A method for safety monitoring of experimental equipment in universities

By constructing decentralized monitoring nodes for university experimental equipment and combining RSA and elliptic curve signature algorithms, the problems of server failure and data privacy in university laboratory safety monitoring systems have been solved, achieving safe and reliable monitoring and management of experimental equipment.

CN115913684BActive Publication Date: 2026-11-17JIANGSU UNIV OF SCI & TECH
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202211385494.0
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2022-11-07
Publication Date
2026-11-17
Estimated Expiration
2042-11-07

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing university laboratory safety monitoring systems cannot function properly when traditional servers fail, and lack decentralization and data privacy protection, posing security risks.

Method used

A decentralized method for safety monitoring of university experimental equipment is adopted. The experimental equipment monitoring nodes are constructed using microcontrollers, CAN bus interfaces, communication interface modules, and alarm modules. Data encryption and authentication are performed using RSA and elliptic curve signature algorithms. Point-to-point communication is achieved through a wireless network, and a web server is built on each node to provide access and control services via the HTTP protocol.

Benefits of technology

It achieves fully decentralized monitoring of university experimental equipment, ensuring high data security, avoiding system crashes caused by server failures, ensuring data is not lost or tampered with, providing remote configuration and control functions, and saving computing resources.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

A method for security monitoring of experimental equipment in universities includes the following steps: First, the laboratory administrator establishes the basic parameters of the encryption and signature methods. The laboratory administrator and each monitoring node of the experimental equipment establish their own private keys and send their public keys to other nodes. Each monitoring node monitors the equipment status in real time, and alarms are triggered when abnormal equipment status is detected. The monitoring data and equipment usage records are periodically encrypted using the system administrator's public key and stored locally, and then encrypted again using their own private key. i The encrypted data is signed and sent to other nodes; after the other nodes verify the signature, they update the node's storage information; the laboratory administrator accesses the experimental equipment monitoring nodes via a web page using the HTTP protocol, remotely configures the nodes, decrypts and views the data stored in the nodes using their private key, and controls the experimental equipment. This invention protects data security and ensures data immutability and non-repudiation through data encryption and signing.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of Internet of Things (IoT) technology, and involves the intersection of IoT and information security technologies. More specifically, it relates to a method for achieving decentralized security monitoring of experimental equipment in universities. Background Technology

[0002] With the continuous development of education and the rapid advancement of educational resources, universities are increasingly demanding higher standards for laboratory safety. The frequent safety incidents in university laboratories both domestically and internationally in recent years serve as a stark reminder that improving laboratory safety measures is urgently needed. Realizing the safe monitoring of the status of university experimental equipment is a crucial aspect of university laboratory safety management, effectively ensuring a safe laboratory environment, eliminating fire hazards, and guaranteeing the safe operation of experimental equipment. Current technologies generally rely on traditional application servers for laboratory safety monitoring and management; however, when the application server malfunctions, the system cannot function properly. Other technologies replace traditional application servers with blockchain platforms, but these still have an external server interface, failing to achieve complete decentralization and data privacy protection. Summary of the Invention

[0003] The purpose of this invention is to address the problems and deficiencies of existing technologies by proposing a safety monitoring method for experimental equipment in universities.

[0004] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention employs the following technical solution.

