A bank mobile operation security protection method, device and storage medium

Abstract

The present invention discloses a bank mobile operation security protection method, device and storage medium. An EMM management terminal set in the bank's internal network performs security verification on the mobile device through the international mobile equipment identity code IMEI of the mobile device. When the EMM management terminal determines that the IMEI of the mobile device is in the registered IMEI list, it is determined that the mobile device has passed the verification. The mobile device is connected to the EMM management terminal through a public network, and a bank operation application is run in the mobile device; the mobile device performs certificate verification on a front-end server set in the bank's internal network based on a secure data channel; the mobile device that passes the verification performs data transmission with the server of the bank's internal network through the secure data channel, and before the mobile device sends data to the server of the bank's internal network, the bank operation application of the data source and the operating system of the mobile device are also verified for security. The embodiments of the present invention improve the security of bank mobile operations.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of Internet security technology, and in particular to a bank mobile operation security protection method, device and storage medium. Background Art

[0002] Currently, the common way to handle business in bank branches is to go to the bank counter and ask the teller to assist in handling bank counter business. The tools used are computers, fingerprint scanners, cameras, printers, card readers and other equipment dedicated to bank tellers, as well as password keyboards and electronic signature screens outside the counter for customers.

[0003] Currently, there are also a small number of bank branch staff who use work equipment, such as tablet computers and small integrated peripherals, to work in a public network environment. Since there are nodes in network communication running in a public network environment, information is easily stolen and attacked, and its communication security is difficult to guarantee. Summary of the invention

[0004] The present invention provides a bank mobile operation security protection method, device, electronic device and storage medium to solve the problem that the information of mobile devices is easily stolen and attacked and the communication security is difficult to ensure because the mobile devices are running in a public network environment.

[0005] According to one aspect of the present invention, a bank mobile operation security protection method is provided, comprising:

[0006] The enterprise mobility management EMM management terminal set in the bank's internal network performs security verification on the mobile device through the international mobile equipment identity code IMEI of the mobile device. When the EMM management terminal determines that the IMEI of the mobile device is in the registered IMEI list, it is determined that the mobile device has passed the verification, wherein the mobile device is connected to the EMM management terminal through a public network, and the bank operation application is running in the mobile device;

[0007] The mobile device set up in the public network verifies the certificate of the front-end server set up in the bank's internal network based on the secure data channel;

[0008] The mobile device that has passed the verification transmits data with the server of the bank's internal network through a secure data channel. Before the mobile device sends data to the server of the bank's internal network, the security of the bank's operating application that is the source of the data and the operating system of the mobile device are also verified.

[0009] According to another aspect of the present invention, a bank mobile operation safety protection device is provided, comprising:

[0010] An EMM management terminal set in the internal network of the bank is used to perform security verification on the mobile device through the international mobile equipment identity code IMEI of the mobile device. When the EMM management terminal determines that the IMEI of the mobile device is in the registered IMEI list, it is determined that the mobile device has passed the verification, wherein the mobile device is connected to the EMM management terminal through a public network, and a banking operation application is run in the mobile device;

[0011] The mobile device is used to verify the certificate of the front-end server set up in the bank's internal network based on the secure data channel, and to transmit data with the server of the bank's internal network through the secure data channel. Before the mobile device sends data to the server of the bank's internal network, the security of the bank's operating application that is the source of the data and the operating system of the mobile device are also verified.

[0012] According to another aspect of the present invention, there is provided a computer-readable storage medium storing computer instructions for implementing the bank mobile operation security protection method of any embodiment when the processor executes the computer instructions.

[0013] The technical solution of the embodiment of the present invention is that the enterprise mobility management EMM management end set in the bank's internal network performs security verification on the mobile device through the international mobile equipment identity code IMEI of the mobile device. When the EMM management end determines that the IMEI of the mobile device is in the registered IMEI list, it is determined that the mobile device has passed the verification, wherein the mobile device is connected to the EMM management end through a public network, and a bank operation application is run in the mobile device; the mobile device set in the public network performs certificate verification on the front-end server set in the bank's internal network based on a secure data channel; the mobile device that passes the verification transmits data with the server of the bank's internal network through the secure data channel, wherein before the mobile device sends data to the server of the bank's internal network, the security of the bank's operation application and the operating system of the mobile device are also verified. That is to say, by making the device in the bank's internal network and the mobile device in the public network perform multiple identity authentication, use a secure data channel for data transmission, and perform security verification on the bank's operation application and the operating system of the mobile device, the problem that the mobile device is running in a public network environment and its information is easily stolen and attacked, and its communication security is difficult to be guaranteed is solved, and the technical effect of improving the security of the bank's mobile operation is achieved.

[0014] It should be understood that the contents described in this section are not intended to identify the key or important features of the embodiments of the present invention, nor are they intended to limit the scope of the present invention. Other features of the present invention will become easily understood through the following description. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0015] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for use in the description of the embodiments. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative work.

