A method for checking a driving permission in an ATO mode, a vehicle-mounted device, and a system

Abstract

The application provides a driving permission checking method in an ATO mode, a vehicle-mounted device and a system. The method comprises the following steps: the vehicle-mounted device determines a track number and a passing sign on the driving permission according to the driving permission and line topology data; the vehicle-mounted device determines whether the determined track number and passing sign are consistent with the track number and passing sign in an operation plan received by the vehicle-mounted device; and when the determined track number and passing sign are consistent with the track number and passing sign in the received operation plan, the vehicle-mounted device considers that the driving permission checking is successful. The vehicle-mounted device in the embodiment of the present application performs local checking on the driving permission in combination with the operation plan information sent by the TSRS. The safety risk caused by the fact that other devices outside the vehicle-mounted device perform checking and the vehicle-mounted device only executes the driving permission in the prior art is reduced.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application belongs to the technical field of rail vehicle control, and particularly relates to a train operation permission checking method in ATO mode, a vehicle-mounted device and a system. BACKGROUND

[0002] The existing train control system (hereinafter referred to as train control system) includes train control ground equipment and train control vehicle-mounted equipment. The ground equipment is a device deployed on the ground, and the vehicle-mounted equipment is a device deployed on the train to realize train control. The train control system plays a crucial role in the railway signal system for train travel control and is the core control system for safe train travel. The radio block central (RBC) in the ground equipment is the core device, which needs to generate a train MA (Movement Authority) according to information provided by interlocking, adjacent RBC, TSRS (Temporary Speed Restriction Server), CTC (Centralized Traffic Control), and send the MA to the train control system vehicle-mounted equipment. The train control system vehicle-mounted equipment mainly includes ATP (Automatic Train Protection) and ATO (Automatic Train Operation) and the like. The ATP needs to determine a speed control curve according to the train operation permission information sent by the RBC to control the safe operation of the train. When the train is running, there are ATO operation mode and non-ATO operation mode. When the ATO function is enabled, the vehicle-mounted equipment also receives a running plan from the TSRS to realize automatic driving functions such as automatic operation of the train in the section and accurate parking of the train at the station.

[0003] In the existing train control system, whether the ATO mode is started or not, the ATP does not check the train operation permission MA sent by the RBC, but directly controls the train according to the train operation permission. At this time, if the MA sent by the RBC is incorrect, the ATP will also use the incorrect train operation permission for train control, which may cause a safety risk. Further, when the ATO is enabled, if the MA is inconsistent with the running plan, the train will stop at the wrong track, causing operation failure. And after starting the ATO mode, the train operation safety requirement is higher, therefore, the checking of the train operation permission MA is particularly important. SUMMARY

[0004] To solve at least one of the above problems, the present disclosure provides a train operation permission checking method in ATO mode, a vehicle-mounted device and a system.

[0005] The present disclosure provides a method for checking train operation permission in ATO mode, the method comprising,

[0006] The vehicle-mounted device determines the track number and passing sign according to the train operation permission and the line topology data;

[0007] The vehicle-mounted device determines whether the determined track number and passing sign are consistent with the track number and passing sign in the received operation plan;

[0008] When the determined track number and passing sign are consistent with the track number and passing sign in the received operation plan, the vehicle-mounted device considers that the checking of the train operation permission is successful.

[0009] In some embodiments,

[0010] The vehicle-mounted device receives the train operation permission from the RBC; and / or,

[0011] The vehicle-mounted device receives the line topology data from the TSRS, and / or receives the track number and passing sign from the TSRS.

[0012] In some embodiments, when the determined track number and passing sign are inconsistent with the track number and passing sign in the received operation plan, the vehicle-mounted device considers that the checking of the train operation permission fails, and performs a safety side processing.

[0013] In some embodiments,

[0014] When the determined track number is inconsistent with the track number in the received operation plan, a first safety side processing is performed; and / or

[0015] When the determined passing sign is inconsistent with the passing sign in the received operation plan, a second safety side processing is performed.

