Method and apparatus for secure communication of broadcast information related to cell access

Abstract

Various aspects of the present disclosure relate to mechanisms for securely communicating broadcast information related to cell access within a secure cell. The broadcast information may be encrypted using a cell-specific broadcast key that may be derived from a periodically refreshed broadcast root key. The wireless communication device may obtain the broadcast root key via a secure connection with a provisioning server or a core network node within the core network that maintains the broadcast root key or a long-term key that may be used to derive the broadcast root key. The cell-specific broadcast key may be derived using a key derivation function of the broadcast root key and at least cell identification information associated with the secure cell.

Description

[0001] CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

[0002] This patent application claims priority to and the benefit of co-pending non-provisional application No. 17 / 199,283 filed in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office on March 11, 2021, and provisional application No. 62 / 990,980 filed in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office on March 17, 2020, both of which are assigned to the assignee of this application and are hereby expressly incorporated herein by reference as if fully set forth below and for all applicable purposes. Technical Field

[0003] The techniques discussed below relate generally to wireless communication networks, and more particularly to secure communication of broadcast information related to cell access in wireless communication networks.

[0004] introduction

[0005] In a fifth generation (5G) wireless communication network, such as a new radio (NR) wireless communication network, a user equipment (UE) may perform a cell search to acquire time and frequency synchronization with the cell and identify the physical cell identity (PCI) of the cell. The PCI may be carried in a primary synchronization signal (PSS) and a secondary synchronization signal (SSS) of a synchronization signal block (SSB). For example, an SSB including a PSS, SSS, and a physical broadcast control channel (PBCH) may be transmitted over four symbols in the time domain and 240 subcarriers in the frequency domain.

[0006] The PBCH may include a master information block (MIB), which includes various system information, together with parameters for decoding a system information block (SIB). The SIB may be, for example, a system information type 1 (SystemInformationType1) (SIB1), which may include various additional system information. The MIB and SIB1 together include minimal system information (SI) for initial system (cell) access.

[0007] Unprotected broadcast messages, such as MIB and SIB1, may be vulnerable to various types of denial of service (DoS) attacks. For example, an attacker may modify MIB and / or SIB1 to include an incorrect public land mobile network (PLMN) identity (ID) or incorrect cell / access class barring information. As another example, an attacker may capture a broadcast message such as SIB1 in one cell and relay the captured broadcast message in another cell. This may result in poisoning of the UE's location record due to receiving a false tracking area code (TAC).

[0008] A brief overview of some examples

[0009] An overview of one or more aspects of the present disclosure is given below to provide a basic understanding of these aspects. This overview is not an exhaustive overview of all conceived features of the present disclosure, and is neither intended to identify the key or decisive elements of all aspects of the present disclosure, nor to attempt to define the scope of any or all aspects of the present disclosure. Its sole purpose is to present some concepts of one or more aspects of the present disclosure in a form as a preface to a more detailed description given later.

[0010] In one example, a method of wireless communication at a wireless communication device in a radio access network (RAN) of a wireless communication system is disclosed. The method includes obtaining a broadcast root key, receiving an acquisition signal from a RAN node serving a secure cell within the RAN, and obtaining cell identification information based at least on the acquisition signal. The method further includes deriving a cell-specific broadcast key based at least on the broadcast root key and the cell identification information, receiving encrypted broadcast information related to cell access, and decrypting the encrypted broadcast information using the cell-specific broadcast key to produce decrypted broadcast information.

[0011] Another example provides a wireless communication device in a radio access network (RAN) of a wireless communication network. The wireless communication device includes a transceiver, a memory, and a processor coupled to the transceiver and the memory. The processor and the memory are configured to obtain a broadcast root key, receive an acquisition signal from a RAN node serving a secure cell within the RAN via the transceiver, and obtain cell identification information based at least on the acquisition signal. The processor and the memory are further configured to derive a cell-specific broadcast key based at least on the broadcast root key and the cell identification information, receive encrypted broadcast information related to cell access via the transceiver, and decrypt the encrypted broadcast information using the cell-specific broadcast key to generate decrypted broadcast information.

[0012] Another example provides a method of wireless communication at a radio access network (RAN) node in a wireless communication system. The method includes obtaining a cell-specific broadcast key for a secure cell served by the RAN node, encrypting broadcast information related to cell access using at least the cell-specific broadcast key to produce encrypted broadcast information, and transmitting the encrypted broadcast information in the secure cell.

[0013] Another example provides a radio access network (RAN) node in a wireless communication system. The RAN node includes a transceiver, a memory, and a processor communicatively coupled to the transceiver and the memory. The processor and the memory are configured to obtain a cell-specific broadcast key for a secure cell served by the RAN node, encrypt broadcast information related to cell access using at least the cell-specific broadcast key to generate encrypted broadcast information, and transmit the encrypted broadcast information in the secure cell via the transceiver.

[0014] These and other aspects will be more fully understood after reading the following detailed description. After reading the following description of specific exemplary embodiments in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, other aspects, features and embodiments will become apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art. Although each feature may be discussed below with respect to certain embodiments and drawings, all embodiments may include one or more of the advantageous features discussed herein. In other words, although one or more embodiments may be discussed as having certain advantageous features, one or more such features may also be used according to the various embodiments discussed herein. In a similar manner, although exemplary embodiments may be discussed below as device, system or method embodiments, such exemplary embodiments may be implemented in various devices, systems, and methods. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0016] Figure 1 is a schematic illustration of a wireless communication system in accordance with some aspects.

[0017] Figure 2 is a block diagram illustrating an example of a 5G wireless communication system (5GS).

[0018] Figure 3 is a conceptual illustration of an example of a radio access network in accordance with some aspects.

[0019] Figure 4 is a diagram illustrating an example of a frame structure for use in a radio access network in accordance with some aspects.

[0020] Figure 5 is a diagram illustrating various broadcast information related to cellular cell access according to certain aspects.

[0021] Figure 6 is a signaling diagram illustrating example signaling to provide secure communication of broadcast information related to cell access in accordance with certain aspects.

[0022] Fig. 7A and 7B

[0013] An exemplary key derivation of a cell-specific broadcast key in accordance with certain aspects is illustrated.

[0023] Figure 8 is a diagram illustrating an example of an out-of-band delivery path for provisioning a cell-specific broadcast key in accordance with certain aspects.

[0024] Fig. 9 is a diagram illustrating an example of an in-band delivery path for provisioning a cell-specific broadcast key in accordance with certain aspects.

[0025] Fig.10 It is used to explain the use of Fig. 9 A signaling diagram illustrating exemplary signaling for provisioning a cell-specific broadcast key on a device using an in-band delivery path is shown.

[0026] Fig.11 is a diagram illustrating another example of an in-band delivery path for provisioning a cell-specific broadcast key in accordance with certain aspects.

[0027] Fig.12 It is explained according to some aspects of the use Fig.11 A signaling diagram illustrating exemplary signaling for provisioning a cell-specific broadcast key on a device using an in-band delivery path is shown.

[0028] Fig.13 is a diagram illustrating another example of encrypted and unencrypted broadcast information related to cell access in accordance with certain aspects.

[0029] Fig.14 is a signaling diagram illustrating other example signaling to provide secure communication of broadcast information related to cell access in accordance with certain aspects.

[0030] Fig.15

[0013] Another exemplary key derivation of a cell-specific broadcast key in accordance with certain aspects is illustrated.

[0031] Fig.16 is a diagram illustrating an example of provisioning cell-specific unicast keys in accordance with some aspects.

[0032] Fig.17 is a block diagram illustrating an example of a hardware implementation for a RAN node employing a processing system in accordance with some aspects.

[0033] Fig.18 is a block diagram illustrating an example of a hardware implementation for a wireless communication device employing a processing system in accordance with some aspects.

[0034] Fig.19 is a block diagram illustrating an example of a hardware implementation for a provisioning server employing a processing system in accordance with some aspects.

[0035] Fig. 20is a block diagram illustrating an example of a hardware implementation for a core network node employing a processing system according to some aspects.

[0036] Fig.21 is a flow chart of an example methodology for securely receiving broadcast information related to cell access on a wireless communication device in accordance with certain aspects.

[0037] Fig. 22 is a flow chart of another example method for securely receiving broadcast information related to cell access on a wireless communication device in accordance with certain aspects.

[0038] Fig.23 is a flow chart of another example method for securely receiving broadcast information related to cell access on a wireless communication device in accordance with certain aspects.

[0039] Fig.24 is a flow chart of another example method for securely receiving broadcast information related to cell access on a wireless communication device in accordance with certain aspects.

[0040] Fig.25 is a flow chart of an example methodology for securely transmitting, by a RAN node, broadcast information related to cell access in accordance with certain aspects.

[0041] Fig.26 is a flow chart of another example methodology for securely transmitting, by a RAN node, broadcast information related to cell access in accordance with certain aspects.

[0042] Fig. 27 is a flow chart of another example methodology for securely transmitting, by a RAN node, broadcast information related to cell access in accordance with certain aspects.

[0043] Fig.28 is a flow chart of another example methodology for securely transmitting, by a RAN node, broadcast information related to cell access in accordance with certain aspects.

[0044] Fig.29 is a flow chart of another example methodology for securely transmitting, by a RAN node, broadcast information related to cell access in accordance with certain aspects.

[0045] Fig.30 is a flow chart of an example methodology for enabling secure communication of broadcast information related to cell access in accordance with certain aspects.

[0046] Detailed Description

[0047] The detailed description set forth below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings is intended as a description of various configurations and is not intended to represent the only configurations in which the concepts described herein may be practiced. This detailed description includes specific details to provide a thorough understanding of the various concepts. However, it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that these concepts may be practiced without these specific details. In some instances, well-known structures and components are shown in block diagram form in order to avoid diluting such concepts.

[0048] Although various aspects and embodiments are described in this application by explanation of some examples, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that additional implementations and use cases can be generated in many different arrangements and scenarios. The innovation described herein can be implemented across many different platform types, devices, systems, shapes, sizes, and packaging arrangements. For example, each embodiment and / or use can be generated via an integrated chip embodiment and other devices based on non-module components (e.g., end-user devices, vehicles, communication equipment, computing equipment, industrial equipment, retail / shopping equipment, medical equipment, AI-enabled devices, etc.). Although some examples may or may not be specifically for each use case or application, the wide applicability of the described innovation may occur. The scope of each implementation can range from chip-level or module components to non-module, non-chip-level implementations, and further to aggregated, distributed or OEM devices or systems incorporating one or more aspects of the described innovation. In some practical environments, the equipment incorporating the various aspects and features described may also necessarily include additional components and features for implementing and practicing the claimed and described embodiments. For example, the transmission and reception of wireless signals necessarily include several components for analog and digital purposes (e.g., hardware components, including antennas, RF chains, power amplifiers, modulators, buffers, processors, interleavers, adders / summers, etc.). The innovations described herein are intended to be practiced in a wide variety of devices, chip-level components, systems, distributed arrangements, end-user devices, etc., of various sizes, shapes, and configurations.

[0049] Various aspects of the present disclosure relate to mechanisms for securely communicating broadcast information related to cell access within a cell. The broadcast information may be encrypted using a cell-specific broadcast key that may be derived from a broadcast root key that is periodically refreshed in a wireless communication network. For example, the cell-specific broadcast key may be derived using a key derivation function of the broadcast root key and at least cell identification information associated with a secure cell. Herein, the term secure cell refers to a cell that communicates encrypted and / or integrity protected broadcast information related to cell access.

[0050] In some examples, the wireless communication device may obtain the broadcast root key via a secure connection with a provisioning server or a core network node within the core network, which maintains the broadcast root key or a long-term key that can be used to derive the broadcast root key. For example, the wireless communication device may be directly provisioned with a broadcast root key (or long-term key) by a provisioning server via an out-of-band delivery path (e.g., Wi-Fi, near field communication (NFC), USB port, etc.) or an in-band delivery path (e.g., via a secure connection with the provisioning server during a protocol data unit (PDU) session of the wireless communication device). In some examples, the wireless communication device may be connected to a provisioning server via an ordinary cell (e.g., a cell that conveys unencrypted broadcast information related to cell access) to receive a broadcast root key (or long-term key) and then may use the broadcast root key to access a secure cell. In some examples, the wireless communication device may perform device authentication and device certification with a provisioning server to receive a broadcast root key (or long-term key). As another example, the wireless communication device may be indirectly provisioned with a broadcast root key (or long-term key) by a provisioning server. For example, the provisioning server may provide the broadcast root key (or long-term key) to a core network node in the core network, and the core network node may transmit the broadcast root key (or long-term key) to the wireless communication device during the registration of the wireless communication device with the core network (e.g., via a normal cellular cell).

[0051] In some examples, the encrypted broadcast information includes at least a portion of an acquisition signal, such as a synchronization signal block (SSB). For example, the SSB may include unencrypted broadcast information that enables a wireless communication device to acquire cell identification information and encrypted broadcast information. In one example, the unencrypted broadcast information may include a primary synchronization signal (PSS), a secondary synchronization signal (SSS), and a system frame number (SFN) in a physical broadcast channel (PBCH), and the encrypted broadcast information may include the remainder of the PBCH. In some examples, the encrypted broadcast information may include the entire SSB. In this example, a radio access network (RAN) node (e.g., a base station) may transmit an unencrypted SSB including a modified PBCH that contains cell-specific security parameters that can be used to derive a cell-specific broadcast key. The encrypted broadcast information may also include other broadcast information related to cell access, such as SIB1 and a control message including scheduling information for scheduling SIB1.

[0052] The various concepts presented throughout this disclosure may be implemented across a wide variety of telecommunication systems, network architectures, and communication standards. Figure 1, various aspects of the present disclosure are explained with reference to a wireless communication system 100 as an illustrative example and not as a limitation. The wireless communication system 100 includes three interacting domains: a core network 102, a radio access network (RAN) 104, and a user equipment (UE) 106. By means of the wireless communication system 100, the UE 106 may be enabled to perform data communications with an external data network 110, such as, but not limited to, the Internet.

[0053] The RAN 104 may implement any suitable one or more wireless communication technologies to provide radio access to the UE 106. As an example, the RAN 104 may operate in accordance with the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) New Radio (NR) specification, commonly referred to as 5G-NR. As another example, the RAN 104 may operate under a mix of 5G NR and Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (eUTRAN) standards, commonly referred to as LTE. 3GPP refers to this hybrid RAN as the Next Generation RAN, or NG-RAN. Of course, many other examples may be utilized within the scope of the present disclosure.

[0054] As illustrated, RAN 104 includes multiple base stations 108. Broadly speaking, a base station is a network element in a radio access network that is responsible for radio transmission and reception to or from a UE in one or more cellular cells. In different technologies, standards, or contexts, a base station may be referred to as a base transceiver station (BTS), a radio base station, a radio transceiver, a transceiver function, a basic service set (BSS), an extended service set (ESS), an access point (AP), a B node (NB), an evolved B node (eNB), a next generation B node (gNB), a transmission reception point (TRP), or some other suitable terminology by those skilled in the art. In some examples, a base station may include two or more TRPs that may be co-located or non-co-located. Each TRP may communicate on the same or different carrier frequencies in the same or different frequency bands. In an example in which RAN 104 operates according to both LTE and 5G NR standards, one of the base stations may be an LTE base station, and the other may be a 5G NR base station.

[0055] The radio access network 104 is further illustrated as supporting wireless communications for multiple mobile devices. A mobile device may be referred to as a user equipment (UE) in the 3GPP standard, but may also be referred to as a mobile station (MS), a subscriber station, a mobile unit, a subscriber unit, a wireless unit, a remote unit, a mobile device, a wireless device, a wireless communication device, a remote device, a mobile subscriber station, an access terminal (AT), a mobile terminal, a wireless terminal, a remote terminal, a handset, a terminal, a user agent, a mobile client, a client, or some other suitable terminology by those skilled in the art. A UE may be a device that provides a user with access to network services.

[0056] Within this document, a "mobile" device does not necessarily need to have mobile capabilities, and may be stationary. The term mobile device or mobile equipment refers broadly to a wide variety of devices and technologies. A UE may include several hardware structural components sized, shaped, and arranged to facilitate communication; such components may include antennas, antenna arrays, RF chains, amplifiers, one or more processors, and the like electrically coupled to each other. For example, some non-limiting examples of mobile devices include mobile devices, cellular (cell) phones, smart phones, Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) phones, laptops, personal computers (PCs), notebooks, netbooks, smartbooks, tablet devices, personal digital assistants (PDAs), and a wide variety of embedded systems, for example, corresponding to the "Internet of Things" (IoT).

[0057] Additionally, the mobile device may be a car or other transportation vehicle, a remote sensor or actuator, a robot or robotic device, a satellite radio, a global positioning system (GPS) device, an object tracking device, a drone, a multicopter, a quadcopter, a remote control device, a consumer and / or wearable device (such as glasses), a wearable camera, a virtual reality device, a smart watch, a health or fitness tracker, a digital audio player (e.g., an MP3 player), a camera, a game console, etc. Additionally, the mobile device may be a digital home or smart home device, such as home audio, video and / or multimedia equipment, an appliance, a vending machine, a smart lighting device, a home security system, a smart meter, etc. The mobile device may further be a smart energy device, a security device, a solar panel or solar array, a municipal infrastructure device that controls power, lighting, water, etc. (e.g., a smart grid), an industrial automation and enterprise device, a logistics controller and / or agricultural equipment, etc. Still further, the mobile device may provide connected medical or telemedicine support, i.e., health care at a distance. Telehealth devices may include telehealth monitoring devices and telehealth supervisory devices, whose communications may be given priority or prioritized access over other types of information, for example in the form of prioritized access for critical service data transmission and / or associated QoS for critical service data transmission.

[0058] Wireless communication between RAN 104 and UE 106 can be described as utilizing an air interface. Transmissions from a base station (e.g., base station 108) to one or more UEs (e.g., UE 106) over the air interface can be referred to as downlink (DL) transmissions. According to certain aspects of the present disclosure, the term downlink can refer to point-to-multipoint transmissions originating at a base station (e.g., base station 108). Another way to describe this scheme can be to use the term broadcast channel multiplexing. Transmissions from a UE (e.g., UE 106) to a base station (e.g., base station 108) can be referred to as uplink (UL) transmissions. According to further aspects of the present disclosure, the term uplink can refer to point-to-point transmissions originating at a UE (e.g., UE 106).

[0059] In some examples, access to the air interface may be scheduled, wherein a scheduling entity (e.g., a base station 108) allocates resources for communication among some or all devices and equipment within its service area or cell. Within the present disclosure, as discussed further below, a scheduling entity may be responsible for scheduling, assigning, reconfiguring, and releasing resources for one or more scheduled entities (e.g., UEs 106). That is, for scheduled communications, multiple UEs 106 (which may be scheduled entities) may utilize resources allocated by a scheduling entity 108.

[0060] Base station 108 is not the only entity that can be used as a scheduling entity. That is, in some examples, a UE can be used as a scheduling entity, thereby scheduling resources for one or more scheduled entities (e.g., one or more other UEs). For example, a UE can communicate directly with other UEs in a peer-to-peer or device-to-device manner and / or in a relay configuration.

[0061] like Figure 1 , the scheduling entity 108 may broadcast downlink traffic 112 to one or more scheduled entities 106. Broadly speaking, the scheduling entity 108 is a node or device responsible for scheduling traffic in the wireless communication network, including downlink traffic 112 and, in some examples, uplink traffic 116 from one or more scheduled entities 106 to the scheduling entity 108. On the other hand, the scheduled entity 106 is a node or device that receives downlink control information 114 (including but not limited to scheduling information (e.g., grants), synchronization or timing information), or other control information from another entity in the wireless communication network, such as the scheduling entity 108.

[0062] Additionally, uplink and / or downlink control information and / or traffic information may be divided into frames, subframes, time slots, and / or symbols in time. As used herein, a symbol may refer to a time unit in which each subcarrier carries one resource element (RE) in an orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) waveform. A time slot may carry 7 or 14 OFDM symbols. A subframe may refer to a duration of 1 ms. Multiple subframes or time slots may be grouped together to form a single frame or radio frame. In the present disclosure, a frame may refer to a predetermined duration (e.g., 10 ms) for wireless transmission, wherein each frame includes, for example, 10 subframes of 1 ms each. Of course, these definitions are not required, and any appropriate scheme may be utilized to organize the waveform, and the various time divisions of the waveform may have any appropriate duration.

[0063] Generally speaking, base stations 108 may include a backhaul interface for communicating with a backhaul portion 120 of a wireless communication system. Backhaul 120 may provide a link between base stations 108 and core network 102. Additionally, in some examples, a backhaul network may provide interconnections between respective base stations 108. Various types of backhaul interfaces may be employed, such as a direct physical connection, a virtual network, and the like, using any suitable transport network.

[0064] The core network 102 may be part of the wireless communication system 100 and may be independent of the radio access technology used in the RAN 104. In some examples, the core network 102 may be configured according to a 5G standard (e.g., 5GC). In other examples, the core network 102 may be configured according to a 4G Evolved Packet Core (EPC), or any other suitable standard or configuration.

[0065] Now refer to Figure 2 , by way of example and not limitation, a block diagram illustrating an example of various components of a 5G wireless communication system (5GS) 200 is provided. In some examples, the 5GS 200 may be as described above and in Figure 1 .5GS 200 includes a user equipment (UE) 202, an NR-RAN 204, and a core network 206. By means of the wireless communication system 200, the UE 202 can perform data communication with an external data network 214 (such as but not limited to the Internet, an Ethernet network, or a local area network).

[0066] For example, the core network 206 may include an access and mobility management function (AMF) 208, a session management function (SMF) 210, and a user plane function (UPF) 212. The AMF 208 and the SMF 210 employ control plane (e.g., non-access stratum (NAS)) signaling to perform various functions related to mobility management and session management for the UE 202. For example, the AMF 208 provides connectivity, mobility management, and authentication for the UE 202, while the SMF 210 provides session management for the UE 202 (e.g., handling signaling related to a protocol data unit (PDU) session between the UE 202 and the external DN 214). The UPF 212 provides user plane connectivity to route 5G (NR) packets to / from the UE 202 via the NR-RAN 204.

[0067] The core network 206 may further include other functions such as a policy control function (PCF) 216, an authentication server function (AUSF) 218, a unified data management (UDM) 220, a network slice selection function (NSSF) 222, and other functions (not illustrated for simplicity). The PCF 216 provides policy information (e.g., rules) for control plane functions such as network slicing, roaming, and mobility management. In addition, the PCF 216 supports 5G quality of service (QoS) policies, network slicing policies, and other types of policies. The AUSF 218 performs authentication of the UE 202. The UDM 220 facilitates the generation of authentication and key agreement (AKA) credentials, performs user identification, and manages subscription information and UE context. In some examples, the AMF 208 includes a co-located security anchor function (SEAF) that allows the UE 202 to be re-authenticated when it moves between different NR-RANs 204 without having to perform a full authentication process with the AUSF 218. The NSSF 222 redirects traffic to the network slice. For example, network slices may be defined for different categories of subscribers or use cases, such as smart home, Internet of Things (IoT), connected car, smart energy grid, etc. Each use case may receive a unique set of optimized resources and network topology (e.g., network slice) to meet the connectivity, speed, power, and capacity requirements of the use case.

[0068] In order to establish a connection to the 5G core network 206 via the NR-RAN 204, the UE 202 may transmit a registration request and a PDU session establishment request to the 5G core network 206 via the NR-RAN 204. The AMF 208 and the SMF 210 may process the registration request and the PDU session establishment request and establish a PDU session between the UE 202 and the external DN 214 via the UPF 212. A PDU session may include one or more sessions (e.g., data sessions or data flows) and may be served by multiple UPFs 212 (only one of which is shown for convenience). Examples of data flows include, but are not limited to, IP flows, Ethernet flows, and unstructured data flows.

[0069] Now refer to Figure 3 , a schematic illustration of RAN 300 is provided as an example and not as a limitation. In some examples, RAN 300 may be similar to that described above and in Figure 1 RAN 104 illustrated in and / or described above and in Figure 2 The same as the NR-RAN 204 explained in FIG.

[0070] The geographic area covered by the RAN 300 may be divided into cellular areas (cells) that may be uniquely identified by user equipment (UE) based on an identity broadcast from an access point or base station. Figure 3 Cells 302, 304, 306, and 308 are illustrated, each of which may include one or more sectors (not shown). A sector is a sub-area of ​​a cell. All sectors within one cell are served by the same base station. A radio link within a sector may be identified by a single logical identification belonging to the sector. In a cell divided into sectors, multiple sectors within a cell may be formed by antenna groups, where each antenna is responsible for communication with UEs in a portion of the cell.

