Asymmetric proportional allocation method, device, equipment and storage medium for cross-border water rights

Abstract

The present invention provides a method, device, equipment and storage medium for asymmetric proportional allocation of cross-border water rights, including collecting basic data indicators of each cross-border water rights allocation stakeholder in a cross-border water rights allocation system for a research water area, constructing an indicator system related to the exogenous negotiation power of cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders, obtaining the exogenous negotiation power coefficient and negotiation breakdown point of the cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders, and describing the exogenous negotiation power quantification problem of the cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders as a multi-criteria decision-making problem based on the exogenous negotiation power coefficient and the negotiation breakdown point, and obtaining an asymmetric proportional allocation scheme for cross-border water rights in the research water area. Based on the consideration of the basic data indicators of each cross-border water rights allocation stakeholder in the cross-border water rights allocation system, the present invention can ensure that the principle of individual rationality is not destroyed, break through the limitations of the demand proportion law, and provide new ideas and methods for the effective resolution of cross-border water rights allocation conflicts.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of cross-border water rights allocation decision-making, and in particular relates to a method, device, equipment and storage medium for asymmetric proportional allocation of cross-border water rights. Background Art

[0002] With the rapid development of the economy and society and the improvement of awareness of sustainable development of the ecological environment, the allocation of water resources in water use areas such as cities, counties, villages, and towns has become increasingly prominent. Clarifying water resource rights has a good effect on the economic development and water resource utilization efficiency of various regions. Among the many resource allocation methods, the demand proportion method is the most commonly used allocation rule. This allocation rule fully allocates limited public resources based on the resource claims of stakeholders and ensures that all major stakeholders in each decision receive equal resource allocation satisfaction. However, this fair allocation is not realistic and feasible in the management of transboundary water rights, because the transboundary water rights allocation system usually involves multiple stakeholders, and each stakeholder has great differences in water contribution, current demand, water use efficiency, and ecological environment. In addition, the negotiation process of transboundary water rights allocation needs to take into account the individual rationality of each transboundary water rights stakeholder, and the demand proportion law may not ensure that the principle of individual rationality is not destroyed, making it difficult to reach an allocation agreement. Summary of the invention

[0003] In view of the deficiencies in the prior art, the purpose of the present invention is to provide a method, device, equipment and storage medium for asymmetric proportional allocation of cross-border water rights. On the basis of considering the basic data indicators of each cross-border water rights allocation stakeholder in the cross-border water rights allocation system, a method for asymmetric proportional allocation of cross-border water rights that takes into account exogenous negotiation power and negotiation breakdown points is proposed to ensure that the principle of individual rationality is not destroyed, break through the limitations of the demand proportional law, and provide new ideas and methods for the effective resolution of cross-border water rights allocation conflicts, which is of great help to economic development and sustainable development of the ecological environment.

[0004] In order to solve the above technical problems, the technical solution adopted by the present invention is:

[0005] The asymmetric proportional allocation method of transboundary water rights includes the following steps:

[0006] For the study waters, basic data indicators of various stakeholders in the transboundary water rights allocation system are collected;

[0007] Based on the basic data indicators, an indicator system related to the exogenous negotiation power of stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights is constructed;

[0008] Based on the indicator system, the exogenous negotiation power coefficients of the stakeholders in the cross-border water rights allocation are obtained;

[0009] Based on the basic data indicators, obtaining the negotiation breakdown points of the stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights;

[0010] Based on the exogenous negotiation power coefficient and the negotiation breakdown point, the problem of quantifying the exogenous negotiation power of stakeholders in transboundary water rights allocation is described as a multi-criteria decision-making problem, and an asymmetric proportional allocation plan for transboundary water rights in the study waters is obtained.

[0011] Furthermore, the basic data indicators include water contribution, current demand, water use efficiency and ecological environmental sustainability.

[0012] Furthermore, the water contribution is characterized by the proportion of the multi-year average runoff within the jurisdiction of the stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights to the total runoff of the transboundary waters, the current demand is characterized by the current water consumption, the water use efficiency is characterized by the unilateral water gross domestic product, and the ecological environment sustainability is characterized by the ecological environment flow and sewage discharge.

