An identity authentication method and device

By introducing an authentication server and message encryption keys into the communication network, the problem of vulnerability of the identity information of requesting devices and authentication access controllers to attacks is solved, achieving two-way identity authentication and information confidentiality, and ensuring network security.

CN114760044BActive Publication Date: 2026-11-10CHINA IWNCOMM
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202011569232.0
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2020-12-26
Publication Date
2026-11-10
Estimated Expiration
2040-12-26

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In communication networks, during the two-way authentication process between the requesting device and the authentication access controller, sensitive identity information can be easily intercepted by attackers, leading to security vulnerabilities.

Method used

An authentication server is introduced to encrypt and transmit identity information using a message encryption key, and to verify digital signatures using the authentication server's public key, thereby achieving two-way identity authentication.

Benefits of technology

It ensures the confidentiality of identity information, prevents the leakage of sensitive information, and realizes two-way identity authentication between the requesting device and the authentication access controller, ensuring that only legitimate users can access the legitimate network.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

This application discloses an identity authentication method that, when transmitting identity information between a requesting device and an authentication access controller, keeps the identity information of both the requesting device and the authentication access controller confidential to prevent their exposure during transmission and to ensure that attackers cannot obtain their private and sensitive information. Furthermore, by introducing an authentication server, bidirectional identity authentication between the requesting device and the authentication access controller is achieved while ensuring the confidentiality of entity identity-related information.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of network communication security technology, and in particular to an identity authentication method and apparatus. Background Technology

[0002] In communication networks, a requesting device can access the network through an authentication access controller. In situations with high security requirements, the authentication access controller needs to authenticate the requesting device, and the requesting device also needs to authenticate the authentication access controller to ensure that the requesting device is a legitimate user and that the network it is accessing is legitimate. Furthermore, peer-to-peer transmission in blockchain technology also requires establishing trust relationships between different nodes; therefore, node authentication is also crucial.

[0003] During the two-way authentication process between the requesting device and the authentication access controller, both the requesting device and the authentication access controller need to provide their own identity information for authentication. However, this identity information generally carries private and sensitive information such as ID card number, home address, bank card information, geographical location information, or affiliated organization information; and in practical applications, this identity information is usually contained in a digital certificate, which serves as the entity's identity credential.

[0004] If the identity information of the requesting device or the authentication access controller is intercepted by an attacker and used for illegal purposes during the two-way authentication process between the requesting device and the authentication access controller, it will pose a great security risk to the authentication access controller, the requesting device, and the network. Summary of the Invention

[0005] To address the aforementioned technical issues, this application provides an identity authentication method and apparatus. By introducing an authentication server, the confidentiality of entity identity-related information is ensured while achieving bidirectional identity authentication between the authentication access controller and the requesting device.

[0006] In a first aspect, embodiments of this application provide an identity authentication method, including:

[0007] The authentication access controller obtains the identity encrypted message sent by the requesting device. The identity encrypted message includes the identity information encrypted message of the requesting device. The identity information encrypted message is generated by encrypting encrypted data, including the digital certificate of the requesting device, using a message encryption key.

[0008] The authentication access controller uses the message encryption key to decrypt the ciphertext of the requesting device's identity information to obtain the requesting device's digital certificate;

[0009] The authentication access controller sends a first authentication request message to a first authentication server it trusts, the first authentication request message including the digital certificate of the requesting device and the digital certificate of the authentication access controller;

[0010] The authentication access controller receives a first authentication response message sent by the first authentication server. The first authentication response message includes first authentication result information, a first digital signature, second authentication result information, and a second digital signature. The first authentication result information includes a first verification result of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller. The first digital signature is a digital signature calculated and generated by the second authentication server trusted by the requesting device on signature data including the first authentication result information. The second authentication result information includes a second verification result of the digital certificate of the requesting device. The second digital signature is a digital signature calculated and generated by the first authentication server on signature data including the second authentication result information.

[0011] The authentication access controller verifies the second digital signature using the public key of the first authentication server. If the verification passes, the authentication access controller determines the authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result in the second authentication result information. When the authentication access controller determines that the authentication result of the requesting device is valid, it sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device; or...

[0012] The authentication access controller verifies the second digital signature using the public key of the first authentication server. If the verification passes, the authentication access controller sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device and determines the authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result in the second authentication result information; or,

[0013] The authentication access controller uses the public key of the first authentication server to verify the second digital signature; if the second digital signature is verified, the authentication access controller determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result in the second authentication result information; the authentication access controller sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device.

[0014] The third authentication response message includes encrypted identity authentication result information, which is generated by encrypting encrypted data including the first authentication result information and the first digital signature using the message encryption key.

[0015] After receiving the third authentication response message, the requesting device decrypts the ciphertext of the identity authentication result information using the message encryption key to obtain the first authentication result information and the first digital signature. The requesting device verifies the first digital signature using the public key of the second authentication server. If the verification is successful, the requesting device determines the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller based on the first verification result in the first authentication result information.

[0016] Secondly, embodiments of this application provide an authentication access controller, including:

[0017] The acquisition unit is used to acquire the identity ciphertext message sent by the requesting device. The identity ciphertext message includes the identity information ciphertext of the requesting device, which is generated by encrypting encrypted data, including the digital certificate of the requesting device, using a message encryption key.

[0018] The decryption unit is used to decrypt the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device using the message encryption key to obtain the digital certificate of the requesting device.

[0019] The sending unit is configured to send a first authentication request message to a first authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, wherein the first authentication request message includes the digital certificate of the requesting device and the digital certificate of the authentication access controller.

[0020] The receiving unit is configured to receive a first authentication response message sent by the first authentication server. The first authentication response message includes first authentication result information, a first digital signature, second authentication result information, and a second digital signature. The first authentication result information includes a first verification result of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller. The first digital signature is a digital signature calculated and generated by the second authentication server trusted by the requesting device on signature data including the first authentication result information. The second authentication result information includes a second verification result of the digital certificate of the requesting device. The second digital signature is a digital signature calculated and generated by the first authentication server on signature data including the second authentication result information.

[0021] The verification unit is used to verify the second digital signature using the public key of the first authentication server. If the verification passes, the determining unit determines the authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result in the second authentication result information. When the determining unit determines that the authentication result of the requesting device is valid, the sending unit sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device; or...

[0022] The sending unit verifies the second digital signature using the public key of the first authentication server. If the verification passes, the sending unit sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device, and the determining unit determines the authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result in the second authentication result information; or...

[0023] The first authentication server's public key is used to verify the second digital signature; if the second digital signature is verified, the determining unit determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result in the second authentication result information; the sending unit sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device.

[0024] The third authentication response message includes encrypted identity authentication result information, which is generated by encrypting encrypted data including the first authentication result information and the first digital signature using the message encryption key.

[0025] Thirdly, embodiments of this application provide a requesting device, including:

[0026] The sending unit is used to send an identity ciphertext message to the authentication access controller. The identity ciphertext message includes the identity information ciphertext of the requesting device, which is generated by encrypting encrypted data, including the digital certificate of the requesting device, using a message encryption key.

[0027] The receiving unit is configured to receive a third authentication response message sent by the authentication access controller. The third authentication response message includes encrypted identity authentication result information, which is generated by encrypting encrypted data including first authentication result information and a first digital signature using a message encryption key. The first authentication result information includes a first verification result of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller, and the first digital signature is a digital signature calculated by a second authentication server trusted by the requesting device on signature data including the first authentication result information.

[0028] The decryption unit is used to decrypt the ciphertext of the identity authentication result information using the message encryption key to obtain the first authentication result information and the first digital signature;

[0029] The verification unit is used to verify the first digital signature using the public key of the second authentication server;

[0030] The determining unit is configured to determine the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller based on the first verification result in the first authentication result information when the first digital signature verification is successful.

[0031] As can be seen from the above technical solutions, when transmitting identity information during the identity authentication process between the requesting device and the authentication access controller, the identity information of the requesting device and the authentication access controller is kept confidential. This can prevent the identity information from being exposed during network access and ensure that attackers cannot obtain private or sensitive information. Furthermore, by introducing an authentication server, while ensuring the confidentiality of entity identity-related information, real-time two-way identity authentication between the authentication access controller and the requesting device can be achieved, laying the foundation for ensuring that only legitimate users can access the legitimate network. Attached Figure Description

[0032] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of this application. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0033] Figure 1 A schematic diagram illustrating an identity authentication method provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0034] Figure 2 A schematic diagram illustrating a method for requesting a device REQ and negotiating an encryption key for an access controller AAC, provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0035] Figure 3 A schematic diagram illustrating an identity authentication method in a non-roaming situation provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0036] Figure 4 A schematic diagram illustrating an identity authentication method in a roaming situation provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0037] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram illustrating another identity authentication method in a non-roaming situation provided in the embodiments of this application, wherein "*" represents an optional field or optional operation;

[0038] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram illustrating another identity authentication method in roaming situations provided in the embodiments of this application, where "*" represents an optional field or optional operation;

[0039] Figure 7 A structural block diagram of an authentication access controller (AAC) provided in this application embodiment;

[0040] Figure 8 This is a structural block diagram of a request device REQ provided in an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0041] In a communication network, a requesting device can access the network through an authentication access controller. To ensure that the requesting device is a legitimate user, the authentication access controller needs to authenticate the identity of the requesting device. To ensure that the network accessed by the requesting device is a legitimate network, the requesting device also needs to authenticate the identity of the authentication access controller.

[0042] Taking current wireless and mobile communication scenarios as examples, in scenarios where a requesting device accesses a wireless network through an authentication access controller, the requesting device can be a terminal device such as a mobile phone, a personal digital assistant (PDA), or a tablet computer, while the authentication access controller can be a network-side device such as a wireless access point or a wireless router. In scenarios where a requesting device accesses a 4G / 5G network through an authentication access controller, the requesting device can be a terminal device such as a mobile phone or a tablet computer, while the authentication access controller can be a network-side device such as a base station. Of course, this application is also applicable to various data communication scenarios, including other wired networks and short-range communication networks.

[0043] However, during the two-way authentication process between the requesting device and the authentication access controller, both devices need to provide their own identity information. This identity information is usually contained in a digital certificate. If an attacker intercepts this digital certificate, they can obtain the private and sensitive information within it and use it for illegal purposes, posing a significant security risk to the authentication access controller, the requesting device, and even the network.

[0044] To address the aforementioned technical problems, this application provides an identity authentication method, comprising: an authentication access controller acquiring an identity ciphertext message sent by a requesting device, the identity ciphertext message including ciphertext identity information of the requesting device, the identity information ciphertext being generated by encrypting encrypted data, including the digital certificate of the requesting device, using a message encryption key; the identity ciphertext message ensures the security of the transmission of the requesting device's identity information between the requesting device and the authentication access controller. Then, the authentication access controller uses the message encryption key to decrypt the ciphertext of the identity information to obtain the digital certificate of the requesting device. It then sends a first authentication request message, including the digital certificate of the requesting device and the digital certificate of the authentication access controller, to a first authentication server trusted by itself. It also receives a first authentication response message from the first authentication server. The first authentication response message includes first authentication result information, a first digital signature, second authentication result information, and a second digital signature. The first authentication result information includes a first verification result of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller. The first digital signature is a digital signature calculated by the second authentication server trusted by the requesting device based on signature data including the first authentication result information. The second authentication result information includes a second verification result of the digital certificate of the requesting device. The second digital signature is a digital signature calculated by the first authentication server based on signature data including the second authentication result information. The authentication access controller uses the public key of the first authentication server to verify the second digital signature. If the verification passes, the authentication result of the requesting device is determined based on the second verification result in the second authentication result information. When the authentication access controller determines that the requesting device is legitimate, it sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device, which includes encrypted identity authentication result information. The encrypted identity authentication result information is generated by encrypting encrypted data, including the first authentication result information and the first digital signature, using the message encryption key. The requesting device decrypts the encrypted identity authentication result information using the message encryption key to obtain the first authentication result information and the first digital signature. It then verifies the first digital signature using the public key of the second authentication server. If the verification is successful, the authentication access controller determines the identity authentication result based on the first verification result in the first authentication result information.

[0045] It is understood that the first authentication result information mentioned in the embodiments of this application is obtained by the first authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller verifying the legality of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller, and the second authentication result information is obtained by the second authentication server trusted by the requesting device verifying the legality of the digital certificate of the requesting device. The aforementioned first authentication server and second authentication server can be two independent servers used for identity authentication, or the same server used for identity authentication. The above are only some examples of the requesting device, authentication access controller, and authentication server, and should not be construed as limiting the requesting device, authentication access controller, and authentication server. In other possible implementations of the embodiments of this application, the requesting device, authentication access controller, and authentication server can also be other devices.

[0046] The identity authentication method provided in this application embodiment realizes two-way identity authentication (MIA) between the authentication access controller and the requesting device.