[0016] Figure 1 This is a flow chart of a bank mobile operation security protection method provided by the first embodiment of the present invention;

[0017] Figure 2 It is a schematic diagram of the structure of the bank's mobile operation safety protection device;

[0018] Figure 3 It is a flow chart of certificate verification between a mobile device and a front-end server;

[0019] Figure 4 It is a flowchart of the security verification of the banking application of the data source by the mobile device;

[0020] Figure 5 This is a flow chart of a bank mobile operation security protection method provided by Embodiment 2 of the present invention;

[0021] Figure 6 It is a flowchart of data transmission via encrypted Bluetooth data channel;

[0022] Figure 7 It is a flowchart of the base sending the user password to the bank's internal network. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0023] In order to enable those skilled in the art to better understand the scheme of the present invention, the technical scheme in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work should fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0024] It should be noted that the terms "first", "second", etc. in the specification and claims of the present invention and the above-mentioned drawings are used to distinguish similar objects, and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequence. It should be understood that the data used in this way can be interchanged where appropriate, so that the embodiments of the present invention described herein can be implemented in an order other than those illustrated or described herein. In addition, the terms "including" and "having" and any variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusions, for example, a process, method, system, product or device that includes a series of steps or units is not necessarily limited to those steps or units that are clearly listed, but may include other steps or units that are not clearly listed or inherent to these processes, methods, products or devices.

[0025] Embodiment 1

[0026] Figure 1 This is a flow chart of a bank mobile operation security protection method provided by the first embodiment of the present invention. This embodiment is applicable to the situation where the bank operation equipment operates in a public network environment. The method can be executed by a bank mobile operation security protection device. The bank mobile operation security protection device can be implemented in the form of hardware and / or software. The bank mobile operation security protection device can be configured in the bank's internal network or mobile device. Figure 1 As shown, the method includes:

[0027] S110. The Enterprise Mobility Management (EMM) management terminal set up in the bank's internal network performs security verification on the mobile device through the International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) of the mobile device. When the EMM management terminal determines that the IMEI of the mobile device is in the registered IMEI list, it is determined that the mobile device has passed the verification. The mobile device is connected to the EMM management terminal through a public network, and a banking operation application is run in the mobile device.

[0028] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the bank's mobile operation safety protection device. Figure 2As shown, the operating environment of the bank mobile operation protection device involves the public network and the bank's internal network. The bank's internal network usually has the advantages of security and stability. Computers, tablets and small integrated peripherals used for handling business within the scope of bank branches are usually connected to the bank's internal network, and the access methods include physical network cables and bank's internal network WI-FI. However, the mobility of computers, tablets and other devices running in the bank's internal network is poor, so they cannot leave the branch to work. The public network is an ordinary wired network or wireless network, such as a WI-FI network open to unspecified devices. Mobile devices using the public network can leave the branch to work, such as bank account managers directly handling business through the public network at the customer's office, or using the 4G phone card that comes with the tablet to open the hotspot for operation. Of course, compared with the bank's internal network, mobile devices operating in the public network environment are easily stolen and attacked, and their network communication security is poor. Therefore, in order to ensure the operation safety of mobile devices in the public network environment, the bank mobile operation security protection method described in each embodiment of the present invention is adopted.

[0029] The EMM system includes a client installed on a mobile device in the public network and a management terminal in the bank's internal network. Figure 2 Only the EMM management end in the bank's internal network is shown, but the client end is not shown. Enterprise mobile management refers to providing information management solutions and services for enterprise mobile devices, applications, information and other contents involved in the process of enterprise mobile information construction through mobile information management means. In short, enterprise mobile management refers to conducting corporate office work on mobile devices, for example, employees can connect to the company's backend server on their mobile phones.

[0030] Since the mobile device is set in the public network, in order to ensure the communication security between the mobile device and the bank's internal network, the device security of the mobile device needs to be verified. Every mobile device that can communicate with the bank's internal network should be a known mobile device, that is, any mobile device cannot be allowed to communicate with the bank's internal network through the public network without restriction.

[0031] Specifically, mobile devices that are allowed to communicate with the bank's internal network should be pre-registered in the EMM management terminal, using the International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) as the unique identifier of the mobile device. The International Mobile Equipment Identity is commonly referred to as the mobile device serial number, which is used to identify each mobile device in the communication network, equivalent to the mobile device's ID number. The EMM management terminal sets up a registered IMEI list, and stores the IMEI of mobile devices that are allowed to communicate with the bank's internal network in the registered IMEI list. When a mobile device requests to communicate with the bank's internal network, the EMM management terminal determines whether the IMEI of the mobile device is in the registered IMEI list. If it is, it is considered that the mobile device has passed the device security verification. If not, it is considered that the device has not passed the device security verification, and the mobile device is denied communication with the bank's internal network.

[0032] The banking application running in the mobile device, i.e. the EMM client installed on the mobile device, has the function of assisting the internal staff of the bank to provide business processing functions to the customers. That is to say, the mobile device provides services to the customers through the banking application running in it, and also interacts with the EMM management end through the banking application (EMM client). For example, when the banking application is started and attempts to communicate with the internal network of the bank, the EMM management end verifies the device security.

[0033] S120. The mobile device disposed in the public network performs certificate verification on the front-end server disposed in the bank's internal network based on a secure data channel.

[0034] like Figure 2 As shown, the front-end server is a data collection server, which performs data collection and relatively simple data processing compared to the server. S110 is the process of the EMM management end performing security verification on the mobile device. Similarly, the mobile device also needs to perform security verification on the front-end server in the bank's internal network to prevent hackers from using fake front-end servers to defraud customer privacy information in the mobile device.

[0035] Optionally, the secure data channel includes a secure data channel encrypted using https.

[0036] The advantage of this setting is that it provides a simple and easy-to-use secure data channel type, further improving the security of data transmission between mobile devices and front-end servers.

