Power control devices, trusted operating systems, proactive defense methods, and electronic devices

By integrating security chips and software modules into the power control device, lightweight system verification and proactive defense are achieved, solving the problem of high hardware modification costs in existing technologies, improving system security, and supporting multi-platform permission management.

CN117932706BActive Publication Date: 2026-11-17BEIJING SMARTCHIP MICROELECTRONICS TECHNOLOGY CO LTD +1
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202311650716.1
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2023-12-04
Publication Date
2026-11-17
Estimated Expiration
2043-12-04

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing trusted computing systems based on TPM/TPCM require extensive hardware and software modifications, leading to increased costs and a lack of lightweight system verification and proactive defense mechanisms.

Method used

Employing a power control device with a security chip, and using cryptographic devices or smart cryptographic keys, the system achieves proactive defense of the operating system through a unified cryptographic application interface. The security chip is used for measurement and power control, and combined with software module files to trigger measurement requests at different stages, it achieves lightweight system verification and defense.

Benefits of technology

It does not require deep hardware modifications, but utilizes existing security hardware to achieve lightweight system verification and defense, improving system security, reducing costs, and supporting multi-platform permission management.

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Abstract

This application provides a power control device, a trusted operating system proactive defense method, and an electronic device, relating to the field of trusted computing technology. The power control device includes: a security chip for generating measurement results based on built-in preset measurement rules and received measurement requests; an on / off control module for controlling the power supply's on / off state based on the measurement results from the security chip; and a first communication module for data interaction between the security chip and external devices. It can be used in conjunction with module files in a software system, with the security chip in the power control device performing measurements to determine power supply on / off. The implementation method provided in this application can achieve trusted measurement transformation of existing hardware systems and has the advantage of ease of implementation.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of trusted computing technology, specifically to a power control device with a security chip, a trusted operating system active defense method, an electronic device, and a corresponding storage medium. Background Technology

[0002] Traditional security defenses focus primarily on application-layer defenses, paying little attention to underlying defenses. While trusted chains built on TPM / TPCM can guarantee the security of the entire hardware platform and operating system, they also require deep modifications to both hardware and software, inevitably increasing hardware and maintenance costs. The primary defense needs of specialized industries, such as industrial control computers and workstations, are increasing. How to effectively implement lightweight system verification while simultaneously employing proactive defense technologies to quickly block security vulnerabilities and malicious attacks is of paramount importance for endpoint security.

[0003] While existing technologies provide some methods for building trusted computing systems, they all require pre-installation of these methods to achieve the function of trust measurement, and do not provide technical solutions for later upgrades and modifications. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The purpose of this application is to provide a power control device, a trusted operating system active defense method, and an electronic device, which aim to implement an operating system active defense technology based on a unified cryptographic application interface through cryptographic devices or smart cryptographic keys, so as to at least solve some of the problems in the background art.

[0005] To achieve the above objectives, this application provides a power control device with a security chip, comprising: a security chip for generating measurement results based on built-in preset measurement rules and received measurement requests; an on / off control module for controlling the power supply on / off based on the measurement results of the security chip; and a communication module for data interaction between the security chip and external devices.

[0006] Preferably, the external device is security hardware, which includes a second communication module for data interaction with the first communication module.

[0007] Preferably, the security hardware is a smart password key or a PCIe password card.

[0008] Preferably, the power control device controls itself to communicate only with external devices in the access list by setting an access list.

[0009] Preferably, the power control device is further configured to: feed back measurement results and / or measurement progress to external devices via the first communication module.

[0010] This application also provides a method applied to an application end, wherein the application end is powered by the aforementioned power control device and is communicatively coupled to security hardware. The method includes: setting at least one module file in the software system of the application end, wherein when the module file is executed, it triggers the security hardware to send a measurement request to the power control device.

[0011] Preferably, the module file is set in the configuration file of the startup manager.

[0012] Preferably, the module file is in MOD format and is written to the software system using the insmod command.

[0013] Preferably, the module file is set in the operating system image data checking software of the software system, and the operating system image data checking software is used to check the image data of the operating system loaded by the system.

[0014] Preferably, the operating system image data inspection software is configured to trigger the security hardware to perform the following operations: calculate feature values ​​on the operating system image data as hardware algorithm resources; and send the calculated feature values ​​as a measurement request to the power control device.

[0015] Preferably, the module file is set in control command verification software, which is used to verify the control command before it is executed.

