Anti-quantum computing communication service method and system based on asymmetric key pool

Abstract

While achieving anti-quantum computing, this patent also ensures that the cost for users to use anti-quantum computing solutions is not high, the cost for CA and user application systems to switch to anti-quantum computing solutions is not high, and users have the right to choose and customize, thereby meeting the security needs of different users; in addition, situations that affect the security of all members will basically not occur, thereby improving the security of the entire system; in addition, there is no symmetric key management problem for users, and the uncertainty and algorithm complexity caused by the ID cryptography management system will not be introduced; in addition, the national secret algorithm can be used to achieve anti-quantum computing.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of quantum computing-resistant communication, and in particular to a quantum computing-resistant communication service method and system based on an asymmetric key pool. Background Art

[0002] Asymmetric encryption algorithms under classical cryptographic systems, quantum-resistant encryption algorithms, and quantum cryptographic encryption algorithms based on quantum theoretical physics are currently one of the main research contents in the field of information security and confidential communications. From national defense information security to commercial and banking applications, encryption algorithms play an important and fundamental role in national security, basic social order, and economic development. Based on the difficulty of large number factorization in number theory and the difficulty of discrete logarithms in elliptic curves, cryptographers have created a modern asymmetric cryptographic system based on one-way trapdoor functions. However, in the face of the foreseeable research and construction of quantum computers, cryptographic systems based on computational complexity are all unsafe. In the face of the severe threat of code cracking and network security and information security brought about by the continuous development of quantum computing, strengthening the security of cryptographic theory in classical cryptography based on mathematical problems through quantum key distribution has become the main research direction of current quantum-resistant cryptographic encryption algorithms.

[0003] Problems with existing technologies:

[0004] 1. Existing CA and confidential communication systems based on digital certificates cannot resist quantum computing

[0005] 2. The existing quantum computing system based on quantum secure communication is too costly for users and the symmetric key management is complicated.

[0006] 3. In the existing anti-quantum computing system based on asymmetric key pool (patent with application number "201910034536.8"), it is necessary to generate an asymmetric key pool with the public keys of all members and store it in each key card, which increases the storage cost of the client key card, resulting in a high cost for users to use anti-quantum computing solutions; in addition, the data structure of the traditional digital certificate is changed, resulting in excessively high costs for CA and user application systems to switch to anti-quantum computing solutions; in addition, all users use the same account application and communication method, without any choice of customization; in addition, each key card stores the public keys of all members. Once the key card is lost or stolen and cracked, it will affect the security of all members, and the security of the entire system is not high enough.

[0007] 4. In the existing quantum computing-resistant communication system based on ID cryptography (patent application number "202020815697.9"), it is necessary to deploy an additional key management server based on ID cryptography. Since ID cryptography involves relatively complex bilinear pairing operations, the uncertainty caused by the introduction of a new management system increases the complexity of the algorithm.

[0008] 5. The existing anti-quantum computing methods do not use national secret algorithms, which does not meet the requirements of the National Cryptography Administration; the SM2 algorithm in the existing national secret algorithm (including its digital signature algorithm, key exchange protocol, and public key encryption algorithm) cannot resist quantum computing. Summary of the invention

[0009] In response to the problems in the related technology, the present invention proposes a quantum computing-resistant communication service method and system based on an asymmetric key pool to overcome the above-mentioned technical problems existing in the existing related technology.