[0013] Furthermore, the method of constructing an indicator system related to the exogenous negotiation power of stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights is as follows:

[0014] Obtaining actual values ​​of the basic data indicators of each of the transboundary water rights allocation stakeholders and establishing an initial indicator matrix;

[0015] Standardizing the initial indicator matrix to obtain standardized values ​​of the actual values ​​to obtain a standard indicator matrix;

[0016] According to the standard indicator matrix, the mean square error and information entropy value of each of the basic data indicators and the correlation coefficients of the basic data indicators are obtained;

[0017] Obtaining the objective information amount contained in each of the basic data indicators according to the mean square error, the information entropy value and the correlation coefficient;

[0018] Based on the objective information amount, obtaining weight values ​​of each of the basic data indicators;

[0019] Based on the weight value, the exogenous negotiation power coefficient of the stakeholders in the cross-border water rights allocation is obtained.

[0020] Furthermore, the expression for obtaining the objective information amount is:

[0021]

[0022] in: It is a basic data indicator The amount of objective information contained, It is a basic data indicator The mean square error, It is a basic data indicator The information entropy value of is the total number of basic data indicators, It is a basic data indicator With basic data indicators The correlation coefficient of

[0023] The expression for obtaining the weight value is:

[0024]

[0025] in: It is a basic data indicator The weight value of

[0026] The expression for obtaining the exogenous negotiation power coefficient is:

[0027]

[0028] in: Stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights The exogenous negotiation power coefficient of It is a plan Basic data indicators The standardized value of .

[0029] Furthermore, the expression of the negotiation breakdown point obtained by using the bankruptcy game method is:

[0030]

[0031]

[0032] in: It is the cross-border water rights allocation system excluding cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders. The sum of water rights declarations of other stakeholders in cross-border water rights allocation; Stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights Declaration of water rights, ,but ; It is the total amount of allocable resources in the transboundary water rights allocation system; Stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights The negotiation breakdown point.

[0033] Furthermore, the method to obtain the asymmetric proportional allocation scheme of transboundary water rights in the study waters considering exogenous negotiation power and negotiation breakdown point is as follows:

[0034] Objective function:

[0035]

[0036] Constraints:

[0037]

[0038]

[0039]

[0040]

[0041]

[0042]

[0043]

[0044]

[0045]

[0046]

[0047]

[0048] in: It is an objective function of the asymmetric proportional allocation method of transboundary water rights that takes into account exogenous negotiation power and negotiation breakdown points; It is the maximum weighted water rights allocation satisfaction among all cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders; Stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights The weighted water rights allocation satisfaction; Stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights The degree of satisfaction of water rights allocation; Stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights allocation of water rights; Stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights The exogenous negotiation power coefficient of ; It is the minimum exogenous negotiation power coefficient among all transboundary water rights allocation stakeholders in the transboundary water rights allocation system.

[0049] A device for asymmetric proportional allocation of cross-border water rights, comprising:

[0050] The collection module is used to collect basic data indicators of various cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders in the cross-border water rights allocation system for the research waters;

[0051] An indicator system building module, used to build an indicator system related to the exogenous negotiation power of stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights based on the basic data indicators;

[0052] A first acquisition module is used to acquire the exogenous negotiation power coefficient of the stakeholders in the cross-border water rights allocation based on the indicator system;

[0053] The second acquisition module is used to acquire the negotiation breaking point of the stakeholders of the cross-border water rights allocation based on the basic data indicators based on the indicator system;

[0054] The third acquisition module is used to describe the problem of quantifying the exogenous negotiation power of stakeholders in cross-border water rights allocation as a multi-criteria decision-making problem based on the exogenous negotiation power coefficient and the negotiation breakdown point, and obtain an asymmetric proportional allocation plan for cross-border water rights in the study waters.

[0055] A device for asymmetric proportional allocation of cross-border water rights includes a processor and a memory for storing a computer program that can be run on the processor. When the processor is used to run the computer program, it executes the above-mentioned asymmetric proportional allocation method of cross-border water rights.

[0056] A storage medium stores a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the above-mentioned asymmetric proportional allocation method of cross-border water rights.