[0016] Preferably, the control command verification software is configured to trigger the security hardware to perform the following operations: in response to receiving a control command, determining whether the control command is a critical control command; if the control command is a critical control command, performing verification calculations on the control command; and sending the verification calculation results as a measurement request to the power control device.

[0017] Preferably, the module file is set in the system's periodic execution list.

[0018] This application also provides an electronic device, including: at least one processor; and a memory connected to the at least one processor; wherein the memory stores instructions executable by the at least one processor, and the at least one processor implements the steps of the aforementioned trusted operating system proactive defense method by executing the instructions stored in the memory.

[0019] This application also provides a machine-readable storage medium storing instructions that, when executed by a processor, configure the processor to perform steps implementing the aforementioned trusted operating system proactive defense method.

[0020] This application also provides a computer program product, including a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the aforementioned trusted operating system proactive defense method.

[0021] The above technical solution has the following beneficial effects:

[0022] (1) It overcomes the shortcomings of existing trusted technologies based on TPM / TPCM, which often require deep modifications to the motherboard and BIOS hardware and software, involving many uncontrollable factors such as cost and licensing, and cannot effectively achieve lightweight system verification.

[0023] (2) It can add modules at different locations in the software system and carry out related driver development, giving the initiative of system verification, loading and adjudication to cryptographic devices with higher security levels, thereby improving the security of the system.

[0024] (3) Use smart cryptographic keys or devices such as encryption cards and USB keys as key carriers, and use hardware algorithm resources to realize cryptographic operations such as identity authentication and system verification, and use chip technology to ensure that key information is not read out.

[0025] (4) At present, a mature and feasible security protection mechanism has been formed for the security protection of terminal devices, PCs, and server peripherals. By making full use of existing resources (smart password keys, password cards), unified access management across multiple platforms can be achieved and business connections can be strengthened.

[0026] Other features and advantages of the embodiments of this application will be described in detail in the following detailed description section. Attached Figure Description

[0027] The accompanying drawings are provided to further illustrate the embodiments of this application and form part of the specification. They are used together with the following detailed description to explain the embodiments of this application, but do not constitute a limitation on the embodiments of this application. In the drawings:

[0028] Figure 1 The illustration shows a schematic diagram of the deployment of a power control device with a security chip according to an embodiment of this application;

[0029] Figure 2 The diagram illustrates the deployment of the power control device and safety hardware according to an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0030] The specific embodiments of this application will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are for illustration and explanation only and are not intended to limit the embodiments of this application.

[0031] Figure 1 A schematic diagram illustrating the deployment of a power control device with a security chip according to an embodiment of this application is shown. Figure 1 As shown, this application first provides a power control device with a security chip, which includes: a security chip for generating measurement results according to built-in preset measurement rules and received measurement requests; an on / off control module for controlling the power supply on / off according to the measurement results of the security chip; and a first communication module for data interaction between the security chip and external devices.

[0032] The Bluetooth module is an example of the first communication module, but the specific communication method is not limited to it. It can use Bluetooth, Zigbee, Wi-Fi, mobile communication (4G / 5G), near-field communication (NFC, etc.) to achieve data interaction. The measurement methods and rules in the security chip can be implemented based on existing technologies, and no improvements have been made in this implementation. The security chip can also perform security authentication and link encryption functions. The judgment results of the security chip can also be aggregated at a remote end or platform via wireless communication. The on / off control module can be set on the power path between the power supply and the application end to realize the power on / off of the application end. The on / off control module can also be set in the power supply, realizing the on / off of the power output by enabling key chips in the power supply.

[0033] The external device is security hardware, which includes a second communication module for data interaction with the first communication module. The wireless communication link between the two is shown by the dotted line in the figure. For example, this security hardware can be a smart key (USB-key) or a PCIe password card. It has a second communication module capable of communicating with the first communication module. The specific communication method needs to be compatible with the first communication module; it can use Bluetooth, Zigbee, Wi-Fi, mobile communication (4G / 5G), near-field communication (NFC, etc.) to achieve data interaction.

[0034] In some implementations, the power control device controls its communication to only with external devices listed in the access list. To prevent arbitrary access to the power control device, the external devices that can communicate with it can be restricted. The communication device identifiers of the systems connected to the power control device are written into the access list to create a binding relationship between the power control device and the system, thereby enhancing security.

[0035] In some implementations, the power control device can be configured to only receive measurement requests without providing any feedback during the measurement process, thereby reducing information interaction and improving safety. However, this configuration can lead to sudden power outages and a poor user experience. Therefore, the power control device can also be configured to provide feedback on measurement results and / or measurement progress to external devices via the communication module to improve the user experience and provide users with sufficient shutdown and response time.

