Resource access method, computer device, and computer readable storage medium
By using proxy nodes in a zero-trust network environment to parse and verify resource access requests, it ensures that only legitimate resource access requests can be passed, solving the security problems caused by super user permissions and improving the security and efficiency of resource access.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202410989557.6
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-07-23
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-15
- Estimated Expiration
- 2044-07-23
AI Technical Summary
In existing resource access technology, superuser permissions lead to hackers, reducing the security of resource access, especially during cross-domain access.
In a zero-trust network environment, the namespace-associated proxy nodes are actively monitored, accurately resolved, strictly validated and precisely authorized. Each resource access request ensures that only legal and authorized requests can reach the target service instance and introduce pairing Verification mechanism to prevent unauthorized access and malicious attacks.
It greatly enhances the security and controllability of the overall network, eliminates the trust blind spots within the network, and improves the access security and efficiency during resource access.
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Figure CN118523966B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present application belongs to the field of computer technology, and in particular, relates to a resource access method, a computer device, and a computer-readable storage medium. Background Art
[0002] With the advent of the big data era, remote access to computing resources is essential, and remote access technologies and systems for distributed computing resources play a vital role. Resource interaction between different nodes in a network environment must rely on secure resource access technologies and systems.
[0003] In relevant resource access technologies, super user ROOT permissions usually exist, which allows users with cross-domain credentials to remember cross-domain access, which is easy to bring hacker attacks during the resource access process and reduce the security of resource access. Summary of the invention
[0004] In view of this, embodiments of the present application provide a resource access method, a computer device, and a computer-readable storage medium, which can improve access security during resource access.
[0005] A first aspect of an embodiment of the present application provides a resource access method, which is applied to a proxy node associated with a namespace, including:
[0006] In a zero-trust network environment, if a resource access request for the namespace is monitored, the resource access request is parsed to obtain a remote service instance, an access object, and a target service instance, wherein the target service instance depends on the namespace to run;
[0007] If the identity authentication operation for the access object passes, a pairing verification operation for the remote node is performed to obtain a verification result, and the remote service instance depends on the remote node to run;
[0008] If the verification result indicates that the proxy node and the remote node have a resource interaction relationship, the resource access request is responded to through the target service instance, and the response result is transmitted to the remote node.
[0009] In an implementation of the first aspect, parsing the resource access request to obtain a remote service instance, an access object, and a target service instance includes:
[0010] Obtaining a preset protocol format for encapsulating resource access requests;
[0011] According to the preset protocol format, the resource access request is parsed to obtain a remote service instance, an access object and a target service instance, wherein the remote service instance is used to generate the resource access request and the target service instance is used to respond to the resource access request.
[0012] In an implementation manner of the first aspect, performing a pairing verification operation on a remote node to obtain a verification result includes:
[0013] Acquire a first communication credential of a remote node and a second communication credential of the proxy node;
[0014] Based on the first communication credential and the second communication credential, a pairing verification operation is performed on the remote node to obtain a verification result indicating whether a resource interaction relationship exists between the remote node and the proxy node.
[0015] In an implementation of the first aspect, responding to the resource access request by the target service instance includes:
[0016] Generate a resource view adapted to the access object, the resource view being used to store the specified resources to which the access object has access rights;
[0017] Selecting access resources of the target service instance from the resource view;
[0018] For the access resource, the target service instance is called to execute a specified operation adapted to the resource access request.
[0019] In an implementation of the first aspect, generating a resource view adapted to the access object includes:
[0020] Generate a first resource view adapted to the access object based on the object identifier of the access object and the security identifier of the resource in the namespace;
[0021] Acquire a program tag of an application program associated with the remote service instance, and generate a second resource view adapted to the access object based on the program tag and resource tags of each of the resources;
[0022] The first resource view and the second resource view are merged to obtain a resource view adapted to the access object.
[0023] In an implementation of the first aspect, the generating, based on the program tag and the resource tag of each of the resources, a second resource view adapted to the access object includes:
[0024] Based on the program tag and each of the resource tags, semantically search the resources in the namespace to obtain candidate resources that are compatible with the program tag;
[0025] Allocating access rights adapted to the access object to the candidate resource;
[0026] Based on the access object, the candidate resources, and access permissions for the candidate resources, a second resource view adapted to the access object is generated.
[0027] In the first aspect of the embodiment of the present application, in a zero-trust network environment, the proxy node plays the role of the first solid line of defense for namespace resource access. By actively monitoring, accurately parsing, strictly verifying, and accurately authorizing each resource access request, it can ensure that only legitimate and authorized resource access requests can reach the target service instance, greatly enhancing the security and controllability of the overall network. During the resource interaction process, the proxy node performs a strict verification process each time a resource is accessed, strictly eliminating the trust blind spots within the network and improving the access security during resource access.
[0028] A second aspect of an embodiment of the present application provides a resource access method, which is applied to a gateway device in a zero-trust network environment, including:
[0029] A resource access request for a namespace is received from a remote node;
[0030] Parsing the resource access request to obtain a remote service instance, an access object, and a target service instance, wherein the remote service instance depends on the remote node to run, and the target service instance depends on the namespace to run;
[0031] Performing pairing verification on the remote node and the proxy node associated with the namespace to obtain a verification result;
[0032] If the verification result indicates that resource interaction can be performed between the proxy node and the remote node, the resource access request is redirected to the proxy node, so that the proxy node responds to the resource access request based on the target service instance and returns a response result.