[0047] For ease of explanation, in this embodiment of the application, the identity authentication method of the present application will be described using the requesting device (REQuester, abbreviated as REQ), the authentication access controller (AAC, abbreviated as AAC), and the authentication server (AS, abbreviated as AS) as examples.

[0048] In this system, the AS trusted by AAC is called the first authentication server (AS-AAC), and the AS trusted by REQ is called the second authentication server (AS-REQ). AS-AAC has the ability to verify the legitimacy of AAC digital certificates and holds digital certificates conforming to ISO / IEC 9594-8 / ITU X.509, other standards, or other technical systems, along with the corresponding private keys. AS-REQ has the ability to verify the legitimacy of REQ digital certificates and holds digital certificates conforming to ISO / IEC 9594-8 / ITU X.509, other standards, or other technical systems, along with the corresponding private keys. Both AS-AAC and AS-REQ have the ability to transmit digital certificates to other ASs for verification and to transmit the verification results to other ASs. When AS-AAC and AS-REQ are different, they trust each other and are aware of each other's digital certificates or the public keys within those certificates.

[0049] The REQ can be one endpoint participating in the authentication process, establishing a connection with the AAC, accessing the services provided by the AAC, and accessing the AS through the AAC. The REQ holds a digital certificate conforming to ISO / IEC 9594-8 / ITU X.509, other standards, or other technical systems, along with the corresponding private key, and is aware of the AS-REQ's digital certificate or the public key within the AS-REQ's digital certificate. The AAC can be another endpoint participating in the authentication process, establishing a connection with the REQ, providing services, communicating with the REQ, and directly accessing the AS-AAC. The AAC holds a digital certificate conforming to ISO / IEC 9594-8 / ITU X.509, other standards, or other technical systems, along with the corresponding private key, and is aware of the AS-AAC's digital certificate or the public key within the AS-AAC's digital certificate.

[0050] The following is combined Figure 1 This application provides an embodiment of an identity authentication method, which includes:

[0051] S101, AAC obtains the encrypted identity message REQInit sent by REQ.

[0052] The REQInit includes REQ's identity information encrypted EncData. REQ EncData REQ The REQ is encrypted using a symmetric encryption algorithm with the message encryption key, and the digital certificate Cert containing the REQ is encrypted. REQ The encrypted data, including the data itself, is generated using encryption. Therefore, during the transmission of identity information between REQ and AAC, REQ's identity information is kept confidential to prevent its exposure during transmission.

[0053] The message encryption key can be negotiated between REQ and AAC, or it can be pre-shared between REQ and AAC. The implementation method for REQ and AAC negotiating the message encryption key will be described later. In this application, the object to be encrypted is referred to as encrypted data.

[0054] S102, AAC uses the message encryption key to pair EncData REQ Decrypt to obtain Cert REQ .

[0055] Due to EncData REQ REQ uses a symmetric encryption algorithm with a message encryption key to encrypt data including Cert. REQ The encrypted data, including EncData, is obtained through encryption. Therefore, AAC receives EncData. REQ Then, the message encryption key can be used to employ a symmetric encryption algorithm to encrypt EncData. REQ Decryption yields CertREQ .

[0056] S103, AAC sends a first authentication request message AACVeri to the AS-AAC it trusts.

[0057] The AACeri includes Cert REQ and AAC digital certificate Cert AAC AAC will Cert AAC and Cert REQ Send to AS-AAC via AACVeri so that Cert can be completed via AS-AAC. AAC and Cert REQ Verification of its legitimacy.

[0058] It should be noted that if AS-REQ and AS-AAC are the same authentication server, meaning that REQ and AAC both trust the same authentication server, then AS-AAC can be used to represent the authentication server that REQ and AAC both trust (although AS-REQ can also be used). In this case, AS-AAC (which can also be represented as AS-REQ) can be used to authenticate Cert. AAC The first verification result, Res, is obtained by performing a validity verification. AAC , for Cert REQ The second verification result, Res, is obtained by performing a validity verification. REQ According to Res AAC The information included generates the first identification result information Pub AAC According to Res REQ The information included generates the second identification result information Pub REQ Then, including Pub AAC The signature data, including the first digital signature Sig, is calculated to generate the first digital signature. AS_AAC1 (can also be represented as Sig) AS_REQ1 ), for including Pub REQ The second digital signature Sig is generated from the signature data. AS_AAC2 (can also be represented as Sig) AS_REQ2 According to Pub AAC Sig AS_AAC1 (can also be represented as Sig) AS_REQ1 ), Pub REQ and Sig AS_AAC2 (can also be represented as Sig) AS_REQ2 The information, including the first authentication response message ASVeri, is generated.

[0059] If AS-REQ and AS-AAC are two different authentication servers, meaning REQ and AAC trust different authentication servers, then after AS-AAC receives the first authentication request message AACVeri, AS-AAC will authenticate the Authentication Request (Cert). AAC The first verification result, Res, is obtained by performing a validity verification. AAC According to Res AAC The information included generates the first identification result information Pub AAC And send a second authentication request message AS-AACVeri to AS-REQ, wherein AS-AACVeri includes Pub AAC Cert REQ and third digital signature Sig AS_AAC3 Sig AS_AAC3 It is AS-AAC including Pub AAC and Cert REQ The digital signature is generated by calculating the signature data, including the signature data. AS-REQ uses the AS-AAC public key to verify the Sig. AS_AAC3 After successful verification, AS-REQ will be applied to Pub. AAC The signature data, including the first digital signature Sig, is calculated to generate the first digital signature. AS_REQ1 and for Cert REQ The second verification result, Res, is obtained by performing a validity verification. REQ According to Res REQ The information included generates the second identification result information Pub REQ For including Pub REQ The fourth digital signature Sig is generated from the signature data. AS_REQ4 Then, AS-REQ sends a second authentication response message AS-REQVeri to AS-AAC, wherein AS-REQVeri includes Pub. AAC Sig AS_REQ1 Pub REQ and Sig AS_REQ4 AS-AAC uses the public key of AS-REQ to verify Sig. AS_REQ4 After successful verification, AS-AAC supports Pub. REQ The second digital signature Sig is generated from the signature data. AS_AAC2 According to Pub AAC Sig AS_REQ1 Pub REQ and Sig AS_AAC2 The information included generates the first authentication response message ASVeri.

[0060] S104, AAC receives the first authentication response message ASVeri sent by AS-AAC.

[0061] The ASVeri includes the first identification result information Pub. AAC First digital signature Sig AS_REQ1 Second identification result information Pub REQ Second digital signature Sig AS_AAC2 .

[0062] S105, AAC uses the AS-AAC public key to verify the second digital signature Sig. AS_AAC2 .

[0063] S106, AAC based on the second identification result information Pub REQ The second verification result Res REQ Determine the identity verification result of REQ.

[0064] Due to Res REQ It can reflect whether the REQ is valid, so AAC can be used based on Pub. REQ Res in REQ Determining whether a REQ is valid lays the foundation for ensuring that only valid REQs can access the network.

[0065] S107. AAC sends a third authentication response message, AACAuth, to REQ.

[0066] The AACAuth includes encrypted identity authentication result information EncData. AAC Among them, EncData AAC AAC uses a symmetric encryption algorithm with the message encryption key to encrypt the Pub information, including the first authentication result. AAC And the first digital signature Sig AS_REQ1 The encrypted data, including the encrypted data, was generated.

[0067] It should be noted that the execution order of S105 to S107 does not affect the specific implementation of this application. In practical applications, the execution order of S105 to S107 can be set according to requirements. A preferred suggestion is to execute S105 first, when AAC performs an operation on the Sig... AS_AAC2 If the verification fails, ASVeri is discarded when AAC matches the Sig. AS_AAC2 After successful verification, proceed to step S106. If AAC determines that REQ is valid, proceed to step S107. If AAC determines that REQ is invalid, AAC will choose whether to proceed to step S107 based on its local policy. Considering efficiency, the preferred solution is not to proceed to step S107 and end the current authentication process.

[0068] S108, REQ uses the message encryption key to pair EncData AACDecryption yields the first authentication result information Pub AAC And the first digital signature Sig AS_REQ1 .

[0069] Due to EncData AAC AAC uses a symmetric encryption algorithm with a message encryption key to encrypt data including Pub. AAC and Sig AS_REQ1 The encrypted data, including the data itself, is obtained through encryption. Therefore, REQ receives EncData. AAC Then, the message encryption key can be used to employ a symmetric encryption algorithm to encrypt EncData. AAC Decrypt to get Pub AAC and Sig AS_REQ1 .

[0070] S109, REQ uses the AS-REQ public key to verify the first digital signature Sig. AS_REQ1 .

[0071] After successful verification, execute S110.

[0072] S110, REQ based on the first identification result information Pub AAC The first verification result Res AAC Determine the identity verification result of AAC.

[0073] Due to Res AAC This can reflect whether AAC is valid, therefore REQ is related to Sig. AS_REQ1 Once the verification is successful, you can proceed according to the Pub. AAC Res in AAC Determining whether an AAC is legitimate lays the foundation for ensuring that a REQ can access legitimate networks.

[0074] As can be seen from the above technical solutions, when transmitting identity information during the identity authentication process between the requesting device and the authentication access controller, the identity information of the requesting device and the authentication access controller is kept confidential. This can prevent the identity information from being exposed during transmission and ensure that attackers cannot obtain private or sensitive information. Furthermore, by introducing an authentication server, while ensuring the confidentiality of entity identity-related information, real-time two-way identity authentication between the requesting device and the authentication access controller can be achieved, thereby laying the foundation for ensuring that only legitimate users can communicate with legitimate networks.

[0075] Please refer to Figure 1 In the identity authentication process, the consistency of the identity identifier and / or random number in the message can also be verified to ensure the reliability and freshness of the authentication result. Specifically:

[0076] In some embodiments, the AACVeri in S103 may further include the AAC's identity ID. AAC and / or the first random number Nonce generated by AAC AAC Correspondingly, S104's ASVeri also includes ID. AAC and / or Nonce AAC It should be noted that after AS-AAC receives AACeri, it can extract the ID from it. AAC and / or Nonce AAC The ID is passed in subsequent messages, for example, via ASVeri. AAC and / or Nonce AAC Sending to AAC, under normal circumstances, the ID in ASVeri AAC and / or Nonce AAC ID in AACVeri AAC and / or Nonce AAC The same applies, but during transmission, network jitter or attacks may cause the loss or alteration of parameter information in the message. Therefore, prior to S106, AAC could access the ID in ASVeri. AAC and / or Nonce AAC With AAC's own identity ID AAC and / or AAC-generated Nonce AAC (That is, the ID sent by AAC through AACVeri) AAC and / or Nonce AAC The consistency of ) is verified; if the verification passes, AAC then executes S106 according to Res REQ Determine the identity verification result of REQ.

[0077] Similarly, REQInit in S101 can also include a second random number (Nonce) generated by REQ. REQ and / or the encrypted identity information EncData in REQInit REQ The encrypted data may also include the REQ's identity ID. REQ Then AAC for EncData REQ Decryption also yields the ID REQ Correspondingly, S103's AACeri also includes Nonce. REQ and / or ID REQ The S104 ASVeri also includes Nonce REQ and / or ID REQ The encrypted identity authentication result information EncData in S107's AACAuth AACThe encrypted data also includes Nonce REQ and / or ID REQ Accordingly, prior to S110, REQ could decrypt EncData. AAC The Nonce obtained REQ and / or ID REQ Nonce generated with REQ REQ and / or the REQ's own identity ID REQ The consistency is verified; if the verification passes, REQ then executes S110 based on Res. AAC Determine the identity verification result of AAC.

[0078] In other embodiments, REQInit in S101 may also include the digital signature Sig of REQ. REQ Sig REQ The signature data includes the Sig in REQInit. REQ For the other fields mentioned earlier, AAC also needs to determine Sig before S106. REQ The verification process must pass before S106 can be executed. Specifically, AAC determines Sig. REQ Whether the verification is successful includes the following methods: (1) AAC uses the decryption of EncData in REQInit of S101. REQ The obtained Cert REQ Sig REQ Perform verification, and determine Sig based on the verification results. REQ Whether the verification passed; (2) When the Pub in S104's ASVeri REQ It also includes Cert REQ At that time, AAC can first target Pub. REQ Cert in REQ Decrypting EncData REQ The obtained Cert REQ The consistency is verified. If consistent, AAC then uses Pub. REQ Cert in REQ Sig REQ Perform verification, and determine Sig based on the verification results. REQ Whether the verification passed; AAC may also choose not to verify Pub. REQ Cert in REQ Decrypting EncData REQ The obtained Cert REQ Consistency, and directly using Pub REQ Cert in REQ Sig REQ Verification was performed; (3) Sig REQVerification can also be performed by AS-REQ trusted by REQ. In this case, Sig REQ It can be carried in other messages (such as AACVeri in S103, or AS-AACVeri sent by AS-AAC to AS-REQ) and transmitted to AS-REQ. AS-REQ then uses the received Cert. REQ Sig REQ Verification is performed. Only after successful verification will AS-REQ and AS-AAC execute subsequent procedures. Therefore, if AAC can receive ASVeri from S104, AAC determines Sig. REQ Verified.