[0010] To this end, the specific technical solution adopted by the present invention is as follows:

[0011] A quantum computing communication service method based on an asymmetric key pool, wherein a quantum computing service center issues an asymmetric key pool, each of which has its own private key, and can find the public key corresponding to the asymmetric key pool of the quantum computing service center according to the identity information of other quantum computing service centers; the quantum computing service center has a certificate issuing authority, and the certificate issuing authority is used to issue digital certificates to user terminals belonging to the quantum computing service center; the quantum computing service center can provide registration services for the user terminals; the user terminals store user terminal digital certificates, user terminal private keys and quantum computing service center public keys; the user terminal digital certificates are generated by the quantum computing service center; the communication comprises the following steps:

[0012] S1. The user terminal and the corresponding service center authenticate each other to form a session key;

[0013] S2. The user terminal communicates with the corresponding service center of the user terminal to form a symmetric key between the service centers;

[0014] S3, forming a communication key between the user terminals;

[0015] S4, the user terminals use the communication key to communicate confidentially;

[0016] The step S1 comprises the following:

[0017] S11, the user end uses the user end private key to sign the user end identity information, current time and authentication request using an asymmetric algorithm to obtain a first signature, generates a first message and sends it to the corresponding service center of the user end, wherein the first message includes the result of encrypting the first signature using the user end password or the key in the key card, the authentication request and the user end digital certificate using a symmetric algorithm, the user end identity information and the current time;

[0018] S12, the user terminal corresponds to the service center to verify the current time, and after the verification is passed, find the user terminal password or the key in the key card according to the identity information of the user terminal to decrypt and authenticate the first message; use the private key of the service center corresponding to the user terminal to sign the session key between the user terminal and the service center corresponding to the user terminal, the current time and the identity information of the service center corresponding to the user terminal using an asymmetric algorithm to obtain a second signature, generate a second message and send it to the user terminal, the second message includes the identity information of the service center corresponding to the user terminal, the current time and the result of encrypting the second signature and the session key using the user terminal password or the key in the key card;

[0019] S13, the user end verifies the current moment, and after the verification is passed, uses the user end password or the key in the key card to decrypt the second message to obtain the second signature and the session key, and uses the public key of the service center corresponding to the user end to verify the second signature, and after the verification is passed, confirms that the session key is obtained.

[0020] The step S2 comprises the following steps:

[0021] S21, the user terminal generates a true random number, calculates the true random number to obtain a temporary public key, uses the session key to encrypt the current time and the identity information of the communication object using a symmetric algorithm, and then sends it to the corresponding service center of the user terminal;

[0022] S22, the service center corresponding to the user end obtains the identity information of the communication object after decrypting with the session key, finds the service center corresponding to the communication object according to the identity information of the communication object, and finds the public key of the service center corresponding to the communication object from the asymmetric key pool according to the identity information of the service center corresponding to the communication object; uses the key derivation function to calculate the symmetric key between the service center corresponding to the user end and the service center corresponding to the communication object based on the current moment, the private key of the service center corresponding to the user end and the public key of the service center corresponding to the communication object, and uses the session key to encrypt the symmetric key between the service centers and send it to the user end;

[0023] S23, the user end decrypts to obtain the symmetric key between the service center;

[0024] In step S3, the user end is divided into a first user end and a second user end, and includes the following steps:

[0025] S31, the first user end uses the first user end private key to sign the first user end identity information, the current time and the first temporary public key using an asymmetric algorithm to obtain a third signature, uses the symmetric key between the service center to encrypt the third signature, the first temporary public key, and the digital certificate of the first user end to obtain a first ciphertext, generates a third message and sends it to the second user end, the third message including the first user end identity information, the current time and the first ciphertext;

[0026] S32, the second user end uses the symmetric key between the service centers to decrypt the third message to obtain the third signature, the first temporary public key, and the digital certificate of the first user end; encrypts the digital certificate of the first user end using the session key and sends it to the corresponding service center of the second user end;

[0027] S33: The service center corresponding to the second user terminal retrieves the public key of the service center corresponding to the first user terminal to verify the digital certificate of the first user terminal; after the verification is successful, the second user terminal is notified;

[0028] S34, after receiving the notification of successful verification, the second user terminal takes out the public key of the first user terminal from the digital certificate of the first user terminal, and uses the public key of the first user terminal to verify the third signature; after successful verification, the second user terminal uses the private key of the second user terminal to sign the second user terminal identity information, the current time and the second temporary public key using an asymmetric algorithm to obtain a fourth signature, uses the symmetric key between the service center to encrypt the fourth signature, the second temporary public key, and the digital certificate of the second user terminal using a symmetric algorithm to obtain a second ciphertext, generates a fourth message and sends it to the first user terminal, wherein the fourth message includes the second user terminal identity information, the current time and the second ciphertext;