[0016] In some embodiments,

[0017] The first safety side processing is that the vehicle-mounted device reports a fault text, prompts that the track of the train operation permission MA is not matched, and refuses to use the MA to control the train; and / or,

[0018] The second safety side processing is that the vehicle-mounted device reports a fault text, prompts that the passing state of the train operation permission MA is not matched if the determined passing sign is stop while the passing in the operation plan obtained from the TSRS is shown as main line or side line, and refuses to use the MA to control the train.

[0019] In some embodiments,

[0020] After determining that the train starts the ATO mode, the vehicle-mounted device determines the track number and passing sign according to the train operation permission and the line topology data.

[0021] The present disclosure also provides a vehicle-mounted device for checking train operation permit, comprising an interface and a processing unit, wherein,

[0022] the interface is configured to receive train operation permit and line topology data;

[0023] the processing unit is configured to determine track number and passing sign according to the train operation permit and the line topology data, judge whether the determined track number and passing sign are consistent with the track number and passing sign in the received operation plan, and if the determined track number and passing sign are consistent with the track number and passing sign in the received operation plan, it is considered that the train operation permit checking is successful.

[0024] In some embodiments,

[0025] the interface of the vehicle-mounted device is configured to receive the train operation permit from the RBC; and / or,

[0026] the interface of the vehicle-mounted device is configured to receive the line topology data from the TSRS, and / or receive the track number and passing sign from the TSRS.

[0027] In some embodiments, the processing unit is further configured to consider that the train operation permit checking fails and control to perform a safety side processing when the determined track number and passing sign are inconsistent with the track number and passing sign in the received operation plan.

[0028] In some embodiments, the processing unit is configured to control to perform a first safety side processing when the determined track number is inconsistent with the track number in the received operation plan, and / or control to perform a second safety side processing when the determined passing sign is inconsistent with the received passing sign.

[0029] In some embodiments,

[0030] the first safety side processing is that the vehicle-mounted device reports a fault text, prompts that the track of the train operation permit MA is mismatched, and refuses to use the MA to control the train; and / or,

[0031] the second safety side processing is that the vehicle-mounted device reports a fault text, prompts that the passing state of the train operation permit MA is mismatched if the determined passing sign is stop while the passing in the operation plan obtained from the TSRS is shown as main line or side line, and refuses to use the MA to control the train.

[0032] In some embodiments, the processing unit determines the track number and passing sign according to the train operation permit and the line topology data after determining that the train starts the ATO mode.

[0033] The present disclosure also provides a system for checking a driving permit, comprising a vehicle-mounted device, an RBC and a TSRS, wherein,

[0034] The RBC is configured to send a received driving permit to the vehicle-mounted device.

[0035] The TSRS is configured to send line topology data, track number and passing sign to the vehicle-mounted device.

[0036] The vehicle-mounted device is configured to determine the track number and the passing sign according to the driving permit and the line topology data, judge whether the determined track number and the passing sign are consistent with the track number and the passing sign in the received operation plan, and consider that the driving permit checking is successful when the determined track number and the passing sign are consistent with the track number and the passing sign in the received operation plan.

[0037] In some embodiments, when the determined track number and the passing sign are inconsistent with the track number and the passing sign in the received operation plan, the vehicle-mounted device considers that the driving permit checking fails and performs a safety side processing.

[0038] In some embodiments,

[0039] When the determined track number is inconsistent with the track number in the received operation plan, the vehicle-mounted device controls to perform a first safety side processing; and / or,

[0040] When the determined passing sign is inconsistent with the passing sign in the received operation plan, the vehicle-mounted device controls to perform a second safety side processing.

[0041] In some embodiments,

[0042] The first safety side processing is that the vehicle-mounted device reports a fault text, prompts that the track of the driving permit MA is mismatched, and refuses to use the MA to control the train; and / or

[0043] The second safety side processing is that the vehicle-mounted device reports a fault text, prompts that the passing state of the driving permit MA is mismatched if the determined passing sign is stop while the passing sign in the operation plan obtained from the TSRS is main line or side line passing, and refuses to use the MA to control the train.

[0044] In some embodiments, after determining that the train starts the ATO mode, the vehicle-mounted device determines the track number and the passing sign according to the driving permit and the line topology data.