[0037] Figure 3 This is a flow chart of the certificate verification between the mobile device and the front-end server. Figure 3 As shown, the mobile device and the front-end server perform certificate verification, which specifically includes the following steps:

[0038] S310: The mobile device requests a handshake with the front-end server.

[0039] The mobile device sends a handshake signal to the front-end server to prepare for certificate verification.

[0040] S320: The front-end server sends a certificate to the mobile device.

[0041] After the handshake is completed, the front-end server sends the server certificate issued by the certification authority (CA) to the mobile device. At the same time, the front-end server can send the public key to the mobile device based on the principle of https encryption.

[0042] S330: The mobile device verifies the received certificate to determine whether the certificate information is consistent with the locally trusted certificate information.

[0043] The mobile device verifies through the CA whether the certificate is a legitimate server certificate.

[0044] S340, the mobile device exchanges keys with the front-end server to prepare for the subsequent transmission of information encrypted by the communication key.

[0045] After the certificate is verified, based on the principle of https encryption, the mobile device uses its own random number algorithm to generate a random number, encrypts the random number with the public key sent by the front-end server, and sends the encrypted random number to the front-end server. After receiving the encrypted random number, the front-end server uses the private key corresponding to the public key to decrypt it and obtain a random number, which is used as the communication key between the subsequent mobile device and the front-end server.

[0046] S350, data encrypted by the communication key is transmitted between the mobile device and the front-end server.

[0047] At this point, two-way security verification between the mobile device in the public network and the device in the bank's internal network is completed through S110 and S120.

[0048] S130. The verified mobile device transmits data with the server of the bank's internal network through a secure data channel. Before the mobile device sends data to the server of the bank's internal network, the security of the bank's operating application that is the source of the data and the operating system of the mobile device are also verified.

[0049] This step has some overlap with S350. In order to ensure the completeness of the description of S110 - S130 and S310 - S350, the overlapped parts in S130 and S350 are retained.

[0050] Figure 4 The flowchart of the mobile device performing security verification on the banking application of the data source. Optionally, the mobile device performs security verification on the banking application of the data source, including:

[0051] S410. The mobile device performs security verification on the signature certificate of the banking application that is the data source.

[0052] The banking operation application is installed on the mobile device, which can be an EMM client or other related application software installed on the mobile device, such as an input method APP. Therefore, in order to ensure the security of data transmission, it is necessary to perform security verification on the banking operation application related to data generation and transmission.

[0053] The signature certificate is the identity of the application developer. The principle of using the signature certificate to verify the security of the bank operation application is as follows: when signing, the application developer first obtains the hash value of the application as the digital summary information, and then encrypts the digital summary information into a digital signature. The digital signature and the signature certificate file are packaged together into the Android application (Android Application Package, APK) file, that is, the digital signature and the signature certificate correspond one to one. When the application user performs the signature certificate security verification, he first obtains the digital signature and signature certificate from the APK file, decrypts the digital signature to obtain the hash value of the application, and determines whether the hash value of the application is correct, that is, whether the hash value of the application is the correct hash value corresponding to the signature certificate. Among them, the correct hash value is pre-stored and can be directly obtained by the mobile device.

[0054] The advantage of this arrangement is that by verifying the security of the signature certificate of the banking operation application, pirated and double-signed banking operation applications can be identified.

[0055] S420. The mobile device verifies the integrity of the banking operation application that is the data source, and confirms whether the banking operation application has been tampered with.

[0056] In some cases, banking applications may be tampered with without changing the digital signature, for example, by exploiting security vulnerabilities in the Android system.

[0057] The principle of verifying the integrity of the banking application is as follows: the Dalvik VM executes (Dex) file of the tampered banking application is different from the Dex file of the untampered banking application, so by comparing the Dex files, it can be determined whether the banking application is complete and untampered. Among them, the Dex file can be understood as the file obtained by decompressing the APK file.

[0058] Specifically, the mobile device can pre-store the hash value obtained by the hash algorithm of the Dex file of the untampered banking application, which is called the standard hash value. When the integrity of a banking application needs to be verified, the hash value of the Dex file of the banking application is compared with its standard hash value to determine whether the Dex file of the banking application has been tampered with.

[0059] S430. The mobile device verifies the identity of the user of the mobile device when logging into the banking operation application.

[0060] Since mobile devices may be lost or used by illegal users, it is necessary to determine the identity of the specific user operating the mobile device. For example, you can ensure that the mobile device is used by a legitimate user by entering a password, performing face recognition or fingerprint recognition, and set different usage permissions for each login method. For example, after fingerprint recognition login, all functions of the mobile device can be used, while after face recognition login, only some functions of the mobile device can be used.

[0061] After the mobile device is locked and unlocked again, the identity of the mobile device user is verified again to prevent the mobile device from being used by an illegal user after the verified user leaves.

[0062] S440: When the mobile device is running a banking application, confirm that the user of the mobile device is operating in compliance with regulations.

[0063] Even when a legal user uses a mobile device, there is a possibility that the legal user performs non-compliant operations, such as operating the mobile device beyond his / her permission. Specifically, the mobile device verifies whether the user has the right to use each function of the banking application, and prompts the user if the operation is non-compliant and refuses to continue the operation.

[0064] Among them, the code of the banking operation application has been obfuscated, and the banking operation application has been reinforced.

[0065] The purpose of S410 and S420 is to identify the bank operation application that has been tampered with, and obfuscating the code of the bank operation application can prevent the bank operation application from being decompiled or tampered with. If the code of the bank operation application is not obfuscated, once it is decompiled, the source code will be directly exposed to the attacker, causing security risks.