[0029] S35, the first user end uses the symmetric key between the service centers to decrypt the fourth message to obtain the digital certificate of the second user end, encrypts the digital certificate of the second user end using the session key, and sends the encrypted digital certificate to the service center corresponding to the first user end;

[0030] S36. The service center corresponding to the first user terminal verifies the digital certificate of the second user terminal using the public key of the service center corresponding to the second user terminal; after the verification is successful, the first user terminal is notified;

[0031] S37, after receiving the notification of verification success, the first user terminal retrieves the public key of the second user terminal from the digital certificate of the second user terminal, and uses the public key of the second user terminal to verify the fourth signature; after the verification succeeds, a communication key is generated;

[0032] S37. The first user terminal uses the communication key to calculate the message authentication function of the first user terminal identity information, the second user terminal identity information and the current time to obtain a message authentication code, generate a fifth message and send it to the second user terminal, the fifth message includes the message authentication code, the first user terminal identity information, the second user terminal identity information and the current time; the communication key is the key for communication between the first user terminal and the second user terminal.

[0033] S38, the second user terminal generates a communication key, uses the communication key to verify the message authentication code, and obtains the communication key after the verification is successful;

[0034] Preferably, the communication key is a true random number generated by the user end, a temporary public key of the communication object and the current moment calculated by a key derivation function. The true random number is generated by the user end using a true random number generator, and the temporary public key is calculated using the true random number based on an elliptic curve algorithm.

[0035] Optionally, the user terminal registration can be carried out in the following ways according to security requirements: (1) apply for an account and password, and log in using the account and password mode; (2) apply for an account and password, and register biometric authentication information, and use the account and password and biometric authentication mode to log in to the service center for dual verification; (3) apply for a key card containing a symmetric key, and log in to the service center using the symmetric key mode based on the key card; (4) apply for a key card containing a symmetric key, and register biometric authentication information, and log in to the service center using the symmetric key and biometric authentication mode based on the key card.

[0036] Preferably, the user-side digital certificate is generated by the user-side public key securely sent by the user-side to the anti-quantum computing service center, and then by the anti-quantum computing service center using the user-side public key.

[0037] Optionally, the asymmetric algorithm is an SM2 algorithm, the hash algorithm is an SM3 algorithm, and the symmetric encryption algorithm is an SM4 algorithm.

[0038] Optionally, the asymmetric algorithm may be an ECC algorithm.

[0039] A quantum computing-resistant communication service based on an asymmetric key pool, used to implement the steps of the above-mentioned quantum computing-resistant communication service method based on an asymmetric key pool, characterized in that the system includes a certificate issuing authority, a service center and a user terminal, each member is preferably equipped with a key card and a biometric verification module, the quantum computing-resistant service center issues an asymmetric key pool, the quantum computing-resistant service center has its own private key, and can find the public key corresponding to the asymmetric key pool where the quantum computing-resistant service center is located according to the identity information of other quantum computing-resistant service centers; the quantum computing-resistant service center has a certificate issuing authority, and the certificate issuing authority is used to issue digital certificates to the user terminals described in the quantum computing-resistant service center; the quantum computing-resistant service center can provide registration services for the user terminals; the user terminals store user terminal digital certificates, user terminal private keys and quantum computing-resistant service center public keys; the quantum computing-resistant service center is a service provider center within a region or a local area network.