[0033] In an implementation manner of the second aspect, the resource access request is encapsulated in a preset protocol format, and the method further includes:
[0034] In the zero-trust network environment, the preset protocol format is broadcasted so that the proxy nodes associated with each namespace and each remote node encapsulate resource access requests based on the preset protocol format.
[0035] In the second aspect of the embodiment of the present application, in a zero-trust network environment, the gateway device parses resource access requests, clearly distinguishes remote service instances, access objects, and target service instances, and realizes accurate identification and control of resource access requests, ensuring that each request can be correctly routed to the specified namespace. Then, a pairing verification mechanism is introduced to ensure that a legal resource interaction channel is established between the remote node and its associated proxy node, effectively preventing unauthorized access and potential malicious attacks, and strengthening security protection under the zero-trust principle. Resource access requests are directly redirected to the proxy node, avoiding unnecessary intermediate links, accelerating the response speed, and improving the overall efficiency of resource access. Based on this, the access security in the resource access process can be improved.
[0036] A third aspect of an embodiment of the present application provides a resource access device, which is deployed in a proxy node associated with a namespace, including:
[0037] A first parsing module is used to parse the resource access request in a zero-trust network environment to obtain a remote service instance, an access object, and a target service instance if a resource access request for the namespace is monitored, and the target service instance depends on the namespace to run;
[0038] A first verification module, configured to, if the identity authentication operation for the access object is passed, perform a pairing verification operation for the remote node to obtain a verification result, and the remote service instance depends on the remote node to run;
[0039] The response module is used to respond to the resource access request through the target service instance and transmit the response result to the remote node if the verification result indicates that the proxy node and the remote node have a resource interaction relationship.
[0040] A fourth aspect of an embodiment of the present application provides a resource access device, which is deployed in a gateway device in a zero-trust network environment, including:
[0041] A receiving module, configured to receive a resource access request for a namespace from a remote node;
[0042] A second parsing module is used to parse the resource access request to obtain a remote service instance, an access object, and a target service instance, wherein the remote service instance depends on the remote node to run, and the target service instance depends on the namespace to run;
[0043] A second verification module is used to perform pairing verification on the remote node and the proxy node associated with the namespace to obtain a verification result;
[0044] A redirection module is used to redirect the resource access request to the proxy node if the verification result indicates that resource interaction can be performed between the proxy node and the remote node, so that the proxy node responds to the resource access request based on the target service instance and returns a response result.
[0045] A fifth aspect of an embodiment of the present application provides a computer device, which, when a computer device is a proxy node, is used to execute the method described in the first aspect; and when a computer device is a gateway device, is used to execute the method described in the second aspect.
[0046] A sixth aspect of an embodiment of the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium, wherein the computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the method described in the first aspect or the second aspect are implemented.
[0047] It can be understood that the beneficial effects of the third to sixth aspects mentioned above can be found in the relevant descriptions in the first or second aspect mentioned above, and will not be repeated here. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0048] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application, the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present application. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying any creative work.
[0049] Figure 1 It is a schematic diagram of the structure of a resource access system provided in an embodiment of the present application;
[0050] Figure 2 It is a schematic diagram of the implementation process of the resource access method provided in the embodiment of the present application;
[0051] Figure 3 It is a flowchart of a resource access request parsing method provided in an embodiment of the present application;
[0052] Figure 4 It is a flowchart of the node pairing verification method provided in the embodiment of the present application;
[0053] Figure 5 It is a flowchart of a method for responding to a resource access request provided in an embodiment of the present application;
[0054] Figure 6 It is a flowchart of a resource view generation method provided in an embodiment of the present application;
[0055] Figure 7is a flowchart of a method for generating a second resource view provided in an embodiment of the present application;
[0056] Figure 8 is another flowchart of the resource access method provided in an embodiment of the present application;
[0057] Fig. 9 is an example diagram of a preset protocol format provided in an embodiment of the present application;
[0058] Fig.10 is a schematic diagram of a resource access device provided in an embodiment of the present application;
[0059] Fig.11 is another schematic diagram of a resource access device provided in an embodiment of the present application;
[0060] Fig.12 It is a schematic diagram of a computer device provided in an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0061] In the following description, specific details such as specific system structures, technologies, etc. are provided for the purpose of illustration rather than limitation, so as to provide a thorough understanding of the embodiments of the present application. However, it should be clear to those skilled in the art that the present application may also be implemented in other embodiments without these specific details. In other cases, detailed descriptions of well-known systems, devices, circuits, and methods are omitted to prevent unnecessary details from obstructing the description of the present application.
[0062] It should be understood that when used in the present specification and the appended claims, the term "comprising" indicates the presence of described features, wholes, steps, operations, elements and / or components, but does not exclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, wholes, steps, operations, elements, components and / or combinations thereof.
[0063] It should also be understood that the term “and / or” used in the specification and appended claims refers to any and all possible combinations of one or more of the associated listed items, and includes these combinations.
[0064] As used in the specification and appended claims of this application, the term "if" can be interpreted as "when" or "uponce" or "in response to determining" or "in response to detecting", depending on the context. Similarly, the phrase "if it is determined" or "if [described condition or event] is detected" can be interpreted as meaning "uponce it is determined" or "in response to determining" or "uponce [described condition or event] is detected" or "in response to detecting [described condition or event]", depending on the context.
[0065] In addition, in the description of the present application specification and the appended claims, the terms "first", "second", "third", etc. are only used to distinguish the descriptions and cannot be understood as indicating or implying relative importance.
