Intelligent vehicle data collection system and privacy protection method based on blockchain

Abstract

The present invention proposes a blockchain-based intelligent vehicle data collection system and privacy protection method, which uses smart contracts to motivate vehicles to participate in traffic data collection while ensuring vehicle privacy; the system adopts a two-stage game model: the first stage is for the traffic control center to design an incentive mechanism; the second stage is for the vehicle to independently decide whether to participate in data collection based on the incentive mechanism. Smart contracts are implemented through blockchain, allowing vehicles to anonymously upload traffic data and receive rewards, thereby protecting the privacy of vehicles. The method also effectively converts long-term recruitment problems into short-term solvable problems and provides a closed-form solution. The implementation example proves that the method not only guarantees all long-term information update requirements, but also achieves a significant reduction in the average cost of the platform. And through practical application, it can effectively balance the timeliness of traffic information and vehicle recruitment costs, ensure vehicle privacy, and realize reliable intelligent vehicle data collection and transactions.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of intelligent vehicle data processing, and in particular to a blockchain-based intelligent vehicle data collection system and a privacy protection method. Background Art

[0002] With the development of intelligent transportation systems and the increasing value of vehicle data, it is particularly important to establish an efficient vehicle data collection platform. In such a platform, vehicles can collect and share traffic status information, such as road congestion, traffic accidents, etc. However, this process involves the participation of a large number of vehicles and high data collection costs. How to effectively balance the freshness of vehicle data and the collection cost while ensuring the privacy and security of vehicles has become an urgent problem that needs to be solved.

[0003] However, existing technologies still have shortcomings in dealing with the cost-effectiveness and privacy protection of vehicle data collection: in some systems, in order to collect traffic data, vehicles must share their location and driving data, which may lead to privacy leakage; most systems rely on centralized data processing and storage, but this increases the risk and trust issues of centralization; in addition, existing systems are also insufficient in dealing with the balance between data freshness (AoI) and collection costs under dynamic and different time scales.

[0004] Therefore, the prior art has the following disadvantages:

[0005] Privacy leakage: In order to collect effective traffic data, vehicles need to disclose their driving data, which may lead to personal privacy leakage.

[0006] Insufficient cost-effectiveness: While ensuring the freshness of data, high data collection costs need to be paid, which is a huge burden for both the platform and the vehicle.

[0007] Lack of dynamic balance: Existing systems often find it difficult to dynamically balance data freshness and acquisition costs at different time scales.

[0008] In summary, in order to effectively collect vehicle data, ensure the freshness of data, and protect the privacy of vehicles, it is urgent to design a new technical method. Blockchain technology and smart contracts provide a unique solution, where smart contracts ensure that data transactions are completed without leaking vehicle data, and the blockchain system guarantees the authenticity and integrity of the data while reducing dependence on centralized institutions. This approach not only enhances privacy protection, but also improves the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of vehicle data collection. Summary of the invention

[0009] In order to overcome the shortcomings of the prior art, the purpose of the present invention is to provide a blockchain-based intelligent vehicle data collection system and privacy protection method, which implements smart contracts through blockchain, allowing vehicles to anonymously upload traffic data and receive rewards, thereby protecting the privacy of vehicles. The method also effectively converts long-term recruitment problems into short-term solvable problems and provides a closed-form solution. The examples prove that the method not only guarantees all long-term information update requirements, but also achieves a significant reduction in the average cost of the platform. And through practical application, it can effectively balance the timeliness of traffic information and vehicle recruitment costs, ensure vehicle privacy, and realize reliable intelligent vehicle data collection and transactions.

[0010] To achieve the above purpose, the present invention provides the following solution: a method for protecting privacy of smart vehicle data collection based on blockchain, comprising the following steps:

[0011] S1. Construct a decision model for vehicle and traffic information platform;

[0012] S2, solving the decision model obtained in step S1 to obtain the optimal solution of the decision model of the vehicle and traffic information platform;

[0013] S3. According to the optimal solution obtained in step S2, a blockchain-based smart contract is constructed, and the smart contract is used to incentivize vehicles to participate in traffic data collection, and the anonymous data uploading function of the smart contract is verified.