[0045] Compared with the prior art, the present application has the following advantages:

[0046] When the ATO function is enabled, the vehicle-mounted device of the embodiment of the present disclosure combines the operation plan information sent by the TSRS to locally check the driving permission. The safety risk caused by the fact that the existing technology checks the driving permission by other devices outside the vehicle-mounted device and the vehicle-mounted device only executes the driving permission is reduced.

[0047] The present disclosure does not change the overall architecture of the existing train control system, increases the corresponding MA checking data on the existing interface of the system, realizes the driving permission checking function on the existing device software, and has controllable deployment cost, which can effectively reduce the safety risk when the driving permission is abnormal, is conducive to reinforcing the overall safety control function of the train control system, and improves the operation efficiency.

[0048] Other features and advantages of the present disclosure will be described in the following description, and some will become apparent from the description, or will be understood by those skilled in the art. The purpose and other advantages of the present application can be achieved and obtained by the structure indicated in the specification, claims and drawings. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0049] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application or the prior art, the drawings needed in the embodiment or prior art description will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings in the following description are some embodiments of the present application, and those skilled in the art can also obtain other drawings according to these drawings without creative labor.

[0050] Figure 1 A flowchart of a method for checking driving permission by a vehicle-mounted device in an ATO mode according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown;

[0051] Figure 2 A schematic framework of a system for checking driving permission according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown;

[0052] Figure 3 A flowchart of a method for checking driving permission by a vehicle-mounted device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown;

[0053] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of a line element topology according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown;

[0054] Figure 5 A flowchart of a method for checking driving permission by a vehicle-mounted device when starting ATO according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown;

[0055] Figure 6 A flowchart of a method for checking driving permission by a vehicle-mounted device in an ATO mode according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0056] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0057] Figure 1 A basic flowchart of a method for verifying driving permits using an on-board device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown, such as... Figure 1 As shown in this embodiment, the verification of the driving permit is performed by the on-board equipment: the on-board equipment determines the track number and passage mark based on the driving permit and route topology data; the on-board equipment determines whether the determined track number and passage mark are consistent with the track number and passage mark in the operation plan received by the on-board equipment; when the determined track number and passage mark are consistent with the track number and passage mark in the received operation plan, the on-board equipment considers the driving permit verification successful. In this embodiment, the on-board equipment performs local verification of the driving permit in conjunction with the operation plan information sent by the TSRS. This reduces the safety risks caused by the prior art where verification is performed by other devices besides the on-board equipment while the on-board equipment only executes the driving permit verification.

[0058] In this embodiment of the disclosure, in conjunction with, as Figure 2 The schematic framework of the system for verifying vehicle permits shown illustrates the method and system for verifying vehicle permits using on-board equipment as disclosed in this disclosure. Figure 2 As shown, the system for verifying train operation permits in this embodiment includes onboard equipment of the train's onboard system and a ground-based circuit breaker (RBC). The onboard equipment receives information such as the train operation permit (MA), turnout position (e.g., in the correct or reverse position), and signal status (e.g., in the open or closed state) from the RBC, and verifies the received train operation permit in the onboard equipment. The ground system in this embodiment may also include a track topology data transmission system (TSRS), which sends track topology data to the onboard equipment. It should be noted that, unless otherwise specified, data transmission between any two or more devices in this embodiment does not imply direct data transmission between the devices; indirect transmission can also occur through other devices acting as intermediaries / relays.

[0059] In this embodiment of the disclosure, after the RBC receives the turnout position and signal status information from the interlocking, it can transmit the turnout position and signal status information together with the determined train operation permission message transparently to the on-board equipment without performing parsing and reassembly processing, so that the on-board equipment can perform the verification of the train operation permission. Figure 3A schematic flowchart of a method for verifying driving permits performed by an on-board device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown, such as... Figure 3 As shown, the onboard equipment receives train operation authorization (MA), turnout position, and signal status information from the RBC, and receives track topology data from the TSRS. For example, the turnout position includes whether one or more turnsouts in the train route are in the correct or reverse position; the signal status includes whether one or more signals in the train route are in a closed, open, or off state; the track topology data includes the track element number, the address of the preceding track element, and the address of the following track element. Track elements are devices on the track such as signals, turnsouts, transponders, and / or tracks.

