Trusted subway identity authentication and access control method in unstable network environment
The subway access control is carried out offline through elliptic curve cryptography and hybrid encryption, which solves the problems of authentication delay and insufficient security in non-stable network environments, and achieves fast and secure identity authentication and access control.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202210354879.4
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2022-04-06
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-12
- Estimated Expiration
- 2042-04-06
AI Technical Summary
The existing subway access control system has problems of authentication delay and insufficient security in non-stable network environments, especially in the aspects of multiple authentication mechanisms and key management, which leads to service verification delay or failure, and the inability to complete identity authentication when the network is interrupted. .
Using elliptic curve cryptography and hybrid encryption, self-authentication is performed offline through the public key and signature mechanism of the authentication center, generating a one-time conference key and converting it into a streaming key to enhance the encryption key Length, realizes secure identity authentication and access control under non-stable networks.
It realizes uninterrupted identity authentication and access control in a non-stable network environment, improves system computing efficiency and security, reduces encryption and decryption time, and increases the difficulty of illegal cracking.
Smart Images

Figure CN115001658B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The invention belongs to the technical field of digital information transmission, and in particular relates to a reliable subway identity authentication and access control method in an unstable network environment. Background Art
[0002] The current electronic payment service for subway travel mainly relies on mobile terminals such as mobile phones (including PADs, wearable devices, etc.) to realize electronic payment for travel, which realizes subway travel services based on small payments. It is a targeted payment model with fast launch and low investment. However, in order to realize the "Mobility as a Service (MaaS)" service advocated by the Ministry of Transport, the connotation and service objects of payment services will be greatly expanded in the MaaS environment, and the payment method must also be modified to a non-targeted payment model. Electronic payments that meet the MaaS service scenarios and needs (such as differences in payment amounts, service agencies, etc.) must greatly improve security, graded services, and implementation technologies. This also requires a unified certified subway access control system.
[0003] The subway access control system is bound to the one-card registration identification code, user real-name identification, user's financial institution account, digital wallet identification, user service equipment, etc. Each time the current network access control (currently mainly payment transaction user authentication and authorization) is performed, the user uploads the one-card registration identification code + identification authentication, and the cloud platform authentication center performs access control. The authentication center also needs to perform real-name verification. Such authentication and authorization ensures that personal privacy information is difficult to leak, so that user privacy is protected to the greatest extent. However, there are the following shortcomings:
[0004] 1. The authentication center effectively manages the user's account, password, and membership level. As the number of users increases and multiple authentication mechanisms are applied, the authentication center is unable to respond to the authentication needs of users, which affects the operational efficiency of the hardware, causing service authentication delays or even failures, as well as excessive hardware operating and maintenance costs. In addition, the authentication center only identifies the user's identity through database verification, which is less secure.
[0005] 2. To prevent the leakage of personal privacy information, keys are used in the authentication process. Keys are generally issued by specific units. Devices that need to use keys need to be connected to the server of the key issuer through the network. The key issuer's device sends the key to the key-using device based on the network. The key length is long and the encryption speed is slow.
[0006] 3. Compared with ground communications, the subway network signal is weak. When the device that needs to use the key cannot communicate with the authentication center, it cannot obtain the required key and cannot complete identity authentication. Summary of the invention
[0007] Due to the above-mentioned defects in the prior art, the present invention provides a reliable subway identity authentication and access control method in an unstable network environment.
[0008] To achieve the above object, the present invention provides the following technical solutions:
[0009] A reliable subway identity authentication and access control method in an unstable network environment adopts a subway access control system; the subway access control system includes a user, an information system, and an authentication center; and includes the following steps:
[0010] Step S1, system start stage: authentication center, public finite field, elliptic curve, order of base point on elliptic curve, public key of authentication center, hash function of authentication center;
[0011] Step S2, registration and public key acquisition stage: the user brings the user identification code and user signature to the authentication center for login registration; the authentication center calculates and obtains the user's public key and user signature; when the user submits a verification request to the information system, the authentication center calculates and obtains the user's verification value;
[0012] The information system carries the information system identification code and information system signature file and registers with the authentication center; the authentication center calculates and obtains the information system public key and information system signature; when the information system asks the user for verification, it calculates and obtains the information system verification value;
[0013] Step S3, common key generation stage: In this stage, it is assumed that after the authentication center interrupts service, the user requests online access to the information system and communicates with each other. The user will send the user identity code, user verification value and user public key to the information system, and the information system verifies whether the user is a legitimate user; the information system sends the information system identity code, information system verification value and information system public key to the user, and the user verifies whether the information system is a legitimate information system; finally, the common key of the user and the information system is calculated;
[0014] Step S4, authentication and conference key generation phase: the user and the information system authenticate each other and generate a one-time conference key for this connection;
[0015] Step S5, streaming key generation stage: the information system will transmit the conference key to the linear feedback shift register to convert it into a streaming key seed, combine the streaming key seed with a self-selected random number, use the bit function to randomly obtain a decimal point as the starting point, and sequentially take values as the seed value in the streaming key, so that the encryption key length is always greater than the information.