[0071] Various base station arrangements can be used. Figure 3, two base stations 310 and 312 are shown in cells 302 and 304. A third base station 314 is shown controlling a remote radio head (RRH) 316 in cell 306. That is, the base station may have an integrated antenna, or may be connected to the antenna or RRH by a feeder cable. In the illustrated example, cells 302, 304, and 306 may be referred to as macro cells because base stations 310, 312, and 314 support cells with large sizes. In addition, base station 318 is shown in cell 308, which may overlap with one or more macro cells. In this example, cell 308 may be referred to as a small cell (e.g., a micro cell, a pico cell, a femto cell, a home base station, a home Node B, a home evolved Node B, etc.) because base station 318 supports cells with relatively small sizes. Cell size setting may be done according to system design and component constraints.

[0072] It is to be understood that the RAN 300 may include any number of wireless base stations and cellular cells. In addition, relay nodes may be deployed to extend the size or coverage area of ​​a given cellular cell. Base stations 310, 312, 314, 318 provide wireless access points to the core network for any number of mobile devices. In some examples, base stations 310, 312, 314, and / or 318 may be similar to those described above and in Figure 1 The same as the base station / scheduling entity 108 illustrated in FIG.

[0073] Figure 3 Further included is an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) 320, which may be a drone or a quadcopter. UAV 320 may be configured to function as a base station, or more specifically as a mobile base station. That is, in some examples, a cell may not necessarily be stationary, and the geographic area of ​​a cell may move depending on the location of a mobile base station (such as UAV 320).

[0074] Within the RAN 300, cells may include UEs that may be in communication with one or more sectors of each cell. Further, each base station 310, 312, 314, and 318 may be configured to provide a core network (e.g., such as a core network) for all UEs in the corresponding cell. Figure 1 2). For example, UEs 322 and 324 may be in communication with base station 310; UEs 326 and 328 may be in communication with base station 312; UEs 330 and 332 may be in communication with base station 314 via RRH 316; and UE 334 may be in communication with base station 318. In some examples, UEs 322, 324, 326, 328, 330, 332, 334, 338, 340, and / or 342 may be in communication with base station 310 as described above and in Figure 1The UE / scheduled entity 106 illustrated in FIG. 1 is the same as and / or the same as described above and in Figure 2 302. In some examples, UAV 320 (e.g., a quadcopter) can be a mobile network node and can be configured to act as a UE. For example, UAV 320 can operate within cellular cell 302 by communicating with base station 310.

[0075] In a further aspect of the RAN 300, sidelink signals may be used between UEs without having to rely on scheduling or control information from a base station. Sidelink communications may be used, for example, in a device-to-device (D2D) network, a peer-to-peer (P2P) network, a vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) network, a vehicle-to-everything (V2X) network, and / or other suitable sidelink networks. For example, two or more UEs (e.g., UEs 338, 340, and 342) may communicate with each other using sidelink signals 337 without relaying the communication through a base station. In some examples, UEs 338, 340, and 342 may each act as a scheduling entity or a transmitting sidelink device and / or a scheduled entity or a receiving sidelink device to schedule resources and communicate sidelink signals 337 therebetween without relying on scheduling or control information from a base station. In other examples, two or more UEs (e.g., UEs 326 and 328) within the coverage area of ​​a base station (e.g., base station 312) may also communicate sidelink signals 327 on a direct link (sidelink) without communicating the communication through base station 312. In this example, base station 312 may allocate resources to UEs 326 and 328 for sidelink communications.

[0076] In the RAN 300, the ability of a UE to communicate independently of its location while moving is called mobility. The various physical channels between the UE and the radio access network are usually established, maintained, and released under the control of the AMF 208, such as Figure 2 As explained in .

[0077] The RAN 300 may utilize DL-based mobility or UL-based mobility to implement mobility and handover (i.e., the transfer of a UE's connection from one radio channel to another). In a network configured for DL-based mobility, during a call with a scheduling entity, or at any other time, a UE may monitor various parameters of a signal from its serving cell and various parameters of neighboring cells. Depending on the quality of these parameters, the UE may maintain communication with one or more neighboring cells. During this time, if the UE moves from one cell to another, or if the signal quality from a neighboring cell exceeds the signal quality from the serving cell for a given amount of time, the UE may perform a handover or handover from the serving cell to a neighboring (target) cell. For example, a UE 324 (illustrated as a vehicle, but any suitable form of UE may be used) may move from a geographic area corresponding to its serving cell 302 to a geographic area corresponding to a neighboring cell 306. When the signal strength or quality from a neighbor cell 306 exceeds the signal strength or quality of its serving cell 302 for a given amount of time, the UE 324 may transmit a report message indicating this condition to its serving base station 310. In response, the UE 324 may receive a handover command, and the UE may undergo a handover to the cell 306.

[0078] In a network configured for UL-based mobility, the UL reference signal from each UE may be used by the network to select a serving cell for each UE. In some examples, base stations 310, 312, and 314 / 316 may broadcast unified synchronization signals (e.g., unified primary synchronization signal (PSS), unified secondary synchronization signal (SSS), and unified physical broadcast channel (PBCH)). UEs 322, 324, 326, 328, 330, and 332 may receive unified synchronization signals, derive carrier frequency and slot timing from these synchronization signals, and transmit uplink pilots or reference signals in response to the derived timing. An uplink pilot signal transmitted by a UE (e.g., UE 324) may be received concurrently by two or more cells (e.g., base stations 310 and 314 / 316) within the radio access network 300. Each of these cells may measure the strength of the pilot signal, and the radio access network (e.g., one or more of base stations 310 and 314 / 316 and / or a central node within a core network) may determine a serving cell for UE 324. As UE 324 moves in radio access network 300, the network may continue to monitor uplink pilot signals transmitted by UE 324. When the signal strength or quality of the pilot signal measured by a neighboring cell exceeds the signal strength or quality measured by the serving cell, network 300 may handover UE 324 from the serving cell to the neighboring cell with or without notifying UE 324.

[0079] Although the synchronization signal transmitted by base stations 310, 312 and 314 / 316 may be uniform, the synchronization signal may not identify a specific cell, but may identify a zone including multiple cells operating on the same frequency and / or having the same timing. The use of zones in a 5G network or other next generation communication network implements an uplink-based mobility framework and improves the efficiency of both the UE and the network because the number of mobility messages that need to be exchanged between the UE and the network can be reduced.

[0080] In various implementations, the air interface in the radio access network 300 may utilize a licensed spectrum, an unlicensed spectrum, or a shared spectrum. A licensed spectrum generally provides exclusive use of a portion of the spectrum by a mobile network operator purchasing a license from a government regulator. An unlicensed spectrum provides shared use of a portion of the spectrum without a government-granted license. Although some technical rules generally still need to be followed to access the unlicensed spectrum, any operator or device can obtain access. A shared spectrum may fall between licensed and unlicensed spectrum, where technical rules or restrictions may be required to access the spectrum, but the spectrum may still be shared by multiple operators and / or multiple RATs. For example, a license holder of a portion of a licensed spectrum may provide licensed shared access (LSA) to share the spectrum with other parties, for example, using conditions determined by the appropriate license holder to obtain access.

[0081] Devices communicating in the radio access network 300 may utilize one or more multiplexing and multiple access algorithms to achieve simultaneous communication of the various devices. For example, the 5G NR specification utilizes orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) with a cyclic prefix (CP) to provide multiple access for UL transmissions from UEs 322 and 324 to base stations 310, and multiplexing for DL ​​transmissions from base stations 310 to one or more UEs 322 and 324. In addition, for UL transmissions, the 5G NR specification provides support for discrete Fourier transform spread OFDM (DFT-s-OFDM) with CP (also known as single carrier FDMA (SC-FDMA)). However, within the scope of the present disclosure, multiplexing and multiple access are not limited to the above schemes, and may be provided using time division multiple access (TDMA), code division multiple access (CDMA), frequency division multiple access (FDMA), sparse code multiple access (SCMA), resource extension multiple access (RSMA), or other appropriate multiple access schemes. In addition, multiplexing of DL transmissions from base station 310 to UEs 322 and 324 may be provided using time division multiplexing (TDM), code division multiplexing (CDM), frequency division multiplexing (FDM), orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM), sparse code multiplexing (SCM), or other suitable multiplexing schemes.

[0082] The equipment in the radio access network 300 may also utilize one or more duplex algorithms. Duplex refers to a point-to-point communication link in which both endpoints can communicate with each other in two directions. Full-duplex means that both endpoints can communicate with each other at the same time. Half-duplex means that only one endpoint can send information to the other endpoint at a time. Time division duplex (TDD) is usually used to implement half-duplex simulation for wireless links. In TDD, transmissions in different directions on a given channel are separated from each other using time division multiplexing. That is, in some scenarios, a channel is dedicated to transmission in one direction, while at other times, the channel is dedicated to transmission in another direction, where the direction can change very quickly, for example, several times per time slot. In wireless links, full-duplex channels generally rely on physical isolation of transmitters and receivers, and suitable interference cancellation techniques. Full-duplex simulation is usually implemented for wireless links by utilizing frequency division duplex (FDD) or space division duplex (SDD). In FDD, transmissions in different directions can operate at different carrier frequencies (e.g., within a paired spectrum). In SDD, transmissions in different directions on a given channel are separated from each other using spatial division multiplexing (SDM). In other examples, full-duplex communication may be implemented within an unpaired spectrum (e.g., within a single carrier bandwidth), where transmissions in different directions occur within different sub-bands of the carrier bandwidth. This type of full-duplex communication may be referred to herein as sub-band full-duplex (SBFD), also known as flexible duplex.

[0083] Will refer to Figure 4 Various aspects of the present disclosure are described using OFDM waveforms schematically illustrated in FIG. It should be understood by those of ordinary skill in the art that various aspects of the present disclosure can be applied to SC-FDM waveforms (e.g., DFT-s-OFDMA waveforms) in substantially the same manner as described below. That is, while some examples of the present disclosure may focus on OFDM links for clarity, it should be understood that the same principles can also be applied to SC-FDM waveforms.

[0084] Now refer to Figure 4 , illustrates an expanded view of an exemplary subframe 402 showing an OFDM resource grid. However, as will be readily appreciated by those skilled in the art, the PHY transmission structure for any particular application may differ from the examples described herein depending on any number of factors. Here, time is in the horizontal direction in units of OFDM symbols; and frequency is in the vertical direction in units of subcarriers of a carrier.

[0085] Resource grid 404 can be used to schematically represent the time-frequency resources for a given antenna port. That is, in a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) implementation with multiple antenna ports available, there may be a corresponding multiple number of resource grids 404 available for communication. Resource grid 404 is divided into multiple resource elements (REs) 406. RE (which is 1 subcarrier × 1 symbol) is the smallest discrete part of the time-frequency grid and contains a single complex value representing data from a physical channel or signal. Depending on the modulation utilized in a particular implementation, each RE may represent one or more information bits. In some examples, a block of REs may be referred to as a physical resource block (PRB) or more simply a resource block (RB) 408, which contains any suitable number of consecutive subcarriers in the frequency domain. In one example, an RB may include 12 subcarriers, which number is independent of the parameter design used. In some examples, depending on the parameter design, an RB may include any suitable number of consecutive OFDM symbols in the time domain. Within the present disclosure, it is assumed that a single RB (such as RB 408) corresponds entirely to a single communication direction (transmission or reception for a given device).

[0086] A set of contiguous or non-contiguous resource blocks may be referred to herein as a resource block group (RBG), a subband, or a bandwidth part (BWP). A set of subbands or BWPs may span the entire bandwidth. Scheduling a UE or sidelink device (hereinafter collectively referred to as a UE) for downlink, uplink, or sidelink transmission typically involves scheduling one or more resource elements 406 within one or more subbands or bandwidth parts (BWPs). Thus, the UE generally utilizes only a subset of the resource grid 404. In some examples, an RB may be the smallest resource unit that may be allocated to a UE. Thus, the more RBs scheduled for a UE and the higher the modulation scheme selected for the air interface, the higher the data rate of the UE. The RBs may be scheduled by a base station (e.g., a gNB, eNB, etc.), or may be self-scheduled by a UE / sidelink device implementing D2D sidelink communication.

[0087] In this illustration, RB 408 is shown as occupying less than the entire bandwidth of subframe 402, with some subcarriers illustrated above and below RB 408. In a given implementation, subframe 402 may have a bandwidth corresponding to any number of one or more RBs 408. Furthermore, in this illustration, RB 408 is shown as occupying less than the entire duration of subframe 402, but this is merely one possible example.

[0088] Each 1 ms subframe 402 may include one or more adjacent time slots. Figure 4In the example shown in , a subframe 402 includes four time slots 410. In some examples, a time slot may be defined according to a specified number of OFDM symbols with a given cyclic prefix (CP) length. For example, with a nominal CP, a time slot may include 7 or 14 OFDM symbols. Additional examples may include mini-slots (sometimes referred to as shortened transmission time intervals (TTIs)) with shorter durations (e.g., one to three OFDM symbols). In some cases, these mini-slots or shortened transmission time intervals (TTIs) may occupy resources scheduled for ongoing time slot transmissions for the same or different UEs to transmit. Any number of resource blocks may be utilized within a subframe or time slot.

[0089] An expanded view of one of the time slots 410 illustrates that the time slot 410 includes a control region 412 and a data region 414. In general, the control region 412 may carry control channels, while the data region 414 may carry data channels. Of course, a time slot may contain full DL, full UL, or at least one DL portion and at least one UL portion. Figure 4 The structure illustrated in is merely exemplary in nature, and different slot structures may be utilized and may include one or more for each of the control region and the data region.

[0090] Although not in Figure 4 408, but each RE 406 within the RB 408 may be scheduled to carry one or more physical channels, including a control channel, a shared channel, a data channel, etc. Other REs 406 within the RB 408 may carry pilot or reference signals. These pilot or reference signals may be used by the receiving device to perform channel estimation for the corresponding channel, which may enable coherent demodulation / detection of the control and / or data channels within the RB 408.

[0091] In some examples, time slot 410 may be used for broadcast, multicast, groupcast, or unicast communications. For example, broadcast, multicast, or groupcast communications may refer to point-to-multipoint transmissions from one device (e.g., a base station, UE, or other similar device) to other devices. Here, broadcast communications are delivered to all devices, while multicast or groupcast communications are delivered to multiple target recipient devices. Unicast communications may refer to point-to-point transmissions from one device to a single other device.

[0092] In an example of cellular communication on a cellular carrier via a Uu interface, for DL ​​transmission, a scheduling entity (e.g., a base station) may allocate one or more REs 406 (e.g., within a control region 412) to carry DL control information including one or more DL control channels (such as a physical downlink control channel (PDCCH)) to one or more scheduled entities (e.g., UEs). The PDCCH carries downlink control information (DCI), including but not limited to power control commands (e.g., one or more open-loop power control parameters and / or one or more closed-loop power control parameters) for DL ​​and UL transmissions, scheduling information, grants, and / or RE assignments. The PDCCH may further carry HARQ feedback transmissions, such as an acknowledgment (ACK) or a negative acknowledgment (NACK). HARQ is a well-known technique to those of ordinary skill in the art, wherein for accuracy, the integrity of packet transmissions may be checked at the receiving side, for example, using any suitable integrity check mechanism (such as a checksum or a cyclic redundancy check (CRC)). If the integrity of the transmission is confirmed, an ACK may be transmitted, and if it is not confirmed, a NACK may be transmitted. In response to the NACK, the transmitting device may send a HARQ retransmission, which may enable chase combining, incremental redundancy, and the like.

[0093] The base station may further allocate one or more REs 406 (e.g., in the control region 412 or the data region 414) to carry other DL signals, such as a demodulation reference signal (DMRS); a phase tracking reference signal (PT-RS); a channel state information (CSI) reference signal (CSI-RS); and a synchronization signal block (SSB). The SSB may be broadcast at regular intervals based on a periodicity (e.g., 5, 10, 20, 40, 80, or 140 milliseconds). The SSB includes a primary synchronization signal (PSS), a secondary synchronization signal (SSS), and a physical broadcast control channel (PBCH). The UE may utilize the PSS and SSS to achieve radio frame, subframe, time slot, and symbol synchronization in the time domain, identify the center of the channel (system) bandwidth in the frequency domain, and identify the physical cell identity (PCI) of the cell.

[0094] The PBCH in the SSB may further include: a master information block (MIB), which includes various system information and parameters for decoding a system information block (SIB). The SIB may be, for example, a system information type 1 (SystemInformationType1) (SIB1), which may include various additional system information. The MIB and SIB1 together provide minimum system information (SI) for initial access. Examples of system information transmitted in the MIB may include, but are not limited to, subcarrier spacing (e.g., default downlink parameter design), system frame number, configuration of a PDCCH control resource set (CORESET) (e.g., PDCCH CORESET0), a cell barring indicator, a cell reselection indicator, a raster offset, and a search space for SIB1. Examples of remaining minimum system information (RMSI) transmitted in SIB1 may include, but are not limited to, a random access search space, a paging search space, downlink configuration information, and uplink configuration information.

[0095] In UL transmission, the scheduled entity (e.g., UE) may utilize one or more REs 406 to carry UL control information (UCI) to the scheduling entity, which includes one or more UL control channels, such as a physical uplink control channel (PUCCH). UCI may include various packet types and categories, including pilots, reference signals, and information configured to implement or assist in decoding uplink data transmission. Examples of uplink reference signals may include sounding reference signals (SRS) and uplink DMRS. In some examples, UCI may include a scheduling request (SR), i.e., a request for the scheduling entity to schedule uplink transmission. Here, in response to the SR transmitted on the UCI, the scheduling entity may transmit downlink control information (DCI), which may schedule resources for uplink packet transmission. UCI may also include HARQ feedback, channel state feedback (CSF) (such as CSI report), or any other suitable UCI.

[0096] In addition to control information, one or more REs 406 (e.g., within the data region 414) may also be allocated for data traffic. Such data traffic may be carried on one or more traffic channels, such as a physical downlink shared channel (PDSCH) for DL ​​transmissions or a physical uplink shared channel (PUSCH) for UL transmissions. In some examples, one or more REs 406 within the data region 414 may be configured to carry other signals, such as one or more SIBs and DMRS.

[0097] In an example of sidelink communication on a sidelink carrier via a PC5 interface, a control region 412 of a time slot 410 may include a physical sidelink control channel (PSCCH) including sidelink control information (SCI) transmitted by an initiator (transmitter) sidelink device (e.g., a Tx V2X device or other Tx UE) to a set of one or more other receiver sidelink devices (e.g., an Rx V2X device or other Rx UE). A data region 414 of the time slot 410 may include a physical sidelink shared channel (PSSCH) including sidelink data traffic transmitted by a transmitter sidelink device within resources reserved by the initiator (transmitter) sidelink device on the sidelink carrier via the SCI. Other information may be further transmitted on each RE 406 within the time slot 410. For example, HARQ feedback information may be transmitted from a receiver sidelink device to a transmitter sidelink device in a physical sidelink feedback channel (PSFCH) within the time slot 410. Additionally, one or more reference signals may be transmitted within time slot 410, such as a sidelink SSB and / or a sidelink CSI-RS, a sidelink SRS, and / or a sidelink positioning reference signal (PRS).

[0098] These physical channels are generally multiplexed and mapped to transport channels for handling by the medium access control (MAC) layer. The transport channels carry information blocks, which are called transport blocks (TBs). The transport block size (TBS), which may correspond to the number of information bits, may be a controlled parameter based on the modulation and coding scheme (MCS) and the number of RBs in a given transmission.

[0099] Combined with the above Figure 1-Figure 4 The channels or carriers described are not necessarily all of the channels or carriers available between the scheduling entity and the scheduled entity, and one of ordinary skill in the art will recognize that other channels or carriers may be utilized in addition to those illustrated, such as other traffic, control, and feedback channels.

[0100] Figure 5 is a diagram illustrating various broadcast information 500 related to cellular cell access according to certain aspects. The broadcast information 500 may be transmitted by a RAN node (e.g., a base station such as an eNB or gNB) on resources (e.g., time-frequency resources) allocated for transmitting the broadcast information 500 in a cellular cell. The broadcast information 500 includes an acquisition signal 502 including cellular cell identification information. In some examples, the acquisition signal 502 may include a synchronization signal block (SSB). The SSB 502 may be transmitted, for example, within the first four OFDM symbols of a time slot in the time domain (e.g., within the control region) and on 20 PRBs in the frequency domain. In addition, the SSB 502 may have a periodicity of, for example, 20 ms or other suitable periodicity. Figure 5In the example shown, the broadcast information 500 may further include CORESET0 510 and SIB1 512 .

[0101] The SSB 502 may include a PSS 504, an SSS 506, and a PBCH 508. The PSS 504 may include a PSS sequence selected from a PSS sequence set. Additionally, the SSS 506 may include an SSS sequence selected from an SSS sequence set. In some examples, the PSS / SSS sequence identifies a PCI (e.g., a PCI of a cell used to transmit the SSB 502). In some examples, the cell identification information may include the PCI.

[0102] The PBCH 508 includes a MIB that carries various system information (SI), including, for example, a cell barring indication, a subcarrier spacing, a system frame number, and scheduling information for CORESET0 510. For example, the PBCH 508 may include scheduling information indicating the time-frequency resources allocated for CORESET0 510. In some examples, CORESET0 510 may be transmitted in the first four symbols of a slot (e.g., within the control region). In addition, CORESET0 510 carries a PDCCH with a DCI that includes scheduling information for scheduling SIB1 512. SIB1 512 is carried in a physical downlink shared channel (PDSCH) within the data region of a slot. In addition, SIB1 512 contains the remaining minimum system information (SI), including, for example, a set of radio resource parameters that provide network identification and configuration. For example, the set of radio resource parameters may include a bandwidth (e.g., a number of BWPs) that a UE can use to communicate with a base station.

[0103] In a public network deployment, the UE should be able to receive broadcast information 500 related to cell access to select and camp on a cell. However, in a private network deployment, the network operator may limit access to authorized UEs and may implement procedures to address vulnerabilities to DoS attacks. In various aspects of the present disclosure, in order to protect against various types of DoS attacks, at least a portion of the broadcast information 500 related to cell access may be encrypted (encrypted). The encrypted broadcast information 500 may be decrypted by the authorized UE for cell access and other purposes (e.g., cell reselection or other suitable purposes). In some examples, a minimum portion of the broadcast information 500 (e.g., one or more information elements (IEs)) may be unencrypted for cell identification and cell-specific encryption / decryption. For example, the PSS 504 and SSS 506 may be decrypted along with a portion of the PBCH 508 (e.g., a portion of the PBCH containing the system frame number). The remaining IEs, CORESET0 510, and SIB1 512 of the PBCH 508 may be encrypted. Additionally, the encrypted portions of SSB 502, CORESET0 510, and SIB1 512 may be integrity protected to verify the integrity of the broadcast message (eg, to verify that the broadcast message has not been modified or relayed by an attacker).

[0104] In various aspects of the present disclosure, broadcast messages may be encrypted and integrity protected using a broadcast key. In order to enable an authorized UE to decrypt the encrypted broadcast information, a broadcast key may be provisioned on the UE. Here, an authorized UE is a UE that has obtained a broadcast key from the network using various mechanisms, such as an in-band (e.g., via a cellular network) or an out-of-band (e.g., via an external network) mechanism. In some examples, the broadcast key may be a cell-specific broadcast key that is unique to each cell within the wireless communication network (or unique to a group of cells within an area or region of the network). Therefore, when the UE moves throughout the wireless communication network, the UE is provisioned with a different cell-specific broadcast key for each cell. However, provisioning a new cell-specific broadcast key for the UE individually each time the UE moves to a new cell may undesirably increase signaling overhead. Thus, in order to reduce signaling in the network, the UE may be provisioned with a broadcast root key that can be used by the UE to derive a cell-specific broadcast key. The broadcast root key (and therefore the cell-specific broadcast key) may be periodically updated (refreshed) in the network to improve security in the network. In addition, multiple broadcast root keys may be generated, each assigned to a different set of cells or a different set of UEs to reduce key updates or key revocations in the event of a key compromise.

[0105] Figure 6is a signaling diagram illustrating example signaling to provide secure communication of broadcast information related to cell access in accordance with certain aspects. Figure 6 In the example shown, the wireless communication device 602 is attempting to access a secure cell served by a RAN node 604. The RAN node 604 may correspond to Figure 1-Figure 3 Any of the base stations (e.g., gNB, eNB, etc.) or scheduling entities shown in FIG. In addition, the wireless communication device 602 (hereinafter may be collectively referred to as a device) may correspond to the following Figure 1-Figure 3 Device 602 may attempt cell access, for example, upon entering a wireless communication network (eg, a private network), powering on, or switching from a radio resource control (RRC) idle state to an RRC connected state.