[0079] In other embodiments, the AAC digital signature Sig in S103 may also include the AAC digital signature. AAC Sig AAC The signature data includes Sig in AACeri. AAC For the other fields mentioned earlier, REQ also needs to determine Sig before S110. AAC The verification process must pass before S110 can be executed. REQ determines Sig. AAC Whether the verification passes includes the following methods: AS-AAC trusted by AAC utilizes Cert in AACVeri. AAC Sig AAC Verification is performed. Only after successful verification will AS-AAC, AS-REQ, and AAC execute subsequent processes. Therefore, if REQ can receive the AACAuth from S107, REQ determines Sig. AAC Verified.

[0080] Similarly, S107's AACAuth can also include AAC's digital signature Sig. AAC Sig AAC The signature data includes the Sig in AACAuth. AAC The other fields mentioned earlier; correspondingly, in AACAuth, EncData AAC Pub in encrypted data AAC Also includes Cert AAC Therefore, before S110, REQ also needs to determine Sig. AAC The verification process must pass before S110 can be executed. REQ determines Sig. AAC Whether the verification passes includes the following methods: REQ utilizes decrypted EncData AAC The Pub AAC Cert in AAC Sig AAC Perform verification, and determine Sig based on the verification results.AAC Has the verification passed?

[0081] In other embodiments, to ensure the reliability of the authentication result, the AACAuth in S107 may also include a message integrity check code MacTag. AAC MacTag AAC AAC uses message integrity verification key pairs, including those in AACAuth excluding MacTag. AAC Other fields besides those used in the calculation are used to generate the MACTag; therefore, before S110, REQ must also use the message integrity verification key to verify the MACTag. AAC If the verification passes, REQ will then execute S110. REQ verifies the MacTag. AAC When using the message integrity verification key pair, the key should include the key pair in AACAuth excluding the MacTag. AAC Other fields are used to calculate and generate MacTag. AAC and calculate MacTag AAC With the MacTag in the received AACAuth AAC The verification is performed by comparing the results. If they match, the verification passes; otherwise, it fails. The method for generating the message integrity verification key used by REQ and AAC will be explained in the next embodiment.

[0082] In the above embodiments, the message encryption key used by REQ and AAC can be obtained through negotiation between the two. Therefore, this embodiment also provides a method for REQ and AAC to negotiate the message encryption key, see [link to documentation]. Figure 2 The method includes:

[0083] S201, AAC sends a key request message AACInit to REQ.

[0084] The AACInit includes the AAC key exchange parameter KeyInfo. AAC KeyInfo AAC This includes the temporary public key of AAC, where key exchange refers to key exchange algorithms such as Diffie-Hellman (DH). The AACInit may also include the first random number (Nonce) generated by AAC. AAC .

[0085] The AACInit may also include security capabilities. AAC Security capabilities AACThis indicates the security capabilities supported by AAC, including the authentication suites (which contain one or more authentication methods), symmetric encryption algorithms, integrity verification algorithms, and / or key derivation algorithms supported by AAC. These parameters allow REQ to select specific security policies to use. REQ can then base its decisions on these security capabilities. AAC Select the specific security policy (Security capabilities) used by REQ. REQ Security capabilities REQ The REQ indicates the authentication method, symmetric encryption algorithm, integrity verification algorithm, and / or key derivation algorithm used.

[0086] S202, REQ is based on the key exchange parameter KeyInfo, which includes REQ. REQ The corresponding temporary private key and KeyInfo AAC The included temporary public key is used to perform key exchange calculation to generate a first key, and the message encryption key is calculated using a key derivation algorithm based on information including the first key.

[0087] If the AACinit in S201 also includes the Nonce generated by AAC. AAC Then REQ can be based on KeyInfo. REQ The corresponding temporary private key and KeyInfo AAC The included temporary public key is used for key exchange calculation to generate the first key K1, and K1 is combined with the Nonce. AAC The second random number Nonce generated by REQ REQ The information, including the message encryption key, is calculated using a negotiated or pre-defined key derivation algorithm. The negotiated key derivation algorithm can be based on the Security capabilities sent by the AAC according to the REQ. AAC The chosen key derivation algorithm. KeyInfo REQ This refers to the key exchange parameters generated by REQ, including REQ's temporary public key. KeyInfo REQ The corresponding temporary private key is the temporary private key generated by REQ that corresponds to the temporary public key of REQ, that is, the temporary public key and the temporary private key are a pair of temporary public-private keys.

[0088] S203, REQ sends the identity-encrypted message REQInit to AAC.

[0089] The REQInit includes the KeyInfo. REQ So that AAC can be based on including KeyInfo AACThe corresponding temporary private key and KeyInfo REQ The message encryption key is calculated from the information including the temporary public key. KeyInfo AAC The corresponding temporary private key is the temporary private key generated by AAC that corresponds to the temporary public key of AAC. That is, the temporary public key and the temporary private key are a pair of temporary public-private keys.

[0090] The REQInit may also include security capabilities. REQ The REQInit may also include a Nonce. REQ So that AAC can use the KeyInfo as a basis. AAC The corresponding temporary private key, the KeyInfo REQ The included temporary public key, the Nonce AAC and the Nonce REQ The information included is used to calculate the message encryption key.

[0091] The REQInit may also include the Nonce. AAC Therefore, AAC can check the Nonce in REQInit before calculating the message encryption key. AAC Nonce generated by AAC AAC The consistency is verified to ensure that the REQInit received by AAC is a response message to AACInit.

[0092] S204, AAC based on including KeyInfo AAC The corresponding temporary private key and KeyInfo REQ The included temporary public key is used to perform key exchange calculations to generate the first key, and the message encryption key is calculated using the key derivation algorithm based on information including the first key.

[0093] If the REQInit also includes the Nonce REQ Then AAC can be based on the KeyInfo. AAC The corresponding temporary private key and the KeyInfo REQ The included temporary public key is used for key exchange calculation to generate the first key K1, and K1 is combined with the Nonce. AAC and the Nonce REQ The information, including the message encryption key, is calculated using a negotiated or pre-defined key derivation algorithm. The negotiated key derivation algorithm can be the Security capabilities sent by AAC based on the REQ. REQ The key export algorithm to be used.

[0094] It should be noted that, in Figure 2 In this embodiment, REQ and AAC can also generate message integrity verification keys. The implementation methods for REQ and AAC to generate message integrity verification keys are the same as... Figure 2 The implementation methods for generating message encryption keys for REQ and AAC in the examples are the same. For example, AAC can be generated through... Figure 2 The embodiment uses a key derivation algorithm to derive a string of key data. This key data can be used as both a message encryption key and a message integrity verification key. Alternatively, a portion of the key data can be used as a message encryption key, and the other portion as a message integrity verification key. AAC can also... Figure 2 The implementation method utilizes a key derivation algorithm to derive two identical or different key data sequences in stages: one sequence serves as the message encryption key, and the other as the message integrity verification key. REQ can be... Figure 2 The embodiment uses a key derivation algorithm to derive a string of key data. This key data can be used as both a message encryption key and a message integrity verification key. Alternatively, a portion of the key data can be used as the message encryption key, and the other portion as the message integrity verification key. REQ can also be achieved through... Figure 2 The implementation method uses a key derivation algorithm to derive two strings of identical or different key data in stages. One string is used as the message encryption key, and the other string is used as the message integrity verification key.

[0095] This application also provides a method for determining the first authentication server and / or the second authentication server used in the current authentication process by utilizing information exchange between AAC and REQ:

[0096] Please refer to Figure 2 In S201's AACInit, AAC adds the identity ID of at least one authentication server trusted by AAC. AS_AAC Then REQ is based on the ID. AS_AAC Identify the identity ID of at least one authentication server that you trust. AS_REQ In practice, REQ is derived from ID. AS_AAC Select at least one authentication server that it trusts as the ID. AS_REQ If the selection fails, REQ will use at least one authentication server it trusts as its ID. AS_REQ (Where, successful selection corresponds to a non-roaming situation, and failed selection corresponds to a roaming situation), and the ID... AS_REQ Add it to REQInit in S203 and send it to AAC. Then, AAC can use it based on the ID. AS_AAC and ID AS_REQThe primary authentication server, such as AAC, can be used to determine the ID. AS_REQ and ID AS_AAC If at least one identical authentication server identifier exists, it indicates a non-roaming scenario. AAC determines the first authentication server to participate in authentication from among the at least one authentication server identifier trusted by both REQ and AAC. If no such identifier exists, it indicates a roaming scenario, and AAC needs to determine the first authentication server based on the ID. AS_AAC Determine the first authentication server AS-AAC involved in identity authentication and set the ID. AS_REQ Send to AS-AAC so that AS-AAC can process the data based on the ID. AS_REQ Determine the second authentication server AS-REQ.

[0097] As another implementation, AAC may not need to send ID to REQ. AS_AAC The REQ adds the identity ID of at least one trusted authentication server to the REQInit in S203. AS_REQ According to ID AS_REQ The identity ID of the authentication server trusted by AAC itself. AS_AAC The specific implementation of the first authentication server and / or the second authentication server participating in the identity authentication process is as described in the previous implementation method.

[0098] Since the authentication servers for REQ and AAC trusts can be the same or different, when the authentication servers for REQ and AAC trusts are the same, it is a non-roaming situation; when the authentication servers for REQ and AAC trusts are different, it is a roaming situation.

[0099] See Figure 3 This is an embodiment of an identity authentication method in a non-roaming scenario, where AS-AAC (or AS-REQ) can be used to represent the authentication server mutually trusted by REQ and AAC. Before this embodiment is executed, both REQ and AAC already possess the message encryption key, which can be pre-shared by both parties or obtained through [other means]. Figure 2 The identity verification method is obtained through negotiation as shown. This method includes:

[0100] S301, AAC obtains the encrypted identity message REQInit sent by REQ.

[0101] The REQInit includes REQ's identity information encrypted EncData. REQ .

[0102] S302, AAC uses the message encryption key to access EncData in REQInit. REQ Decryption yields the REQ digital certificate Cert.REQ .

[0103] S303, AAC sends the first authentication request message AACVeri to AS-AAC.

[0104] The AACeri includes Cert REQ and AAC digital certificate Cert AAC .

[0105] S304, AS-AAC for Cert AAC Perform a validity verification to obtain Res AAC According to Res AAC The information included generates the first identification result information Pub AAC , for Cert REQ Perform a validity verification to obtain Res REQ According to Res REQ The information included generates the second identification result information Pub REQ For including Pub AAC The signature data, including the first digital signature Sig, is calculated to generate the first digital signature. AS_AAC1 For including Pub REQ The second digital signature Sig is generated from the signature data. AS_AAC2 According to Pub AAC Sig AS_AAC1 Pub REQ and Sig AS_AAC2 The information included generates the first authentication response message ASVeri.

[0106] S305, AAC receives the first authentication response message ASVeri sent by AS-AAC.

[0107] The ASVeri includes Pub AAC Sig AS_AAC1 Pub REQ and Sig AS_AAC2 .

[0108] S306, AAC uses AS-AAC's public key to verify Sig. AS_AAC2 .

[0109] If the verification passes, proceed with S307.

[0110] S307, AAC according to Pub REQ Res in REQ Determine the identity verification result of REQ.

[0111] If AAC determines that REQ is valid, then S308 is executed.

[0112] S308, AAC sends a third authentication response message AACAuth to REQ.

[0113] The AACAuth includes encrypted identity authentication result information EncData. AAC .

[0114] S309, REQ uses the message encryption key to encrypt EncData in AACAuth AAC Decryption yields the first authentication result information Pub AAC And the first digital signature Sig AS_AAC1 .

[0115] S310 and REQ use AS-AAC public keys to verify Sig. AS_AAC1 .

[0116] If the verification passes, proceed with step S311.

[0117] S311, REQ (based on Pub) AAC Res in AAC Determine the identity verification result of AAC.

[0118] See Figure 4 This is one embodiment of an identity authentication method in a roaming scenario. In this case, AS-AAC and AS-REQ trust each other and are aware of each other's digital certificates or the public keys within those certificates. Before this embodiment is executed, both REQ and AAC already possess the message encryption key. This message encryption key can be pre-shared by both parties or obtained through [other means]. Figure 2 The identity verification method is obtained through negotiation as shown. This method includes:

[0119] S401, AAC retrieves the encrypted identity message REQInit sent by REQ.

[0120] The REQInit includes REQ's identity information encrypted EncData. REQ .

[0121] S402, AAC uses the message encryption key to access EncData in REQInit. REQ Decrypt to obtain Cert REQ .

[0122] S403, AAC sends the first authentication request message AACVeri to AS-AAC.

[0123] The AACeri includes Cert REQ and Cert AAC .