[0014] Preferably, in step S1, the decision model consists of a two-stage game model, the first stage is that the traffic control center designs an incentive mechanism, and the second stage is that the vehicle independently decides whether to participate in the traffic data perception task based on the incentive mechanism.

[0015] Preferably, the vehicle autonomously decides whether to participate in the traffic data perception task according to the incentive mechanism, including:

[0016] In T moments, the set of all moments is exist At this moment, there are N t vehicles, the corresponding set is vehicle The road is

[0017] in, is the set of vehicles at time t, is a set of roads, and each vehicle n is judged t Decide whether to participate in the traffic perception task, denoted as

[0018] If a vehicle decides to participate in the traffic sensing task, it also needs to decide on the bandwidth and data transmission power to purchase for the traffic sensing task. The constraints on bandwidth purchase and transmission power are as follows:

[0019] Bandwidth purchase constraint: Vehicles performing sensing tasks on the same road use the same roadside unit RSU for data transmission, and the total bandwidth purchase of the vehicle does not exceed the bandwidth capacity B available for the RSU. An indicator function is used to determine whether a vehicle appears in a specific road section Z. k ∈z, the indicator function is defined as:

[0020]

[0021] That is, the bandwidth purchase constraint is expressed as:

[0022]

[0023] The transmission power constraint is: the selected transmission power is not greater than the vehicle's transmission power limit P max ,Right now:

[0024]

[0025] To ensure that data is successfully uploaded within a time slot, the vehicle's transmission capacity matches the size of the sensed data, and the Shannon capacity formula is used to describe the maximum transmission capacity:

[0026]

[0027] Where τ is the duration of a moment, is the estimated channel state power gain at each moment, σ 2 is the white noise power;

[0028] The sensing data size is expressed as The constraints are:

[0029]

[0030] By simplifying the representation method, we define the vector represents the vehicle's strategy, and satisfy:

[0031]

[0032] And the above equations (2), (3) and (5) are satisfied.

[0033] Preferably, the vehicle autonomously decides whether to participate in the traffic data perception task according to the incentive mechanism, further comprising:

[0034] The utility function of the vehicle is the perceived reward, bandwidth purchase cost, and data upload cost;

[0035] The perception reward includes: if vehicle n t When deciding to participate in the traffic perception task, The rewards available:

[0036]

[0037] in, It is the vehicle designed by the system designer t The rewards for participating in the traffic information perception task are as follows:

[0038] At any time t, the system designer sets the reward for all vehicles participating in the traffic information perception task as:

[0039] The bandwidth purchase fee includes: vehicle n t The cost of purchasing bandwidth is:

[0040]

[0041] in, Represents the number of vehicles except vehicle n t The strategy of other vehicles besides The bandwidth purchased by a representative vehicle is a function of the policies of other vehicles;

[0042] The communication overhead includes: if vehicle n t When deciding to participate in the traffic perception task, It needs to bear the communication overhead of uploading the sensing data, and the communication overhead is proportional to the transmission power. And the duration τ of each moment:

[0043]

[0044] In summary, the utility function of the vehicle is:

[0045]

[0046] That is, the utility function maximization problem is:

[0047]

[0048] Define each vehicle n by the above formula t The utility function maximization problem.

[0049] Preferably, the traffic control center designs an incentive mechanism including:

[0050] The decision variable of the traffic information platform is the reward for participating in the traffic information perception task. what is obtained;

[0051] The traffic perception tasks on each road are the same, and the traffic information platform sets the same reward for each road, that is,

[0052]

[0053] And at time t, each road Z k The freshness of traffic information on The functional formula of traffic information freshness is:

[0054]

[0055] The average traffic information freshness obtained by the above formula is:

[0056]

[0057] For each road, the time-averaged constraint on the freshness of traffic information is:

[0058]

[0059] in, Represents each road Z k Traffic information freshness limit on .

[0060] Preferably, in the incentive mechanism designed by the traffic control center, the goal of the traffic information platform is to minimize the cost of hiring vehicles to participate in traffic perception, including:

[0061] The average vehicle hire cost is:

[0062]

[0063] By minimizing the average hiring cost of hiring vehicles to participate in traffic perception, we get:

[0064]

[0065] The above formula can be used to solve the problem of minimizing traffic perception overhead.

