Fake base station location methods, terminal equipment and media

By identifying non-TAC boundary base stations from legitimate base stations and using TAU counts and location information to determine the location of fake base stations, the problem of low positioning efficiency of fake base stations is solved, and communication security and network performance are improved.

CN115811733BActive Publication Date: 2025-10-31CHINA MOBILE GROUP ZHEJIANG +1
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202111073525.4
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2021-09-14
Publication Date
2025-10-31
Estimated Expiration
2041-09-14

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In existing technologies, fake base stations have low positioning efficiency. Fake base stations are often mobile and highly concealed, making positioning difficult and affecting communication security and network performance.

Method used

By identifying non-TAC boundary base stations from multiple legitimate base stations, and using their TAU counts and location information, the location of fake base stations is determined by utilizing the Thiessen polygon region and time advance, and the operating time of fake base stations is determined by combining the periodic TAU counts.

Benefits of technology

It improves the positioning efficiency of fake base stations and enhances the security and network performance of mobile communication networks.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

This invention discloses a method for locating fake base stations, a terminal device, and a computer-readable storage medium. The method includes: identifying a non-TAC boundary base station from a plurality of legitimate base stations; determining the number of TAUs corresponding to the non-TAC boundary base station; when the number of TAUs exceeds a first threshold, designating the non-TAC boundary base station as a target legitimate base station; and determining second location information of the fake base station based on first location information of the target legitimate base station. This invention aims to improve the efficiency of fake base station location.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of communication technology, and in particular to a method for locating fake base stations, terminal equipment, and computer-readable storage media. Background Technology

[0002] Currently, fake base stations are not only having an increasing impact on communication security, but they are also interfering with normal network equipment and affecting network performance indicators.

[0003] In related technologies, the location of fake base stations typically involves receiving user complaints and testing the complained area. This is followed by manual investigation to locate the fake base station equipment. However, fake base stations are often mobile, extremely concealed, and come in various forms. The transmitting end has evolved to be portable, even vehicle-mounted or backpack-mounted. Simultaneously, the control end has upgraded from laptops to mobile phones or even USB drives, making them highly concealed. This results in low location efficiency when using the methods described in related technologies.

[0004] The above content is only used to help understand the technical solution of the present invention and does not represent an admission that the above content is prior art. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The main objective of this invention is to provide a method for locating fake base stations, a terminal device, and a computer-readable storage medium, aiming to improve the efficiency of fake base station location.

[0006] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention provides a method for locating fake base stations, the method comprising the following steps:

[0007] Identify non-TAC boundary base stations from multiple legitimate base stations;

[0008] Determine the number of TAUs corresponding to the non-TAC boundary base station;

[0009] When the number of TAUs exceeds the first threshold, the non-TAC boundary base station is designated as the target legitimate base station;

[0010] The second location information of the fake base station is determined based on the first location information of the target legitimate base station.

[0011] Optionally, the step of determining non-TAC boundary base stations from multiple legitimate base stations includes:

[0012] Obtain the location information of the legitimate base station, and determine the TAC boundary based on the location information;

[0013] Determine the shortest distance from each of the legal base stations to the TAC boundary and the average time advance corresponding to each of the legal base stations;

[0014] The non-TAC boundary base stations among the legitimate base stations are determined based on the shortest distance and the average time advance.

[0015] Optionally, the step of determining the non-TAC boundary base stations among the legitimate base stations based on the shortest distance and the average time advance includes:

[0016] The location index value is determined based on the shortest distance and the average time advance, wherein the location index value is positively correlated with the shortest distance and negatively correlated with the average time advance;

[0017] When the location index value of the legitimate base station is greater than the second threshold, the legitimate base station is determined to be a non-TAC boundary base station.

[0018] Optionally, the step of determining the second location information of the fake base station based on the first location information of the target legitimate base station includes:

[0019] The Thiessen polygon region is determined based on the first location information of multiple target legitimate base stations;

[0020] The second location information corresponding to the fake base station is determined based on the location corresponding to the Thiessen polygon region.

[0021] Optionally, the step of determining the location information of the fake base station based on the location information of the target legitimate base station includes:

[0022] Obtain first location information corresponding to multiple target legitimate base stations;

[0023] Based on the first location information, determine the location information corresponding to the center locations of the multiple target legitimate base stations;

[0024] The location information corresponding to the center position is used as the second location information.