[0106] The provisioning server 606 is configured to generate one or more broadcast keys for encrypting and integrity protecting broadcast information related to cell access. In some examples, the broadcast key(s) are broadcast root keys that can be used to derive broadcast keys that vary from cell to cell. The broadcast root key(s) can expire after a predetermined time duration, and therefore the provisioning server 606 can generate new broadcast root keys(s) before the current broadcast root key(s) expires. In some examples, the provisioning server 606 can generate one or more long-term keys that can be used to derive the broadcast root key(s). Multiple broadcast root keys and / or multiple long-term keys can be generated and provided to different device groups or different RAN node groups to avoid updating each of these devices and RAN nodes with a new key in the event that one of these keys is damaged. In some examples, the provisioning server 606 can be outside a wireless communication system (e.g., a wireless communication system including the RAN and a core network). For example, the provisioning server 606 can be within an external data network (such as, but not limited to, a private data network) (e.g., via the Internet or a local area network (LAN)).

[0107] At 608, the provisioning server 606 may provision a cell-specific broadcast key on the RAN node 604. The cell-specific broadcast key may be unique to a secure cell served by the RAN node 604 (e.g., unique within a wireless communication network that includes the RAN node 604 or unique to a group of cells within the wireless communication network). In some examples, the provisioning server 606 may generate one or more broadcast root keys and provide the generated broadcast root key(s) to the core network (e.g., Figure 2The core network node may then derive a cell-specific broadcast key for each secure cell in the wireless communication network from the broadcast root key(s) and provision the cell-specific broadcast key for each secure cell on the corresponding serving RAN node. In some examples, the core network node that derives and provisions the cell-specific broadcast key on the RAN node 604 may include one or more of the following: an AMF, a UDM, or a new key management function (KMF) within the core network. In some examples, a network operator of the wireless communication system may configure an operation, administration, and maintenance (OAM) node coupled to or included in the core network to provision the cell-specific broadcast key on the RAN node 604. The OAM node may be responsible for, for example, provisioning and / or managing the wireless communication system or one or more elements (e.g., one or more nodes) within the wireless communication system.

[0108] In some examples, a RAN node (e.g., RAN node 604) may serve two or more secure cells. Thus, the RAN node 604 may be provisioned with a separate, different cell-specific broadcast key for each of the secure cells served by the RAN node 604. In some examples, the RAN node 604 may be provisioned with a RAN node-specific key (e.g., a broadcast RAN key) and may derive a respective cell-specific broadcast key for each secure cell served by the RAN node 604 from the broadcast RAN key.

[0109] At 610, the provisioning server 606 may provision the broadcast root key on the device 602. In some examples, the provisioning server 606 may provision the broadcast root key and the expiration time of the broadcast root key directly on the device 602. For example, the provisioning server 606 may provision the broadcast root key on the device 602 directly via an in-band delivery path (e.g., through a private wireless communication network) or an out-of-band delivery path (e.g., through a Wi-Fi connection to a private network, through a near field communication (NFC) connection to a private network, or through a USB port connection to a private network). In some examples, the provisioning server 606 may perform device authentication, device certification, or both on the device 602 before provisioning the broadcast root key on the device 602. In other examples, the provisioning server 606 may transmit the broadcast root key to a core network node (e.g., AMF) within the core network, which may then transmit the broadcast root key to the device 602 upon successful registration of the device 602 with the core network.

[0110] In some examples, the device 602 may be provisioned with a long-term key from which a broadcast root key may be derived using a key derivation function (KDF). Using a long-term key may reduce or eliminate signaling overhead in the network that may result from the device 602 periodically obtaining a new broadcast root key from the provisioning server 606. For example, the broadcast root key may expire after a predetermined time duration (e.g., after a key refresh interval) and the device 602 may need to obtain or derive a new broadcast root key before the old broadcast root key expires. The device 602 may derive the new broadcast key directly from the long-term key without obtaining the new broadcast root key from the provisioning server 606.

[0111] In some examples, the broadcast root key (or long-term key) may be included in the provisioning information transmitted from the provisioning server 606 or the core network node to the device 602. The provisioning information may include additional information, such as a key refresh interval, a current time, and / or a key identifier (ID) of the long-term key or the broadcast root key. Other provisioning information may further include a hyperframe number (HFN) and a SFN, as described below. In some examples, the long-term key may be used for other purposes (e.g., purposes other than deriving the broadcast root key) and therefore the provisioning information may further include a code for broadcast root key derivation. The device 602 may set the system clock on the device to the current time for updating the broadcast root key based on the key refresh interval.

[0112] At 612, the RAN node 604 may broadcast encrypted and unencrypted information related to cell access in the secure cell. In some examples, the unencrypted information includes cell identification information that uniquely identifies the secure cell. For example, the unencrypted information may include the PSS and SSS of the SSB. The PSS and SSS may be used to determine the PCI of the secure cell and the absolute radio frequency channel number (ARFCN) that specifies the carrier frequency (or the carrier frequency pair corresponding to the uplink and downlink frequencies in the FDD system) utilized in the cell. In some examples, the cell identification information may include the PCI itself or the concatenation of the PCI and the ARFCN (PCI|ARFCN). The latter may be used, for example, in wireless communication networks that reuse PCIs between distant cells (e.g., cells in different tracking areas or registration areas). In addition, the unencrypted information may further include a system frame number (SFN) within the MIB of the PBCH.

[0113] The encrypted information may include, for example, the rest of the MIB (e.g., the MIB other than the SFN), CORESET0, and SIB1. The encrypted information may be encrypted using, for example, a cell-specific broadcast key. In some examples, the encrypted information may be encrypted using a cell-specific broadcast key and a freshness parameter (e.g., a counter). In one example, the freshness parameter may include the current time. In another example, the freshness parameter may include the SFN. In yet another example, the freshness parameter includes a combination (e.g., concatenation) of the HFN and SFN of the wireless communication network. A superframe may include, for example, 1024 frames, and there may be 1024 superframes in a superframe period. Thus, the range of SFN may be between 0 and 1023 and the range of HFN may be between 0 and 1023. The SFN and HFN may each include 10 bits. Thus, combining the HFN with the SFN produces a unique combination of a cell-specific broadcast key and a freshness parameter that may be changed for about three hours for the broadcast root key (and a corresponding cell-specific broadcast key for a secure cell). Therefore, in this example, the key refresh interval may correspond to the wrap time of the freshness parameter. SFN and / or a combination of HFN and SFN is only one example of a freshness parameter, and other suitable freshness parameters may be utilized in other examples.

[0114] In an example where a combination of HFN and SFN is used as a freshness parameter, the provisioning information provided to the device 602 by the core network node or provisioning server 606 may include the HFN and the SFN. Here, the SFN is included in the provisioning information (along with the SFN transmitted by the RAN node 604 within the MIB) to minimize errors when correlating the SFN received by the RAN node 604 with the HFN.

[0115] The encrypted broadcast information may further be integrity protected using a message authentication code derived from a broadcast key that varies from cell to cell and the encrypted broadcast information. In some examples, the key used for the message authentication code may be an integrity protection key derived from a broadcast key that varies from cell to cell. The device 602 may verify the message authentication code before or after decrypting the encrypted broadcast information to verify the integrity of the broadcast information. The order of decryption and integrity verification depends on the order of encryption and integrity protection. For example, when the broadcast information is first encrypted by the RAN node 604 and then integrity protected, the device 602 may first verify the integrity and then decrypt the broadcast information. As another example, when the broadcast information is first integrity protected and then encrypted by the RAN node, the device 602 may first decrypt the broadcast information and then verify the integrity.

[0116] At 614, the device 602 may derive a cell-specific broadcast key based on the broadcast root key and the cell identification information (e.g., PCI or PCI|ARFCN). For example, the PCI includes 10 bits, and therefore in a private network deployment including more than 1000 cells, the PCI alone may not uniquely identify the cell. Therefore, the combination (or concatenation) of the PCI and the ARFCN may be used to uniquely identify the cell and thereby derive a unique cell-specific broadcast key. For example, the device 602 may derive the cell-specific broadcast key using a key derivation function (KDF) of the broadcast root key and the cell identification information. In some examples, the device 602 may further utilize other cell-specific security parameters to derive the cell-specific broadcast key. The additional cell-specific security parameters may be used, for example, for large-scale private network cell deployments that include numerous cells such that the combination of the PCI and the ARFCN does not uniquely identify a cell in the network. Examples of cell-specific security parameters may include, but are not limited to, a key ID of a broadcast root key, other cell identification information (e.g., a random number assigned to the cell), an identifier of the RAN node 604, a security algorithm, or additional freshness parameters (e.g., an additional counter that may include the current time, SFN, HFN, or a combination of SN and HFN).

[0117] In some examples, the device 602 may derive a broadcast RAN key from the broadcast root key and then further derive a cell-specific broadcast key from the broadcast RAN key. For example, the device 602 may derive the broadcast RAN key using a KDF of the broadcast root key and an identifier of the RAN node 604. The device 602 may then derive the cell-specific broadcast key using a KDF of the broadcast RAN key and cell identification information (e.g., PCI, PCI|ARFCH, or other cell identification information, such as cell identification information received as part of cell-specific security parameters).

[0118] At 616, the device 602 may decrypt the encrypted broadcast information using a broadcast key that varies from cell to cell. In some examples, the device 602 may decrypt the encrypted broadcast information using a combination of a broadcast key that varies from cell to cell and a freshness parameter (e.g., current time, SFN, or a combination of HFN and SFN) and generate decrypted broadcast information. In some examples, the device 602 may further derive a broadcast protection key from the broadcast key that varies from cell to cell to decrypt the encrypted broadcast information. In this example, the encrypted broadcast information is encrypted using the broadcast protection key. At 618, the device 602 may access the RAN node 604 and register with the core network using the unencrypted broadcast information and the decrypted broadcast information. In some examples, the device 602 may use the unencrypted broadcast information and the decrypted broadcast information for cell reselection or other suitable purposes, rather than cell access.

[0119] Fig. 7A and 7B An exemplary key derivation for a cell-specific broadcast key according to certain aspects is illustrated. Fig. 7A In the example shown, the broadcast key (K B-CELL )704 is the root key from the broadcast (K B-ROOT ) 702 and cellular cell identification information (Cell ID_I) 706. For example, the broadcast key (K B-CELL ) can be exported as follows:

[0120] K B-CELL =KDF(K B-ROOT ,Cell ID_I) (Formula 1),

[0121] Wherein Cell ID_I is PCI, PCI|ARFCN, or other appropriate cellular cell identification information.

[0122] exist Figure 7B In the example shown, the broadcast root key (K B-ROOT ) 702 is derived from a long-term key (K) 708 and a freshness parameter (T) 710. In some examples, the freshness parameter 710 may be based on the current time (T current ) and key refresh interval (T refresh ) to determine. The current time (T current ) and key refresh interval (T refresh ) may be included in the provisioning information transmitted to the device. As described above, the provisioning information may include a long-term key, a key refresh interval, a current time, a key identifier (ID) of a long-term key or a broadcast root key, a HFN, and a SFN.

[0123] For example, the refresh parameters (T) 710 may include a refresh parameter based on the current time (Tcurrent ) and the current counter value of the counter set by the key refresh interval (T refresh In some examples, the counter may correspond to a system clock of the device, and the device may set the system clock to the current time (T current For example, the broadcast root key (K B-ROOT ) can be exported as follows:

[0124] K B-ROOT =KDF(K,T,[optional parameter]) (Formula 2),

[0125] Where T = [T current / T refresh Once the counter value increases by an amount equal to the key refresh interval, K B-ROOT The value of changes, thus generating a new K at the expiration of each key refresh interval B-ROOT .

[0126] Can be used to export K B-ROOT Other optional parameters may include one or more of the following: a key ID associated with the long-term key K (e.g., in examples where more than one long-term key is generated and used in a wireless communication network), a network identifier associated with the RAN, a tracking area code associated with a tracking area including a secure cell, an area identifier associated with a RAN node, or a registration area code associated with a registration area including a secure cell. Cell-specific broadcast key (K B-CELL )704 can then be based on K B-ROOT 702 and cell identification information (Cell ID_I) 706, as defined above in Equation 1. In some examples, the refresh parameter (T) 710 may be used as a key ID for a cell-specific broadcast key.

[0127] Figure 8 is a diagram illustrating an example of an out-of-band delivery path for provisioning a cell-specific broadcast key in accordance with certain aspects. Figure 8 In the example shown, a device (e.g., UE) 802 is located in a secure cell 800 served by a RAN node (e.g., a base station such as a gNB) 804. The RAN node 804 may correspond to Figure 1-Figure 3 Any of the base stations (e.g., gNB, eNB, etc.) or scheduling entities shown in FIG. In addition, the device 802 may correspond to Figure 1-Figure 3 Any of the UEs or scheduled entities shown in .

[0128] RAN node 804 is coupled to a core network 808 including a core network node 810 (eg, Figure 2The core network 206 of FIG. 808). The core network node 810 may include one or more of AMF, UDM, KMF, or OAM (which may be external to the core network 808). The provisioning server 806 is shown as being outside the wireless communication system (e.g., outside the RAN including the RAN node 804 and the core network 808). For example, the provisioning server 806 may be within an external data network (such as (but not limited to) a private data network) (e.g., via the Internet or a LAN). In some examples, the provisioning server 806 may correspond to Figure 6 Provisioning server 606 is shown.

[0129] The provisioning server 806 is configured to generate one or more broadcast keys (e.g., broadcast root keys or long-term keys) for encryption and integrity protection of broadcast information related to cell access. Multiple broadcast root keys and / or multiple long-term keys may be generated and used by different groups of devices or different groups of RAN nodes to avoid updating each of these devices and RAN nodes with a new key in the event of key corruption of one of these keys.

[0130] exist Figure 8 In the example shown, provisioning server 806 can be configured to generate provisioning information 812 and transmit it to device 802 via an out-of-band delivery path. The provisioning information may include, for example, a broadcast root key or a long-term key and a key refresh interval (or an expiration time of the broadcast root key). In addition, the provisioning information may further include a current time (T current ), key ID of long-term key and / or broadcast root key, and / or HFN and SFN.

[0131] In some examples, the out-of-band delivery path used by the provisioning server to provide provisioning information directly to the device 802 may include a Wi-Fi connection between the device 802 and an access point connected to a private data network that includes the provisioning server 806. For example, the device 802 may access the provisioning server 806 associated with the private data network to retrieve the provisioning information 812 via Wi-Fi using credentials (e.g., device-specific credentials) provided to the device 802 by the private network. In other examples, the out-of-band delivery path may include a near field communication (NFC) connection between the device 802 and a secure checkpoint associated with the private data network that is connected to the provisioning server 806. For example, a user may scan an NFC device on the device 802 upon entering a secure checkpoint (e.g., at the entrance of a building associated with the private data network) to access the provisioning server 806 and retrieve the provisioning information 812 from the provisioning server 806 using credentials provided to the device 802 by the private data network. In other examples, the out-of-band delivery path may include a USB port connection to the private data network that includes the provisioning server 806. For example, a user may connect a port on device 802 to a USB port connected to a private data network to retrieve provisioning information 812 from provisioning server 806 using credentials provided by the private data network to device 802. Other out-of-band delivery paths are possible, and the present disclosure is not limited to any particular out-of-band delivery path.

[0132] In some examples, the credentials provided to the device 802 by the private data network may be used for device authentication. In addition, the device 802 may perform device attestation to verify the device security status (e.g., whether the operating system is up to date, whether the lock screen is enabled, whether the device fingerprint or biometrics is enabled, etc.). In some examples, the provisioning server 806 may provision a specific long-term key (or broadcast root key) on the device 802 based on the device security status of the device 802. In this example, the provisioning server 806 may generate multiple long-term keys (or broadcast root keys) and provision different keys on different devices based on the device security status of the device. Different keys may allow the device to access a specific cellular cell.

[0133] The provisioning server 806 may further transmit key information 814 to a core network node 810 within the core network. The key information 814 may include, for example, a broadcast root key or a long-term key and a key refresh interval or expiration time associated with the long-term key or the broadcast root key. The key information 814 may further include a key ID of the long-term key or the broadcast root key. In some examples, the key information 814 may further include a current time and a HFN / SFN used to synchronize the core network node 810 with the provisioning server 806. The core network node 810 may use, for example, the above formulas 1 and 2 to derive a cell-specific broadcast key for the RAN node 804 from the broadcast root key or the long-term key. The core network node 810 may then provision a cell-specific broadcast key 816 on the RAN node 804. In some examples, the core network node 810 may derive a broadcast RAN key from the broadcast root key and provision the broadcast RAN key on the RAN node 804 instead of a cell-specific broadcast key.

[0134] The RAN node 804 may then transmit broadcast information 818 including encrypted and unencrypted broadcast information related to cell access within the secure cell 800. In some examples, the broadcast information 818 may include acquisition signals such as SSB, CORESET0, and SIB1. The device 802 may use the unencrypted broadcast information (e.g., within the acquisition signal) to obtain cell identification information and use the cell identification information and the broadcast root key to derive a cell-specific broadcast key. The device 802 may then decrypt the encrypted broadcast information related to cell access to access the secure cell 800 or for other suitable purposes (e.g., cell reselection).

[0135] Fig. 9 is a diagram illustrating an example of an in-band delivery path for provisioning a cell-specific broadcast key in accordance with certain aspects. Fig. 9 In the example shown, a device (e.g., UE) 902 is located in an area covered by both a secure cell 900a and a normal cell (referred to herein as a pinhole access cell) 900b. The secure cell 900a and the pinhole access cell 900b are each identified by a different corresponding PCI. In addition, both the pinhole access cell 900b and the secure cell 900a are served by the same RAN node (e.g., a base station such as a gNB) 904. The RAN node 904 may correspond to Figure 1-Figure 3 Any of the base stations (e.g., gNB, eNB, etc.) or scheduling entities shown in FIG. In addition, the device 902 may correspond to Figure 1-Figure 3 Any of the UEs or scheduled entities shown in .

[0136] RAN node 904 is coupled to a core network 908 including a core network node 910 (eg, Figure 2 The core network 206 of FIG. 908). The core network node 910 may include one or more of AMF, UDM, KMF, or OAM (which may be external to the core network 908). The provisioning server 906 is shown as being outside the wireless communication system (e.g., outside the RAN including the RAN node 904 and the core network 908). For example, the provisioning server 906 may be within an external data network (such as (but not limited to) a private data network) (e.g., via the Internet or a LAN). In some examples, the provisioning server 906 may correspond to Figure 6 The provisioning server 606 and / or Figure 8 Provisioning server 806 is shown.

[0137] The provisioning server 906 is configured to generate one or more broadcast keys (e.g., broadcast root keys or long-term keys) for encryption and integrity protection of broadcast information related to cell access. Multiple broadcast root keys and / or multiple long-term keys may be generated and used by different groups of devices or different groups of RAN nodes to avoid updating each of these devices and RAN nodes with a new key in the event of key corruption of one of these keys.

[0138] The provisioning server 906 may be further configured to transmit key information 914 to a core network node 910 within the core network. The key information 914 may include, for example, a broadcast root key or a long-term key and a key refresh interval or expiration time associated with the long-term key or the broadcast root key. The key information 914 may further include a key ID of the long-term key or the broadcast root key. In some examples, the key information 914 may further include a current time and a HFN / SFN for synchronizing the core network node 910 with the provisioning server 906. The core network node 910 may use, for example, the above formulas 1 and 2 to derive a cell-specific broadcast key for the RAN node 904 from the broadcast root key or the long-term key. The core network node 910 may then provision a cell-specific broadcast key 916 on the RAN node 904. In some examples, the core network node 910 may derive a broadcast RAN key from the broadcast root key and provision the broadcast RAN key on the RAN node 904 instead of a cell-specific broadcast key.

[0139] The pinhole access cell 900b broadcasts unencrypted broadcast information 918 related to cell access for use by the device 902 to access the pinhole access cell 900b. For example, the pinhole access cell 900b may broadcast unencrypted SSB, CORESET0, and PBCH to enable the device 902 to access the pinhole access cell 900b. Upon accessing the pinhole access cell 900b, the device 902 may register with the core network 908. For example, the device 902 may transmit a registration request to the AMF within the core network 908 via the RAN node 904. The AMF may then initiate a non-access stratum (NAS) level authentication between the device 902 and the core network 908 (e.g., the AUSF and UDM in the core network). The AMF may then retrieve mobility subscription data, SMF selection data, and UE context and communicate with the PCF for policy association for the device 902. The AMF may then send a NAS security registration accept message to the device 902 to complete the registration.

[0140] Once the device 902 has registered with the core network 908, the device 902 may establish a PDU session via the pinhole access cell 900b. For example, the device 902 may transmit a PDU session establishment message to the SMF within the core network 908. Based on policy information associated with the device registration via the pinhole access cell 900b, the SMF may allow the device 902 to establish a connection with the provisioning server 906 in the private external data network only via the PDU session. Thus, the pinhole access cell 900b restricts the device 902 from connecting to any other server or data network other than the provisioning server 906 in the private data network. The connection between the device 902 and the provisioning server 906 may be routed through a UPF (or more than one UPF) in the core network 908 as selected by the SMF.

[0141] The device 902 may then perform device authentication and device attestation with the provisioning server 906 to establish a secure connection with the provisioning server 906. For example, the device 902 may perform device authentication using credentials provided by the private network (e.g., credentials that vary from device to device). The provisioning server 906 may further verify the device security state of the device 902 to perform device attestation. After authenticating the device 902 and passing the requirement for device attestation, the provisioning server 906 may transmit provisioning information 912 to the device 902 via the RAN node 904 and the pinhole access cell 900b. The provisioning information provided to the device 902 by the provisioning server 906 may include, for example, a broadcast root key or a long-term key and a key refresh interval (or an expiration time of the broadcast root key). In addition, the provisioning information may further include a current time (T current ), key ID of long-term key and / or broadcast root key, and / or HFN and SFN.

[0142] In some examples, the RAN node 904 may then transmit an RRC connection release message to the device 902 via the pinhole access cell 900b. The RRC connection release message may include redirection information for redirecting the device 902 to the secure cell 900a. In other examples, the RAN node 904 may transmit a handover command to the device 902 to initiate handover of the device 902 from the pinhole access cell 900b to the secure cell 900a. The device 902 may then receive broadcast information 920 including encrypted and unencrypted broadcast information related to cell access broadcasted by the RAN node 904 within the secure cell 900a. In some examples, the broadcast information 920 may include acquisition signals, such as SSB, as well as CORESET0 and SIB1. The device 902 may use the unencrypted broadcast information (e.g., within the acquisition signal) to obtain cell identification information and use the cell identification information and the broadcast root key to derive a broadcast key that varies from cell to cell. Device 902 may then decrypt the encrypted broadcast information related to cell access to access secure cell 900a or for other suitable purposes (eg, cell reselection).

[0143] Fig.10 It is used to explain the use of Fig. 9 1002 to provision a cell-specific broadcast key on the device 1002 using an in-band delivery path as shown. Fig. 9 In the embodiment, device 1002 is located in an area covered by both pinhole access cell 1004 and secure cell 1006. Secure cell 1006 and pinhole access cell 1004 each have different corresponding PCIs and both are served by the same RAN node (e.g., base station, such as gNB). RAN node is coupled to core network 1008 (e.g., Figure 2 In addition, the provisioning server 1010 is located in a private external data network outside the wireless communication system.

[0144] At 1012, the device 1002 may access the pinhole access cell 1004. For example, the pinhole access cell 1004 may broadcast unencrypted broadcast information related to cell access (e.g., SSB, CORESET0, and PBCH) for the device 1002 to use to access the pinhole access cell 1004. At 1014, the device 1002 may register with the core network 1008 via the pinhole access cell 1004. For example, the device 1002 may transmit a registration request to the AMF within the core network 1008. The AMF may then initiate a non-access stratum (NAS) level authentication between the device 1002 and the core network 1008 (e.g., AUSF and UDM in the core network). The AMF may then retrieve mobility subscription data, SMF selection data, and UE context and communicate with the PCF for policy association for the device 1002. The AMF may then send a NAS security registration accept message to the device 1002 to complete the registration.

[0145] At 1016, the device 1002 may establish a PDU session with the core network 1008 via the pinhole access cell 1004. For example, the device 1002 may transmit a PDU session establishment message to the SMF within the core network 1008. Based on the policy information associated with the device registration via the pinhole access cell 1004, at 1018, the SMF may allow the device 1002 to establish a connection with the provisioning server 1010 in the private external data network only via the PDU session. At 1020, the device 1002 may then perform device authentication and device attestation with the provisioning server 1010 to establish a secure connection with the provisioning server 1010. For example, the device 1002 may perform device authentication using credentials provided by the private network. The provisioning server 1010 may further verify the device security state of the device 1002 to perform device attestation. After successfully performing the device authentication and device attestation, at 1022, the provisioning server 1010 may transmit provisioning information to the device 1002 via the pinhole access cell 1004. The provisioning information provided by the provisioning server 1010 to the device 1002 may include, for example, a broadcast root key or a long-term key and a key refresh interval (or an expiration time of the broadcast root key). In addition, the provisioning information may further include the current time (T current ), key ID of long-term key and / or broadcast root key, and / or HFN and SFN.

