mutual trust authentication module configured to perform mutual trust authentication with the target vehicle based on the point-to-point encrypted communication; a random number obtaining module configured to generate a first random number and receive a second random number sent by a second vehicle in the new vehicle platoon; the first random number or the second random number is generated according to an original platoon communication secret key used for communication between vehicles in the original vehicle platoon; a secret key generation module configured to generate a new platoon communication secret key according to the first random number, the second random number, and a preset secret key generation algorithm; an encrypted communication module configured to perform communication with other vehicles in the new vehicle platoon based on the generated new platoon communication secret key; The mutual trust authentication module is specifically configured to receive a mutual trust authentication request sent by the target vehicle based on the point-to-point encrypted communication, and the mutual trust authentication request carries at least one of vehicle operation organization information, a communication protocol version, and an entry purpose of the target vehicle; in a case where it is determined that the mutual trust authentication request meets a first preset authentication condition, mutual trust authentication is performed with the target vehicle based on the point-to-point encrypted communication; and the first preset authentication condition includes at least one of the following: the original vehicle platoon agrees to form the new vehicle platoon with the target vehicle, the vehicle operation organization information of the target vehicle is preset vehicle operation organization information, the communication protocol version of the target vehicle is a supported communication protocol version, and the entry purpose is not prohibited.
12. A vehicle comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored on the memory and executable on the processor, characterized in that, The computer program is executed by the processor to implement the steps of the method of any one of claims 1 to 10.
13. A storage medium having stored thereon a computer program, characterized in that The computer program is executed by the processor to implement the steps of the method of any one of claims 1 to 10.
14. A computer program product comprising a computer program, characterized in that, The computer program is executed by the processor to implement the steps of the method of any one of claims 1 to 10. The computer program is executed by the processor to implement the steps of the method of any one of claims 1 to 10.
Citation Information
Patent Citations
Secure communication method and device
CN112640504A