[0057] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following advantages and beneficial effects:

[0058] The present invention establishes a method for asymmetric proportional allocation of cross-border water rights that considers exogenous negotiation power and negotiation breakdown points. Considering that the traditional equal proportion method in the relevant technology cannot consider the individual rationality of cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders, this embodiment considers the basic data indicators of each cross-border water rights allocation stakeholder in the cross-border water rights allocation system, obtains the exogenous negotiation power coefficient of the cross-border water rights allocation stakeholder, that is, the comprehensive coefficient value of the cross-border water rights allocation stakeholder differential expression in each basic data indicator in the cross-border water rights allocation process, and determines the negotiation breakdown point of the cross-border water rights allocation stakeholder, that is, obtains the lower limit of the water allocation of each cross-border water rights allocation stakeholder, describes the exogenous negotiation power quantification problem of the cross-border water rights allocation stakeholder as a multi-criteria decision-making problem, and obtains the asymmetric proportional allocation scheme of cross-border water rights in the study waters. The present invention innovatively combines multi-criteria decision-making technology, bankruptcy game theory and demand proportion law, and proposes a method for allocation that can simultaneously consider the exogenous negotiation power and negotiation breakdown points of cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders, which can enrich the theoretical system of cross-border water rights allocation decision-making and have a good effect on economic development and water resource utilization efficiency in various regions. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0059] The drawings described herein are used to provide a further understanding of the present invention and constitute a part of this application. The illustrative embodiments of the present invention and their descriptions are used to explain the present invention and do not constitute an improper limitation of the present invention. In the drawings:

[0060] Figure 1 The present invention is a flow chart of the asymmetric proportional allocation method of cross-border water rights.

[0061] Figure 2 It is the water rights allocation satisfaction of the cross-border water rights stakeholders and their exogenous negotiation power relationship obtained by the asymmetric proportional allocation method of cross-border water rights in the specific embodiment of the present invention.

[0062] Figure 3 This is a flow chart of the asymmetric proportional allocation device for cross-border water rights of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0063] The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be described clearly and completely below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present invention.

[0064] In the following description, a large number of specific details are provided to provide a more thorough understanding of the present invention. However, it is apparent to those skilled in the art that the present invention can be implemented without one or more of these details. In other examples, in order to avoid confusion with the present invention, some technical features well known in the art are not described.

[0065] It should be understood that the present invention can be implemented in different forms and should not be interpreted as limited to the embodiments set forth herein. On the contrary, these embodiments are provided to make the disclosure thorough and complete and to fully convey the scope of the present invention to those skilled in the art.

[0066] Example 1

[0067] Example 1 provides a method for asymmetric proportional allocation of cross-border water rights, such as Figure 1 As shown, the following steps are included:

[0068] Step S1: For the research waters, collect basic data indicators of various stakeholders in the transboundary water rights allocation system;

[0069] Step S2: Based on the basic data indicators, construct an indicator system related to the exogenous negotiation power of stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights;

[0070] Step S3, based on the indicator system, obtaining the exogenous negotiation power coefficients of stakeholders in cross-border water rights allocation;

[0071] Step S4, based on basic data indicators, obtaining negotiation breakdown points of stakeholders in cross-border water rights allocation;

[0072] Step S5: Based on the exogenous negotiation power coefficient and negotiation breakdown point, the problem of quantifying the exogenous negotiation power of stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights is described as a multi-criteria decision-making problem to obtain an asymmetric proportional allocation plan for transboundary water rights in the study waters.