[0066] Code obfuscation is a technique used to hide the structure and flow of code, which can make it more difficult to read the code. For example, by changing the names of methods and variables in Java code to irrelevant and meaningless names, or obfuscating simple logical branches, it is difficult for attackers to control the internal implementation logic of the application, increasing the difficulty of reverse engineering and cracking. Specifically, the Proguard tool can be used to obfuscate the program source code.

[0067] Reinforcement of the bank operation application can prevent the bank operation application from being decompiled or tampered. If the APK file does not take effective protection measures, it may face the risk of being decompiled. Specifically, the APK file can be uploaded to the reinforcement platform for reinforcement to generate a reinforced APK file.

[0068] The benefit of this setup is that it provides a comprehensive and implementable technical solution for security verification of banking application operations, and performs all-round security verification from the perspectives of signature certificates, application integrity and user safety.

[0069] Optionally, the mobile device performs security verification on the operating system of the mobile device, including: the mobile device performs security verification on the version of its operating system, wherein the mobile device is installed with an EMM security desktop.

[0070] Commonly used operating systems such as Android are more vulnerable to attacks due to their openness and high degree of fragmentation. For example, when the mobile device is a tablet computer, the computer manufacturer will provide system security patches to users in a timely manner, and these system security patches may affect the stable operation of banking applications. Therefore, the EMM security desktop can be installed in the mobile device, where the EMM security desktop can be understood as security protection software released by the bank. The EMM security desktop has the function of a security sandbox, which is responsible for isolating the native operating system, verifying the security of the operating system, controlling the mobile device to run only the specified version of the operating system, and controlling the mobile device not to automatically upgrade the operating system.

[0071] The benefit of this setting is that the EMM secure desktop can be used to further improve the security of mobile devices running in public networks.

[0072] The technical solution of the embodiment of the present invention is that the enterprise mobility management EMM management end set in the bank's internal network performs security verification on the mobile device through the international mobile equipment identity code IMEI of the mobile device. When the EMM management end determines that the IMEI of the mobile device is in the registered IMEI list, it is determined that the mobile device has passed the verification, wherein the mobile device is connected to the EMM management end through a public network, and a bank operation application is run in the mobile device; the mobile device set in the public network performs certificate verification on the front-end server set in the bank's internal network based on a secure data channel; the mobile device that passes the verification transmits data with the server of the bank's internal network through the secure data channel, wherein before the mobile device sends data to the server of the bank's internal network, the security of the bank's operation application and the operating system of the mobile device are also verified. That is to say, by making the device in the bank's internal network and the mobile device in the public network perform multiple identity authentication, use a secure data channel for data transmission, and perform security verification on the bank's operation application and the operating system of the mobile device, the problem that the mobile device is running in a public network environment and its information is easily stolen and attacked, and its communication security is difficult to be guaranteed is solved, and the technical effect of improving the security of the bank's mobile operation is achieved.

[0073] Embodiment 2

[0074] Figure 5 1 is a flow chart of a bank mobile operation security protection method provided by the second embodiment of the present invention. This embodiment is a further refinement of the first embodiment, and the steps that are the same or similar to the first embodiment will not be repeated. Figure 5 As shown, the method includes:

[0075] S510. The enterprise mobility management EMM management terminal set in the bank's internal network verifies the security of the mobile device through the international mobile equipment identity code IMEI of the mobile device. When the EMM management terminal determines that the IMEI of the mobile device is in the registered IMEI list, it is determined that the mobile device has passed the verification. The mobile device is connected to the EMM management terminal through a public network, and a banking operation application is run in the mobile device.

[0076] S520: The mobile device in the public network performs certificate verification on the front-end server in the bank's internal network based on the secure data channel.

[0077] S530. The mobile device that has passed the verification transmits data with the server of the bank's internal network through a secure data channel. Before the mobile device sends data to the server of the bank's internal network, the security of the bank's operating application that is the source of the data and the operating system of the mobile device are also verified.

[0078] S540. The mobile device performs security verification on the base through the serial number of the base. When the mobile device determines that the serial number of the base is correct, it is determined that the base has passed the verification. The base is dedicated to the mobile device and is used to input information into the mobile device.

[0079] like Figure 2 As shown, in addition to the mobile device, a base is also provided in the public network. The base here refers to a device connected to the mobile device for banking operations, for example, a device with functions such as a password keyboard, an electronic signature screen, a card reader, a fingerprint reader, etc., wherein the base has an independent operating system. Therefore, in addition to ensuring the security of the mobile device, the security of the base also needs to be ensured, that is, any base cannot be allowed to communicate with the mobile device through the public network without restriction.

[0080] Specifically, the base that is allowed to communicate with the mobile device should be pre-registered in the EMM management terminal, and the ID card identification module serial number is used as the unique identifier of the base. When the mobile device is ready to establish a connection with the base, the EMM management terminal sends the base's ID card identification module serial number that matches it to the mobile device; the base sends the base's ID card identification module serial number to the mobile device, and the mobile device determines whether the ID card identification module serial number is consistent with the matching ID card identification module serial number sent by the EMM management terminal. If they are consistent, the base is allowed to establish a connection with the mobile device, otherwise the connection is not allowed.