[0016] Further, step S1 includes:
[0017] Step S101, the authentication center selects a prime number q with a length greater than 160 bits, and selects a secure elliptic curve E(Fq) on a finite field Fq, and then selects a base point G=(x, y) of order n on the elliptic curve E(Fq), so that nG=O; wherein n is the order of the base point on the elliptic curve, and point O is the infinity point of the selected elliptic curve;
[0018] Step S102: The authentication center selects a one-way collision-free hash function h() and takes a random parameter q CA ∈Z, where Z represents a set of integers, and then calculates the public key Q of the authentication center CA =q CA G; finally, the public finite field Fq, the elliptic curve E(Fq), the order n of the base point on the elliptic curve, the base point G, and the public key Q of the certification center CA , the hash function h() of the authentication center.
[0019] Further, step S2 includes:
[0020] Step S201, the user uses the user identification code id u and randomly select a parameter d u ∈[2, n-2], calculate and generate the user signature V u =h(id u / / d u )G, then the user carries the user identification code id u and user signature V u , register with the authentication center through a secure channel; during the registration process, the authentication center selects a random parameter k CA ∈[2, n-2], calculate and obtain the user's public key Q u Sign with the user u , where Q u =V u +(k CA -h(id u ))G=(q ux ,q uy );w u =k CA +d CA (q ux +h(id u ))mod n; mod means remainder operation, d CA is the private key of the certification authority, q ux The user's public key Q u The X value, q uy The user's public key Q u Y value of
[0021] When the user asks the information system for verification, the user verification value S is calculated and obtained. u =w u +h(id u / / d u )mod n;
[0022] Step S202: Information system i uses information system identification code id i and randomly select a parameter d i ∈[2, n-2], calculate and generate the information system signature file V i =h(id i / / id i )G, then the information system carries the information system identity identification code information system and the information system signature file V i , register with the authentication center through a secure channel; during the registration process, the authentication center selects a random parameter k CA ∈[2, n-2], calculate and obtain the information system public key Q i Signature and information system i ; Among them, Q i =V i +(k CA -h(id i ))G=(q ix ,q iy );w i =k CA +d CA (q ix +h(id i ))mod n; mod means remainder operation, d CA is the private key of the certification authority, q ix is the information system public key Q i The X value, q iy is the information system public key Q i Y value of
[0023] When the information system asks the user for verification, the information system verification value S is calculated and obtained. i =w i +h(id i / / d i )mod n.
[0024] Further, step S3 includes:
[0025] Step S301, the user will enter the user identification code id u , user verification value S u and user public key Q u sent to the information system; the information system will then calculate And compare whether the calculated value is the same as the verification value To check the user identification code id u , user verification value S u and user public key Q u Is it a legitimate user? If they are the same, proceed to the next step, otherwise terminate the step;
[0026] Step S302: The information system sends the information system identity code id i , Information system verification value S i and information system public key Q i Send to the user; the user will calculate And compare whether the calculated value is the same as the verification value To check the information system identity code id i , Information system verification value S i and information system public key Q i Is it a legitimate information system? If they are the same, proceed to the next step, otherwise terminate the step;
[0027] Step S303, calculate the common key C of the user and the information system ui =S u S i .
[0028] Further, step S4 includes:
[0029] Step S401, the user picks a random number t u ∈Z, and calculate the user's first comparison value T u =t u G and the user's first challenge value R u =C ui +T u ; Then the user identification code id u and the user's first challenge value R u Transmit to information system;
[0030] Step S402: The information system receives the first challenge value R from the user. u and common key C ui Calculate the user's second comparison value Because the common key between the user and the information system is C ui , so the user's second comparison value Equal to the user's first comparison value T u ;
[0031] Step S402: The information system takes a random number t i∈Z, and calculate the first comparison value T of the information system i =t i G and information system first challenge value R i =C ui +T i ;calculate: Then, a one-time conference key G is generated for this connection. ui =W i +C ui and the first authentication value Auth(i)=h(id u , id i , W i ) and the user's second authentication value Then the information system identity code id i , the first challenge value of the information system R i , the first authentication value Auth(i) is returned to the user;
[0032] Step S403: After receiving the information, the user checks whether the first authentication value Auth(i) of the information system is the same as the second authentication value of the information system calculated by the user. equal; The calculation process is as follows: The second comparison value of the information system
[0033] If they are equal, continue to calculate the conference key and the user's first authentication value Auth(u), which is expressed as follows: Otherwise, stop verification immediately;
[0034] Step S404, the user returns the user's first authentication value Auth(u) to the information system, and the information system verifies whether the user's first authentication value Auth(u) is the same as the user's second authentication value calculated by itself. If they are equal, the verification process of this stage is completed; otherwise, the verification is stopped immediately.