[0073] Embodiment 1 provides an asymmetric proportional allocation method for cross-border water rights, establishes an asymmetric proportional allocation method for cross-border water rights that considers exogenous negotiation power and negotiation breakdown points, and considers that the traditional equal proportion method in the relevant technology cannot consider the individual rationality of cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders. This embodiment considers the basic data indicators of each cross-border water rights allocation stakeholder in the cross-border water rights allocation system, obtains the exogenous negotiation power coefficient of the cross-border water rights allocation stakeholder, that is, the comprehensive coefficient value of the cross-border water rights allocation stakeholder in the differential expression of each basic data indicator in the cross-border water rights allocation process, and determines the negotiation breakdown point of the cross-border water rights allocation stakeholder, that is, obtains the lower limit of the water allocation of each cross-border water rights allocation stakeholder, describes the exogenous negotiation power quantification problem of the cross-border water rights allocation stakeholder as a multi-criteria decision-making problem, and obtains the asymmetric proportional allocation scheme of cross-border water rights in the study waters. The present invention innovatively combines multi-criteria decision-making technology, bankruptcy game theory and demand proportion law, and proposes an allocation method that can simultaneously consider the exogenous negotiation power and negotiation breakdown points of cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders, which can enrich the theoretical system of cross-border water rights allocation decision-making and has a good effect on the economic development and water resource utilization efficiency of various regions.

[0074] The following is a detailed description of the asymmetric proportional allocation method of cross-border water rights.

[0075] In step S1, the basic data indicators include water contribution, current demand, water use efficiency and ecological and environmental sustainability. The traditional proportional rule only considers the demand ratio of cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders when allocating cross-border water rights, without considering other characteristic factors other than water demand, such as water contribution, water contribution, current water use, water use efficiency and ecological and environmental sustainability, that is, placing all cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders in an equal power position. In this embodiment, the comprehensive coefficient value of the differences in water contribution, current water use, water use efficiency and ecological and environmental sustainability of all cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders in the process of cross-border water rights allocation is used as the exogenous negotiation power of cross-border water resources allocation stakeholders.

[0076] In step S2, water contribution is represented by the ratio of the multi-year average runoff in the territory of the cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders to the total runoff of the cross-border waters, the current demand is represented by the current water consumption, the water use efficiency is represented by the unilateral water GDP, and the ecological environment sustainability is represented by the ecological environment flow and sewage discharge. The indicator system related to the exogenous negotiation power of stakeholders in the cross-border water rights allocation is shown in Table 1:

[0077] Table 1 Index system related to exogenous negotiation power of stakeholders in cross-border water rights allocation

[0078]

[0079] In step S3, the method for constructing an indicator system related to the exogenous negotiation power of stakeholders in cross-border water rights allocation is as follows:

[0080] Step S301: Describe the problem of quantifying the exogenous negotiation power of stakeholders in cross-border water rights allocation as a multi-criteria decision-making problem and process it, wherein the stakeholders in cross-border water rights allocation are regarded as the schemes to be evaluated in the multi-criteria decision-making problem, and the basic data indicators that affect the exogenous negotiation power of stakeholders in cross-border water rights allocation are regarded as the evaluation criteria of each scheme. In this way, an initial indicator matrix for obtaining the exogenous negotiation power coefficients of stakeholders in cross-border water rights allocation can be constructed. , obtain the actual values ​​of basic data indicators for each cross-border water rights allocation stakeholder in each plan, the initial indicator matrix As shown below:

[0081] (1)

[0082] in: It is a plan Basic data indicators The actual value of , ; It is the set of all options to be evaluated, here it refers to the stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights; It is a set of evaluation criteria for all options, which refers to the set of basic data indicators related to the exogenous negotiation power of stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights; is the number of options; is the number of evaluation criteria.

[0083] Step S302: Use the efficacy coefficient method to calculate the initial index matrix The index values ​​in are standardized to achieve the unification of their dimensions and attributes, and the initial index matrix Perform standardization processing to obtain the standardized values ​​of the indicator values ​​of each basic data indicator in each solution, and obtain the standard indicator matrix. The expression of the standardized value is:

[0084] (2)

[0085] in: It is a plan Basic data indicators The standardized value of and The solutions are Medium benefit index Cost indicators The standardized value of and They are the benefit index set and the cost index set; and They are basic data indicators The satisfactory value and unacceptable value of ) and minimum value ( ) instead; and They are translation index and scaling index, which usually need to be set according to actual needs. In order to retain the objective information of the original data as much as possible, this embodiment takes and .