[0081] S550. The verified base transmits data with the mobile device through an encrypted channel, and then transmits data with the front-end server and the server in the bank's internal network. Before the base sends data to the mobile device, the security of the base's operating system is also verified. The base is used to input information to the mobile device.

[0082] like Figure 2 As shown, after the base is verified, data is transmitted between the base and the mobile device, and between the mobile device and the front-end server. For example, the base sends the signature entered by the customer on the electronic signature screen to the mobile device through an encrypted channel, and the mobile device forwards the signature to the front-end server through a secure data channel. Similar to the mobile device, since the base also has an operating system, the security of the base's operating system also needs to be verified.

[0083] Optionally, the encrypted channel includes an encrypted Bluetooth data channel.

[0084] Mobile devices and bases are usually connected and communicated via Bluetooth. Bluetooth is a wireless open standard technology used to exchange voice or data between short-range devices. It has obvious advantages of ease of use, but like any wireless technology, Bluetooth communication is vulnerable to various attacks and threats. The security protection of the Bluetooth channel is mainly completed by the security manager of the Bluetooth module. At the same time, the Bluetooth protocol also provides three security modes. In order to further improve security, the Bluetooth data channel needs to be encrypted.

[0085] Figure 6 This is a flowchart of data transmission through an encrypted Bluetooth data channel. Figure 6 As shown, the Bluetooth data channel is symmetrically encrypted, specifically including the following steps:

[0086] S610: The base calls the encrypted SO file to encrypt the original data.

[0087] Among them, the encrypted SO file is an independently developed encryption module, and the SO file is a program function library under Linux, that is, compiled code and data that can be used by other programs.

[0088] S620: The base sends the encrypted original data to the mobile device.

[0089] S630: After receiving the encrypted original data, the mobile device calls the encrypted SO file to decrypt the data to obtain the original data.

[0090] The encrypted SO file is known to the mobile device matched with the base, so the mobile device can decrypt the encrypted original data.

[0091] Figure 6 The data transmission direction is to transmit data from the base to the mobile device, and the process of transmitting data from the mobile device to the base can be obtained similarly.

[0092] The advantage of this setting is that it provides a simple and easy-to-use encryption channel, further improving the security of data transmission between the base and the mobile device.

[0093] Optionally, the base performs security verification on its operating system, including: the base installs and runs the EMM base client; the base receives and runs the base application sent by the EMM base client; the base sets security policies through the EMM base client to control the disabling of related interfaces and functions to ensure the security of its operating system.

[0094] As a medium for collecting customer information, the base can directly collect user identity, account, password, signature and other private information. The base operating system is the core of information processing. If it is invaded by viruses or illegal programs, it will cause greater risks.

[0095] Therefore, the base is included in the EMM system for management, that is, the EMM system includes not only the client installed on the mobile device and the management terminal in the bank's internal network, but also the EMM base client installed and running on the base. Other applications installed on the base should be issued by the EMM base client and pass the security verification of the EMM base client. The EMM base client has a security sandbox function to control the disabling of related interfaces and functions, such as shutting down external interfaces such as USB and prohibiting connection to the Internet via WI-FI.

[0096] The advantage of this setting is that the EMM base client is used to further improve the security of the base running in the public network.

[0097] Optionally, the verified base transmits data with the mobile device through an encrypted channel, and then transmits data with the front-end server and the server in the bank's internal network, including:

[0098] The base uses a working key to encrypt the user password, and transmits the encrypted user password to the mobile device through an encrypted channel, and then transmits it to the front-end server by the mobile device, wherein the working key is a key agreed upon between the base and the front-end server for encrypting and decrypting the user password.

[0099] The base encrypts the user's signature trajectory and transmits the encrypted user's signature trajectory to the mobile device through an encrypted channel, and then transmits it to the front-end server by the mobile device. The user's signature trajectory is a collection of signature trajectory point data obtained by the base after the user signs on the electronic signature screen on the base.

[0100] User passwords are important private information of customers. Therefore, when transmitting user passwords from the base to the front-end server in the bank's internal network, in addition to the encrypted Bluetooth data channel between the base and the mobile device, the base and the front-end server also use a working key to encrypt and decrypt the user passwords. In order to prevent the key value from being obtained by monitoring software when the customer enters the password on the base, the base keyboard uses a product certified by the National Cryptography Administration and listed in the commercial cryptography product service catalog, and supports SM2 / 3 / 4 encryption algorithms.

[0101] The user signature track is not completely equivalent to the user signature image. Compared with the signature image, the user signature track has a stronger recognition value and can be used for subsequent handwriting comparison. The user signature track, like the user password, is also the customer's most important privacy information. The base transmits data with the mobile device through an encrypted Bluetooth data channel. Therefore, there is also a risk of theft during the transmission of the user signature track. Specifically, the user signature image and the encrypted user signature track can be packaged and transmitted to the mobile device together, and then forwarded by the mobile device to the bank's internal network.

[0102] The advantage of this setting is that by encrypting user passwords and user signature traces, it provides stronger protection for customers' important privacy information and further improves the security of mobile banking operations.

[0103] Figure 7 This is a flowchart of the base sending the user password to the bank's internal network. Optionally, the base uses the working key to encrypt the user password, and transmits the encrypted user password to the mobile device through an encrypted channel, and the mobile device transmits it to the front-end server, including:

[0104] S710: The base generates a public key and a private key pair, and sends the public key to the mobile device.

[0105] Both the public key and the private key are generated by the base, of which the private key is retained by the base itself and the public key is sent to the mobile device. Since the private key matches the public key, the information encrypted by one key can be decrypted by the other key.