[0035] Further, step S5 includes:
[0036] Step S501: The information system receives the conference key G of the previous stage. ui , whose value is equal to S i , that is, G ui =S i , and then select a feedback polynomial: f(x)=1+C1x+C2x 2 +…+C L-1 x L-1 +C L x L , CL =1; where L is called the series of the feedback polynomial, and the feedback coefficient C i The number of non-zero terms in is called the number of terms in the feedback polynomial, where 1≤i≤L-1, and L=256, and C 17 , C 47 , C 197 , C 215 , C 219 and C 256 =1, the remainder is 0, and the expression is:
[0037] f(x)=1+x 17 +x 47 +x 197 +x 219 +x 256 ;
[0038] At this stage, we can get an array S i {i}, and sent to step S502, its equation: f(x) = S i {i};
[0039] Step S502: The user receives the array S i {i} result, add a self-selected random number π, so that the length of the stream encryption and decryption key is always greater than the length of the message, and use a function π(i) to represent the starting position of the number;
[0040] right and K S =S S {i}π(L+Len(M)-1) is XORed and passed through a linear feedback shift register to obtain the stream encryption key K S ; Wherein, Len(M) represents the length of the plaintext information M.
[0041] The reliable subway identity authentication and access control method in an unstable network environment also includes step S6, a stream encryption and decryption generation stage:
[0042] When encrypting a stream, a one-time XOR operation and key encryption operation are performed. The expression is as follows: Among them, M represents plain text, represents XOR operation, C represents ciphertext;
[0043] When decrypting a stream, the user receives information from the information system and uses a one-time XOR operation to perform the decryption operation. The expression is as follows:
[0044] In this solution, when the authentication center is offline, or the service is interrupted or paralyzed, the system service can still be uninterrupted through the self-authentication mechanism. The elliptic curve is used for self-identification signature authentication. The session key for one-time authentication is obtained during the registration process, and the session key is transmitted to the linear feedback shift register to convert it into a streaming key combined with a self-selected random number π (PI), and the key length is continuously strengthened. Finally, the characteristics of streaming encryption and decryption are used. Based on XOR, it can not only strengthen the authentication mechanism and shorten the time required for encryption and decryption, thereby completing the authentication in an offline state, but also make the system faster and safer.
[0045] This scheme has a self-authentication mechanism. Since this scheme adopts the co-existence signature mechanism of elliptic curve cryptography, it has the advantage of a shorter key length, thereby improving the computing performance of the system. When users and information systems register with the authentication center for the first time, they can obtain the public key assigned by the authentication center. When the authentication center interrupts the service, the user requests online access to the information system and communicates with each other. The user will send his identification code, verification value and public key to the information system; conversely, the information system will also send its identification code, verification value and public key to the user. At this time, the information system will check whether the user is a legitimate user. Conversely, the user verification method is the same, thereby generating a common key between the user and the information system. If the authentication center is offline due to hardware failure due to frequent responses to users or is attacked by an unknown network and cannot perform authentication operations, mutual authentication will be performed with the information system to achieve the goal of uninterrupted service under a secure environment architecture and ensure the smooth operation of the information system and troops.
[0046] This solution adopts a hybrid encryption method, first using an asymmetric encryption method to authenticate identity and simultaneously generate a conference key, and then applying a stream symmetric encryption method to encrypt data, so that the key length is always greater than the information length, which can effectively increase the difficulty of brute force cracking and greatly reduce the feasibility of illegal users cracking passwords and then invading.
[0047] This solution, like the current intelligent passenger service "wave to board" requirement, provides subway passengers with a convenient and safe urban rail travel experience, realizes reliable subway identity authentication in an unstable network environment, and adopts a hybrid encryption method, first using an asymmetric cryptographic method to authenticate the identity and simultaneously generate a conference key to achieve secure access control and access control. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0048] Figure 1 Flowchart of this program. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0049] The structure of the present invention is further described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments, but is not intended to limit the present invention.
[0050] Professional term analysis:
[0051] Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) is a public key cryptography technology proposed by Miller and Koblitz in 1985. Since the security provided by each key bit of the ECC is far greater than that of other public key cryptography systems, the ECC is more suitable for use in environments with limited memory, such as smart cards or mobile wireless devices. Definition of elliptic curve: Let p>3 be a prime number, and the elliptic curve E in GF(P): y 2 =x 3 +ax+bmodp, where 4a 3 +27b 2 ≠0(modp). Define another point O at infinity on the curve. For any point A∈E, A+O=O+A=A.
[0052] For the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), please refer to the Chinese patent publication number CN101610153A, "Electronic Signature Authentication Method Based on Elliptic Curve Signature Algorithm". Different from the current processing method (such as RSA algorithm), the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm can have multiple different signing methods for any information.
[0053] Stream encryption process: The data to be processed is regarded as a series of bytes or bits, and then a pseudo-random stream key is used to perform operations on the bytes or bits in the processed data one by one (such as through XOR operations, etc.) to produce unreadable ciphertext content.
[0054] Linear feedback shift register: A shift register that, given the output of the previous state, uses a linear function of that output as input.