[0066] References to "one embodiment" or "some embodiments" etc. described in the specification of this application mean that one or more embodiments of the present application include specific features, structures or characteristics described in conjunction with the embodiment. Therefore, the statements "in one embodiment", "in some embodiments", "in some other embodiments", "in some other embodiments", etc. that appear in different places in this specification do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment, but mean "one or more but not all embodiments", unless otherwise specifically emphasized in other ways. The terms "including", "comprising", "having" and their variations all mean "including but not limited to", unless otherwise specifically emphasized in other ways.
[0067] like Figure 1 As shown, a structure diagram of a resource access system provided by an embodiment of the present application, in which a proxy node 110, a gateway device 120, and a remote node 130 are in a zero-trust network environment where resource interaction can be performed, and the proxy node 110 is associated with a namespace 111, and a target service instance runs in the namespace 111. When performing resource interaction, the remote node 130 generates a resource access request for the namespace 111 based on the operation of the access object on the remote client, and sends the resource access request to the gateway device 120.
[0068] The gateway device 120 first parses the resource access request to obtain the remote service instance, the access object and the target service instance; then performs pairing verification on the remote node 130 and the proxy node 110 associated with the namespace 111 to obtain a verification result; if the verification result indicates that resource interaction can be performed between the proxy node 110 and the remote node 130, the resource access request is redirected to the proxy node 110.
[0069] If the proxy node 110 monitors a resource access request for the namespace 111, it takes over the resource access request and parses the resource access request to obtain the remote service instance, the access object and the target service instance; if the identity authentication operation for the access object passes, the pairing verification operation for the remote node 130 is performed to obtain the verification result; if the verification result indicates that the proxy node 110 and the remote node 130 have a resource interaction relationship, the resource access request is responded to through the target service instance, and the response result is transmitted to the remote node 130.
[0070] In one embodiment, Figure 2 As shown, a resource access method is provided, which is applied to Figure 1The proxy node in the example is used to illustrate, including the following steps S101 to S103. Among them:
[0071] Step S101, in a zero-trust network environment, if a resource access request for the namespace is monitored, the resource access request is parsed to obtain a remote service instance, an access object, and a target service instance, and the target service instance depends on the namespace to run.
[0072] In applications, in a zero-trust network environment, security policies assume that threats inside and outside the network exist equally, so all resource access requests must be strictly verified and authorized. Under the zero-trust network architecture, proxy nodes are usually deployed at the edge of the network or run directly in parallel with service instances in the namespace, continuously monitoring all network traffic in and out of the associated namespace. That is, when a remote service instance attempts to access resources in a namespace (such as calling a target service instance, operating resources in a namespace), the proxy node immediately takes over the resource access request and prevents the resource access request from directly accessing the namespace. The proxy node parses the resource access request and extracts key information from it, including: 1) Remote service instance, the service or application instance that initiates the resource access request, and the identity of the remote service instance needs to be verified. 2) The access object is the entity that requests access to a specific resource in the namespace, which can be a user, application, or other service. 3) Target service instance, the service instance that ultimately responds to the resource access request, and its operation depends on the configuration and policy of the current namespace.
[0073] Step S102: If the identity authentication operation for the access object is passed, a pairing verification operation for the remote node is performed to obtain a verification result, and the remote service instance depends on the remote node to run.
[0074] In the application, the access object carries the local identity credentials assigned by the proxy node. After the proxy node parses the access object, it performs authentication for the access object based on the local identity credentials, including but not limited to passwords, multi-factor authentication (MFA), OAuth tokens, etc. Determine whether the access object has the right to access the resources provided by the target service instance. If the verification fails, the resource access request will be rejected and security policies such as access denial and alarms can be triggered. At the same time, for the access object that has passed the authentication, the proxy node will continue to perform pairing verification with the remote node (the node on which the remote service instance depends) to determine whether there is a resource interaction relationship between the two. In the application, the pairing verification operation between two nodes can be implemented based on the peer-to-peer (P2P) mechanism. The result of the pairing verification indicates whether there is a valid resource interaction relationship between the proxy node and the remote node.
[0075] In the application, since the proxy node in the zero-trust network environment can take over any resource access request for the namespace and authenticate the access object in the resource access request based on the local identity credentials, the proxy node in the zero-trust network environment takes over the resource access request of the access object with super user (ROOT) permissions (in a non-zero-trust network environment, the access object with super user permissions is a trust blind spot within the network, and the access object with super user (ROOT) permissions can access any resource in the namespace without obstacles), and authenticates the access object through the local identity credentials. If the authentication fails (the access object with super user (ROOT) permissions does not carry the local identity credentials of the proxy node), the resource access operation cannot continue. In this way, even if the object with super user (ROOT) permissions is the target of attack, the security of the resource access process can be guaranteed.
[0076] Step S103: If the verification result indicates that the proxy node and the remote node have a resource interaction relationship, respond to the resource access request through the target service instance and transmit the response result to the remote node.
[0077] In the application, if the pairing verification is successful, that is, the proxy node and the remote node have a resource interaction relationship, the proxy node will allow the resource access request to continue and respond to the resource access request by calling the target service instance running in the namespace. The target service instance will generate a response based on the content of the request, and then send the response result back to the remote node through the proxy node to complete the resource access process.
[0078] In this embodiment, in a zero-trust network environment, the proxy node acts as the first solid line of defense for namespace resource access. By actively monitoring, accurately parsing, strictly verifying, and accurately authorizing each resource access request, it can ensure that only legitimate and authorized resource access requests can reach the target service instance, greatly enhancing the security and controllability of the overall network. The resource interaction process follows the core principle of the zero-trust network architecture - "never trust, always verify". The proxy node performs a strict verification process for each resource access, strictly eliminating the trust blind spots within the network, and ensuring the security and reliability of all resource interaction operations.