[0124] S404, AS-AAC for Cert AAC Perform a validity verification to obtain Res AAC According to Res AAC The information included generates the first identification result information Pub AAC For including Pub AAC and Cert REQ The signature data, including the third digital signature Sig, is calculated to generate the third digital signature. AS_AAC3 .

[0125] S405, AS-AAC sends a second authentication request message AS-AACVeri to AS-REQ.

[0126] The AS-AACVeri includes Pub AAC Cert REQ and Sig AS_AAC3 .

[0127] S406 and AS-REQ use the public key of AS-AAC to verify Sig. AS_AAC3 After successful verification, Cert REQ Perform a validity verification to obtain Res REQ According to Res REQ The information included generates the second identification result information Pub REQ For including Pub AAC The signature data, including the first digital signature Sig, is calculated to generate the first digital signature. AS_REQ1 For including Pub REQ The fourth digital signature Sig is generated from the signature data. AS_REQ4 .

[0128] S407, AS-REQ sends a second authentication response message AS-REQVeri to AS-AAC.

[0129] The AS-REQVeri includes the first identification result information Pub. AAC First digital signature Sig AS_REQ1 Second identification result information Pub REQ and the fourth digital signature Sig AS_REQ4 .

[0130] S408 and AS-AAC use the public key of AS-REQ to verify Sig. AS_REQ4 After verification, for Pub REQ The second digital signature Sig is generated from the signature data. AS_AAC2 According to Pub AAC Sig AS_REQ1 Pub REQ and SigAS_AAC2 The information included generates the first authentication response message ASVeri.

[0131] S409, AAC receives the first authentication response message ASVeri sent by AS-AAC.

[0132] The ASVeri includes Pub AAC Sig AS_REQ1 Pub REQ and Sig AS_AAC2 .

[0133] S410 and AAC use AS-AAC's public key to verify Sig. AS_AAC2 .

[0134] If the verification passes, execute S411.

[0135] S411, AAC according to Pub REQ Res in REQ Determine the identity verification result of REQ.

[0136] If AAC determines that REQ is valid, then S412 is executed.

[0137] S412, AAC sends a third authentication response message AACAuth to REQ.

[0138] The AACAuth includes encrypted identity authentication result information EncData. AAC .

[0139] S413, REQ uses the message encryption key to access EncData in AACAuth. AAC Decryption yields the first authentication result information Pub AAC And the first digital signature Sig AS_REQ1 .

[0140] S414, REQ uses the AS-REQ public key to verify Sig. AS_REQ1 .

[0141] If the verification passes, proceed with S415.

[0142] S415, REQ (based on Pub) AAC Res in AAC Determine the identity verification result of AAC.

[0143] See Figure 5This is an embodiment of an identity authentication method in a non-roaming scenario, where AS-AAC (or AS-REQ) can be used to represent the authentication server jointly trusted by REQ and AAC. In this embodiment, the message encryption key negotiation process between REQ and AAC is integrated into the identity authentication process in parallel, making it easier to implement in engineering. The identity authentication method includes:

[0144] S501, AAC generates Nonce AAC and KeyInfo AAC Generate security capabilities as needed AAC .

[0145] S502, AAC sends a key request message AACInit to REQ.

[0146] The AACInit includes Nonce AAC KeyInfo AAC and security capabilities AAC Among them, security capabilities AAC This is an optional field that represents the security capabilities supported by AAC, including the authentication suites, symmetric encryption algorithms, integrity verification algorithms, and / or key derivation algorithms supported by AAC (the same applies throughout the text).

[0147] S503, REQ generates Nonce REQ and KeyInfo REQ Generate security capabilities as needed REQ According to including KeyInfo REQ The corresponding temporary private key and KeyInfo AAC The included temporary public key is used for key exchange calculation to generate the first key K1, and K1 is combined with the Nonce. AAC Nonce REQ Other information (other information used by REQ and AAC is the same and optional, such as specific strings) is used to calculate the message encryption key and message integrity verification key using a negotiated or pre-defined key derivation algorithm; the ciphertext EncData of REQ's identity information is then calculated using a symmetric encryption algorithm with the message encryption key. REQ ; Calculate Sig REQ .

[0148] Among them, security capabilities REQ REQ indicates that it is based on security capabilities AACThe selection of a specific security strategy, i.e., REQ determines the authentication method, symmetric encryption algorithm, integrity verification algorithm, and / or key derivation algorithm to be used; REQ's calculation of the message integrity verification key is an optional operation, which can be performed later when needed.

[0149] S504, REQ sends the encrypted identity message REQInit to AAC.

[0150] The REQInit includes Nonce AAC Nonce REQ Security capabilities REQ KeyInfo REQ EncData REQ and Sig REQ Among them, Nonce AAC and security capabilities REQ Nonce is an optional field. AAC Should be in conjunction with the Nonce in AACInit AAC Same; Does REQ generate security capabilities? REQ It depends on whether the AACInit sent by AAC to REQ includes security capabilities. AAC EncData REQ The encrypted data includes ID REQ and Cert REQ Sig REQ The signature data includes the Sig in REQInit. REQ Other fields mentioned earlier, such as Nonce, are included in REQInit sequentially. AAC Nonce REQ Security capabilities REQ KeyInfo REQ EncData REQ and Sig REQ At that time, Sig REQ The signature data includes the Nonce AAC Nonce REQ Security capabilities REQ KeyInfo REQ and EncData REQ Additionally, when Nonce is not included in REQInit. AAC When using fields, Sig REQThe signature data also includes the Nonce from AACInit. AAC Fields. In this application, the object to be signed is referred to as signature data.

[0151] S505. After receiving the REQInit, AAC performs the following operations (unless otherwise specified or logically related, the actions numbered (1), (2)... in this document do not necessarily have a sequential order due to their numbering. The same applies throughout the document), including:

[0152] (1) If a Nonce exists in REQInit AAC Then check the Nonce. AAC Is it related to the Nonce generated by AAC? AAC If they are the same, discard REQInit; if they are different, discard it.

[0153] (2) Based on the KeyInfo AAC The corresponding temporary private key and the KeyInfo REQ The included temporary public key is used for key exchange calculation to generate the first key K1, and K1 is combined with the Nonce. AAC Nonce REQ Other information (the other information used by AAC and REQ is the same and optional, such as a specific string) is used to calculate the message encryption key and message integrity verification key using a negotiated or pre-defined key derivation algorithm; the calculation of the message integrity verification key by AAC is an optional operation, and this step can be performed later when needed;

[0154] (3) Decrypt EncData using the message encryption key and a symmetric encryption algorithm. REQ Get Cert REQ and ID REQ .

[0155] S506, AAC sends the first authentication request message AACVeri to AS-AAC.

[0156] The AACeri includes Nonce AAC ID AAC Cert AAC Nonce REQ ID REQ and Cert REQ Among them, Nonce REQ ID REQ Cert REQ The nonce should be identical to the corresponding field in REQInit. AAC Should be related to the Nonce generated by AAC AAC same.

[0157] S507, after receiving the AACVeri, AS-AAC performs the following operations, including:

[0158] (1) Verify Cert AAC The legitimacy of Res AAC According to Res AAC and Cert AAC Information generated in Pub AAC Validate Cert REQ The legitimacy of Res REQ According to Res REQ and Cert REQ Information generated in Pub REQ ;

[0159] (2) Calculate the first digital signature Sig AS_AAC1 Second digital signature Sig AS_AAC2 .

[0160] S508, AS-AAC sends the first authentication response message ASVeri to AAC.

[0161] The ASVeri includes ID REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC Sig AS_AAC1 ID AAC Nonce AAC Pub REQ and Sig AS_AAC2 Among them, ID REQ Nonce REQ ID AAC Nonce AAC It should be identical to the corresponding field in AACVeri; Sig AS_AAC1 The signature data includes ID REQ Nonce REQ and Pub AAC ;Sig AS_AAC2 The signature data includes ID AAC Nonce AAC and Pub REQ .

[0162] S509. After receiving the ASVeri, AAC performs the following operations, including:

[0163] (1) Check the ID in ASVeri AAC Nonce AAC Are they respectively related to AAC's own identity ID? AACNonce generated by AAC AAC same;

[0164] (2) Verify Sig using AS-AAC public key AS_AAC2 ;

[0165] (3) Check Pub REQ Cert in REQ Is it related to decrypting EncData? REQ The obtained Cert REQ same;

[0166] (4) Using Cert REQ Verify Sig REQ ;

[0167] (5) If any step of the above checks and verifications fails, ASVeri shall be discarded immediately; if all the above checks and verifications pass, ASVeri shall be discarded according to the Pub. REQ Res in REQ Determine the identity verification result of REQ; if REQ is determined to be illegitimate, end the verification process.

[0168] (6) Calculate EncData using the message encryption key AAC ;

[0169] (7) Calculate Sig AAC ;

[0170] (8) Calculate MacTag as needed AAC .

[0171] S510 and AAC send a third authentication response message, AACAuth, to REQ.

[0172] The AACAuth includes Nonce. REQ Nonce AAC EncData AAC Sig AAC and MacTag AAC Among them, Nonce REQ and Nonce AAC This is an optional field and should be configured separately with the Nonce field in REQInit. REQ Nonce generated by AAC AAC Same; EncData AAC The encrypted data includes ID REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC and Sig AS_AAC1 And ID REQ Nonce REQPub AAC Sig AS_AAC1 This should be identical to the corresponding field in ASVeri. Sig AAC The signature data includes the Sig in AACAuth. AAC Other fields mentioned earlier. MacTag AAC MacTag is an optional field. AAC The calculation process is as follows: using the message integrity verification key, an integrity verification algorithm is applied to all messages in AACAuth except for the MacTag. AAC Other fields are used to calculate and generate MacTag. AAC .

[0173] S511. After receiving the AACAuth, REQ performs the following operations, including:

[0174] (1) If a Nonce exists in AACAuth REQ Then check the Nonce. REQ Nonce generated with REQ REQ Are they the same? If a Nonce exists in AACAuth... AAC Then check the Nonce. AAC Nonce in the received AACInit AAC Are they the same?

[0175] (2) If MacTag exists in AACAuth AAC Then verify MacTag AAC ;

[0176] The verification process is as follows: REQ uses the message integrity verification key and an integrity verification algorithm to verify the integrity of data, excluding the MacTag, in AACAuth. AAC Other fields are calculated locally to generate MacTag. AAC (This calculation method is the same as AAC's calculation of MacTag) AAC (In the same way), and calculate the MacTag AAC With the MacTag in the received AACAuth AAC Compare them.

[0177] (3) Decrypt EncData using the message encryption key and a symmetric encryption algorithm. AAC Get ID REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC and Sig AS_AAC1 ;

[0178] (4) Check the ID obtained after decryption REQ NonceREQ Are they respectively related to REQ's own identity ID? REQ Nonce generated by REQ REQ same;

[0179] (5) Verify Sig using AS-AAC public key AS_AAC1 And, using Pub AAC Cert in AAC Verify Sig AAC ;

[0180] (6) After all the above checks and verifications are passed, according to Pub AAC Res in AAC Determine the identity authentication result of AAC; if any step of the above checks and verifications fails, discard AACAuth immediately.

[0181] It should be noted that (1) in S509, Sig REQ The verification can also be changed to be performed first in S505, that is, AAC decrypts EncData. REQ Get Cert REQ Then, using Cert REQ Sig REQ Verification is performed at this time, Pub REQ Cert may not be included. REQ Alternatively, in S509, for Sig REQ The verification can also be changed to be performed first by AS-AAC in S507. In this case, Sig REQ The data is transmitted to AS-AAC via the S506's AACVR, and AS-AAC uses the received Cert data. REQ Sig REQ Verification is performed at this time, Pub REQ Cert may not be included. REQ (2) Calculate Sig in S509 AAC The operation can also be changed to be executed first in S506, that is, in S506, AAC first processes the Nonce... AAC ID AAC Cert AAC Nonce REQ ID REQ and Cert REQ The information, including the signature calculation, generates the Sig. AAC Therefore, S506's AACeri also includes Sig. AAC In S507, AS-AAC also needs to verify Sig. AACAfter successful verification, AS-AAC performs subsequent operations. In this case, AAC does not need to calculate Sig in S509. AAC Correspondingly, S510's AACAuth does not include Sig. AAC In S511, REQ no longer verifies Sig. AAC At this time, Pub AAC Cert may not be included. AAC .

[0182] See Figure 6 This is an embodiment of an identity authentication method in roaming scenarios. In this embodiment, the message encryption key negotiation process between REQ and AAC is integrated into the identity authentication process in parallel, making it easier to implement in engineering. The identity authentication method includes:

[0183] S601, AAC generates Nonce AAC and KeyInfo AAC Generate security capabilities as needed AAC .

[0184] S602, AAC sends a key request message AACInit to REQ.