[0005] A method for safety monitoring of experimental equipment in universities is disclosed. The system upon which this method is based includes a laboratory administrator and multiple monitoring nodes for the experimental equipment. Each monitoring node comprises a microcontroller unit, a power module, a CAN bus interface, a communication interface module, a storage module, and an alarm module. The microcontroller unit is connected to the power module, CAN bus interface, communication interface module, storage module, and alarm module, respectively. The monitoring nodes are connected to the experimental equipment via the CAN bus interface. The communication interface module includes an RJ45 wired network interface and Wi-Fi and 2.5G / 5G wireless interfaces. Communication between the multiple monitoring nodes is based on a wireless network. The laboratory administrator communicates with the communication interface module of the monitoring node via a wired or wireless network. The communication interface module also connects to other experimental equipment via Wi-Fi and 2.5G / 5G wireless interfaces. The lab administrator establishes the basic parameters of the RSA encryption method, selecting q prime numbers p1, p2, p3, ..., p... q , where q>2, calculate β= p1p2p3......p q Then the Euler totient function φ(β) = (p1-1)(p2-1)(p3-1)......(pq -1), define parameter z as coprime to β and z < β, randomly select a number α coprime to φ(β)φ(z) and α < φ(β)φ(z), find γ that satisfies (αγ)mod(φ(β)φ(z))=1, and obtain (α, β) as the administrator's private key and (γ, β) as the administrator's public key; The laboratory administrator establishes the basic parameters of the elliptic curve signature method, and the equation of the elliptic curve E is y. 2 =x 3 +ax+b, the base point of the elliptic curve is G, the order of the elliptic curve is n, and each experimental equipment monitoring node determines its own private key k. i Calculate the public key K i =k i G is sent to other experimental equipment monitoring nodes; When signing, the node selects a random number r. i Є[1, n-1], calculate r i G=(x i y i ), t i = ximodn, when t i =0, then reselect r i h i =H(h(e i + f i )), s i = k i -1 ( r i t i – h i ) mod n, we get (s i , t i That is (e) i f i The signature of ); when verifying the signature, h is calculated. i =H(h(e i +f i u1=h i t i-1 mod n, u2=s i t i-1 modn, u1G+u2K i =(x0,y0), v i =x0modn, when v i =t i If the signature is valid, the verification is successful; otherwise, the signature is invalid and the verification fails. Here, h(.) is the hash function operation and H(.) is the Hamming weight calculation operation. The method is characterized by comprising the following steps: (1) Each experimental equipment monitoring node monitors the equipment status in real time based on the CAN bus interface. When an abnormal equipment status is detected, the alarm module of the experimental equipment monitoring node is triggered to alarm. (2) Each experimental equipment monitoring node periodically records monitoring data and puts the monitoring data into practice. l i and equipment usage records g i Encrypt using the lab administrator's public key (γ, β) to obtain the ciphertext. e i = l i γ modβ and f i = g i γ modβ is stored locally and uses its own private key. k i For ciphertext ( e i , f i After signing, ( e i , f i The signature is sent to other experimental equipment monitoring nodes; (3) Other experimental equipment monitoring nodes receive ciphertext ( e i , f i After signing, the experimental device is used to monitor the public key of the node. K i Verify the signature, and update the storage information of the experimental equipment monitoring node after successful verification; (4) A web server is built on each experimental equipment monitoring node based on the LwIP protocol stack to provide access, configuration, and control services based on the HTTP protocol; the laboratory administrator accesses the experimental equipment monitoring node through a web page based on the HTTP protocol, remotely configures the experimental equipment monitoring node, controls the experimental equipment through the experimental equipment monitoring node, and views the information stored in the experimental equipment monitoring node. When viewing, the administrator uses their private key (α, β) to decrypt the ciphertext stored in the node. e i , f i During decryption, calculations are performed. e i α modβ, f i α mod β yields the plaintext ( li ,g i ).

[0006] More preferably, the storage of encrypted data in step (2) refers to storing the encrypted monitoring data and equipment usage records of the monitoring node of the experimental equipment for each period of time; the updating of the storage information of the monitoring node of the experimental equipment in step (3) refers to storing the latest encrypted monitoring data and usage records of the monitoring node of the experimental equipment received, in order to replace the original storage information of the monitoring node of the experimental equipment.

[0007] More preferably, the laboratory administrator's access to, configuration and control of each experimental equipment monitoring node in step (4) means that the laboratory administrator can log in to any experimental equipment monitoring node based on a web page to view the latest monitoring data and equipment usage records of each experimental equipment monitoring node. When it is necessary to view the complete data of a certain experimental equipment monitoring node, configure the experimental equipment monitoring node and control the experimental equipment connected to the experimental equipment monitoring node, it is necessary to log in to the corresponding experimental equipment monitoring node.

