Method, device and system for performing secondary check of driving permission by on-board equipment

Abstract

The present disclosure provides a method, device and system for performing secondary checking of a train operation permit by a vehicle-mounted device, the method comprising: performing, by the vehicle-mounted device, first checking of the train operation permit based on a turnout position and a signal state; and performing, by the vehicle-mounted device, second checking based on a track number and a passing sign after the first checking is successful. The checking method of the present disclosure, which performs double checking at the vehicle-mounted device by using different information, greatly improves the accuracy of checking of the train operation permit and ensures the safety of train operation. In particular, when the train is in an ATO mode, the safety of train operation is greatly improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This disclosure belongs to the field of rail vehicle control technology, and in particular relates to a method, device and system for performing secondary verification of train operation permits by on-board equipment. Background Technology

[0002] In the train control system (hereinafter referred to as the train control system), the on-board train control equipment ATP (Automatic Train Protection) determines the speed control curve based on information such as the movement authority (MA) sent by the ground equipment RBC (Radio Block Central) to control the safe operation of the train.

[0003] Therefore, train operation permits play a crucial role in train operation safety; errors in these permits can lead to serious safety accidents. Verifying train operation permits is a means of ensuring their accuracy. However, in the current train control system's MA-based control process, the ATP (Automatic Train Protection) does not verify the MA sent by the RBC (Railway Control Center). In extreme cases, if the MA sent by the RBC is incorrect, the ATP will still use this incorrect permit to control the train, potentially creating safety risks. When in ATO (Automatic Train Operation) mode, if the MA is inconsistent with the operation plan, the train will stop on the wrong track, causing operational failures.

[0004] Therefore, there is a need for a verification method that verifies train operation permits on the onboard equipment and improves the accuracy of the verification. Summary of the Invention

[0005] To address the aforementioned issues, this disclosure provides a method, apparatus, and system for performing secondary verification of vehicle permits using on-board equipment.

[0006] This disclosure provides a method for performing secondary verification of driving permits by an on-board device, the method comprising:

[0007] The onboard equipment performs the first verification of the train operation permit based on the switch position and signal status.

[0008] After the first verification is successful, the on-board equipment performs a second verification based on the track information and passing signs in the operation plan.

[0009] In some embodiments, the first verification includes:

[0010] The onboard equipment obtains the transponder list through the train permission MA and determines the turnout position and signal status that the train permission MA should pass through according to the line topology received from the TSRS.

[0011] Compare the determined turnout position and signal status with the turnout position and signal status sent by the RBC;

[0012] If the comparison results are consistent, then the first verification is successful.

[0013] In some embodiments, the second verification includes:

[0014] The onboard equipment obtains the transponder list through the driving permission MA, and determines the track information and passage signs that the driving permission MA should pass through based on the line topology received from the TRSR and the signal status received from the RBC.

[0015] The identified stock lane information, indicated by a flag, is compared with the stock lane information obtained from TSRS, also indicated by a flag.

[0016] If the comparison results are consistent, then the second verification is successful.

[0017] In some embodiments,

[0018] When the determined turnout position is inconsistent with the turnout position sent by the RBC, the onboard equipment reports a fault and refuses to control the train to move according to the train operation permit; and / or,

[0019] When the determined signal status is inconsistent with the signal status sent by the RBC, if the station entry signal is closed when the train is in the mainline receiving state, the on-board equipment shortens the train operation permission MA to the station entry signal; otherwise, it refuses to control the train to move according to the train operation permission.

[0020] In some embodiments,

[0021] When the determined track information is inconsistent with the track information in the operation plan obtained from TSRS, the onboard equipment reports a fault and refuses to control the train to move according to the train operation permit; and / or,

[0022] When the determined passage sign is inconsistent with the passage sign in the operation plan obtained from TSRS, if the operation plan specifies passage on the main line or siding while the determined passage sign is a stop, the onboard equipment will refuse to control the train to proceed according to the train operation permit.

[0023] This disclosure also provides an in-vehicle device for performing secondary verification of driving permits, the in-vehicle device including one or more interfaces and a processing unit, wherein...

[0024] The one or more interfaces are configured to receive driving permits and route topology;

[0025] The processing unit is configured to perform a first verification of the train operation permit based on the turnout position and signal status. After the first verification is successful, a second verification is performed based on the track information and the passage sign.