[0060] The on-board equipment obtains a transponder order list from the received driving permission MA. In this embodiment of the disclosure, the transponder order list represents the sequential order and spacing of transponders within the driving permission MA range. For example, as shown in... Figure 4 Taking the 1G siding open route X-X1 as an example, the transponder sequence list is as follows: The transponder sequence within the received traffic permission MA range is: transponder JZ -> transponder FJZ1 -> transponder DW1 -> transponder CZ1; the reference transponder is 1000m from transponder JZ, transponder JZ is 900m from transponder FCZ1, transponder FCZ3 is 450m from transponder DW1, and transponder DW1 is 450m from transponder CZ1. Combining this transponder list obtained from the traffic permission MA with the line topology data, the turnout positions and signal statuses within the traffic permission MA are determined. For example, taking the above transponder sequence list as transponder JZ-> transponder FJZ1-> transponder DW1-> transponder CZ1, transponder JZ is retrieved in the line topology, and all signal elements on this link, including turnouts and signals, are checked: transponder JZ-> signal X-> turnout SW1-> signal S1-> transponder FJZ1-> transponder DW1-> transponder CZ1-> signal X1. It is determined that signal X is open, turnout SW1 is reversed, signal S1 is closed, and signal X1 is closed.

[0061] The on-board device compares the switch position and signal state determined according to the transponder list and line topology data in the MA with the switch position and signal state received from the RBC, to determine whether they are consistent. That is, the on-board device compares the determined switch position with the received switch position, to determine whether the determined switch position is consistent with the received switch position from the RBC; in the case of consistency, the on-board device can continue to compare the determined signal state with the received signal state, to determine whether the determined signal state is consistent with the received signal state from the RBC; in the case of consistency, it is determined that the train operation permission MA is a correct train operation permission, that is, it is considered that the verification of the train operation permission is successful. After the verification is successful, the train is controlled based on the train operation permission MA. It should be noted that, although the present embodiment and the accompanying Figure 3 The present embodiment does not limit the order of the above-mentioned two steps, that is, the consistency of the signal state is determined first, then the consistency of the switch position is determined, or the consistency of the signal state and the switch position is determined simultaneously.

[0062] In the present embodiment, when the switch position determined by the on-board device is inconsistent with the received switch position from the RBC, the on-board device considers that the received train operation permission MA is incorrect, that is, it is considered that the verification of the train operation permission fails. At this time, the safety side processing 1 is performed, that is, the fault text is reported, it is prompted that the MA switch position is not matched, and the MA is refused to be used to control the train.

[0063] In the present embodiment, when the signal state determined by the on-board device is inconsistent with the received signal state from the RBC, the on-board device considers that the received train operation permission MA is incorrect, that is, it is considered that the verification of the train operation permission fails. At this time, the safety side processing 2 is performed, that is, the fault text is reported, it is prompted that the train operation permission MA signal state is not matched, at this time, if it is determined that the train is in the on-track receiving state, the in-station signal is closed, the train operation permission MA is shortened to the in-station signal, and in other cases, the train operation permission MA is refused.

[0064] In the present embodiment, the line topology data is used to describe the line topology structure, and the line topology data includes line element atomic data and line element data address, which is exemplarily shown in the following table:

[0065] Table 1 Line topology data

[0066] This line element data address Line element atomic data

[0067] The line element data address is the element address, and the line element atomic data is composed of the address of the previous line element of the line element, the address of the next line element of the line element, the line element type, and the line element number, and the like. The following table shows an example of the line element atomic data structure:

[0068] Table 2 Line element atomic data

[0069]

[0070] The line element atomic data describes the identification of the line element (i.e., the line element type, the line element number) and the two-dimensional topological relationship of the line element (the address of the previous line element of the line element, the address of the next element). For the size of the data structure, it can be set according to actual needs. As shown in Table 1, in the embodiment of the present disclosure, the line element atomic data is designed as a 3-byte data structure, the first byte describes the data address of the previous line element connected to the line element, the first 8 bits of the second byte are the type of the line element (the type definition is shown in Table 3), and the last 24 bits are the number of the line element (the full road unique number), and the third byte describes the number address of the next line element connected to the line element. In the embodiment of the present disclosure, the line element includes, for example, a signal machine, a turnout point, a turnout positioning, a turnout counterposition, a normal balise, a precise balise, and a track, and the like. The topological relationship before and after is obtained from the signal plane design.