[0086] Step S303, according to the standard indicator matrix, obtaining the mean square error and information entropy value of each of the basic data indicators and the correlation coefficient of each of the basic data indicators, specifically including:

[0087] Step S3031: Based on the standardized values ​​of the indicator values ​​of each basic data indicator in each scheme in step S302, the average values ​​of each basic data indicator are obtained, and the mean square error is obtained:

[0088] (3)

[0089] (4)

[0090] in: It is a basic data indicator The average value of It is a basic data indicator The mean square error of .

[0091] Step S3032: Based on the standardized values ​​of the basic data indicators, the basic data indicators are normalized and the information entropy values ​​of the basic data indicators are obtained:

[0092] (5)

[0093] (6)

[0094] in: It is a basic data indicator The normalized value of It is a basic data indicator The information entropy value of Is the number of options The relevant real constants and , general order , then it can be guaranteed In within the scope; is the natural logarithm sign.

[0095] Step S3033: based on the standardized values ​​of the basic data indicators, obtain the correlation coefficients between the basic data indicators:

[0096] (7)

[0097] in: It is a basic data indicator Basic data indicators The correlation coefficient of the evaluation subject is as follows: the larger the value, the greater the conflict between the basic data indicators, and the more information that can reflect the characteristics of the evaluation subject; It is a plan Basic data indicators The standardized value of It is a basic data indicator The mean of the normalized values.

[0098] Step S304: Obtain the objective information contained in each basic data indicator according to the mean square error, information entropy value and correlation coefficient:

[0099] (8)

[0100] in: It is a basic data indicator The amount of objective information contained.

[0101] Step S305: Based on the objective information amount, obtain the weight value of the basic data indicator:

[0102] (9)

[0103] in: It is a basic data indicator The weight value of .

[0104] Step S306: Based on the indicator weight values ​​and combined with the standardized values, the exogenous negotiation power coefficients of stakeholders in cross-border water rights allocation are obtained:

[0105] (10)

[0106] in: Stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights The coefficient of exogenous negotiation power.

[0107] In step S4, the bankruptcy game method is used to obtain the negotiation breakdown point of the cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders. The negotiation breakdown point is defined as the water resource allocation amount at the starting point of the cross-border water rights allocation stakeholder negotiation, i.e., the lower limit of the water allocation of the cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders, taking into account that the traditional equal proportion law cannot take into account the individual rationality of all cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders in the cross-border water rights allocation process. The bankruptcy theory method is used in this embodiment to determine the negotiation breakdown point of stakeholders, and the expression for obtaining the negotiation breakdown point is:

[0108] (11)

[0109] (12)

[0110] in: It is the cross-border water rights allocation system excluding cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders. The sum of water rights declarations of other stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights; Stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights Water Rights Statement, here ,but ; It is the total amount of allocable resources in the transboundary water rights allocation system; Stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights The negotiation breakdown point.

[0111] In step S5, the method for obtaining an asymmetric proportional allocation scheme of transboundary water rights in the study waters taking into account exogenous negotiation power and negotiation breakdown points is as follows:

[0112] Establish the objective function:

[0113] (13)

[0114] Create constraints:

[0115] (14)

[0116] (15)

[0117] (16)

[0118] (17)

[0119] (18)

[0120] (19)

[0121] (20)

[0122] (twenty one)

[0123] (twenty two)

[0124] (twenty three)

[0125] (twenty four)

[0126] in: It is the water rights allocation satisfaction with the maximum weight among all cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders; Stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights The weighted water rights allocation satisfaction; Stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights The degree of satisfaction of water rights allocation; Stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights allocation of water rights; Stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights The exogenous negotiation power coefficient of ; It is the minimum exogenous negotiation power coefficient among all transboundary water rights allocation stakeholders in the transboundary water rights allocation system.

[0127] To make the implementation purpose, technical solution and advantages of the present invention clearer, the technical solution of the present invention will be introduced in conjunction with the embodiments of the present invention. It should be understood that the specific embodiments used herein are only used to explain the present invention and are not used to limit the present invention.