[0026] In some embodiments, the first verification includes:

[0027] The processing unit obtains the transponder list through the train travel authorization MA and determines the turnout position and signal status that the train travel authorization MA should pass through according to the line topology received from the TSRS.

[0028] Compare the determined turnout position and signal status with the turnout position and signal status sent by the RBC;

[0029] If the comparison results are consistent, then the first verification is successful.

[0030] In some embodiments, the second verification includes:

[0031] The processing unit obtains the transponder list through the train travel permit (MA) and determines the track information and passage markers that the train travel permit (MA) should pass through according to the line topology received from the TRSR.

[0032] The identified track information, indicated by a flag, is compared with the track information in the operation plan obtained from TSRS, also indicated by a flag.

[0033] If the comparison results are consistent, then the second verification is successful.

[0034] In some embodiments,

[0035] When the determined turnout position is inconsistent with the turnout position sent by the RBC, the processing unit reports a fault and refuses to control the train to proceed according to the train operation permit; and / or,

[0036] When the determined signal status is inconsistent with the signal status sent by the RBC, if the entry signal is closed when the train is in the mainline receiving state, the processing unit shortens the train operation permit MA to the entry signal; otherwise, it refuses to control the train to move according to the train operation permit.

[0037] In some embodiments,

[0038] When the determined track information is inconsistent with the track information in the operation plan obtained from TSRS, the processing unit reports a fault and refuses to control the train to proceed according to the train operation permit; and / or,

[0039] When the determined passage sign is inconsistent with the passage sign in the operation plan obtained from TSRS, if the operation plan specifies passage on the main line or siding while the determined passage sign is a stop, the processing unit refuses to control the train to proceed according to the train operation permit.

[0040] This disclosure also provides a system for verifying driving permits, the system including an on-board unit, an RBC, and a TSRS, wherein...

[0041] The RBC is configured to send driving permission to the on-board equipment;

[0042] The TSRS is configured to send the line topology to the on-board equipment;

[0043] The on-board equipment is configured to perform a first verification of the train operation permit based on the turnout position and signal status. After the first verification is successful, a second verification is performed based on the track information and the passage sign.

[0044] In some embodiments, the first verification includes:

[0045] The onboard equipment obtains the transponder list from the train permission MA received from the RBC, and determines the turnout position and signal status that the train permission MA should pass through according to the line topology received from the TSRS.

[0046] Compare the determined turnout position and signal status with the turnout position and signal status sent by the RBC;

[0047] If the comparison results are consistent, then the first verification is successful.

[0048] In some embodiments, the second verification includes:

[0049] The on-board equipment obtains the transponder list from the train permission MA received from the RBC, and determines the track information and passage sign that the train permission MA should pass through according to the line topology received from the TRSR and the signal status received from the RBC.

[0050] The identified track information, via flags, is compared with the track information, via flags, in the operation plan obtained from TSRS;

[0051] If the comparison results are consistent, then the second verification is successful.

[0052] In some embodiments,

[0053] When the determined turnout position is inconsistent with the turnout position sent by the RBC, the onboard equipment reports a fault and refuses to control the train to move according to the train operation permit; and / or,

[0054] When the determined signal status is inconsistent with the signal status sent by the RBC, if the station entry signal is closed when the train is in the mainline receiving state, the on-board equipment shortens the train operation permission MA to the station entry signal; otherwise, it refuses to control the train to move according to the train operation permission.

[0055] In some embodiments,

[0056] When the determined track information is inconsistent with the track information in the operation plan obtained from TSRS, the onboard equipment reports a fault and refuses to control the train to move according to the train operation permit; and / or,

[0057] When the determined passage marker is inconsistent with the passage marker in the operation plan obtained from TSRS, if the operation plan specifies passage on the main line or siding while the determined passage marker is a stop, the onboard equipment will refuse to control the train to move according to the operation permit.

[0058] Compared with the prior art, this disclosure has the following advantages:

[0059] This disclosure proposes a method for the train control onboard equipment to perform two verifications of the movement authorization (MA) using different information. First, the onboard equipment performs an initial local verification of the movement authorization, followed by a second verification. This dual verification method, where the onboard equipment performs two verifications using different information, significantly improves the accuracy of movement authorization verification and ensures train operation safety. Especially when the train is in ATO (Automatic Train Operation) mode, train operation safety is greatly enhanced.