[0146] At 1024, the device 1002 may then be redirected or switched to the secure cell 1006 to receive broadcast information including encrypted and unencrypted broadcast information related to cell access within the secure cell 1006. In some examples, the broadcast information may include an acquisition signal, such as SSB, as well as CORESET0 and SIB1. At 1026, the device 1002 may use the unencrypted broadcast information (e.g., within the acquisition signal) to obtain cell identification information and derive a cell-specific broadcast key based on the cell identification information and the broadcast root key. At 1028, the device 1002 may then decrypt the encrypted broadcast information related to cell access and use the decrypted broadcast information to access the secure cell 1006 at 1030.

[0147] Fig.11 is a diagram illustrating another example of an in-band delivery path for provisioning a cell-specific broadcast key in accordance with certain aspects. Fig.11 In the example shown, a device (e.g., UE) 1102 is located in an area covered by both a secure cell 1100a and a pinhole access cell 1100b. The secure cell 1100a and the pinhole access cell 1100b are each identified by a different corresponding PCI. In addition, both the pinhole access cell 1100b and the secure cell 1100a are served by the same RAN node (e.g., base station, such as a gNB) 1104. The RAN node 1104 may correspond to Figure 1-Figure 3 Any of the base stations (e.g., gNB, eNB, etc.) or scheduling entities shown in FIG. In addition, the device 1102 may correspond to Figure 1-Figure 3 Any of the UEs or scheduled entities shown in .

[0148] RAN node 1104 is coupled to a core network 1108 including a core network node 1110 (eg, Figure 2 The core network 206 of FIG. 1108). The core network node 1110 may include one or more of AMF, UDM, KMF, or OAM (which may be external to the core network 1108). The provisioning server 1106 is shown as being outside the wireless communication system (e.g., outside the RAN including the RAN node 1104 and the core network 1108). For example, the provisioning server 1106 may be within an external data network (such as (but not limited to) a private data network) (e.g., via the Internet or a LAN). In some examples, the provisioning server 1106 may correspond to Figure 6 The provisioning server 606 shown, Figure 8 The provisioning server 806 and / or Fig. 9 And / or the provisioning server 906 / 1010 shown in 10.

[0149] The provisioning server 1106 is configured to generate one or more broadcast keys (e.g., broadcast root keys or long-term keys) for encryption and integrity protection of broadcast information related to cell access. Multiple broadcast root keys and / or multiple long-term keys may be generated and used by different groups of devices or different groups of RAN nodes to avoid updating each of these devices and RAN nodes with a new key in the event of key corruption of one of these keys.

[0150] The provisioning server 1106 may be further configured to transmit key information 1114 to a core network node 1110 within the core network. The key information 1114 may include, for example, a broadcast root key or a long-term key and a key refresh interval or expiration time associated with the long-term key or the broadcast root key. The key information 1114 may further include a key ID of the long-term key or the broadcast root key. In some examples, the key information 1114 may further include a current time and a HFN / SFN used to synchronize the core network node 1110 with the provisioning server 1106. The core network node 1110 may use, for example, equations 1 and 2 above to derive a cell-specific broadcast key for the RAN node 1104 from the broadcast root key or the long-term key. The core network node 1110 may then provision a cell-specific broadcast key 1116 on the RAN node 1104. In some examples, the core network node 1110 may derive a broadcast RAN key from the broadcast root key and provision the broadcast RAN key on the RAN node 1104 instead of a cell-specific broadcast key.

[0151] The pinhole access cell 1100b broadcasts unencrypted broadcast information 1118 related to cell access for use by the device 1102 to access the pinhole access cell 1100b. For example, the pinhole access cell 1100b may broadcast unencrypted SSB, CORESET0, and PBCH to enable the device 1102 to access the pinhole access cell 1100b. Upon accessing the pinhole access cell 1100b, the device 1102 may register with the core network 1108. For example, the device 1102 may transmit a registration request to the AMF within the core network 1108 via the RAN node 1104. The AMF may then initiate a non-access stratum (NAS) level authentication between the device 1102 and the core network 1108 (e.g., the AUSF and UDM in the core network). The AMF may then retrieve mobility subscription data, SMF selection data, and UE context and communicate with the PCF for policy association for the device 1102. The AMF may then send a NAS security registration accept message to the device 1102 to complete the registration.

[0152] exist Fig.11In the example shown, the AMF may further include provisioning information 1112 in the registration accept message transmitted to the device 1102 via the RAN node 1104 and the pinhole access cell 1100b. Fig.11 As shown, the core network node 1110 may provide the device 1102 with provisioning information 1112 in the registration accept message, rather than requiring the device 1102 to establish a PDU session and connection with the provisioning server 1106. The provisioning information may include, for example, a broadcast root key or a long-term key and a key refresh interval (or an expiration time of the broadcast root key). In addition, the provisioning information provided by the AMF to the device 1102 may further include the current time (T current ), key IDs of long-term keys and / or broadcast root keys, and / or HFN and SFN. In some examples, the AMF may be configured to perform device authentication (e.g., using device-specific credentials provided by a private data network) and / or device certification with the device 1102 prior to delivering the provisioning information 1112.

[0153] In some examples, the RAN node 1104 may then transmit an RRC connection release message to the device 1102 via the pinhole access cell 1100b. The RRC connection release message may include redirection information for redirecting the device 1102 to the secure cell 1100a. In other examples, the RAN node 1104 may transmit a handover command to the device 1102 to initiate handover of the device 1102 from the pinhole access cell 1100b to the secure cell 1100a. The device 1102 may then receive broadcast information 1120 including encrypted and unencrypted broadcast information related to cell access broadcasted by the RAN node 1104 within the secure cell 1100a. In some examples, the broadcast information 1120 may include an acquisition signal, such as an SSB, as well as CORESET0 and SIB1. The device 1102 may use the unencrypted broadcast information (e.g., within the acquisition signal) to obtain cell identification information and use the cell identification information and the broadcast root key to derive a cell-specific broadcast key. The device 1102 may then decrypt the encrypted broadcast information related to cell access to access the secure cell 1100a or for other suitable purposes (eg, cell reselection).

[0154] Fig.12 It is explained according to some aspects of the use Fig.11 12 is a signaling diagram of an exemplary signaling for provisioning a cell-specific broadcast key on device 1202 using an in-band delivery path as shown. Fig.11In the embodiment, device 1202 is located in an area covered by both pinhole access cell 1204 and secure cell 1206. Secure cell 1206 and pinhole access cell 1204 each have different corresponding PCIs and both are served by the same RAN node (e.g., a base station such as a gNB). The RAN node is coupled to one or more core network nodes 1208 (e.g., at Figure 2 12. The core network node(s) 1208 may include, for example, the AMF and the AUSF. In addition, the provisioning server 1210 is located in a private external data network outside the wireless communication system.

[0155] At 1212, the provisioning server 1210 may transmit key information to a core network node 1208 (e.g., AMF) within the core network. The key information may include, for example, a broadcast root key or a long-term key and a key refresh interval or expiration time associated with the long-term key or the broadcast root key. The key information may further include a key ID of the long-term key or the broadcast root key. In some examples, the key information may further include a current time and a HFN / SFN used to synchronize the core network node 1208 with the provisioning server 1210.

[0156] At 1214, the device 1202 may access the pinhole access cell 1204. For example, the pinhole access cell 1204 may broadcast unencrypted broadcast information related to cell access (e.g., SSB, CORESET0, and PBCH) for the device 1202 to use to access the pinhole access cell 1204. At 1216, the device 1202 may transmit a registration request to the AMF 1208 via the pinhole access cell 1204. At block 1218, the AMF may then initiate a non-access stratum (NAS) level authentication between the device 1202 and the AUSF in the core network. The AMF may then retrieve mobility subscription data, SMF selection data, and UE context and communicate with the PCF for policy association for the device 1202.

[0157] At block 1220, the AMF 1208 may then send a NAS security registration accept message to the device 1202 to complete the registration. Fig.12 In the example shown, the AMF may further include provisioning information in the registration acceptance message transmitted to the device 1202 via the pinhole access cell 1204. The provisioning information may include, for example, a broadcast root key or a long-term key and a key refresh interval (or an expiration time of the broadcast root key). In addition, the provisioning information provided by the AMF to the device 1202 may further include the current time (T current), key IDs of long-term keys and / or broadcast root keys, and / or HFN and SFN. In some examples, the AMF may be configured to perform device authentication (e.g., using device-specific credentials provided by a private data network) and / or device certification with the device 1202 before delivering the provisioning information.

[0158] At 1222, the device 1202 may then be redirected or switched to the secure cell 1206 to receive broadcast information including encrypted and unencrypted broadcast information related to cell access within the secure cell 1206. In some examples, the broadcast information may include an acquisition signal, such as SSB, as well as CORESET0 and SIB1. At 1224, the device 1202 may use the unencrypted broadcast information (e.g., within the acquisition signal) to obtain cell identification information and derive a cell-specific broadcast key based on the cell identification information and the broadcast root key. At 1226, the device 1202 may then decrypt the encrypted broadcast information related to cell access and use the decrypted broadcast information to access the secure cell 1206 at 1228.

[0159] Fig.13 1 is a diagram illustrating another example of encrypted and unencrypted broadcast information 1300 related to cell access according to certain aspects. The broadcast information 1300 may be transmitted by a RAN node (e.g., a base station such as an eNB or gNB) on resources (e.g., time-frequency resources) allocated for transmitting the broadcast information 1300 in a cell. The broadcast information 1300 includes a first acquisition signal 1302 and a second acquisition signal 1304. Each acquisition signal 1302 and 1304 may include, for example, an SSB. The first acquisition signal (SSB') 1302 and the second acquisition signal (SSB) 1304 may be transmitted in different messages. For example, each acquisition signal 1302 and 1304 may be transmitted with a 20 ms period offset by 10 ms from each other so that the first acquisition signal 1302 and the second acquisition signal 1304 are transmitted in alternating frames (e.g., the first acquisition signal 1302 is transmitted in the first frame, the second acquisition signal 1304 is transmitted in the second frame, the first acquisition signal 1302 is transmitted again in the third frame, and so on).

[0160] The first acquisition signal (SSB') 1302 may be unencrypted and may carry at least one cell-specific security parameter. The cell-specific security parameter(s) may include, for example, cell identification information. The cell identification information may include PCI, ARFCN, and / or other cell identification information, such as a random number assigned to the cell. The cell-specific security parameter(s) may further include, but are not limited to, a key identifier of a broadcast root key, an identifier of a RAN node, a security algorithm, and / or a freshness parameter (e.g., a counter, such as a current time and / or HFN and SFN). In an example, the first acquisition signal may include a PSS, an SSS, and a modified PBCH including at least one cell-specific security parameter. The modified PBCH may further set a cell-specific prohibition indication to prevent unauthorized devices from accessing the cell. In some examples, the first acquisition signal 1302 may be integrity protected using a cell-specific broadcast key.

[0161] The second acquisition signal 1304 may be fully encrypted and integrity protected using a cell-specific broadcast key (and in some examples, a freshness parameter). The second acquisition signal 1304 may include a PSS, SSS, and a normal PBCH. Thus, the PBCH of the second acquisition signal 1304 includes a MIB that carries various system information (SI), including, for example, scheduling information for CORESET0 1306. In addition, CORESET0 1306 carries a PDCCH with a DCI that includes scheduling information for scheduling SIB1 1308. SIB1 1308 contains the remaining minimum system information (SI) that can be used to access the cell.

[0162] The device may derive a cell-specific broadcast key using the cell-specific security parameter(s) in the first acquisition signal 1302 (SSB'). For example, the device may derive the cell-specific broadcast key from the broadcast root key and one or more cell-specific security parameters (e.g., PCI, AFRCH, other cell identification information, SFN, RAN node identifier, key ID, etc.). The device may then decrypt and decode the second acquisition signal 1304 (SSB) using the cell-specific broadcast key (and a freshness parameter in some examples). In examples where the first acquisition signal 1302 is integrity protected using the cell-specific broadcast key, the device may verify the integrity of the first acquisition signal 1302 (e.g., verify a message authentication code) using the derived cell-specific broadcast key (or an integrity protection key derived from the cell-specific broadcast key).

[0163] Fig.14is a signaling diagram illustrating other exemplary signaling to provide secure communication of broadcast information related to cell access in accordance with certain aspects. Fig.14 In the example shown, device 1402 is attempting to access a secure cell served by RAN node 1404. RAN node 1404 may correspond to Figure 1-Figure 3 Any of the base stations (e.g., gNB, eNB, etc.) or scheduling entities shown in FIG. In addition, the device 1402 may correspond to Figure 1-Figure 3 The device 1402 may attempt cell access, for example, upon entering a wireless communication network (eg, a private network), powering on, or switching from a radio resource control (RRC) idle state to an RRC connected state.

[0164] The provisioning server 1406 is configured to generate one or more broadcast keys for encrypting and integrity protecting broadcast information related to cell access. In some examples, the broadcast key(s) are broadcast root keys that can be used to derive broadcast keys that vary from cell to cell. The broadcast root key(s) can expire after a predetermined time duration, and therefore the provisioning server 1406 can generate new broadcast root keys(s) before the current broadcast root key(s) expires. In some examples, the provisioning server 1406 can generate one or more long-term keys that can be used to derive the broadcast root key(s). Multiple broadcast root keys and / or multiple long-term keys can be generated and provided to different device groups or different RAN node groups to avoid updating each of these devices and RAN nodes with a new key in the event that one of these keys is damaged. In some examples, the provisioning server 1406 can be outside a wireless communication system (e.g., a wireless communication system including the RAN and a core network). For example, the provisioning server 1406 can be within an external data network (such as, but not limited to, a private data network) (e.g., via the Internet or a LAN).

[0165] At 1408, the provisioning server 1406 may provision a cell-specific broadcast key on the RAN node 1404. The cell-specific broadcast key may be unique to a secure cell served by the RAN node 1404 (e.g., unique within a wireless communication network including the RAN node 1404 or unique to a group of cells within the wireless communication network). In some examples, the provisioning server 1406 may generate one or more broadcast root keys and provide the generated broadcast root key(s) to the core network (e.g., Figure 2The core network node may then derive a cell-specific broadcast key for each secure cell in the wireless communication network from the broadcast root key(s) and provision the cell-specific broadcast key for each secure cell on the corresponding serving RAN node. In some examples, the core network node that derives and provisions the cell-specific broadcast key on the RAN node 1404 may include one or more of an AMF, UDM, KMF, or OAM (which may be external to the core network).

[0166] In some examples, the provisioning server 1406 may provision a broadcast RAN key (unique to the RAN node 1404) on the RAN node 1404. The RAN node 1404 may then derive a cell-specific broadcast key from the broadcast RAN key. The broadcast RAN key may be provisioned in examples where the RAN node serves multiple secure cells or where the number of cells in a private network is large and additional cell-specific security parameter(s) such as the RAN node ID are used to derive a unique cell-specific broadcast root key.

[0167] At 1410, provisioning server 1406 may provision the broadcast root key on device 1402. In some examples, provisioning server 1406 may provision the broadcast root key and the expiration time of the broadcast root key directly on device 1402. In other examples, provisioning server 1406 may transmit the broadcast root key to a core network node (e.g., AMF) within the core network, which may then transmit the broadcast root key to device 1402 upon successful registration of device 1402 with the core network.

[0168] In some examples, device 1402 may be provisioned with a long-term key from which a broadcast root key may be derived using a key derivation function (KDF), as described above. In some examples, the broadcast root key (or long-term key) may be included in provisioning information transmitted from provisioning server 1406 or a core network node to device 1402. The provisioning information may include additional information, such as a key refresh interval (or expiration time) for the broadcast root key, the current time, a key identifier (ID) of the long-term key or the broadcast root key, and / or the HFN and SFN.

[0169] At 1412, the RAN node 1404 may broadcast a first acquisition signal (e.g., a first SSB) including unencrypted broadcast information related to cell access in the secure cell. The unencrypted broadcast information may include one or more cell-specific security parameters. The cell-specific security parameter(s) may include, for example, cell identification information (e.g., PCI, ARFCN, and / or other cell identification information, such as a random number assigned to the cell), a key identifier for a broadcast root key, an identifier of a RAN node, a security algorithm, and / or a freshness parameter (e.g., a counter, such as a current time, a SFN, or a combination of a HFN and a SFN). In an example, the first acquisition signal may include a modified SSB (e.g., SSB') including a PSS, an SSS, and a modified PBCH including at least one cell-specific security parameter.

[0170] At 1414, the device 1402 may derive a cell-specific broadcast key based on the broadcast root key and (the) cell-specific security parameters. For example, the device 1402 may derive the cell-specific broadcast key using a key derivation function (KDF) of the broadcast root key and the cell-specific security parameters. In some examples, the device 1402 may derive a broadcast RAN key from the broadcast root key and then derive a cell-specific broadcast key from the broadcast RAN key. For example, the device 1402 may derive the broadcast RAN key using a KDF of the broadcast root key and an identifier of the RAN node 1404 included in the cell-specific security parameters. The device 1402 may then derive the cell-specific broadcast key using a KDF of at least the broadcast RAN key and cell identification information (e.g., PCI, PCI|ARFCH, or other cell identification information included in the cell-specific security parameters). Other cell-specific security parameters may also be used to derive the cell-specific broadcast key. Once the cell-specific broadcast key is derived, the device 1402 may use the cell-specific broadcast key (or an integrity protection key derived from the cell-specific broadcast key) to verify the integrity of the first acquired signal based on a message authentication code included in the first acquired signal.

[0171] At 1416, the RAN node 1404 may broadcast a second acquisition signal (e.g., a second SSB) including encrypted broadcast information related to cell access. The encrypted broadcast information may include, for example, PSS, SSS, and PBCH. Additional encrypted broadcast information related to cell access following the second acquisition signal may further include CORESET0 and SIB1. The encrypted broadcast information may further be integrity protected based on a cell-specific broadcast key.

[0172] At 1418, the device 1402 may decrypt the encrypted broadcast information using a cell-specific broadcast key. In some examples, the device 1402 may decrypt the encrypted broadcast information using a combination of a cell-specific broadcast key and a freshness parameter (e.g., current time, SFN, or a combination of HFN and SFN) and produce decrypted broadcast information. Upon decrypting and decoding the encrypted broadcast information, the device 1402 may verify the integrity of the encrypted broadcast information. At 1418, the device 1402 may access the RAN node 1404 and register with the core network. In some examples, the device 1402 may use the unencrypted broadcast information and the decrypted broadcast information for cell reselection or other suitable purposes, rather than cell access.

[0173] Fig.15 Another exemplary key derivation for a cell-specific broadcast key in accordance with certain aspects is illustrated. Fig.15 In the example shown, the broadcast root key (K B-ROOT ) 1506 is derived from the long-term key (K) 1502 and the freshness parameter (T) 1504 using, for example, Equation 2 above. In some examples, the freshness parameter 1504 may be based on the current time (T) included in the provisioning information transmitted to the device. current ) and key refresh interval (T refresh ) is determined. In addition, the provisioning information may further include a long-term key, a key identifier (ID) of a long-term key or a broadcast root key, a HFN, and a SFN.

[0174] For example, the refresh parameters (T) 1504 may include a refresh parameter based on the current time (T current ) and the current counter value of the counter set by the key refresh interval (T refresh In some examples, the counter may correspond to a system clock of the device, and the device may set the system clock to the current time (T current Once the counter value increases by an amount equal to the key refresh interval, K B-ROOT The value of changes, thus generating a new K at the expiration of each key refresh interval B-ROOT .

[0175] Can be used to export K B-ROOT Other optional parameters may include one or more of the following: a key ID associated with the long-term key K (for example, in examples where more than one long-term key is generated and used in the wireless communication network), a network identifier associated with the RAN, a tracking area code associated with a tracking area including a secure cell, an area identifier associated with a RAN node, or a registration area code associated with a registration area including a secure cell.

[0176] like Fig.15 As further shown, the broadcast RAN key (K B-RAN )1510 can then be obtained from the broadcast root key (K B-ROOT ) and the RAN identifier (RAN ID) 1508. For example, the broadcast RAN key (K B-RAN )1510 can be derived as follows:

[0177] K B-RAN =KDF(K B-ROOT ,RAN ID)(Formula 3),

[0178] The RAN ID 1508 may be used as an unencrypted captured signal (e.g., Fig.13 and 14 It receives a portion of the security parameters that vary from cell to cell within the SSB') shown in the figure.

[0179] The broadcast key (K B-CELL )1514 can then be based on K B-RAN 1510 and cellular cell identification information (Cell ID_I) 1512, as defined in equation 1 above. In some examples, K B-CELL Based on K B-RAN 1510, Cell ID_I 1512, and one or more additional cell-specific security parameters (such as a key identifier, security algorithm, and / or freshness parameter of the broadcast root key). In some examples, the broadcast RAN key 1510 can be provisioned on a RAN node and the RAN node can use the same KDF as the device (e.g., based on the same set of parameters) to derive the cell-specific broadcast key (K B-CELL )1514.

[0180] Fig.16 is a diagram illustrating an example of provisioning cell-specific unicast keys in accordance with some aspects. Fig.16 In the example shown, a device (e.g., UE) 1602 is located in a secure cell served by a RAN node 1604 (e.g., a base station such as a gNB). The RAN node 1604 may correspond to Figure 1-Figure 3 Any of the base stations (e.g., gNB, eNB, etc.) or scheduling entities shown in FIG. In addition, the device 1602 may correspond to Figure 1-Figure 316. The RAN node 1604 is coupled to the AMF 1606. The provisioning server 1608 is located in the external private data network. The provisioning server 1608 is configured to generate one or more broadcast keys (e.g., a broadcast root key or a long-term key) for encrypting and integrity protecting broadcast information related to cellular cell access.

[0181] At 1610, the device 1602 and the AMF 1606 may set up non-access stratum (NAS) security to securely deliver NAS messages in the control plane between the device 1602 and the AMF 1606. The NAS security may be set up, for example, during registration of the device 1602 on the core network. In some examples, the NAS security may utilize an authentication key K obtained during an authentication and key agreement (AKA) procedure with the core network (during authentication of the device to the AUSF as part of the registration procedure). AMF Derived NAS security keys. After setting up NAS security, the AMF 1606 and the device 1602 may share NAS security keys (e.g., NAS encryption keys and NAS integrity protection keys), which may then be used to encrypt and integrity protect NAS messages transmitted between the device 1602 and the AMF 1606. For example, the NAS encryption keys and NAS integrity protection keys may be used to protect a registration accept message transmitted from the AMF 1606 to the device 1602.

[0182] At 1612, the provisioning server 1608 provisions the broadcast root key and other provisioning information on the device 1602 via an out-of-band delivery path or an in-band delivery path. In some examples, the provisioning information may be provided to the device 1602 via the out-of-band delivery path before the device 1602 is registered (e.g., before 1610). In other examples, the provisioning information may be provided within a registration accept message transmitted from the AMF 1606 to the device 1602 after the NAS security is set up. In still other examples, the provisioning server 1608 may deliver the provisioning information via a connection between the device 1602 and the provisioning server 1608 established during a PDU session.

[0183] At 1614, device 1602 may derive a cell-specific broadcast key from the broadcast root key and at least the cell identification information. In some examples, device 1602 may use unencrypted broadcast information (e.g., within an acquisition signal) to obtain the cell identification information (and possibly other cell-specific security parameters) and use the cell identification information and the broadcast root key to derive the cell-specific broadcast key.

[0184] At 1616, device 1602 may receive one or more encrypted messages encrypted using a cell-specific broadcast key from RAN node 1604. In some examples, the encrypted messages may include broadcast messages or unicast messages. For example, the encrypted unicast messages may include device-specific downlink control information (DCI) containing control information specific to device 1602.

[0185] At 1618, the device 1602 may establish or set up an access stratum (AS) security context with the RAN node 1604 to deliver RRC messages in the control plane and IP packets in the user plane between the device 1602 and the RAN node 1604. AS security may utilize a key from a RAN node (K gNB ) derived from the AS security key. RAN node key (K gNB ) can be obtained by device 1602 from K AMF The AS security key may be derived and provided by the AMF 1606 to the RAN node 1604. After setting up AS security, the RAN node 1604 and the device 1602 may share AS security keys (e.g., RRC AS encryption keys, RRC AS integrity protection keys, and user plane encryption keys), which may then be used to encrypt and integrity protect RRC messages and encrypt IP packets transmitted between the device 1602 and the RAN node 1604.