[0008] This invention, starting from data security and decentralization, establishes a web server on each device monitoring node, achieving fully decentralized functionality. Each device status monitoring node is a web server, and the laboratory administrator can monitor all device information by accessing any device status monitoring node. When a device status monitoring node fails, it does not affect the administrator's monitoring and management, nor does it result in data loss or corruption.

[0009] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following advantages and beneficial effects: This invention offers high security. Data from each device status monitoring node is encrypted using the administrator's public key and broadcast to other nodes. Only the administrator can decrypt and view the data using their private key, thus protecting data security. Each device status monitoring node signs the encrypted data with its own private key, and other device status monitoring nodes verify the identity using the public key of that node, making the data immutable and tamper-proof.

[0010] This invention enables a fully peer-to-peer network, eliminating the need for servers, central nodes, cloud platforms, or IoT platforms. Compared to the MQTT protocol used in existing technologies, the services provided by the HTTP protocol offer greater versatility, enabling not only data querying and monitoring but also control functions and remote configuration.

[0011] This invention also improves the RSA encryption algorithm and the elliptic curve signature algorithm. The RSA encryption algorithm based on multi-prime numbers has higher security. The ECC signature algorithm signs the Hamming weight of the data hash value, and the signing process does not require the inversion of random numbers. Instead, it inverts the private key. Since the private key of each device status monitoring node is relatively fixed, it can be inverted and saved in advance. Under the premise of ensuring the same security, it saves computing resources and is more suitable for device status monitoring nodes with limited computing and storage capabilities. Attached Figure Description

[0012] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of the safety monitoring method for university experimental equipment according to the present invention.

[0013] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of the construction of the monitoring node for the experimental equipment. Detailed Implementation

[0014] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this invention clearer, the invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the invention and are not intended to limit the invention.