[0066] Preferably, in step S2, it includes:

[0067] Solve for each vehicle n t The utility function maximization problem is:

[0068]

[0069]

[0070]

[0071] Each vehicle n t Optimal solution for decision variables Satisfies the above formula.

[0072] Preferably, in step S2, it also includes:

[0073] The concept of virtual queue is used to solve the traffic perception overhead minimization problem of the traffic information platform to obtain the optimal solution, as follows:

[0074] For each road Z k , the virtual queue is:

[0075]

[0076] And it is proved that the sufficient condition to satisfy the time-average constraint of traffic information freshness is:

[0077]

[0078] Then, the new constraint (22) is transformed into the objective function by the penalty function method, that is, at each time t, a new objective function is obtained:

[0079]

[0080] The traffic perception overhead minimization problem of the traffic information platform is then transformed into the following:

[0081]

[0082] By solving the above problems, we can obtain the optimal solution to the problem of minimizing the traffic perception overhead of the traffic information platform:

[0083]

[0084]

[0085]

[0086] Finally, the optimal solution to the traffic perception overhead minimization problem of the traffic information platform is obtained.

[0087] Preferably, in step S3, according to the optimal solution of the decision model of the vehicle and traffic information platform, a smart contract is constructed using the Ethereum blockchain, and the smart contract is used to automatically execute vehicle data collection tasks and incentive allocation, and a mechanism for recording related transactions on the blockchain is established to ensure the transparency and traceability of the process.

[0088] The present invention also provides a blockchain-based intelligent vehicle data collection privacy protection system, including a perception platform, an auxiliary server and data collection terminal users of perception tasks, wherein the auxiliary server is a smart contract, the perception platform is a traffic information platform, which is used to provide an incentive mechanism and generate a corresponding smart contract, and the data collection terminal users of the perception task are vehicles, which participate in traffic perception tasks through autonomous decisions and purchase bandwidth and information transmission power for traffic perception tasks. After completing the traffic perception tasks, the vehicles upload traffic perception data through the smart contract to obtain rewards.

[0089] According to the specific technical solution provided by the present invention, the present invention discloses the following technical effects:

[0090] The present invention provides a blockchain-based intelligent vehicle data collection system and privacy protection method, which uses smart contracts to motivate vehicles to participate in traffic data collection while ensuring vehicle privacy; the system adopts a two-stage game model: the first stage is for the traffic control center to design an incentive mechanism; the second stage is for the vehicle to independently decide whether to participate in data collection based on the incentive mechanism. Smart contracts are implemented through blockchain, allowing vehicles to anonymously upload traffic data and receive rewards, thereby protecting the privacy of vehicles. The method also effectively converts long-term recruitment problems into short-term solvable problems and provides a closed-form solution. The implementation example proves that the method not only guarantees all long-term information update requirements, but also achieves a significant reduction in the average cost of the platform. And through practical application, it can effectively balance the timeliness of traffic information and vehicle recruitment costs, ensure vehicle privacy, and realize reliable intelligent vehicle data collection and transactions. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0091] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative labor.

[0092] Figure 1 A flowchart of a method for protecting privacy in smart vehicle data collection based on blockchain provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0093] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of a blockchain-based smart vehicle data collection privacy protection system provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0094] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of the traffic information platform and vehicle interaction provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0095] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of a two-stage game model provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0096] Figure 5 A schematic diagram of a smart contract provided by an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0097] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0098] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a blockchain-based intelligent vehicle data collection system and privacy protection method, which uses smart contracts to motivate vehicles to participate in traffic data collection while ensuring vehicle privacy; the system adopts a two-stage game model: the first stage is for the traffic control center to design an incentive mechanism; the second stage is for the vehicle to independently decide whether to participate in data collection based on the incentive mechanism. Smart contracts are implemented through blockchain, allowing vehicles to anonymously upload traffic data and receive rewards, thereby protecting the privacy of vehicles. The method also effectively converts long-term recruitment problems into short-term solvable problems and provides a closed-form solution. The example proves that the method not only guarantees all long-term information update requirements, but also achieves a significant reduction in the average cost of the platform. And through practical application, it can effectively balance the timeliness of traffic information and vehicle recruitment costs, ensure vehicle privacy, and realize reliable intelligent vehicle data collection and transactions.