[0106] S720. The mobile device sends the public key to the front-end server, and then sends it to the server and the encryption server in the bank's internal network.

[0107] After receiving the public key sent by the base, the mobile device forwards the public key to the front-end server, which in turn forwards the public key to the server, which then forwards the public key to the encryption server. The encryption server is set up in the bank's internal network and is mainly responsible for various encryption and decryption tasks in the bank's internal network.

[0108] S730. The encryption server encrypts the master key using the public key, and sends the encrypted master key to the server, and then to the front-end server.

[0109] The encryption server generates a master key and encrypts it with a public key. The master key is used for layer-by-layer encryption, that is, the master key is encrypted with a public key, the working key is encrypted with the master key, and finally the user password is encrypted with the working key. The encryption server sends the encrypted master key to the server, and the server forwards the encrypted master key to the front-end server.

[0110] S740. The front-end server sends the encrypted master key to the mobile device, and then to the base.

[0111] S750. The base uses the private key to decrypt the encrypted master key to obtain the master key.

[0112] The base uses the private key corresponding to the public key to decrypt the encrypted master key, obtain the master key and store it.

[0113] S760. The encryption server encrypts the working key using the master key, and sends the encrypted working key to the server, and then to the front-end server.

[0114] The encryption server generates a working key, encrypts the working key using the master key in S730, and sends the encrypted working key to the server, which then sends the encrypted working key to the front-end server.

[0115] S770. The front-end server sends the encrypted working key to the mobile device, and then to the base.

[0116] S780. The base uses the master key to decrypt the encrypted working key to obtain the working key.

[0117] In S750, the base has obtained and stored the master key, so the base can use the master key to decrypt the encrypted working key, obtain the working key and store it.

[0118] S790, the base uses the working key to encrypt the user password, and transmits the encrypted user password to the mobile device through an encrypted channel, and then the mobile device transmits the password to the front-end server.

[0119] Correspondingly, the front-end server sends the encrypted user password to the server, which forwards it to the encryption server. The encryption server uses the working key to decrypt the encrypted user password to obtain the user password.

[0120] The advantage of this setting is that the master key is encrypted with the public key, the working key is encrypted with the master key, and finally the user password is encrypted with the working key. In other words, through layers of encryption, the security of transmitting user passwords between the base and the bank's internal network is further improved.

[0121] According to the technical solution of the embodiment of the present invention, the mobile device verifies the security of the base through the serial number of the base, and when the mobile device determines that the serial number of the base is correct, it determines that the base has passed the verification, wherein the base is dedicated to the mobile device and is used to input information into the mobile device; the verified base transmits data with the mobile device through an encrypted channel, and then transmits data with the front-end server and the server in the bank's internal network, wherein before the base sends data to the mobile device, it also verifies the security of the operating system of the base, and the base is used to input information to the mobile device, that is, by allowing the mobile device to verify the security of the base, and transmitting data between the mobile device and the base through an encrypted channel, the problem that the information is easily stolen and attacked and its communication security is difficult to guarantee due to the base running in a public network environment is solved, and the technical effect of improving the security of the bank's mobile operations is achieved.

[0122] Optionally, the banking mobile operation security protection method also includes: the mobile device promptly cleans up sensitive information in the mobile device's memory, prohibits the screenshot function of the banking operation application installed on the mobile device, and adds a watermark to the image displayed on the mobile device's screen.

[0123] Specifically, watermark information of the mobile device user can be added to the image displayed on the screen of the mobile device. If the screen of the mobile device is photographed manually, the user of the mobile device at that time can be found through the watermark, thereby tracking the photographer.

[0124] The advantage of this setting is that it reduces the risk of information leakage on mobile devices and increases the security of mobile banking operations.

[0125] Embodiment 3

[0126] Embodiment 3 of the present invention provides a bank mobile operation security protection device, such as Figure 2 As shown, the device comprises:

[0127] An EMM management terminal set in the internal network of the bank is used to perform security verification on the mobile device through the international mobile equipment identity code IMEI of the mobile device. When the EMM management terminal determines that the IMEI of the mobile device is in the registered IMEI list, it is determined that the mobile device has passed the verification, wherein the mobile device is connected to the EMM management terminal through a public network, and a banking operation application is run in the mobile device;

[0128] The mobile device is used to verify the certificate of the front-end server set up in the bank's internal network based on the secure data channel, and to transmit data with the server of the bank's internal network through the secure data channel. Before the mobile device sends data to the server of the bank's internal network, the security of the bank's operating application that is the source of the data and the operating system of the mobile device are also verified.

[0129] Optionally, the mobile device is further used to perform security verification on the base through the serial number of the base, and when the mobile device determines that the serial number of the base is correct, it is determined that the base has passed the verification, wherein the base is dedicated to the mobile device and is used to input information into the mobile device;

[0130] The bank's mobile operation protection device also includes a base arranged in a public network, which is used to transmit data with the mobile device through an encrypted channel after verification, and then transmit data with the front-end server and server in the bank's internal network. Before the base sends data to the mobile device, the security of the base's operating system is also verified. The base is used to input information into the mobile device.