[0025] Optionally, after determining the second location information of the fake base station based on the first location information of the target legitimate base station, the method further includes:

[0026] Obtain the periodic TAU count corresponding to the target legitimate base station within two statistical periods;

[0027] The working time of the fake base station is determined based on the number of periodic TAUs corresponding to the target legitimate base station within two statistical periods.

[0028] Optionally, the step of determining the working time of the fake base station based on the number of periodic TAUs corresponding to the target legitimate base station within two statistical periods includes:

[0029] Determine the difference between the periodic TAU counts corresponding to the target legitimate base station within two statistical periods;

[0030] The operating time of the fake base station is determined based on the difference.

[0031] In addition, to achieve the above objectives, the present invention also provides a terminal device, the terminal device including a memory, a processor, and a fake base station positioning program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the fake base station positioning program, when executed by the processor, implements the steps of the fake base station positioning method as described above.

[0032] Furthermore, to achieve the above objectives, the present invention also provides a terminal device, the terminal device comprising:

[0033] The first determining module is used to determine non-TAC boundary base stations from multiple legitimate base stations;

[0034] The second determining module is used to determine the number of TAUs corresponding to the non-TAC boundary base station;

[0035] The positioning module is used to identify the non-TAC boundary base station as the target legitimate base station when the number of TAUs exceeds a first threshold; and to determine the second location information of the fake base station based on the first location information of the target legitimate base station.

[0036] In addition, to achieve the above objectives, the present invention also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a fake base station location program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the fake base station location method as described above.

[0037] This invention proposes a method, terminal device, and computer-readable storage medium for locating fake base stations. First, it identifies non-TAC boundary base stations from a pool of legitimate base stations. Then, it determines the number of TAUs (Tracking Area Uses) corresponding to each non-TAC boundary base station. When the number of TAUs exceeds a first threshold, the non-TAC boundary base station is designated as a target legitimate base station. Based on the first location information of the target legitimate base station, the second location information of the fake base station is determined. This achieves the goal of discovering and locating fake base stations based on network-side indicators, thereby improving the efficiency of fake base station location and ultimately enhancing the security of mobile communication networks. Attached Figure Description

[0038] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the terminal structure of the hardware operating environment involved in the embodiments of the present invention;

[0039] Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating an embodiment of the fake base station positioning method of the present invention;

[0040] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the Thiessen polygon involved in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0041] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the TAC boundary according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0042] Figure 5 This is a schematic flowchart of another optional embodiment of the present invention;

[0043] Figure 6 This is a modular schematic diagram of the terminal device involved in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0044] The realization of the objective, functional features and advantages of the present invention will be further explained in conjunction with the embodiments and with reference to the accompanying drawings. Detailed Implementation

[0045] It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the invention and are not intended to limit the invention.

[0046] like Figure 1 As shown, Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the terminal structure of the hardware operating environment involved in the embodiments of the present invention.

[0047] like Figure 1 As shown, the control terminal may include: a processor 1001, such as a CPU, a network interface 1003, a memory 1004, and a communication bus 1002. The communication bus 1002 is used to enable communication between these components. The network interface 1003 may optionally include a standard wired interface or a wireless interface (such as a Wi-Fi interface). The memory 1004 may be high-speed RAM or stable non-volatile memory, such as a disk drive. Alternatively, the memory 1004 may be a storage device independent of the aforementioned processor 1001.

[0048] Those skilled in the art will understand that Figure 1 The terminal structure shown does not constitute a limitation on the terminal and may include more or fewer components than shown, or combine certain components, or have different component arrangements.

[0049] like Figure 1 As shown, the memory 1004, which serves as a computer storage medium, may include an operating system, a network communication module, and a fake base station location program.

[0050] exist Figure 1 In the terminal shown, the processor 1001 can be used to call the fake base station location program stored in the memory 1004 and perform the following operations:

[0051] Identify non-TAC boundary base stations from multiple legitimate base stations;

[0052] Determine the number of TAUs corresponding to the non-TAC boundary base station;

[0053] When the number of TAUs exceeds the first threshold, the non-TAC boundary base station is designated as the target legitimate base station;

[0054] The second location information of the fake base station is determined based on the first location information of the target legitimate base station.