[0079] In one embodiment, Figure 3 As shown, the implementation process of step S101 includes the following steps S201 to S202. Among them:
[0080] Step S201: obtaining a preset protocol format for encapsulating a resource access request.
[0081] In the application, the preset protocol format is a custom protocol format used to encapsulate resource requests. The preset protocol format belongs to the network transport layer protocol and can be personalized according to actual needs. The preset protocol format is pre-broadcast by the gateway in the zero-trust network environment. In this way, the remote node associated with the gateway device can encapsulate the resource access request based on the preset protocol format, and the proxy node can parse the resource access request based on the preset protocol format. The preset protocol format is applicable to the network transport layer. Unlike the protocol of the network application layer (http protocol), the preset protocol format does not need to expose socket information (such as port, IP address, etc.), and can include the path of the remote service instance and the path of the target service instance.
[0082] See also Figure 4 The preset protocol format is " / dfs / d1 / d2 / svc1\\;usr=u1;pw=pw1\\d3\\d4\\db1", where "usr=u1;pw=pw1" is the access object, " / dfs / d1 / d2 / svc1" is the target service instance (the path in the namespace), and "\\d3\\d4\\db1" is the path of the remote service instance.
[0083] Step S202, according to the preset protocol format, parse the resource access request to obtain a remote service instance, an access object and a target service instance, wherein the remote service instance is used to generate the resource access request and the target service instance is used to respond to the resource access request.
[0084] In the application, the proxy node decodes the resource access request according to the preset protocol format and extracts the relevant content including the remote service instance, the access object, and the target service instance. The remote service instance can be identified by its unique identifier for subsequent authentication and authorization processes. The target service instance also needs to be correctly identified so that the proxy node can locate the correct service instance to process the request.
[0085] In this embodiment, the preset protocol format ensures that all resource access requests follow a consistent structure and syntax, which promotes interoperability between different services and simplifies the design and implementation of cross-system communication. By parsing resource access requests, the remote service instance (initiator) and the target service instance (responder) can be clearly distinguished, avoiding coupling between service instances and enhancing maintainability.
[0086] In one embodiment, Figure 5 As shown, the implementation process of step S102 includes the following steps S301 to S302. Among them:
[0087] Step S301, obtaining a first communication credential of a remote node and a second communication credential of the proxy node.
[0088] In applications, in a zero-trust network architecture, trust between nodes cannot be pre-assumed. After the proxy node detects a resource access request and passes the identity authentication of the access object, it will further verify the resource interaction relationship between remote nodes. Verification between nodes can be implemented based on a peer-to-peer (P2P) mechanism. Ensure that the proxy node and the remote node can confirm each other's identity and authority before interacting with resources.
[0089] In the application, the proxy node obtains the first communication credential of the remote node, which includes but is not limited to: public key certificate (used to prove the identity of the remote node, the certificate is issued by a trusted third party and contains the public key and node identity information), dynamic token (may be one-time, used for temporary verification of this communication), digital signature (sign the request to prove the source of the request). At the same time, the proxy node also prepares its own second communication credential, which may also include public key certificate, dynamic token, digital signature, etc., to indicate its identity to the remote node.
[0090] Step S302: Based on the first communication credential and the second communication credential, a pairing verification operation is performed on the remote node to obtain a verification result indicating whether a resource interaction relationship exists between the remote node and the proxy node.
[0091] In the application, after obtaining the first communication credential of the remote node and its own second communication credential, the proxy node starts to perform pairing verification operations. The specific pairing verification can be certificate verification, checking whether the certificate of the remote node is valid, whether it is issued by a trusted certificate authority, and whether it is within the validity period. Digital signature verification, verifying the digital signature on the resource access request sent by the remote node to ensure that the resource access request has not been tampered with and is indeed from the remote node. Dynamic token matching, if a dynamic token is used, ensure that the token is consistent with the expected one. Permission check, confirming that the remote node has the authority to interact with the proxy node for resources.
[0092] In the application, the result of pairing verification is used to indicate whether there is a resource interaction relationship between the remote node and the agent node. If the verification is successful, it means that the remote node has been confirmed to be trustworthy and can interact with resources with the agent node. At this point, the agent node can safely continue to process resource access requests and establish a secure channel with the remote node for resource interaction. If the verification fails, the agent node will refuse to establish a connection with the remote node or conduct any resource interaction. In addition, the zero trust model requires continuous verification and monitoring, and the trust status of the node may be re-evaluated periodically even after the initial pairing verification is successful.
[0093] In this embodiment, a trusted resource interaction relationship is established between the remote node and the proxy node to achieve secure identity authentication and encrypted communication between the nodes, thereby improving the overall security and reliability of resource transmission.
[0094] In one embodiment, Figure 6 As shown, the implementation process of step S103 includes the following steps S401 to S403. Among them:
[0095] Step S401: Generate a resource view adapted to the access object, wherein the resource view is used to store the designated resources to which the access object has access rights.
[0096] In the application, the proxy node identifies and determines the specific access object (for example, user, application or other system entity). Access objects have different roles and permissions, which determine which resources they can access. The proxy node generates a resource view adapted to the access object. The resource view is a list of resources specific to the access object. This resource view only contains the resources that the access object has permission to access, and blocks those unauthorized resources. The resource view should be dynamic and able to reflect changes in permissions in a timely manner.
