Improving protection of serial numbers in authentication and key agreement protocols
By incorporating MAC into the key stream calculation in the authentication protocol, the problem of SQN being vulnerable to replay attacks in the prior art is solved, and the security and integrity protection of SQN is achieved to prevent the serial number from being exploited by malicious actors.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411023737.5
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2020-01-17
- Filing Date
- 2020-01-18
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-12
AI Technical Summary
In the existing authentication and key negotiation protocols, the serial number (SQN) is vulnerable to replay attacks and lacks an effective protection mechanism, which threatens the security of the serial number.
By incorporating the integrity-protected message authentication code (MAC) into the calculation of the key stream, the key stream is different for each SQN, so it is impossible to find an XOR between two different SQNs, and Enhance the protection mechanism of SQN.
It effectively prevents replay attacks, ensures the security and integrity of SQN, and prevents malicious actors from exposing or reusing SQN values.
Smart Images

Figure CN118945651A_ABST
Abstract
Description
[0001] This application is a divisional application of the invention patent application entitled "Improved Protection of Serial Numbers in Authentication and Key Agreement Protocols" with an international application date of January 18, 2020 and application number 202080008932.4 (international application number PCT / US2020 / 014232).
[0002] CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS
[0003] This application claims priority to U.S. Patent Application No. 16 / 746,495, filed on January 17, 2020, which in turn claims the benefit of and priority to U.S. Provisional Patent Application S / N. 62 / 794,191, filed on January 18, 2019, both of which are assigned to the assignee of this application and are hereby expressly incorporated herein by reference. Technical Field
[0004] Aspects of the present disclosure relate to wireless communications, and more particularly, to techniques for protecting sequence numbers (SQNs) used in authentication protocols, such as the Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol. Background Art
[0005] Wireless communication systems are widely deployed to provide various telecommunication services such as telephony, video, data, messaging, broadcast, etc. These wireless communication systems may employ multiple-access technologies capable of supporting communication with multiple users by sharing available system resources (e.g., bandwidth, transmit power, etc.). Examples of such multiple-access systems include Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Long Term Evolution (LTE) systems, LTE-Advanced (LTE-A) systems, Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) systems, Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) systems, Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA) systems, Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDMA) systems, Single Carrier Frequency Division Multiple Access (SC-FDMA) systems, and Time Division Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access (TD-SCDMA) systems, to name just a few.
[0006] In some examples, a wireless multiple access communication system may include several base stations (BS), each of which is capable of simultaneously supporting communication of multiple communication devices (also referred to as user equipment (UE)). In an LTE or LTE-A network, a set of one or more base stations may define an evolved B node (eNB). In other examples (e.g., in a next generation, new radio (NR), or 5G network), a wireless multiple access communication system may include several distributed units (DU) (e.g., edge units (EU), edge nodes (EN), radio heads (RH), smart radio heads (SRH), transmission reception points (TRP), etc.) in communication with several central units (CU) (e.g., central nodes (CN), access node controllers (ANC), etc.), wherein a set of one or more distributed units in communication with a central unit may define an access node (e.g., which may be referred to as a base station, a 5G NB, a next generation B node (gNB or g B node), a TRP, etc.). A base station or distributed unit may communicate with a set of UEs on downlink channels (eg, for transmissions from or to the base station) and uplink channels (eg, for transmissions from the UE to the base station or distributed unit).
[0007] These multiple access technologies have been adopted in various telecommunication standards to provide common protocols that enable different wireless devices to communicate at city, country, region, and even global levels. New Radio (NR) (e.g., 5G) is an example of an emerging telecommunication standard. NR is an enhancement set of the LTE mobile standard promulgated by 3GPP. It is designed to better support mobile broadband Internet access by improving spectrum efficiency, reducing costs, improving services, utilizing new spectrum, and better integrating with other open standards using OFDMA with cyclic prefix (CP) on downlink (DL) and uplink (UL). To this end, NR supports beamforming, multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) antenna technology, and carrier aggregation.
[0008] However, as the demand for mobile broadband access continues to grow, there is a need for further improvements to NR and LTE technologies. Preferably, these improvements should be applicable to other multiple access technologies and the telecommunication standards that employ these technologies. Summary of the invention
[0009] The systems, methods, and devices of the present disclosure each have several aspects, no single one of which is solely responsible for its desirable attributes. Without limiting the scope of the present disclosure as expressed in the appended claims, some features will now be briefly discussed. After considering this discussion, and particularly after reading the section entitled "Detailed Description," it will be understood how the features of the present disclosure provide advantages including improved communication between base stations and user equipment in a wireless network.