[0055] A reliable subway identity authentication and access control method in an unstable network environment adopts a subway access control system; the subway access control system includes a user, an information system, and an authentication center.
[0056] User refers to the user who uses the subway official APP. The urban rail official APP provides differentiated data services based on the registration identification code of the urban rail cloud big data platform. When registering, the subway official APP will transcode various identifiers to generate the registration identification code of the Ministry of Transport to meet the convenience and security requirements of unified and standardized transportation data services. The registration identification code can include MSISDN international mobile number, IMSI mobile user identification code, IMEI mobile device identification code, ICCID card identification code, EPC electronic product code, Ecode item code, QR code ID, physical card ID, virtual card ID, etc.
[0057] The information system refers to the clearing center used in the subway automatic ticket vending and checking system. It adopts real-name-based management and control, mainly including real-name authentication, real-name information storage, real-name verification, related binding, access security logs, etc. It strictly links to achieve unified security boundary authorization management and control of people, facilities and equipment, cuts off unauthorized intrusions, and authorizes the authentication center that matches the access according to each authorization authority.
[0058] The authentication center refers to the cloud and big data platform. This solution uses the cloud and big data platform to coordinate the management and control of the subway access control system.
[0059] Trusted subway identity authentication and access control methods in unstable network environments, such as Figure 1 As shown, the following steps are included:
[0060] Step S1, system start phase: the authentication center CA establishes an elliptic curve cryptographic system and discloses the finite field Fq, the elliptic curve E(Fq), the order n of the base point on the elliptic curve, and the public key Q of the authentication center CA , the hash function h() of the authentication center. Specifically:
[0061] Step S101, the authentication center CA selects a length greater than 160 bits (2 160 ) and select a secure elliptic curve E(Fq) on a finite field Fq, then select a base point G = (x, y) of order n on the elliptic curve E(Fq), such that nG = O; where n is the order of the base point on the elliptic curve, and O is the point at infinity of the selected elliptic curve;
[0062] Step S102: The authentication center CA selects a one-way collision-free hash function h() and takes a random parameter q CA ∈Z, where Z represents a set of integers, and then calculates the public key Q of the authentication center CA =q CA G; finally, the public finite field Fq, the elliptic curve E(Fq), the order n of the base point on the elliptic curve, the base point G, and the public key Q of the certification center CA, the hash function h() of the authentication center.
[0063] Step S2, registration and public key acquisition stage: the user brings the user identification code and user signature to the authentication center for login registration; the authentication center calculates and obtains the user's public key and user signature; when the user submits a verification request to the information system, the authentication center calculates and obtains the user's verification value;
[0064] The information system carries the information system identification code and information system signature file, and registers with the authentication center; the authentication center calculates and obtains the information system public key and information system signature; when the information system asks the user for verification, it calculates and obtains the information system verification value. Specifically:
[0065] Step S201, user u uses user identification code id u and randomly select a parameter d u ∈[2, n-2], calculate and generate the user signature V u = k(id u / / d u )G, then user u carries the user identification code id u and user signature V u , register with the authentication center through a secure channel; during the registration process, the authentication center selects a random parameter k CA ∈[2, n-2], calculate and obtain the user's public key Q u Sign with the user u , where Q u =V u +(k CA -h(id u ))G=(q ux ,q uy );w u =k CA +d CA (q ux +h(id u ))mod n; mod means remainder operation, d CA is the private key of the certification authority, q ux The user's public key Q u The X value, q uy The user's public key Q u The Y value of .
[0066] User identification code id u , which can be a combination of name, ID number, phone number, QR code ID, physical card ID, virtual card ID, etc.
[0067] When the user asks the information system for verification, the user verification value S is calculated and obtained. u =w u +h(id u / / d u )mod n.
[0068] Step S202, the registration procedure of the information system is the same as that of the user. The information system i uses the information system identity identification code id i and randomly select a parameter d i ∈[2, n-2], calculate and generate the information system signature file V i =h(id i / / d i )G, then the information system carries the information system identity identification code information system and the information system signature file V i , register with the authentication center through a secure channel; during the registration process, the authentication center selects a random parameter kCA∈[2, n-2], calculates and obtains the information system public key Q i Signature and information system i ; Among them, Q i =V i +(k CA -h(id i ))G=(q ix ,q iy );w i =k CA +d CA (q ix +h(id i ))mod n; mod means remainder operation, d CA is the private key of the certification authority, q ix is the information system public key Q i The X value, q iy is the information system public key Q i The Y value of .
[0069] When the information system asks the user for verification, the information system verification value S is calculated and obtained. i =w i +h(id i / / d i )mod n.
[0070] Once each user and information system completes the above registration process and obtains their own key and signature, they can then complete the self-authentication process directly at the front end without relying on the authentication center, thus effectively reducing the authentication center's frequent processing of verifications from users and information systems. However, although the current processing method (such as the RSA algorithm) can also achieve this goal, it requires a longer key length, a higher computing cost, and a slower speed than this solution.