[0040] The beneficial effects of the invention are:

[0041] 1. This patent achieves quantum-resistant computing while being low-cost for users and eliminating symmetric key management issues; it does not introduce uncertainty and algorithm complexity caused by ID cryptography management systems;

[0042] 2. While realizing quantum-resistant computing, this patent only needs to generate an asymmetric key pool from the public keys of all service center members and then store it in the key card of the quantum-resistant computing service center. Each client does not need a key card or only needs a key card with a small storage capacity, so the cost for users to use the quantum-resistant computing solution is not high; in addition, the data structure of the traditional digital certificate is not changed, so the cost for CA and user application systems to switch to the quantum-resistant computing solution is not high; in addition, users have the right to choose customization, that is, they can choose to customize different account application and communication methods from low to high according to their own security needs, thereby meeting the security needs of different users; in addition, only the key card of the quantum-resistant computing service center stores the public keys of all service center members. The key card is deployed together with the service and can generally be properly protected. The possibility of the key card being lost or stolen and cracked is very small, so the situation that affects the security of all members basically does not occur, thereby improving the security of the entire system;

[0043] 3. While achieving anti-quantum computing, this patent can also use SM2, SM3, SM4 and other algorithms in the national secret algorithm to achieve anti-quantum computing, which meets the requirements of the National Cryptography Administration. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0044] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.

[0045] Figure 1 is a network diagram involved in an embodiment of the present invention; DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0046] To further illustrate each embodiment, the present invention provides drawings, which are part of the disclosure of the present invention and are mainly used to illustrate the embodiments and can be used in conjunction with the relevant descriptions in the specification to explain the operating principles of the embodiments. With reference to these contents, ordinary technicians in the field should be able to understand other possible implementations and advantages of the present invention. The components in the figures are not drawn to scale, and similar component symbols are generally used to represent similar components.

[0047] It should be understood that, where technically feasible, the technical features listed above for different embodiments can be combined with each other to form other embodiments within the scope of the present invention. In addition, the specific examples and embodiments described in the present invention are non-limiting, and the structures, steps, and sequences described above can be modified accordingly without departing from the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0048] like Figure 1 As shown, the quantum computing-resistant communication system based on an asymmetric key pool includes multiple user terminals and multiple quantum computing-resistant service centers.

[0049] An asymmetric key pool is issued by a quantum-resistant computing service center. Each quantum-resistant computing service center has its own private key SKS and can find the public key corresponding to the asymmetric key pool where S is located based on the identity IDS of any other quantum-resistant computing service center S. The method for generating an asymmetric key pool can be found in the patent with application number "201910034536.8", which is a collection of a large number of public keys. In this patent, it is a collection of public keys PKS of all quantum-resistant computing service centers.

[0050] The quantum-resistant computing service center S is generally a service provider center within a certain region or a local area network.

[0051] In this patent, each quantum computing service center has its own CA center to issue digital certificates to its subordinate users. The format and issuance method of digital certificates are the same as those of classic CA. First, user U generates user private key SKU and user public key PKU, and after securely sending PKU to S (such as local copy or intranet transmission), S generates user digital certificate CERTU, and the signature private key of CERTU is SKS; PKS, SKU, and CERTU are stored in the user terminal or user key card.

[0052] Users can choose to customize different account application and communication methods from low to high according to their own security needs:

[0053] (1) Apply for an account and password; log in to S using the account and password mode and form a session key; communicate using the session key;

[0054] (2) Apply for an account and password, and register biometric authentication information; use the account and password + biometric authentication mode to log in to S and form a session key; use the session key to communicate;

[0055] (3) Apply for a key card containing a symmetric key; use the key card symmetric key mode to log in to S and form a session key; use the session key to communicate;

[0056] (4) Apply for a key card containing a symmetric key and register biometric authentication information; use the key card symmetric key + biometric authentication mode to log in to S and form a session key; use the session key to communicate.

[0057] In this patent, if the requirements of the national secret algorithm need to be met, the public and private key algorithms are the SM2 algorithm, the hash algorithm is the SM3 algorithm, and the symmetric encryption algorithm is the SM4 algorithm; if the requirements of the national secret algorithm do not need to be met, the public and private key algorithms are the ECC algorithm, the hash algorithm type is not limited, and the symmetric encryption algorithm type is not limited.

