An IPv6 terminal identity authentication method using 5G NR physical layer information

Abstract

The present invention discloses an IPv6 terminal identity authentication method using 5GNR physical layer information, which belongs to the field of wireless communication security. First, a mobile security communication system model with eavesdroppers is constructed; then the two legal communication parties send detection signals to each other to estimate the communication channel, and then decorrelate the channel estimation matrix; the two legal communication parties respectively jointly quantize the phase and amplitude of the channel estimation matrix after decorrelation processing; the two legal communication parties generate consistent keys through a privacy coordination method based on BCH error correction code; the two legal communication parties respectively perform hash sequence transformation on the consistent keys obtained by each other to obtain the final key; the legal sender generates an identity authentication tag through hash transformation based on the generated key and the source information to be transmitted, and sends it together with the source information; the legal receiver generates an identity authentication tag after hash transformation based on the received source information and the generated key, and compares it with the received identity authentication tag to complete the authentication process. The present invention effectively resists active attacks, does not have the problem of incompatibility with the underlying network, and solves the security leakage risk brought by key distribution management, thereby enhancing the security of the system.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of wireless communication security, and specifically relates to an IPv6 terminal identity authentication method using 5G NR physical layer information. Background Art

[0002] In recent years, due to the popularity of mobile devices and the development of the Internet of Things, IPv4 addresses have been exhausted and cannot meet the "one object, one address" requirement of the Internet of Things. Therefore, IPv4 networks are gradually evolving towards IPv6 networks. Since mobile devices and Internet of Things terminals are usually deployed in public open intervals, these open intervals are usually accessed using wireless networks. However, due to the openness of wireless networks, there are huge security vulnerabilities in wireless communication systems. Most existing wireless communication systems authenticate targets through identity authentication mechanisms to ensure the legitimacy of access users. Therefore, identity authentication is an important issue in wireless communications.

[0003] At present, identity authentication methods are divided into two schemes: passive authentication and active authentication. In the passive authentication scheme, the transmitter and receiver perform authentication based on the physical layer information of the received signal, such as radio frequency characteristics, channel characteristics, etc. The transmitter and receiver do not modify the source signal. However, there are many problems with the passive authentication scheme in practical applications. First, the physical distance between the transmitter and receiver needs to be more than half a wavelength to ensure that the channel characteristics are independent of each other. Secondly, the passive authentication scheme requires a secure training phase, and the security of the training phase needs to be implemented by the upper layer mechanism, which requires a large delay. The active scheme uses a more complex authentication mechanism, which does not require the participation of the upper layer device and can solve some of the problems existing in the passive scheme. The active authentication scheme includes two stages: key generation and information transmission. The transmitter and receiver first use the key generation algorithm to generate a shared key and a public key. Then, the sender uses the shared key and the source information to generate a tag for identity authentication. The sender uses the generated tag to modify the source information and transmits the modified source information and the tag to the receiver at the same time. The receiver recovers the key based on the received source information and tag and compares it with its own shared key to determine whether the received information comes from a legitimate sender and complete identity authentication. Currently, most active authentication schemes use traditional key generation algorithms to generate tags, such as asymmetric encryption algorithms (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman, RSA) encryption algorithms. However, traditional key generation algorithms require a legitimate distributor to distribute public keys and shared keys to legitimate senders and receivers. The key generation algorithm has high computational complexity and the distribution process adds additional communication delays. In addition, if the shared key of the sender and receiver is successfully eavesdropped, the security of the active identity authentication scheme using traditional key generation algorithms will be completely invalid.

[0004] In response to the above problems, the present invention studies an active identity authentication scheme based on physical layer information. The physical layer information between the two ends of the transmitter and receiver, such as channel information, is shared and unique to the two ends of the transmitter and receiver, does not require an additional distribution process, and cannot be broken by any increase in computing power. Therefore, the present invention uses the physical layer information between the two ends of the transmitter and receiver to generate a tag to complete the identity authentication, thereby solving the problem of high computational complexity and insufficient security in the active authentication scheme.

[0005] [1].N.Yang,L.Wang,G.Geraci,M.Elkashlan,J.Yuan and M.Di Renzo, "Safeguarding 5G wireless communication networks using physical layersecurity," in IEEE Communications Magazine, vol.53, no.4, pp.20-27, April 2015.

[0006] [2].N.Xie, Z.Li and H.Tan, "A Survey of Physical-Layer Authentication in Wireless Communications," in IEEE Communications Surveys&Tutorials, vol.23, no.1, pp.282-310, Firstquarter 2021.