[0071] Step S3, common key generation stage: In this stage, it is assumed that after the authentication center interrupts service, the user requests online access to the information system and communicates with each other. The user will send the user identity code id u , user verification value S u and user public key Q u The information system then verifies whether the user is a legitimate user; the information system sends the information system identity code idi and the information system verification value S i and information system public key Q i It is sent to the user, who then verifies whether the information system is a legitimate information system; finally, the common key C of the user and the information system is calculated. ui =S u S i . Specifically:
[0072] Step S301, the user will enter the user identification code id u , user verification value S u and user public key Q u sent to the information system; the information system will then calculate And compare whether the calculated value is the same as the verification value To check the user identification code id u , user verification value S u and user public key Q u Is it a legitimate user? If they are the same, proceed to the next step, otherwise terminate the step.
[0073] Step S302: The information system sends the information system identity code id i , Information system verification value S i and information system public key Q i The user will calculate And compare whether the calculated value is the same as the verification value To check the information system identity code id i , Information system verification value S i and information system public key Q iIs it a legitimate information system? If they are the same, proceed to the next step, otherwise terminate the step.
[0074] Step S303: If all verification values are verified, the common key C of the user and the information system is calculated. ui =S u S i .
[0075] Step S4, authentication and conference key generation phase. After the above phases, the user and the information system have calculated a common key Cui. Then the user and the information system authenticate each other. Specifically:
[0076] Step S401, the user picks a random number t u ∈Z, and calculate the user's first comparison value T u =t u G and the user's first challenge value R u =Cui+T u Then the user identity code idu and the user's first challenge value R u sent to the information system.
[0077] Step S402: The information system receives the first challenge value R from the user. u and common key C ui Calculate the user's second comparison value Because the common key between the user and the information system is C ui , so the user's second comparison value Equal to the user's first comparison value T u .
[0078] Step S402: The information system takes a random number t i ∈Z, and calculate the first comparison value T of the information system i =t i G and information system first challenge value R i =C ui +T i .calculate: Then, a one-time conference key G is generated for this connection. ui =W i +C ui and the first authentication value Auth(i)=h(id u , id i , W i ) and the user's second authentication value Then the information system identity code id i , the first challenge value of the information system Ri , the first authentication value Auth(i) is returned to the user.
[0079] Step S403: After receiving the information, the user checks whether the first authentication value Auth(i) of the information system is the same as the second authentication value of the information system calculated by the user. equal; The calculation process is as follows: The second comparison value of the information system
[0080] If they are equal, continue to calculate the conference key and the user's first authentication value Auth(u), which is expressed as follows: Otherwise, verification stops immediately.
[0081] Step S404, the user returns the user's first authentication value Auth(u) to the information system, and the information system verifies whether the user's first authentication value Auth(u) is the same as the user's second authentication value calculated by itself. If they are equal, the verification process of this stage is completed; otherwise, the verification is stopped immediately.
[0082] Step S5, stream key generation phase.
[0083] In order to make the stream key used by the user and the information system different each time they connect, the conference key obtained in the previous stage is used as the key seed of the stream key. When this key seed is in the information system, it is a block key. The information system will convert the conference key G ui Sent to the linear feedback shift register to convert into a streaming key seed S s , and transmit the key seed to the next stage of operation; Assuming that the information system contains sensitive information and provides it to each user, in order to not interrupt the information system service in the same security environment and achieve the theoretical security mechanism, this scheme will stream the key seed S s Combined with a self-selected random number π, using its irrational and transcendental number non-periodic cycle characteristics, a bit-taking function is used to randomly obtain a decimal point as the starting point, and the values are taken in sequence as the seed value in the stream key, so that the encryption key length is always greater than the information, increasing the difficulty of brute force cracking.
[0084] Step S501: The information system receives the conference key G of the previous stage. ui , whose value is equal to S i , that is, G ui =S i , and then select a feedback polynomial: f(x)=1+C1x+C2x 2 +…+C L-1 x L-1 +C L xL , C L =1; where L is called the degree of the feedback polynomial (Drgree), the number of non-zero values in the feedback coefficient Ci (1≤i≤L-1) is called the number of terms in the feedback polynomial (Tap), and L=256, and C 17 , C 47 , C 197 , C 215 , C 219 and C 256 =1, the remainder is 0, and the expression is:
[0085] f(x)=1+x 17 +x 47 +x 197 +x 219 +x 256 .
[0086] At this stage, we can get an array S i {i}, and sent to step S502, its equation: f(x) = S i {i}.
[0087] Step S502: The user receives the array S i {i} As a result, considering the high probability that the key length is smaller than the message length, this scheme adds a self-selected random number π to make the stream encryption and decryption key length always larger than the message length. In order to avoid repeated use of values, a function π(i) is used to represent the starting position of the number.
[0088] right and K S =S S {i}π(L+Len(M)-1) is XORed and passed through a linear feedback shift register to obtain the stream encryption key K S ; Wherein, Len(M) represents the length of the plaintext information M.