[0131] Optionally, the base is further used to encrypt the user password using the working key, and transmit the encrypted user password to the mobile device through an encrypted channel, and then transmit it to the front-end server by the mobile device, wherein the working key is a key agreed between the base and the front-end server for encrypting and decrypting the user password;

[0132] The base is also used to encrypt the user's signature trajectory and transmit the encrypted user signature trajectory to the mobile device through an encrypted channel, and then transmitted to the front-end server by the mobile device. The user signature trajectory is a collection of signature trajectory point data obtained by the base after the user signs on the electronic signature screen on the base.

[0133] Optionally, the secure data channel includes: a secure data channel encrypted using https; the encrypted channel includes: an encrypted Bluetooth data channel.

[0134] Optionally, the base uses the working key to encrypt the user password, and transmits the encrypted user password to the mobile device through an encrypted channel, and the mobile device transmits the encrypted user password to the front-end server, including:

[0135] The base generates a public and private key pair and sends the public key to the mobile device;

[0136] The mobile device sends the public key to the front-end server, which then sends it to the server and the encryption server in the bank’s internal network;

[0137] The encryption server encrypts the master key using the public key and sends the encrypted master key to the server, and then to the front-end server;

[0138] The front-end server sends the encrypted master key to the mobile device, which then sends it to the base;

[0139] The base uses the private key to decrypt the encrypted master key to obtain the master key;

[0140] The encryption server encrypts the working key using the master key and sends the encrypted working key to the server, and then to the front-end server;

[0141] The front-end server sends the encrypted working key to the mobile device, which then sends it to the base;

[0142] The base uses the master key to decrypt the encrypted working key to obtain the working key;

[0143] The base uses the working key to encrypt the user password, and transmits the encrypted user password to the mobile device through an encrypted channel, and then transmits it to the front-end server by the mobile device.

[0144] Optionally, the mobile device is also used to:

[0145] Verify the security of the signature certificate of the banking application that is the source of the data;

[0146] Verify the integrity of the bank operation application of the data source to confirm whether the bank operation application has been tampered with;

[0147] Verify the identity of the user of the mobile device when logging into the banking application;

[0148] When the banking application is running, confirm that the user of the mobile device is operating in compliance with regulations;

[0149] Among them, the code of the banking operation application has been obfuscated, and the banking operation application has been reinforced.

[0150] Optionally, the mobile device is also used to perform security verification on the version of its operating system, wherein the mobile device is installed with an EMM security desktop;

[0151] Accordingly, the base installs and runs the EMM base client;

[0152] Receive and run the base application sent by the EMM base client;

[0153] Set security policies through the EMM base client to control the disabling of related interfaces and functions to ensure the security of its operating system.

[0154] Optionally, the mobile device is also used to promptly clean up sensitive information in the mobile device's memory, disable the screenshot function of the banking application installed on the mobile device, and add a watermark to the image displayed on the mobile device's screen.

[0155] The bank mobile operation security protection device provided in the embodiment of the present invention can execute the bank mobile operation security protection method provided in any embodiment of the present invention, and has the corresponding functional modules and beneficial effects of the execution method.

[0156] Embodiment 4

[0157] Embodiment 4 of the present invention further provides a computer-readable storage medium containing computer instructions, and when the computer instructions are executed by a computer processor, they are used to execute a bank mobile operation security protection method, the method comprising:

[0158] The enterprise mobility management EMM management terminal set in the bank's internal network performs security verification on the mobile device through the international mobile equipment identity code IMEI of the mobile device. When the EMM management terminal determines that the IMEI of the mobile device is in the registered IMEI list, it is determined that the mobile device has passed the verification, wherein the mobile device is connected to the EMM management terminal through a public network, and the bank operation application is running in the mobile device;

[0159] The mobile device set in the public network verifies the certificate of the front-end server set in the bank's internal network based on the secure data channel;

[0160] The mobile device that has passed the verification transmits data with the server of the bank's internal network through a secure data channel. Before the mobile device sends data to the server of the bank's internal network, the security of the bank's operating application that is the source of the data and the operating system of the mobile device are also verified.

[0161] Of course, the computer-readable storage medium containing computer instructions provided in an embodiment of the present invention is not limited to the method operations described above, and can also execute related operations in the bank mobile operation security protection method provided in any embodiment of the present invention.

[0162] Through the above description of the implementation methods, the technicians in the relevant field can clearly understand that the present invention can be implemented by means of software and necessary general hardware, and of course it can also be implemented by hardware, but in many cases the former is a better implementation method. Based on such an understanding, the technical solution of the present invention, in essence, or the part that contributes to the prior art, can be embodied in the form of a software product, and the computer software product can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, such as a computer floppy disk, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a flash memory (FLASH), a hard disk or an optical disk, etc., including a number of instructions for a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to execute the methods described in each embodiment of the present invention.

[0163] It is worth noting that in the above-mentioned embodiment of the bank mobile operation safety protection device, the various units and modules included are only divided according to functional logic, but are not limited to the above-mentioned division, as long as the corresponding functions can be achieved; in addition, the specific name of each functional unit is only for the convenience of distinguishing each other, and is not used to limit the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0164] Note that the above are only preferred embodiments of the present invention and the technical principles used. Those skilled in the art will understand that the present invention is not limited to the specific embodiments described herein, and that various obvious changes, readjustments and substitutions can be made by those skilled in the art without departing from the scope of protection of the present invention. Therefore, although the present invention has been described in more detail through the above embodiments, the present invention is not limited to the above embodiments, and may include more other equivalent embodiments without departing from the concept of the present invention, and the scope of the present invention is determined by the scope of the appended claims.