[0007] [3].

[0008] [4].N.

[0009] [5].I.Ahmad, S.Shahabuddin, T.Kumar, J.Okwuibe, A.Gurtov andM.Ylianttila, "Security for 5G and Beyond," in IEEE Communications Surveys&Tutorials, vol.21, no.4, pp.3682-3722, Fourthquarter 2019. Summary of the invention

[0010] In view of the above problems, the present invention proposes a method for active authentication using physical layer information, which generates an identity authentication tag by jointly using amplitude and phase channel information. This method transmits source information and identity authentication tags at the sending end at the same time, effectively taking into account the information theoretical security in active authentication and the advantages of passive authentication without key distribution management.

[0011] The specific steps are as follows:

[0012] Step 1: Construct a mobile communication system model with an eavesdropper;

[0013] The system model includes an eavesdropper E and two T Transmitting antennas, N R The legitimate communication parties A and B of the receiving antenna use an Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) system in a Time Division Duplex (TDD) mode.

[0014] The working process of the whole system is as follows: 1) A sends a pilot signal to B, B receives the pilot signal sent by A and performs channel estimation on it to obtain the channel estimation result; B sends a pilot signal to A, A receives the pilot signal sent by B and performs channel estimation on it to obtain the channel estimation result; 2) A and B perform spatial and frequency decorrelation processing on their respective channel estimation results, and A and B quantize the amplitude and phase of their respective channel estimation results after decorrelation processing; 3) A performs Bose--Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem (BCH) encoding on its own quantized result, and converts the BCH encoding into The error correction code is sent to B, B performs BCH encoding on its own quantized result, and uses the error correction code received from A to correct its own encoding. A performs hash transformation on its own quantized result to obtain the final key; B performs hash transformation on its own error-corrected result to obtain the final key; 4) A generates an identity authentication tag by hashing the message to be sent and the key held by A. A sends the source information and the identity authentication tag to B at the same time, and B generates an identity authentication tag based on the received source information and the key held; 5) B compares the generated identity authentication tag with the received identity authentication tag to complete the authentication process.

[0015] Step 2: A and B send detection signals to each other and perform their own channel estimation;

[0016] The specific steps are as follows:

[0017] Step 201: A sends a detection signal P occupying M resource blocks (RBs) to B. A , where the sounding signal is a demodulation reference signal (DMRS) of configuration type 1 in the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) protocol;

[0018] Step 202: B receives the corresponding detection signal on the RB transmitted by A.

[0019]

[0020] Among them, H A The detection signal P A The channel state experienced during transmission, where K represents the number of subcarriers occupied by the detection signal; N A has a mean of zero and a variance of Gaussian white noise;

[0021] Step 203: B receives the received detection signal Perform the least squares (LS) channel estimation, the specific estimation method is:

[0022]

[0023] in, is the channel estimate received by B when A sends the detection signal, ||·|| 2 represents the square operation of the two-norm;

[0024] Step 204: B sends a detection signal P occupying M RBs to A. B , where the detection signal is a DMRS of configuration type 1;

[0025] Step 205: B receives the corresponding detection signal on the RB transmitted by A.

[0026]

[0027] Among them, H B The detection signal P B The channel state experienced during transmission, where K represents the number of subcarriers occupied by the detection signal; N B has a mean of zero and a variance of Gaussian white noise, and N B With N A is independent and uncorrelated Gaussian white noise;

[0028] Step 206: A receives the detection signal Perform LS channel estimation, the specific estimation method is:

[0029]

[0030] in, is the channel estimate received by A when B sends the detection signal;

[0031] Step 3: The legitimate communicating parties respectively perform decorrelation processing on the estimated channel matrix, and respectively perform joint quantization on the phase and amplitude of the channel estimation matrix after decorrelation processing;

[0032] Step 301: A and B estimate their respective channel And solve the spatial correlation between each antenna. The specific operations are as follows:

[0033]

[0034]

[0035] Among them, h A,::k ,h B,::k express The channel estimation result of the case where the third dimension is determined is, Respectively represent h A,::k and h B,::k The conjugate transpose of ;

[0036] Step 302: A and B target R s,A , R s,B Perform eigenvalue decomposition (EVD). The specific operations are as follows:

[0037]

[0038]

[0039] Step 303: A and B respectively use the eigenvalue vectors obtained by EVD in step 302 to perform spatial decorrelation on the channel estimation results. The specific operations are as follows:

[0040]

[0041]

[0042] Among them, K h A,::k ,h B,::k Compose H′ in the order of k A , H′ B ;

[0043] Step 304: A and B respectively calculate the frequency correlation of the results after performing spatial decorrelation in step 303. The specific operations are as follows:

[0044]

[0045]

[0046] Among them, h′ A,ij: and h′ B,ij: Represents H′ A and H′ B The first two dimensions of the two-dimensional vector determine the and Represents h′ A,ij: and h′ B,ij: The conjugate transpose of ;

[0047] Step 305: A and B target R f,A , R f,B Perform eigenvalue decomposition. The specific operations are as follows:

[0048]

[0049]

[0050] Step 306: A and B use the eigenvalue vectors obtained by EVD in step 305 to calculate H′ A , H′ B Perform frequency decorrelation. The specific operations are as follows:

[0051]

[0052]

[0053] Among them, h A,ij: ,h B,ij: According to the order of i, j, H is formed A , H B ;

[0054] Step 307: H obtained according to step 306 A and H B To calculate the phase of each subcarrier, the specific operations are as follows:

[0055]

[0056]

[0057] in, Represent the channel phases estimated by A and B respectively;

[0058] Step 308: Pha obtained in step 307 A , Pha B Perform quantization of 01 bits. The specific operations are as follows:

[0059] If Pha A (k)∈(10,80), key A (k,:) = [0 0];

[0060] If Pha A (k)∈(110,170), key A (k,:) = [0 1];

[0061] If Pha A (k)∈(-80,-10), key A (k,:) = [1 0];

[0062] If Pha A (k)∈(-170,-110), key A(k,:) = [1 1];

[0063] If Pha B (k)∈(10,80), key B (k,:) = [0 0];

[0064] If Pha B (k)∈(110,170), key B (k,:) = [0 1];

[0065] If Pha B (k)∈(-80,-10), key B (k,:) = [1 0];

[0066] If Pha B (k)∈(-170,-110), key B (k,:) = [1 1];

[0067] The key A ,key B Rearrange the rows to generate the phase key information keyPha A ,keyPha B , where keyPha A , represents the binary domain, m is the number of phases that fit the phase interval range;

[0068] Step 309: H obtained according to step 306 A and H B The real part of the binary quantization operation is performed to obtain the amplitude key information keyMag A and keyMag B , the specific operations are as follows:

[0069]

[0070] If real(H A )>a, and real(H A )>mean+α,keyMag A [i]=1

[0071] If real(H A )>a, and real(H A ) <mean-α,keyMag A [i]=0

[0072]

[0073] If real(H B )>a, and real(H B )>mean+α,keyMag B [i]=1

[0074] If real(H B )>a, and real(H B ) <mean-α,keyMag B [i]=0

[0075] Among them, a=1 is intended to remove too small values ​​and increase randomness, and α represents the quantization threshold;

[0076] Step 310: A and B respectively concatenate the phase key information and the amplitude key information to generate the initial key keyInit A and keyInit B ;

[0077] keyInit A =[keyPha A ;keyMag A ]

[0078] keyInit B =[keyPha B ;keyMag B ]

[0079] Step 4: The two parties in legitimate communication generate the final key through privacy coordination and privacy amplification based on BCH error correction code;

[0080] Step 401, A generates an error correction code using BCH encoding, and sends the error correction code bits to B;

[0081] Step 402, B generates a code according to the BCH code, and uses the error correction code received from A to perform error correction, assuming that the error correction code will not make mistakes during the process of sending the error correction code;

[0082] Step 403, repeat steps 401 and 402 until the keys of both parties are consistent, and A and B obtain the consistent key K;

[0083] Step 404: A and B perform hash sequence transformation on their respective consistent keys to obtain the final key K. fin ;

[0084] Step 5: The legitimate sender A generates and sends an identity authentication tag, and the legitimate receiver B generates an identity authentication tag;

[0085] Step 501: A sends source information x as needed A and key Kfin The identity authentication tag tag is generated and sent after hash transformation A ;

[0086] tag A =Hash(x A ,K fin )

[0087] Among them, Hash(·) is the hash transformation;

[0088] Step 502: A sends a message msg consisting of a BCH-encoded identity authentication tag and source information;

[0089] msg = Bchenc(x A ,tag A )

[0090] Wherein, Bchenc(·) is the BCH code;

[0091] Step 503: B receives Perform BCH decoding;

[0092]