[0036] The power control device provided in the above embodiments can perform safety or reliability measurements when power is supplied, thereby improving the security of the system.

[0037] In other embodiments, a trusted operating system proactive defense method is also provided, which uses the aforementioned power control device to supply power to the application; and is communicatively coupled with security hardware. The method includes: setting at least one module file in the application's software system, which, when executed, triggers the security hardware to send a measurement request to the power control device. The communication coupling includes, but is not limited to: direct connection via a system interface, connection via other devices, or connection via a network path. Similarly, as... Figure 1 As shown, the power management unit supplies power to the VCC of the application chip, and this path is controlled by the power control device. The module file is a piece of program code that can be configured as needed in the application software system, implementing proactive measurement triggering based on a trusted mechanism. In this embodiment, the module file is preferably a MOD file. A MOD file is a Linux module file, a loadable file of a Linux kernel module, and also a kernel extension module. A MOD file typically contains the source code of one or more Linux kernel functions, which are compiled into a single module that can be loaded and unloaded using the inod and rmmod commands. In some cases, the module file can also be a KO (Kernel Object) file, or other module file formats supported by the system.

[0038] As can be seen from the above implementation methods, in situations requiring trust measurement, it is only necessary to use it in conjunction with a power control device equipped with a security chip and upgrade the application's software system. Trust measurement of the application can be achieved based on existing security hardware, completely avoiding the need to modify the existing application hardware. Furthermore, this trust management measure is implemented at the power supply end, achieving the most basic level of defense.

[0039] In some embodiments of this application, the proactive measurement is set during the startup process of the application software system. Specifically, the module file is in the form of application interface software, manifested as a MOD module during the GRUB runtime phase, with a runtime environment of arm64, x86 / x64-bit processor architecture and Linux operating system environment. MOD: module kernel module, which can be loaded into the kernel via the insmod command. It operates and accesses the cryptographic device by accessing the BIOS interface through the GRUB system interface. In multi-boot mode, the insmod command is added to the Grub.cfg file, and the MOD completes the identification, loading, and application logic implementation of the smart password key and cryptographic device hardware resources. The application logic of the MOD is to boot the system to perform proactive measurement, and configure GRUB to alarm the user if the measurement result is incorrect, prompting the user to actively shut down and back up the system for reinstallation, thereby achieving trusted authentication at startup.

[0040] The following uses a specific scenario as an example to explain its active measurement. Upon initial system power-on, the motherboard powers on, and onboard devices such as the USB key or password device power on. During the system boot process, interactive authentication with the security chip in the power control device is achieved. This authentication technology can be implemented using symmetric keys based on a distributed algorithm, or it can be implemented using certificates based on a PKI system. The core is that the security chip and USB key store static confidential data such as keys. The authentication logic is to verify the legitimacy of the system operator upon power-on. If the system does not receive authentication feedback upon power-on, it is in a non-wake-up state, the power supply cannot provide normal power, or after entering the boot menu, it will indicate the non-wake-up state and power off.

[0041] In some embodiments of this application, the proactive measurement is set to verify the integrity of the loaded system. This operating system image data check can be performed proactively, triggered by a peripheral interface device, or executed after preset conditions are met. The feature value is preferably a hash value, or other digest or feature algorithms. For example, the system has already been powered on and is in a woken-up state. The MOD boot system enters the boot state, based on USB interface-related protocols provided in the UEFI specification, such as the USB IO Protocol. Users can use this protocol to operate USB devices. A USB key or PCIe cryptographic card is used as hardware algorithm resources to perform a hash operation on the operating system image data, obtaining a hash result Hash(T); the system's standard image baseline value is stored in a security chip and denoted as Hash(S); the hash result Hash(T) is compared with the baseline value Hash(S) as the source integrity verification result. If the verification passes, the boot process is complete; if the verification fails, it proves the data source is illegal, alarms the user that the measurement has failed, and prompts the user to proactively shut down and back up the system for reinstallation. Through the above embodiments, the integrity measurement of the operating system can be achieved.

[0042] In some embodiments of this application, the proactive metric is used for transaction adjudication. This transaction adjudication can be implemented using control command verification software. Specifically, in response to receiving a control command, it is determined whether the control command is a critical control command; this can be verified directly or by security hardware. When security hardware is present, the critical control command can be verified by the security hardware. If the control command is a critical control command, a verification calculation is performed on the control command; this verification calculation can be performed using a symmetric key method, such as a MAC verification code. It can also be performed using an asymmetric key method, such as a signature operation. The verification calculation result is sent as a metric request to the power control device, where it is verified by the security chip. If the verification passes, the control command is executed; if the verification fails, power is cut off as appropriate.