[0015] like Figure 1 As shown, this invention provides a method for safety monitoring of experimental equipment in universities. The system upon which this method is based includes a laboratory administrator and multiple monitoring nodes for experimental equipment. Figure 2 As shown, the experimental equipment monitoring node includes a microcontroller unit (MCU), a power module, a CAN bus interface, a communication interface module, a storage module, and an alarm module. The MCU is connected to the power module, CAN bus interface, communication interface module, storage module, and alarm module, respectively. The experimental equipment monitoring node is connected to the experimental equipment via the CAN bus. The communication interface module includes an RJ45 wired network interface and WIFI and 2.5G / 5G wireless interfaces. Multiple experimental equipment monitoring nodes communicate with each other via a wireless network. The laboratory administrator communicates with the communication interface module in the experimental equipment monitoring node via a wired or wireless network. The communication interface module also connects to other experimental equipment via WIFI and 2.5G / 5G wireless interfaces. The specific content and steps of this method are as follows: (1) The laboratory administrator establishes the basic parameters of the elliptic curve signature method, elliptic curve E The equation is y 2 =x 3 + ax+b The base point of the elliptic curve is G The order of the elliptic curve is nEach experimental equipment monitoring node determines its own private key. k i Calculate the public key K i =k i G Send to other nodes; the lab administrator establishes the basic parameters of the RSA encryption method and selects... q prime number p 1, p 2, p 3, ...... , p q ,in q >2, calculate β= p 1 p 2 p 3 ......p q Then Euler's totient function φ(β) = ( p 1-1)( p 2-1)( p 3-1) ...... ( p q -1), define parameter z as coprime to β, and z < β. Randomly select a number α coprime to φ(β)φ(z), and α < φ(β)φ(z). Find γ that satisfies (αγ) mod (φ(β)φ(z)). = 1. Then (α, β) is the private key, and (γ, β) is the public key; the administrator sends the public key to each experimental device monitoring node; (2) The experimental equipment monitoring node monitors the equipment status in real time. When an abnormal equipment status is detected, the alarm module of the node is triggered to alarm. (3) The monitoring nodes of the experimental equipment periodically record monitoring data and put the monitoring data into practice. l i and equipment usage records g i Encrypt using the system administrator's public key (γ, β) to obtain the ciphertext. e i = l i γ modβ and f i = g i γ modβ stores the encrypted complete data of each cycle locally and uses its own private key. k i For ciphertext ( e i , fi After signing, ( e i , f i The signature is sent to other nodes; when signing, the nodes select a random number. r i Є [1, n -1], calculate r i G= ( x i ,y i ), t i = x i mod n ,when t i =0, then select again r i , h i =H(h( e i + f i )), s i = k i -1 ( r i t i – h i )mod n ,get( s i , t i ) is ( e i , f i The signature of ); where h(.) is the hash function operation and H(.) is the Hamming weight calculation operation; (4) After receiving the encrypted data and signature, other nodes use the node's public key. K i Verify the signature; upon successful verification, update the node's storage information, storing the latest encrypted monitoring data and usage records received from that node; calculate the signature verification process. h i =H(h( e i + f i )),u 1= h i t i -1 mod n , u 2= s i t i -1 mod n , u 1 G + u 2 K i =( x 0, y 0), v i = x 0mod n ,when v i =t i If the signature is valid, the verification is successful; otherwise, the signature is invalid and the verification fails. Here, h(.) is the hash function operation and H(.) is the Hamming weight calculation operation. (5) A web server is built on each experimental equipment monitoring node based on the LwIP protocol stack to provide access, configuration, and control services based on the HTTP protocol; the laboratory administrator accesses the experimental equipment monitoring node through a web page based on the HTTP protocol, remotely configures the node, controls the experimental equipment through the node, and views the information stored in the node. When viewing, the administrator uses their private key (α, β) to decrypt the ciphertext stored in the node. e i , f i During decryption, calculations are performed. e i α modβ, f i α mod β yields the plaintext ( l i ,g i Laboratory administrators can log in to any node via a web page to view the latest monitoring data and equipment usage records for each node. When it is necessary to view the complete data of a node, configure the node, and control the experimental equipment connected to the node, it is necessary to log in to the corresponding node.

[0016] The above description is merely a preferred embodiment of the present invention. Of course, the present invention may have other various embodiments. Without departing from the spirit and essence of the present invention, any person skilled in the art can make various corresponding equivalent changes and modifications based on the present invention, all of which should fall within the protection scope of the appended claims.