[0060] The design approach disclosed herein does not change the overall architecture of the existing train control system. It adds corresponding MA verification data to the existing system interfaces and implements the train operation permit verification function on the existing equipment software. The deployment cost is controllable, which can effectively reduce the safety risks when the train operation permit is abnormal. It is conducive to strengthening the overall safety control function of the train control system and improving operational efficiency.

[0061] Other features and advantages of this disclosure will be set forth in the description which follows, and will be apparent in part from the description, or may be learned by practicing the disclosure. The objects and other advantages of this disclosure may be realized and obtained by means of the structures pointed out in the description, claims and drawings. Attached Figure Description

[0062] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of this disclosure or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are some embodiments of this disclosure. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0063] Figure 1 A simplified flowchart illustrating a secondary verification of driving permits performed by an on-board device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown;

[0064] Figure 2 A schematic flowchart of a method for initial verification of driving permits by an on-board device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown.

[0065] Figure 3 A schematic framework of a vehicle permit verification system according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown;

[0066] Figure 4 A schematic flowchart of a method for initial verification of driving permits performed by an on-board device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown;

[0067] Figure 5 A schematic diagram of a line element topology according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown;

[0068] Figure 6 A schematic flowchart of a method for a second verification of driving permit by an on-board device when starting ATO is shown according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

[0069] Figure 7 A schematic flowchart of a second vehicle permit verification method performed by an on-board device in an ATO mode according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown. Detailed Implementation

[0070] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of this disclosure clearer, the technical solutions of the embodiments of this disclosure will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of this disclosure, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of this disclosure, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of this disclosure.

[0071] Figure 1 A simplified flowchart illustrating a secondary verification of driving permits performed by an on-board device according to an embodiment of this disclosure is shown, such as... Figure 1 The on-board equipment shown first performs a first verification. After the first verification is passed, a second verification is performed: the on-board equipment performs a first verification of the train operation permission based on the turnout position and signal status; after the first verification is successful, the on-board equipment performs a second verification based on the track information and the passage sign.

[0072] Figure 2 A basic flowchart of a method for initial verification of driving permits by an on-board device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown, such as... Figure 2As shown in this embodiment, the verification of train operation permits is performed by onboard equipment: the onboard equipment determines the turnout position (e.g., whether it is in the correct or reverse position) and signal status (e.g., whether it is in the open or closed state) based on the train operation permit received from the RBC and the line topology data received from the TSRS; the onboard equipment determines whether the determined turnout position and signal status are consistent with the turnout position and signal status received by the onboard equipment; when the determined turnout position and signal status are consistent with the received turnout position and signal status, the onboard equipment considers the verification of the train operation permit (MA) to be successful; if the turnout position or signal status is inconsistent, safety-side processing is performed. In this embodiment, by verifying the train operation permit through onboard equipment that controls train movement, the risk of train control / movement caused by erroneous train operation permits in the prior art is avoided.

[0073] In this embodiment of the disclosure, in conjunction with, as Figure 3 The schematic framework of the system for verifying vehicle permits shown illustrates the method and system for verifying vehicle permits using on-board equipment as disclosed in this disclosure. Figure 3 As shown, the system for verifying train operation permits in this embodiment includes onboard equipment of the train's onboard system and a ground-based circuit breaker (RBC). The onboard equipment receives information such as train operation permit (MA), turnout position, and signal status from the RBC, and verifies the received train operation permit in the onboard equipment. The onboard system in this embodiment may also include a track topology data transmission system (TSRS), which sends track topology data to the onboard equipment. It should be noted that data transmission between any two or more devices in this embodiment, unless otherwise specified, does not imply direct data transmission between the devices; indirect transmission can also occur through other devices acting as intermediaries / relays.