[0058] like Figure 1 As described above, the user end and the service center complete the networking: SA----A----Internet----B----SB

[0059] Example 1

[0060] 1.1 Authentication between client A and service center SA

[0061] A generates MSGA=IDA||TA||{INFO||SIG(IDA||TA||INFO,SKA)||CERTA}KA, where IDA is the identity information of user A, TA is the current timestamp, INFO is the authentication request. If the user includes a biometric authentication mode, INFO also includes the biometric authentication information collected by the user this time. SIG(X,SKA) represents the use of user A's private key SKA to sign message X, CERTA is user A's digital certificate, KA represents A's password or the symmetric key in the key card, and {Y}KA means using KA to encrypt message Y.

[0062] A sends MSGA to SA. Since digital signatures and digital certificates that are vulnerable to quantum computer attacks are protected by symmetric keys, the message is not easily cracked by quantum computers.

[0063] 1.2 Service Center SA receives the message

[0064] SA determines whether TA is the current time. SA finds KA based on the user ID, and uses KA to decrypt the message to obtain INF O||SIG(IDA||TA||INFO,SKA)||CERTA. If INFO also contains the biometric authentication information collected by the user this time, the biometric authentication information is authenticated. Verify the legitimacy of CERTA, that is, use SA's public key to verify the digital signature in CERTA. After the verification is successful, use the PKA in CERTA to verify the signature SIG(IDA||TA||INFO,SKA), and recognize A's identity after successful verification.

[0065] 1.3 Client A receives the message

[0066] SA generates MSGSA=IDSA||TSA||{K SA-A ||SIG(IDSA||TSA||K SA-A ,SKSA)}KA, where IDSA is the identity information of SA, TSA is the current timestamp, K SA-A It is the session key between SA and A.

[0067] SA sends MSGSA to A.

[0068] A determines whether TSA is the current time. A decrypts the message with KA to obtain K SA-A ||SIG(IDSA||TSA||K SA-A ,SKSA). Use SA's public key PKSA to sign SIG(IDSA||TSA||K SA-A ,SKSA) for verification. After successful verification, the identity of SA is recognized and K SA-A as a session key.

[0069] Similarly, the same method can be used to form K between B and SB. SB-B as a session key.

[0070] Example 2

[0071] 2.1 Communication between client A and service center SA

[0072] A generates a true random number ra and calculates a temporary public key RA=ra*P, where P is an elliptic curve cryptography parameter.

[0073] A uses K to represent the current TA and the identity of the communication object IDB SA-A Send to SA.

[0074] Based on public information, SA finds the service center it belongs to, SB, according to IDB, and finds its public key, PKSB, from the asymmetric key pool according to IDSB. SA calculates the symmetric key K between SA and SB corresponding to the TA moment SA-SB(TA) = KDF(TA,SKSA*PKSB), where KDF(*,*) represents a key derivation function, such as a MAC function, i.e., a message authentication code function, SKSA is the private key of SA, and PKSB is the public key of SB. SA converts K SA-SB(TA) Use K SA-A Send to A.

[0075] A decrypts to get K SA-SB(TA) . Generate MSGA=IDA||TA||{RA||SIG(IDA||TA||RA,SKA)||CERTA}K SA-SB(TA) , where IDA is the identity information of user A, TA is the current timestamp,

[0076] A sends MSGA to B.

[0077] 2.2 After receiving the message, user B communicates with service center SB

[0078] The client B generates a true random number rb and calculates a temporary public key RB=rb*P.

[0079] B determines whether TA is the current time. B uses K SB-BSend to Service Center SB.