[0010] Certain aspects provide a method for wireless communication by a user equipment. The method generally includes receiving an authentication request including at least a random challenge from a network. The method also includes, after receiving the authentication request, generating a synchronization parameter based at least in part on a key shared by the network and the UE, the random challenge, and a first message authentication code (MAC). The method further includes transmitting the synchronization parameter and the first MAC to the network in response to the authentication request.
[0011] Certain aspects provide an apparatus for wireless communication. The apparatus generally includes a receiver, at least one processor, a transmitter, and a memory coupled to the at least one processor. The receiver is configured to receive an authentication request including at least a random challenge from a network. The at least one processor is configured to generate synchronization parameters based at least in part on a key shared by the network and the apparatus, the random challenge, and a first message authentication code (MAC) after the authentication request has been received. The transmitter is configured to transmit the synchronization parameters and the first MAC to the network in response to the authentication request.
[0012] Certain aspects provide an apparatus for wireless communication. The apparatus generally includes means for receiving an authentication request including at least a random challenge from a network. The apparatus also includes means for generating synchronization parameters based at least in part on a key shared by the network and the UE, the random challenge, and a first message authentication code (MAC) after receiving the authentication request. The apparatus further includes means for transmitting the synchronization parameters and the first MAC to the network in response to the authentication request.
[0013] Certain aspects provide a computer-readable medium for wireless communication by a user equipment (UE). The computer-readable medium has computer executable code stored thereon, and the computer executable code performs operations when executed by one or more processors. The operations include receiving an authentication request from a network that includes at least a random challenge. The operations also include generating synchronization parameters based at least in part on a key shared by the network and the UE, the random challenge, and a first message authentication code (MAC) after receiving the authentication request. The operations further include transmitting the synchronization parameters and the first MAC to the network in response to the authentication request.
[0014] Certain aspects provide a method for wireless communication by a network entity. The method generally includes transmitting an authentication request including at least a random challenge to a user equipment (UE). The method also includes receiving a synchronization parameter and a first message authentication code (MAC) after transmitting the authentication request. The method further includes deriving a first sequence number from the synchronization parameter using at least a key shared with the UE and the network entity, the random challenge, and the first MAC.
[0015] Certain aspects provide an apparatus for wireless communication. The apparatus generally includes a transmitter, a receiver, at least one processor, and a memory coupled to the at least one processor. The transmitter is configured to transmit a first authentication request including at least a random challenge to a user equipment (UE). The receiver is configured to receive synchronization parameters and a first message authentication code (MAC) after the transmission of the first authentication request. The at least one processor is configured to derive a first sequence number from the synchronization parameter using at least a key shared with the UE and the apparatus, the random challenge, and the first MAC.
[0016] Certain aspects provide an apparatus for wireless communication. The apparatus generally includes means for transmitting an authentication request including at least a random challenge to a user equipment (UE). The apparatus also includes means for receiving synchronization parameters and a first message authentication code (MAC) after transmitting the authentication request. The apparatus further includes means for deriving a first sequence number from the synchronization parameters using at least a key shared with the UE and the network entity, the random challenge, and the first MAC.
[0017] Certain aspects provide a computer-readable medium for wireless communication by a network entity. The computer-readable medium has computer executable code stored thereon, and the computer executable code performs operations when executed by one or more processors. The operations include transmitting an authentication request including at least a random challenge to a user equipment (UE). The operations also include receiving synchronization parameters and a first message authentication code (MAC) after transmitting the authentication request. The operations further include deriving a first sequence number from the synchronization parameters using at least a key shared with the UE and the network entity, the random challenge, and the first MAC.
[0018] To achieve the foregoing and related ends, one or more aspects include features fully described below and particularly pointed out in the claims. The following description and the accompanying drawings set forth in detail certain illustrative features of one or more aspects. However, these features are only indicative of several of the various ways in which the principles of the various aspects can be employed. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0019] In order to understand in detail the manner in which the above-stated features of the present disclosure are used, a more particular description of the content briefly summarized above may be made with reference to various aspects, some of which are illustrated in the accompanying drawings. It should be noted, however, that the accompanying drawings illustrate only certain typical aspects of the present disclosure and are not to be considered limiting of its scope, as the description may admit to other equally effective aspects.
[0020] Figure 1 is a block diagram conceptually illustrating an example telecommunications system in accordance with certain aspects of the present disclosure.
[0021] Figure 2is a block diagram conceptually illustrating designs of example base stations (BSs) and user equipment (UEs) in accordance with certain aspects of the present disclosure.
[0022] Figure 3 is a diagram illustrating an example 5G system architecture in accordance with certain aspects of the present disclosure.
[0023] Figure 4 An example system architecture for interworking between a 5G system (5GS) and an E-UTRAN system in accordance with certain aspects of the present disclosure is illustrated.
