Anonymity and fast identity authentication method for internet of vehicles based on double-chain architecture and national secret algorithm
By using a dual-chain architecture and national cryptographic algorithms, the system achieves separate storage of real vehicle information and pseudonymous information in the Internet of Vehicles, solving the problems of insufficient security and efficiency in existing technologies. It enables anonymous and rapid identity authentication and efficient tracking of malicious vehicles, thereby improving the security and performance of the system.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202310337009.0
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2023-03-31
- Publication Date
- 2025-11-28
- Estimated Expiration
- 2043-03-31
AI Technical Summary
Existing vehicle-to-everything (V2X) identity authentication technologies are inadequate in terms of security and efficiency, especially in their inability to trace malicious nodes in real time and the performance burden that pseudonym registration and authentication processes place on RSUs (Registered Units).
Adopting a dual-chain architecture, the real vehicle information is stored in the cloud chain, while the pseudonym information is stored on the dynamic chain. Anonymous authentication is achieved through the pseudonym mechanism, and an efficient anonymous traceability mechanism is designed. The registration and authentication processes are decoupled using blockchain and smart contract technologies, and secure communication is achieved using national cryptographic algorithms.
It improves the security and throughput of the vehicle-to-everything (V2X) system, enables anonymous and rapid authentication between vehicles, protects vehicle privacy, and can promptly trace malicious vehicles, preventing single points of failure.
Smart Images

Figure CN116566646B_ABST
Abstract
Description
TECHNICAL FIELD
[0001] The present application relates to the technical fields of blockchain and identity authentication, and particularly relates to an anonymous identity authentication method based on blockchain in the context of Internet of Vehicles. BACKGROUND
[0002] Anonymous identity authentication is the first line of defense for vehicle data security and privacy protection. Anonymous identity authentication refers to confirming the authenticity of the user's identity without obtaining the real identity of the vehicle owner. From a security perspective: first, when a node in the system is compromised, an excellent identity authentication scheme can identify malicious nodes and malicious messages and prevent malicious nodes from damaging the system; second, the node can authenticate the identity of the message sender to determine the authenticity of the data and ensure the safety of the data source. From the perspective of privacy protection, anonymous identity authentication uses pseudonyms for authentication during communication, and real information is not disclosed, protecting user privacy.
[0003] Blockchain technology originated from a paper titled "Bitcoin, A peer-to-peer electronic cash system" published by Nakamoto in 2008. Since then, blockchain has been widely used in finance, government, education and other fields. In a narrow sense, blockchain is only a chain data structure that packages transactions into blocks and combines them in a sequential manner according to the time sequence, and uses cryptography to ensure data tamper-proofing and non-falsification. In a broad sense, blockchain technology is a new distributed infrastructure and computing method that uses blockchain data structure to verify and store data, uses distributed node consensus algorithm to generate and update data, uses cryptography to ensure data transmission and access security, and uses smart contracts composed of automatic script code to program and operate data. Some researchers apply blockchain technology to the field of Internet of Vehicles identity authentication to supplement the shortcomings of traditional identity authentication schemes. Some researchers also combine identity authentication with blockchain technology to build a distributed system to avoid single point failure and performance bottlenecks caused by centralization, and take certain measures to make up for the shortcomings of traditional identity authentication schemes, increase system data credibility, and improve overall system security.
[0004] CN111372248A, a high-efficiency anonymous identity authentication method in a vehicle networking environment, belongs to the technical field of vehicle networking security. The technical solution is as follows: the method includes the following steps: vehicle offline registration, online registration and fast identity authentication. The beneficial effects of the present application are: the present application sets up a temporary identity certificate Token mechanism, realizes anonymous two-way communication of vehicles, and improves the authentication efficiency; using the distributed ledger mode of blockchain, it not only guarantees the data traceability and non-tamperability, but also solves the problems of low identity authentication efficiency and vulnerability caused by the centralization of traditional PKI authentication center in vehicle networking; the combination of blockchain PBFT consensus mechanism and smart contract greatly reduces the authentication delay of traditional methods.