[0071] For example, Table 3 shows the definition of the line element type, including the value of the line element and the corresponding meaning:

[0072] Table 3 Definition of line element type

[0073]

[0074] Based on the above definition, the line topology can be described by using the line topology data. Figure 4 An example of a line element topology graph is shown, which describes the line topology of Figure 4 as shown in the following table:

[0075] Table 4 Line topology data example

[0076]

[0077]

[0078] In the line topology data structure of the embodiment of the present disclosure, the element number is represented by English letters for example, and different English letters are used to distinguish the same type of elements in different positions. Still taking Figure 4Taking the 1G train reception as an example, transponders JZ, FJZ1, DW1, and CZ1 are all of type 4 (ordinary transponders), and these four different physical transponders are represented by different element numbers. In the actual line topology data structure, these are marked with bits. For ease of understanding, the 24-bit element numbers are represented by element names in Table 4 above. From the above line topology data, it can be seen that... Figure 4 In the diagram, the data address of the ordinary transponder JZ is 0, and the address of the next line element (i.e., signal X) is 3; the address of the line element preceding signal X (i.e., ordinary transponder JZ) is 0, and the address of the next line element (turnout tip SW1_CJ) is 6; this process is repeated sequentially. Figure 4 The relationships between various line elements are ultimately described by the aforementioned line topology data. In this embodiment, since the line element topology data describes the sequential relationships between various elements in the line, the position and status of one or more elements in the line can be obtained based on this line topology data. Taking the transponder sequence list transponder JZ-> transponder FJZ1-> transponder DW1-> transponder CZ1 as an example (where -> indicates sequential order), transponder JZ is retrieved from the line topology data. Signal X is obtained through the address 3 following JZ, and SW1_CJ is obtained through the address 6 following X. There are two addresses following SW1_CJ, 9 and 42, corresponding to the reverse and position of turnout SW1. According to the above method, transponder FJZ1 can be obtained by searching backwards through the reverse position of SW1. The link is determined as transponder JZ->signal X->turnout SW1->signal S1->transponder FJZ1, which confirms that turnout SW1 is in the reverse position, until transponder CZ1 is retrieved. This means that the various track elements and their statuses in the train operation permit (MA) are obtained, including the switch positions and signal statuses.

[0079] When ATO is enabled on the train, ground equipment, such as RBC / TSRS, needs to add data configurations to the system without ATO enabled, and the train control onboard equipment needs to perform the relevant configurations. In addition to performing the aforementioned verification of the train operation permit, the train control onboard equipment also performs a secondary verification of the train operation permit (MA). Figure 5 A schematic flowchart of a method for verifying vehicle permits when starting an ATO (Autonomous Vehicle Operation) according to an embodiment of this disclosure is shown, such as... Figure 5 As shown, the onboard equipment determines the track number and passage sign (e.g., pass and / or stop) on the MA based on the driving permit and track topology; when ATO is enabled, the track element topology data in Table 4 will be updated with precise location of transponder elements and track elements, still based on... Figure 4For example, according to the train operation permit MA (a list of transponder sequences) and the line topology and checking all signal elements on the link, the signal elements are: transponder JZ -> signal machine X -> turnout SW1 -> signal machine S1 -> transponder FJZ1 -> transponder JD1 -> transponder DW1 -> transponder JD2 -> track 1 -> transponder CZ1 -> signal machine X1, the determined track number is 1, and the passing sign is determined to be stop by determining that the state of the signal machine X1 is closed. That is, according to the line element topology data, the elements and states on the line in the train operation permit MA can be obtained, such as the track number and the passing sign.

[0080] The vehicle-mounted device determines whether the determined track number and the passing sign are consistent with the track number and the passing sign in the received operation plan; when the determined track number and the passing sign are consistent with the track number and the passing sign in the received operation plan, the vehicle-mounted device considers that the train operation permit checking is successful. In the embodiment of the present disclosure, the vehicle-mounted device that controls the train running performs secondary checking on the train operation permit MA when starting ATO, which adapts to the train control mode of ATO and further avoids the risk of train control / operation caused by the incorrect train operation permit in the prior art. It should be noted that in the embodiment of the present disclosure, the timing of determining whether the train starts the ATO mode is not necessarily after the first train operation permit MA, but can be at any time before the secondary checking.