[0093] Among them, Bchdec(·) is BCH decoding, is the estimated source information of B, The identity authentication label estimated by B for A;

[0094] Step 504: B receives and key K fin Generate identity tag B ;

[0095]

[0096] Step 6: The receiver compares the received identity authentication tag with the identity authentication tag generated by itself bit by bit, and calculates the success authentication rate and false alarm probability;

[0097] Step 7: The legal communication parties use a fixed key to generate a tag through steps 5 and 6, replace the key generated based on the physical layer information used in steps 5 and 6 with the inherent key of both parties, and calculate the success authentication rate and false alarm probability;

[0098] Step 8: When a third-party illegal user E exists, he attempts to forge an identity authentication tag to access the legitimate recipient B;

[0099] Step 801: E generates an authentication tag using a randomly guessed key. E ;

[0100] Step 802: E has some background knowledge about the key held by B. E generates a key based on the background knowledge of the key. 1 , using key 1 Generate tags E1 ;

[0101] Step 803: B compares the received identity authentication tag with the identity authentication tag generated by itself bit by bit, and calculates the success authentication rate of E;

[0102] The advantages of the present invention are:

[0103] 1. An IPv6 terminal identity authentication method using 5G NR physical layer information effectively resists active attacks from illegal users;

[0104] 2. An IPv6 terminal identity authentication method using 5G NR physical layer information to effectively solve the physical layer incompatibility problem that may exist in upper layer authentication;

[0105] 3. An IPv6 terminal identity authentication method using 5G NR physical layer information effectively solves the key distribution and management problems in active authentication schemes; BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0106] Figure 1 It is a typical physical layer security system model of the present invention;

[0107] Figure 2 It is the processing flow of the security solution of the present invention;

[0108] Figure 3 It is a flow chart of an IPv6 terminal identity authentication method using 5GNR physical layer information of the present invention;

[0109] Figure 4 is the false alarm probability of the legitimate sender under different authentication thresholds in the present invention;

[0110] Figure 5 is the probability of successful authentication of the third party under different authentication thresholds in the present invention;

[0111] Figure 6 is the success authentication rate of the third party under different key background knowledge in the present invention; DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0112] In order to enable those skilled in the art to more clearly understand and implement the present invention, the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below in the form of specific embodiments in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

[0113] The present invention provides an IPv6 terminal identity authentication method using 5GNR physical layer information, and its communication scenario model is as follows Figure 1 As shown, the system implementation block diagram is as follows Figure 2 As shown, user A and user B send detection signals to each other for channel detection, and extract the characteristics of the channel between the two communicating parties from the detection signals; A and B quantize the channel characteristics respectively; then the two parties coordinate the privacy of the quantized results to improve the consistency of the keys generated by both parties; A and B perform privacy amplification operations on the keys respectively to improve the security of the keys generated by both parties; A generates an authentication tag based on the generated key and the sent source information through hash transformation, and sends it to B together with the source information; B generates an authentication tag through hash transformation based on the received source information and the generated key; B compares the received tag with the generated tag.

[0114] like Figure 3 As shown, the specific steps of the present invention are:

[0115] Step 1: Construct a mobile communication system model with an eavesdropper;

[0116] The system model includes an eavesdropper E and two T Transmitting antennas, N R The legitimate communication parties A and B at the receiving antenna use an Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) system in a Time Division Duplex (TDD) mode.

[0117] The working process of the whole system is as follows: 1) A sends a pilot signal to B, B receives the pilot signal sent by A, and performs channel estimation on it to obtain the channel estimation result; B sends a pilot signal to A, A receives the pilot signal sent by B, and performs channel estimation on it to obtain the channel estimation result; 2) A and B perform spatial and frequency decorrelation processing on their respective channel estimation results, and A and B quantize the amplitude and phase of their respective channel estimation results after decorrelation processing; 3) A performs BCH encoding on its quantized result, and sends the BCH-encoded error correction code to B, and B performs BCH encoding on its quantized result. The quantized result is BCH encoded, and the error correction code received from Party A is used to correct its own encoding. A performs hash transformation on its quantized result to obtain the final key; B performs hash transformation on its error-corrected result to obtain the final key; 4) A generates an identity authentication tag by hashing the message to be sent and the key held by A. A sends the source information and the identity authentication tag to B at the same time. B generates the identity authentication tag based on the received source information and the key held; 5) B compares the generated identity authentication tag with the received identity authentication tag to complete the authentication process.