[0185] The AACInit includes Nonce AAC KeyInfo AAC ID AS_AAC and security capabilities AAC Among them, ID AS_AAC and security capabilities AAC Optional field; ID AS_AAC The identity identifier of at least one authentication server representing AAC trust is used to enable REQ to be based on the ID. AS_AAC Determine if a mutually trusted authentication server exists.

[0186] S603, REQ generates Nonce REQ and KeyInfo REQ Generate security capabilities as needed REQ and ID AS_REQ According to including KeyInfo REQ The corresponding temporary private key and KeyInfo AAC The included temporary public key is used for key exchange calculation to generate the first key K1, and K1 is combined with the Nonce. AAC Nonce REQOther information (other information used by REQ and AAC is the same and optional, such as specific strings) is used to calculate the message encryption key and message integrity verification key using a negotiated or pre-defined key derivation algorithm; the ciphertext EncData of REQ's identity information is then calculated using a symmetric encryption algorithm with the message encryption key. REQ ; Calculate Sig REQ .

[0187] Among them, security capabilities REQ and ID AS_REQ Optional field; ID AS_REQ The identity identifier of at least one authentication server representing REQ trust, when an ID exists in AACInit. AS_AAC At that time, REQ will try to select at least one authentication server from its trusted authentication servers that matches the ID. AS_AAC The same authentication server in the middle as ID AS_REQ If the choice fails, at least one authentication server trusted by the user will be used as the ID. AS_REQ When the ID does not exist in AACInit AS_AAC At that time, REQ uses at least one authentication server it trusts as its ID. AS_REQ Calculating the message integrity verification key using REQ is an optional operation; this step can be performed later when needed.

[0188] S604, REQ sends the encrypted identity message REQInit to AAC.

[0189] The REQInit includes Nonce AAC Nonce REQ KeyInfo REQ Security capabilities REQ ID AS_REQ EncData REQ and Sig REQ Among them, Nonce AAC Security capabilities REQ and ID AS_REQ Nonce is an optional field. AAC It should be the same as the corresponding field in AACInit; REQ: whether to generate security capabilities REQ It depends on whether the AACInit sent by AAC to REQ includes security capabilities. AAC EncData REQ The encrypted data includes ID REQ and CertREQ ;Sig REQ The signature data includes the Sig in REQInit. REQ Other fields mentioned earlier, when REQInit does not include Nonce AAC When using fields, Sig REQ The signature data also includes the Nonce from AACInit. AAC Field.

[0190] S605. After receiving the REQInit, AAC performs the following operations, including:

[0191] (1) If a Nonce exists in REQInit AAC Then check the Nonce. AAC Is it related to the Nonce generated by AAC? AAC If they are the same, discard REQInit; if they are different, discard it.

[0192] (2) Based on the KeyInfo AAC The corresponding temporary private key and the KeyInfo REQ The included temporary public key is used for key exchange calculation to generate the first key K1, and K1 is combined with the Nonce. AAC Nonce REQ Other information (the other information used by AAC and REQ is the same and optional, such as a specific string) is used to calculate the message encryption key and message integrity verification key using a negotiated or pre-defined key derivation algorithm; the calculation of the message integrity verification key by AAC is an optional operation, and this step can be performed later when needed;

[0193] (3) Decrypt EncData using the message encryption key and a symmetric encryption algorithm. REQ Get Cert REQ and ID REQ ;

[0194] (4) If REQInit carries ID AS_REQ And AACInit carries an ID AS_AAC Then AAC determines ID AS_REQ and ID AS_AAC If at least one identical authentication server identity exists, it indicates a non-roaming scenario, and AAC determines the first authentication server to participate in identity authentication from the identity identifiers of at least one authentication server mutually trusted by REQ and AAC. If not, it indicates a roaming scenario, and AAC needs to determine the first authentication server based on ID. AS_AAC Determine the first authentication server AS-AAC involved in identity authentication and set the ID. AS_REQSend to AS-AAC so that AS-AAC can process the data based on the ID. AS_REQ Determine the second authentication server AS-REQ; or,

[0195] If REQInit carries an ID AS_REQ However, AACInit does not carry an ID. AS_AAC Then AAC determines ID AS_REQ If at least one authentication server with the same identity identifier exists as the authentication server trusted by AAC, then in a non-roaming scenario, AAC determines the first authentication server to participate in authentication from the identity identifiers of at least one authentication server commonly trusted by both REQ and AAC. If not, then in a roaming scenario, AAC needs to determine the first authentication server AS-AAC to participate in authentication based on its own trusted authentication servers, and then record the ID. AS_REQ Send to AS-AAC so that AS-AAC can process the data based on the ID. AS_REQ Determine the second authentication server AS-REQ;

[0196] It should be noted that the result determined in this embodiment should be the roaming status.

[0197] S606, AAC sends the first authentication request message AACVeri to AS-AAC.

[0198] The AACeri includes ID REQ Nonce REQ Cert REQ ID AS_REQ ID AAC Nonce AAC and Cert AAC Among them, ID REQ Nonce REQ Cert REQ The nonce should be identical to the corresponding field in REQInit; AAC Should be related to the Nonce generated by AAC AAC Same; ID AS_REQ This is an optional field and should be the same as the corresponding field in REQInit.

[0199] S607, after receiving the AACVeri, AS-AAC performs the following operations, including:

[0200] (1) Verify Cert AAC The legitimacy of Res AAC According to Res AAC and Cert AAC Information generated in Pub AAC ;

[0201] (2) If ID exists in AACVeri AS_REQ Then AS-AAC is based on ID AS_REQ Determine the second authentication server AS-REQ; if it does not exist, it means that AS-AAC has already confirmed AS-REQ.

[0202] (3) Calculate the third digital signature Sig AS_AAC3 .

[0203] S608, AS-AAC sends a second authentication request message AS-AACVeri to AS-REQ.

[0204] The AS-AACVeri includes ID AAC Nonce AAC Pub AAC ID REQ Nonce REQ Cert REQ and Sig AS_AAC3 Among them, ID AAC Nonce AAC Cert REQ ID REQ Nonce REQ It should be identical to the corresponding field in AACVeri; Sig AS_AAC3 The signature data includes Sig in AS-AACVeri. AS_AAC3 Other fields mentioned earlier.

[0205] S609. After receiving the AS-AACVeri, AS-REQ performs the following operations, including:

[0206] (1) Verify Sig using AS-AAC public key AS_AAC3 If the verification fails, discard AS-AACVeri;

[0207] (2) Verify Cert REQ The legitimacy of Res REQ According to Res REQ and Cert REQ Information generated in Pub REQ ;

[0208] (3) Calculate the first digital signature Sig AS_REQ1 and the fourth digital signature Sig AS_REQ4 .

[0209] S610 and AS-REQ send a second authentication response message AS-REQVeri to AS-AAC.

[0210] The AS-REQVeri includes ID REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC Sig AS_REQ1 ID AAC Nonce AAC Pub REQ and Sig AS_REQ4 Among them, ID REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC ID AAC Nonce AAC This should be identical to the corresponding field in AS-AACVeri. Sig AS_REQ1 The signature data includes ID REQ Nonce REQ and Pub AAC ;Sig AS_REQ4 The signature data includes ID AAC Nonce AAC and Pub REQ .

[0211] S611. After receiving the AS-REQVeri, AS-AAC performs the following operations, including:

[0212] (1) Verify Sig using the public key of AS-REQ AS_REQ4 If the verification fails, the AS-REQVeri will be discarded.

[0213] (2) Calculate the second digital signature Sig AS_AAC2 .

[0214] S612, AS-AAC sends the first authentication response message ASVeri to AAC.

[0215] The ASVeri includes ID REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC Sig AS_REQ1 ID AAC Nonce AAC Pub REQ and Sig AS_AAC2 Among them, ID REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC Sig AS_REQ1 ID AAC Nonce AAC Pub REQThey should be identical to the corresponding fields in AS-REQVeri; Sig AS_AAC2 The signature data includes ID AAC Nonce AAC and Pub REQ .

[0216] S613. After receiving the ASVeri, the AAC performs the following operations, including:

[0217] (1) Check the ID in ASVeri AAC Nonce AAC Are they respectively related to AAC's own identity ID? AAC Nonce generated by AAC AAC same;

[0218] (2) Verify Sig using AS-AAC public key AS_AAC2 ;

[0219] (3) Check Pub REQ Cert in REQ Is it related to decrypting EncData? REQ The obtained Cert REQ same;

[0220] (4) Using Cert REQ Verify Sig REQ ;

[0221] (5) If any step of the above checks and verifications fails, ASVeri shall be discarded immediately; if all the above checks and verifications pass, ASVeri shall be discarded according to the Pub. REQ Res in REQ Determine the identity verification result of REQ; if REQ is determined to be illegitimate, then end the current verification process.

[0222] (6) Calculate EncData using the message encryption key AAC ;

[0223] (7) Calculate Sig AAC ;

[0224] (8) Calculate MacTag as needed AAC The calculation process is as follows: Figure 5 As described in the examples.

[0225] S614, AAC sends a third authentication response message AACAuth to REQ.

[0226] The AACAuth includes Nonce. REQ Nonce AAC EncDataAAC Sig AAC and MacTag AAC Among them, Nonce REQ Nonce AAC and MacTag AAC Nonce is an optional field. REQ and Nonce AAC It should be compared with the Nonce in REQInit respectively. REQ Nonce generated by AAC AAC Same; EncData AAC The encrypted data includes ID REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC and Sig AS_REQ1 , where ID REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC Sig AS_REQ1 It should be identical to the corresponding field in ASVeri; Sig AAC The signature data includes the Sig in AACAuth. AAC Other fields mentioned earlier.

[0227] S615. After receiving the AACAuth, REQ performs the following operations, including:

[0228] (1) If a Nonce exists in AACAuth REQ Then check the Nonce. REQ Nonce generated with REQ REQ Are they the same? If a Nonce exists in AACAuth... AAC Then check the Nonce. AAC Nonce in the received AACInit AAC Are they the same?

[0229] (2) If MacTag exists in AACAuth AAC Then verify MacTag AAC The verification process is as follows: Figure 5 As described in the embodiments;

[0230] (3) Decrypt EncData using the message encryption key and a symmetric encryption algorithm. AAC Get ID REQ Nonce REQ Pub AAC and Sig AS_REQ1 ;

[0231] (4) Check the ID obtained after decryptionREQ Nonce REQ Are they respectively related to REQ's own identity ID? REQ Nonce generated by REQ REQ same;

[0232] (5) Verify Sig using the public key of AS-REQ AS_REQ1 And, using Pub AAC Cert in AAC Verify Sig AAC ;

[0233] (6) After all the above checks and verifications are passed, according to Pub AAC Res in AAC Determine the identity authentication result of AAC; if any step of the above checks and verifications fails, discard AACAuth immediately.

[0234] It should be noted that (1) in S613, Sig REQ The verification can also be changed to be performed first in S605, that is, AAC decrypts EncData. REQ Get Cert REQ Then, using Cert REQ Sig REQ Verification is performed at this time, Pub REQ Cert may not be included. REQ Alternatively, in S613, for Sig REQ The verification can also be changed to be performed first by AS-REQ in S609. In this case, Sig REQ The data is transmitted to AS-REQ via AACVeri of S606 and AS-AACVeri of S608, and then AS-REQ uses the received Cert data. REQ Sig REQ Verification is performed at this time, Pub REQ Cert may not be included. REQ (2) Calculate Sig in S613 AAC The operation can also be changed to be executed first in S606, that is, in S606, AAC includes ID. REQ Nonce REQ Cert REQ ID AS_REQ ID AAC Nonce AAC and Cert AAC The information, including the signature calculation, generates the Sig. AAC , where ID AS_REQ If it is an optional field, then the AACVeri of S606 also includes Sig.AAC In S607, AS-AAC also needs to verify Sig. AAC After successful verification, AS-AAC performs subsequent operations. In this case, AAC in S613 does not need to calculate Sig. AAC Accordingly, S614's AACAuth does not include Sig. AAC In S615, REQ no longer verifies Sig. AAC At this time, Pub AAC Cert may not be included. AAC .

[0235] In the above embodiments, each message may also carry a hash value. X_Y The hash value X_Y This is calculated by the sending entity X using a hash algorithm on the latest preceding message received from the peer entity Y. It is used by the peer entity Y to verify whether entity X has received the complete latest preceding message. Here, HASH... REQ_AAC This represents the hash value calculated by REQ for the latest preceding message sent by AAC. AAC_REQ HASH represents the hash value calculated by AAC for the latest preceding message sent by the received REQ. AAC_AS-AAC HASH represents the hash value calculated by AAC for the latest preceding message received from AS-AAC. AS-AAC_AAC HASH represents the hash value calculated by AS-AAC for the latest preceding message sent by AAC. AS-AAC_AS-REQ HASH represents the hash value calculated by AS-AAC for the latest preceding message sent by AS-REQ. AS-REQ_AS-AAC This represents the hash value calculated by AS-REQ for the latest preceding message received from AS-AAC. If the message currently sent by sender entity X is the first message exchanged between entity X and entity Y, meaning that entity X has not received any preceding messages from peer entity Y, then the hash value in this message... X_Y It may not exist or be meaningless.