[0081] Figure 6 A flowchart of a method for checking a train operation permit performed by a vehicle-mounted device in an ATO mode according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown. As shown in Figure 6 When starting ATO, the vehicle-mounted device determines the track number and the passing sign on the train operation permit MA according to the line topology received from the TSRS and the train operation permit MA received from the RBC. When ATO is enabled, the line topology data in Table 4 will increase the precise positioning transponder element and the track element, and still taking the 1G train operation as an example, according to the MA (a list of transponder sequences) and the line topology and checking all signal elements on the link, the signal elements are: transponder JZ -> signal machine X -> turnout SW1 -> signal machine S1 -> transponder FJZ1 -> transponder JD1 -> transponder DW1 -> transponder JD2 -> track 1 -> transponder CZ1 -> signal machine X1, the determined track number is 1, and the passing sign is determined to be stop by determining that the state of the signal machine X1 is closed. Figure 4

[0082] ​And the vehicle-mounted device acquires the track number and passing sign from the operation plan received from the TSRS. It should be noted that in the embodiments of the present disclosure, the order between the two steps of determining the track number and passing sign on the train operation permit MA and acquiring the track number and passing sign from the operation plan received from the TSRS is not limited.

[0083] The vehicle-mounted device compares the determined track number and passing sign with the track number and passing sign acquired from the operation plan received from the TSRS. If the two track numbers are consistent and the two passing signs match, the vehicle-mounted device considers that the checking of the train operation permit MA is successful, and the vehicle-mounted device will use the train operation permit MA to control the train. If the two track numbers are inconsistent or the two passing signs do not match, the safety side processing is performed.

[0084] When the track number determined by the vehicle-mounted device is inconsistent with the track number acquired from the TSRS, the vehicle-mounted device considers that the checking of the train operation permit MA fails, at which time the safety side processing 3 is performed, i.e., a fault text is reported, it is prompted that the track of the train operation permit MA is mismatched, and the use of the MA to control the train is refused.

[0085] When the passing sign determined by the vehicle-mounted device is inconsistent with the passing sign acquired from the TSRS, the vehicle-mounted device considers that the checking of the train operation permit MA fails, at which time the safety side processing 4 is performed, i.e., a fault text is reported, if the passing sign determined is a stop (for example, the exit signal state is closed) while the passing sign acquired from the operation plan of the TSRS is a main line or a side line passing, it is prompted that the passing state of the train operation permit MA is mismatched, and the use of the MA to control the train is refused.

[0086] Although the present disclosure is described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, it should be understood by those skilled in the art that the technical solutions recorded in the foregoing embodiments can be modified, or some technical features can be replaced by equivalents; and these modifications or replacements do not make the essence of the corresponding technical solutions deviate from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present disclosure.

Claims

1. A method for verifying vehicle permits in ATO mode, the method comprising: After confirming the train's activation in ATO mode, the onboard equipment determines the track number and passage marker based on the train operation permit and track topology data; among which, The on-board equipment obtains the transponder sequence list based on the driving permit, checks the signal elements on the corresponding link based on the transponder sequence list and line topology data, determines the track number and passage mark on the driving permit, and obtains the track number and passage mark based on the operation plan received from TSRS. The on-board equipment determines whether the track number and passage mark are consistent with the track number and passage mark in the operation plan received by the on-board equipment. When the determined track number and passage sign match the track number and passage sign in the received operation plan, the on-board equipment considers the driving permit verification successful; when the determined track number and passage sign do not match the track number and passage sign in the received operation plan, the on-board equipment considers the driving permit verification failed and performs safety-side processing.

2. The method according to claim 1, wherein, The on-board equipment receives driving permission from the RBC; and / or The on-board equipment receives line topology data from the TSRS, and / or receives track numbers and passage signs from the TSRS.

3. The method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein, If the determined track number is inconsistent with the track number in the received operation plan, the first safety side processing shall be performed; and / or If the determined pass flag is inconsistent with the pass flag in the received operation plan, a second security side process is performed.