[0074] In this embodiment of the disclosure, after the RBC receives the turnout position and signal status information from the interlocking, it can transmit the turnout position and signal status information together with the determined train operation permission message transparently to the on-board equipment without performing parsing and reassembly processing, so that the on-board equipment can perform the verification of the train operation permission. Figure 4 A schematic flowchart of a method for initial verification of driving permits performed by an on-board device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown, such as... Figure 4As shown, the onboard equipment receives train operation authorization (MA), turnout position, and signal status information from the RBC, and receives track topology data from the TSRS. For example, the turnout position includes whether one or more turnsouts in the train route are in the correct or reverse position; the signal status includes whether one or more signals in the train route are in a closed, open, or off state; the track topology data includes the track element number, the address of the preceding track element, and the address of the following track element. Track elements are devices on the track such as signals, turnsouts, transponders, and / or tracks.

[0075] The on-board equipment obtains a transponder order list from the received driving permission MA. In this embodiment of the disclosure, the transponder order list represents the sequential order and spacing of transponders within the driving permission MA range. For example, as shown in... Figure 5 Taking the 1G siding open route X-X1 as an example, the transponder sequence list is as follows: The transponder sequence within the received traffic permission MA range is: transponder JZ -> transponder FJZ1 -> transponder DW1 -> transponder CZ1; the reference transponder is 1000m from transponder JZ, transponder JZ is 900m from transponder FCZ1, transponder FCZ3 is 450m from transponder DW1, and transponder DW1 is 450m from transponder CZ1. Combining this transponder list obtained from the traffic permission MA with the line topology data, the turnout positions and signal statuses within the traffic permission MA are determined. For example, taking the above transponder sequence list as transponder JZ-> transponder FJZ1-> transponder DW1-> transponder CZ1, transponder JZ is retrieved in the line topology, and all signal elements on this link, including turnouts and signals, are checked: transponder JZ-> signal X-> turnout SW1-> signal S1-> transponder FJZ1-> transponder DW1-> transponder CZ1-> signal X1. It is determined that signal X is open, turnout SW1 is reversed, signal S1 is closed, and signal X1 is closed.

[0076] The onboard equipment compares the turnout positions and signal states determined based on the transponder list and track topology data in the MA with the turnout positions and signal states received from the RBC to determine if they are consistent. That is, the onboard equipment compares the determined turnout positions with the received turnout positions to determine if they match. If they match, the onboard equipment can further compare the determined signal states with the received signal states to determine if they match. If they match, the train operation permission MA is considered a correct train operation permission, meaning the verification of the train operation permission is considered successful. After successful verification, the train is controlled based on the train operation permission MA. It should be noted that although this disclosure embodiment and the appendix... Figure 4 The example given is that the turnout positions are checked first, and then the signal status is checked second. However, this embodiment does not limit the order of the checks. It is also applicable to the present disclosure to check whether the signal status is checked first, and then check whether the turnout positions are checked second, or to check whether the signal status and turnout positions are checked simultaneously.

[0077] In this embodiment of the disclosure, when the turnout position determined by the on-board equipment is inconsistent with the turnout position received from the RBC, the on-board equipment will consider the received train operation permit MA to be incorrect, that is, consider the train operation permit verification to have failed. At this time, safety side processing 1 is executed, that is, a fault text is reported, indicating that the MA turnout position does not match, and the MA is refused to be used to control the train.

[0078] In this embodiment of the disclosure, when the signal status determined by the on-board equipment is inconsistent with the signal status received from the RBC, the on-board equipment will consider the received train permission MA to be incorrect, that is, consider the train permission verification to have failed. At this time, safety side processing 2 is executed, and a fault text is reported, indicating that the train permission MA signal status does not match. If the train is in the mainline receiving signal closed state, the train permission MA is shortened to the receiving signal; otherwise, the train permission MA is rejected.

[0079] In this embodiment of the disclosure, line topology data is used to describe the line topology structure. The line topology data includes the atomic data of the line elements and the addresses of the line element data, as exemplarily shown in the table below:

[0080] Table 1 Line Topology Data

[0081] This line element data address Line element atomic data

[0082] The line element data address is the address of the current element. The atomic data of a line element consists of fields such as the address of the preceding line element, the address of the following line element, the line element type, and the line element number. The table below provides an example of the atomic data structure for a line element:

[0083] Table 2. Atomic data of circuit elements

[0084]

[0085] The atomic data of a line element describes the identifier of the line element (i.e., the type and number of the line element) and the two-dimensional topological relationship of the line element (the address of the preceding and following line elements). The size of the data structure can be set according to actual needs. As shown in Table 1, in this embodiment, the atomic data of the line element is designed as a 3-byte data structure. The first byte describes the data address of the preceding line element connected to this line element. The first 8 bits of the second byte are the type of this line element (the type definition is shown in Table 3), and the last 24 bits are the numerical number of this line element (a unique number for the entire railway). The third byte describes the numerical address of the following line element connected to this line element. In this embodiment, the line elements include, for example, train control engineering elements such as signals, turnout tips, turnout positioning, turnout reversal, ordinary transponders, precision transponders, and tracks. Their preceding and following topological relationships are obtained from the signal plan design.