[0005] In this patent, the blockchain is composed of RSUs, and the fast authentication communication process needs the participation of the RSU chain. Its networking mode and authentication process are still slightly insufficient in security and efficiency; for security, the real information and pseudonym information of the vehicle are severely divided, and real-time effective tracing of malicious nodes cannot be achieved, and the real information may be tampered with. For efficiency, the pseudonym registration and authentication process are all concentrated on the RSU, which is a heavy burden for RSU with limited performance, and may cause large-scale downtime of RSU under high load;
[0006] The present application designs a double-chain architecture, stores real information in a cloud chain, ensures the non-tamperability of vehicle real information, records the mapping between real information and pseudonyms, and can quickly trace the real vehicle owner if a pseudonym is misused. The double-chain architecture also decouples the pseudonym registration process and the authentication process, allowing the cloud chain with stronger performance to complete the tedious pseudonym registration process, and the vehicles perform lightweight anonymous two-way authentication through the dynamic chain with limited performance. SUMMARY
[0007] The present application aims to solve the problems of the above prior art. A vehicle networking anonymous fast identity authentication method based on a double-chain architecture and a national cryptographic algorithm is proposed. The technical solution of the present application is as follows:
[0008] A vehicle networking anonymous fast identity authentication method based on a double-chain architecture and a national cryptographic algorithm, which includes the following steps:
[0009] 1) Construct a double-chain system, build a system running framework, including a cloud storage chain, a vehicle dynamic chain and a TEE trusted environment in the vehicle;
[0010] 2) Initialize system parameters;
[0011] 3) Real-name registration, based on the framework of step 1), the vehicle submits its real identity information to the cloud chain for registration, and obtains a dedicated digital certificate after success;
[0012] 4), Vehicle pseudonym generation and registration, the vehicle first generates a pseudonym token locally, and then calls the certificate and token as parameters to register the anonymous identity with the storage chain smart contract;
[0013] 5), Inter-vehicle anonymous fast authentication, based on the dynamic chain in step 1), the inter-vehicle anonymous fast authentication is realized through the pseudonym token and the DH key negotiation algorithm.
[0014] Further, the double-chain architecture of step 1) is composed of a cloud storage chain, a vehicle dynamic chain, a cross-chain protocol and an in-vehicle TEE trusted environment, specifically:
[0015] Cloud storage chain: composed of TA traffic system authority chain, is the trust basis of the whole system, which stores the real information of the vehicle, is used to generate certificates, issue tokens, trace malicious vehicles, and ensure system security;
[0016] Vehicle dynamic chain: composed of RSU and OBU, in order to ensure communication privacy and consider the limitations of on-board devices, only the hash value of the anonymous identity that can be dynamically revoked and registered is stored on the chain, which is used for fast anonymous authentication and ensures the authentication efficiency of the system.
[0017] Further, the step 2) initialization system parameters specifically include: SM2 curve selection, cloud chain public and private key pair generation, hash function selection, certificate library cold start, and cross-chain protocol start.
[0018] Further, the step 3) real name registration process specifically includes:
[0019] (1) Vehicle x sends a request for real authentication to the storage chain to obtain the related parameters of the elliptic curve and the hash function;
[0020] (2) After vehicle x receives the public parameters, a random number x is generated as its own private key SK Vx , and the corresponding public key PK Vx is calculated; the user inputs its own real identity information I, uses the hash function H1 to take the hash of I to get h I , uses SK Vx to sign h I to get the signature information Sig I , and the vehicle assembles information M = {PK Vx , Sig I , I, h I}, encrypts the information using the public key PK TA to get the ciphertext c, and calls the storage chain real name registration smart contract using c;
[0021] (3) After the storage chain smart contract accepts the real name registration request, first use SKTA decrypts, if decryption fails, the message is directly discarded; if successful, I is hashed through H1 and compared with h I x verifies the signature, if verification fails, the message is discarded; after success, the real information in M is extracted out, and real verification is performed through offline verification method; after verification, a digital certificate Cer is generated for the vehicle Vx The mapping of the KV pair {PK Vx , Cer Vx} is stored in the evidence chain, and the vehicle is returned with success information, and the vehicle is added to the dynamic chain.