[0024] Figure 5 Explains the example flow of the AKA protocol challenge-response phase.
[0025] Figure 6 An example procedure for determining whether authentication is successful is illustrated.
[0026] Figure 7 An example procedure for generating synchronization parameters is illustrated.
[0027] Figure 8 is a flow diagram illustrating example operations for wireless communications in accordance with certain aspects of the present disclosure.
[0028] Fig. 9 An example improved procedure for generating synchronization parameters in accordance with certain aspects of the present disclosure is illustrated.
[0029] Fig.10 is a flow diagram illustrating example operations for wireless communications in accordance with certain aspects of the present disclosure.
[0030] Fig.11 Illustrated are communications devices that may include various components configured to perform operations for the techniques disclosed herein in accordance with aspects of the present disclosure.
[0031] Fig.12 Illustrated are communications devices that may include various components configured to perform operations for the techniques disclosed herein in accordance with aspects of the present disclosure.
[0032] To facilitate understanding, identical reference numerals have been used, where possible, to designate identical elements that are common to the figures. It is contemplated that elements disclosed in one aspect may be beneficially utilized in other aspects without specific recitation. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0033] Aspects of the present disclosure provide apparatus, methods, processing systems, and computer-readable media for improving protection of sequence numbers (SQNs) in authentication procedures (e.g., the Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol) for secure wireless communications. For example, conventional authentication procedures (such as the AKA protocol) may be susceptible to certain replay attacks that allow a malicious actor to reveal SQN values used in the authentication procedures. As described in more detail below, the SQN may be compromised in part due to the use of an XOR operation and the lack of randomness used in conventional protection mechanisms for the SQN.
[0034] To address this, aspects presented herein provide improved techniques for protecting SQN(s) in an authentication protocol (e.g., AKA protocol). As described in more detail below, aspects provide techniques for incorporating a message authentication code (MAC) that integrity protects the SQN into the calculation of a keystream used to protect the SQN. By doing so, the keystream becomes different for each SQN so that it is impossible to find an XOR between two different SQNs.
[0035] The following description provides an example of protecting SQN in an authentication protocol for secure wireless communication, without limiting the scope, applicability, or examples set forth in the claims. Changes may be made to the functions and arrangements of the elements discussed without departing from the scope of the present disclosure. Various examples may appropriately omit, replace, or add various procedures or components. For example, the described method may be performed in an order different from the order described, and various steps may be added, omitted, or combined. Moreover, the features described with reference to some examples may be combined in some other examples. For example, any number of aspects set forth herein may be used to implement an apparatus or practice method. In addition, the scope of the present disclosure is intended to cover such equipment or methods practiced using other structures, functionalities, or structures and functionalities as a supplement to or in addition to the various aspects of the present disclosure set forth herein. It should be understood that any aspect of the present disclosure disclosed herein may be implemented by one or more elements of the claims. The wording "exemplary" is used herein to mean "used as an example, instance, or illustration". Any aspect described as "exemplary" herein is not necessarily to be interpreted as superior to or superior to other aspects.
[0036] In general, any number of wireless networks may be deployed in a given geographic area. Each wireless network may support a specific radio access technology (RAT) and may operate on one or more frequencies. RAT may also be referred to as radio technology, air interface, etc. Frequency may also be referred to as carrier, subcarrier, frequency channel, frequency modulation, subband, etc. Each frequency may support a single RAT in a given geographic area to avoid interference between wireless networks of different RATs. In some cases, NR or 5G RAT networks may be deployed.
[0037] Figure 1 An example wireless communication network 100 is illustrated in which various aspects of the present disclosure may be performed. For example, the wireless communication network 100 may be a NR system (e.g., a 5G NR network), an LTE system, a system supporting both NR and LTE, etc.
[0038] like Figure 1 As illustrated in , the wireless communication network 100 may include several base stations (BSs) 110a-z (each also individually referred to herein as BS 110 or collectively referred to as BS 110) and other network entities. BS 110 may provide communication coverage for a specific geographic area (sometimes referred to as a "cell"), which may be stationary or mobile depending on the location of the mobile BS 110. In some examples, BS 110 may be interconnected to each other and / or to one or more other BSs or network nodes (not shown) in the wireless communication network 100 using any suitable transport network via various types of backhaul interfaces (e.g., direct physical connections, wireless connections, virtual networks, etc.). Figure 1 In the example shown in , BS110a, 110b, and 110c may be macro BSs for macro cells 102a, 102b, and 102c, respectively. BS110x may be a pico BS for a pico cell 102x. BS110y and 110z may be femto BSs for femto cells 102y and 102z, respectively. The BS may support one or more cells. BS110 communicates with user equipment (UE) 120a-y (each also individually referred to herein as UE 120 or collectively referred to as UE 120) in the wireless communication network 100. UE 120 (e.g., 120x, 120y, etc.) may be dispersed throughout the wireless communication network 100, and each UE 120 may be stationary or mobile.