[0097] Step S402: Select access resources of the target service instance from the resource view.
[0098] In the application, once the resource view is generated, the proxy node selects the access resource of the target service instance from the resource view.
[0099] Step S403: for the access resource, calling the target service instance to execute a specified operation adapted to the resource access request.
[0100] In the application, the proxy node calls the target service instance to perform the specified operation for accessing resources. The specified operation includes but is not limited to reading, writing, modifying, deleting or other operations. Specifically, the proxy node sends a request to the target service instance, which contains the necessary parameters and operation type. Before performing the operation, the service instance usually verifies the requested permissions again to ensure that the operation complies with the access control policy. If the permission verification passes, the service instance will perform the requested operation and return the corresponding response to the initiator.
[0101] In this embodiment, the resource access efficiency can be improved by reading the access resources required by the target service instance through the resource view.
[0102] In one embodiment, Figure 7 As shown, the implementation process of step S401 includes the following steps S501 to S503. Among them:
[0103] Step S501: Generate a first resource view adapted to the access object based on the object identifier of the access object and the security identifier of the resource in the namespace.
[0104] In the application, the proxy node generates a first resource view, which only contains the resources that the access object can see according to its identity and namespace permissions. This resource view is personalized, and different access objects or applications may have different views.
[0105] Step S502: Acquire a program tag of an application program associated with the remote service instance, and generate a second resource view adapted to the access object based on the program tag and resource tags of each resource.
[0106] In applications, remote service instances are often associated with specific applications, which may have labels that describe their functionality, purpose, or security level. The system needs to obtain these program labels. Similarly, resources can also be tagged to indicate their type, sensitivity, or relationship to other entities. The proxy node needs to check whether the resource label matches the application's program label or meets certain conditions. Based on the label match, the proxy node creates a second resource view to further filter out resources that are not only accessible based on identity and namespace, but also comply with the label policy.
[0107] Step S503: merge the first resource view and the second resource view to obtain a resource view adapted to the access object.
[0108] In the application, the proxy node merges the two resource views to ensure that the final resource view meets all access control requirements based on identity, namespace, and tag at the same time. Compare and merge the two resource views, removing any conflicting or duplicate entries. If a resource appears in both views, but the tag-based policy denies access, the resource should not appear in the final resource view. The generated resource view contains all resources that the access object can actually access, which is the effective intersection of the first resource view and the second resource view.
[0109] In this embodiment, a personalized resource view is dynamically generated by combining the identity of the access object, the security attributes of the resource, and the label of the application, which effectively improves the security of the system, the accuracy of access, and the efficiency of resource management, while ensuring that each user can only see the information they have permission to access, thereby protecting the privacy and integrity of the data.
[0110] In one embodiment, Figure 8 As shown, the implementation process of step S502 includes the following steps S601 to S603. Among them:
[0111] Step S601: Based on the program tag and each of the resource tags, semantic retrieval is performed on the resources in the namespace to obtain candidate resources that are compatible with the program tag.
[0112] In an application, the application associated with the remote service instance that generates a resource access request includes at least one program tag, which is usually a keyword or phrase used to describe and classify the characteristics of the application. For example, it describes the main functions provided by the application, such as "payment processing", "data analysis", and "instant messaging"; it describes the business field to which the application belongs, such as "finance", "medical care", and "education". The proxy node uses program tags and resource tags to automatically perform semantic retrieval on resources in the namespace, and can accurately find candidate resources that meet the program requirements.
[0113] Step S602: Allocate access rights that are compatible with the access object to the candidate resource.
[0114] In the application, for candidate resources obtained through semantic retrieval, the proxy node assigns appropriate access rights based on the object identity of the access object. This can effectively avoid the risk of excessive permissions. Usually, the proxy node assigns viewing permissions to candidate resources. The implementation of tag-based permission allocation follows the principle of least privilege, granting only the minimum permissions required to complete the task. When new resources or new access objects are added to the system, permission allocation can be easily adjusted by updating tags to maintain the flexibility and scalability of the system.
[0115] Step S603: Generate a second resource view adapted to the access object based on the access object, the candidate resources, and access permissions for the candidate resources.
[0116] In the application, the proxy node generates a second resource view adapted to the access object according to the preset resource view format for the access object, the candidate resources, and the access permissions for the candidate resources. This resource view only displays the resources that the access object is allowed to view and operate. When the proxy node reads the access resources required by the access object, it does not need to filter from the massive resources in the namespace, but can directly obtain the access resources according to the resource view.
[0117] In this embodiment, by intelligently matching program requirements with semantic labels of resources, candidate resources that meet the requirements are automatically screened out, and access permissions are set for these resources in a targeted manner, ultimately building a customized resource view, which greatly optimizes the resource discovery and authorization process and enhances the flexibility and security of the system.
[0118] In one embodiment, Fig. 9 As shown, a resource access method is provided, which is applied to Figure 1Taking the gateway device in the zero-trust network environment as an example, the method includes the following steps S701 to S704. Among them:
[0119] Step S701: receiving a resource access request for a namespace from a remote node.
[0120] In an application, when a remote node attempts to access a resource located in a specific namespace by generating a resource access request, the gateway device first intercepts and receives the resource access request. The remote node can be another service, application, or end user, and a namespace is a logically isolated environment for managing and controlling a group of related resources and services.
[0121] Step S702: parse the resource access request to obtain a remote service instance, an access object, and a target service instance. The remote service instance depends on the remote node to run, and the target service instance depends on the namespace to run.