[0086] For example, Table 3 shows the definition of line element types, including the values ​​of line elements and their corresponding meanings:

[0087] Table 3 Definition of Line Element Types

[0088]

[0089] Based on the above definitions, line topology data can be used to describe line topology. Figure 5 An example is shown: a line element topology diagram. The above-mentioned line topology data is used to... Figure 5 The line topology is described in the table below:

[0090] Table 4 Example of Line Topology Data

[0091]

[0092] In the above-described line topology data structure of this disclosure embodiment, for illustrative purposes, element numbers are represented by English letters. Different English letters are used to distinguish elements of the same type in different positions. Still using... Figure 5Taking the 1G train reception as an example, transponders JZ, FJZ1, DW1, and CZ1 are all of type 4 (ordinary transponders), and these four different physical transponders are represented by different element numbers. In the actual line topology data structure, these are marked with bits. For ease of understanding, the 24-bit element numbers are represented by element names in Table 4 above. From the above line topology data, it can be seen that... Figure 4 In the diagram, the data address of the ordinary transponder JZ is 0, and the address of the next line element (i.e., signal X) is 3; the address of the line element preceding signal X (i.e., ordinary transponder JZ) is 0, and the address of the next line element (turnout tip SW1_CJ) is 6; this process is repeated sequentially. Figure 5 The relationships between various line elements are described, and the line element topology is ultimately described by the aforementioned line topology data. In this embodiment of the disclosure, since the line element topology data describes the sequential relationships between various elements in the line, the position and status of one or more elements in the line can be obtained based on this line topology data. Taking the transponder sequence list transponder JZ-> transponder FJZ1-> transponder DW1-> transponder CZ1 as an example, transponder JZ is retrieved in the line topology data. Signal X is obtained through the address 3 after JZ, and SW1_CJ is obtained through the address 6 after X. There are two addresses after SW1_CJ, namely 9 and 42, which correspond to the reverse and position of turnout SW1. According to the above method, transponder FJZ1 can be obtained by searching backwards through the reverse position of SW1. The link is determined as transponder JZ->signal X->turnout SW1->signal S1->transponder FJZ1, which confirms that turnout SW1 is in the reverse position, until transponder CZ1 is retrieved. This means that the various track elements and their statuses in the train operation permit (MA) are obtained, including the switch positions and signal statuses.

[0093] When ATO is enabled on the train, ground equipment, such as RBC / TSRS, needs to add data configurations to the system without ATO enabled, and the train control onboard equipment needs to perform the relevant configurations. In addition to performing the aforementioned verification of the train operation permit, the train control onboard equipment also performs a secondary verification of the train operation permit (MA). Figure 6 This illustration shows a flowchart of a method for a second verification of vehicle permits by an on-board unit when starting an ATO (Automatic Vehicle Authorization) system, according to an embodiment of this disclosure. Figure 6 As shown, the onboard equipment determines the track number and passage sign (e.g., pass and / or stop) on the MA based on the driving permit and track topology; when ATO is enabled, the track element topology data in Table 4 will be updated with precise location of transponder elements and track elements, still based on... Figure 5Taking the 1G train reception as an example, based on the train operation permit MA (transponder sequence list) and the line topology, and verifying all signal elements on this link, the sequence is as follows: Transponder JZ -> Signal X -> Turnout SW1 -> Signal S1 -> Transponder FJZ1 -> Transponder JD1 -> Transponder DW1 -> Transponder JD2 -> Track 1 -> Transponder CZ1 -> Signal X1. Therefore, the track number is determined to be 1. Since the signal X1 is confirmed to be closed, the passage flag is determined to be "stop". In other words, based on the line element topology data, the train operation permit MA and its status, such as track number and passage flag, can be obtained.