[0022] Further, the step 4) vehicle pseudonym generation and registration process is specifically as follows:
[0023] (1) The vehicle generates a random number c, which is used as its temporary private key SK Tvx , and generates a temporary public key PK Tvx according to the random number; uses SK Vx to sign the message to obtain Sig x , and generates a timestamp T1 according to the current time, and assembles M = {PK Tvx , Sig x , T1, Cer Vx} together with its own certificate, encrypts M using PK TA , and calls the evidence chain anonymous registration smart contract;
[0024] (2) The evidence chain smart contract decrypts the request using SK TA , if decryption fails, the message is not legal, and the message is directly discarded; after successful decryption, first verify Cer Vx , the contract uses PK TA to verify the legality of the certificate issuer's signature, and obtains PK Cer from the certificate, and uses this public key to verify the legality of Sig x in M, if both are successful, the request is legal; then, the vehicle's temporarily generated public key PK Tvx is spliced together with the current timestamp to form an anonymous identity Token, and the timestamp identifies the validity time of the Token; the KV pair {Token, PK Vx} is stored in the evidence chain, so as to trace the real identity later; Token is used as M to call the cross-chain protocol, and the anonymous identity is transmitted to the dynamic chain through the cross-chain protocol;
[0025] (3) After the cross-chain protocol, the anonymous identity is chained on the dynamic chain, at this time the dynamic chain only knows that this anonymous identity is legal, and does not know other additional identity information, and anonymity is achieved; after the vehicle obtains the returned success information, the anonymous identity Token is saved locally, and in subsequent communication, the Token can be used for anonymous communication; the vehicle can apply for multiple anonymous identities to ensure the privacy and unlinkability of its own communication.
[0026] Further, the cross-chain protocol uses a notary mechanism, uses an (n, t) threshold signature algorithm, that is, as long as t notaries sign a transaction, a total digital signature of the transaction by an n notary private key can be formed, so that Sig H(M) The total public key can be used to verify the signature. The notary group is jointly created by the RSU, and then composed of high-reputation nodes in the dynamic chain. The notary group is divided into a verification group and a linking group, the verification group performs threshold signature on each cross-chain transaction, the linking group aggregates the signature of the verification group, sends it to the smart contract of the dynamic chain for verification, and completes the on-chain operation. The cross-chain protocol includes four steps of initialization, receiving request, threshold signature and cross-chain operation.
[0027] (1) The TA collects anonymous identity application information and assembles it into a transaction TX, TX contains a set of multiple anonymous identity Tokens, uses SK TA Signs the hash of TX to obtain Sig H(M) Broadcasts M={TX, Sig H(M) , T3} to the notary group.
[0028] (2) The notary group node verifies each transaction received and signs the transaction using the notary group partial private key and sends it to the linking group for aggregation.
[0029] (3) The linking group accepts the signature information of the verification group, and when t pieces of information are collected, the signature information is aggregated into Sig sum , uses M={TX, Sig sum , T4} to call the smart contract of the dynamic chain.
[0030] (4) The smart contract checks the timeliness of T4, if it is too far from the current time, discards the message, verifies the authenticity of Sig sum through the notary group public key, and after verification, parses TX and modifies the dynamic chain according to TX.
[0031] Further, the step 5) vehicle-to-vehicle anonymous quick authentication process is as follows:
[0032] (1) Vehicle A generates a random number x, multiplies it by the base point to get xG; Vehicle A selects a local non-expired anonymous identity, parses out the temporary public key PK Tvx from it; Vehicle A signs xG||Token using the corresponding private key to obtain Sig A , and generates the current timestamp T2, together forming the message M = {Sig A , xG, Token, T2} sent to vehicle B, requesting authentication;
[0033] (2) After receiving the request, vehicle B first checks the timestamp and discards requests with too large a time gap, then extracts Token from M and checks the timestamp in Token to confirm that the Token is still within the use period, and verifies the signature; Finally, through the dynamic chain smart contract, the authenticity of the Token is queried; After successful verification, vehicle B generates a random number y, multiplies it by the base point to get yG, and similarly, vehicle B selects an unexpired anonymous identity and uses the corresponding public and private keys of the identity to generate a signature Sig B for xG||Token, and generates the current timestamp T3, together forming the message M = {Sig B , yG, Token, T3} and replying to vehicle A;
[0034] (3) Vehicle A verifies the anonymous identity of vehicle B through the same process, and if successful, vehicle A and B both calculate the symmetric key xyG and use this symmetric key to encrypt the message, achieving secure communication.