[0122] In the application, the gateway device parses the received resource access request according to the preset protocol format to identify the components of the request, including: remote service instance, access object, and target service instance. The remote service instance depends on the remote node or the namespace in the remote node to run. The target service instance depends on the namespace to run. The gateway device determines the actual location of the target service instance and the corresponding access policy.
[0123] Step S703: perform pairing verification on the remote node and the proxy node associated with the namespace to obtain a verification result.
[0124] In the application, each namespace is associated with a proxy node, and the proxy node takes over any resource access request that attempts to access the namespace. In order to redirect the resource access request to the appropriate proxy node, the gateway device starts a pairing verification operation for the remote node associated with the resource access request and the proxy node associated with the namespace on which the target service instance depends, to confirm whether the remote node and the proxy node associated with the namespace can interact with resources securely. Pairing verification includes at least: 1) identity authentication to confirm the identity of the remote service instance and the access object. 2) authorization check to verify whether the access object has the authority to access the target service instance. In the application, authentication between the remote node and the service node can be implemented based on the P2P mechanism.
[0125] Step S704: if the verification result indicates that resource interaction can be performed between the proxy node and the remote node, redirect the resource access request to the proxy node, so that the proxy node responds to the resource access request based on the target service instance and returns a response result.
[0126] In the application, if the pairing verification is successful, that is, a trusted resource interaction relationship is established between the proxy node and the remote node, and the access object is authorized to access the target service instance, the gateway device will redirect the resource access request to the proxy node. The proxy node executes the resource access request according to the characteristics and policies of the target service instance.
[0127] In this embodiment, in a zero-trust network environment, the gateway device parses resource access requests, clearly distinguishes remote service instances, access objects, and target service instances, and realizes accurate identification and control of resource access requests, ensuring that each request can be correctly routed to the specified namespace. Then, a pairing verification mechanism is introduced to ensure that a legal resource interaction channel is established between the remote node and its associated proxy node, effectively preventing unauthorized access and potential malicious attacks, and strengthening security protection under the zero-trust principle. Resource access requests are directly redirected to the proxy node, avoiding unnecessary intermediate links, accelerating the response speed, and improving the overall efficiency of resource access. In this way, the security and processing efficiency of the resource access process can be improved.
[0128] In one embodiment, the resource access request is encapsulated in a preset protocol format. In the zero-trust network environment, the preset protocol format is broadcasted so that the proxy nodes associated with each namespace and each remote node encapsulate the resource access request based on the preset protocol format.
[0129] In applications, in a zero-trust network environment, resource access requests are encapsulated and broadcast using a preset protocol format, which ensures that all participating nodes (including proxy nodes associated with each namespace and remote nodes) can encapsulate and parse resource access requests based on the same set of protocol rules. The preset protocol format provides a unified data exchange standard, ensuring that all participating nodes construct and interpret resource access requests in the same way, thereby eliminating communication barriers caused by inconsistent formats. Figure 4 The preset protocol format is shown.
[0130] In this embodiment, a preset protocol format is used to encapsulate resource access requests and broadcast them in a zero-trust network environment, which can not only improve the uniformity and security of network communications, but also simplify system integration and development work, while optimizing the utilization of network resources, ultimately achieving more efficient, secure and stable resource access and management.
[0131] The embodiment of the present application also provides a resource access device for executing the steps in the above resource access method embodiment. The resource access device is deployed in a proxy node associated with the namespace. Fig.10 As shown, the resource access device 800 provided in the embodiment of the present application includes:
[0132] The first parsing module 810 is used to parse the resource access request in a zero-trust network environment, if a resource access request for the namespace is monitored, to obtain a remote service instance, an access object, and a target service instance, wherein the target service instance depends on the namespace to run.
[0133] The first verification module 820 is used to perform a pairing verification operation on a remote node if the identity authentication operation on the access object is passed, and obtain a verification result, and the remote service instance depends on the remote node to run.
[0134] The response module 830 is configured to respond to the resource access request through the target service instance and transmit the response result to the remote node if the verification result indicates that the proxy node and the remote node have a resource interaction relationship.
[0135] In one embodiment, the first parsing module is also used to obtain a preset protocol format for encapsulating a resource access request; according to the preset protocol format, the resource access request is parsed to obtain a remote service instance, an access object and a target service instance, the remote service instance is used to generate the resource access request, and the target service instance is used to respond to the resource access request.
[0136] In one embodiment, the second verification module is also used to obtain the first communication credential of the remote node and the second communication credential of the proxy node; based on the first communication credential and the second communication credential, perform a pairing verification operation on the remote node to obtain a verification result indicating whether there is a resource interaction relationship between the remote node and the proxy node.
[0137] In one embodiment, the response module is also used to generate a resource view adapted to the access object, the resource view being used to store specified resources to which the access object has access rights; select access resources of the target service instance from the resource view; and, for the access resources, call the target service instance to perform specified operations adapted to the resource access request.
[0138] In one embodiment, the response module is also used to generate a first resource view adapted to the access object based on the object identifier of the access object and the security identifier of the resources in the namespace; obtain the program tag of the application associated with the remote service instance, and generate a second resource view adapted to the access object based on the program tag and the resource tag of each of the resources; merge the first resource view and the second resource view to obtain a resource view adapted to the access object.
[0139] In one embodiment, the response module is also used to perform semantic retrieval on the resources in the namespace based on the program tag and each of the resource tags to obtain candidate resources that are adapted to the program tag; assign access permissions that are adapted to the access object to the candidate resources; and generate a second resource view that is adapted to the access object based on the access object, the candidate resources, and the access permissions for the candidate resources.