[0186] At 1620, the device 1602 may further determine the RAN node key (K gNB ) and at least one parameter to derive a unicast key that is specific to a cell. For example, a unicast key (K U-CELL ) can be exported as follows:

[0187] K U-CELL =KDF(K gNB , parameter) (Formula 4),

[0188] The parameter may include one or more of the cell identification information and the freshness parameter. In some examples, the parameter may include a concatenation of the cell identification information and the freshness parameter (eg, a counter).

[0189] At 1622, RAN node 1604 may transmit encrypted unicast message(s) encrypted with a cell-specific unicast key to device 1602. In some examples, the encrypted unicast message(s) may include encrypted DCI containing unicast information for device 1602. Device 1602 may then decrypt the encrypted DCI using the cell-specific unicast key. In some examples, device 1602 and RAN node 1604 may switch from using a cell-specific broadcast key to a cell-specific unicast key for unicast messages when the device 1602 is in an RRC connected state with a cell radio network temporary identifier (C-RNTI) assigned. In some examples, device 1602 and RAN node 1604 may switch from using a cell-specific broadcast key to a cell-specific unicast key for unicast messages after device 1602 sends an AS security mode complete message to RAN node 1604 (e.g., indicating that the AS security setup is complete), after device 1602 sends an RRC reconfiguration complete message to RAN node 1604, after device 1602 receives an RRC reestablishment message from RAN node 1604, or after device 1602 receives an RRC recovery message from RAN node 1604.

[0190] Fig.17 1700 is a conceptual diagram illustrating an example of a hardware implementation of an exemplary RAN node employing a processing system 1714. For example, the RAN node 1700 may be a Figure 1-Figure 3 , Figure 6 , Figure 8-Figure 12 , Fig.14 and / or Fig.16 Any one of the base stations (e.g., gNB or eNB) illustrated in any one or more of the RAN node 1700. The RAN node 1700 may be configured to serve at least one secure cell. In addition, the RAN node 1700 may be configured to serve a pinhole access cell.

[0191] The RAN node 1700 may be implemented with a processing system 1714 including one or more processors 1704. Examples of the processor 1704 include a microprocessor, a microcontroller, a digital signal processor (DSP), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), a programmable logic device (PLD), a state machine, a gated logic, a discrete hardware circuit, and other suitable hardware configured to perform various functionalities described throughout this disclosure. In various examples, the RAN node 1700 may be configured to perform any one or more of the functions described herein. That is, the processor 1704 as utilized in the RAN node 1700 may be used to implement any one or more of the processes described below. In some instances, the processor 1704 may be implemented via a baseband or modem chip, while in other implementations, the processor 1704 itself may include a number of devices that are distinct and different from the baseband or modem chip (e.g., in such scenarios, may work together to achieve the embodiments discussed herein). And as mentioned above, various hardware arrangements and components outside of the baseband modem processor may be used in implementations, including RF chains, power amplifiers, modulators, buffers, interleavers, adders / summers, etc.

[0192] In this example, the processing system 1714 may be implemented with a bus architecture generally represented by bus 1702. Depending on the specific application and overall design constraints of the processing system 1714, the bus 1702 may include any number of interconnecting buses and bridges. The bus 1702 communicatively couples various circuits including one or more processors (generally represented by processor 1704), memory 1705, and computer-readable media (generally represented by computer-readable media 1706). The bus 1702 may also link various other circuits, such as timing sources, peripherals, voltage regulators, and power management circuits, which are well known in the art and therefore will not be described further. The bus interface 1708 provides an interface between the bus 1702 and the transceiver 1710. The transceiver 1710 provides a means for communicating with various other devices via a transmission medium (e.g., an air interface). A user interface 1712 (e.g., a keypad, a display, a speaker, a microphone, a joystick) may also be provided.

[0193] The processor 1704 is responsible for managing the bus 1702 and general processing, including the execution of software stored on the computer-readable medium 1706. The software, when executed by the processor 1704, causes the processing system 1714 to perform the various functions described below for any particular device. The computer-readable medium 1706 and the memory 1705 may also be used to store data manipulated by the processor 1704 when executing the software.

[0194] One or more processors 1704 in the processing system can execute software. Software should be broadly interpreted to mean instructions, instruction sets, codes, code segments, program codes, programs, subroutines, software modules, applications, software applications, software packages, routines, subroutines, objects, executables, threads of execution, procedures, functions, etc., whether described in software, firmware, middleware, microcode, hardware description language, or other terms. The software can reside on a computer-readable medium 1706.

[0195] Computer readable medium 1706 may be a non-transitory computer readable medium. As examples, non-transitory computer readable media include magnetic storage devices (e.g., hard disks, floppy disks, magnetic tapes), optical disks (e.g., compact disks (CDs) or digital versatile disks (DVDs)), smart cards, flash memory devices (e.g., card, stick, or key-type drives), random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), programmable ROM (PROM), erasable PROM (EPROM), electrically erasable PROM (EEPROM), registers, removable disks, and any other suitable medium for storing software and / or instructions that can be accessed and read by a computer. Computer readable medium 1706 may reside in processing system 1714, external to processing system 1714, or distributed across multiple entities including processing system 1714. Computer readable medium 1706 may be implemented in a computer program product. In some examples, computer readable medium 1706 may be part of memory 1705. As examples, a computer program product may include a computer readable medium in packaging materials. Those skilled in the art will recognize how to best implement the described functionality presented throughout this disclosure depending on the particular application and the overall design constraints imposed on the overall system.

[0196] In some aspects of the present disclosure, the processor 1704 may include circuitry configured for various functions. For example, the processor 1704 may include a resource assignment and scheduling circuitry 1742 configured to generate, schedule, and modify resource assignments or grants for time-frequency resources (e.g., a set of one or more resource elements). For example, the resource assignment and scheduling circuitry 1742 may schedule time-frequency resources within multiple time division duplex (TDD) and / or frequency division duplex (FDD) subframes, time slots, and / or mini-slots to carry user data traffic and / or control information to and / or from multiple devices (e.g., UEs).

[0197] In some examples, the resource assignment and scheduling circuit system 1742 may be configured to schedule resources for transmitting acquisition signals (e.g., SSBs) and other broadcast information related to cell access (e.g., CORESET0 and SIB1) in a secure cell. In some examples, at least a portion of the broadcast information (e.g., SSBs, CORESET0, and SIB1) may include encrypted broadcast information. For example, the resource assignment and scheduling circuit system 1742 may schedule resources for SSBs including PSS, SSS, and PBCH. In this example, PSS, SSS, and a portion of PBCH (e.g., SFN) may be unencrypted, while the rest of PBCH may be encrypted. As another example, the resource assignment and scheduling circuit system 1742 may schedule resources for transmitting a first acquisition signal (e.g., a first SSB) including unencrypted broadcast information related to cell access and a second acquisition signal (e.g., a second SSB) including encrypted broadcast information. In this example, the first SSB may include a first PSS, a first SSS, and a modified PBCH including one or more security parameters that vary from cell to cell. The second SSB may include a second PSS, a second SSS, and a second PBCH (eg, a normal PBCH). The first and second PSSs may include the same PSS sequence, and the first and second SSSs may include the same SSS sequence used to identify a safety cell.

[0198] In addition, the resource assignment and scheduling circuit system 1742 may be further configured to schedule resources for transmitting additional broadcast and / or unicast messages that may be encrypted in the secure cell. The resource assignment and scheduling circuit system 1742 may be further configured to schedule resources for transmitting unencrypted broadcast information (e.g., SSB, CORESET0, and SIB1) in the pinhole access cell. The resource assignment and scheduling circuit system 1742 may be further configured to execute resource assignment and scheduling software 1752 stored in the computer-readable medium 1706 to implement one or more of the functions described herein.

[0199] Processor 1704 may further include communication and processing circuitry 1744 configured to communicate with a scheduled entity (e.g., a device or UE). In some examples, communication and processing circuitry 1744 may include one or more hardware components that provide a physical structure for performing processes related to wireless communication (e.g., signal reception and / or signal transmission) and signal processing (e.g., processing received signals and / or processing signals for transmission).

[0200] In some examples, the communication and processing circuit system 1744 may be configured to transmit an acquisition signal (e.g., SSB) and other broadcast information related to cell access (e.g., CORESET0 and SIB1) in a secure cell via the transceiver 1710. In some examples, at least a portion of the broadcast information (e.g., SSB, CORESET0, and SIB1) may include encrypted broadcast information. For example, the communication and processing circuit system 1744 may be configured to transmit an SSB including PSS, SSS, and PBCH via the transceiver 1710. In this example, the PSS, SSS, and a portion of the PBCH (e.g., SFN) may be unencrypted, while the remainder of the PBCH may be encrypted. As another example, the communication and processing circuit system 1744 may be configured to transmit a first acquisition signal (e.g., a first SSB) including unencrypted broadcast information related to cell access and a second acquisition signal (e.g., a second SSB) including encrypted broadcast information via the transceiver 1710. In this example, the first SSB may include a first PSS, a first SSS, and a modified PBCH including one or more cell-specific security parameters. The second SSB may include a second PSS, a second SSS, and a second PBCH (e.g., a normal PBCH). The first and second PSSs may include the same PSS sequence, and the first and second SSSs may include the same SSS sequence to identify a secure cell.

[0201] Additionally, the communication and processing circuitry 1744 may be further configured to transmit additional broadcast and / or unicast messages that may be encrypted in a secure cell via the transceiver 1710. The communication and processing circuitry 1744 may be further configured to transmit unencrypted broadcast information (e.g., SSB, CORESET0, and SIB1) in a pinhole access cell via the transceiver. The communication and processing circuitry 1744 may be further configured to execute communication and processing software 1754 stored in the computer-readable medium 1706 to implement one or more of the functions described herein.

[0202] The processor 1704 may further include an acquisition signal generation circuit system 1746 configured to generate an acquisition signal including at least cell identification information for transmission in a cell served by the RAN node 1700. The acquisition signal may be, for example, an SSB including a PSS, an SSS, and a PBCH. In some examples, the acquisition signal generation circuit system 1746 may be configured to generate a first SSB including unencrypted broadcast information for transmission in a pinhole access cell served by the RAN node 1700 and a second SSB including both encrypted and unencrypted broadcast information for transmission in a secure cell served by the RAN node 1700. In some examples, the acquisition signal generation circuit system 1746 may be configured to generate a first SSB including unencrypted broadcast information and a second SSB including encrypted broadcast information for transmission in a secure cell. In this example, the first SSB may include a modified PBCH including one or more security parameters that vary from cell to cell. Capture signal generation circuitry 1746 may be further configured to execute capture signal generation software 1756 stored in computer-readable medium 1706 to implement one or more functions described herein.

[0203] Processor 1704 may further include encryption and integrity protection circuitry 1748 configured to use a cell-specific broadcast key (K B-CELL ) 1715 to encrypt and integrity protect at least a portion of broadcast information related to cell access. The cell-specific broadcast key 1715 may be stored, for example, in the memory 1705. The RAN node 1700 may be provisioned with the cell-specific broadcast key 1715 by a core network node (e.g., AMF, UDM, KMF, or OAM) or may be provisioned with a broadcast RAN key (K B-RAN ) and derives a cell-specific broadcast key from the broadcast RAN key.

[0204] In some examples, the encryption and integrity protection circuit system 1748 may be configured to encrypt and integrity protect a portion of the acquisition signal (e.g., SSB). For example, the encryption and integrity protection circuit system 1748 may be configured to use a cell-specific broadcast key 1715 to encrypt and integrity protect a portion of the PBCH of the SSB excluding the SFN. In other examples, the encryption and integrity protection circuit system 1748 may be configured to use a cell-specific broadcast key 1715 to encrypt and integrity protect all portions of the acquisition signal (e.g., PSS, SSS, and PBCH of the SSB). In other examples, the encryption and integrity protection circuit system 1748 may be configured to use a cell-specific broadcast key 1715 to integrity protect a modified SSB (e.g., an SSB including a modified PBCH). The encryption and integrity protection circuit system 1748 may be further configured to use a cell-specific broadcast key 1715 to encrypt and integrity protect other broadcast information related to cell access (such as CORESET0 and SIB1). Additionally, encryption and integrity protection circuitry 1748 may be configured to use cell-specific broadcast keys 1715 to encrypt and integrity protect other broadcast and unicast messages.

[0205] In some examples, the encryption and integrity protection circuit system 1748 may be configured to encrypt broadcast and / or unicast messages using a cell-specific broadcast key 1715 and a freshness parameter (e.g., a counter). In one example, the freshness parameter may include the current time. In another example, the freshness parameter may include the SFN. In yet another example, the freshness parameter includes a combination (e.g., cascade) of the SFN and the HFN. In some examples, the encryption and integrity protection circuit system 1748 may be configured to derive an integrity protection key from a cell-specific broadcast key and generate a message authentication code for the message from the integrity protection key and the broadcast or unicast message. The message authentication code may then be provided to the communication and processing circuit system 1744 to be attached to the encrypted message.

[0206] In some examples, encryption and integrity protection circuitry 1748 may be further configured to use a cell-specific unicast key (K U-CELL) 1718 to encrypt and integrity protect unicast messages (e.g., device-specific DCI). Cell-specific unicast keys 1718 may be stored, for example, in a memory. In some examples, encryption and integrity protection circuitry 1748 may derive cell-specific unicast keys from RAN node keys provisioned on RAN nodes by the core network. The encryption and integrity protection circuitry may be further configured to execute encryption and integrity protection software 1758 stored in computer-readable medium 1706 to implement one or more of the functions described herein.

[0207] Fig.18 18 is a block diagram illustrating an example of a hardware implementation for a wireless communication device 1800 employing a processing system 1814. For example, the wireless communication device 1800 may correspond to the above Figure 1-Figure 3 , Figure 6 , Figure 8-Figure 12 , Fig.14 and / or Fig.16 Any of the UEs shown and described in any one or more of .

[0208] According to various aspects of the present disclosure, an element, or any portion of an element, or any combination of elements may be implemented using a processing system 1814 including one or more processors 1804. The processing system 1814 may be associated with Fig.17 The processing system 1714 illustrated in FIG. 1 is substantially the same as that in FIG. 1 , including a bus interface 1808, a bus 1802, a memory 1805, a processor 1804, and a computer-readable medium 1806. In addition, the wireless communication device 1800 may include the same as that in FIG. Fig.17 The user interface 1812 and transceiver 1810 may be substantially similar to those described in . That is, the processor 1804 as utilized in the wireless communication device 1800 may be used to implement any one or more of the processes described below.

[0209] In some aspects of the present disclosure, the processor 1804 may include circuitry configured for various functions. For example, the processor 1804 may include a communication and processing circuitry 1842 configured to communicate with a RAN node (e.g., a base station such as a gNB or eNB) via the transceiver 1810. The communication and processing circuitry 1842 may include one or more hardware components that provide a physical structure for performing processes related to wireless communication (e.g., signal reception and / or signal transmission) and signal processing (e.g., processing received signals and / or processing signals for transmission). For example, the communication and processing circuitry 1842 may be configured to exchange control information and data with a base station via one or more subframes, time slots, and / or mini-time slots.

[0210] In some examples, the communication and processing circuit system 1842 can be configured to receive a broadcast key (such as a broadcast root key (K B-ROOT ) 1815 or long-term key (K) 1816) and stores the broadcast key 1815 or 1816 in, for example, memory 1805. In examples where the communication and processing circuit system 1842 receives the broadcast root key 1815, the long-term key 1816 may not be received or stored. In some examples, the communication and processing circuit system 1842 may be configured to receive the broadcast key 1815 or 1816 from a provisioning server or a core network node in the core network via the RAN node and transceiver 1810. In other examples, the communication and processing circuit system 1842 may be configured to receive the broadcast key 1815 or 1816 via the transceiver 1810 through a Wi-Fi connection to a private data network. In still other examples, the communication and processing circuit system 1842 may be configured to receive the broadcast key 1815 or 1816 via an interface 1820 (e.g., an interface of a USB port or an NFC device) that provides a connection to a private data network.

[0211] In some examples, the communication and processing circuit system 1842 may be configured to receive broadcast information related to cell access from the RAN node via the transceiver 1810. In some examples, the communication and processing circuit system 1842 may be configured to receive one or more acquisition signals (e.g., SSB) and other broadcast information related to cell access (e.g., CORESET0 and SIB1) in a secure cell. In some examples, at least a portion of the broadcast information (e.g., SSB, CORESET0, and SIB1) may include encrypted broadcast information. For example, the communication and processing circuit system 1842 may be configured to receive SSB including PSS, SSS, and PBCH via the transceiver 1810. In this example, the PSS, SSS, and a portion of the PBCH (e.g., SFN) may be unencrypted, while the remainder of the PBCH may be encrypted. As another example, the communication and processing circuit system 1842 may be configured to receive, via the transceiver 1810, a first acquisition signal (e.g., a first SSB) including unencrypted broadcast information related to cell access and a second acquisition signal (e.g., a second SSB) including encrypted broadcast information. In this example, the first SSB may include a first PSS, a first SSS, and a modified PBCH including one or more security parameters that vary from cell to cell. The second SSB may include a second PSS, a second SSS, and a second PBCH (e.g., a normal PBCH). The first and second PSS may include the same PSS sequence, and the first and second SSS may include the same SSS sequence to identify a secure cell. In addition, the communication and processing circuit system 1842 may be further configured to receive additional broadcast and / or unicast messages that may be encrypted in a secure cell via the transceiver 1810.

[0212] The communication and processing circuit system 1842 may be further configured to receive unencrypted broadcast information (e.g., SSB, CORESET0, and SIB1) transmitted in the pinhole access cell via the transceiver 1810. In this example, the communication and processing circuit system 1842 may be configured to access the pinhole access cell using the unencrypted broadcast information. The communication and processing circuit system 1842 may be further configured to register with the core network via the pinhole access cell to provision a broadcast root key 1815 on the wireless communication device 1800. For example, the communication and processing circuit system 1842 may be configured to receive the broadcast root key 1815 or the long-term key 1816 from the provisioning server (e.g., after the communication and processing circuit system 1842 establishes a PDU session and connection with the provisioning server) or receive the broadcast root key 1815 or the long-term key 1816 from the core network node (e.g., included in a registration acceptance message).

[0213] The communication and processing circuit system 1842 may be further configured to receive provisioning information (which may include a broadcast root key or a long-term key) from a provisioning server or core network node via the transceiver 1810 or the interface 1820. In some examples, the provisioning information may include a key refresh interval (or expiration time) of the broadcast root key, the current time, a key identifier (ID) of the long-term key or the broadcast root key, and / or the HFN and SFN. In some examples, the SFN may be considered part of the provisioning information, but the SFN may be received from the RAN node as part of the unencrypted broadcast information. The communication and processing circuit system 1842 may be further configured to execute the communication and processing software 1852 stored on the computer-readable medium 1806 to implement one or more functions described herein.

[0214] Processor 1804 may further include key derivation circuitry 1844 configured to derive one or more keys for decrypting encrypted broadcast and / or unicast messages received by communication and processing circuitry 1842. In examples where communication and processing circuitry 1842 receives broadcast root key 1815, key derivation circuitry 1844 may be configured to request a new broadcast root key before the expiration time of the current broadcast root key 1815.

[0215] In an example where the communication and processing circuit system 1842 receives a long-term key 1816, the key derivation circuit system 1844 may be configured to derive a broadcast root key 1815 from the long-term key 1816 and a refresh parameter. In some examples, the refresh parameter may be determined based on a current time received as part of the provisioning information. For example, the key derivation circuit system 1844 may be configured to set the system clock 1830 to the received current time and use the system clock as a counter when determining the refresh parameter. In some examples, the refresh parameter may correspond to a quotient of a current counter value of the counter and a key refresh interval. Here, the key refresh interval may be received as part of the provisioning information. The key derivation circuit system 1844 may further derive the broadcast root key 1815 based on other additional parameters (such as one or more of the following: a key identifier associated with the long-term key, a network identifier associated with the RAN, a tracking area code associated with a tracking area including a secure cell, an area identifier associated with a RAN node, or a registration area code associated with a registration area including a secure cell).

[0216] The key derivation circuitry 1844 may be further configured to derive a cell-specific broadcast key (K B-CELL)1817. In some examples, the key derivation circuit system 1844 may derive the cell-specific broadcast key 1817 based on the broadcast root key 1815 and the cell identification information. In some examples, the cell identification information may include the PCI indicated by the unencrypted PSS and SSS of the received SSB or a combination (concatenation) of the PCI and the ARFCN. In other examples, the cell identification information may include other cell identification information (e.g., a random number generated for a secure cell) included in the (all) cell-specific security parameters. Thus, the cell identification information may include one or more of the PCI, the ARFCN, and / or other cell identification information. The key derivation circuit system 1844 may further derive the cell-specific broadcast key 1817 based on one or more additional cell-specific security parameters (such as a key ID of the broadcast root key, an identifier of a RAN node (RAN node ID), a security algorithm, or an additional freshness parameter (e.g., an additional counter, which may include the current time, SFN, or a combination of HFN and SFN)). For example, the key derivation circuitry 1844 may be configured to derive a broadcast RAN key (K ) from the broadcast root key 1815 and the RAN node ID. B-RAN ) and then derives a cell-specific broadcast key 1817 from the broadcast RAN key and at least the cell identification information.

[0217] The key derivation circuitry 1844 may be further configured to derive a cell-specific unicast key (K U-CELL ) 1818 for decrypting unicast messages transmitted from the RAN node to the wireless communication device 1800 (e.g., unicast DCI specific to the wireless communication device 1800). In some examples, the key derivation circuit system 1844 can be configured to derive the key from the RAN node key (K gNB ) derives a cell-specific unicast key 1818, the RAN node key (K gNB ) may be derived from an authentication key obtained from the core network during registration. For example, the key derivation circuitry 1844 may be configured to derive a cell-specific unicast key 1818 from the RAN node key and at least one other parameter. In some examples, the other parameters may include one or more of cell identification information and a freshness parameter. The key derivation circuitry 1844 may be further configured to execute key derivation software 1854 stored on the computer-readable medium 1806 to implement one or more functions described herein.

[0218] The processor 1804 may further include a decryption and integrity verification circuit system 1846, which is configured to decrypt and verify the integrity of a portion of the acquisition signal (e.g., SSB). For example, the decryption and integrity verification circuit system 1846 may be configured to use the cell-specific broadcast key 1817 to decrypt and verify the integrity of the portion of the PBCH of the SSB excluding the SFN. In other examples, the decryption and integrity verification circuit system 1846 may be configured to use the cell-specific broadcast key 1817 to decrypt and verify the integrity of all portions of the acquisition signal (e.g., PSS, SSS, and PBCH of the SSB). In other examples, the decryption and integrity verification circuit system 1846 may be configured to use the cell-specific broadcast key 1817 to verify the integrity of the modified SSB (e.g., SSB including the modified PBCH). The decryption and integrity verification circuit system 1846 may be further configured to use the cell-specific broadcast key 1817 to decrypt and verify the integrity of other broadcast information related to cell access (such as CORESET0 and SIB1). Additionally, decryption and integrity verification circuitry 1846 may be configured to use the cell-specific broadcast key 1817 to decrypt and verify the integrity of other broadcast and unicast messages.

[0219] In some examples, the decryption and integrity verification circuit system 1846 may be configured to use the broadcast key 1817 that varies from cell to cell and a freshness parameter (e.g., a counter) to decrypt broadcast and / or unicast messages. In one example, the freshness parameter may include the current time. In another example, the freshness parameter may include the SFN. In yet another example, the freshness parameter includes a combination (e.g., cascade) of the SFN and the HFN. In some examples, the decryption and integrity verification circuit system 1846 may be configured to derive an integrity protection key from the broadcast key that varies from cell to cell and verify a message authentication code included in a broadcast or unicast message based on the integrity protection key.

[0220] In some examples, decryption and integrity verification circuitry 1846 may be further configured to decrypt and verify the integrity of a unicast message (e.g., unicast DCI) using cell-specific unicast key 1818. Decryption and integrity verification circuitry may be further configured to execute decryption and integrity verification software 1856 stored in computer-readable medium 1806 to implement one or more of the functions described herein.

[0221] Fig.19 1900 is a block diagram illustrating an example of a hardware implementation of a provisioning server 1900 employing a processing system 1914. For example, the provisioning server 1900 may correspond to the above Figure 6 , Figure 8-Figure 12 , Fig.14 and / or Fig.16 Any of the provisioning servers shown and described in any one or more of .

[0222] According to various aspects of the present disclosure, an element, or any portion of an element, or any combination of elements may be implemented using a processing system 1914 including one or more processors 1904. The processing system 1914 may be connected to Fig.17 The processing system 1714 illustrated in FIG. 1 is substantially the same as that in FIG. 1 , including a bus interface 1908, a bus 1902, a memory 1905, a processor 1904, and a computer readable medium 1906. In addition, the provisioning server 1900 may include the same as that in FIG. Fig.18 An optional user interface 1912 and network interface 1910 that are substantially similar to those described in . That is, the processor 1904 as utilized in the provisioning server 1900 may be used to implement any one or more of the processes described below.