[0089] Step S6, stream encryption and decryption generation stage.
[0090] When encrypting a stream, in order to enhance the encryption speed, this solution uses a one-time XOR operation and key encryption operation, the expression is as follows: Among them, M represents plain text, represents XOR operation, and C represents ciphertext.
[0091] During stream decryption, the user receives information from the information system. Considering the need for fast decryption, this solution only uses a one-time XOR operation to perform the decryption operation. The expression is as follows:
[0092] In this solution, steps S1 to S3 realize reliable subway identity authentication in an unstable network environment. The information system trusts the user's public key, and the user trusts the public key of the information system. This solution can meet the characteristics of self-authentication. After the first registration is completed, the identities of each other can be confirmed without third-party authentication through the authentication center. Moreover, since the user has jurisdiction over the random value d obtained by himself, it can avoid being impersonated.
[0093] In this solution, steps S4 to S6 achieve secure access control. A hybrid encryption method is used, first using an asymmetric encryption method to authenticate identity and synchronously generate a conference key, and then using a stream of symmetric encryption methods to encrypt data, so that the key length is always greater than the information length, which can effectively increase the difficulty of brute force cracking and greatly reduce the feasibility of being hacked by illegal users and then intruded.
[0094] Below, this solution is described in terms of confidentiality, integrity, availability, identity authentication, access control security, and benefit analysis:
[0095] Confidentiality:
[0096] Confidentiality means that data transmission is protected and will not be used by unauthorized persons to collect large amounts of information, which would result in the disclosure of the transmitted data. All data exchanges are kept confidential.
[0097] Scenario: The attacker intends to hack into the information system and obtain relevant sensitive parameters.
[0098] Solution: If the data content is intercepted by the attacker, he will face the problem of being unable to obtain the conference key. The architecture of this solution adopts the synchronization of conference keys in a dual offline state, so the attacker cannot know the encrypted conference key Cui. Even if the data content is intercepted, it cannot be decrypted using the conference key. Therefore, this solution meets the system confidentiality requirements.
[0099] Completeness:
[0100] Integrity means that data cannot be destroyed or interfered with during transmission, that is, it cannot be forged, and is used to protect data from tampering, insertion, deletion and retransmission attacks.
[0101] Scenario: The attacker intends to tamper with the parameters in the information system to affect the overall logistics reference.
[0102] Solution: During the registration phase of this solution, users will first enter their identity code and signature (id u , V u) is sent to the authentication center. If an attacker wants to impersonate a user and send information to the authentication center, he will face the problem of one-way hash function and elliptic curve discretization. Unless the private key of the authentication center is obtained, the access rights in the verification server cannot be changed. Therefore, this design architecture can ensure the integrity of data during transmission.
[0103] Availability:
[0104] Availability is to ensure that information and systems can continue to operate and be used normally. When legitimate users request to use information systems, such as email, application systems, etc., users can get a response within an appropriate time and obtain the required services.
[0105] Scenario: When the authentication center is attacked and disconnected, it cannot respond to user login requests.
[0106] Solution: This solution is based on offline identity authentication. Users use their own ID u and randomly select a parameter d u ∈[2, n-2], calculate V u =h(id u / / d u ), generate signature V u (The information system signature is generated in the same way as the user), then user u carries the identity identification code and signature file (id u , V u ), and register with the authentication center through a secure channel (the information system registration method is the same as the user). During the registration process, the authentication center takes a random parameter k CA ∈[2, n-2] calculate Q u =V u +(k CA h(id u ))G=(q ux ,q uy ) and W u =k CA +d CA (q ux +h(id u ))mod n, get the user's public key Q u And signature w u ; When the user asks the information system for verification again, by calculating S u =w u +h(id u / / d u ) mod n to get the verification value, and pass S u =S u G=Q u +h(id u )G+[(qux +h(id u ))]Q CA Verify its correctness. Once each user and information system has completed the above registration process and obtained their own keys and signatures, they can then complete the self-certification process directly at the front end without relying on the certification center to meet the availability of information system operations.
[0107] Identity authentication: refers to the user being able to confirm whether another user is a legitimate user.
[0108] Scenario: When an attacker attempts to impersonate a legitimate user to log into an information system.
[0109] Solution: This solution is to use the authentication server to confirm the legitimacy of the identities of the user, the information system server, and the user server. Assuming that the authentication center stops service, the user requests online access to the information system and communicates with each other. The user will send the user's identity code, verification value, and public key (id u ,S u ,Q u ) is sent to the information system; conversely, the information system will also send the information system's identity identification code, verification value and public key (id i ,S i ,Q i ) is sent to the user. At this time, the information system will calculate And compare whether the calculated value is the same as the verification value In order to check the user u's identity code, verification value and public key (id u ,S u ,Q u ) is a legitimate user. If true, then the common key C of the user and the information system is calculated ui =S u S i ; Otherwise, stop verification immediately.