[0055] Furthermore, the processor 1001 can call the fake base station location program stored in the memory 1004 and also perform the following operations:

[0056] Obtain the location information of the legitimate base station, and determine the TAC boundary based on the location information;

[0057] Determine the shortest distance from each of the legal base stations to the TAC boundary and the average time advance corresponding to each of the legal base stations;

[0058] The non-TAC boundary base stations among the legitimate base stations are determined based on the shortest distance and the average time advance.

[0059] Furthermore, the processor 1001 can call the fake base station location program stored in the memory 1004 and also perform the following operations:

[0060] The location index value is determined based on the shortest distance and the average time advance, wherein the location index value is positively correlated with the shortest distance and negatively correlated with the average time advance;

[0061] When the location index value of the legitimate base station is greater than the second threshold, the legitimate base station is determined to be a non-TAC boundary base station.

[0062] Furthermore, the processor 1001 can call the fake base station location program stored in the memory 1004 and also perform the following operations:

[0063] The Thiessen polygon region is determined based on the first location information of multiple target legitimate base stations;

[0064] The second location information corresponding to the fake base station is determined based on the location corresponding to the Thiessen polygon region.

[0065] Furthermore, the processor 1001 can call the fake base station location program stored in the memory 1004 and also perform the following operations:

[0066] Obtain first location information corresponding to multiple target legitimate base stations;

[0067] Based on the first location information, determine the location information corresponding to the center locations of the multiple target legitimate base stations;

[0068] The location information corresponding to the center position is used as the second location information.

[0069] Furthermore, the processor 1001 can call the fake base station location program stored in the memory 1004 and also perform the following operations:

[0070] Obtain the periodic TAU count corresponding to the target legitimate base station within two statistical periods;

[0071] The working time of the fake base station is determined based on the number of periodic TAUs corresponding to the target legitimate base station within two statistical periods.

[0072] Furthermore, the processor 1001 can call the fake base station location program stored in the memory 1004 and also perform the following operations:

[0073] Determine the difference between the periodic TAU counts corresponding to the target legitimate base station within two statistical periods;

[0074] The operating time of the fake base station is determined based on the difference.

[0075] Currently, fake base stations are not only having an increasing impact on communication security, but they are also interfering with normal network equipment and affecting network performance indicators.

[0076] 4G networks implement two-way authentication between terminals and the network, preventing 4G fake base stations from establishing authentication relationships and effectively blocking terminals from accessing them. However, GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications) networks use one-way authentication, where only the network authenticates the terminal, but the terminal has no authority to verify the legitimacy of the base station. Therefore, when 4G fake base stations cooperate with 2G fake base stations, it is possible to achieve the same effect as allowing multi-mode terminals to access 2G fake base stations, seriously affecting communication security. Furthermore, currently used 4G "fake base stations," also known as "electronic fences," are mostly located in high-traffic areas such as major intersections, shopping malls, and transportation hubs, and their locations are fixed with little change in form, making them immobile.

[0077] In related technologies, the location of fake base stations typically involves receiving user complaints and testing the complained area. This is followed by manual investigation to locate the fake base station equipment. However, fake base stations are often mobile, extremely concealed, and come in various forms. The transmitting end has evolved to be portable, even vehicle-mounted or backpack-mounted. Simultaneously, the control end has upgraded from laptops to mobile phones or even USB drives, making them highly concealed. This results in low location efficiency when using the methods described in related technologies.

[0078] To improve the efficiency of locating fake base stations, this invention proposes a method for locating fake base stations, which aims to discover and locate fake base stations based on network-side indicators, thereby improving the efficiency of fake base station location.

[0079] The following specific embodiments further explain the fake base station positioning method proposed in this invention.

[0080] In one embodiment, please refer to Figure 2 The fake base station location method includes the following steps:

[0081] Step S10: Identify non-TAC boundary base stations from multiple legitimate base stations;

[0082] Step S20: Determine the number of TAUs corresponding to the non-TAC boundary base station;

[0083] Step S30: When the number of TAUs is greater than the first threshold, the non-TAC boundary base station is regarded as the target legitimate base station;

[0084] Step S40: Determine the second location information of the fake base station based on the first location information of the target legitimate base station.

[0085] Alternatively, as one implementation, the latitude and longitude of each legitimate base station can be obtained first based on the engineering parameter data of each legitimate base station built by the operator. Then, the location information of each legitimate base station can be determined based on its corresponding latitude and longitude. In some application scenarios, the location information of each legitimate base station can also be directly saved, allowing the location information of each legitimate base station to be determined directly based on the pre-stored location information.