[0118] Step 2: A and B send detection signals to each other and perform their own channel estimation;

[0119] The specific steps are as follows:

[0120] Step 201: A sends a detection signal P occupying M RBs to B. A , where the detection signal is a DMRS of configuration type 1 in the 3GPP protocol;

[0121] Step 202: B receives the corresponding detection signal on the RB transmitted by A.

[0122]

[0123] Among them, H A The detection signal P A The channel state experienced during transmission, where K represents the number of subcarriers occupied by the detection signal; N A has a mean of zero and a variance of Gaussian white noise;

[0124] Step 203: B receives the received detection signal Perform LS channel estimation, the specific estimation method is:

[0125]

[0126] in, is the channel estimate received by B when A sends the detection signal, ||·|| 2 represents the square operation of the two-norm;

[0127] Step 204: B sends a detection signal P occupying M RBs to A. B , where the detection signal is a DMRS of configuration type 1;

[0128] Step 205: B receives the corresponding detection signal on the RB transmitted by A.

[0129]

[0130] Among them, H B The detection signal P B The channel state experienced during transmission, where K represents the number of subcarriers occupied by the detection signal; N B has a mean of zero and a variance of Gaussian white noise, and N B With N A is independent and uncorrelated Gaussian white noise;

[0131] Step 206: A receives the detection signal Perform LS channel estimation, the specific estimation method is:

[0132]

[0133] in, is the channel estimate received by A when B sends the detection signal;

[0134] Step 3: The legitimate communicating parties respectively perform decorrelation processing on the estimated channel matrix, and respectively perform joint quantization on the phase and amplitude of the channel estimation matrix after decorrelation processing;

[0135] Step 301: A and B estimate their respective channel And solve the spatial correlation between each antenna. The specific operations are as follows:

[0136]

[0137]

[0138] Among them, h A,::k ,h B,::k express The channel estimation result of the case where the third dimension is determined is, Respectively represent h A,::k and h B,::k The conjugate transpose of ;

[0139] Step 302: A and B target R s,A , R s,B Perform eigenvalue decomposition. The specific operations are as follows:

[0140]

[0141]

[0142] Step 303: A and B respectively use the eigenvalue vectors obtained by EVD in step 302 to perform spatial decorrelation on the channel estimation results. The specific operations are as follows:

[0143]

[0144]

[0145] Among them, K h A,::k ,h B,::k Compose H′ in the order of k A , H′ B ;

[0146] Step 304: A and B respectively calculate the frequency correlation of the results after performing spatial decorrelation in step 303. The specific operations are as follows:

[0147]

[0148]

[0149] Among them, h′ A,ij: and h′ B,ij: Represents H′ A and H′ B The first two dimensions of the two-dimensional vector determine the Represents h′ A,ij: and h′ B,ij: The conjugate transpose of ;

[0150] Step 305: A and B target R f,A , R f,B Perform eigenvalue decomposition. The specific operations are as follows:

[0151]

[0152]

[0153] Step 306: A and B use the eigenvalue vectors obtained by EVD in step 305 to calculate H′ A , H′ B Perform frequency decorrelation. The specific operations are as follows:

[0154]

[0155]

[0156] Among them, h A,ij: ,h B,ij: According to the order of i, j, H is formed A , H B ;

[0157] Step 307: H obtained according to step 306 A and H B To calculate the phase of each subcarrier, the specific operations are as follows:

[0158]

[0159]

[0160] in, Represent the channel phases estimated by A and B respectively;

[0161] Step 308: Pha obtained in step 307A , Pha B Perform quantization of 01 bits. The specific operations are as follows:

[0162] If Pha A (k)∈(10,80), key A (k,:) = [0 0];

[0163] If Pha A (k)∈(110,170), key A (k,:) = [0 1];

[0164] If Pha A (k)∈(-80,-10), key A (k,:) = [1 0];

[0165] If Pha A (k)∈(-170,-110), key A (k,:) = [1 1];

[0166] If Pha B (k)∈(10,80), key B (k,:) = [0 0];

[0167] If Pha B (k)∈(110,170), key B (k,:) = [0 1];

[0168] If Pha B (k)∈(-80,-10), key B (k,:) = [1 0];

[0169] If Pha B (k)∈(-170,-110), key B (k,:) = [1 1];

[0170] The key A ,key B Rearrange the rows to generate the phase key information keyPha A ,keyPha B , where keyPha A , represents the binary domain, m is the number of phases that fit the phase interval range;

[0171] Step 309: H obtained according to step 306 A and H BThe real part of the binary quantization operation is performed to obtain the amplitude key information keyMag A and keyMag B , the specific operations are as follows:

[0172]

[0173] If real(H A )>a, and real(H A )>mean+α,keyMag A [i]=1

[0174] If real(H A )>a, and real(H A ) <mean-α,keyMag A [i]=0

[0175]

[0176] If real(H B )>a, and real(H B )>mean+α,keyMag B [i]=1

[0177] If real(H B )>a, and real(H B ) <mean-α,keyMag B [i]=0

[0178] Among them, a=1 is intended to remove too small values ​​and increase randomness, and α represents the quantization threshold;

[0179] Step 310: A and B respectively concatenate the phase key information and the amplitude key information to generate the initial key keyInit A and keyInit B ;

[0180] keyInit A =[keyPha A ;keyMag A ]

[0181] keyInit B =[keyPha B ;keyMag B ]

[0182] Step 4: The two parties in legitimate communication generate the final key through privacy coordination and privacy amplification based on BCH error correction code;

[0183] Step 401, A generates an error correction code using BCH encoding, and sends the error correction code bits to B;

[0184] Step 402, B generates a code according to the BCH code, and uses the error correction code received from A to perform error correction, assuming that the error correction code will not make mistakes during the process of sending the error correction code;

[0185] Step 403, repeat steps 401 and 402 until the keys of both parties are consistent, and A and B obtain the consistent key K;

[0186] Step 404: A and B perform hash sequence transformation on their respective consistent keys to obtain the final key K. fin ;

[0187] Step 5: The legitimate sender A generates and sends an identity authentication tag, and the legitimate receiver B generates an identity authentication tag;

[0188] Step 501: A sends source information x as needed A and key K fin The identity authentication tag tag is generated and sent after hash transformation A ;

[0189] tag A =Hash(x A ,K fin )

[0190] Among them, Hash(·) is the hash transformation;

[0191] Step 502: A sends a message msg consisting of a BCH-encoded identity authentication tag and source information;

[0192] msg = Bchenc(x A ,tag A )

[0193] Wherein, Bchenc(·) is the BCH code;

[0194] Step 503: B receives Perform BCH decoding;

[0195]

[0196] Among them, Bchdec(·) is BCH decoding, is the estimated source information of B, The identity authentication label estimated by B for A;

[0197] Step 504: B receives and key K fin Generate identity tagB ;

[0198]

[0199] Step 6: The receiver compares the received identity authentication tag with the identity authentication tag generated by itself bit by bit, and calculates the success authentication rate and false alarm probability;

[0200] Step 7: The legal communication parties use a fixed key to generate a tag through steps 5 and 6, replace the key generated based on the physical layer information used in steps 5 and 6 with the inherent key of both parties, and calculate the success authentication rate and false alarm probability;

[0201] Step 8: When a third-party illegal user E exists, he attempts to forge an identity authentication tag to access the legitimate recipient B;

[0202] Step 801: E generates an authentication tag using a randomly guessed key. E ;

[0203] Step 802: E has some background knowledge about the key held by B. E generates a key based on the background knowledge of the key. 1 , using key 1 Generate tags E1 ;

[0204] Step 803: B compares the received identity authentication tag with the identity authentication tag generated by itself bit by bit, and calculates the success authentication rate of E;

[0205] The present invention uses the Tapped Delay Line (TDL) channel simulation model defined in the 3GPP protocol. Figure 4 is the false alarm probability caused by the legitimate user under different signal-to-noise ratio conditions and different authentication thresholds. Figure 4 It can be seen that the false alarm probability decreases with the increase of channel signal-to-noise ratio. Under the condition of poor channel signal-to-noise ratio, legitimate users cannot successfully pass the authentication. Since there are many errors in the source information received by the receiver, the identity authentication tags held by both legitimate users are quite different. When the authentication threshold is gradually increased, the false alarm probability caused by legitimate users is lower.

[0206] like Figure 5 As shown in the figure, the third party generates a tag by randomly guessing the key between legitimate users. It can be seen from the figure that the lower the authentication threshold, the fewer illegal users can pass the authentication. When the authentication threshold is 0.375, the third party can hardly pass the authentication. However, the traditional method of using fixed keys for active authentication at the physical layer may be illegally stolen by the third party to help them complete the identity authentication process. Figure 6 As shown in Figure 2, under the authentication threshold of 0.375, when the third party has a key background of more than 0.6, some third parties can already pass the authentication process. Our method uses physical layer information to generate keys and adopts a "one-time one-key" approach to avoid key leakage and prevent third parties from accessing the network.