[0110] Access Control Security:
[0111] The security of access control means ensuring the security of access permission value management. It is necessary to set legitimate user permissions to prevent any unauthorized access and damage, and determine whether the service request is within the authorization scope.
[0112] Scenario: An attacker attempts to gain system access and damage with illegal user privileges.
[0113] Solution: This solution will use the elliptic curve cryptography system and combine it with self-authentication to strengthen the security of system authentication and control access rights, so that legitimate users can use the information system within a reasonable authorization scope. Users take a random number tu ∈Z n , and calculate T u =t u P,R u =C ui +T u , then the information (id u , R u ) is sent to the information system. After receiving the user's verification request, the information system also takes a random number ti∈Z n And calculate T i =t i P,R i =C ui +T i , the information system receives R u and C ui calculate Then, a one-time conference key G is generated for this connection. ui =W i +C ui and Auth(i)=h(id u , id i , W i )and At this time, the information system will (id i , R i , Auth(i)) is sent back to the user. After receiving it, the user checks whether Auth(i) is the same as the one calculated by himself. If they are equal, the verification process at this stage is completed to meet the security of access control.
[0114] Benefit Analysis: This solution is mainly based on the elliptic curve cryptography system, and breaks the traditional signcryption method, introducing an offline self-authentication mechanism, effectively reducing the frequency of third-party authentication centers responding to user identity verification needs, indirectly reducing the hardware damage rate, and obtaining the public key assigned by the authentication center after the first registration is completed. It is a one-time conference key for mutual authentication between users and information systems in an offline state. In addition, due to the characteristics of the elliptic curve cryptography system, under the same environment, its key length is shorter than the current RSA algorithm, so the computing speed can be greatly improved, and at the same time, it can also reduce the demand for transmission bandwidth, effectively reducing the overall system operation load and improving system security.
[0115] Table 1 is a comparison table of the safety differences between the traditional scheme and this scheme.
[0116]
[0117] Those skilled in the art should understand that those skilled in the art can implement variations by combining the prior art and the above embodiments, which will not be described in detail here. Such variations do not affect the essential content of the present invention, and will not be described in detail here.
Claims
1. A reliable subway identity authentication and access control method in an unstable network environment, characterized in that: A subway access control system is used; the subway access control system includes users, information systems, and an authentication center; It includes the following steps: Step S1, system start stage: the authentication center discloses the finite field, the elliptic curve, the order of the base point on the elliptic curve, the public key of the authentication center and the hash function of the authentication center; Step S2, registration and public key acquisition stage: the user brings the user identification code and user signature to the authentication center for login registration; the authentication center calculates and obtains the user's public key and user signature; when the user submits a verification request to the information system, the authentication center calculates and obtains the user's verification value; The information system carries the information system identification code and information system signature file and registers with the authentication center; the authentication center calculates and obtains the information system public key and information system signature; when the information system asks the user for verification, it calculates and obtains the information system verification value; Step S3, common key generation stage: In this stage, it is assumed that after the authentication center interrupts service, the user requests online access to the information system and communicates with each other. The user will send the user identity code, user verification value and user public key to the information system, and the information system verifies whether the user is a legitimate user; the information system sends the information system identity code, information system verification value and information system public key to the user, and the user verifies whether the information system is a legitimate information system; finally, the common key of the user and the information system is calculated; Step S4, authentication and conference key generation phase: the user and the information system authenticate each other and generate a one-time conference key for this connection; Step S5, stream key generation stage: the information system will transmit the conference key to the linear feedback shift register to convert it into a stream key seed, combine the stream key seed with a self-selected random number, use the bit function to randomly obtain a decimal point as the starting point, and sequentially take values as the seed value in the stream key, so that the encryption key length is always greater than the information; Step S1 includes: Step S101, the authentication center selects a prime number q with a length greater than 160 bits, and selects a secure elliptic curve E(Fq) on a finite field Fq, and then selects a base point G=(x, y) of order n on the elliptic curve E(Fq), so that nG=O; wherein n is the order of the base point on the elliptic curve, and point O is the infinity point of the selected elliptic curve; Step S102: The authentication center selects a one-way collision-free hash function h() and takes a random parameter q CA ∈Z, where Z represents a set of integers, and then calculates the public key Q of the authentication center CA =q CA G; finally, the finite field Fq, the elliptic curve E(Fq), the order n of the base point on the elliptic curve, the base point G, and the public key Q of the certification center are made public CA and the hash function h() of the authentication center; Step S2 comprises: Step S201, the user uses the user identification code id u and randomly select a parameter d u ∈[2, n-2], calculate and generate the user signature V u =h(id u / / d u )G, then the user carries the user identification code id u and user signature V u , register with the authentication center through a secure