[0086] Furthermore, once the location information of each legitimate base station is determined, the TAC (Tracking Area Code) boundary corresponding to the legitimate base station built by the operator can be determined based on the location information of the legitimate base station.

[0087] For example, refer to Figure 3 After obtaining the location information of legitimate base stations, Thiessen polygons can be constructed using these location information, with the legitimate base stations as nodes. Further, referring to... Figure 4 Once the Thiessen polygons are created using legitimate base stations as nodes, TAC merging can be performed based on these polygons to determine the TAC boundaries.

[0088] Furthermore, after determining the TAC boundary based on the location information of the legitimate base stations built by the operator, the shortest distance from each legitimate base station to its corresponding TAC boundary can be determined based on the TAC boundary and the location information of each legitimate base station. And / or the average time advance corresponding to each legitimate base station can be obtained.

[0089] It should be noted that when a terminal communicates with a base station, signal transmission takes time. To maintain timing alignment of communication data, when the relative positions of the mobile terminal and the legitimate base station differ, a signal transmission timing advance needs to be set based on the specific relative position to ensure that the timing of the signals received by the base station is aligned. Therefore, the timing advance is different each time the legitimate base station communicates with the mobile terminal. The average timing advance for each mobile terminal during the communication process can then be obtained, and the location of the base station in the center of the TAC area can be determined based on the average timing advance.

[0090] Furthermore, when the shortest distance from each legitimate base station to the TAC boundary is obtained, and / or the average time advance corresponding to each legitimate base station is obtained, the non-TAC boundary base stations among the legitimate base stations can be determined based on the shortest distance D and / or the average time advance.

[0091] For example, a location index value can be determined based on the shortest distance and the average time advance, wherein the location index value is positively correlated with the shortest distance and negatively correlated with the average time advance; when the location index value of the legitimate base station is greater than a second threshold, the legitimate base station is determined to be a non-TAC boundary base station. Otherwise, the legitimate base station is determined to be a TAC boundary base station.

[0092] For example, as an alternative implementation, after determining the shortest distance D from a legitimate base station to the TAC boundary and the average time advance TA corresponding to the legitimate base station, it can be determined whether the legitimate base station is a non-TAC boundary base station according to the following inequality:

[0093] D / TA>Th2

[0094] Th2 is the preset threshold value, which can be customized according to the actual situation.

[0095] It is understandable that for a legitimate base station, the closer it is to the center of the TAC (Tracking Area Containment) region, the greater its shortest distance to the TAC boundary, and the smaller its corresponding average time advance. Therefore, based on the above inequality, we can combine the shortest distance of a legitimate base station to the TAC boundary with its corresponding average time advance (TA) to determine whether the legitimate base station is a non-TAC boundary base station. This achieves the effect of accurately determining whether a legitimate base station is a non-TAC boundary base station based on network-side indicators.

[0096] As an alternative implementation, once the shortest distance is determined, the legit base station can be directly identified as a non-TAC boundary base station based on the maximum distance. In this implementation, a distance threshold can be set. If the shortest distance corresponding to a legit base station is greater than the distance threshold, the legit base station is determined to be a non-TAC boundary base station. Otherwise, it is determined to be a TAC boundary base station.

[0097] As another alternative implementation, the determination of whether a corresponding legitimate base station is a non-TAC boundary base station can also be based on the average time advance. For example, a time judgment threshold can be set. When the average time advance corresponding to a legitimate base station is greater than a preset time judgment threshold, the legitimate base station is determined to be a TAC boundary base station; otherwise, it is determined to be a non-TAC boundary base station.

[0098] It should be noted that during mobile communication, for legitimate communication processes, the TAU (Tracking Area Update) process is generally triggered only in the following three situations.

[0099] First, when the Tracking Area Code (TAC) of the terminal's cell changes, the tracking area needs to be updated. In 4G networks, the concept of a Tracking Area List (TA List) is introduced. A TA list contains multiple TACs. When a terminal moves within a TA list, a Tracking Area Update (TAU) is not required. The tracking area update is only performed when the terminal changes its TA list. The Tracking Area List (TAList) typically consists of 1-16 TACs. The TAList approach minimizes system overhead caused by frequent TAC updates at TAC boundaries and can extend TAC update time when there are many users at the TAC edge, reducing system load. Therefore, in 4G systems, TALists are used for paging and location updates.