[0035] Further, the DH key agreement algorithm specifically includes:
[0036] The Diffie-Hellman algorithm is a key agreement algorithm based on the symmetric encryption system, used to negotiate keys on an insecure communication channel to achieve encrypted communication. The following are the general steps of the Diffie-Hellman key agreement algorithm:
[0037] (1) First, A and B both select a large prime number p and a primitive root G. These values are usually pre-shared between the two parties or transmitted through a secure channel.
[0038] (2) A selects a random private key a and calculates the public key A = g^a mod p. Bob also selects a random private key b and calculates the public key B = g^b mod p.
[0039] (3) A and B exchange their public keys A and B.
[0040] (4) Alice calculates K = B^a mod p, while Bob calculates K = A^b mod p. Since (ab) mod p = (ba) mod p, the K calculated by Alice and Bob are the same.
[0041] The Diffie-Hellman key agreement algorithm is integrated in the anonymous two-way authentication process, and the finally negotiated secure key is xyG, and subsequent encryption communication can be carried out through the key.
[0042] The advantages and beneficial effects of the present application are as follows:
[0043] The traditional Internet of Vehicles still has deficiencies in data security, privacy protection and fault tolerance. In view of these problems, the present scheme uses a double-chain structure, prevents single-point failure through blockchain and smart contract technology, stores vehicle auxiliary authentication information and real identity information separately, and realizes anonymous authentication through pseudonym mechanism to strengthen data privacy. An efficient anonymous tracing mechanism is designed to trace and clean up malicious vehicles in time, ensuring system security.
[0044] 1. A double-chain architecture is proposed, which uses a combination of evidence chain and dynamic chain to decouple functions. The evidence chain stores real information and constructs a vehicle node real information network, responsible for real information tracing of malicious nodes. The dynamic chain stores auxiliary authentication information and pseudonym, provides efficient inter-vehicle two-way authentication protocol support, and improves the security and throughput of the system.
[0045] 2. The pseudonym registration process is essentially a vehicle-cloud authentication protocol, which guarantees the security of real-name authentication through blockchain and digital certificate technology. An anonymous two-way authentication protocol based on pseudonym is also designed, which uses cryptography and blockchain technology for anonymous two-way authentication to protect vehicle privacy and improve system security.
[0046] 3. Based on the double-chain architecture, an adaptive cross-chain protocol based on notary group and threshold signature is designed, which uses high-reputation nodes as notary group to ensure the reliability of the notary group and realizes safe and efficient cross-chain communication between the evidence chain and the dynamic chain. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS
[0047] Figure 1 is a system architecture diagram of a preferred embodiment provided by the present application;
[0048] Figure 2 is a real-name registration process diagram;
[0049] Figure 3 is an anonymous identity registration process diagram;
[0050] Figure 4 is an anonymous two-way authentication process diagram. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0051] The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be described clearly and in detail below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present application. The described embodiments are only some of the embodiments of the present application.
[0052] The technical solutions of the present application to solve the above technical problems are:
[0053] The present application provides a kind of based on double chain architecture and national secret algorithm's Internet of Vehicles anonymous fast identity authentication method, the described embodiment is only a part of the embodiments of the present application.
[0054] The flow chart of the scheme is as Figure One It is a kind of based on double chain architecture and national secret algorithm's Internet of Vehicles anonymous fast identity authentication method, and it specifically includes the following steps:
[0055] 1), build double chain system, build system running framework, including cloud chain, dynamic chain and in-vehicle TEE trusted environment;
[0056] 2), initialize system, initialize system parameters, including cryptography curve selection etc.;
[0057] 3), real-name registration, based on the framework of step one, vehicle will submit its real identity information to cloud chain for registration, obtain exclusive digital certificate after success;
[0058] 4), vehicle pseudonym generation and registration, vehicle first generates pseudonym Token locally, then certificate and Token are called as parameters to call storage chain smart contract for anonymous identity registration;
[0059] 5), anonymous fast authentication between vehicles, based on dynamic chain in step one between vehicles, anonymous fast authentication between vehicles is realized through pseudonym Token and DH secret key negotiation algorithm.