[0223] In some aspects of the present disclosure, the processor 1904 may include circuit systems configured for various functions. For example, the processor 1904 may include a communication and processing circuit system 1942 configured to communicate on a data network (e.g., one or more of a private data network, the Internet, or other suitable networks) via a network interface 1910. The communication and processing circuit system 1942 may include one or more hardware components that provide a physical structure for performing processes related to wired communication (e.g., signal reception and / or signal transmission) and signal processing (e.g., processing received signals and / or processing signals for transmission). For example, the communication and processing circuit system 1942 may be configured to exchange data packets (e.g., IP packets) with a core network and / or a device via a core network and a RAN.

[0224] In some examples, the communication and processing circuit system 1942 may be configured to provision a broadcast root key on the device for the device to use to derive a cell-specific broadcast key used by a secure cell to securely transmit encrypted broadcast information related to cell access to the device. In some examples, the communication and processing circuit system 1942 may establish a connection with the device over an in-band path through a wireless communication network (e.g., RAN) via the network interface 1910 (e.g., via a core network and RAN). For example, the communication and processing circuit system 1942 may be configured to establish the connection over the RAN via a PDU session between the device and the core network. The communication and processing circuit system 1942 may be further configured to transmit a broadcast key 1915 (such as a broadcast root key (K )) to the device over the in-band connection. B-ROOT ) or can be used to derive K B-ROOTThe long-term key (K) and other provisioning information 1918 are used to provision the broadcast root key on the device.

[0225] In other examples, the communication and processing circuit system 1942 may be configured to establish a connection with a core network node (e.g., AMF, UDM, KMF, or OAM) in the core network via the network interface 1910 and transmit one or more broadcast keys 1915 and other provisioning information 1918 to the core network node through the core network connection. The core network node can then provision the broadcast root key on the device. In yet other examples, the communication and processing circuit system 1942 may be configured to establish a connection with the device through an out-of-band path via the network interface 1910 and transmit the broadcast key 1915 and other provisioning information 1918 to the device through the out-of-band connection. For example, the communication and processing circuit system 1942 may be configured to transmit the broadcast key 1915 and other provisioning information 1918 to the device through a Wi-Fi connection, an NFC connection, or other out-of-band private data network connection with the device.

[0226] The communication and processing circuit system 1942 may be further configured to provision a cell-specific broadcast key on a RAN node serving a secure cell in which the device is located via the core network. In some examples, the communication and processing circuit system 1942 may be configured to transmit key information 1920 to a core network node within the core network via the network interface 1910, including at least a broadcast key 1915 (e.g., a broadcast root key or a long-term key) and a key refresh interval (or key expiration time). The key information 1920 may further include a key ID for a long-term key or a broadcast root key. In some examples, the key information 1920 may further include a current time and HFN / SFN for synchronizing the core network node with the provisioning server. The core network node may then derive a cell-specific broadcast key (or broadcast RAN key) from the broadcast key 1915 and provision a cell-specific broadcast key (or broadcast RAN key) on the RAN node. The communication and processing circuitry 1942 may be further configured to execute communication and processing software 1952 stored in the computer-readable medium 1906 to implement one or more of the functions described herein.

[0227] The processor 1904 may further include a key generation circuit system 1944 configured to generate one or more broadcast keys (broadcast root keys or long-term keys) 1915 and store the broadcast keys 1915 in, for example, the memory 1905. The stored broadcast key(s) 1915 may be used by the communication and processing circuit system 1942 to distribute the broadcast key(s) 1915 to the core network nodes and / or devices. The key generation circuit system 1944 may generate the broadcast root key(s) periodically (e.g., before the expiration time of the current broadcast root key ends). Multiple long-term keys and / or broadcast root keys may be generated at one time and provided to different groups of devices or different groups of RAN nodes / cells. The use of multiple broadcast keys 1915 may reduce the burden on the provisioning server 1900 by enabling the provisioning server 1900 to update only the devices and / or RAN nodes / cells affected by the damaged broadcast key(s) with a new broadcast key when one or more of these broadcast keys are damaged by an attacker. Additionally, provisioning different broadcast keys 1915 on different devices based on the device security state of the devices may allow different devices to access different portions of the wireless communication network (e.g., different cells). The key generation circuitry 1944 may be further configured to execute key generation software 1954 stored in the computer-readable medium 1906 to implement one or more of the functions described herein.

[0228] Processor 1904 may further include provisioning / key information generation circuitry 1946 configured to generate provisioning information 1918 and key information 1920 associated with broadcast key(s) 1915. Provisioning information 1918 and key information 1920 may be stored, for example, in memory 1905. The stored provisioning information 1918 and key information 1920 may be used by communication and processing circuitry 1942 to distribute corresponding provisioning information 1918 or key information 1920 with broadcast key(s) 1915 to core network nodes and devices. In some examples, provisioning information 1918 associated with broadcast key 1915 may include a key refresh interval (or expiration time) of a broadcast root key, a current time, a key identifier (ID) of a long-term key or a broadcast root key, and / or one or more of a HFN and a SFN. In some examples, key information 1920 associated with broadcast key 1915 may include a key refresh interval or expiration time and a key ID of a long-term key or broadcast root key associated with broadcast key 1915. Provisioning / key information generation circuitry 1946 may be further configured to execute provisioning / key information generation software 1956 stored in computer-readable medium 1906 to implement one or more of the functions described herein.

[0229] Fig. 202014 is a block diagram illustrating an example of a hardware implementation of a core network node 2000 employing a processing system 2014. For example, the core network node 2000 may correspond to the core network node 2000 described above. Figure 1 , Figure 2 , Figure 6 , Figure 8-Figure 12 , Fig.14 and / or Fig.16 Any one of the core network nodes shown and described in any one or more of . In some examples, the core network node may correspond to one or more of AMF, UDM, SMF, UPF, KMF and / or OAM.

[0230] According to various aspects of the present disclosure, an element, or any portion of an element, or any combination of elements may be implemented using a processing system 2014 including one or more processors 2004. The processing system 2014 may be used with Fig.17 The processing system 1714 described in the embodiment is substantially the same as that described in the embodiment, including a bus interface 2008, a bus 2002, a memory 2005, a processor 2004, and a computer readable medium 2006. In addition, the core network node 2000 may include the same as that described in the embodiment. Fig.18 and 19 The optional user interface 2012 and network interface 2010 are substantially similar to those described in . That is, the processor 2004 as utilized in the core network node 2000 may be used to implement any one or more of the following processes.

[0231] In some aspects of the present disclosure, the processor 2004 may include a circuit system configured for various functions. For example, the processor 2004 may include a communication and processing circuit system 2042, which is configured to communicate on the core network via the network interface 2010. The communication and processing circuit system 2042 may include one or more hardware components that provide a physical structure for performing processes related to communication (e.g., signal reception and / or signal transmission) and signal processing (e.g., processing received signals and / or processing signals for transmission). For example, the communication and processing circuit system 2042 may be configured to exchange NAS signaling, data packets (e.g., IP packets) and / or other messages or signaling information with a provisioning server via the core network and RAN, via the core network and RAN and a RAN node, or via the core network and an external data network (e.g., a private data network).

[0232] In some examples, the communication and processing circuit system 2042 may be configured to provision a broadcast key 2015 (e.g., a broadcast root key or a long-term key) on the device for the device to use to derive a cell-specific broadcast key used by a secure cell to securely transmit encrypted broadcast information related to cell access to the device. In some examples, the communication and processing circuit system 2042 may establish a PDU session with the device via the network interface 2010 (e.g., via the core network and RAN) and then establish a connection (e.g., a user plane connection) between the device and a provisioning server via the network interface 2010 (e.g., via the core network, RAN, and an external data network). Here, the core network node may include an SMF and / or a UPF. The communication and processing circuit system 2042 may be further configured to transmit the broadcast key 2015 (such as a broadcast root key (K )) to the device via the user plane connection. B-ROOT ) or can be used to derive K B-ROOT The long-term key (K) and other provisioning information 2020 are transmitted from the provisioning server to the device to provision the broadcast root key on the device.

[0233] In other examples, the communication and processing circuit system 2042 may be configured to receive key information (KI) 2018 from the provisioning server and store the key information 2018 in, for example, the memory 2005. The key information 2018 may include one or more broadcast keys 2015 and an associated key refresh interval or expiration time of the key. The key information 2018 may further include a corresponding key ID for each of the broadcast keys 2015. In some examples, the key information 2018 may further include a current time and a HFN / SFN for synchronizing the core network node with the provisioning server. The communication and processing circuit system 2042 may be further configured to transmit a broadcast key 2015 of the one or more broadcast keys and corresponding provisioning information (PI) 2020 corresponding to the broadcast key to the device. For example, the communication and processing circuit system 2042 may be configured to include the broadcast key 2015 and the corresponding provisioning information 2020 in a NAS registration acceptance message transmitted to the device during the registration procedure. Here, the core network node may include an AMF.

[0234] In some examples, the communication and processing circuit system 2042 may be configured to receive the one or more broadcast keys 2015 and key information 2018 from the provisioning server and establish a connection with the RAN node to transmit the cell-specific broadcast key 2016 derived from the broadcast key 2015 of the one or more broadcast keys to the RAN node via the network interface 2010. Here, the core network node may include an AMF, UDM, KMF, or OAM. In some examples, the communication and processing circuit system 2042 may transmit a broadcast RAN key derived from the broadcast key 2015 and usable to derive the cell-specific broadcast key 2016 to the RAN node. The communication and processing circuit system 2042 may be further configured to execute the communication and processing software 2052 stored in the computer-readable medium 2006 to implement one or more of the functions described herein.

[0235] The processor 2004 may further include a key derivation circuit system 2044 configured to derive cell-specific broadcast key(s) 2016 (or broadcast RAN key(s)) for each secure cell served by the core network node 2000 from one or more broadcast keys (broadcast root key or long-term key) 2015 and store the cell-specific broadcast key (or broadcast RAN key) 2016, for example, in the memory 2005. The stored cell-specific broadcast key(s) 2016 may be used by the communication and processing circuit system 2042 to distribute the cell-specific broadcast key(s) 2016 to the RAN nodes. The key derivation circuit system 2044 may further periodically update the cell-specific broadcast key(s) 2016 (e.g., derive new cell-specific broadcast key(s) 2016 from the broadcast key 2015) based on an expiration time and / or a key refresh interval. The key derivation circuitry 2044 may be further configured to execute key derivation software 2054 stored in the computer-readable medium 2006 to implement one or more of the functions described herein.

[0236] The processor 2004 may further include a provisioning circuit system 2046 configured to provision the broadcast key 2015 on the device. In some examples, the provisioning circuit system 2046 may be configured to generate provisioning information 2020 associated with the broadcast key 2015. For example, the provisioning information 2020 associated with the broadcast key 2015 may include a key refresh interval (or expiration time) of the broadcast root key (e.g., as determined from the KI 2018), a current time, a key identifier (ID) of a long-term key or a broadcast root key (e.g., as determined from the KI 2018), and / or one or more of the HFN and the SFN. The generated provisioning information 2020 may then be provided to the device by the communication and processing circuit system 2042 together with the broadcast key. Here, the core network node may include an AMF.

[0237] The provisioning circuitry 2046 may be further configured to operate with the communication and processing circuitry 2042 to provision the cell-specific broadcast key (or broadcast RAN key) 2016 on the corresponding RAN node via the network interface 2010. For example, the provisioning circuitry 2046 may provision the new cell-specific broadcast key (or broadcast RAN key) 2016 on the corresponding RAN node once derived by the key derivation circuitry 2044. The provisioning circuitry 2046 may be further configured to execute provisioning software 2056 stored on the computer-readable medium 2006 to implement one or more of the functions described herein.

[0238] Fig.21 2100 is a flow chart of a method for securely receiving broadcast information related to cellular cell access on a wireless communication device according to certain aspects. As described below, some or all of the illustrated features may be omitted in certain implementations within the scope of the present disclosure, and some of the illustrated features may not be required to implement all embodiments. In some examples, the method may be performed as described above and in Fig.18 The wireless communication device 1800 illustrated in FIG. 1 is executed by a processor or a processing system, or by any suitable means for performing the described functions.

[0239] In block 2102, the wireless communication device may obtain a broadcast root key. In some examples, the wireless communication device may receive provisioning information associated with the broadcast root key from a provisioning server (e.g., via a connection with the provisioning server or from a core network node during registration of the wireless communication device on the core network) via an out-of-band delivery path or an in-band delivery path. In some examples, the provisioning information includes at least one of a broadcast root key, a long-term key, a current time, a key identifier of the broadcast root key, or a system frame number (SFN) of the RAN. In some examples, the wireless communication device may derive the broadcast root key from the long-term key. For example, the wireless communication device may derive the broadcast root key using a key derivation function of at least a long-term key and a refresh parameter determined based on the current time. In some examples, the refresh parameter includes a quotient of a current counter value of a counter set based on the current time and a key refresh interval. For example, the counter may include a system clock of the wireless communication device, and the wireless communication device may further set the system clock to the current time.

[0240] In some examples, the wireless communication device may derive the broadcast root key based on the long-term key, the refresh parameter, and one or more of: a key identifier associated with the long-term key, a network identifier associated with the RAN, a tracking area code associated with a tracking area including a secure cell, an area identifier associated with a RAN node, or a registration area code associated with a registration area including a secure cell. In some examples, the provisioning information includes the broadcast root key and an expiration time of the broadcast root key. In this example, the wireless communication device may also retrieve a new broadcast root key from the provisioning server or the core network node before the expiration time. For example, the above in conjunction with Fig.18 The communication and processing circuitry 1842 and key derivation circuitry 1844 as shown and described may, along with the transceiver 1810, provide a means for obtaining a broadcast root key.

[0241] At block 2104, the wireless communication device may receive an acquisition signal from a RAN node serving a secure cell within the RAN. In some examples, the acquisition signal may include an SSB. In some examples, the SSB may be an unencrypted modified SSB including a modified PBCH (e.g., including security parameters that vary from cell to cell). In other examples, the SSB may include encrypted and unencrypted broadcast information related to cell access. For example, the PSS and SSS and the SFN in the PBCH may be unencrypted, while the rest of the PBCH may be encrypted. For example, the above in conjunction with Fig.18 The communication and processing circuitry 1842 and transceiver 1810 as shown and described may together provide a means for receiving an acquisition signal.

[0242] At block 2016, the wireless communication device may acquire cell identification information based on at least the acquired signal. In some examples, the cell identification information may include PCI, ARFCN, and / or other cell identification information (e.g., a random number assigned to the cell). In some examples, the cell identification information includes at least the PCI of the secure cell or a concatenation of the PCI and ARFCN. In this example, the acquired signal may include unencrypted information including the PCI and ARFCN. For example, the above in conjunction with Fig.18 The communication and processing circuitry 1842 and key derivation circuitry 1844 shown and described may together provide a means for acquiring cell identification information.

[0243] At block 2108, the wireless communication device may derive a cell-specific broadcast key based on at least the broadcast root key and the cell identification information. In some examples, the wireless communication device may derive the cell-specific broadcast key based on the broadcast root key, the cell identification information, and one or more other cell-specific security parameters. Examples of cell-specific security parameters include a key ID of the broadcast root key, an identifier of a RAN node, a security algorithm, or a freshness parameter (e.g., a counter that may include a current time, a SFN, or a combination of a HFN and a SFN).

[0244] In some examples, at least one cell-specific security parameter may include cell identification information. In this example, the wireless communication device may derive a cell-specific broadcast key based on a broadcast root key and at least one cell-specific security parameter. In some examples, an acquisition signal may include a first acquisition signal including encrypted broadcast information and a second acquisition signal including at least one cell-specific security parameter. In some examples, the second acquisition signal may include a message authentication code derived from the cell-specific broadcast key and the second acquisition signal. In this example, the wireless communication device may also use the message authentication code to verify the integrity of the second acquisition signal based on an integrity protection key derived from the cell-specific broadcast key. In some examples, the first acquisition signal includes a first SSB and the second acquisition signal includes a second SSB. In some examples, the second acquisition signal including at least one cell-specific security parameter is received in a frame different from the frame containing the first acquisition signal.

[0245] In some examples, the wireless communication device may also derive a key ID of a cell-specific broadcast key from a refresh parameter (e.g., determined based on the current time). In some examples, the wireless communication device may derive a broadcast RAN key based on a broadcast root key and an identifier of a RAN node. The wireless communication device may then derive a cell-specific broadcast key based on the broadcast RAN key and the cell identification information. For example, the above combination Fig.18 The key derivation circuitry 1844 shown and described may provide means for deriving a cell-specific broadcast key.

[0246] At block 2110, the wireless communication device may receive encrypted broadcast information related to cell access. In some examples, the encrypted broadcast information may include an encrypted acquisition signal (e.g., an encrypted SSB) or encrypted broadcast information within an SSB that includes both encrypted broadcast information and unencrypted broadcast information. In other examples, the encrypted broadcast information may include encrypted CORESET0 and / or encrypted SIB1. For example, the above in conjunction with Fig.18 The communication and processing circuitry 1842 and transceiver 1810 shown and described may together provide a means for receiving encrypted broadcast information.

[0247] At block 2112, the wireless communication device may decrypt the encrypted broadcast information using a cell-specific broadcast key to produce decrypted broadcast information. In some examples, the wireless communication device may decrypt the encrypted broadcast information using a cell-specific broadcast key and a freshness parameter (e.g., a current time, a SFN, or a combination of a HFN and a SFN). For example, the freshness parameter may include at least a concatenation of a SFN or a HFN and a SFN. In some examples, the wireless communication device may also verify the integrity of the encrypted broadcast information using a cell-specific broadcast key (e.g., using an integrity protection key derived from the cell-specific broadcast key). For example, the above in combination Fig.18 The decryption and integrity verification circuitry 1846 shown and described may provide means for decrypting encrypted broadcast information.

[0248] Fig. 22 2200 is a flowchart of another method for securely receiving broadcast information related to cellular cell access on a wireless communication device according to certain aspects. As described below, some or all of the illustrated features may be omitted in certain implementations within the scope of the present disclosure, and some of the illustrated features may not be required to implement all embodiments. In some examples, the method may be as described above and in Fig.18 The wireless communication device 1800 illustrated in FIG. 1 is executed by a processor or a processing system, or by any suitable means for performing the described functions.

[0249] At block 2202, a wireless communication device may access a pinhole access cell based on unencrypted broadcast information related to cell access transmitted in a pinhole access cell served by a radio access network (RAN) node (e.g., a base station such as a gNB). For example, the unencrypted broadcast information may include unencrypted SSB, CORESET0, and PBCH. For example, the above description may include the following: Fig.18 The communication and processing circuitry 1842 and transceiver 1810 shown and described may together provide a means for accessing a pinhole cell.

[0250] In block 2204, the wireless communication device may register with the core network via a pinhole access cell. For example, the wireless communication device may transmit a registration request to the AMF within the core network via a pinhole access cell. The AMF may then initiate a non-access stratum (NAS) level authentication between the wireless communication device and the core network (e.g., AUSF and UDM in the core network). The AMF may then retrieve mobility subscription data, SMF selection data, and UE context and communicate with the PCF for policy association for the wireless communication device. The AMF may then send a NAS security registration accept message to the wireless communication device to complete the registration. For example, the above in conjunction with Fig.18 The communication and processing circuitry 1842 and transceiver 1810 shown and described may together provide a means for registering with a core network.

[0251] At block 2206, the wireless communication device may establish a PDU session via the pinhole access cell. For example, the wireless communication device may transmit a PDU session establishment message to the SMF within the core network. Fig.18 The communication and processing circuitry 1842 and transceiver 1810 as shown and described may together provide a means for establishing a PDU session.

[0252] At block 2208, the wireless communication device may establish a connection with the provisioning server via a PDU session. In some examples, based on policy information associated with registration via a pinhole access cell, the SMF may allow the wireless communication device to establish a connection with the provisioning server in the private external data network only via a PDU session. The connection between the wireless communication device and the provisioning server may be routed through a UPF (or more than one UPF) in the core network as selected by the SMF. For example, the above with respect to Fig.18 The communication and processing circuitry 1842 and transceiver 1810 shown and described may together provide a means for establishing a connection with a provisioning server.

[0253] In block 2210, the wireless communication device may receive provisioning information associated with a broadcast root key from a provisioning server. In some examples, the provisioning information may include a broadcast root key or a long-term key. In addition, the provisioning information may further include a current time, a key ID, a SFN, and / or a HFN of a long-term key and / or a broadcast root key. In some examples, the wireless communication device may perform authentication and device attestation with the provisioning server to establish a secure connection with the provisioning server. For example, the wireless communication device may perform device authentication using credentials (e.g., device-specific credentials) provided by a private network. The provisioning server may further verify the device security state of the wireless communication device to perform device attestation. The wireless communication device may then receive the provisioning information in response to successfully performing device authentication and device attestation.

[0254] In some examples, the wireless communication device may then receive an RRC connection release message from the pinhole access cell. The RRC connection release message may include redirection information for redirecting the wireless communication device to the secure cell. In other examples, the wireless communication device may receive a handover command from the pinhole access cell to initiate a handover of the wireless communication device from the pinhole access cell to the secure cell. For example, the above with respect to Fig.18 The communication and processing circuitry 1842 and transceiver 1810 shown and described may together provide a means for receiving provisioning information.

[0255] At block 2212, the wireless communication device may derive a cell-specific broadcast key based on at least the broadcast root key and the cell identification information of the secure cell. In some examples, the wireless communication device may receive broadcast information including encrypted and unencrypted broadcast information related to cell access broadcast by a RAN node within a secure cell. In some examples, the broadcast information may include acquisition signals, such as SSB, as well as CORESET0 and SIB1. The wireless communication device may use the unencrypted broadcast information (e.g., within the acquisition signal) to obtain the cell identification information and use the cell identification information and the broadcast root key to derive a cell-specific broadcast key. For example, the above in conjunction with Fig.18 The communication and processing circuitry 1842 and key derivation circuitry 1844 and transceiver 1810 shown and described may together provide a means for deriving a cell-specific broadcast key.

[0256] At block 2214, the wireless communication device may decrypt the encrypted broadcast information using the cell-specific broadcast key to produce decrypted broadcast information. In some examples, the wireless communication device may decrypt the encrypted broadcast information using the cell-specific broadcast key and a freshness parameter (e.g., the current time, SFN, or a combination of HFN and SFN). For example, the freshness parameter may include at least the SFN or a concatenation of the HFN and SFN. In some examples, the wireless communication device may also verify the integrity of the encrypted broadcast information using the cell-specific broadcast key (e.g., using an integrity protection key derived from the cell-specific broadcast key). For example, the above in combination Fig.18 The decryption and integrity verification circuitry 1846 shown and described may provide means for decrypting encrypted broadcast information.

[0257] At block 2216, the wireless communication device may utilize the decrypted broadcast information to access the secure cell. Fig.18 The communication and processing circuitry 1842 and transceiver 1810 shown and described may together provide a means for accessing a secure cell.

[0258] Fig.23 2300 is a flowchart of another method for securely receiving broadcast information related to cellular cell access on a wireless communication device according to certain aspects. As described below, some or all of the illustrated features may be omitted in certain implementations within the scope of the present disclosure, and some of the illustrated features may not be required to implement all embodiments. In some examples, the method may be performed as described above and in Fig.18 The wireless communication device 1800 illustrated in FIG. 1 is executed by a processor or a processing system, or by any suitable means for performing the described functions.

[0259] At block 2302, a wireless communication device may access a pinhole access cell based on unencrypted broadcast information related to cell access transmitted in a pinhole access cell served by a radio access network (RAN) node (e.g., a base station such as a gNB). For example, the unencrypted broadcast information may include unencrypted SSB, CORESET0, and PBCH. For example, the above description may include the following: Fig.18 The communication and processing circuitry 1842 and transceiver 1810 shown and described may together provide a means for accessing a pinhole cell.

[0260] At block 2304, the wireless communication device may transmit a registration request message to a core network node within the core network via a pinhole access cell. For example, the wireless communication device may transmit a registration request to an AMF within the core network via a pinhole access cell. The AMF may then initiate a non-access stratum (NAS) level authentication between the wireless communication device and the core network (e.g., AUSF and UDM in the core network). The AMF may then retrieve mobility subscription data, SMF selection data, and UE context and communicate with the PCF for policy association for the wireless communication device. For example, the above in conjunction with Fig.18 The communication and processing circuitry 1842 and transceiver 1810 shown and described may together provide a means for transmitting a registration request message.