[0043] Figure 2 A schematic diagram illustrating the deployment of the power control device and safety hardware according to an embodiment of this application is shown. Figure 2 As shown, the software system achieves authentication, measurement, and adjudication between the power control device and the safety hardware by adding MOD-style code.

[0044] In some embodiments of this application, the module file is set in the system's periodic execution list for execution at preset times. For example, during system startup, if the aforementioned CGF file is modified, causing the active measurement process to not execute or to be skipped in other ways, a security risk exists. In this case, if the security hardware does not perform a measurement operation for a period of time after the authentication process, it can proactively initiate a measurement request. If the measurement request fails, a power-off notification is sent, and power is cut off after authorization verification. This overcomes the security risk of the module file being skipped.

[0045] Through the above implementation methods, the business functions of a lightweight system, such as authentication, integrity verification, and transaction adjudication, are realized by simply upgrading the software and replacing the power supply, using cryptographic technology. It can also make full use of existing resources (smart cryptographic keys, cryptographic cards, etc.) to achieve unified access management across multiple platforms and strengthen business integration.

[0046] The above embodiments provide multiple implementation locations and methods for module files, enabling trust measurement at different operational stages of the software system. These embodiments can be used in combination, i.e., proactively implementing multiple trust measurements within the software system to enhance system security.

[0047] Based on the same inventive concept, this application also provides a trusted operating system proactive defense device. The device includes: a power supply interface for receiving power from the aforementioned power control device; a security hardware interface for connecting to the aforementioned security hardware; and a file setting module for setting at least one module file in the software system of the application, wherein when the module file is executed, it triggers the security hardware to send a measurement request to the power control device.

[0048] In some implementations, the module file is set in the startup manager's configuration file.

[0049] In some implementations, the module file is in MOD format and is written to the software system using the insmod command.

[0050] In some implementations, the module file is located in the operating system image data checking software of the software system, which is used to check the image data of the operating system loaded by the system.

[0051] In some implementations, the operating system image data inspection software is configured to trigger the security hardware to perform the following operations: calculate feature values ​​on the operating system image data as hardware algorithm resources; and send the calculated feature values ​​as a measurement request to the power control device.

[0052] In some implementations, the module file is located in control command verification software, which is used to verify the control command before it is executed.

[0053] In some implementations, the control command verification software is configured to trigger the security hardware to perform the following operations: in response to receiving a control command, determining whether the control command is a critical control command; if the control command is a critical control command, performing a verification calculation on the control command; and sending the verification calculation result as a measurement request to the power control device.

[0054] In some implementations, the module file is set in the system's periodic execution list.

[0055] The specific limitations of each functional module in the aforementioned Trusted Operating System Active Defense Device can be found in the limitations of the Trusted Operating System Active Defense Method described above, and will not be repeated here. Each module in the aforementioned device can be implemented entirely or partially through software, hardware, or a combination thereof. These modules can be embedded in the processor of the computer device in hardware form or independently of it, or stored in the memory of the computer device in software form, so that the processor can call and execute the corresponding operations of each module. This device also overcomes the shortcomings of existing TPM / TPCM-based trusted technologies, which often require deep modifications to the motherboard and BIOS hardware and software, involve many uncontrollable factors such as cost and licensing, and cannot effectively achieve lightweight system verification.

[0056] In some embodiments of this application, an electronic device is also provided, comprising: at least one processor; and a memory connected to the at least one processor; wherein the memory stores instructions executable by the at least one processor, which executes the steps of the aforementioned trusted operating system active defense method. The control module or processor here has numerical calculation and logical operation functions, and at least includes a central processing unit (CPU) with data processing capabilities, random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), multiple I / O ports, and an interrupt system. The processor contains a kernel that retrieves corresponding program units from the memory. One or more kernels can be configured, and the aforementioned method can be implemented by adjusting kernel parameters. The memory may include non-permanent memory in a computer-readable medium, such as random access memory (RAM) and / or non-volatile memory, such as read-only memory (ROM) or flash RAM, and includes at least one memory chip.

[0057] In one embodiment provided in this application, a machine-readable storage medium is provided, on which instructions are stored, which, when executed by a processor, cause the processor to be configured to perform the steps of the aforementioned trusted operating system proactive defense method.