[0060] Specifically, the anonymous fast identity authentication method based on double chain architecture and national secret algorithm, characterized in that:
[0061] Step 1) the double chain architecture is composed of cloud storage chain, vehicle dynamic chain, cross-chain protocol and in-vehicle TEE trusted environment, specifically as follows:
[0062] Cloud storage chain: composed of TA (transportation system authority), is the trust root of the whole system, which stores vehicle real information, mainly responsible for generating certificate, issuing Token, tracing malicious vehicles, etc., to ensure system security.
[0063] Vehicle dynamic chain: composed of RSU and OBU, to ensure communication privacy and consider the limitation of vehicle-mounted equipment, only the Hash value of anonymous identity that can be dynamically revoked registration is stored on the chain, which is mainly used for fast anonymous authentication to ensure system authentication efficiency.
[0064] Step 2) Initialize the system and initialize system parameters, including SM2 curve selection, cloud blockchain public and private key pair generation, hash function selection, certificate store cold start, and cross-chain protocol startup;
[0065] Step 3) The real-name registration process includes, for example: Figure Two The details are as follows:
[0066] (1) Vehicle x sends a request for real authentication to the evidence storage chain in order to obtain the relevant parameters of the elliptic curve and hash function.
[0067] (2) After receiving the public parameters, vehicle x uses a random number generator to generate a random number x as its own private key SK. Vx And calculate the corresponding public key PK. Vx The user inputs their real identity information I, and the hash function H1 is used to hash I to obtain h. I Using SK Vx For h I Sign to obtain Sig I Vehicle assembly information M = {PK} Vx Sig I 、I、h I}, use PK to store this information TA The encrypted text c is obtained, and c is used to call the real-name registration smart contract of the evidence storage chain.
[0068] (3) After the evidence storage chain smart contract accepts the real-name registration request, it first uses SK TA Perform decryption; if decryption fails, discard the message. If successful, hash I using H1 and then combine it with h. I Comparative verification was conducted, and the results were compared and verified through a PK test. x Verify the signature; if verification fails, discard the message. Upon successful verification, extract the actual information from M and verify its authenticity using a series of methods, including offline verification. Once verification is successful, generate a digital certificate Cer for this vehicle. Vx , put KV into {PK Vx Cer Vx The mapping of} is stored in the evidence storage chain, a success message is returned to the vehicle, and the vehicle is added to the dynamic chain.
[0069] Step 4) Vehicle pseudonym generation and registration process as follows Figure Three The details are as follows:
[0070] (1) The vehicle generates a random number c and uses this random number as its own temporary private key SK. Tvx And generate a temporary public key PK based on this random number. Tvx Using SK Vx Sign the message to get Sigx , and generates a timestamp T1 according to the current time, assembles it into M = {PK Tvx , Sig x , T1, Cer Vx} together with the self certificate, and calls the notarization chain anonymous registration smart contract after encrypting M using PK TA .
[0071] (2) The notarization chain smart contract decrypts the request using SK TA . If decryption fails, it means that the message is not legal, and the message is discarded directly. After successful decryption, first, Cer Vx is verified. The contract verifies the legality of the certificate issuer's signature using PK TA , and obtains PK Cer from the certificate, and uses this public key to verify the legality of Sig x in M. If both are successful, it means that this request is legal. Then, the vehicle's temporarily generated public key PK Tvx is spliced with the current timestamp to form an anonymous identity Token, and the timestamp identifies the validity period of the Token. The KV pair {Token, PK Vx} is stored in the notarization chain for subsequent tracing of the real identity. Token is used as M to call the cross-chain protocol, and the anonymous identity is transmitted to the dynamic chain through the cross-chain protocol.
[0072] (3) After the cross-chain protocol, the anonymous identity is on the dynamic chain, at this time the dynamic chain only knows that this anonymous identity is legal, and does not know other additional identity information, realizing anonymity. After the vehicle obtains the returned success information, the anonymous identity Token is saved locally, and in subsequent communication, this Token can be used for anonymous communication. The vehicle can apply for multiple anonymous identities to ensure the privacy and unlinkability of its own communication.