[0039] The wireless communication network 100 may also include a relay station (e.g., relay station 110r) (also referred to as a relay, etc.), which receives transmissions of data and / or other information from an upstream station (e.g., BS110a or UE 120r) and sends transmissions of data and / or other information to a downstream station (e.g., UE 120 or BS110), or which relays transmissions between UEs 120 to facilitate communication between the devices.
[0040] RAN 150 may include a network controller 160 and BS(s) 110. RAN 150 may be in communication with CN 130, which includes one or more CN nodes 132a. Network controller 160 may be coupled to a set of BSs 110 and provide coordination and control of these BSs 110. Network controller 160 may communicate with BSs 110 via a backhaul. BSs 110 may also communicate with each other via wireless or wired backhaul (e.g., directly or indirectly). Although in Figure 1 A single RAN 150 and a single CN 130 are depicted in FIG, but the wireless communication network 100 may include multiple RANs 150 and / or multiple CNs 130. Furthermore, in some cases, the wireless communication network 100 may support RAN / CNs of the same RAT, different RATs, or a combination of RATs.
[0041] As illustrated, UE 120a includes a protection component 170 configured to implement one or more techniques described herein for protecting sequence numbers in an authentication protocol. Using protection component 170, UE 120a may receive an authentication request including at least a random challenge from a network (e.g., CN 130), and generate synchronization parameters based at least in part on a key shared by the network and the UE, the random challenge, and a first MAC. UE 120a may transmit the synchronization parameters and the first MAC to the network in response to the authentication request.
[0042] As also illustrated, BS 110a (e.g., a RAN entity or RAN node, such as a gNB or eNB) includes a protection component 180 configured to implement one or more techniques described herein for protecting sequence numbers in an authentication protocol. As further illustrated, CN node 132a includes a protection component 190 configured to implement one or more techniques described herein for protecting sequence numbers in an authentication protocol. Using protection component 190, CN node 132a may transmit a first authentication request including at least a random challenge to a UE (e.g., UE 120a), and after transmitting the first authentication request, receive synchronization parameters and a first MAC. Using protection component 190, CN node 132a may derive a first sequence number from the synchronization parameter using at least a key shared with the UE and the network entity, the random challenge, and the first MAC.
[0043] Figure 2 1 and 120a (eg, in a BS 110a and a UE 120a) that can be used to implement various aspects of the present disclosure are illustrated. Figure 1 Example components of the wireless communication network 100).
[0044] At BS 110a, a transmit processor 220 may receive data from a data source 212 and control information from a controller / processor 240. The control information may be for a physical broadcast channel (PBCH), a physical control format indicator channel (PCFICH), a physical hybrid ARQ indicator channel (PHICH), a physical downlink control channel (PDCCH), a group common PDCCH (GC PDCCH), etc. The data may be for a physical downlink shared channel (PDSCH), etc. The processor 220 may process (e.g., encode and symbol map) the data and the control information to obtain data symbols and control symbols, respectively. The transmit processor 220 may also generate reference symbols (such as for a primary synchronization signal (PSS), a secondary synchronization signal (SSS), and a cell-specific reference signal (CRS)). The transmit (TX) multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) processor 230 may perform spatial processing (e.g., precoding) on data symbols, control symbols, and / or reference symbols, where applicable, and may provide an output symbol stream to modulators (MODs) 232a-232t. Each modulator 232 may process a respective output symbol stream (e.g., for OFDM, etc.) to obtain an output sample stream. Each modulator may further process (e.g., convert to analog, amplify, filter, and up-convert) the output sample stream to obtain a downlink signal. The downlink signals from modulators 232a-232t may be transmitted via antennas 234a-234t, respectively.
[0045] At UE 120a, antennas 252a-252r may receive downlink signals from BS 110a and may provide received signals to demodulators (DEMODs) in transceivers 254a-254r, respectively. Each demodulator 254 may condition (e.g., filter, amplify, downconvert, and digitize) a respective received signal to obtain input samples. Each demodulator may further process the input samples (e.g., for OFDM, etc.) to obtain received symbols. A MIMO detector 256 may obtain received symbols from all demodulators 254a-254r, perform MIMO detection on the received symbols where applicable, and provide detected symbols. A receive processor 258 may process (e.g., demodulate, deinterleave, and decode) the detected symbols, provide decoded data for UE 120a to a data sink 260, and provide decoded control information to a controller / processor 280.