[0128] According to the attached Figure 1 The flow chart of the model proposed in the present invention can clearly show the implementation process of the present invention. Next, the technical solution of the present invention is further introduced by taking the water rights allocation problem of a certain research water area as an example, including the following steps:

[0129] The cross-border water rights allocation of a certain research water area involves 9 water use areas of A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H and I. Therefore, the cross-border water rights allocation system in this specific embodiment contains 9 cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders. According to the water use data of each water use area in a certain research water area from 2011 to 2020, it can be known that the average water demand of the research water area over the years is 41.906 billion m³ (excluding the average water demand of 799 million m³ in other areas over the years). However, according to the existing allocation plan of a certain research water area, only 35.00 billion m³ of water rights can be allocated. Therefore, the sum of water rights declarations of various cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders in a certain research water area exceeds the allocable water rights, that is, there is a certain competition for water rights in the research water area. In addition, the basic data on water contribution, current demand, water use efficiency and ecological environmental sustainability related to the exogenous negotiation power of cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders in the research water area are shown in Table 2.

[0130] Table 2 Index system related to exogenous negotiation power of stakeholders in cross-border water rights allocation in a research area

[0131]

[0132] Among them, the water use area can be determined according to the water resource zoning of the research water area, which means that the zoning is determined based on the hydrological zoning and the characteristics of water resources are taken into consideration.

[0133] It is a collection of schemes to be evaluated, which here refers to the stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights in a certain study water area (including 9 water-using areas: A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H and I).

[0134] It is a collection of scheme evaluation criteria, which refers here to the set of basic data indicators related to the exogenous negotiation power of stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights (including the five indicators in Table 2, namely, the proportion of multi-year average runoff to total runoff, current water consumption, unilateral water GDP, ecological environmental flow and sewage discharge).

[0135] is the number of solutions (in this specific embodiment ).

[0136] is the number of evaluation criteria (in this specific embodiment ).

[0137] Based on the indicator data of the exogenous negotiation power-related indicator system of stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights in a certain research water area in Table 2, formula (2) to formula (10) can be used to obtain the mean square error value, information entropy value, objective information content and weight value of the basic data indicators. The results are shown in Table 3.

[0138] Table 3 Mean square error, information entropy, objective information content and weight values ​​of the indicators related to the negotiation power of stakeholders in the allocation of water rights in a certain research area

[0139]

[0140] Based on the results in Table 3 and combined with the standardized value obtained by formula (2), formula (10) is used to obtain the exogenous negotiation power coefficient of stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights in a certain study water area.

[0141] Based on the basic data indicators of the water rights allocation system of a certain research water area in step S1, formulas (11) and (12) are used to obtain the negotiation breakdown points of the nine water use areas in the cross-border water rights allocation of a certain research water area. The results are shown in Table 4.

[0142] Table 4 Negotiation breakdown points among stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights in a research area

[0143]

[0144] The exogenous negotiation power coefficients of stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights in a certain research water area obtained in step S3 are: A-0.171, B-0.080, C-0.089, D-0.038, E-0.088, F-0.143, G-0.107, H-0.124, and I-0.160.

[0145] Based on the negotiation breakdown points of the 9 water use areas in the water rights of a certain research water area obtained in step S4, as shown in Table 3, combined with the basic data related to the water rights allocation of the Yellow River research water area in S1, the model (Formula (13)-Formula (24)) is used to obtain the water rights allocation of a certain research water area. The results are shown in Table 5.

[0146] Table 5 Water rights allocation scheme for a certain research water area based on the demand ratio law and the model proposed by the present invention (unit: %)

[0147]

[0148] From the results in Table 4, it can be seen that under the demand proportion rule scheme, the nine water-using areas (cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders) in a certain research water area obtained equal water rights allocation satisfaction (83.52%), because this rule only allocates water rights based on the fixed demand proportion of cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders. However, it is obviously not scientific and reasonable to allocate cross-border water rights based solely on the water rights declaration amount of cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders, because the nine water-using areas involved in the cross-border water rights allocation of a certain research water area have differences in many factors such as water contribution, current demand, water use efficiency and ecological environmental sustainability. Such differences will inevitably affect the decision-making behavior and final decision-making results of the nine cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders in the actual negotiation process of water rights allocation in a certain research water area.