[0094] The onboard equipment determines whether the determined track number and passage mark are consistent with the track number and passage mark in the operation plan received by the onboard equipment; when the determined track number and passage mark are consistent with the track number and passage mark in the received operation plan, the onboard equipment considers the train operation permit verification successful. In this embodiment of the disclosure, the train operation permit MA is re-verified by the onboard equipment that controls train movement when ATO is initiated, which adapts to the train control mode of ATO and further avoids the risk of train control / movement caused by erroneous train operation permits in the prior art. It should be noted that in this embodiment of the disclosure, the timing of determining whether the train should initiate ATO mode is not necessarily after the first train operation permit MA, but can be any time before the second verification.

[0095] Figure 7 A schematic flowchart illustrating a second vehicle permit verification method performed by an on-board device in ATO mode according to an embodiment of this disclosure is shown. Figure 7 As shown, when ATO is activated, the onboard equipment determines the track number and passage marker on the train permission MA based on the line topology received from TSRS and the train permission MA received from RBC. With ATO enabled, the line topology data in Table 4 will include more precise location of transponder and track elements, still based on... Figure 5 Taking the 1G train reception as an example, based on the MA (transponder sequence list) and the line topology, and after checking all the signal elements on this link, it is found that: transponder JZ->signal X->turnout SW1->signal S1->transponder FJZ1->transponder JD1->transponder DW1->transponder JD2->track 1->transponder CZ1->signal X1. The track number is determined to be 1. The signal X1 is determined to be closed, and the passage sign is determined to be a stop.

[0096] Furthermore, the on-board equipment obtains the track number and passage mark from the operation plan received from the TSRS. It should be noted that, in this embodiment of the disclosure, the order of the two steps—determining the track number and passage mark on the driving permit MA and obtaining the track number and passage mark according to the operation plan received from the TSRS—is not limited.

[0097] The onboard equipment compares the determined track number and passage mark with the track number and passage mark obtained from the operation plan received from the TSRS. If the two track numbers match and the two passage marks match, the onboard equipment considers the verification of the train operation permit MA to be successful, and the onboard equipment will use the train operation permit MA to control the train; if the two track numbers do not match or the two passage marks do not match, safety side processing is performed.

[0098] When the track number determined by the onboard equipment is inconsistent with the track number obtained from the TSRS, the onboard equipment considers the verification of the train operation permit MA to have failed. At this time, safety side processing 3 is executed, that is, a fault text is reported, indicating that the track of the train operation permit MA does not match, and the MA is refused to be used to control the train.

[0099] When the passage mark determined by the onboard equipment is inconsistent with the passage mark obtained from the TSRS, the onboard equipment considers the verification of the train operation permit MA to have failed. At this time, safety side processing 4 is executed, that is, a fault text is reported. If the operation plan obtained from the TSRS shows that the train is passing through the main line or siding, but the determined passage mark is a stop (for example, the departure signal is closed), the train operation permit MA passage status is mismatched, and the MA is refused to be used to control the train.

[0100] Although the present disclosure has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications can still be made to the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments, or equivalent substitutions can be made to some of the technical features; and such modifications or substitutions do not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present disclosure.

Claims

1. A method for performing secondary verification of driving permits by on-board equipment, the method comprising: The onboard equipment performs the first verification of the train operation permit based on the switch position and signal status; among which... The first verification includes: the onboard equipment obtains the transponder list through the train operation permission (MA) and determines the turnout position and signal status that the train operation permission MA should pass through according to the line topology received from the TSRS; the determined turnout position and signal status are compared with the turnout position and signal status sent by the RBC; if the comparison results are consistent, the first verification is successful; if the determined turnout position is inconsistent with the turnout position sent by the RBC, the onboard equipment reports a fault and refuses to control the train to move according to the train operation permission. After the first verification is successful, the onboard equipment performs a second verification based on the track information and passage signs in the operation plan. This second verification includes: after activating ATO, the onboard equipment obtains the transponder list from the train permission MA received from the RBC, and determines the track information and passage signs that the train permission MA should traverse according to the line topology received from the TRSR; the determined track information and passage signs are compared with those obtained from the TSRS; if the comparison results are consistent, the second verification is successful. If the determined track information is inconsistent with the track information in the operation plan obtained from the TSRS, the onboard equipment reports a fault and refuses to control the train according to the train permission; if the determined passage signs are inconsistent with the passage signs in the operation plan obtained from the TSRS, and the operation plan specifies a mainline or siding passage while the determined passage sign is a stop, the onboard equipment refuses to control the train according to the train permission.