[0207] To sum up, by implementing an embodiment of the present invention, a tag is generated by using a key generated by physical layer information to complete the authentication process, which can not only resist active attacks, but also eliminate the need for upper layer intervention as in existing authentication methods, and there is no problem of media incompatibility between different networks; compared with the existing physical layer tag generation authentication method, the present invention uses physical layer information to generate the key required to generate the identity authentication tag, effectively avoiding the security leakage risks caused by key distribution and management operations in existing methods, and providing higher security performance.

[0208] The above is a preferred embodiment of the present invention. It should be pointed out that a person skilled in the art can make several improvements and modifications without departing from the principle of the present invention. These improvements and modifications are also considered to be within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for IPv6 terminal identity authentication using 5GNR physical layer information, the specific implementation steps of which are: Step 1: Construct a mobile communication system model with an eavesdropper; The system model includes an eavesdropper E and two T Transmitting antennas, N R The legitimate communicating parties A and B at the receiving antenna use an Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) system in a Time Division Duplex (TDD) mode. The working process of the whole system is as follows: 1) A sends a pilot signal to B, B receives the pilot signal sent by A, and performs channel estimation on it to obtain the channel estimation result; B sends a pilot signal to A, A receives the pilot signal sent by B, and performs channel estimation on it to obtain the channel estimation result; 2) A and B perform spatial and frequency decorrelation processing on their respective channel estimation results, and A and B quantize the amplitude and phase of their respective channel estimation results after decorrelation processing; 3) A performs Bose--Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem (BCH) encoding on its own quantized result, and sends the error correction code after BCH encoding to B, B performs BCH encoding on its own quantized result, and uses the error correction code received from A to correct its own code, A performs hash transformation on its own quantized result to obtain the final key; B performs hash transformation on its own error-corrected result to obtain the final key; 4) A generates an identity authentication tag by hashing the message to be sent and the key held by A. A sends the source information and the identity authentication tag to B at the same time. B generates the identity authentication tag based on the received source information and the key held; 5) B compares the generated identity authentication tag with the received identity authentication tag to complete the authentication process; Step 2: A and B send detection signals to each other and perform their own channel estimation; The specific steps are as follows: Step 201: A sends a detection signal P occupying M resource blocks (RBs) to B. A , where the sounding signal is a demodulation reference signal (DMRS) of configuration type 1 in the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) protocol; Step 202: B receives the corresponding detection signal on the RB transmitted by A. Among them, H A The detection signal P A The channel state experienced during transmission, where K represents the number of subcarriers occupied by the detection signal; N A has a mean of zero and a variance of Gaussian white noise; Step 203: B receives the received detection signal Perform the least squares (LS) channel estimation, the specific estimation method is: in, is the channel estimate received by B when A sends the detection signal, ||·|| 2 represents the square operation of the two-norm; Step 204: B sends a detection signal P occupying M RBs to A. B , where the detection signal is a DMRS of configuration type 1; Step 205: B receives the corresponding detection signal on the RB transmitted by A. Among them, H B The detection signal P B The channel state experienced during transmission, where K represents the number of subcarriers occupied by the detection signal; N B has a mean of zero and a variance of Gaussian white noise, and N B With N A is independent and uncorrelated Gaussian white noise; Step 206: A receives the detection signal Perform LS channel estimation, the specific estimation method is: in, is the channel estimate received by A when B sends the detection signal; Step 3: The legitimate communicating parties respectively perform decorrelation processing on the estimated channel matrix, and respectively perform joint quantization on the phase and amplitude of the decorrelation-processed channel estimation matrix; Step 301: A and B estimate their respective channel And solve the spatial correlation between each antenna. The specific operations are as follows: Among them, h A,::k ,h B,::k express The channel estimation result of the case where the third dimension is determined is, Respectively represent h A,::k and h B,::k The conjugate transpose of ; Step 302: A and B target R s,A , R s,B Perform eigenvalue