[0100] Second, periodic tracking area update, that is, the terminal’s TAC has not changed, but the TAU periodic request timer (T3412) times out, and the terminal will trigger periodic TAU.

[0101] Third, the power-on / off trace area update, which means that the terminal performs a trace area update process when it is powered on or off. This corresponds to Attach and Detach.

[0102] Furthermore, typical 4G fake base stations set up a different TAC (Trusted Account Code) than the existing network, using the same PLMN (Public Lands Mobile Network) identifier as the operator, and a frequency and PCI (Physical Cell Identifier) ​​currently in use on the network, while transmitting a high-power signal. When a terminal reselects a fake base station and finds that the fake base station's TAC is inconsistent with its previous TAC, it will initiate a TAU (Transactional Unlocking) process. Since authentication is usually not required in the TAU process, the fake base station can obtain the user's IMSI and other information through Identity lookup. After the terminal is rejected by the fake base station's TAU, it may re-initiate the TAU process under normal network conditions. This will cause legitimate base stations to detect abnormal TAUs. Therefore, once a non-TAC boundary base station is identified, the presence of fake base stations in its vicinity can be determined based on the TAU process corresponding to that non-TAC boundary base station.

[0103] For example, after determining the non-TAC boundary base station among the legitimate base stations, the number of Tracking Area Updates (TAUs) corresponding to the non-TAC boundary base station can be further determined. Then, when the number of TAUs is greater than a first threshold, it is determined that there is a fake base station around the non-TAC boundary base station (legitimate base station). The non-TAC boundary base station is then taken as the target legitimate base station, and the second location information of the fake base station is determined according to the first location information of the target legitimate base station.

[0104] Optionally, in one embodiment, the number of TAUs can be periodically counted for each non-TAC boundary base station. Then, the periodic TAU count for each non-TAC boundary base station within each statistical period is obtained, and the total number of TAUs for each non-TAC boundary base station is determined based on the periodic TAU count. The length of the statistical period can be customized according to actual needs. For example, it can be set to one day, one hour, four hours, or eight hours. This embodiment does not specifically limit the period length. It is understood that the shorter the period length, the more sensitive it is to short-term sudden fluctuations.

[0105] For example, when determining the number of TAUs corresponding to the non-TAC boundary base station based on the periodic TAU count, the periodic TAUs corresponding to the last N statistical periods at the current time can be obtained, and then the number of TAUs S corresponding to the non-TAC boundary base station can be determined according to the following formula:

[0106] S=∑ j=1~N TAU i,j

[0107] j is the statistical period identifier, i is the base station identifier corresponding to the non-TAC boundary base station, and TUAi,j Let N be the number of periodic TUAs for base station i within period j. N is the number of statistical periods used for the calculation.

[0108] Furthermore, after determining the number of TAUs S corresponding to each non-TAC boundary base station, if the number of TAUs is greater than a first threshold, it indicates that there are fake base stations around it, and therefore the non-TAC boundary base station can be regarded as a target legitimate base station. Otherwise, it indicates that there are no fake base stations around it.

[0109] Understandably, the above method can determine whether there are fake base stations around each non-TAC boundary base station. This, in turn, allows for the identification of multiple legitimate target base stations surrounded by fake base stations.

[0110] Once the target legitimate base station is identified, the second location information of the fake base station can be determined based on the first location information of the target legitimate base station.

[0111] For example, a fake base station may affect multiple legitimate base stations in the vicinity, causing these legitimate base stations to be identified as target legitimate base stations. Therefore, a Thiessen polygon region can be determined based on the first location information of the multiple target legitimate base stations, and a second location information corresponding to the fake base station can be determined based on the location corresponding to the Thiessen polygon region. That is, the region corresponding to the Thiessen polygon formed by the multiple target legitimate base stations as nodes can be regarded as the region where the base station exists.

[0112] As another alternative, after multiple target legitimate base stations are determined, the center position corresponding to the multiple target legitimate base stations can be determined based on the first location information corresponding to the multiple legitimate base stations, and then the location information corresponding to the center position can be used as the second location information.

[0113] It is understandable that once a legitimate target base station is identified, it can be determined that a fake base station exists in the vicinity of the legitimate target base station. Therefore, based on the first location information of the legitimate target base station, the second location information of the fake base station can be determined according to the actual scenario. The determination method provided in this embodiment is for illustrative purposes only and is not intended to limit the location determination to only the two methods described above.