[0236] Correspondingly, after the peer entity Y receives a message sent by entity X, if the message contains a hash... X_Y If entity Y has not sent a preceding message to entity X, then entity Y ignores the hash. X_Y When entity Y has previously sent a preceding message to entity X, entity Y uses a hash algorithm to calculate a hash value locally for the latest preceding message previously sent to entity X, and then hashes it with the hash value carried in the received message. X_YIf they match, the subsequent steps are executed; otherwise, the process is discarded or terminated. In this invention, for entity X, the preceding message sent by peer entity Y to entity X refers to any message received by entity X before it sends message M to peer entity Y; the latest preceding message sent by peer entity Y to entity X refers to the latest message received by entity X before it sends message M to peer entity Y. If message M sent by entity X to its peer entity Y is the first message exchanged between entity X and entity Y, then there are no preceding messages sent by peer entity Y to entity X before entity X sends message M to its peer entity Y.

[0237] The above Figure 5 and Figure 6 The optional fields and optional operations in the corresponding embodiments are shown in the accompanying drawings. Figure 5 and Figure 6 The asterisk (*) indicates the content. The order of the various contents included in the messages in all the above embodiments is not limited, and unless otherwise specified, the order in which the message receiver operates on the relevant messages and processes the contents included in the messages is not limited.

[0238] based on Figures 1 to 6 For a corresponding embodiment, see Figure 7 This application provides an authentication access controller (AAC) including:

[0239] The acquisition unit 710 is used to acquire the identity ciphertext message sent by the requesting device. The identity ciphertext message includes the identity information ciphertext of the requesting device. The identity information ciphertext is generated by encrypting encrypted data, including the digital certificate of the requesting device, using a message encryption key.

[0240] The decryption unit 720 is used to decrypt the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device using the message encryption key to obtain the digital certificate of the requesting device;

[0241] Sending unit 730 is configured to send a first authentication request message to a first authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, wherein the first authentication request message includes the digital certificate of the requesting device and the digital certificate of the authentication access controller.

[0242] The receiving unit 740 is configured to receive a first authentication response message sent by the first authentication server. The first authentication response message includes first authentication result information, a first digital signature, second authentication result information, and a second digital signature. The first authentication result information includes a first verification result of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller. The first digital signature is a digital signature calculated and generated by the second authentication server trusted by the requesting device on signature data including the first authentication result information. The second authentication result information includes a second verification result of the digital certificate of the requesting device. The second digital signature is a digital signature calculated and generated by the first authentication server on signature data including the second authentication result information.

[0243] Verification unit 750 is used to verify the second digital signature using the public key of the first authentication server. If the verification passes, determination unit 760 determines the authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result in the second authentication result information. When determination unit 760 determines that the authentication result of the requesting device is valid, sending unit 730 sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device; or...

[0244] Verification unit 750 is used to verify the second digital signature using the public key of the first authentication server. If the verification passes, sending unit 730 sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device, and determining unit 760 determines the authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result in the second authentication result information; or...

[0245] Verification unit 750 is used to verify the second digital signature using the public key of the first authentication server; if the second digital signature is verified, determination unit 760 determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result in the second authentication result information; sending unit 730 sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device.

[0246] The third authentication response message includes encrypted identity authentication result information, which is generated by encrypting encrypted data including the first authentication result information and the first digital signature using the message encryption key.

[0247] Optionally, before the acquisition unit 710 acquires the encrypted identity message, the sending unit 730 is further configured to send a key request message to the requesting device, the key request message including the key exchange parameters of the authentication access controller; then the encrypted identity message acquired by the acquisition unit 710 also includes the key exchange parameters of the requesting device; the authentication access controller further includes:

[0248] The calculation unit is configured to perform key exchange calculations to generate a first key based on the temporary private key corresponding to the key exchange parameters of the authentication access controller and the temporary public key included in the key exchange parameters of the requesting device, and to calculate the message encryption key using a key derivation algorithm based on information including the first key.

[0249] Optionally, the key request message sent by the sending unit 730 may also include a first random number generated by the authentication access controller; the identity ciphertext message acquired by the acquisition unit 710 may also include a second random number generated by the requesting device.

[0250] The calculation unit is further configured to calculate the message encryption key based on information including the first key, the first random number, and the second random number.

[0251] Optionally, the identity encrypted message acquired by the acquisition unit 710 may also include the first random number;

[0252] Before the computing unit calculates the message encryption key, the verification unit 750 is also used to verify the consistency between the first random number in the identity ciphertext message and the first random number generated by the authentication access controller.

[0253] Optionally, if the key request message sent by the sending unit 730 also includes security capability parameter information supported by the authentication access controller, then the identity ciphertext message obtained by the obtaining unit 710 also includes the specific security policy used by the requesting device as determined by the requesting device based on the security capability parameter information.

[0254] Optionally, the key request message sent by the sending unit 730 may also include the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller; then the identity ciphertext message obtained by the obtaining unit 710 may also include the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device.

[0255] The determining unit 760 is further configured to determine the first authentication server based on the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device in the identity ciphertext message and the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller in the key request message.

[0256] Optionally, the identity ciphertext message acquired by the acquisition unit 710 may also include the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device;

[0257] The determining unit 760 is further configured to determine the first authentication server based on the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device in the identity encrypted message and the identity identifier of the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller.

[0258] Optionally, the first authentication request message sent by the sending unit 730 may further include the identity identifier of the authentication access controller and / or the first random number generated by the authentication access controller; correspondingly, the first authentication response message received by the receiving unit 740 may further include the identity identifier of the authentication access controller and / or the first random number.

[0259] Before the determining unit 760 determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device, the verification unit 750 is further configured to verify the consistency between the identity identifier of the authentication access controller in the first authentication response message and the identity identifier of the authentication access controller itself; and / or, verify the consistency between the first random number in the first authentication response message and the first random number generated by the authentication access controller.

[0260] Optionally, the identity ciphertext message acquired by the acquisition unit 710 may also include a second random number generated by the requesting device, and / or, the encrypted data of the identity information ciphertext in the identity ciphertext message may also include the identity identifier of the requesting device; correspondingly,

[0261] The first authentication request message sent by the sending unit 730 also includes the second random number, and / or the identity identifier of the requesting device;

[0262] The first authentication response message received by the receiving unit 740 also includes the second random number, and / or the identity identifier of the requesting device;

[0263] The encrypted data of the identity authentication result information ciphertext in the third authentication response message sent by the sending unit 730 also includes the second random number, and / or the identity identifier of the requesting device.

[0264] Optionally, if the identity encrypted message acquired by the acquisition unit 710 also includes the digital signature of the requesting device, then before the determination unit 760 determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device, the determination unit 760 is further used to determine whether the digital signature of the requesting device has been verified. If the digital signature of the requesting device has been verified, then the identity authentication result of the requesting device is determined according to the second verification result.

[0265] Optionally, the determining unit 760 is specifically used for:

[0266] The digital certificate of the requesting device is obtained by decrypting the encrypted identity information of the requesting device using the decryption unit 720. The digital signature of the requesting device is then verified, and the verification result determines whether the digital signature of the requesting device has passed verification; or...

[0267] When the second authentication result information also includes the digital certificate of the requesting device, the digital signature of the requesting device is verified using the digital certificate of the requesting device in the second authentication result information, and the verification result is used to determine whether the digital signature of the requesting device has passed verification; or...

[0268] When the second authentication result information also includes the digital certificate of the requesting device, the consistency between the digital certificate of the requesting device in the second authentication result information and the digital certificate of the requesting device obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of identity information in the ciphertext message is verified; if they are consistent, the digital certificate of the requesting device is then used to verify the digital signature of the requesting device, and the verification result is used to determine whether the digital signature of the requesting device has passed verification; or...

[0269] The second authentication server uses the received digital certificate of the requesting device to verify the digital signature of the requesting device. If the receiving unit 740 receives the first authentication response message, it determines that the digital signature of the requesting device has been verified.

[0270] Optionally, the third authentication response message sent by the sending unit 730 may also include a message integrity check code. The message integrity check code is generated by the calculation unit using a message integrity check key to calculate other fields in the third authentication response message besides the message integrity check code. The message integrity check key is generated in the same way as the message encryption key.

[0271] Optionally, the message sent by the authentication access controller to the requesting device may further include a hash value calculated by the authentication access controller for the latest preamble message received from the requesting device; the message sent by the authentication access controller to the first authentication server may further include a hash value calculated by the authentication access controller for the latest preamble message received from the first authentication server.

[0272] See Figure 8 This application embodiment also provides a request device REQ, including:

[0273] The sending unit 810 is used to send an identity ciphertext message to the authentication access controller. The identity ciphertext message includes the identity information ciphertext of the requesting device. The identity information ciphertext is generated by encrypting encrypted data, including the digital certificate of the requesting device, using a message encryption key.

[0274] The receiving unit 820 is configured to receive a third authentication response message sent by the authentication access controller. The third authentication response message includes encrypted identity authentication result information, which is generated by encrypting encrypted data including first authentication result information and a first digital signature using a message encryption key. The first authentication result information includes a first verification result of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller, and the first digital signature is a digital signature calculated by the second authentication server trusted by the requesting device on signature data including the first authentication result information.

[0275] The decryption unit 830 is used to decrypt the ciphertext of the identity authentication result information using the message encryption key to obtain the first authentication result information and the first digital signature.

[0276] Verification unit 840 is used to verify the first digital signature using the public key of the second authentication server;

[0277] The determining unit 850 is used to determine the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller based on the first verification result in the first authentication result information when the first digital signature verification is successful.

[0278] Optionally, before the sending unit 810 sends the identity encrypted message, the receiving unit 820 is further configured to receive a key request message sent by the authentication access controller, the key request message including the key exchange parameters of the authentication access controller; the requesting device further includes:

[0279] The calculation unit is configured to perform key exchange calculation to generate a first key based on the temporary private key corresponding to the key exchange parameters of the requesting device and the temporary public key included in the key exchange parameters of the authentication access controller, and to calculate the message encryption key using a key derivation algorithm based on information including the first key.

[0280] The encrypted identity message sent by the sending unit 810 also includes the key exchange parameters of the requesting device.

[0281] Optionally, the key request message received by the receiving unit 820 may also include a first random number generated by the authentication access controller;

[0282] The computing unit is also configured to calculate the message encryption key based on information including the first key, the first random number, and the second random number generated by the requesting device;

[0283] The identity ciphertext message sent by the sending unit 810 also includes the second random number.

[0284] Optionally, the key request message received by the receiving unit 820 may also include security capability parameter information supported by the authentication access controller, and the determining unit 850 may further be used to determine the specific security policy used by the requesting device based on the security capability parameter information.

[0285] The encrypted identity message sent by the sending unit 810 also includes the specific security policy.

[0286] Optionally, the key request message received by the receiving unit 820 may also include the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller; the determining unit 850 is further configured to determine the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device based on the identity identifier of the at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller.

[0287] The encrypted identity message sent by the sending unit 810 also includes the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device.

[0288] Optionally, the encrypted identity message sent by the sending unit 810 may also include the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device.

[0289] Optionally, the identity ciphertext message sent by the sending unit 810 may also include a second random number generated by the requesting device, and / or the encrypted data of the identity information ciphertext in the identity ciphertext message may also include the identity identifier of the requesting device;

[0290] Correspondingly, the encrypted data of the identity authentication result information ciphertext in the third authentication response message received by the receiving unit 820 also includes the second random number, and / or the identity identifier of the requesting device;

[0291] The decryption unit 830 decrypts the encrypted identity authentication result information to obtain the second random number and / or the identity identifier of the requesting device;

[0292] Before the determining unit 850 determines the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller, the verification unit 840 is further used to verify the consistency between the second random number decrypted by the decryption unit 830 and the second random number generated by the requesting device, and / or to verify the consistency between the identity identifier of the requesting device decrypted by the decryption unit 830 and the identity identifier of the requesting device itself.

[0293] Optionally, before determining the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller, the determining unit 850 is further configured to determine whether the digital signature of the authentication access controller has been verified. If the digital signature of the authentication access controller has been verified, the determining unit 850 then determines the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller based on the first verification result.

[0294] Optionally, the determining unit 850 is specifically used for:

[0295] When the authentication access controller sends a first authentication request message to its trusted first authentication server, which also includes the digital signature of the authentication access controller, the first authentication server verifies the digital signature of the authentication access controller using the digital certificate of the authentication access controller in the first authentication request message. If the receiving unit 820 receives a third authentication response message, it determines that the digital signature of the authentication access controller has been verified successfully; or...