[0073] Step 5) The anonymous quick authentication process between vehicles is as shown in Figure Four , and is as follows:
[0074] (1) Vehicle A generates a random number x, and multiplies it by the base point to obtain xG. Vehicle A selects a local anonymous identity that is not expired, and parses the temporary public key PK Tvx therein. Vehicle A signs xG||Token using the corresponding private key to obtain Sig A , and generates a current timestamp T2, together forming a message M = {Sig A , xG, Token, T2} sent to vehicle B, requesting authentication.
[0075] (2) Upon receiving the request, Vehicle B first checks the timestamp, discarding requests with large time discrepancies. Then, it extracts the Token from M, checks the timestamp on the Token to confirm it is still valid, and verifies the signature. Finally, it queries the Token's authenticity via the dynamic chain smart contract. After successful verification, Vehicle B generates a random number y, multiplies it by the base point to obtain yG. Similarly, Vehicle B selects an anonymous identity that has not expired and uses the public and private keys corresponding to that identity to generate a signature Sig for xG||Token. B And generate the current timestamp T3, together forming the message M = {Sig} B ,yG,Token,T3}, reply to vehicle A.
[0076] (3) Vehicle A verifies the anonymous identity of vehicle B through the same process. If successful, both vehicle A and vehicle B can calculate the symmetric key xyG on their own and use this symmetric key to encrypt messages and achieve secure communication.
[0077] The following is a description to help understand blockchain concepts: A blockchain is a chain-like data structure that sequentially links data blocks in chronological order, using cryptography to ensure the immutability and unforgeability of these blocks. Each block in a blockchain is linked to the preceding block by including its cryptographic hash. Each block also includes a timestamp, its cryptographic hash, and one or more transactions. Transactions verified by nodes in the blockchain network are hashed to form a Merkle tree. In the Merkle tree, the data at the leaf nodes is hashed, and for each branch, all hash values of that branch are concatenated at the root. This process is repeated for the Merkle tree until the root node is reached. The root node of the Merkle tree stores the hash value representing all the data in that tree. When a hash value claims to be a transaction stored in the Merkle tree, it can be quickly verified by checking if the hash value matches the structure of the Merkle tree.
[0078] The systems, devices, modules, or units described in the above embodiments can be implemented by computer chips or entities, or by products with certain functions. A typical implementation device is a computer. Specifically, a computer can be, for example, a personal computer, laptop computer, cellular phone, camera phone, smartphone, personal digital assistant, media player, navigation device, email device, game console, tablet computer, wearable device, or any combination of these devices.
[0079] It is also to be noted that the terms "comprising", "including", or any other variations thereof, are intended to cover a non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements does not include only those elements but can also include other elements not expressly listed or inherent to such process, method, article, or apparatus. An element proceeded by "comprises a... " does not, without more constraints, exclude the existence of additional identical elements in the process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises the element.
[0080] The above examples are to be understood only as illustrative of the application and not a restriction on the scope of protection of the application. After reading the specification, the skilled person can make various changes or modifications to the application, and these equivalent changes and modifications also fall within the scope defined by the claims of the application.
Claims
1. A method for anonymous and fast identity authentication in vehicle-to-everything (V2X) networks based on a dual-chain architecture and national cryptographic algorithms, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: 1) Construct a dual-chain system and build a system operation framework, including a cloud-based evidence storage chain, a vehicle dynamic chain, and an in-vehicle TEE trusted environment; 2) Initialize system parameters; 3) Real-name registration: Based on the framework of step 1), vehicles submit their real identity information to the cloud blockchain for registration, and obtain a unique digital certificate upon successful registration. 4) Vehicle pseudonym generation and registration: The vehicle first generates a pseudonym token locally, and then uses the certificate and token as parameters to call the evidence storage chain smart contract to register an anonymous identity. 5) Anonymous fast authentication between vehicles: Based on the dynamic chain in step 1), anonymous fast authentication between vehicles is achieved through pseudonym tokens and Diffie-Hellman key negotiation algorithm. The dual-chain architecture in step 1) consists of a cloud-based evidence storage chain, a vehicle dynamic chain, a cross-chain protocol, and an in-vehicle TEE trusted environment, specifically: Cloud-based evidence storage chain: This chain, composed of authoritative institutions within the TA transportation system, is the foundation of trust for the entire system. It stores real vehicle information and is used to generate certificates, issue tokens, trace malicious vehicles, and ensure system security. Vehicle Dynamic Chain: Composed of RSU and OBU, to ensure communication privacy and considering the limitations of in-vehicle equipment, the chain only stores the hash value of anonymous identity that can be dynamically revoked for fast anonymous authentication, ensuring system authentication efficiency.