[0261] In box 2306, the wireless communication device may receive a registration acceptance message from the core network via a pinhole access cellular cell. The registration acceptance message may include provisioning information associated with the broadcast root key. For example, the AMF may send a NAS secure registration acceptance message including the provisioning information to the wireless communication device to complete the registration. The provisioning information may include, for example, a broadcast root key or a long-term key. In addition, the provisioning information provided by the AMF to the wireless communication device may further include the current time, a key ID of the long-term key and / or the broadcast root key, the SFN and / or the HFN. In some examples, the AMF may be configured to perform device authentication (e.g., using device-specific credentials provided by a private data network) and / or device certification with the wireless communication device before delivering the registration acceptance message including the provisioning information.

[0262] In some examples, the wireless communication device may then receive an RRC connection release message from the pinhole access cell. The RRC connection release message may include redirection information for redirecting the wireless communication device to the secure cell. In other examples, the wireless communication device may receive a handover command from the pinhole access cell to initiate a handover of the wireless communication device from the pinhole access cell to the secure cell. For example, the above with respect to Fig.18 The communication and processing circuitry 1842 and transceiver 1810 as shown and described may together provide a means for receiving a registration accept message.

[0263] At block 2308, the wireless communication device may derive a cell-specific broadcast key based on at least the broadcast root key and the cell identification information of the secure cell. In some examples, the wireless communication device may receive broadcast information including encrypted and unencrypted broadcast information related to cell access broadcast by a RAN node within a secure cell. In some examples, the broadcast information may include acquisition signals, such as SSB, as well as CORESET0 and SIB1. The wireless communication device may use the unencrypted broadcast information (e.g., within the acquisition signal) to obtain the cell identification information and use the cell identification information and the broadcast root key to derive a cell-specific broadcast key. For example, the above in conjunction with Fig.18 The communication and processing circuitry 1842 and key derivation circuitry 1844 and transceiver 1810 shown and described may together provide a means for deriving a cell-specific broadcast key.

[0264] At block 2310, the wireless communication device may decrypt the encrypted broadcast information using a cell-specific broadcast key to produce decrypted broadcast information. In some examples, the wireless communication device may decrypt the encrypted broadcast information using a cell-specific broadcast key and a freshness parameter (e.g., a current time, a SFN, or a combination of a HFN and a SFN). For example, the freshness parameter may include at least a concatenation of a SFN or a HFN and a SFN. In some examples, the wireless communication device may also verify the integrity of the encrypted broadcast information using a cell-specific broadcast key (e.g., using an integrity protection key derived from the cell-specific broadcast key). For example, the above in combination Fig.18 The decryption and integrity verification circuitry 1846 shown and described may provide means for decrypting encrypted broadcast information.

[0265] At block 2312, the wireless communication device may utilize the decrypted broadcast information to access a secure cell. Fig.18 The communication and processing circuitry 1842 and transceiver 1810 shown and described may together provide a means for accessing a secure cell.

[0266] Fig.24 2400 is a flowchart of another method for securely receiving broadcast information related to cellular cell access on a wireless communication device according to certain aspects. As described below, some or all of the illustrated features may be omitted in certain implementations within the scope of the present disclosure, and some of the illustrated features may not be required to implement all embodiments. In some examples, the method may be as described above and in Fig.18 The wireless communication device 1800 illustrated in FIG. 1 is executed by a processor or a processing system, or by any suitable means for performing the described functions.

[0267] At block 2402, a wireless communication device may access a secure cell. For example, the wireless communication device may utilize Figure 21-23 For example, the above combined with any of the methods shown in Fig.18 The communication and processing circuitry 1842, along with the key derivation circuitry 1844, decryption and integrity verification circuitry 1846, and transceiver 1810, as shown and described may together provide a means for accessing a secure cell.

[0268] At block 2404, the wireless communication device may register with the core network upon accessing a secure cell. For example, the wireless communication device and the AMF within the core network may set up non-access stratum (NAS) security to securely deliver NAS messages in the control plane between the wireless communication device and the AMF. Fig.18 The communication and processing circuitry 1842 and transceiver 1810 shown and described may together provide a means for registering with a core network.

[0269] At block 2406, the wireless communication device may establish an access stratum (AS) security context with a radio access network (RAN) node. The AS security context may include a RAN node key. The AS security context may be used to securely deliver RRC messages in a control plane and IP packets in a user plane between the wireless communication device and the RAN node. In some examples, AS security may utilize an AS security key derived from a RAN node key.

[0270] In some examples, the wireless communication device may receive at least one message from the RAN node before establishing the AS security context. The at least one message may be encrypted using a broadcast key that varies from cell to cell. For example, the at least one message may be a broadcast message or a unicast message. For example, the above Fig.18 The communication and processing circuitry 1842 and transceiver 1810 as shown and described may together provide a means for establishing an AS security context.

[0271] At 2408, the wireless communication device may derive a cell-specific unicast key based on the RAN node key and at least one parameter. The at least one parameter may include a concatenation of cell identification information about the secure cell and a freshness parameter (e.g., a counter). Fig.18 The communication and processing circuitry 1842 and key derivation circuitry 1844 and transceiver 1810 shown and described may together provide a means for deriving a cell-specific unicast key.

[0272] At block 2410, a wireless communication device may receive encrypted downlink control information including unicast information for the wireless communication device from a RAN node. Fig.18 The communication and processing circuitry 1842 and transceiver 1810 shown and described may together provide a means for receiving encrypted downlink control information.

[0273] At block 2412, the wireless communication device may decrypt the encrypted downlink control information using a cell-specific unicast key. Fig.18 The decryption and integrity verification circuitry 1846 shown and described may provide means for decrypting downlink control information.

[0274] In one configuration, the wireless communication device 1800 includes a method for performing a combined Figure 1-Figure 3 , Figure 8 , Fig. 9 , Fig.11 and / or Fig.18 In one aspect, the aforementioned means may be Fig.18 The processor 1804 shown in the figure is configured to perform the functions recited by the aforementioned means. On the other hand, the aforementioned means may be a circuit or any equipment configured to perform the functions recited by the aforementioned means.

[0275] Of course, in the above examples, the circuit system included in the processor 1804 is provided only as an example, and other means for performing the described functions may be included in various aspects of the present disclosure, including but not limited to instructions stored in the computer-readable storage medium 1806, or in Figure 1 – Figure 3 , Figure 8 , Fig. 9 , Fig.11 and / or Fig.18 Any of the descriptions and using, for example, this article about Figure 6 , Fig. 7A , Figure 7B , Fig.10 , Fig.12 , Fig.14 , Fig.16 as well as Fig.21 – Fig.24 Any other suitable apparatus or device for implementing the described processes and / or algorithms.

[0276] Fig.252500 is a flow chart of a method for securely transmitting broadcast information related to cellular cell access by a RAN node according to certain aspects. As described below, some or all of the illustrated features may be omitted in certain implementations within the scope of the present disclosure, and some of the illustrated features may not be required to implement all embodiments. In some examples, the method may be as described above and in Fig.17 The RAN node 1700 illustrated in the accompanying drawings is executed by a processor or a processing system, or by any suitable means for performing the described functions.

[0277] At block 2502, the RAN node may obtain a cell-specific broadcast key for a secure cell served by the RAN node. In some examples, the RAN node may receive the cell-specific broadcast key from a core network node (e.g., AMF, UDM, KMF, or OAM) within the core network. In this example, the cell-specific broadcast key may be derived from a broadcast root key provided to the core network node by a provisioning server. In other examples, the RAN node may receive a broadcast RAN key from the core network node and may derive the cell-specific broadcast key based on the broadcast RAN key and cell identification information of the secure cell (e.g., PCI, PCI|ARFCN, or other cell identification information). For example, the above in conjunction with Fig.17 The communication and processing circuitry 1744 as shown and described with the encryption and integrity protection circuitry 1748 and transceiver 1710 may together provide a means for acquiring a cell-specific broadcast key.

[0278] At block 2504, the RAN node may encrypt broadcast information related to cell access using a cell-specific broadcast key to produce encrypted broadcast information. In some examples, the encrypted broadcast information may include at least a portion of the acquisition signal. For example, the encrypted broadcast information may include an SSB or a PBCH of the SSB excluding the SFN. The encrypted broadcast information may further include CORESET0 and / or SIB1. In some examples, the RAN node may encrypt the broadcast information using a cell-specific broadcast key and a freshness parameter (e.g., current time, SFN, or a combination (concatenation) of HFN and SFN).

[0279] In some examples, the RAN node may transmit an acquisition signal including at least a portion of the encrypted broadcast information and the unencrypted broadcast information. For example, the unencrypted broadcast information may include the physical cell identity (PCI) of the secure cell and the absolute radio frequency channel number (ARFCN) of the secure cell. In this example, the acquisition signal may include an SSB including a PSS, SSS, and PBCH. The unencrypted broadcast information may include the PSS, SSS, and a first portion of the PBCH, and the encrypted broadcast information may include the remainder of the PBCH, a SIB (e.g., SIB1), and a PDCCH resource set (CORESET 0) including scheduling information about SIB1. In some examples, the first portion of the PBCH may include a SFN within the MIB. For example, the above in conjunction with Fig.17 The encryption and integrity protection circuitry 1748 and acquisition signal generation circuitry 1746 shown and described may together provide a means for encrypting broadcast information.

[0280] At block 2506, the RAN node may transmit the encrypted broadcast information in the secure cell. Fig.17 The communication and processing circuitry 1744 and transceiver 1710 shown and described may together provide a means for transmitting encrypted broadcast information.

[0281] Fig.26 2600 is a flowchart of another method for securely transmitting broadcast information related to cellular cell access by a RAN node according to certain aspects. As described below, some or all of the illustrated features may be omitted in certain implementations within the scope of the present disclosure, and some of the illustrated features may not be required to implement all embodiments. In some examples, the method may be as described above and in Fig.17 The RAN node 1700 illustrated in the accompanying drawings is executed by a processor or a processing system, or by any suitable means for performing the described functions.

[0282] At block 2602, the RAN node may obtain a cell-specific broadcast key for a secure cell served by the RAN node. In some examples, the RAN node may receive the cell-specific broadcast key from a core network node (e.g., AMF, UDM, KMF, or OAM) within the core network. In this example, the cell-specific broadcast key may be derived from a broadcast root key provided to the core network node by a provisioning server. In other examples, the RAN node may receive a broadcast RAN key from the core network node and may derive the cell-specific broadcast key based on the broadcast RAN key and cell identification information of the secure cell (e.g., PCI, PCI|ARFCN, or other cell identification information). For example, the above in conjunction with Fig.17The communication and processing circuitry 1744 as shown and described with the encryption and integrity protection circuitry 1748 and transceiver 1710 may together provide a means for acquiring a cell-specific broadcast key.

[0283] At block 2604, the RAN node may encrypt broadcast information related to cell access using a cell-specific broadcast key to generate encrypted broadcast information. In some examples, the encrypted broadcast information may include an SSB or a PBCH of the SSB excluding SFN. The encrypted broadcast information may further include CORESET0 and / or SIB1. In some examples, the RAN node may encrypt the broadcast information using a cell-specific broadcast key and a freshness parameter (e.g., current time, SFN, or a combination (concatenation) of HFN and SFN). For example, the above in conjunction with Fig.17 The encryption and integrity protection circuitry 1748 and acquisition signal generation circuitry 1746 shown and described may together provide a means for encrypting broadcast information.

[0284] At block 2606, the RAN node may transmit a first acquisition signal including at least a portion of the encrypted broadcast information in the secure cell. For example, the first acquisition signal may include a first SSB. For example, the above Fig.17 The communication and processing circuitry 1744 and transceiver 1710 as shown and described may together provide a means for transmitting a first acquisition signal.

[0285] At block 2608, the RAN node may transmit a second acquisition signal in the secure cell including at least one cell-specific security parameter. For example, the second acquisition signal may include a second SSB. In some examples, at least one cell-specific security parameter includes cell identification information. In some examples, at least one cell-specific security parameter further includes at least one of a key ID of a broadcast root key, an identifier of the RAN node, or a freshness parameter. In some examples, the RAN node may transmit the second acquisition signal in a message different from the message containing the first acquisition signal. In some examples, the second acquisition signal includes a message authentication code derived from the cell-specific broadcast key and the second acquisition signal. For example, the above in combination Fig.17 The communication and processing circuitry 1744 and transceiver 1710 as shown and described may together provide a means for transmitting the second acquisition signal.

[0286] Fig. 272700 is a flowchart of another method for securely transmitting broadcast information related to cellular cell access by a RAN node according to certain aspects. As described below, some or all of the illustrated features may be omitted in certain implementations within the scope of the present disclosure, and some of the illustrated features may not be required to implement all embodiments. In some examples, the method may be as described above and in Fig.17 The RAN node 1700 illustrated in the accompanying drawings is executed by a processor or a processing system, or by any suitable means for performing the described functions.

[0287] In block 2702, the RAN node may obtain a cell-specific broadcast key for a secure cell served by the RAN node. In some examples, the RAN node may receive the cell-specific broadcast key from a core network node (e.g., AMF, UDM, KMF, or OAM) within the core network. In this example, the cell-specific broadcast key may be derived from a broadcast root key provided to the core network node by a provisioning server. In other examples, the RAN node may receive a broadcast RAN key from the core network node and may derive the cell-specific broadcast key based on the broadcast RAN key and cell identification information of the secure cell (e.g., PCI, PCI|ARFCN, or other cell identification information). For example, the above in conjunction with Fig.17 The communication and processing circuitry 1744 as shown and described with the encryption and integrity protection circuitry 1748 and transceiver 1710 may together provide a means for acquiring a cell-specific broadcast key.

[0288] At block 2704, the RAN node may transmit provisioning information to the wireless communication device. At least a portion of the provisioning information may originate at a provisioning server and be provided from the provisioning server directly or via a core network node within the core network to the RAN node. The provisioning information may enable provisioning of a broadcast root key for deriving a cell-specific broadcast key on the wireless communication device. In some examples, the provisioning information may include at least one of a broadcast root key, a long-term key, a current time, a key ID of the broadcast root key, a SFN, or a HFN of the RAN. For example, the above in conjunction with Fig.17 The communication and processing circuitry 1744 and transceiver 1710 as shown and described may together provide a means for communicating provisioning information.

[0289] At block 2706, the RAN node may encrypt broadcast information related to cell access using a cell-specific broadcast key to produce encrypted broadcast information. In some examples, the encrypted broadcast information may include at least a portion of the acquisition signal. For example, the encrypted broadcast information may include an SSB or a PBCH of the SSB excluding the SFN. The encrypted broadcast information may further include CORESET0 and / or SIB1. In some examples, the RAN node may encrypt the broadcast information using a cell-specific broadcast key and a freshness parameter (e.g., current time, SFN, or a combination (concatenation) of HFN and SFN).

[0290] In some examples, the RAN node may transmit an acquisition signal including at least a portion of the encrypted broadcast information and the unencrypted broadcast information. For example, the unencrypted broadcast information may include the physical cell identity (PCI) of the secure cell and the absolute radio frequency channel number (ARFCN) of the secure cell. In this example, the acquisition signal may include an SSB including a PSS, SSS, and PBCH. The unencrypted broadcast information may include the PSS, SSS, and a first portion of the PBCH, and the encrypted broadcast information may include the remainder of the PBCH, a SIB (e.g., SIB1), and a PDCCH resource set (CORESET 0) including scheduling information about SIB1. In some examples, the first portion of the PBCH may include a SFN within the MIB. For example, the above in conjunction with Fig.17 The encryption and integrity protection circuitry 1748 and acquisition signal generation circuitry 1746 shown and described may together provide a means for encrypting broadcast information.

[0291] At block 2708, the RAN node may transmit the encrypted broadcast information in the secure cell. Fig.17 The communication and processing circuitry 1744 and transceiver 1710 shown and described may together provide a means for transmitting encrypted broadcast information.

[0292] Fig.28 2800 is a flowchart of another method for securely transmitting broadcast information related to cellular cell access by a RAN node according to certain aspects. As described below, some or all of the illustrated features may be omitted in certain implementations within the scope of the present disclosure, and some of the illustrated features may not be required to implement all embodiments. In some examples, the method may be as described above and in Fig.17 The RAN node 1700 illustrated in the accompanying drawings is executed by a processor or a processing system, or by any suitable means for performing the described functions.

[0293] At block 2802, a RAN node may transmit unencrypted broadcast information related to cell access in a pinhole access cell served by a radio access network (RAN) node. For example, the unencrypted broadcast information may include unencrypted SSB, CORESET0, and PBCH. For example, the above description may include Fig.17 The communication and processing circuitry 1744 and transceiver 1710 as shown and described may together provide a means for transmitting unencrypted broadcast information in a pinhole access cell.

[0294] In block 2804, the RAN node may receive a registration request from the wireless communication device via a pinhole access cell based on the unencrypted broadcast information to register the wireless communication device with the core network. In some examples, the RAN node may also establish a protocol data unit (PDU) session for the wireless communication device via the pinhole access cell and the core network. The RAN node may then establish a connection between the wireless communication device and a provisioning server via the PDU session. In addition, the RAN node may transmit provisioning information from the provisioning server to the wireless communication device. The provisioning information may enable provisioning of a broadcast root key on the wireless communication device for deriving a broadcast key that varies from cell to cell. For example, the above with respect to Fig.17 The communication and processing circuitry 1744 and transceiver 1710 as shown and described may together provide a means for receiving a registration request from a wireless communication device via a pinhole access cell.

[0295] At block 2806, the RAN node may transmit a registration accept message from a core network node within the core network to the wireless communication device via the pinhole access cell. In some examples, the registration accept message includes provisioning information that enables provisioning of a broadcast root key for deriving a cell-specific broadcast key on the wireless communication device.

[0296] In some examples, the RAN node may also transmit a radio resource control (RRC) connection release message to the wireless communication device via the pinhole access cell. The RRC connection release message may include redirection information for redirecting the wireless communication device to the secure cell. In other examples, the RAN node may transmit a handover command to the wireless communication device via the pinhole access cell to handover the wireless communication device from the pinhole access cell to the secure cell. For example, the above description may include the following: Fig.17 The communication and processing circuitry 1744 and transceiver 1710 as shown and described may together provide a means for transmitting a registration accept message to a wireless communication device via a pinhole access cell.

[0297] Fig.292900 is a flowchart of another method for securely transmitting broadcast information related to cellular cell access by a RAN node according to certain aspects. As described below, some or all of the illustrated features may be omitted in certain implementations within the scope of the present disclosure, and some of the illustrated features may not be required to implement all embodiments. In some examples, the method may be as described above and in Fig.17 The RAN node 1700 illustrated in the accompanying drawings is executed by a processor or a processing system, or by any suitable means for performing the described functions.

[0298] At block 2902, the RAN node may establish an access stratum (AS) security context with the wireless communication device when the wireless communication device registers with the core network via a secure cell. The AS security context may include a RAN node key. The AS security context may be used to securely deliver RRC messages in the control plane and IP packets in the user plane between the wireless communication device and the RAN node. In some examples, AS security may utilize an AS security key derived from the RAN node key.

[0299] In some examples, the RAN node may transmit at least one message to the wireless communication device before establishing the AS security context. The at least one message may be encrypted using a broadcast key that varies from cell to cell. For example, the at least one message may be a broadcast message or a unicast message. For example, the above Fig.17 The communication and processing circuitry 1744 and transceiver 1710 as shown and described may together provide means for establishing an AS security context with a wireless communication device.

[0300] At block 2904, the RAN node may derive a cell-specific unicast key based on the RAN node key and at least one parameter. The at least one parameter may include a concatenation of cell identification information about the secure cell and a freshness parameter (e.g., a counter). Fig.17 The illustrated and described encryption and integrity protection circuitry 1748 may provide means for deriving cell-specific unicast keys.

[0301] At block 2906, the RAN node may encrypt downlink control information including unicast information for the wireless communication device using a cell-specific unicast key to produce encrypted downlink control information. Fig.17 The ciphering and integrity protection circuitry 1748 shown and described may provide means for encrypting downlink control information.

[0302] At block 2908, the RAN node may transmit the encrypted downlink control information to the wireless communication device. Fig.17The communication and processing circuitry 1744 and transceiver 1710 shown and described may together provide a means for transmitting encrypted downlink control information to a wireless communication device.

[0303] In one configuration, the RAN node 1700 includes a Figure 1-Figure 3 , Figure 8 , Fig. 9 , Fig.11 and / or Fig.17 In one aspect, the aforementioned means may be Fig.17 The processor 1704 shown in the figure is configured to perform the functions recited by the aforementioned means. On the other hand, the aforementioned means may be a circuit or any equipment configured to perform the functions recited by the aforementioned means.

[0304] Of course, in the above examples, the circuit system included in the processor 1704 is provided only as an example, and other means for performing the described functions may be included in various aspects of the present disclosure, including but not limited to instructions stored in the computer-readable storage medium 1706, or in Figure 1 – Figure 3 , Figure 8 , Fig. 9 , Fig.11 and / or Fig.17 Any of the descriptions and using, for example, this article about Figure 6 , Fig. 7A , Figure 7B , Fig.10 , Fig.12 , Fig.14 , Fig.16 and / or Figure 25-Figure 29 Any other suitable apparatus or device for implementing the described processes and / or algorithms.

[0305] Fig.30 3000 is a flow chart of a method for implementing secure communication of broadcast information related to cellular cell access according to certain aspects. As described below, some or all of the illustrated features may be omitted in certain implementations within the scope of the present disclosure, and some of the illustrated features may not be required to implement all embodiments. In some examples, the method may be implemented as described above and in Fig.19 The provisioning server 1900 illustrated in the specification is executed by a processor or processing system, or by any suitable device for performing the described functions.

[0306] At block 3002, a provisioning server may generate at least one broadcast key associated with at least one secure cell. In some examples, the at least one broadcast key may include at least one long-term key or at least one broadcast root key. In some examples, the provisioning server may generate at least one long-term key that may be used to derive at least one broadcast root key. For example, the above combination Fig.19 The key generation circuitry 1944 shown and described may provide means for generating at least one broadcast key.

[0307] At block 3004, a provisioning server may provision a broadcast key (e.g., a long-term key or a broadcast root key) of at least one broadcast key on a wireless communication device for use by the wireless communication device to derive a cell-specific broadcast key used by a secure cell of at least one secure cell to securely transmit encrypted broadcast information related to cell access to the wireless communication device. In some examples, the provisioning server may provision the broadcast key via an out-of-band delivery path or an in-band delivery path (e.g., via a connection with the wireless communication device or via a core network node during registration of the wireless communication device on the core network). In some examples, the provisioning server may also transmit provisioning information to the wireless communication device (e.g., directly or via a core network node).

[0308] In some examples, the provisioning server may establish a connection with the wireless communication device via a protocol data unit (PDU) session associated with the wireless communication device. The provisioning server may then transmit a broadcast key to the wireless communication device via the connection. In some examples, the broadcast key is a long-term key of at least one long-term key given to the wireless communication device via the connection. In some examples, the provisioning server may also transmit provisioning information to the wireless communication device via the connection. The provisioning information may include at least one of a first key identifier of the long-term key, a second key identifier of the broadcast root key of at least one broadcast root key, or a key refresh interval.

[0309] In some examples, a provisioning server may transmit key information including at least one long-term key and a key refresh interval to a core network node within the core network for transmission of the provisioning information including at least one long-term key and a key refresh interval from the core network node to the wireless communication device during registration of the wireless communication device with the core network.

[0310] In some examples, a provisioning server may provision a cell-specific broadcast key on a RAN node serving a secure cell via a core network. In some examples, the provisioning server may generate at least one long-term key that can be used to derive at least one broadcast root key. The provisioning server may then transmit key information including at least a long-term key and a key refresh interval in at least one long-term key to a core network node within the core network to derive a broadcast root key in at least one broadcast root key and a cell-specific broadcast key or a broadcast RAN key derived therefrom. The cell-specific broadcast key or broadcast RAN key and the key refresh interval may then be transmitted from the core network node to the RAN node. A cell-specific network key may be derived from the broadcast RAN key. In other examples, the provisioning server may transmit key information including at least a broadcast key and a key refresh interval to a core network node within the core network to derive a cell-specific broadcast key or a broadcast RAN key derived therefrom. The cell-specific broadcast key or broadcast RAN key and the key refresh interval may then be transmitted from the core network node to the RAN node. A cell-specific network key may be derived from the broadcast RAN key. For example, the above in combination Fig.19 The communication and processing circuitry 1942 and network interface 1910 as shown and described may together provide a means for provisioning broadcast keys on a wireless communication device.

[0311] In one configuration, the provisioning server 1900 includes a Figure 1-Figure 3 , Figure 8 , Fig. 9 , Fig.11 and / or Fig.19 In one aspect, the aforementioned means may be Fig.19 The processor 1904 shown in the figure is configured to perform the functions recited by the aforementioned means. On the other hand, the aforementioned means may be a circuit or any equipment configured to perform the functions recited by the aforementioned means.