[0114] In the technical solution disclosed in this embodiment, the location information of legitimate base stations is first obtained, and the Tracking Area Code (TAC) boundary is determined based on the location information. Then, the shortest distance from each legitimate base station to the TAC boundary and the average time advance corresponding to each legitimate base station are determined. Based on the shortest distance and the average time advance, non-TAC boundary base stations among the legitimate base stations are identified. Furthermore, the Tracking Area Update (TAU) count corresponding to each non-TAC boundary base station is determined. When the TAU count exceeds a first threshold, the non-TAC boundary base station is designated as the target legitimate base station. The second location information of the fake base station is determined based on the first location information of the target legitimate base station. This achieves the goal of discovering and locating fake base stations based on network-side indicators, thereby improving the location efficiency of fake base stations and enhancing the security of mobile communication networks.

[0115] Optionally, refer to Figure 5 Based on the above embodiments, in another embodiment, after step S40, the method further includes:

[0116] Step S50: Obtain the periodic TAU count corresponding to the target legitimate base station within two statistical periods;

[0117] Step S60: Determine the working time of the fake base station based on the number of periodic TAUs corresponding to the target legitimate base station within two statistical periods.

[0118] In this embodiment, the number of TAUs corresponding to the target legitimate base station can be counted periodically to obtain the periodic number of TAUs corresponding to the target legitimate base station in each statistical period.

[0119] When fake base stations around a target legitimate base station begin operating, the number of TAUs corresponding to the target legitimate base station changes significantly. Therefore, the periodic TAU count corresponding to the target legitimate base station can be obtained over two statistical periods, and the operating time of the fake base station can be determined based on the periodic TAU count corresponding to the target legitimate base station over two consecutive statistical periods. For example, the difference between the periodic TAU counts corresponding to the target legitimate base station over two consecutive statistical periods can be determined, and the operating time of the fake base station can be determined based on this difference.

[0120] It is understandable that in the first period, when the fake base station is not operational, the number of periodic TAUs for the target legitimate base station in the first period will be much less than in the second period. Conversely, when the fake base station is operational, the number of periodic TAUs for the target legitimate base station in the second period will be significantly less. Therefore, the difference between the two can be obtained first. When the difference is greater than a preset threshold, it indicates that the fake base station is operational in the second period. Thus, the operational time of the fake base station can be determined as the time period corresponding to the second statistical period.

[0121] Understandably, the first period can be set as the statistical period corresponding to when the fake base station starts working. The second period can be the statistical period for determining whether the fake base station is in a working state. When the fake base station has been working for a long time, multiple consecutive statistical periods can be selected sequentially as the second period until the statistical period in which the fake base station is not working is detected. Then, the time period corresponding to multiple consecutive statistical periods in which the fake base station is in a working state is taken as the working time period of the fake base station.

[0122] In the technical solution disclosed in this embodiment, the periodic TAU count corresponding to the target legitimate base station within two statistical periods is obtained, and the working time of the fake base station is determined based on the periodic TAU count corresponding to the target legitimate base station within two consecutive statistical periods. This achieves the goal of determining the working time of the fake base station based on network-side indicators, thereby improving the efficiency of fake base station identification and management.

[0123] Furthermore, this embodiment of the invention also proposes a terminal device, which includes: a memory, a processor, and a fake base station positioning program stored in the memory and executable on the processor. When the fake base station positioning program is executed by the processor, it implements the steps of the fake base station positioning method described in the above embodiments.

[0124] Furthermore, referring to Figure 6, this embodiment of the invention also proposes a terminal device 100, which includes:

[0125] The first determining module 101 is used to determine non-TAC boundary base stations from multiple legal base stations;

[0126] The second determining module 102 is used to determine the number of TAUs corresponding to the non-TAC boundary base station;

[0127] The positioning module 105 is used to identify the non-TAC boundary base station as the target legitimate base station when the number of TAUs is greater than a first threshold; and to determine the second location information of the fake base station based on the first location information of the target legitimate base station.

[0128] Furthermore, embodiments of the present invention also propose a computer-readable storage medium storing a fake base station location program, wherein when the fake base station location program is executed by a processor, it implements the steps of the fake base station location method described in the above embodiments.

[0129] It should be noted that, in this document, the terms "comprising," "including," or any other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or system that comprises a list of elements includes not only those elements but also other elements not expressly listed, or elements inherent to such a process, method, article, or system. Unless otherwise specified, an element defined by the phrase "comprising one..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article, or system that includes that element.