[0099] In order to make the above-mentioned objects, features and advantages of the present invention more obvious and easy to understand, the present invention is further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.

[0100] like Figure 1 As shown, the present invention provides a privacy protection method for intelligent vehicle data collection based on blockchain, comprising the following steps:

[0101] S1. Constructing the decision model of vehicle and traffic information platform: refer to Figure 4 ,The decision model consists of a two-stage game model. The first stage is for the ,traffic control center to design an incentive mechanism, and the second stage is for ,vehicles to autonomously decide whether to participate in the traffic data ,perception task based on the incentive mechanism.

[0102] Among them, the vehicle independently decides whether to participate in the traffic data perception task according to the incentive mechanism, including:

[0103] I: Within T moments, the set of all moments is exist At this moment, there are N t vehicles, the corresponding set is vehicle The road is

[0104] in, is the set of vehicles at time t, is a set of roads, and each vehicle n is judged t Decide whether to participate in the traffic perception task, denoted as

[0105] If a vehicle decides to participate in the traffic sensing task, it also needs to decide on the bandwidth and data transmission power to purchase for the traffic sensing task. The constraints on bandwidth purchase and transmission power are as follows:

[0106] Bandwidth purchase constraint: Vehicles performing sensing tasks on the same road use the same roadside unit RSU for data transmission, and the total bandwidth purchase of the vehicle does not exceed the bandwidth capacity B available for the RSU. An indicator function is used to determine whether a vehicle appears in a specific road section Z. k ∈z, the indicator function is defined as:

[0107]

[0108] That is, the bandwidth purchase constraint is expressed as:

[0109]

[0110] The transmission power constraint is: the selected transmission power is not greater than the vehicle's transmission power limit P max ,Right now:

[0111]

[0112] To ensure that data is successfully uploaded within a time slot, the vehicle's transmission capacity matches the size of the sensed data, and the Shannon capacity formula is used to describe the maximum transmission capacity:

[0113]

[0114] Where τ is the duration of a moment, is the estimated channel state power gain at each moment, σ 2 is the white noise power;

[0115] The sensing data size is expressed as The constraints are:

[0116]

[0117] By simplifying the representation method, we define the vector represents the vehicle's strategy, and satisfy:

[0118]

[0119] And the above equations (2), (3) and (5) are satisfied.

[0120] II: The utility function of the vehicle is the perceived reward, bandwidth purchase cost, and data upload cost;

[0121] The perception reward includes: if vehicle n t When deciding to participate in the traffic perception task, The rewards available:

[0122]

[0123] in, It is the vehicle designed by the system designer t The rewards for participating in the traffic information perception task are as follows:

[0124] At any time t, the system designer sets the reward for all vehicles participating in the traffic information perception task as:

[0125] The bandwidth purchase fee includes: vehicle n t The cost of purchasing bandwidth is:

[0126]

[0127] in, Represents the number of vehicles except vehicle n t The strategy of other vehicles besides The bandwidth purchased by a representative vehicle is a function of the policies of other vehicles;

[0128] The communication overhead includes: if vehicle n t When deciding to participate in the traffic perception task, It needs to bear the communication overhead of uploading the sensing data, and the communication overhead is proportional to the transmission power. And the duration τ of each moment:

[0129]

[0130] In summary, the utility function of the vehicle is:

[0131]

[0132] That is, the utility function maximization problem is:

[0133]

[0134] Define each vehicle n by the above formula t The utility function maximization problem.

[0135] In addition, the incentive mechanism for designing a traffic control center includes:

[0136] The decision variable of the traffic information platform is the reward for participating in the traffic information perception task. what is obtained;

[0137] The traffic perception tasks on each road are the same, and the traffic information platform sets the same reward for each road, that is,

[0138]

[0139] And at time t, each road Z k The freshness of traffic information on The functional formula of traffic information freshness is:

[0140]

[0141] The average traffic information freshness obtained by the above formula is:

[0142]

[0143] For each road, the time-averaged constraint on the freshness of traffic information is:

[0144]

[0145] in, Represents each road Z k Traffic information freshness limit on .