2. The vehicle-to-everything (V2X) anonymous fast identity authentication method based on a dual-chain architecture and national cryptographic algorithms as described in claim 1, characterized in that, Step 2) Initializing system parameters specifically includes: SM2 curve selection, cloud blockchain public and private key pair generation, hash function selection, certificate store cold start, and cross-chain protocol startup.
3. The method for anonymous and fast identity authentication in vehicle networking based on a dual-chain architecture and national cryptographic algorithms according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step 3) of the real-name registration process specifically includes: (1) Vehicle x sends a request for real authentication to the evidence storage chain in order to obtain the relevant parameters of the elliptic curve and hash function; (2) After receiving the public parameters, vehicle x uses a random number generator to generate a random number x as its own private key SK. Vx And calculate the corresponding public key PK. Vx The user inputs their real identity information I, and the hash function H1 is used to hash I to obtain h. I Using SK Vx For h I Signature information Sig is obtained by signing. I Vehicle assembly information M = {PK} Vx Sig I 、I、h I }, use the public key PK to access this information. TA Encrypt the ciphertext c, and use c to call the real-name registration smart contract of the evidence storage chain; (3) After the evidence storage chain smart contract accepts the real-name registration request, it first uses SK TA Perform decryption. If decryption fails, discard the message. If successful, hash I using H1 and then combine it with h. I Comparative verification was conducted, and the results were compared and verified through a PK test. x Verify the signature; if verification fails, discard the message. Upon successful verification, extract the actual information from M and verify its authenticity using offline verification methods. Once verification is successful, generate a digital certificate Cer for this vehicle. Vx , put KV into {PK Vx Cer Vx The mapping of} is stored in the evidence storage chain, a success message is returned to the vehicle, and the vehicle is added to the dynamic chain.
4. The vehicle-to-everything (V2X) anonymous fast identity authentication method based on a dual-chain architecture and national cryptographic algorithms as described in claim 3, characterized in that, The specific process for generating and registering vehicle pseudonyms in step 4) is as follows: (1) The vehicle generates a random number c and uses this random number as its own temporary private key SK. Tvx And generate a temporary public key PK based on this random number. Tvx Using SK Vx Sign the message to get Sig x It generates a timestamp T1 based on the current time and assembles it together with its own certificate into M = {PK}. Tvx Sig x T1, Cer Vx }, use PK for M TA After encryption, the smart contract is anonymously registered using the evidence storage chain. (2) The evidence storage chain smart contract uses SK TA The request is decrypted. If decryption fails, the message is invalid and should be discarded. If decryption is successful, the message is first processed by Cer. Vx The contract uses PK for testing. TA Verify the legitimacy of the certificate issuer's signature and obtain the PK from the certificate. Cer Use this public key to verify Sig in M x The legitimacy of the request is verified; if all steps are successful, the request is considered legitimate. Subsequently, the temporarily generated public key PK of the vehicle is transferred. Tvx Concatenate the current timestamp with the key-value pair {Token, PK} to form an anonymous identity token. The timestamp indicates the token's validity period. Vx The information is stored in the evidence storage chain so that the true identity can be traced later. Use the token as M to call the cross-chain protocol and transfer the anonymous identity to the dynamic chain through the cross-chain protocol. (3) After the cross-chain protocol, the anonymous identity is on the dynamic chain. At this time, the dynamic chain only knows that the anonymous identity is legal and does not know any other additional identity information, thus achieving anonymity. After the vehicle receives the returned success information, it saves the anonymous identity token locally and uses this token for anonymous communication in subsequent communications. The vehicle applies for multiple anonymous identities to ensure the privacy and non-linkability of its own communication.