[0080] Based on public information and IDA, SB finds the service center it belongs to as SA, and finds its public key as PKSA from the asymmetric key pool based on IDSA. SB calculates the symmetric key K between SB and SA corresponding to the TA moment SB-SA(TA) =KDF(TA,SKSB*PKSA), where SKSB is the private key of SB and PKSA is the public key of SA. Since SKSB*PKSA=SKSB*SKSA*P=SKSA*SKSB*P=SKSA*PKSB, K SB-SA(TA) =K SA-SB(TA) SB will K SB-SA(TA) Use K SB-B Send to B.

[0081] B decrypts and obtains K SB-SA(TA) and use it to decrypt MSGA to get RA||SIG(IDA||TA||RA,SKA)||CERTA.

[0082] B encrypts CERTA with the session key and sends it to SB to request SB verification. SB takes out PKSA to verify CERTA, and informs B of the successful verification after the verification is successful. After B obtains the successful verification message, it takes out PKA from CERTA and uses PKA to verify SIG(IDA||TA||RA,SKA), and recognizes A's identity after the verification is successful.

[0083] B generates MSGB=IDB||TA||{RB||SIG(IDB||TA||RB,SKB)||CERTB}K SB-SA(TA) , where IDB represents the identity information of user B, and CERTB is the digital certificate of user B.

[0084] Client B sends MSGB to client A.

[0085] 2.3 User A receives the message

[0086] User A uses K SA-SB(TA) Decrypt and get RB||SIG(IDB||TA||RB,SKB)||CERTB.

[0087] A encrypts CERTB with the session key and sends it to SA to request SA verification. SA takes out PKSB to verify CERT B. After the verification is successful, it informs A that the verification is successful. After A obtains the verification success message, it takes out PKB from CERTB and uses PKB to verify the signature SIG(IDB||TA||RB,SKB). After the verification is successful, it recognizes B's identity. A generates the session key KSAB=KDF(TA,ra*RB), where ra is the first random number and RB is the second temporary public key.

[0088] User terminal A generates MSGAB=IDA||IDB||TA||MAC(IDA||IDB||TA,KSAB), where IDA is the identity information of user terminal A, IDB is the identity information of user terminal B, MAC(IDA||IDB||TA,KSAB) means using session key KSAB to calculate the message authentication code for the combination of IDA, IDB, and TA, and MAC(*,*) is the message authentication code function.

[0089] Client A sends MSGAB to client B.

[0090] User A uses KSAB as the session key for communicating with B.

[0091] 2.4 Client B receives the message

[0092] The user terminal B generates a session key KSBA=KDF(TA,rb*RA), where rb is the second random number and RA is the first temporary public key. Since rb*RA=rb*ra*P=ra*rb*P=ra*RB, KSBA=KSAB.

[0093] Use KSBA to verify the message authentication code MAC(IDA||IDB||TA,KSAB). After successful verification, it is confirmed that A has obtained the session key.

[0094] Client B uses KSBA as the session key for communicating with A.

[0095] 2.5 Client A and Client B use session keys for confidential communication

[0096] The technical features of the above-described embodiments may be arbitrarily combined. To make the description concise, not all possible combinations of the technical features in the above-described embodiments are described. However, as long as there is no contradiction in the combination of these technical features, they should be considered to be within the scope of this specification.

[0097] The above-mentioned embodiments only express several implementation methods of the present invention, and the descriptions thereof are relatively specific and detailed, but they cannot be understood as limiting the scope of the invention patent. It should be pointed out that, for ordinary technicians in this field, several variations and improvements can be made without departing from the concept of the present invention, and these all belong to the protection scope of the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the patent of the present invention shall be subject to the attached claims.