Claims

1. A method for safety monitoring of experimental equipment in universities, wherein the system upon which this method is based includes a laboratory administrator and multiple experimental equipment monitoring nodes; each experimental equipment monitoring node includes a microcontroller, a power module, a CAN bus interface, a communication interface module, a storage module, and an alarm module; the microcontroller is connected to the power module, CAN bus interface, communication interface module, storage module, and alarm module respectively; the experimental equipment monitoring node is connected to the experimental equipment via the CAN bus interface; the communication interface module includes an RJ45 wired network interface and WIFI and 2.5G / 5G wireless interfaces; multiple experimental equipment monitoring nodes communicate with each other via a wireless network; the laboratory administrator communicates with the communication interface module in the experimental equipment monitoring node via a wired or wireless network; the communication interface module also connects to other experimental equipment via WIFI and 2.5G / 5G wireless interfaces, characterized in that... The method includes the following steps: (1) The laboratory administrator establishes the basic parameters of the elliptic curve signature method, and the equation of the elliptic curve E is y 2 =x 3 +ax+b, the base point of the elliptic curve is G, the order of the elliptic curve is n, and each experimental equipment monitoring node determines its own private key k. i Calculate the public key K i =k i G is sent to other experimental equipment monitoring nodes; the laboratory administrator establishes the basic parameters of the RSA encryption method, calculates (α, β) as the administrator's private key and (γ, β) as the administrator's public key, and the administrator sends the public key to each experimental equipment monitoring node; The methods for calculating the private key and the public key are as follows: The lab administrator establishes the basic parameters of the RSA encryption method, selecting q prime numbers p1, p2, p3, ..., p... q , where q>2, calculate β=p1p2p3......p q Then the Euler totient function φ(β) = (p1-1)(p2-1)(p3-1)......(p q -1), define parameter z as coprime to β and z < β, randomly select a number α coprime to φ(β)φ(z) and α < φ(β)φ(z), find γ that satisfies (αγ)mod(φ(β)φ(z))=1, and obtain (α, β) as the administrator's private key and (γ, β) as the administrator's public key; (2) Each experimental equipment monitoring node monitors the equipment status in real time based on the CAN bus interface. When an abnormal equipment status is detected, the alarm module of the experimental equipment monitoring node is triggered to alarm. (3) Each experimental equipment monitoring node periodically records monitoring data, and puts the monitoring data into a record. i and equipment usage records g i Encrypting the data using the lab administrator's public key (γ, β) yields the ciphertext e. i =l i γ modβ and f i =g i γ modβ is stored locally and uses its own private key k i For ciphertext (e i f i After signing, (e) i f i The signature is sent to other experimental equipment monitoring nodes; The specific content and method of the signature are as follows: Nodes select random numbers Calculate r i G=(x i y i ), When t i =0, then reselect r i h i =H(h(e i +f i )), , to obtain (s i , t i That is (e) i f i The signature of ), where h(.) is the hash function operation and H(.) is the Hamming weight calculation operation; (4) Other experimental equipment monitoring nodes receive ciphertext (e i f i After signing, the public key K of the monitoring node is used with the experimental device. i Verify the signature, and update the storage information of the experimental equipment monitoring node after successful verification; The specific content and method for verifying the signature are as follows: When verifying the signature, h is calculated. i =H(h(e i +f i )), , u1G+u2K i =(x0,y0), v i = x0modn, when v i =t i If the signature is valid, the verification is successful; otherwise, the signature is invalid and the verification fails. Here, h(.) is the hash function operation and H(.) is the Hamming weight calculation operation. (5) A web server based on the LwIP protocol stack is built on each experimental equipment monitoring node to provide access, configuration and control services based on the HTTP protocol; the laboratory administrator accesses the experimental equipment monitoring node through a web page based on the HTTP protocol, remotely configures the experimental equipment monitoring node and controls the experimental equipment through the experimental equipment monitoring node, views the information stored in the experimental equipment monitoring node, and decrypts the ciphertext (e) stored in the node using his / her private key (α, β) when viewing. i f i During decryption, e is calculated. i α modβ,f i α modβ yields plaintext (l) i g i ).

2. The method for safety monitoring of experimental equipment in universities according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step (3), storing encrypted data locally refers to storing the encrypted monitoring data and equipment usage records of the monitoring nodes of this experimental equipment at each cycle time.

3. The method for safety monitoring of experimental equipment in universities according to claim 1, characterized in that: The update of the storage information of the experimental equipment monitoring node mentioned in step (4) refers to storing the latest encrypted monitoring data and usage records of the experimental equipment monitoring node to replace the original storage information of the experimental equipment monitoring node.

4. The method for safety monitoring of experimental equipment in universities according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step (5), the laboratory administrator accesses, configures, and controls each experimental equipment monitoring node. This means that the laboratory administrator can log in to any experimental equipment monitoring node via a web page to view the latest monitoring data and equipment usage records of each experimental equipment monitoring node. When it is necessary to view the complete data of a certain experimental equipment monitoring node, configure the experimental equipment monitoring node, and control the experimental equipment connected to the experimental equipment monitoring node, it is necessary to log in to the corresponding experimental equipment monitoring node.

Citation Information

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