[0046] On the uplink, at the UE 120a, the transmit processor 264 may receive and process data from the data source 262 (e.g., data for a physical uplink shared channel (PUSCH)) and control information from the controller / processor 280 (e.g., control information for a physical uplink control channel (PUCCH)). The transmit processor 264 may also generate reference symbols for reference signals (e.g., sounding reference signals (SRS)). The symbols from the transmit processor 264 may be precoded by the TX MIMO processor 266, if applicable, further processed by a demodulator in the transceiver 254a-254r (e.g., for SC-FDM, etc.), and transmitted to the BS 110a. At the BS 110a, the uplink signal from the UE 120a may be received by the antenna 234, processed by the modulator 232, detected by the MIMO detector 236, if applicable, and further processed by the receive processor 238 to obtain decoded data and control information sent by the UE 120a. Receive processor 238 may provide decoded data to data sink 239 and decoded control information to controller / processor 240 .
[0047] Memories 242 and 282 may store data and program codes for BS 110a and UE 120a, respectively.A scheduler 244 may schedule UEs for data transmission on the downlink and / or uplink.
[0048] The controller / processor 280 and / or other processors and modules at the UE 120a may perform or direct the execution of processes for the techniques described herein. Figure 2 As shown in , according to various aspects described herein, the controller / processor 280 of the UE 120a has a protection component 170 that is configured to implement one or more techniques described herein for protecting sequence numbers in the authentication protocol. Similarly, the controller / processor 240 and / or other processors and modules at the BS 110a may perform or direct the execution of the various processes of the techniques described herein. For example, Figure 2 As shown in , according to various aspects described herein, the controller / processor 240 of BS110a has a protection component 180, which is configured to implement one or more techniques described herein for protecting the serial number in the authentication protocol. Figure 2Although not shown in the figure, the CN node may include a controller / processor and / or other processors and modules that perform or direct the execution of various processes for the various techniques described herein. For example, according to various aspects described herein, the controller / processor of the CN node may include a protection component 190 that is configured to implement one or more techniques described herein for protecting sequence numbers used in the authentication protocol. Although shown at the controller / processor, other components of the UE 120a and the BS 110a may also be used to perform the operations described herein.
[0049] Figure 3 3 is a diagram illustrating an example 5G system architecture according to aspects of the present disclosure. As shown, the 5G system 300 includes the RAN 150, the UE 120, the core network (CN) 130, and the data network (DN) 350 (eg, operator services, Internet access, or third-party services). CN 130 may be implemented by one or more network entities (e.g., CN node(s) 132a) that perform the following network functions (NFs): network slice selection function (NSSF) 332; authentication server function (AUSF) 334; unified data management (UDM) 336; access and mobility management function (AMF) 338; session management function (SMF) 340; policy control function (PCF) 342; application function (AF) 344; user plane function (UPF) 346; and various other functions, such as unstructured data storage function (UDSF); network exposure function (NEF); NF repository function (NRF); unified data repository (UDR); 5G equipment identity register (5G-EIR); and security edge protection proxy (SEPP).
[0050] AMF 338 includes the following functionality (some or all of the AMF functionality may be supported in one or more instances of AMF): termination of the RAN CP interface (N2); termination of NAS (N1), NAS encryption and integrity protection; registration management; connection management; reachability management; mobility management; lawful interception (for AMF events and interface to LI system); providing transmission of SM messages between UE and SMF; transparent proxy for routing SM messages; access authentication; access authorization; providing transmission of SMS messages between UE and SMSF; security anchor functionality (SEAF); security context management (SCM), which receives keys from SEAF, which uses the keys to derive access network specific keys; location service management for regulatory services; providing transmission of location service messages between UE and LMF and between RAN and LMF; EPS bearer ID allocation for interworking with EPS; and UE mobility event notification.
[0051] In certain aspects, the AMF may interact with the AUSF and the UE, receiving intermediate keys established as a result of the UE authentication process. In the case of Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) based authentication, the AMF retrieves security material from the AUSF.
[0052] Regardless of the number of network functions, there may be only one NAS interface instance per access network between the UE and the CN, terminating at one of the network functions implementing at least NAS security and mobility management.
[0053] In addition to the above-mentioned AMF functionality, the AMF may also include the following functionality to support non-3GPP access networks: support for N2 interface with N3IWF; support for NAS signaling with UE on N3IWF; support for authentication of UE connected on N3IWF; management of mobility, authentication and (several) separate security context states for UE connected via non-3GPP access or via both 3GPP and non-3GPP access; support for coordinated RM management context valid on 3GPP and non-3GPP access; and support for dedicated CM management context for UE for connectivity on non-3GPP access.