[0149] like Figure 2 As shown in FIG. 1 , the water rights allocation satisfaction of cross-border water rights stakeholders and their exogenous negotiation power relationship obtained by the asymmetric proportional allocation method of cross-border water rights in a specific embodiment of the present invention. Figure 2 It can be seen that the water rights allocation satisfaction of the cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders in a certain research water area is positively correlated with their exogenous negotiation power coefficient, that is, the cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders with a larger exogenous negotiation power coefficient have obtained a higher water rights allocation satisfaction. In addition, from the allocation results, the water rights allocation shares of the 9 cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders in a certain research water area are all higher than their negotiation breakdown points, indicating that the model proposed in this invention can ensure the individual rationality of the cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders involved in the process of cross-border water rights allocation.

[0150] The present invention incorporates the asymmetry of water contribution, current demand, water use efficiency and ecological environment of the nine water users involved in the cross-border water rights allocation of a certain research water area into the demand proportion law by adopting multi-criteria decision-making technology, so it is more in line with the actual situation than the demand proportion law. From the results of allocation, the model scheme proposed by the present invention, on the basis of satisfying the constraints of Pareto allocation efficiency, statement boundedness, individual rationality and non-negativity, the cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders with larger negotiation power coefficients obtain higher water rights allocation satisfaction.

[0151] Example 2

[0152] Embodiment 2 provides a device for allocating asymmetric proportions of cross-border water rights, such as Figure 3 As shown, including:

[0153] The collection module is used to collect basic data indicators of various cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders in the cross-border water rights allocation system for the research waters;

[0154] An indicator system building module is used to construct an indicator system related to the exogenous negotiation power of stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights based on basic data indicators;

[0155] The first acquisition module is used to obtain the exogenous negotiation power coefficients of stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights based on the indicator system;

[0156] The second acquisition module is used to obtain negotiation breakdown points of stakeholders in transboundary water rights allocation based on basic data indicators;

[0157] The third acquisition module is used to describe the problem of quantifying the exogenous negotiation power of stakeholders in transboundary water rights allocation as a multi-criteria decision-making problem based on the exogenous negotiation power coefficient and the negotiation breakdown point, and to obtain the asymmetric proportional allocation plan of transboundary water rights in the study waters.

[0158] Example 3

[0159] Embodiment 3 provides a device for asymmetric proportional allocation of transboundary water rights, comprising a processor and a memory for storing a computer program that can be run on the processor, and the processor is used to execute the asymmetric proportional allocation method of transboundary water rights when running the computer program.

[0160] Example 4

[0161] Embodiment 4 provides a storage medium, wherein a computer program is stored in the storage medium. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the method for asymmetric proportional allocation of cross-border water rights is implemented.

[0162] Those of ordinary skill in the art can understand that all or part of the processes in the above-mentioned embodiment methods can be completed by instructing the relevant hardware through a computer program, and the computer program can be stored in a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium. When the computer program is executed, it can include the processes of the embodiments of the above-mentioned methods. Among them, any reference to memory, storage, database or other media used in the embodiments provided in this application can include at least one of non-volatile and volatile memory. Non-volatile memory can include read-only memory (ROM), tape, floppy disk, flash memory or optical memory, etc. Volatile memory can include random access memory (RAM) or external cache memory. As an illustration and not limitation, RAM can be in various forms, such as static random access memory (SRAM) or dynamic random access memory (DRAM).

[0163] Obviously, those skilled in the art can make various changes and modifications to the present invention without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention. Thus, if these modifications and variations of the present invention fall within the scope of the claims of the present invention and their equivalents, the present invention is also intended to include these modifications and variations.