Claims

1. A quantum computing-resistant communication service method based on an asymmetric key pool, It is characterized in that The anti-quantum computing service center issues an asymmetric key pool. Each anti-quantum computing service center has its own private key and can find the public key corresponding to the asymmetric key pool of the anti-quantum computing service center according to the identity information of other anti-quantum computing service centers. The anti-quantum computing service center has a certificate issuing authority, which is used to issue digital certificates to the user terminals belonging to the anti-quantum computing service center. The anti-quantum computing service center provides registration services for the user terminals. The user terminals store the user terminal digital certificate, the user terminal private key and the anti-quantum computing service center public key. The user terminal digital certificate is generated by the anti-quantum computing service center. The steps include: S1. The user terminal and the corresponding service center authenticate each other to form a session key; S2. The user terminal communicates with the corresponding service center of the user terminal to form a symmetric key between the service centers; S3, forming a communication key between the user terminals; S4, the user terminals use the communication key to communicate confidentially; The step S1 comprises: S11, the user end uses the user end private key to sign the user end identity information, current time and authentication request using an asymmetric algorithm to obtain a first signature, generates a first message and sends it to the corresponding service center of the user end, wherein the first message includes the result of encrypting the first signature using the user end password or the key in the key card, the authentication request and the user end digital certificate using a symmetric algorithm, the user end identity information and the current time; S12, the user terminal corresponds to the service center to verify the current time, and after the verification is passed, find the user terminal password or the key in the key card according to the identity information of the user terminal to decrypt and authenticate the first message; use the private key of the service center corresponding to the user terminal to sign the session key between the user terminal and the service center corresponding to the user terminal, the current time and the identity information of the service center corresponding to the user terminal using an asymmetric algorithm to obtain a second signature, generate a second message and send it to the user terminal, the second message includes the identity information of the service center corresponding to the user terminal, the current time and the result of encrypting the second signature and the session key using the user terminal password or the key in the key card; S13, the user end verifies the current moment, and after the verification is passed, uses the user end password or the key in the key card to decrypt the second message to obtain the second signature and the session key, and uses the public key of the service center corresponding to the user end to verify the second signature, and after the verification is passed, confirms that the session key is obtained; The step S2 comprises the following steps: S21, the user terminal generates a true random number, calculates the true random number to obtain a temporary public key, uses the session key to encrypt the current time and the identity information of the communication object using a symmetric algorithm, and then sends it to the corresponding service center of the user terminal; S22, the service center corresponding to the user end obtains the identity information of the communication object after decrypting with the session key, finds the service center corresponding to the communication object according to the identity information of the communication object, and finds the public key of the service center corresponding to the communication object from the asymmetric key pool according to the identity information of the service center corresponding to the communication object; uses the key derivation function to calculate the symmetric key between the service center corresponding to the user end and the service center corresponding to the communication object based on the current moment, the private key of the service center corresponding to the user end and the public key of the service center corresponding to the communication object, and uses the session key to encrypt the symmetric key between the service centers and send it to the user end; S23, the user end decrypts to obtain the symmetric key between the service center; In step S3, the user end is divided into a first user end and a second user end, and includes the following steps: S31, the first user end uses the first user end private key to sign the first user end identity information, the current time and the first temporary public key using an asymmetric algorithm to obtain a third signature, uses the symmetric key between the service center to encrypt the third signature, the first temporary public key, and the digital certificate of the first user end to obtain a first ciphertext, generates a third message and sends it to the second user end, the third message including the first user end identity information, the current time and the first ciphertext; S32, the second user end uses the symmetric key between the service centers to decrypt the third message to obtain the third signature, the first temporary public key, and the digital certificate of the first user end; encrypts the digital certificate of the first user end using the session key and sends it to the corresponding service center of the second user end; S33: The service center corresponding to the second user terminal retrieves the public key of the service center corresponding to the first user terminal to verify the digital certificate of the first user terminal; after the verification is successful, the second user terminal is notified; S34, after receiving the notification of successful verification, the second user terminal takes out the public key of the first user terminal from the digital certificate of the first user terminal, and uses the public key of the first user terminal to verify the third signature; after successful verification, the second user terminal uses the private key of the second user terminal to sign the second user terminal identity information, the current time and the second temporary public key using an asymmetric algorithm to obtain a fourth signature, uses the symmetric key between the service center to encrypt the fourth signature, the second temporary public key, and the digital certificate of the second user terminal using a symmetric algorithm to obtain a second ciphertext, generates a fourth message and sends it to the first user terminal, wherein the fourth message includes the second user terminal identity information, the current time and the second ciphertext; S35, the first user end uses the symmetric key between the service centers to decrypt the fourth message to obtain the digital certificate of the second user end, encrypts the digital certificate of the second user end using the session key, and sends the encrypted digital certificate to the service center corresponding to the first user end; S36. The service center corresponding to the first user terminal verifies the digital certificate of the second user terminal using the public key of the service center corresponding to the second user terminal; after the verification is successful, the first user terminal is notified; S37, after receiving the notification of verification success, the first user terminal retrieves the public key of the second user terminal from the digital certificate of the second user terminal, and uses the public key of the second user terminal to verify the fourth signature; after the verification succeeds, a communication key is generated; S38, the first user terminal uses the communication key to calculate the message authentication function on the first user terminal identity information, the second user terminal identity information and the current time to obtain a message authentication code, generate a fifth message and send it to the second user terminal, the fifth message includes the message authentication code, the first user terminal identity information, the second user terminal identity information and the current time; the communication key is the key for communication between the first user terminal and the second user terminal; S39. The second user terminal generates a communication key, uses the communication key to verify the message authentication code, and obtains the communication key after the verification is successful.