[0054] Not all functionality is required to be supported in an instance of a network slice. In addition to the AMF functionality described above, the AMF may also include policy-related functionality as further described herein. On the N2 interface, some information (e.g., 3GPP cell identification) and procedures (e.g., handover related) defined on 3GPP access may not be applicable, and non-3GPP access specific information that is not applicable to 3GPP access may be applied. Some procedures supported by NAS signaling on 3GPP access may not be applicable to untrusted non-3GPP (e.g., paging) access.
[0055] SMF 340 includes the following functionality (some or all of the SMF functionality may be supported in one or more instances of the SMF): session management, e.g., session establishment, modification, and release, including tunnel maintenance between the UPF and AN nodes; UE IP address allocation and management (including optional authorization); DHCPv4 (server and client) and DHCPv6 (server and client) functions; ARP proxy as specified in IETF RFC 1027 for Ethernet packet data units (PDUs) and / or DHCPv6 as specified in IETF RFC 1028 for DHCPv6; and / or DHCPv6 as specified in IETF RFC 1029 for DHCPv6. IPv6 Neighbor Solicitation Proxy as specified in 4861 functionality (the SMF responds to ARP and / or IPv6 Neighbor Solicitation requests by providing a MAC address that corresponds to the IP address sent in the request); selection and control of UP functionality, including controlling the UPF to proxy ARP or IPv6 Neighbor Discovery or forward all ARP / IPv6 Neighbor Solicitation traffic to the SMF for Ethernet PDU sessions; configuring traffic steering at the UPF to route traffic to the correct destination; terminating interfaces towards the Policy Control Function; Lawful Interception (for SM events and interfaces to the LI system); charging data collection and support for charging interfaces; control and coordination of charging data collection at the UPF; terminating the SM part of NAS messages; downlink data notification; initiator of AN-specific SM information, which is sent to the AN via the AMF on N2; determining the SSC mode for the session; and roaming functionality, such as handling local implementation to apply QoS SLA (VPLMN), charging data collection and charging interface (VPLMN), lawful interception (in VPLMN for SM events and interface to LI system), and support for interaction with external DN for transmitting signaling of external DN for PDU session authorization / authentication.
[0056] Not all functionality is required to be supported in an instance of a network slice. In addition to the functionality of the SMF described above, the SMF may also include policy-related functionality as further described herein.
[0057] The UPF 346 includes the following functionality (some or all of the UPF functionality may be supported in a single instance of the UPF): anchor point for intra-RAT / inter-RAT mobility (if applicable); external PDU session point for interconnection with the data network; packet routing and forwarding (e.g., support for uplink classifier to route traffic flows to data network instances, support for multi-homed PDU sessions at branching points); packet inspection (e.g., application detection based on service data flow templates and optional PFDs received in addition from the SMF); user plane portion of policy rule enforcement, e.g., gating, redirection, traffic steering); lawful interception (UP collection); traffic usage reporting; QoS handling for the user plane, e.g., UL / DL rate enforcement or reflective QoS marking in DL; uplink traffic verification (SDF to QoS flow mapping); transport level packet marking in uplink and downlink; downlink packet buffering and downlink data notification triggering; sending and forwarding one or more "end markers" to the source NG-RAN node; and for Ethernet PDUs as described in the IETF RFC The UPF may also be used to support ARP proxy as specified in IETF RFC 1027 and / or IPv6 Neighbor Solicitation Proxy as specified in IETF RFC 4861 functionality. The UPF responds to ARP and / or IPv6 Neighbor Solicitation requests by providing the MAC address that corresponds to the IP address sent in the request. Not all UPF functionality is required to be supported in an instance of the User Plane Function of a Network Slice.
[0058] UDM includes support for the following functionality: Generation of 3GPP AKA authentication credentials; User identity handling (e.g., storage and management of SUPI for each subscriber in the 5G system); Access authorization based on subscription data (e.g., roaming restrictions); UE's serving NF registration management (e.g., storing the serving AMF for the UE, storing the serving SMF for the PDU session for the UE); Support for service / session continuity, for example, by maintaining SMF / DNN assignments for ongoing sessions; MT-SMS delivery support; Lawful interception functionality (especially in the case of outbound roaming where UDM is the only point of contact for the LI); Subscription management; SMS management;
[0059] To provide this functionality, the UDM uses subscription data (including authentication data) which can be stored in the UDR, in which case the UDM implements the application logic and does not require internal user data storage, and then several different UDMs can serve the same user in different transactions.
[0060] The interaction between the UDM and the HSS is implementation specific. The UDM is located in the HPLMN of the subscribers it serves and accesses information of the UDR located in the same PLMN.