Claims

1. Asymmetric proportional allocation method for transboundary water rights, characterized by: The following steps are involved: For the research waters, basic data indicators of various stakeholders in the cross-border water rights allocation system are collected, including water contribution, current demand, water use efficiency and ecological environmental sustainability; Based on the basic data indicators, an indicator system related to the exogenous negotiation power of stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights is constructed; Based on the indicator system, the exogenous negotiation power coefficient of the stakeholders in the cross-border water rights allocation is obtained. The specific method is as follows: Obtaining actual values ​​of the basic data indicators of each of the transboundary water rights allocation stakeholders and establishing an initial indicator matrix; Standardizing the initial indicator matrix to obtain standardized values ​​of the actual values ​​to obtain a standard indicator matrix; According to the standard indicator matrix, the mean square error and information entropy value of each of the basic data indicators and the correlation coefficients of the basic data indicators are obtained; According to the mean square error, the information entropy value and the correlation coefficient, the objective information amount contained in each of the basic data indicators is obtained, and the expression for obtaining the objective information amount is: in: It is a basic data indicator The amount of objective information contained, It is a basic data indicator The mean square error, It is a basic data indicator The information entropy value of is the total number of basic data indicators, It is a basic data indicator With basic data indicators The correlation coefficient of Based on the objective information amount, the weight value of each basic data indicator is obtained, and the expression is: in: It is a basic data indicator The weight value of Based on the weight value, the exogenous negotiation power coefficient of the cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders is obtained, and the expression is: in: Stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights The exogenous negotiation power coefficient of It is a plan Basic data indicators The standardized value of Based on the basic data indicators, the negotiation breakdown point of the stakeholders in the cross-border water rights allocation is obtained. The expression of the negotiation breakdown point obtained by the bankruptcy game method is: in: It is the cross-border water rights allocation system excluding cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders. The sum of water rights declarations of other stakeholders in cross-border water rights allocation; Stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights Declaration of water rights, ,but ; It is the total amount of allocable resources in the transboundary water rights allocation system; Stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights the breaking point of the negotiations; Based on the exogenous negotiation power coefficient and the negotiation breakdown point, the problem of quantifying the exogenous negotiation power of stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights is described as a multi-criteria decision-making problem, and the asymmetric proportional allocation scheme of transboundary water rights in the study waters is obtained. The specific method is as follows: Objective function: Constraints: in: It is an objective function of the asymmetric proportional allocation method of transboundary water rights that takes into account exogenous negotiation power and negotiation breakdown points; It is the maximum weighted water rights allocation satisfaction among all cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders; Stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights The weighted water rights allocation satisfaction; Stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights The degree of satisfaction of water rights allocation; Stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights allocation of water rights; Stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights The exogenous negotiation power coefficient of ; It is the minimum exogenous negotiation power coefficient among all transboundary water rights allocation stakeholders in the transboundary water rights allocation system.

2. The asymmetric proportional allocation method of transboundary water rights according to claim 1 is characterized by: The water contribution is characterized by the proportion of the multi-year average runoff within the jurisdiction of the stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights to the total runoff of the transboundary waters, the current demand is characterized by the current water consumption, the water use efficiency is characterized by the unilateral water gross domestic product, and the ecological environment sustainability is characterized by the ecological environment flow and sewage discharge.

3. A device for asymmetric proportional allocation of transboundary water rights, applied to the asymmetric proportional allocation method of transboundary water rights according to any one of claims 1-2, characterized in that: include: The collection module is used to collect basic data indicators of various cross-border water rights allocation stakeholders in the cross-border water rights allocation system for the research waters; An indicator system building module, used to build an indicator system related to the exogenous negotiation power of stakeholders in the allocation of transboundary water rights based on the basic data indicators; A first acquisition module is used to acquire the exogenous negotiation power coefficient of the stakeholders in the cross-border water rights allocation based on the indicator system; The second acquisition module is used to acquire the negotiation breaking point of the stakeholders of the cross-border water rights allocation based on the basic data indicators based on the indicator system; The third acquisition module is used to describe the problem of quantifying the exogenous negotiation power of stakeholders in cross-border water rights allocation as a multi-criteria decision-making problem based on the exogenous negotiation power coefficient and the negotiation breakdown point, and obtain an asymmetric proportional allocation plan for cross-border water rights in the study waters.

4. A device for asymmetric proportional allocation of cross-border water rights, characterized by: The invention comprises a processor and a memory for storing a computer program that can be run on the processor. When the processor is used to run the computer program, the method for asymmetric proportional allocation of transboundary water rights as described in any one of claims 1 to 2 is executed.

5. A storage medium, characterized in that: The storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by the processor, the method for asymmetric proportional allocation of transboundary water rights as described in any one of claims 1-2 is implemented.

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