[0140] The embodiment of the present application also provides a resource access device for executing the steps in the above resource access method embodiment. The resource access device is deployed in a gateway device in a zero-trust network environment. Fig.11 As shown, the resource access device 900 provided in the embodiment of the present application includes:
[0141] The receiving module 910 is configured to receive a resource access request for a namespace from a remote node.
[0142] The second parsing module 920 is used to parse the resource access request to obtain a remote service instance, an access object, and a target service instance. The remote service instance depends on the remote node to run, and the target service instance depends on the namespace to run.
[0143] The second verification module 930 is used to perform pairing verification on the remote node and the proxy node associated with the namespace to obtain a verification result.
[0144] The redirection module 940 is used to redirect the resource access request to the proxy node if the verification result indicates that resource interaction can be performed between the proxy node and the remote node, so that the proxy node responds to the resource access request based on the target service instance and returns a response result.
[0145] In one embodiment, the resource access request is encapsulated in a preset protocol format, and in the zero-trust network environment, the preset protocol format is broadcast so that the proxy nodes associated with each namespace and each remote node encapsulate the resource access request based on the preset protocol format.
[0146] In applications, each module in the resource access device may be a software program module, or may be implemented by different logic circuits integrated in a processor, or may be implemented by multiple distributed processors.
[0147] Fig.12 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a computer device provided in one embodiment of the present application. Fig.12 As shown, the computer device 1000 of this embodiment includes: at least one processor 1010 ( Fig.12Only one is shown in the figure) a processor, a memory 1020, and a computer program 1030 stored in the memory 1020 and executable on the at least one processor 1010, and when the processor 1010 executes the computer program 1030, the steps in any of the above-mentioned resource access method embodiments are implemented.
[0148] The computer device 1000 may include, but is not limited to, a processor 1010 and a memory 1020. Those skilled in the art will appreciate that Fig.12 The computer device 1000 is merely an example and does not constitute a limitation on the computer device 1000 . The computer device 1000 may include more or fewer components than shown in the figure, or a combination of certain components, or different components. For example, the computer device 1000 may also include input and output devices, network access devices, etc.
[0149] The processor 1010 may be a central processing unit (CPU), or other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSP), application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA) or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, etc. A general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor or any conventional processor, etc.
[0150] In some embodiments, the memory 1020 may be an internal storage unit of the computer device 1000, such as a hard disk or memory of the computer device 1000. In other embodiments, the memory 1020 may also be an external storage device of the computer device 1000, such as a plug-in hard disk, a smart media card (SMC), a secure digital (SD) card, a flash card, etc. equipped on the computer device 1000. Further, the memory 1020 may also include both an internal storage unit of the computer device 1000 and an external storage device. The memory 1020 is used to store an operating system, an application program, a boot loader (BootLoader), data, and other programs, such as the program code of the computer program. The memory 1020 may also be used to temporarily store data that has been output or is to be output.
[0151] It should be noted that the information interaction, execution process, etc. between the above-mentioned devices / units are based on the same concept as the method embodiment of the present application. Their specific functions and technical effects can be found in the method embodiment part and will not be repeated here.
[0152] The technicians in the relevant field can clearly understand that for the convenience and simplicity of description, only the division of the above-mentioned functional units and modules is used as an example for illustration. In practical applications, the above-mentioned function allocation can be completed by different functional units and modules as needed, that is, the internal structure of the device can be divided into different functional units or modules to complete all or part of the functions described above. The functional units and modules in the embodiment can be integrated in a processing unit, or each unit can exist physically separately, or two or more units can be integrated in one unit. The above-mentioned integrated unit can be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of software functional units. In addition, the specific names of the functional units and modules are only for the convenience of distinguishing each other, and are not used to limit the scope of protection of this application. The specific working process of the units and modules in the above-mentioned system can refer to the corresponding process in the aforementioned method embodiment, which will not be repeated here.
[0153] An embodiment of the present application further provides a computer-readable storage medium, wherein the computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps in the above-mentioned method embodiments can be implemented.
[0154] An embodiment of the present application provides a computer program product. When the computer program product runs on a mobile terminal, the mobile terminal can implement the steps in the above-mentioned method embodiments when executing the computer program product.
[0155] If the integrated unit is implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the present application implements all or part of the processes in the above-mentioned embodiment method, which can be completed by instructing the relevant hardware through a computer program, and the computer program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. When the computer program is executed by the processor, the steps of the above-mentioned various method embodiments can be implemented. Among them, the computer program includes computer program code, and the computer program code can be in source code form, object code form, executable file or some intermediate form. The computer-readable medium may at least include: any entity or device that can carry the computer program code to the device / terminal device, recording medium, computer memory, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), electric carrier signal, telecommunication signal and software distribution medium. For example, a USB flash drive, a mobile hard disk, a magnetic disk or an optical disk. In some jurisdictions, according to legislation and patent practice, computer-readable media cannot be electric carrier signals and telecommunication signals.
[0156] In the above embodiments, the description of each embodiment has its own emphasis. For parts that are not described or recorded in detail in a certain embodiment, reference can be made to the relevant descriptions of other embodiments.
[0157] Those of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that the units and algorithm steps of each example described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether these functions are performed in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Professional and technical personnel can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered to be beyond the scope of this application.