5. The vehicle-to-everything (V2X) anonymous fast identity authentication method based on a dual-chain architecture and national cryptographic algorithms as described in claim 4, characterized in that, The cross-chain protocol uses a notary mechanism and an (n,t) threshold signature algorithm. This means that as long as t notaries sign a transaction, a total digital signature of the transaction is formed using the private keys of n notaries, thus obtaining the Sig... H(M) The signature is verified using the master public key. The notary group is jointly created by the RSU and subsequently composed of high-reputation nodes in the dynamic chain. The notary group is divided into a verification group and a linking group. The verification group performs a threshold signature on each cross-chain transaction, and the linking group aggregates the signatures from the verification group, sends them to the smart contract on the dynamic chain for verification, and completes the on-chain operation. The cross-chain protocol includes four steps: initialization, request reception, threshold signature, and cross-chain operation. (1) TA collects anonymous identity application information and assembles it into a transaction TX. TX contains a collection of multiple anonymous identity tokens, using SK. TA Sign the TX hash to obtain Sig H(M) Let M = {TX, Sig} H(M) T3} broadcasts to the notary group; (2) The notary group node verifies each transaction it receives, and signs the transaction using part of the notary group's private key before sending it to the link group for aggregation. (3) The link group receives the signature information from the verification group. After collecting t pieces of information, it aggregates the signature information into Sig. sum Using M = {TX, Sig} sum T4} invokes the dynamic chain smart contract; (4) The smart contract checks the timeliness of T4. If it is too far from the current time, the message is discarded, and Sig is verified using the public key of the notary public group. sum After the authenticity verification is passed, the transaction (TX) is parsed out, and the dynamic link is modified based on the TX.
6. The vehicle-to-everything (V2X) anonymous fast identity authentication method based on a dual-chain architecture and national cryptographic algorithms as described in claim 4, characterized in that, The anonymous rapid authentication process between vehicles in step 5) is as follows: (1) Vehicle A generates a random number x, multiplies it by the base point to obtain xG; Vehicle A selects a local, unexpired anonymous identity and parses out the temporary public key PK from it. Tvx Vehicle A uses the corresponding private key to sign xG||Token and obtain Sig A And generate the current timestamp T2, together forming the message M = {Sig} A Send the following to vehicle B: xG, Token, T2, to request authentication; (2) After receiving the request, vehicle B first checks the timestamp and discards requests with large time differences. Then, it extracts the Token from M, checks the timestamp in the Token to confirm that the Token is still valid, and verifies the signature. Finally, it queries the authenticity of the Token through the dynamic chain smart contract. After successful verification, vehicle B generates a random number y, multiplies it by the base point to obtain yG. Similarly, vehicle B selects an anonymous identity that has not expired and uses the public and private keys corresponding to this identity to generate a signature Sig for xG||Token. B And generate the current timestamp T3, together forming the message M = {Sig} B , yG, Token, T3}, reply to vehicle A; (3) Vehicle A verifies the anonymous identity of vehicle B through the same process. If successful, both vehicle A and vehicle B calculate the symmetric key xyG and use this symmetric key to encrypt the message to achieve secure communication.
7. The method for anonymous and fast identity authentication in vehicle networking based on a dual-chain architecture and national cryptographic algorithms as described in claim 6, characterized in that, The Diffie-Hellman key negotiation algorithm specifically includes: The Diffie-Hellman algorithm is a key negotiation algorithm based on a fee-symmetric encryption system, used to negotiate keys over insecure communication channels to achieve encrypted communication. The following are the general steps of the Diffie-Hellman key negotiation algorithm: (1) First, A and B each choose a large prime number p and a primitive root G; these values are usually shared in advance between the two parties or transmitted through a secure channel; (2) A chooses a random private key a and calculates the public key A = g^a mod p; Bob also chooses a random private key b and calculates the public key B = g^b mod p; (3) A and B exchange their respective public keys A and B; (4) Alice calculates K = B^a mod p, while Bob calculates K = A^b mod p; since (ab) mod p = (ba) mod p, Alice and Bob calculate the same K. The Diffie-Hellman key negotiation algorithm is integrated into the anonymous two-way authentication process, and the final negotiated security key is xyG, which can be used for subsequent encrypted communication.
Citation Information
Patent Citations
Efficient anonymous identity authentication method in Internet of Vehicles environment
CN111372248A
Internet of vehicles pseudonym management method based on homomorphic encryption mechanism
CN114599028A