decomposition (EVD). The specific operations are as follows: Step 303: A and B respectively use the eigenvalue vectors obtained by EVD in step 302 to perform spatial decorrelation on the channel estimation results. The specific operations are as follows: Among them, K h A,::k ,h B,::k Compose H′ in the order of k A , H′ B ; Step 304: A and B respectively calculate the frequency correlation of the results after performing spatial decorrelation in step 303. The specific operations are as follows: Among them, h′ A,ij: and h′ B,ij: Represents H′ A and H′ B The first two dimensions of the two-dimensional vector determine the and Represents h′ A,ij: and h′ B,ij: The conjugate transpose of ; Step 305: A and B target R f,A , R f,B Perform eigenvalue decomposition. The specific operations are as follows: Step 306: A and B use the eigenvalue vectors obtained by EVD in step 305 to calculate H′ A , H′ B Perform frequency decorrelation. The specific operations are as follows: Among them, h A,ij: ,h B,ij: According to the order of i, j, H is formed A , H B ; Step 307: H obtained according to step 306 A and H B To calculate the phase of each subcarrier, the specific operations are as follows: in, Represent the channel phases estimated by A and B respectively; Step 308: Pha obtained in step 307 A , Pha B Perform quantization of 01 bits. The specific operations are as follows: If Pha A (k)∈(10,80), key A (k,:) = [0 0]; If Pha A (k)∈(110,170), key A (k,:) = [0 1]; If Pha A (k)∈(-80,-10), key A (k,:) = [1 0]; If Pha A (k)∈(-170,-110), key A (k,:) = [1 1]; If Pha B (k)∈(10,80), key B (k,:) = [0 0]; If Pha B (k)∈(110,170), key B (k,:) = [0 1]; If Pha B (k)∈(-80,-10), key B (k,:) = [1 0]; If Pha B (k)∈(-170,-110), key B (k,:) = [1 1]; The key A ,key B Rearrange the rows to generate the phase key information keyPha A ,keyPha B , where keyPha A , represents the binary domain, m is the number of phases that fit the phase interval range; Step 309: H obtained according to step 306 A and H B The real part of the binary quantization operation is performed to obtain the amplitude key information keyMag A and keyMag B , the specific operations are as follows: If real(H A )>a, and real(H A )>mean+α,keyMag A [i]=1 If real(H A )>a, and real(H A ) <mean-α,keyMag A [i]=0 If real(H B )>a, and real(H B )>mean+α,keyMag B [i]=1 If real(H B )>a, and real(H B ) <mean-α,keyMag B [i]=0 Among them, a=1 is intended to remove too small values ​​and increase randomness, and α represents the quantization threshold; Step 310: A and B respectively concatenate the phase key information and the amplitude key information to generate the initial key keyInit A and keyInit B ; keyInit A =[keyPha A ;keyMag A ] keyInit B =[keyPha B ;keyMag B ] Step 4: The two parties in legitimate communication generate the final key through privacy coordination and privacy amplification based on BCH error correction code; Step 401, A generates an error correction code using BCH encoding, and sends the error correction code bits to B; Step 402, B generates a code according to the BCH code, and uses the error correction code received from A to perform error correction, assuming that the error correction code will not make mistakes during the process of sending the error correction code; Step 403, repeat steps 401 and 402 until the keys of both parties are consistent, and A and B obtain the consistent key K; Step 404: A and B perform hash sequence transformation on their respective consistent keys to obtain the final key K. fin ; Step 5: The legitimate sender A generates and sends an identity authentication tag, and the legitimate receiver B generates an identity authentication tag; Step 501: A sends source information x as needed A and key K fin The identity authentication tag tag is generated and sent after hash transformation A ; tag A =Hash(x A ,K fin ) Among them, Hash(·) is the hash transformation; Step 502: A sends a message msg consisting of a BCH-encoded identity authentication tag and source information; msg=Bchenc(x A ,tag A ) Wherein, Bchenc(·) is the BCH code; Step 503: B receives Perform BCH decoding; Among them, Bchdec(·) is BCH decoding, is the estimated source information of B, The identity authentication label estimated by B for A; Step 504: B receives and key K fin Generate identity tag B ; Step 6: The receiver compares the received identity authentication tag with the identity authentication tag generated by itself bit by bit, and calculates the success authentication rate and false alarm probability; Step 7: The legal communication parties use a fixed key to generate a tag through steps 5 and 6, replace the key generated based on the physical layer information used in steps 5 and 6 with the inherent key of both parties, and calculate the success authentication rate and false alarm probability; Step 8: When a third-party user E exists, he attempts to forge an identity authentication tag to access the legitimate recipient B; Step 801: E generates an authentication tag using a randomly guessed key. E ; Step 802: E has some background knowledge about the key held by B. E generates key1 based on the background knowledge of the key and uses key1 to generate tag E1 ; Step 803: B compares the received identity authentication tag with the identity authentication tag generated by itself bit by bit, and calculates E's success authentication rate.

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