2. The method according to claim 1, wherein, When the determined signal status is inconsistent with the signal status sent by the RBC, if the entry signal is closed when the train is in the mainline receiving state, the on-board equipment shortens the train operation permission MA to the entry signal; otherwise, it refuses to control the train to run according to the train operation permission.

3. An on-board device for performing secondary verification of driving permits, the on-board device comprising one or more interfaces and a processing unit, wherein, The one or more interfaces are configured to receive driving permits and route topology; The processing unit is configured to perform a first verification of the train operation permit based on the turnout position and signal status, and after the first verification is successful, perform a second verification based on the track information and the passage sign. The first verification includes: the processing unit obtains the transponder list through the train operation permission (MA) and determines the turnout position and signal status that the train operation permission MA should pass through according to the line topology received from the TSRS; the determined turnout position and signal status are compared with the turnout position and signal status sent by the RBC; if the comparison results are consistent, the first verification is successful; wherein, if the determined turnout position is inconsistent with the turnout position sent by the RBC, the on-board equipment reports a fault and refuses to control the train to move according to the train operation permission; The second verification includes: after ATO is initiated, the processing unit obtains the transponder list through the train operation permission (MA) received from the RBC, and determines the track information and passage signs that the train operation permission MA should pass through according to the line topology received from the TRSR; the determined track information and passage signs are compared with the track information and passage signs obtained from the TSRS; if the comparison results are consistent, the second verification is successful; wherein, if the determined track information is inconsistent with the track information obtained from the TSRS, the processing unit reports a fault and refuses to control the train to run according to the train operation permission; if the determined passage signs are inconsistent with the passage signs obtained from the TSRS, and the operation plan specifies a mainline or siding passage but the determined passage sign is a stop, the processing unit refuses to control the train to run according to the train operation permission.

4. The vehicle-mounted device according to claim 3, wherein, When the determined signal status is inconsistent with the signal status sent by the RBC, if the entry signal is closed when the train is in the mainline receiving state, the processing unit shortens the train operation permit MA to the entry signal; otherwise, it refuses to control the train to run according to the train operation permit.

5. A system for verifying driving permits, the system comprising on-board equipment, an RBC, and a TSRS, wherein, The RBC is configured to send driving permission to the on-board equipment; The TSRS is configured to send route topology and operation plan to the on-board equipment; The on-board equipment is configured to perform a first check on the train operation permit based on the turnout position and signal status. After the first check is successful, a second check is performed based on the track information and passing signs in the operation plan. The first verification includes: the onboard equipment obtains the transponder list through the train operation permission (MA) received from the RBC, and determines the turnout position and signal status that the train operation permission MA should pass through according to the line topology received from the TSRS; the determined turnout position and signal status are compared with the turnout position and signal status sent by the RBC; if the comparison results are consistent, the first verification is successful; if the determined turnout position is inconsistent with the turnout position sent by the RBC, the onboard equipment reports a fault and refuses to control the train to move according to the train operation permission. The second verification includes: after ATO is initiated, the onboard equipment obtains the transponder list through the train permission MA received from the RBC, and determines the track information and passage signs that the train permission MA should pass through according to the line topology received from the TRSR; the determined track information and passage signs are compared with the track information and passage signs obtained from the TSRS; if the comparison results are consistent, the second verification is successful; wherein, if the determined track information is inconsistent with the track information in the operation plan obtained from the TSRS, the onboard equipment reports a fault and refuses to control the train to run according to the train permission; if the determined passage signs are inconsistent with the passage signs in the operation plan obtained from the TSRS, and the operation plan specifies a mainline or siding passage while the determined passage sign is a stop, the onboard equipment refuses to control the train to run according to the train permission.

6. The system according to claim 5, wherein, When the determined signal status is inconsistent with the signal status sent by the RBC, if the entry signal is closed when the train is in the mainline receiving state, the on-board equipment shortens the train operation permission MA to the entry signal; otherwise, it refuses to control the train to run according to the train operation permission.

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