[0061] UDR supports the following functionality: storage and retrieval of subscription data by UDM; storage and retrieval of policy data by PCF; storage and retrieval of structured data for disclosure and application data (including packet flow description (PFD) for application detection, application request information for multiple UEs) by NEF. UDR is located in the same PLMN as the NF service consumer, which stores and retrieves data in and from the PLMN using Nudr, which is an intra-PLMN interface.
[0062] Figure 4 An example system architecture 400 for interworking between two systems / networks (e.g., 5GS and E-UTRAN-EPC) according to certain aspects of the present disclosure is illustrated. As shown, a UE 120 may be served by separate RANs 150A (e.g., E-UTRAN) and 150B (e.g., NR RAN0) controlled by separate core networks 130A (e.g., EPC) and 130B (e.g., 5GC), where RAN 150A provides E-UTRA services and RAN 150B provides NR services. A UE may operate under only one RAN / CN or both RAN / CNs at a time.
[0063] Authentication protocols are generally used as part of the process of protecting network communications (e.g., network communications between a UE and a network). The AKA protocol is an example of an authentication protocol, which is generally used to mutually authenticate a UE (e.g., which is equipped with a USIM) with the network and establish keys to protect subsequent communications. The AKA protocol implements a method of displaying (or exposing) a confidentiality key (K) (e.g., K IMSI ), which is shared between the UE and the authentication center (AuC) in the home network of the UE (e.g., the home location register (HLR)) and can be used by the UE and the authentication center (AuC) in the home network of the UE. In addition, the AKA protocol uses multiple counters SQN MS and SQN HE To provide replay protection for UE. HE is an individual counter stored in the home network for each user, and SQN MS is an individual counter stored at the UE and represents the highest SQN that the UE has accepted.
[0064] The AKA protocol generally includes three phases: (1) identification, (2) challenge-response, and (3) resynchronization procedure. In the identification phase, the serving network (e.g., Visitor Location Register (VLR) / Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN)) identifies the UE. If the current identity of the UE is not known to the serving network, the serving network may request the identity of the UE (International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI)) from the UE via a "User Identity Request" message. In response, the UE may send its IMSI to the serving network in a "User Identity Response" message. The UE identity enables the serving network to request authentication material from the home network (e.g., HLR / AuC).
[0065] In the challenge-response phase, the home network generates authentication material (e.g., one or more authentication vectors) in response to receiving a request for authentication of the UE from the service network, and sends the authentication material to the service network. Subsequently, the service network and the UE may exchange authentication request / response messages based on the authentication material. Figure 5 An example flow 500 of the challenge-response phase of the AKA protocol is depicted.
[0066] As shown, upon receiving a request from the VLR / SGSN (502), the HE / AuC generates (504) and sends (506) an ordered array of n authentication vectors to the VLR / SGSN. The authentication vectors may be ordered based on a sequence number. Each authentication vector includes a random challenge (e.g., a random number (R)), an expected response XRES, a cipher key (CK), an integrity key (IK), and an authentication token (AUTN). Each authentication vector may be used for (or valid for) an authentication and key agreement between the VLR / SGSN and the UE. The authentication vectors may be stored at the VLR / SGSN (508).
[0067] When the VLR / SGSN initiates authentication and key negotiation, it selects the next authentication vector from the ordered array (510) and sends the parameters R and AUTN to the UE (512). AUTN can be generated according to the following formula:
[0068] AUTN = (hidden) sequence number (SQN) || AMF || MAC (1),
[0069] Where AMF is an authentication management field used to signal information (parameters) about authentication to the UE, and MAC is composed of R, AMF and SQN (e.g., SQN HE ) as input using the long-term subscriber key (K) (e.g., K IMSI ). In one example, the MAC in formula (1) can be generated according to the following formula:
[0070] MAC = f1 K (SQN || R || AMF) (2),
[0071] where f1 is the message authentication function. Note that, as used in this paper, || represents cascading. SQN in AUTN HE An anonymous key (AK) can be used to hide (or conceal) (e.g., SQN HE ⊕AK, where ⊕ is "exclusive OR"). In one example, AK can be generated according to the following formula:
[0072] AK = f5 K (R) (3),
[0073] Where f5 is the key generation function.
[0074] The UE checks whether the AUTN is acceptable (514), and if so, generates a response (RES) (514), which is sent back to the VLR / SGSN (516). The UE also generates a CK and IK (522). The VLR / SGSN compares the received RES with the XRES (518), and if they match, the authentication and key agreement exchange is considered successfully completed. The established keys CK and IK are then passed by the UE and VLR / SGSN to the entity that performs the encryption and integrity functions (520).