Claims

1. A bank mobile operation security protection method, characterized in that: include: The enterprise mobility management EMM management terminal set in the internal network of the bank performs security verification on the mobile device through the international mobile equipment identity code IMEI of the mobile device, and when the EMM management terminal determines that the IMEI of the mobile device is in the registered IMEI list, it is determined that the mobile device has passed the verification, wherein the mobile device is connected to the EMM management terminal through a public network, and a bank operation application is running in the mobile device; The mobile device set up in the public network verifies the certificate of the front-end server set up in the bank's internal network based on the secure data channel; The mobile device that has passed the verification performs data transmission with the server of the bank's internal network through a secure data channel, wherein before the mobile device sends data to the server of the bank's internal network, the security of the bank's operating application that is the source of the data and the operating system of the mobile device are also verified; The mobile device verifies the security of the base through the serial number of the base, and when the mobile device determines that the serial number of the base is correct, it is determined that the base has passed the verification, wherein the base is dedicated to the mobile device and is used to input information into the mobile device; The base that has passed the verification transmits data with the mobile device through an encrypted channel, and then transmits data with the front-end server and service end in the bank's internal network. Before the base sends data to the mobile device, the security of the base's operating system is also verified.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The base that has passed the verification transmits data with the mobile device through an encrypted channel, and then transmits data with the front-end server and the service end in the bank's internal network, including: The base encrypts the user password using the working key, and transmits the encrypted user password to the mobile device through an encrypted channel, and the mobile device transmits the encrypted user password to the front-end server, wherein the working key is a key agreed between the base and the front-end server for encrypting and decrypting the user password; The base encrypts the user signature trajectory and transmits the encrypted user signature trajectory to the mobile device through an encrypted channel, and then transmits it to the front-end server by the mobile device, wherein the user signature trajectory is a collection of signature trajectory point data obtained by the base after the user signs on the electronic signature screen on the base.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The secure data channel includes: a secure data channel encrypted using https; The encrypted channel includes: an encrypted Bluetooth data channel.

4. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that: The base encrypts the user password using the working key, and transmits the encrypted user password to the mobile device through an encrypted channel, and the mobile device transmits the encrypted user password to the front-end server, including: The base generates a public key and a private key pair, and sends the public key to the mobile device; The mobile device sends the public key to the front-end server, and then to the service end and the encryption server in the bank's internal network; The encryption server encrypts the master key using the public key, and sends the encrypted master key to the server, and then to the front-end server; The front-end server sends the encrypted master key to the mobile device, and then to the base; The base uses the private key to decrypt the encrypted master key to obtain the master key; The encryption server encrypts the working key using the master key, and sends the encrypted working key to the service end, and then to the front-end server; The front-end server sends the encrypted working key to the mobile device, and then sends it to the base; The base uses the master key to decrypt the encrypted working key to obtain the working key; The base uses the working key to encrypt the user password, and transmits the encrypted user password to the mobile device through an encrypted channel, and then the mobile device transmits the encrypted user password to the front-end server.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The mobile device performs security verification on the banking application of the data source, including: The mobile device performs security verification on the signature certificate of the banking application of the data source; The mobile device verifies the integrity of the banking operation application of the data source to confirm whether the banking operation application has been tampered with; The mobile device verifies the identity of the user of the mobile device when logging into the banking application; The mobile device confirms that the operation of the user of the mobile device is in compliance with regulations when the banking operation application is running; Among them, the code of the banking operation application has been obfuscated and the banking operation application has been reinforced.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The mobile device performs security verification on the operating system of the mobile device, including: The mobile device performs security verification on the version of its operating system, wherein the mobile device is installed with an EMM security desktop; Accordingly, the base performs security verification on its operating system, including: The base installs and runs the EMM base client; The base receives and runs the base application sent by the EMM base client; The base sets security policies through the EMM base client to control the disabling of related interfaces and functions to ensure the security of its operating system.

7. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that Also includes: The mobile device promptly cleans up sensitive information in the memory of the mobile device, prohibits the screenshot function of the banking application installed on the mobile device, and adds a watermark to the image displayed on the screen of the mobile device.

8. A bank mobile operation safety protection device, characterized in that: include: An EMM management terminal is set in the internal network of the bank, and is used to perform security verification on the mobile device through the international mobile equipment identity code IMEI of the mobile device. When the EMM management terminal determines that the IMEI of the mobile device is in the registered IMEI list, it is determined that the mobile device has passed the verification, wherein the mobile device is connected to the EMM management terminal through a public network, and a banking operation application is running in the mobile device; A mobile device, used to perform certificate verification on a front-end server set up in the bank's internal network based on a secure data channel, and to perform data transmission with a server in the bank's internal network through the secure data channel, wherein before the mobile device sends data to the server in the bank's internal network, it also performs security verification on the bank's operating application that is the source of the data and the operating system of the mobile device; The mobile device is further used to verify the security of the base through the serial number of the base, and when the mobile device determines that the serial number of the base is correct, it is determined that the base has passed the verification, wherein the base is dedicated to the mobile device and is used to input information into the mobile device; The base is set up in the public network, which is used to transmit data with the mobile device through an encrypted channel after verification, and then transmit data with the front-end server and service end in the bank's internal network. Before the base sends data to the mobile device, the security of the operating system of the base is also verified.

9. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The computer-readable storage medium stores computer instructions, and the computer instructions are used to enable a processor to implement the bank mobile operation security protection method described in any one of claims 1-7 when executed.

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