[0158] In the embodiments provided in the present application, it should be understood that the disclosed devices / network equipment and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the device / network equipment embodiments described above are merely schematic. For example, the division of the modules or units is only a logical function division. There may be other division methods in actual implementation, such as multiple units or components can be combined or integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed. Another point is that the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed can be through some interfaces, indirect coupling or communication connection of devices or units, which can be electrical, mechanical or other forms.
[0159] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components shown as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed on multiple network units. Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of this embodiment.
[0160] The embodiments described above are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present application, rather than to limit them. Although the present application has been described in detail with reference to the aforementioned embodiments, a person skilled in the art should understand that the technical solutions described in the aforementioned embodiments may still be modified, or some of the technical features may be replaced by equivalents. Such modifications or replacements do not deviate the essence of the corresponding technical solutions from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application, and should all be included in the protection scope of the present application.
Claims
1. A resource access method, characterized in that: Applies to proxy nodes associated with the namespace, including: In a zero-trust network environment, if a resource access request for the namespace redirected from a gateway device is monitored, the resource access request is taken over to prevent the resource access request from directly accessing the namespace, and the resource access request is parsed to obtain the remote service instance, the access object, and the target service instance; If the identity authentication operation for the access object is successful, performing a pairing verification operation for the remote node to obtain a verification result; If the verification result indicates that the proxy node and the remote node have a resource interaction relationship, responding to the resource access request through the target service instance and transmitting the response result to the remote node; In which, the resource access request is generated by the remote node based on the operation of the access object on the remote client, the access object is an entity requesting access to a specific resource in the namespace, the remote service instance is a service or application instance that initiates the resource access request, and the target service instance is a service instance that ultimately responds to the resource access request. The remote service instance depends on the remote node to run, and the target service instance depends on the namespace to run. The gateway device is used to receive the resource access request from the remote node, parse the resource access request to obtain the remote service instance, the access object and the target service instance, and perform pairing verification on the remote node and the proxy node. If the verification result indicates that resource interaction can be performed between the proxy node and the remote node, the resource access request is redirected to the proxy node.
2. The resource access method according to claim 1, wherein: The parsing of the resource access request to obtain a remote service instance, an access object, and a target service instance includes: Obtaining a preset protocol format for encapsulating resource access requests; According to the preset protocol format, the resource access request is parsed to obtain a remote service instance, an access object, and a target service instance. The remote service instance is used to generate the resource access request, and the target service instance is used to respond to the resource access request.
3. The resource access method according to claim 1, wherein: The performing of the pairing verification operation on the remote node to obtain a verification result includes: Obtaining a first communication credential of a remote node and a second communication credential of the proxy node; Based on the first communication credential and the second communication credential, a pairing verification operation is performed on the remote node to obtain a verification result indicating whether a resource interaction relationship exists between the remote node and the proxy node.
4. The resource access method according to claim 1, wherein: The responding to the resource access request through the target service instance includes: Generating a resource view adapted to the access object, wherein the resource view is used to store the specified resources to which the access object has access rights; Selecting access resources of the target service instance from the resource view; For the access resource, the target service instance is called to execute a specified operation adapted to the resource access request.
5. The resource access method according to claim 4, wherein: The generating of a resource view adapted to the access object includes: generating a first resource view adapted to the access object based on the object identifier of the access object and the security identifier of the resource in the namespace; Obtaining a program tag of an application associated with the remote service instance, and generating a second resource view adapted to the access object based on the program tag and the resource tag of each of the resources; The first resource view and the second resource view are merged to obtain a resource view adapted to the access object.
6. The resource access method according to claim 5, wherein: The generating, based on the program tag and the resource tag of each resource, a second resource view adapted to the access object, includes: Based on the program tag and each of the resource tags, performing semantic retrieval on the resources in the namespace to obtain candidate resources that are compatible with the program tag; Allocating access rights adapted to the access object to the candidate resource; A second resource view adapted to the access object is generated based on the access object, the candidate resources, and access permissions for the candidate resources.
7. A resource access method, characterized in that: Gateway devices used in zero-trust network environments include: A resource access request for a namespace is received from a remote node; Parsing the resource access request to obtain a remote service instance, an access object, and a target service instance; Performing pairing verification on the remote node and the proxy node associated with the namespace to obtain a verification result; If the verification result indicates that resource interaction can be performed between the proxy node and the remote node, redirecting the resource access request to the proxy node; In which, the remote node is used to generate the resource access request based on the operation of the access object on the remote client, the access object is the entity requesting access to a specific resource in the namespace, the remote service instance is the service or application instance that initiates the resource access request, the target service instance is the service instance that ultimately responds to the resource access request, the remote service instance depends on the remote node to run, and the target service instance depends on the namespace to run. The proxy node is used to take over the resource access request when it monitors the resource access request to prevent the resource access request from directly accessing the namespace, and parse the resource access request to obtain the remote service instance, the access object and the target service instance. If the authentication operation for the access object passes, the proxy node performs a pairing verification operation for the remote node, and if the verification result indicates that the proxy node and the remote node have a resource interaction relationship, the proxy node responds to the resource access request based on the target service instance and transmits the response result to the remote node.
8. The resource access method according to claim 7, wherein: The resource access request is encapsulated in a preset protocol format, and the method further includes: In the zero-trust network environment, the preset protocol format is broadcasted so that the proxy nodes associated with each namespace and each remote node encapsulate resource access requests based on the preset protocol format.
9. A computer device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein: When the processor executes the computer program, the resource access method according to any one of claims 1 to 8 is implemented.
10. A computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, characterized in that: When the computer program is executed by a processor, the resource access method according to any one of claims 1 to 8 is implemented.