[0146] In the design of incentive mechanisms by the traffic control center, the goal of the traffic information platform is to minimize the cost of hiring vehicles to participate in traffic perception, including:

[0147] The average vehicle hire cost is:

[0148]

[0149] By minimizing the average hiring cost of hiring vehicles to participate in traffic perception, we get:

[0150]

[0151] The above formula can be used to solve the problem of minimizing traffic perception overhead.

[0152] S2, solving the decision model obtained in step S1 to obtain the optimal solution of the decision model of the vehicle and traffic information platform;

[0153] Solve for each vehicle n t The utility function maximization problem is:

[0154]

[0155]

[0156]

[0157] Each vehicle n t Optimal solution for decision variables Satisfies the above formula.

[0158] The concept of virtual queue is used to solve the traffic perception overhead minimization problem of the traffic information platform to obtain the optimal solution, as follows:

[0159] For each road Z k , the virtual queue is:

[0160]

[0161] And it is proved that the sufficient condition to satisfy the time-average constraint of traffic information freshness is:

[0162]

[0163] Then, the new constraint (22) is transformed into the objective function by the penalty function method, that is, at each time t, a new objective function is obtained:

[0164]

[0165] The traffic perception overhead minimization problem of the traffic information platform is then transformed into the following:

[0166]

[0167] By solving the above problems, we can obtain the optimal solution to the problem of minimizing the traffic perception overhead of the traffic information platform:

[0168]

[0169]

[0170]

[0171] Finally, the optimal solution to the traffic perception overhead minimization problem of the traffic information platform is obtained.

[0172] S3. According to the optimal solution obtained in step S2, a blockchain-based smart contract is constructed, and the smart contract is used to incentivize vehicles to participate in traffic data collection, and the anonymous data uploading function of the smart contract is verified.

[0173] Among them, according to the optimal solution of the decision-making model of the vehicle and traffic information platform, the Ethereum blockchain is used to build a smart contract, which is used to automatically execute vehicle data collection tasks and incentive distribution, and a mechanism for recording related transactions on the blockchain is established to ensure the transparency and traceability of the process.

[0174] The mechanics of the platform are implemented using smart contracts on a local instance of the Ethereum blockchain, chosen for its robustness and proven track record in smart contract applications.

[0175] The deployment of smart contracts is performed using the Remix Integrated Development Environment (IDE), a popular tool for Ethereum projects. Figure 5 As shown in (a), the user interface of our smart contract facilitates the interaction between the platform and the vehicle as follows:

[0176] Platform: The platform uses the “updateRoadSectionReward” function of the smart contract to manage the rewards for vehicles participating in traffic sensing for all road sections. k When a vehicle needs to be recruited, the platform can allocate Tokens of equal value are awarded to vehicles on that road. k The platform uses the same function to set token rewards to zero when no vehicle recruitment is needed.

[0177] Vehicle: The vehicle interacts with the smart contract using its public Ethereum ID to ensure anonymity in the real world. The road data is submitted via the smart contract’s “submitData” function. k The smart contract interface allows vehicles to verify the received rewards using the “balanceOf” function. It also includes a “roadSectionRewards” function that enables vehicles to view the rewards assigned to each road section. These features are critical in facilitating private and efficient interactions between vehicles and the platform.

[0178] Smart contracts run on the Ethereum blockchain using Ganache software, such as Figure 5 (b) shows the result of the transaction being recorded on the blockchain. Figure 5 The bottom transaction in (b) is the release transaction of the smart contract of the traffic information platform. This result illustrates the effectiveness of our design.

[0179] The vehicle initiates a traffic sensing transaction through the Remix IDE platform. The detailed information of the traffic sensing transaction including traffic sensing data is as follows: Figure 5 (c) This transaction is related to Figure 5 This corresponds to the top transaction in (b), which demonstrates the anonymous data upload function of the smart contract.