[0312] Of course, in the above examples, the circuit system included in the processor 1904 is provided only as an example, and other means for performing the described functions may be included in various aspects of the present disclosure, including but not limited to instructions stored in the computer-readable storage medium 1906, or in Figure 1 – Figure 3 , Figure 8 , Fig. 9 , Fig.11 and / or Fig.19 Any of the descriptions and using, for example, this article about Figure 6 , Fig. 7A , Figure 7B , Fig.10 , Fig.12 , Fig.14 , Fig.16 and / or Fig.30 Any other suitable apparatus or device for implementing the described processes and / or algorithms.

[0313] Fig.21 – Fig.30 The processes shown in may include additional aspects, such as any single aspect or any combination of aspects described below and / or in combination with one or more other processes described elsewhere herein.

[0314] Aspect 1: A wireless communication method in a radio access network (RAN) of a wireless communication system, comprising: at a wireless communication device: obtaining a broadcast root key; receiving a capture signal from a RAN node serving a secure cell within the RAN; obtaining cell identification information based on at least the capture signal; deriving a cell-specific broadcast key based on at least the broadcast root key and the cell identification information; receiving encrypted broadcast information related to cell access; and decrypting the encrypted broadcast information using the cell-specific broadcast key to produce decrypted broadcast information.

[0315] Aspect 2: A method as described in Aspect 1, wherein obtaining the broadcast root key further includes: receiving provisioning information including at least one of the broadcast root key, a long-term key, a current time, a key identifier of the broadcast root key, or a system frame number (SFN) of the RAN.

[0316] Aspect 3: A method as described in Aspect 2, wherein obtaining the broadcast root key further includes: deriving the broadcast root key based on at least the long-term key, a refresh parameter determined based on the current time, and one or more of the following: a key identifier associated with the long-term key, a network identifier associated with the RAN, a tracking area code associated with a tracking area including the secure cell, an area identifier associated with the RAN node, or a registration area code associated with a registration area including the secure cell.

[0317] Aspect 4: The method according to aspect 3, wherein the refresh parameter comprises a quotient of a current counter value of a counter set based on the current time and a key refresh interval.

[0318] Aspect 5: A method as described in any of Aspects 2 to 4, wherein the provisioning information further includes a hyperframe number (HFN) of the RAN, and wherein decrypting the encrypted broadcast information further includes: decrypting the encrypted broadcast information based on the broadcast key and freshness parameter that varies from cell to cell, wherein the freshness parameter includes a cascade of the HFN and the SFN.

[0319] Aspect 6: The method as described in any one of aspects 1 to 5, wherein obtaining the broadcast root key further comprises: receiving provisioning information associated with the broadcast root key via an out-of-band delivery path external to the wireless communication system.

[0320] Aspect 7: A method as described in any one of Aspects 1 to 5, wherein obtaining the broadcast root key further comprises: receiving provisioning information associated with the broadcast root key from a provisioning server, a core network node, or at least one of the RAN nodes.

[0321] Aspect 8: A method as described in any one of Aspects 1 to 5 or 7, wherein obtaining the broadcast root key further includes: accessing the pinhole access cell based on unencrypted broadcast information related to cell access transmitted in the pinhole access cell served by the RAN node; and registering with the core network via the pinhole access cell to obtain the broadcast root key.

[0322] Aspect 9: A method as described in Aspect 8, wherein obtaining the broadcast root key further includes: establishing a protocol data unit (PDU) session via the pinhole access cellular cell; establishing a connection with a provisioning server via the PDU session; and receiving provisioning information associated with the broadcast root key from the provisioning server on the wireless communication device.

[0323] Aspect 10: The method as described in Aspect 9 further includes: performing device authentication and device certification with the provisioning server to establish a secure connection with the provisioning server, wherein receiving the provisioning information further includes: receiving the provisioning information in response to successfully performing the device authentication and the device certification.

[0324] Aspect 11: A method as described in Aspect 8, wherein registering with the core network further includes: transmitting a registration request message to a core network node within the core network via the pinhole access cell; and receiving a registration acceptance message from the core network node via the pinhole access cell, wherein the registration acceptance message includes provisioning information associated with the broadcast root key.

[0325] Aspect 12: The method as described in any one of Aspects 8 to 11 further includes: receiving a radio resource control (RRC) connection release message from the pinhole access cell, wherein the RRC connection release message includes redirection information for redirecting the wireless communication device to the secure cell; and accessing the secure cell using the decrypted broadcast information.

[0326] Aspect 13: The method as described in any one of Aspects 8 to 11 further includes: receiving a switching command from the pinhole access cell to switch the wireless communication device from the pinhole access cell to the secure cell; and using the decrypted broadcast information to access the secure cell.

[0327] Aspect 14: A method as described in any of Aspects 1 to 13, wherein the cellular cell identification information includes a cascade of the PCI and the absolute radio frequency channel number (ARFCN) of the secure cellular cell, and the acquisition signal includes unencrypted broadcast information and at least a portion of the encrypted broadcast information, wherein the unencrypted broadcast information includes the PCI and the ARFCN.

[0328] Aspect 15: A method as described in Aspect 14, wherein: the acquisition signal includes a synchronization signal block (SSB), the SSB includes a primary synchronization signal, a secondary synchronization signal, and a physical broadcast control channel (PBCH), the unencrypted broadcast information includes the primary synchronization signal, the secondary synchronization signal and the first part of the PBCH, the first part of the PBCH includes a system frame number (SFN) within a master information block (MIB), and the encrypted broadcast information includes the remaining part of the PBCH, a system information block, and a physical downlink control channel (PDCCH) control resource set including scheduling information for the system information block.

[0329] Aspect 16: The method as described in any one of aspects 1 to 15, wherein the acquisition signal includes a first acquisition signal including the encrypted broadcast information and a second acquisition signal including at least one cell-specific security parameter.

[0330] Aspect 17: A method as described in Aspect 16, wherein the at least one cell-specific security parameter includes the cell identification information, and wherein deriving the cell-specific broadcast key further includes: deriving the cell-specific broadcast key based on the broadcast root key and the at least one cell-specific security parameter, wherein the at least one cell-specific security parameter further includes at least one of a key identifier of the broadcast root key, an identifier of the RAN node, or a freshness parameter.

[0331] Aspect 18: A method as described in Aspect 16 or 17, wherein the second acquisition signal includes a message authentication code derived from the broadcast key that varies from cell to cell and the second acquisition signal, and the method further includes: using the message authentication code to verify the integrity of the second acquisition signal based on an integrity protection key derived from the broadcast key that varies from cell to cell.

[0332] Aspect 19: A method as described in any of Aspects 1 to 18, wherein deriving the cell-specific broadcast key further comprises: deriving a broadcast RAN key based on the broadcast root key and an identifier of the RAN node; and deriving the cell-specific broadcast key based on the broadcast RAN key and the cell identification information.

[0333] Aspect 20: The method as described in any of Aspects 1 to 19 further includes: registering with the core network when accessing the secure cellular cell; establishing an access layer security context with the RAN node, the access layer security context including a RAN node key; deriving a unicast key that varies from cell to cell based on the RAN node key and at least one parameter, wherein the at least one parameter includes a cascade of the cellular cell identification information and a freshness parameter; receiving encrypted downlink control information including unicast information for the wireless communication device from the RAN node; and decrypting the encrypted downlink control information using the unicast key that varies from cell to cell.

[0334] Aspect 21: A wireless communication method in a wireless communication system, comprising: obtaining, at a radio access network (RAN) node: a cell-specific broadcast key for a secure cell served by the RAN node; using at least the cell-specific broadcast key to encrypt broadcast information related to cell access to generate encrypted broadcast information; and transmitting the encrypted broadcast information in the secure cell.

[0335] Aspect 22: A method as described in Aspect 21, wherein obtaining the broadcast key that is specific to the cell further includes: receiving the broadcast key that is specific to the cell from a core network node within the core network, wherein the broadcast key that is specific to the cell is derived from a broadcast root key provided to the core network node by a provisioning server.

[0336] Aspect 23: A method as described in Aspect 21, wherein obtaining the broadcast key that is specific to the cell further includes: receiving a broadcast RAN key from a core network node in the core network; and deriving the broadcast key that is specific to the cell based on the broadcast RAN key and the cell identification information associated with the secure cell.

[0337] Aspect 24: A method as described in any of Aspects 21 to 23, wherein at least a portion of the encrypted broadcast information is transmitted within a first acquisition signal in the secure cell, and the method further includes: transmitting a second acquisition signal including at least one cell-specific security parameter, wherein the at least one cell-specific security parameter includes cell identification information and further includes at least one of a key identifier of a broadcast root key for deriving the cell-specific broadcast key, an identifier of the RAN node, or a freshness parameter.

[0338] Aspect 25: The method as described in any one of Aspects 21 to 24 further includes: transmitting provisioning information to a wireless communication device, at least a portion of the provisioning information originating at a provisioning server, wherein the provisioning information enables provisioning of a broadcast root key for deriving the cell-specific broadcast key on the wireless communication device, wherein the provisioning information includes at least one of the broadcast root key, a long-term key, a current time, a key identifier of the broadcast root key, or a system frame number (SFN) of the RAN.

[0339] Aspect 26: A method as described in Aspect 25, wherein the provisioning information further includes a hyperframe number (HFN) of the RAN, and wherein encrypting the broadcast information further includes: encrypting the broadcast information using the broadcast key that varies among cell sites and a freshness parameter that includes a cascade of the HFN and the SFN.

[0340] Aspect 27: The method as described in any of Aspects 21 to 26 further includes: transmitting unencrypted broadcast information related to cellular cell access in a pinhole access cellular cell served by the RAN node; receiving a registration request from a wireless communication device via the pinhole access cellular cell based on the unencrypted broadcast information to register the wireless communication device with the core network; and transmitting a registration acceptance message from a core network node within the core network to the wireless communication device via the pinhole access cellular cell.

[0341] Aspect 28: The method as described in any one of Aspects 21 to 27 further includes: establishing an access stratum security context with the wireless communication device when the wireless communication device registers with the core network, the access stratum security context including a RAN node key; deriving a unicast key that varies from cell to cell based on the RAN node key and at least one parameter; using the unicast key that varies from cell to cell to encrypt downlink control information including unicast information for the wireless communication device to generate encrypted downlink control information; and transmitting the encrypted downlink control information to the wireless communication device.

[0342] Aspect 29: An apparatus in a wireless communication network, comprising a transceiver, a memory, and a processor coupled to the transceiver and the memory, the processor and the memory being configured to execute the method as described in any one of Aspects 1 to 20 or Aspects 21 to 28.

[0343] Aspect 30: An apparatus in a wireless communication network, comprising at least one device for executing the method as described in any one of aspects 1 to 20 or aspects 21 to 28.

[0344] Aspect 31: A non-transitory computer-readable medium storing computer executable codes, wherein the computer executable codes include codes for causing an apparatus in a wireless communication network to perform the method as described in any one of aspects 1 to 20 or aspects 21 to 28.

[0345] Several aspects of wireless communication networks have been presented with reference to exemplary implementations. As those skilled in the art will readily appreciate, the various aspects described throughout this disclosure may be extended to other telecommunication systems, network architectures and communication standards.

[0346] As an example, various aspects may be implemented within other systems defined by 3GPP, such as Long Term Evolution (LTE), Evolved Packet System (EPS), Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS), and / or Global System for Mobile (GSM). Various aspects may also be extended to systems defined by the Third Generation Partnership Project 2 (3GPP2), such as CDMA2000 and / or Evolution Data Optimized (EV-DO). Other examples may be implemented within systems employing IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi), IEEE 802.16 (WiMAX), IEEE 802.20, Ultra Wideband (UWB), Bluetooth, and / or other suitable systems. The actual telecommunication standard, network architecture, and / or communication standard employed will depend on the specific application and the overall design constraints imposed on the system.

[0347] Within the present disclosure, the wording "exemplary" is used to mean "serving as an example, instance, or illustration". Any implementation or aspect described herein as "exemplary" is not necessarily to be construed as superior or superior to other aspects of the present disclosure. Likewise, the term "aspect" does not require that all aspects of the present disclosure include the features, advantages, or modes of operation discussed. The term "coupled" is used herein to refer to a direct or indirect coupling between two objects. For example, if object A physically contacts object B, and object B contacts object C, objects A and C may still be considered to be coupled to each other - even if they are not in direct physical contact with each other. For example, a first object may be coupled to a second object, even if the first object never directly contacts the second object physically. The terms "circuit" and "circuitry" are used broadly and are intended to include both hardware implementations of electronic devices and conductors and software implementations of information and instructions, which, when connected and configured, enable the functions described in the present disclosure to be performed without limitation on the type of electronic circuits, which, when executed by a processor, enable the functions described in the present disclosure to be performed.

[0348] Figure 1-Figure 30 One or more of the components, steps, features, and / or functions described herein may be rearranged and / or combined into a single component, step, feature, or function, or implemented in several components, steps, or functions. Additional stages, components, steps, and / or functions may also be added without departing from the novel features disclosed herein. Figure 1-Figure 20 The apparatus, devices and / or components illustrated in the can be configured to perform one or more methods, features or steps described herein. The novel algorithms described herein can also be efficiently implemented in software and / or embedded in hardware.

[0349] It should be understood that the specific order or hierarchy of steps in the disclosed methods is an illustration of an exemplary process. Based on design preferences, it will be understood that the specific order or hierarchy of steps in these methods can be rearranged. The attached method claims present the stages of the various steps in a sample order and are not meant to be limited to the specific order or hierarchy presented unless specifically stated herein.

[0350] The previous description is provided to enable any person skilled in the art to practice the various aspects described herein. Various modifications to these aspects will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art, and the universal principles defined herein may be applied to other aspects. Thus, the claims are not intended to be limited to the various aspects shown herein, but should be granted the full scope consistent with the language of the claims, wherein the singular reference to the phase is not intended to mean "there is and only one" - unless specifically stated, but is intended to mean "one or more". Unless specifically stated otherwise, the term "some / some" refers to one or more. The phrase "at least one" of a list of items refers to any combination of these items, including a single member. As an example, "at least one of a, b or c" is intended to cover: a; b; c; a and b; a and c; b and c; and a, b and c. The various stages of the various aspects described throughout this disclosure are all structurally and functionally equivalent schemes currently or hereafter known to those of ordinary skill in the art, and are expressly incorporated herein by reference, and are intended to be covered by the claims. In addition, nothing disclosed herein is intended to be donated to the public, regardless of whether such disclosure is explicitly recorded in the claims.

Claims

1. A wireless communication method, comprising: Obtaining a broadcast root key from a plurality of broadcast root keys, each broadcast root key being associated with a different set of corresponding cells or a different set of corresponding wireless communication devices; receiving an acquisition signal from a RAN node serving a security cell within a radio access network RAN ​​of the wireless communication system; acquiring cell identification information based on at least the acquired signal; deriving a cell-specific broadcast key based on at least the broadcast root key and the cell identification information; receiving encrypted broadcast information related to cell access, the encrypted broadcast information being broadcast to a plurality of wireless communication devices including the wireless communication device in the secure cell; as well as The encrypted broadcast information is decrypted using the cell-specific broadcast key to produce decrypted broadcast information.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein obtaining the broadcast root key further comprises: Provisioning information including at least one of the broadcast root key, a long-term key, a current time, a key identifier of the broadcast root key, or a system frame number SFN of the RAN is received.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein obtaining the broadcast root key further comprises: The broadcast root key is derived based on at least the long-term key, a refresh parameter determined based on the current time, and one or more of: a key identifier associated with the long-term key, a network identifier associated with the RAN, a tracking area code associated with a tracking area including the secure cell, an area identifier associated with the RAN node, or a registration area code associated with a registration area including the secure cell. 4 . The method of claim 3 , wherein the refresh parameter comprises a quotient of a current counter value of a counter set based on the current time and a key refresh interval.

5. The method of claim 2, wherein the provisioning information further comprises a hyperframe number HFN of the RAN, and wherein decrypting the encrypted broadcast information further comprises: The encrypted broadcast information is decrypted based on the cell-specific broadcast key and a freshness parameter, wherein the freshness parameter comprises a concatenation of the HFN and the SFN.

6. The method of claim 1, wherein obtaining the broadcast root key further comprises: Provisioning information associated with the broadcast root key is received via an out-of-band delivery path external to the wireless communication system.

7. The method of claim 1, wherein obtaining the broadcast root key further comprises: Provisioning information associated with the broadcast root key is received from at least one of a provisioning server, a core network node, or the RAN node.

8. The method of claim 1, wherein obtaining the broadcast root key further comprises: accessing the pinhole access cell based on unencrypted broadcast information related to cell access transmitted in the pinhole access cell served by the RAN node; as well as The cellular cell is accessed via the pinhole to register with a core network to obtain the broadcast root key.

9. The method of claim 8, wherein obtaining the broadcast root key further comprises: Accessing the cellular cell via the pinhole to establish a protocol data unit (PDU) session; establishing a connection with a provisioning server via the PDU session; as well as Provisioning information associated with the broadcast root key is received from the provisioning server at the wireless communication device.

10. The method of claim 9, further comprising: performing device authentication and device certification with the provisioning server to establish a secure connection with the provisioning server, wherein receiving the provisioning information further comprises: The provisioning information is received in response to successfully performing the device authentication and the device certification.

11. The method of claim 8, wherein registering with the core network further comprises: Transmitting a registration request message to a core network node in the core network via the pinhole access cellular cell; as well as A registration accept message is received from the core network node via the pinhole access cell, wherein the registration accept message includes provisioning information associated with the broadcast root key.

12. The method of claim 8, further comprising: receiving a radio resource control (RRC) connection release message from the pinhole access cell, wherein the RRC connection release message includes redirection information for redirecting the wireless communication device to the secure cell; as well as The decrypted broadcast information is utilized to access the secure cell.

13. The method of claim 8, further comprising: receiving a handover command from the pinhole access cell to handover the wireless communication device from the pinhole access cell to the safety cell; as well as The decrypted broadcast information is utilized to access the secure cell.

14. The method of claim 1, wherein: The cell identification information includes a concatenation of the PCI and the absolute radio frequency channel number ARFCN of the secure cell, and The acquisition signal includes unencrypted broadcast information and at least a portion of the encrypted broadcast information, wherein the unencrypted broadcast information includes the PCI and the ARFCN.

15. The method of claim 14, wherein: The acquisition signal includes a synchronization signal block SSB, and the SSB includes a primary synchronization signal, a secondary synchronization signal, and a physical broadcast control channel PBCH. The unencrypted broadcast information includes the primary synchronization signal, the secondary synchronization signal and the first part of the PBCH, The first part of the PBCH includes the system frame number SFN in the master information block MIB, and The encrypted broadcast information includes the remaining portion of the PBCH, a system information block, and a physical downlink control channel (PDCCH) control resource set including scheduling information for the system information block.

16. The method of claim 1, wherein the acquisition signal comprises a first acquisition signal including the encrypted broadcast information and a second acquisition signal including at least one cell-specific security parameter.

17. The method of claim 16, wherein the at least one cell-specific security parameter comprises the cell identification information, and wherein deriving the cell-specific broadcast key further comprises: The cell-specific broadcast key is derived based on the broadcast root key and the at least one cell-specific security parameter, wherein the at least one cell-specific security parameter further includes at least one of a key identifier of the broadcast root key, an identifier of the RAN node, or a freshness parameter.

18. The method of claim 16, wherein the second acquisition signal comprises a message authentication code derived from the cell-specific broadcast key and the second acquisition signal, and the method further comprising: The integrity of the second acquired signal is verified using the message authentication code based on an integrity protection key derived from the cell-specific broadcast key.

19. The method of claim 1, wherein deriving the cell-specific broadcast key further comprises: deriving a broadcast RAN key based on the broadcast root key and an identifier of the RAN node; as well as The cell-specific broadcast key is derived based on the broadcast RAN key and the cell identification information.

20. The method of claim 1, further comprising: registering with a core network upon accessing the secure cellular cell; establishing an access stratum security context with the RAN node, the access stratum security context comprising a RAN node key; deriving a cell-specific unicast key based on the RAN node key and at least one parameter, wherein the at least one parameter comprises a concatenation of the cell identification information and a freshness parameter; receiving, from the RAN node, encrypted downlink control information including unicast information for the wireless communication device; as well as The encrypted downlink control information is decrypted using the cell-specific unicast key.

21. A wireless communication device configured for wireless communication, comprising: one or more memories; as well as one or more processors coupled to the one or more memories, wherein the one or more processors are configured to: obtaining provisioning information including a broadcast root key of a plurality of broadcast root keys, each broadcast root key being associated with a different set of corresponding cells or a different set of corresponding wireless communication devices; receiving an acquisition signal from a radio access network RAN ​​node serving a security cell within a wireless communication network; acquiring cell identification information based on at least the acquired signal; deriving a cell-specific broadcast key based on at least the broadcast root key and the cell identification information; receiving encrypted broadcast information related to cell access, the encrypted broadcast information being broadcast to a plurality of wireless communication devices including the wireless communication device in the secure cell; as well as The encrypted broadcast information is decrypted using the cell-specific broadcast key to access the secure cell.

22. A wireless communication method in a wireless communication system, comprising: at a radio access network RAN ​​node: obtaining a cell-specific broadcast key for a secure cell served by the RAN node, the cell-specific broadcast key being derived based on a broadcast root key of a plurality of broadcast root keys, each broadcast root key being associated with a different set of corresponding cells or a different set of corresponding wireless communication devices; encrypting broadcast information related to cell access using at least the cell-specific broadcast key to produce encrypted broadcast information for broadcasting to a plurality of wireless communication devices in the secure cell; as well as The encrypted broadcast information is provided in the secure cell.

23. The method of claim 22, wherein obtaining the cell-specific broadcast key further comprises: The cell-specific broadcast key is received from a core network node within a core network, wherein the cell-specific broadcast key is derived from the broadcast root key provided to the core network node by a provisioning server.

24. The method of claim 22, wherein obtaining the cell-specific broadcast key further comprises: receiving a broadcast RAN key from a core network node in the core network, the broadcast RAN key being derived from the broadcast root key; as well as The cell-specific broadcast key is derived based on the broadcast RAN key and cell identification information associated with the secure cell.

25. The method of claim 22, wherein at least a portion of the encrypted broadcast information is transmitted within a first acquisition signal in the secure cell, and the method further comprises: transmitting a second acquisition signal including at least one cell-specific security parameter, wherein the at least one cell-specific security parameter includes cell identification information and further includes at least one of a key identifier of the broadcast root key for deriving the cell-specific broadcast key, an identifier of the RAN node, or a freshness parameter.

26. The method of claim 22, further comprising: Transmitting provisioning information to a wireless communication device, at least a portion of the provisioning information originating at a provisioning server, wherein the provisioning information enables provisioning of the broadcast root key for deriving the cell-specific broadcast key on the wireless communication device, wherein the provisioning information includes at least one of the broadcast root key, a long-term key, a current time, a key identifier of the broadcast root key, or a system frame number (SFN) of the RAN.

27. The method of claim 26, wherein the provisioning information further comprises a hyperframe number HFN of the RAN, and wherein encrypting the broadcast information further comprises: The broadcast information is encrypted using the cell-specific broadcast key and a freshness parameter comprising a concatenation of the HFN and the SFN.

28. The method of claim 22, further comprising: transmitting unencrypted broadcast information related to cell access in a pinhole access cell served by the RAN node; receiving a registration request from a wireless communication device via the pinhole access cell based on the unencrypted broadcast information to register the wireless communication device with a core network; as well as A registration accept message is transmitted from a core network node within the core network to the wireless communication device via the pinhole access cell.

29. The method of claim 22, further comprising: Establishing an access layer security context with the wireless communication device when the wireless communication device registers with the core network, the access layer security context including a RAN node key; deriving a cell-specific unicast key based on the RAN node key and at least one parameter; encrypting downlink control information including unicast information for the wireless communication device using the cell-specific unicast key to produce encrypted downlink control information; as well as The encrypted downlink control information is transmitted to the wireless communication device.

30. A radio access network RAN ​​node, comprising: one or more memories; as well as one or more processors coupled to the one or more memories, wherein the one or more processors are configured to: obtaining a cell-specific broadcast key for a secure cell served by the RAN node, the cell-specific broadcast key being derived based on a broadcast root key of a plurality of broadcast root keys, each broadcast root key being associated with a different set of corresponding cells or a different set of corresponding wireless communication devices; encrypting broadcast information related to cell access using at least the cell-specific broadcast key to produce encrypted broadcast information for broadcasting to a plurality of wireless communication devices in the secure cell; as well as The encrypted broadcast information is provided in the secure cell.

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