[0130] The sequence numbers of the above embodiments of the present invention are for descriptive purposes only and do not represent the superiority or inferiority of the embodiments.

[0131] Through the above description of the embodiments, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that the methods of the above embodiments can be implemented by means of software plus necessary general-purpose hardware platforms. Of course, they can also be implemented by hardware, but in many cases the former is a better implementation method. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present invention, or the part that contributes to the prior art, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a storage medium (such as ROM / RAM, magnetic disk, optical disk) as described above, and includes several instructions to cause a terminal device (such as a PC or server) to execute the methods described in the various embodiments of the present invention.

[0132] The above are merely preferred embodiments of the present invention and do not limit the scope of the patent. Any equivalent structural or procedural transformations made based on the description and drawings of the present invention, or direct or indirect applications in other related technical fields, are similarly included within the scope of patent protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for locating fake base stations, characterized in that, The fake base station location method includes: Determining non-TAC boundary base stations from multiple legitimate base stations includes: acquiring location information of the legitimate base stations and determining the TAC boundary based on the location information; determining the shortest distance from each of the legitimate base stations to the TAC boundary and the average time advance corresponding to each of the legitimate base stations; and determining non-TAC boundary base stations among the legitimate base stations based on the shortest distance and the average time advance. Determine the number of TAUs corresponding to the non-TAC boundary base station; When the number of TAUs exceeds the first threshold, the non-TAC boundary base station is designated as the target legitimate base station; The second location information of the fake base station is determined based on the first location information of the target legitimate base station.

2. The fake base station positioning method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of determining the non-TAC boundary base stations among the legal base stations based on the shortest distance and the average time advance includes: The location index value is determined based on the shortest distance and the average time advance, wherein the location index value is positively correlated with the shortest distance and negatively correlated with the average time advance; When the location index value of the legitimate base station is greater than the second threshold, the legitimate base station is determined to be a non-TAC boundary base station.

3. The fake base station positioning method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of determining the second location information of the fake base station based on the first location information of the target legitimate base station includes: The Thiessen polygon region is determined based on the first location information of the multiple target legitimate base stations; The second location information corresponding to the fake base station is determined based on the location corresponding to the Thiessen polygon region.

4. The fake base station positioning method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of determining the second location information of the fake base station based on the first location information of the target legitimate base station includes: Obtain the first location information corresponding to multiple target legitimate base stations; Based on the first location information, determine the location information corresponding to the center locations of the multiple target legitimate base stations; The location information corresponding to the center position is used as the second location information.

5. The fake base station positioning method according to claim 1, characterized in that, After the step of determining the second location information of the fake base station based on the first location information of the target legitimate base station, the method further includes: Obtain the periodic TAU count corresponding to the target legitimate base station within two statistical periods; The working time of the fake base station is determined based on the number of periodic TAUs corresponding to the target legitimate base station within two statistical periods.

6. The fake base station positioning method according to claim 5, characterized in that, The step of determining the working time of the fake base station based on the periodic TAU count corresponding to the target legitimate base station within two statistical periods includes: Determine the difference between the periodic TAU counts corresponding to the target legitimate base station within two statistical periods; The operating time of the fake base station is determined based on the difference.

7. A terminal device, characterized in that, The terminal device includes: a memory, a processor, and a fake base station location program stored in the memory and executable on the processor. When the fake base station location program is executed by the processor, it implements the steps of the fake base station location method as described in any one of claims 1 to 6.

8. A terminal device, characterized in that, The terminal device includes: A first determining module is configured to determine non-TAC boundary base stations from a plurality of legitimate base stations, including: acquiring location information of the legitimate base stations and determining a TAC boundary based on the location information; determining the shortest distance from each of the legitimate base stations to the TAC boundary and the average time advance corresponding to each of the legitimate base stations; and determining non-TAC boundary base stations among the legitimate base stations based on the shortest distance and the average time advance. The second determining module is used to determine the number of TAUs corresponding to the non-TAC boundary base station; The positioning module is used to identify the non-TAC boundary base station as the target legitimate base station when the number of TAUs exceeds a first threshold; and to determine the second location information of the fake base station based on the first location information of the target legitimate base station.

9. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer-readable storage medium stores a fake base station location program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the fake base station location method as described in any one of claims 1 to 6.

Citation Information

Patent Citations

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