[0058] In one embodiment provided in this application, a computer program product is provided, including a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the aforementioned trusted operating system proactive defense method.

[0059] Those skilled in the art will understand that embodiments of this application can be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, this application can take the form of a completely hardware embodiment, a completely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, this application can take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.

[0060] This application is described with reference to flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of this application. It will be understood that each block of the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, and combinations of blocks in the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, special-purpose computer, embedded processor, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, generate instructions for implementing the flowchart... Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in one or more boxes.

[0061] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable storage medium that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing device to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable storage medium produce an article of manufacture including instruction means, which are implemented in a process Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The function specified in one or more boxes.

[0062] These computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing equipment to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable equipment to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions that execute on the computer or other programmable equipment for implementing the process. Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1The steps of the function specified in one or more boxes.

[0063] In a typical configuration, a computing device includes one or more processors (CPU), input / output interfaces, network interfaces, and memory.

[0064] Memory may include non-persistent memory in computer-readable media, such as random access memory (RAM) and / or non-volatile memory, such as read-only memory (ROM) or flash RAM. Memory is an example of computer-readable media.

[0065] Computer-readable media includes both permanent and non-permanent, removable and non-removable media that can store information using any method or technology. Information can be computer-readable instructions, data structures, modules of programs, or other data. Examples of computer storage media include, but are not limited to, phase-change memory (PRAM), static random access memory (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), other types of random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), flash memory or other memory technologies, CD-ROM, digital versatile optical disc (DVD) or other optical storage, magnetic tape, magnetic magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other non-transferable medium that can be used to store information accessible by a computing device. As defined herein, computer-readable media does not include transient computer-readable media, such as modulated data signals and carrier waves.

[0066] It should also be noted that the terms "comprising," "including," or any other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements includes not only those elements but also other elements not expressly listed, or elements inherent to such process, method, article, or apparatus. Unless otherwise specified, an element defined by the phrase "comprising one..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article, or apparatus that includes that element.

[0067] The above are merely embodiments of this application and are not intended to limit the scope of this application. Various modifications and variations can be made to this application by those skilled in the art. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of this application should be included within the scope of the claims of this application.

Claims

1. A proactive defense method for a trusted operating system, characterized in that, Applied to the application end, wherein the application end is powered by a power control device and is communicatively coupled with security hardware, the method includes: At least one module file is set in the software system of the application terminal. The module file is set in the control command verification software. The control command verification software is used to verify the control command before the control command is executed. When the module file is executed, it triggers the security hardware to send a measurement request to the power control device, including: the control command verification software is configured to trigger the security hardware to perform the following operations: in response to receiving a control command, it determines whether the control command is a critical control command; if the control command is a critical control command, the security hardware performs verification calculation on the control command; the verification calculation result is sent as a measurement request to the power control device, where the security chip verifies it; if the verification passes, the control command is executed; if the verification fails, the power is cut off as appropriate. The power control device includes: A security chip is used to generate measurement results based on built-in preset measurement rules and received measurement requests; The on / off control module is used to control the power supply on / off based on the measurement results of the security chip; The first communication module is used for data interaction between the security chip and external devices.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The external device is security hardware, which includes a second communication module for data interaction with the first communication module.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The security hardware is a smart password key or a PCIe password card.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The power control device controls itself to communicate only with external devices on the access list by setting an access list.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The power control device is also configured to: feed back measurement results and / or measurement progress to external devices via the first communication module.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The module file is set in the configuration file of the startup manager.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that, The module file is in MOD format and is written to the software system using the insmod command.

8. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The module file is set in the operating system image data checking software of the software system. The operating system image data checking software is used to check the image data of the operating system loaded by the system.

9. The method according to claim 8, characterized in that, The operating system image data inspection software is configured to trigger the security hardware to perform the following operations: The operating system image data is used as a hardware algorithm resource to calculate feature values; The calculated feature value is then sent as a measurement request to the power control device.

10. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The module file is set in the system's periodic execution list.

11. An electronic device, characterized in that, include: At least one processor; A memory connected to the at least one processor; The memory stores instructions executable by the at least one processor, which implements the steps of the trusted operating system proactive defense method according to any one of claims 1 to 10 by executing the instructions stored in the memory.

12. A machine-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The machine-readable storage medium stores instructions that, when executed by a processor, cause the processor to be configured to implement the trusted operating system proactive defense method as described in any one of claims 1 to 10.

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