channel; during the registration process, the authentication center selects a random parameter k CA ∈[2, n-2], calculate and obtain the user's public key Q u Sign with the user u , where Q u =V u +(k CA -h(id u ))G=(q ux ,q uy );w u =[k CA +d CA (q ux +h(id u ))]mod n; mod means remainder operation, d CA is the private key of the certification authority, q ux The user's public key Q u The X value, q uy The user's public key Q u Y value of When the user asks the information system for verification, the user verification value S is calculated and obtained. u =[w u +h(id u / / d u )]modn; Step S202: Information system i uses information system identification code id i and randomly select a parameter d i ∈[2, n-2], calculate and generate the information system signature file V i =h(id i / / d i )G, then the information system carries the information system identity code and the information system signature file V i , register with the authentication center through a secure channel; during the registration process, the authentication center selects a random parameter k CA ∈[2, n-2], calculate and obtain the information system public key Q i Signature and information system i ; Among them, Q i =V i +(k CA -h(id i ))G=(q ix ,q iy );w i =[k CA +d CA (q ix +h(id i ))]mod n; mod means remainder operation, d CA is the private key of the certification authority, q ix is the information system public key Q i The X value, q iy is the information system public key Q i Y value of When the information system asks the user for verification, the information system verification value S is calculated and obtained. i =[w i +h(id i / / d i )]modn; Step S3 includes: Step S301, the user will enter the user identification code id u , user verification value S u and user public key Q u sent to the information system; the information system will then calculate And compare the calculated value with the verification value to check the user's identity code id u , user verification value S u and user public key Q u Whether it is a legitimate user: If yes, proceed to the next step, otherwise terminate the step; Step S302: The information system sends the information system identity code id i , Information system verification value S i and information system public key Q i Send to the user; the user will calculate And compare the calculated value to the verification value to check the information system identity code id i , Information system verification value S i and information system public key Q i Whether it belongs to a legal information system: If the same, proceed to the next step, otherwise terminate the step; Step S303, calculate the common key C of the user and the information system ui =S u S i .
2. The method for reliable subway identity authentication and access control in an unstable network environment according to claim 1, characterized in that: Step S4 comprises: Step S401, the user picks a random number t u ∈Z, and calculate the user's first comparison value T u =t u G and the user's first challenge value R u =C ui +T u ; Then the user identification code id u and the user's first challenge value R u Transmit to information system; Step S402: The information system receives the first challenge value R from the user. u and common key C ui Calculate the user's second comparison value User second comparison value Equal to the user's first comparison value T u ; The information system takes a random number t i ∈Z, and calculate the first comparison value T of the information system i =t i G and information system first challenge value R i =C ui +T i ;calculate: Then, a one-time conference key G is generated for this connection. ui =W i +C ui and the first authentication value Auth(i)=h(id u , id i , W i ) and the user's second authentication value Then the information system identity code id i , Information System First Challenge Value R i and the first authentication value Auth(i) is returned to the user; Step S403: After receiving the information, the user checks whether the first authentication value Auth(i) of the information system is the same as the second authentication value of the information system calculated by the user. equal; The calculation process is as follows: The second comparison value of the information system If they are equal, continue to calculate the conference key and the user's first authentication value Auth(u), which is expressed as follows: Otherwise, stop verification immediately; Step S404, the user returns the user's first authentication value Auth(u) to the information system, and the information system verifies whether the user's first authentication value Auth(u) is the same as the user's second authentication value calculated by itself. If they are equal, the verification process of this stage is completed; otherwise, the verification is stopped immediately.
3. The method for reliable subway identity authentication and access control in an unstable network environment according to claim 2, characterized in that: Step S5 includes: Step S501: The information system receives the conference key G of the previous stage. ui , whose value is equal to S i , that is, G ui =S i , and then select a feedback polynomial: f(x)=1+C1 x+C2 x 2 +…+C L-1 x L-1 +C L x L , C L =1; where L is called the series of the feedback polynomial, and the feedback coefficient C i The number of non-zero terms in is called the number of terms in the feedback polynomial, where 1≤i≤L-1, and L=256, and C 17 , C 47 , C 197 , C 215 , C 219 and C 256 =1, the remainder is 0, and the expression is: f(x)=1+x 17 +x 47 +x 197 +x 219 +x 256 ; At this stage, we can get an array S i {i}, and sent to step S502, its equation: f(x) = S i {i}; Step S502: The user receives the array S i {i} result, add a self-selected random number π, so that the length of the stream encryption and decryption key is always greater than the length of the message, and use a function π(i) to represent the starting position of the number; right and K S =S i {i}π(L+Len(M)-1) is XORed and passed through a linear feedback shift register to obtain the stream encryption key K S ; Wherein, Len(M) represents the length of the plaintext information M.
4. The method for reliable subway identity authentication and access control in an unstable network environment according to claim 3, characterized in that: The step S6 is also included, the stream encryption and decryption generation stage: When encrypting a stream, a one-time XOR operation and key encryption operation are used, and the expression is as follows: C = M ⊕ K S ; Where M represents plain text, ⊕ represents XOR operation, and C represents cipher text; When decrypting a stream, the user receives information from the information system and uses a one-time XOR operation to perform the decryption operation. The expression is as follows: M = C ⊕ K S .