[0296] When the third authentication response message also includes the digital signature of the authentication access controller, the first authentication result information also includes the digital certificate of the authentication access controller; then the digital certificate of the authentication access controller is used to verify the digital signature of the authentication access controller, and the verification result is used to determine whether the digital signature of the authentication access controller has been verified.

[0297] Optionally, the third authentication response message received by the receiving unit 820 may also include a message integrity check code; then, before the determining unit 850 determines the authentication result of the authentication access controller, the verification unit 840 is further used to verify the message integrity check code using a message integrity check key; the message integrity check key is generated in the same way as the message encryption key.

[0298] Optionally, the message sent by the requesting device to the authentication access controller may also include a hash value calculated by the requesting device for the latest preceding message received from the authentication access controller.

[0299] Those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the steps of the above method embodiments can be implemented by hardware related to program instructions. The aforementioned program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. When the program is executed, it performs the steps of the above method embodiments. The aforementioned storage medium can be at least one of the following media: read-only memory (ROM), RAM, magnetic disk or optical disk, and other media that can store program code.

[0300] It should be noted that the various embodiments in this specification are described in a progressive manner, and the same or similar parts between the various embodiments can be referred to mutually. Each embodiment focuses on describing the differences from other embodiments. In particular, for the device and system embodiments, since they are consistent with and correspond to the method embodiments, the description is relatively simple, and relevant parts can be referred to the description of the method embodiments. The device and system embodiments described above are merely illustrative. The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate, and the components shown as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the modules can be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment solution according to actual needs. Those skilled in the art can understand and implement this without creative effort.

[0301] The above description is merely one specific embodiment of this application, but the scope of protection of this application is not limited thereto. Any variations or substitutions that can be easily conceived by those skilled in the art within the technical scope disclosed in this application should be included within the scope of protection of this application. Therefore, the scope of protection of this application should be determined by the scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A method for identity verification, characterized in that, The method includes: The authentication access controller obtains the identity encrypted message sent by the requesting device. The identity encrypted message includes the identity information encrypted message of the requesting device. The identity information encrypted message is generated by encrypting encrypted data, including the digital certificate of the requesting device, using a message encryption key. The authentication access controller uses the message encryption key to decrypt the ciphertext of the requesting device's identity information to obtain the requesting device's digital certificate; The authentication access controller sends a first authentication request message to a first authentication server it trusts, the first authentication request message including the digital certificate of the requesting device and the digital certificate of the authentication access controller; The authentication access controller receives a first authentication response message sent by the first authentication server. The first authentication response message includes first authentication result information, a first digital signature, second authentication result information, and a second digital signature. The first authentication result information includes a first verification result of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller. The first digital signature is a digital signature calculated and generated by the second authentication server trusted by the requesting device on signature data including the first authentication result information. The second authentication result information includes a second verification result of the digital certificate of the requesting device. The second digital signature is a digital signature calculated and generated by the first authentication server on signature data including the second authentication result information. The authentication access controller verifies the second digital signature using the public key of the first authentication server. If the verification passes, the authentication access controller determines the authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result in the second authentication result information. When the authentication access controller determines that the authentication result of the requesting device is valid, it sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device; or... The authentication access controller verifies the second digital signature using the public key of the first authentication server. If the verification passes, the authentication access controller sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device and determines the authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result in the second authentication result information; or, The authentication access controller uses the public key of the first authentication server to verify the second digital signature; if the second digital signature is verified, the authentication access controller determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result in the second authentication result information; the authentication access controller sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device. The third authentication response message includes encrypted identity authentication result information, which is generated by encrypting encrypted data including the first authentication result information and the first digital signature using the message encryption key. After receiving the third authentication response message, the requesting device decrypts the ciphertext of the identity authentication result information using the message encryption key to obtain the first authentication result information and the first digital signature. The requesting device verifies the first digital signature using the public key of the second authentication server. If the verification is successful, the requesting device determines the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller based on the first verification result in the first authentication result information.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Before the authentication access controller obtains the encrypted identity message sent by the requesting device, the method further includes: The authentication access controller sends a key request message to the requesting device, the key request message including the key exchange parameters of the authentication access controller; The requesting device generates a first key by performing a key exchange calculation based on the temporary private key corresponding to the key exchange parameters of the requesting device and the temporary public key included in the key exchange parameters of the authentication access controller, and calculates the message encryption key using a key derivation algorithm based on information including the first key. The encrypted identity message sent by the requesting device to the authentication access controller also includes the key exchange parameters of the requesting device. The authentication access controller generates the first key by performing key exchange calculation based on the temporary private key corresponding to the key exchange parameters of the authentication access controller and the temporary public key included in the key exchange parameters of the requesting device, and calculates the message encryption key using the key derivation algorithm based on information including the first key.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The key request message also includes a first random number generated by the authentication access controller; The specific steps involved in calculating the message encryption key by the requesting device are as follows: The requesting device calculates the message encryption key based on information including the first key, the first random number, and the second random number generated by the requesting device. Correspondingly, the encrypted identity message also includes the second random number; The specific steps involved in calculating the message encryption key by the authentication access controller are as follows: The authentication access controller calculates the message encryption key based on information including the first key, the first random number, and the second random number.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The identity-encrypted message further includes the first random number; therefore, before the authentication access controller calculates the message encryption key, the method further includes: The authentication access controller verifies the consistency between the first random number in the identity encrypted message and the first random number generated by the authentication access controller. If the verification passes, the authentication access controller then calculates the message encryption key.

5. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The key request message also includes security capability parameter information supported by the authentication access controller, and the method further includes: The requesting device determines the specific security policy to be used by the requesting device based on the security capability parameter information; The encrypted identity message also includes the specific security policy.

6. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The key request message further includes the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller; then the method further includes: The requesting device determines the identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller based on the identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device. The encrypted identity message also includes the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device; The authentication access controller then determines the first authentication server based on the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device in the identity ciphertext message and the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller in the key request message.

7. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The encrypted identity message also includes the identity identifier of at least one authentication server that the requesting device trusts; then the method further includes: The authentication access controller determines the first authentication server based on the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device in the identity ciphertext message and the identity identifier of the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller.

8. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The first authentication request message also includes the identity identifier of the authentication access controller and / or a first random number generated by the authentication access controller; Accordingly, the first authentication response message also includes the identity identifier of the authentication access controller and / or the first random number; Before the authentication access controller determines the authentication result of the requesting device, the method further includes: The authentication access controller verifies the consistency between the authentication access controller's identity identifier in the first authentication response message and the authentication access controller's own identity identifier; and / or verifies the consistency between the first random number in the first authentication response message and the first random number generated by the authentication access controller; If the verification is successful, the authentication access controller then determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result.

9. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The encrypted identity message also includes a second random number generated by the requesting device, and / or the encrypted data of the encrypted identity information in the encrypted identity message also includes the identity identifier of the requesting device; Accordingly, the first authentication request message also includes the second random number and / or the identity identifier of the requesting device; The first authentication response message also includes the second random number and / or the identity identifier of the requesting device; The encrypted data of the identity authentication result information ciphertext in the third authentication response message also includes the second random number and / or the identity identifier of the requesting device; Before the requesting device determines the authentication result of the authentication access controller, the method further includes: The requesting device uses the message encryption key to decrypt the ciphertext of the identity authentication result information to obtain the second random number and / or the identity identifier of the requesting device; The requesting device verifies the consistency between the decrypted second random number and the second random number generated by the requesting device, and / or verifies the consistency between the decrypted identity of the requesting device and the identity of the requesting device itself. If the verification is successful, the requesting device then determines the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller based on the first verification result.

10. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, If the encrypted identity message also includes the digital signature of the requesting device, then before the authentication access controller determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device, the method further includes: The authentication access controller determines whether the digital signature of the requesting device has been verified. If the digital signature of the requesting device has been verified, the authentication access controller then determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result.

11. The method according to claim 10, characterized in that, The authentication access controller determines whether the digital signature of the requesting device has been verified, specifically including: The authentication access controller verifies the digital signature of the requesting device using the digital certificate obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the requesting device's identity information, and determines whether the digital signature of the requesting device has passed verification based on the verification result; or... When the second authentication result information also includes the digital certificate of the requesting device, the authentication access controller uses the digital certificate of the requesting device in the second authentication result information to verify the digital signature of the requesting device, and determines whether the digital signature of the requesting device has passed verification based on the verification result; or... When the second authentication result information also includes the digital certificate of the requesting device, the authentication access controller verifies the consistency between the digital certificate of the requesting device in the second authentication result information and the digital certificate of the requesting device obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of identity information in the ciphertext message; if they are consistent, the authentication access controller then uses the digital certificate of the requesting device to verify the digital signature of the requesting device, and determines whether the digital signature of the requesting device has passed verification based on the verification result; or... The second authentication server uses the received digital certificate of the requesting device to verify the digital signature of the requesting device. If the authentication access controller receives the first authentication response message, it determines that the digital signature of the requesting device has been verified.

12. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Before the requesting device determines the authentication result of the authentication access controller, the method further includes: The requesting device determines whether the digital signature of the authentication access controller has been verified. If the digital signature of the authentication access controller has been verified, the requesting device then determines the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller based on the first verification result.

13. The method according to claim 12, characterized in that, The requesting device determines whether the digital signature of the authentication access controller has been verified, specifically including: When the first authentication request message also includes the digital signature of the authentication access controller, the first authentication server verifies the digital signature of the authentication access controller using the digital certificate of the authentication access controller in the first authentication request message. If the requesting device receives the third authentication response message, it determines that the digital signature of the authentication access controller has been verified successfully; or... When the third authentication response message also includes the digital signature of the authentication access controller, the first authentication result information also includes the digital certificate of the authentication access controller; then the requesting device uses the digital certificate of the authentication access controller to verify the digital signature of the authentication access controller, and determines whether the digital signature of the authentication access controller has been verified based on the verification result.

14. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The third authentication response message also includes a message integrity check code, which is generated by the authentication access controller using a message integrity check key to calculate other fields in the third authentication response message besides the message integrity check code; the message integrity check key of the authentication access controller is generated in the same way as the message encryption key of the authentication access controller. Before the requesting device determines the authentication result of the authentication access controller, the method further includes: The requesting device uses the message integrity verification key to verify the message integrity verification code; The message integrity verification key of the requesting device is generated in the same way as the message encryption key of the requesting device.

15. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 14, characterized in that, If the first authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller and the second authentication server trusted by the requesting device are the same authentication server, then the method further includes: The first authentication server verifies the legality of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller to obtain a first verification result, verifies the legality of the digital certificate of the requesting device to obtain a second verification result, generates the first authentication result information based on information including the first verification result, generates the second authentication result information based on information including the second verification result, calculates and generates a first digital signature on the signature data including the first authentication result information, calculates and generates a second digital signature on the signature data including the second authentication result information, and generates the first authentication response message based on information including the first authentication result information, the first digital signature, the second authentication result information, and the second digital signature.

16. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 14, characterized in that, If the first authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller and the second authentication server trusted by the requesting device are two different authentication servers, then the method further includes: The first authentication server verifies the legality of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller to obtain a first verification result, generates the first authentication result information based on the information including the first verification result, and calculates and generates a third digital signature based on the signature data including the first authentication result information and the digital certificate of the requesting device. The first authentication server sends a second authentication request message to the second authentication server. The second authentication request message includes the first authentication result information, the digital certificate of the requesting device, and the third digital signature. The second authentication server verifies the third digital signature using the public key of the first authentication server. If the verification is successful, the second authentication server verifies the legality of the digital certificate of the requesting device to obtain a second verification result. Based on the information including the second verification result, the second authentication result information is generated. A first digital signature is calculated and generated from the signature data including the first authentication result information. A fourth digital signature is calculated and generated from the signature data including the second authentication result information. The first authentication server receives a second authentication response message sent by the second authentication server. The second authentication response message includes the first authentication result information, the first digital signature, the second authentication result information, and the fourth digital signature. The first authentication server uses the public key of the second authentication server to verify the fourth digital signature. If the verification is successful, the first authentication server calculates and generates a second digital signature from the signature data, including the second authentication result information, and generates the first authentication response message based on the information including the first authentication result information, the first digital signature, the second authentication result information, and the second digital signature.

17. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 14, characterized in that, The message sent by the requesting device to the authentication access controller also includes a hash value calculated by the requesting device for the latest preceding message received from the authentication access controller; When the authentication access controller receives a message from the requesting device, it first verifies the hash value in the received message, and then performs subsequent operations after the verification is successful. The message sent by the authentication access controller to the requesting device also includes a hash value calculated by the authentication access controller for the latest preceding message sent by the requesting device. When the requesting device receives a message from the authentication access controller, it first verifies the hash value in the received message, and then performs subsequent operations after the verification is successful. The message sent by the authentication access controller to the first authentication server also includes a hash value calculated by the authentication access controller for the latest preceding message received from the first authentication server; When the first authentication server receives a message from the authentication access controller, it first verifies the hash value in the received message, and then performs subsequent operations after the verification is successful. The message sent by the first authentication server to the authentication access controller also includes a hash value calculated by the first authentication server for the latest preceding message sent by the authentication access controller. When the authentication access controller receives a message from the first authentication server, it first verifies the hash value in the received message, and then performs subsequent operations after the verification is successful. The message sent by the first authentication server to the second authentication server also includes a hash value calculated by the first authentication server for the latest preceding message received from the second authentication server; When the second authentication server receives a message from the first authentication server, it first verifies the hash value in the received message, and then performs subsequent operations after the verification is successful. The message sent by the second authentication server to the first authentication server also includes a hash value calculated by the second authentication server for the latest preceding message sent by the first authentication server. When the first authentication server receives a message from the second authentication server, it first verifies the hash value in the received message, and then performs subsequent operations after the verification is successful.

18. An authentication access controller, characterized in that, The authentication access controller includes: The acquisition unit is used to acquire the identity ciphertext message sent by the requesting device. The identity ciphertext message includes the identity information ciphertext of the requesting device, which is generated by encrypting encrypted data, including the digital certificate of the requesting device, using a message encryption key. The decryption unit is used to decrypt the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device using the message encryption key to obtain the digital certificate of the requesting device. The sending unit is configured to send a first authentication request message to a first authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, wherein the first authentication request message includes the digital certificate of the requesting device and the digital certificate of the authentication access controller. The receiving unit is configured to receive a first authentication response message sent by the first authentication server. The first authentication response message includes first authentication result information, a first digital signature, second authentication result information, and a second digital signature. The first authentication result information includes a first verification result of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller. The first digital signature is a digital signature calculated and generated by the second authentication server trusted by the requesting device on signature data including the first authentication result information. The second authentication result information includes a second verification result of the digital certificate of the requesting device. The second digital signature is a digital signature calculated and generated by the first authentication server on signature data including the second authentication result information. The verification unit is used to verify the second digital signature using the public key of the first authentication server. If the verification passes, the determining unit determines the authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result in the second authentication result information. When the determining unit determines that the authentication result of the requesting device is valid, the sending unit sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device; or... The sending unit verifies the second digital signature using the public key of the first authentication server. If the verification passes, the sending unit sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device, and the determining unit determines the authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result in the second authentication result information; or... The first authentication server's public key is used to verify the second digital signature; if the second digital signature is verified, the determining unit determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device based on the second verification result in the second authentication result information; the sending unit sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device. The third authentication response message includes encrypted identity authentication result information, which is generated by encrypting encrypted data including the first authentication result information and the first digital signature using the message encryption key.

19. The authentication access controller according to claim 18, characterized in that, Before the acquisition unit acquires the encrypted identity message, the sending unit is further configured to send a key request message to the requesting device, the key request message including the key exchange parameters of the authentication access controller; then the encrypted identity message acquired by the acquisition unit also includes the key exchange parameters of the requesting device; the authentication access controller further includes: The calculation unit is configured to perform key exchange calculations to generate a first key based on the temporary private key corresponding to the key exchange parameters of the authentication access controller and the temporary public key included in the key exchange parameters of the requesting device, and to calculate the message encryption key using a key derivation algorithm based on information including the first key.

20. The authentication access controller according to claim 19, characterized in that, The key request message sent by the sending unit also includes a first random number generated by the authentication access controller; the identity ciphertext message acquired by the acquisition unit also includes a second random number generated by the requesting device. The calculation unit is further configured to calculate the message encryption key based on information including the first key, the first random number, and the second random number.

21. The authentication access controller according to claim 20, characterized in that, The encrypted identity message acquired by the acquisition unit also includes the first random number; Before the computing unit calculates the message encryption key, the verification unit is also used to verify the consistency between the first random number in the identity encrypted message and the first random number generated by the authentication access controller.

22. The authentication access controller according to claim 19, characterized in that, The key request message sent by the sending unit also includes security capability parameter information supported by the authentication access controller. Therefore, the identity ciphertext message obtained by the obtaining unit also includes the specific security policy used by the requesting device as determined by the requesting device based on the security capability parameter information.

23. The authentication access controller according to claim 19, characterized in that, The key request message sent by the sending unit also includes the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller; therefore, the identity ciphertext message obtained by the obtaining unit also includes the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device. The determining unit is further configured to determine the first authentication server based on the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device in the identity encrypted message and the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller in the key request message.

24. The authentication access controller according to claim 18, characterized in that, The encrypted identity message acquired by the acquisition unit also includes the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device; The determining unit is further configured to determine the first authentication server based on the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device in the identity encrypted message and the identity identifier of the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller.

25. The authentication access controller according to claim 18, characterized in that, The first authentication request message sent by the sending unit also includes the identity identifier of the authentication access controller and / or the first random number generated by the authentication access controller; correspondingly, the first authentication response message received by the receiving unit also includes the identity identifier of the authentication access controller and / or the first random number. Before the determining unit determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device, the verification unit is further configured to verify the consistency between the identity identifier of the authentication access controller in the first authentication response message and the identity identifier of the authentication access controller itself; And / or, verify the consistency between the first random number in the first authentication response message and the first random number generated by the authentication access controller.

26. The authentication access controller according to claim 18, characterized in that, The identity ciphertext message acquired by the acquisition unit also includes a second random number generated by the requesting device, and / or, the encrypted data of the identity information ciphertext in the identity ciphertext message also includes the identity identifier of the requesting device; accordingly, The first authentication request message sent by the sending unit also includes the second random number and / or the identity identifier of the requesting device; The first authentication response message received by the receiving unit also includes the second random number and / or the identity identifier of the requesting device; The encrypted data of the identity authentication result information ciphertext in the third authentication response message sent by the sending unit also includes the second random number and / or the identity identifier of the requesting device.

27. The authentication access controller according to claim 18, characterized in that, The identity encrypted message acquired by the acquisition unit also includes the digital signature of the requesting device. Before the determination unit determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device, the determination unit is also used to determine whether the digital signature of the requesting device has been verified. If the digital signature of the requesting device has been verified, the identity authentication result of the requesting device is then determined based on the second verification result.

28. The authentication access controller according to claim 27, characterized in that, The determining unit is specifically used for: The digital certificate of the requesting device is obtained by decrypting the encrypted identity information of the requesting device using the decryption unit, and the digital signature of the requesting device is verified. Based on the verification result, it is determined whether the digital signature of the requesting device has passed the verification. or, When the second authentication result information also includes the digital certificate of the requesting device, the digital signature of the requesting device is verified using the digital certificate of the requesting device in the second authentication result information, and the verification result is used to determine whether the digital signature of the requesting device has been verified. or, When the second authentication result information also includes the digital certificate of the requesting device, the consistency between the digital certificate of the requesting device in the second authentication result information and the digital certificate of the requesting device obtained by decrypting the identity information ciphertext in the identity ciphertext message is verified. If they match, the digital signature of the requesting device is then verified using the requesting device's digital certificate. Based on the verification result, it is determined whether the digital signature of the requesting device has passed verification; or... The second authentication server uses the received digital certificate of the requesting device to verify the digital signature of the requesting device. If the receiving unit receives the first authentication response message, it determines that the digital signature of the requesting device has been verified.

29. The authentication access controller according to claim 19, characterized in that, The third authentication response message sent by the sending unit also includes a message integrity check code. The message integrity check code is generated by the calculation unit using a message integrity check key to calculate other fields in the third authentication response message besides the message integrity check code. The message integrity check key is generated in the same way as the message encryption key.

30. The authentication access controller according to any one of claims 18 to 29, characterized in that, The message sent by the authentication access controller to the requesting device also includes a hash value calculated by the authentication access controller for the latest preamble message received from the requesting device; the message sent by the authentication access controller to the first authentication server also includes a hash value calculated by the authentication access controller for the latest preamble message received from the first authentication server.

31. A requesting device, characterized in that, The requesting device includes: The sending unit is used to send an identity ciphertext message to the authentication access controller. The identity ciphertext message includes the identity information ciphertext of the requesting device, which is generated by encrypting encrypted data, including the digital certificate of the requesting device, using a message encryption key. The receiving unit is configured to receive a third authentication response message sent by the authentication access controller. The third authentication response message is sent by the authentication access controller after receiving a first authentication response message sent by a first authentication server trusted by the controller. The first authentication response message includes first authentication result information, a first digital signature, second authentication result information, and a second digital signature. The first authentication result information includes a first verification result of the authentication access controller's digital certificate. The first digital signature is a digital signature calculated by the second authentication server trusted by the requesting device on signature data including the first authentication result information. The second authentication result information includes a second verification result of the requesting device's digital certificate. The second digital signature is a digital signature calculated by the first authentication server on signature data including the second authentication result information. The third authentication response message includes encrypted identity authentication result information, which is generated by encrypting encrypted data including the first authentication result information and the first digital signature using a message encryption key. The decryption unit is used to decrypt the ciphertext of the identity authentication result information using the message encryption key to obtain the first authentication result information and the first digital signature; The verification unit is used to verify the first digital signature using the public key of the second authentication server; The determining unit is configured to determine the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller based on the first verification result in the first authentication result information when the first digital signature verification is successful.

32. The requesting device according to claim 31, characterized in that, Before the sending unit sends the identity encrypted message, the receiving unit is also configured to receive a key request message sent by the authentication access controller, the key request message including the key exchange parameters of the authentication access controller; The requesting device also includes: The calculation unit is configured to perform key exchange calculation to generate a first key based on the temporary private key corresponding to the key exchange parameters of the requesting device and the temporary public key included in the key exchange parameters of the authentication access controller, and to calculate the message encryption key using a key derivation algorithm based on information including the first key. The encrypted identity message sent by the sending unit also includes the key exchange parameters of the requesting device.

33. The requesting device according to claim 32, characterized in that, The key request message received by the receiving unit also includes a first random number generated by the authentication access controller; The computing unit is also configured to calculate the message encryption key based on information including the first key, the first random number, and the second random number generated by the requesting device; The encrypted identity message sent by the sending unit also includes the second random number.

34. The requesting device according to claim 32, characterized in that, The key request message received by the receiving unit also includes security capability parameter information supported by the authentication access controller, and the determining unit is further configured to determine the specific security policy used by the requesting device based on the security capability parameter information; The encrypted identity message sent by the sending unit also includes the specific security policy.

35. The requesting device according to claim 32, characterized in that, The key request message received by the receiving unit also includes the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller; the determining unit is further configured to determine the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device based on the identity identifier of the at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller. The encrypted identity message sent by the sending unit also includes the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device.

36. The requesting device according to claim 31, characterized in that, The encrypted identity message sent by the sending unit also includes the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device.

37. The requesting device according to claim 31, characterized in that, The identity ciphertext message sent by the sending unit also includes a second random number generated by the requesting device, and / or the encrypted data of the identity information ciphertext in the identity ciphertext message also includes the identity identifier of the requesting device; Correspondingly, the encrypted data of the identity authentication result information ciphertext in the third authentication response message received by the receiving unit also includes the second random number and / or the identity identifier of the requesting device; The decryption unit decrypts the encrypted identity authentication result information to obtain the second random number and / or the identity identifier of the requesting device. Before the determining unit determines the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller, the verification unit is further used to verify the consistency between the second random number decrypted by the decryption unit and the second random number generated by the requesting device, and / or to verify the consistency between the identity identifier of the requesting device decrypted by the decryption unit and the identity identifier of the requesting device itself.

38. The requesting device according to claim 31, characterized in that, Before the determining unit determines the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller, the determining unit is further configured to determine whether the digital signature of the authentication access controller has been verified. If the digital signature of the authentication access controller has been verified, the determining unit then determines the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller based on the first verification result.

39. The requesting device according to claim 38, characterized in that, The determining unit is specifically used for: When the authentication access controller sends a first authentication request message to its trusted first authentication server, and the message includes the digital signature of the authentication access controller, the first authentication server verifies the digital signature of the authentication access controller using the digital certificate of the authentication access controller in the first authentication request message. If the receiving unit receives a third authentication response message, it determines that the digital signature of the authentication access controller has been verified successfully; or... When the third authentication response message also includes the digital signature of the authentication access controller, the first authentication result information also includes the digital certificate of the authentication access controller; then the digital certificate of the authentication access controller is used to verify the digital signature of the authentication access controller, and the verification result is used to determine whether the digital signature of the authentication access controller has been verified.

40. The requesting device according to claim 32, characterized in that, The third authentication response message received by the receiving unit also includes a message integrity check code; therefore, before the determining unit determines the authentication result of the authentication access controller, the verification unit is also used to verify the message integrity check code using the message integrity check key; the message integrity check key is generated in the same way as the message encryption key.

41. The requesting device according to any one of claims 31 to 40, characterized in that, The message sent by the requesting device to the authentication access controller also includes a hash value calculated by the requesting device for the latest preceding message received from the authentication access controller.

Citation Information

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