[0180] like Figure 2 and Figure 3 As shown, the present invention also provides a blockchain-based intelligent vehicle data collection privacy protection system, including a perception platform, an auxiliary server and a data collection terminal user of a perception task, wherein the auxiliary server is a smart contract, and the perception platform is a traffic information platform, which is used to provide an incentive mechanism and generate a corresponding smart contract, and the data collection terminal user of the perception task is a vehicle, and the vehicle participates in the traffic perception task through autonomous decision-making, and purchases bandwidth and information transmission power for the traffic perception task. After completing the traffic perception task, the vehicle uploads the traffic perception data through the smart contract to obtain a reward.

[0181] The beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows:

[0182] The present invention provides a blockchain-based intelligent vehicle data collection system and privacy protection method, which uses smart contracts to motivate vehicles to participate in traffic data collection while ensuring vehicle privacy; the system adopts a two-stage game model: the first stage is for the traffic control center to design an incentive mechanism; the second stage is for the vehicle to independently decide whether to participate in data collection based on the incentive mechanism. Smart contracts are implemented through blockchain, allowing vehicles to anonymously upload traffic data and receive rewards, thereby protecting the privacy of vehicles. The method also effectively converts long-term recruitment problems into short-term solvable problems and provides a closed-form solution. The implementation example proves that the method not only guarantees all long-term information update requirements, but also achieves a significant reduction in the average cost of the platform. And through practical application, it can effectively balance the timeliness of traffic information and vehicle recruitment costs, ensure vehicle privacy, and realize reliable intelligent vehicle data collection and transactions.

[0183] In this specification, each embodiment is described in a progressive manner, and each embodiment focuses on the differences from other embodiments. The same or similar parts between the embodiments can be referred to each other. For the system disclosed in the embodiment, since it corresponds to the method disclosed in the embodiment, the description is relatively simple, and the relevant parts can be referred to the method part.

[0184] The principles and implementation methods of the present invention are described in this article using specific examples. The description of the above embodiments is only used to help understand the method and core idea of ​​the present invention. At the same time, for those skilled in the art, according to the idea of ​​the present invention, there will be changes in the specific implementation methods and application scope. In summary, the content of this specification should not be understood as limiting the present invention.