4. The method according to claim 3, wherein, The first safety-side processing involves the onboard equipment reporting a fault text, indicating a track mismatch in the train operation permit (MA), and refusing to use the MA to control the train; and / or The second safety-side processing involves the onboard equipment reporting a fault text. If the operation plan obtained from the TSRS shows a passage on the main line or siding, and the determined passage marker is a stop, then a message indicating a mismatch in the passing status of the train travel permit MA is displayed, and the MA is refused to be used to control the train.

5. An on-board device for verifying driving permits, the on-board device comprising an interface and a processing unit, wherein, The interface is configured to receive driving permits and route topology data; The processing unit is configured to, after determining that the train has started in ATO mode, determine the track number and passage mark based on the train operation permit and track topology data; determine whether the determined track number and passage mark are consistent with the track number and passage mark in the operation plan received by the on-board equipment; if the determined track number and passage mark are consistent with the track number and passage mark in the received operation plan, the train operation permit verification is considered successful; wherein, the processing unit is further configured to, if the determined track number and passage mark are inconsistent with the track number and passage mark in the received operation plan, consider the train operation permit verification as unsuccessful and control the execution of safety-side processing; The on-board equipment obtains the transponder sequence list based on the driving permit, checks the signal elements on the corresponding link based on the transponder sequence list and line topology data, determines the track number and passage mark on the driving permit, and obtains the track number and passage mark based on the operation plan received from the TSRS.

6. The vehicle-mounted device according to claim 5, wherein, The interface of the on-board equipment is configured to receive driving permission from the RBC; and / or, The interface of the on-board equipment is configured to receive line topology data from the TSRS, and / or receive track numbers and passage signs from the TSRS.

7. The vehicle-mounted device according to claim 5 or 6, wherein, The processing unit is configured to control the execution of a first safety-side process when the determined track number is inconsistent with the track number in the received operation plan; and / or to control the execution of a second safety-side process when the determined pass flag is inconsistent with the received pass flag.

8. The vehicle-mounted device according to claim 7, wherein, The first safety-side processing involves the onboard equipment reporting a fault text, indicating a track mismatch in the train operation permit (MA), and refusing to use the MA to control the train; and / or, The second safety-side processing involves the onboard equipment reporting a fault text. If the operation plan obtained from the TSRS shows a passage on the main line or siding, and the determined passage marker is a stop, then a message indicating a mismatch in the passing status of the train travel permit MA is displayed, and the MA is refused to be used to control the train.

9. A system for verifying driving permits, the system comprising an on-board unit, an RBC, and a TSRS, wherein, The RBC is configured to send a driving permission to the on-board equipment; The TSRS is configured to send route topology data, track numbers, and passage markers to the onboard equipment. The onboard equipment is configured to, after determining that the train has started in ATO mode, determine the track number and passage mark based on the train operation permit and track topology data; determine whether the determined track number and passage mark are consistent with the track number and passage mark in the operation plan received by the onboard equipment; if the determined track number and passage mark are consistent with the track number and passage mark in the received operation plan, the onboard equipment considers the train operation permit verification successful; wherein, if the determined track number and passage mark are inconsistent with the track number and passage mark in the received operation plan, the onboard equipment considers the train operation permit verification to have failed and performs safety-side processing. The on-board equipment obtains the transponder sequence list based on the driving permit, checks the signal elements on the corresponding link based on the transponder sequence list and line topology data, determines the track number and passage mark on the driving permit, and obtains the track number and passage mark based on the operation plan received from the TSRS.

10. The system according to claim 9, wherein, When the determined track number is inconsistent with the track number in the received operation plan, the on-board equipment control performs the first safety side processing; And / or, When the determined pass sign is inconsistent with the pass sign in the received operation plan, the on-board equipment control performs second safety side processing.

11. The system according to claim 10, wherein, The first safety-side processing involves the onboard equipment reporting a fault text, indicating a track mismatch in the train operation permit (MA), and refusing to use the MA to control the train; and / or, The second safety-side processing involves the onboard equipment reporting a fault text. If the operation plan obtained from the TSRS shows a passage on the main line or siding, and the determined passage marker is a stop, then a message indicating a mismatch in the passing status of the train travel permit MA is displayed, and the MA is refused to be used to control the train.

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