2. According to claim 1, a quantum computing-resistant communication service method based on an asymmetric key pool, It is characterized in that The communication key is calculated by a key derivation function using a true random number generated by the user end, a temporary public key of the communication object, and the current moment.

3. According to claim 2, a quantum computing-resistant communication service method based on an asymmetric key pool, It is characterized in that The true random number is generated by the user end using a true random number generator, and the temporary public key is calculated using the true random number based on an elliptic curve algorithm.

4. According to claim 3, a quantum computing-resistant communication service method based on an asymmetric key pool, It is characterized in that The user-side registration can be carried out in the following ways according to security requirements: (1) Apply for an account and password, and log in using the account and password mode; (2) Apply for an account and password, and register biometric authentication information, and use the account and password and biometric authentication mode to log in to the service center for dual verification; (3) Apply for a key card containing a symmetric key, and use the symmetric key mode based on the key card to log in to the service center; (4) Apply for a key card containing a symmetric key, and register biometric authentication information, and use the symmetric key and biometric authentication mode to log in to the service center for dual verification based on the key card.

5. According to claim 4, a method for quantum computing-resistant communication service based on an asymmetric key pool, It is characterized in that The user-side digital certificate is generated by the user-side public key securely sent by the user to the anti-quantum computing service center, and then generated by the anti-quantum computing service center using the user-side public key.

6. A quantum computing-resistant communication service method based on an asymmetric key pool according to claim 5, It is characterized in that The asymmetric algorithm is SM2 algorithm, and the symmetric encryption algorithm is SM4 algorithm.

7. According to claim 5, a method for quantum computing-resistant communication service based on an asymmetric key pool, It is characterized in that The asymmetric algorithm may be an ECC algorithm.

8. A quantum computing-resistant communication service system based on an asymmetric key pool, used to implement the steps of the quantum computing-resistant communication service method based on an asymmetric key pool as described in any one of claims 1 to 7, It is characterized in that The system includes a certificate issuing authority, an anti-quantum computing service center and a user terminal. The anti-quantum computing service center is equipped with a key card and a biometric verification module. The anti-quantum computing service center issues an asymmetric key pool. Each anti-quantum computing service center has its own private key and can find the public key corresponding to the asymmetric key pool where the anti-quantum computing service center is located based on the identity information of other anti-quantum computing service centers. The anti-quantum computing service center has a certificate issuing authority, which is used to issue digital certificates to the user terminals described in the anti-quantum computing service center. The anti-quantum computing service center provides registration services for the user terminals. The user terminals store user digital certificates, user private keys and anti-quantum computing service center public keys. The anti-quantum computing service center is a service provider center within a region or local area network.

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