Claims

1. A privacy protection method for intelligent vehicle data collection based on blockchain, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: S1. Construct a decision model for vehicle and traffic information platform; In S1, the decision model consists of a two-stage game model, in which the first stage is for the traffic control center to design an incentive mechanism, and the second stage is for the vehicle to autonomously decide whether to participate in the traffic data perception task according to the incentive mechanism; The vehicle autonomously decides whether to participate in the traffic data perception task according to the incentive mechanism, including: exist In the moment, the set of all moments is ,exist Moment, total vehicles, the corresponding set is ,vehicle The road is ; in, yes The collection of vehicles at the moment, , is a set of roads, judging each vehicle Decide whether to participate in the traffic data perception task, denoted as ; If a vehicle decides to participate in the traffic data perception task, it also needs to decide on the bandwidth and data transmission power to purchase for the traffic data perception task. The constraints on bandwidth purchase and transmission power are as follows: Bandwidth purchase constraint: Vehicles performing perception tasks on the same road use the same roadside unit RSU for data transmission, and the total bandwidth purchased by the vehicles does not exceed the bandwidth capacity available to the RSU. , using an indicator function to determine whether a vehicle is present on a specific road section , the indicator function is defined as: （1） That is, the bandwidth purchase constraint is expressed as: （2） The transmission power constraint is: the selected transmission power is not greater than the vehicle's transmission power limit ,Right now: （3） To ensure that data is successfully uploaded within a time slot, the vehicle's transmission capacity matches the size of the sensed data, and the Shannon capacity formula is used to describe the maximum transmission capacity: （4） in, is the duration of a moment, is the channel state power gain estimate at each moment, is the white noise power; The sensing data size is expressed as , then the constraints are: （5） By simplifying the representation method, we define the vector represents the vehicle's strategy, and satisfy: （6） And satisfy the above formulas (2), (3) and (5); The vehicle autonomously decides whether to participate in the traffic data perception task according to the incentive mechanism, further comprising: The utility function of the vehicle is the perceived reward, bandwidth purchase cost, and data upload cost; The perceived reward includes: if the vehicle When deciding to participate in the traffic data perception task, , which can receive rewards: （7） in, It is a vehicle designed by the system designer The rewards for participating in the traffic data perception task are as follows: In any At this moment, the system designer sets the reward for all vehicles participating in the traffic data perception task as: ; The bandwidth purchase cost includes: Vehicle The cost of purchasing bandwidth is: （8） in, Represents the removal of vehicles The strategy of other vehicles besides The bandwidth purchased by a representative vehicle is a function of the policies of other vehicles; The data upload cost includes: When deciding to participate in the traffic data perception task, , which needs to bear the communication overhead of uploading the sensing data, and the communication overhead is proportional to the transmission power and the duration of each moment : （9） In summary, the utility function of the vehicle is: （10） That is, the utility function maximization problem is: （11） Define each vehicle by the above formula The utility function maximization problem; The traffic control center designs an incentive mechanism including: The decision variable of the traffic information platform is the reward for participating in the traffic data perception task. what is obtained; The traffic data perception task on each road is the same, and the traffic information platform sets the same reward for each road, that is, we get: （12） and in t At this moment, every road The freshness of traffic information on , then the functional formula of traffic information freshness is: （13） The average traffic information freshness obtained by the above formula is: （14） For each road, the time-averaged constraint on the freshness of traffic information is: （15） in, Represents each road Traffic information freshness limit on the network; In the incentive mechanism designed by the traffic control center, the goal of the traffic information platform is to minimize the cost of hiring vehicles to participate in traffic data perception tasks, including: The average vehicle hiring cost is: （16） By minimizing the average hiring cost in real time, the cost of hiring vehicles to participate in traffic data perception tasks is reduced, and the following is obtained: （17） The above formula is used to solve the problem of minimizing the overhead of traffic data perception tasks; S2, solving the decision model obtained in step S1 to obtain the optimal solution of the decision model of the vehicle and traffic information platform; In said S2, it includes: Solve for each vehicle The utility function maximization problem is: （18） （19） In the formula, B Represents the bandwidth capacity available to the RSU; （20） Each vehicle Optimal solution for decision variables Satisfy the above formula; In the S2, it also includes: The concept of virtual queue is used to solve the problem of minimizing the traffic data perception task overhead of the traffic information platform to obtain the optimal solution, as follows: For each road , the virtual queue is: （21） In the formula, Indicates the road Information freshness constraints; And it is proved that the sufficient condition to satisfy the time-average constraint of traffic information freshness is: （22） Then, the new constraint (22) is transformed into the objective function by the penalty function method, that is, At this moment, we get the new objective function: （23） Then the traffic data perception task overhead minimization problem of the traffic information platform is transformed into the following: （24） By solving the above problems, we can obtain the optimal solution to the problem of minimizing the traffic data perception task overhead of the traffic information platform: （25） （26） （27） Finally, the optimal solution to the problem of minimizing the overhead of the traffic data perception task of the traffic information platform is obtained; S3. According to the optimal solution obtained in step S2, a blockchain-based smart contract is constructed, and the smart contract is used to incentivize vehicles to participate in traffic data collection, and the anonymous data uploading function of the smart contract is verified.

2. According to the blockchain-based smart vehicle data collection privacy protection method of claim 1, it is characterized in that: In step S3, according to the optimal solution of the decision model of the vehicle and traffic information platform, a smart contract is constructed using the Ethereum blockchain, and the smart contract is used to automatically execute vehicle data collection tasks and incentive allocation, and a mechanism for recording related transactions on the blockchain is established to ensure the transparency and traceability of the process.

3. A system for the privacy protection method for smart vehicle data collection based on blockchain as described in any one of claims 1 to 2, characterized in that: It includes a perception platform, an auxiliary server and a data collection terminal user of a traffic data perception task. The auxiliary server is a smart contract, and the perception platform is a traffic information platform, which is used to provide an incentive mechanism and generate a corresponding smart contract. The data collection terminal user of the perception task is a vehicle. The vehicle participates in the traffic data perception task through autonomous decision and purchases bandwidth and data transmission power for the traffic data perception task. After completing the traffic data perception task, the vehicle uploads the traffic perception data through the smart contract to obtain a reward.

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