[0075] To determine whether authentication is successful, the UE checks (1) whether the message authentication code (MAC) extracted from the AUTN is correct and (2) verifies the freshness of the authentication vector used for the user authentication request (e.g., to resist replay attacks). Figure 6 One example procedure 600 that a UE may use to determine whether authentication was successful is depicted.
[0076] As shown, upon receiving R and AUTN, the UE calculates (or generates) AK (eg, using (3)) and retrieves the sequence number SQN HE =(SQN HE ⊕AK)⊕AK. UE uses R and SQN extracted from AUTN HE Generate the expected MAC (XMAC) (e.g., XMAC = f1 K (SQN HE ||R||AMF)). The UE determines whether XMAC is equal to the MAC included in AUTN and the retrieved SQN HE Is it fresh (e.g., SQN HEIf XMAC is not equal to MAC, the UE sends an authentication failure message back to the VLR / SGSN and may abandon the authentication procedure. HE Not fresh (e.g., SQN HE is not in the correct range), the UE determines that there has been a synchronization failure. In this case, the UE sends an indication of the synchronization failure back to the VLR / SGSN, including synchronization parameters (AUTS). AUTS is used to allow the home network to communicate with the UE through the SQN based on the UE. MS (For example, SQN MS + threshold) replaces its own SQN with another SQN HE to resynchronize with the UE. If XMAC = MAC and SQN HE is fresh, the UE may proceed to generate RES (eg, RES=f2 K (R)), CK (for example, CK = f3 K (R)) and IK (e.g., IK = f4 K (R)), where f2 is a message authentication function, f3 is a key generation function, and f4 is a key generation function. In one example, if SQN HE >SQN MS And SQN HE <SQN MS + threshold, the UE can determine the SQN HE It's fresh.
[0077] During the resynchronization phase (eg, the UE determines the SQN HE is not fresh), the UE generates synchronization parameters AUTS to allow the network to resynchronize with the UE. Figure 7 One example procedure 700 that may be used to generate an AUTS is depicted.
[0078] As shown, the UE is aware of the SQN (which the UE will accept) (e.g., SQN MS ) and R, SQN MS and AMF as input using K (e.g. K IMSI ) to calculate the synchronous MAC (e.g., MAC-S). Specifically, MAC-S can be generated using the following formula:
[0079] MAC-S = f1* K (SQN MS || R || AMF) (4),
[0080] Where f1* is a message authentication code function, the property of which is that no valuable information about the values of f1, ... f5, f5* (or vice versa) can be inferred from the function value of f1*. Using MAC-S, the UE then calculates AUTS according to the following formula:
[0081] AUTS = SQN MS ⊕ AK* || MAC-S (5),
[0082] Where AK*=f5* K (R), and f5* is the key generation function used to calculate AK* in resynchronization and has the property that no valuable information about the values of f1, f1*, f2, f2*, ... f5 (and vice versa) can be inferred from the function value of f5*.
[0083] Using the SQN extracted from AUTS MS Reset SQN HE Afterwards, the network can be based on the reset SQN HE To generate another set of authentication vectors, these authentication vectors are sent to the VLR / SGSN to try to resynchronize with the UE.
[0084] Example protection of SQN in AKA protocol
[0085] One problem with the AKA protocol discussed above is that the AKA protocol may be vulnerable to certain replay attacks that allow malicious actors to reveal the value of the SQN. Specifically, the protection mechanism of the SQN (e.g., concealing the SQN with AK) (e.g., Figure 7 ) can be defeated under certain replay attacks due to its use of XOR and lack of randomness. For example, in such an attack, a malicious actor can repeatedly send the same authentication challenge (R, AUTN) to the UE and get back multiple AUTS from the UE in response. MS (For example, in AUTS) by using f5* K (R), so a malicious actor can infer (e.g., reveal) the SQN by comparing multiple AUTS returned from the UE MS at least a portion of (e.g., SQN MS For a given R, two SQN MS The XOR difference between them is preserved so that SQN MS Can be used to conceal SQN via XOR MS AK* to reveal.
[0086] Accordingly, various aspects presented herein provide improved techniques for protecting SQNs in authentication protocols (eg, AKA protocols). Specifically, various aspects provide techniques for protecting SQNs (eg, SQNs) in an integrity-protected manner. MS ) into the calculation of the key stream (e.g., AK*) used to protect the SQN. By doing so, the key stream becomes specific to each SQN. MS Different, so that in two different SQN MS It is impossible to find an XOR between them.
[0087] Note that while many aspects described herein use the AKA protocol for UMTS as a reference example of an authentication protocol in which the SQN can be protected using the techniques described herein, the techniques described herein are not limited to the AKA protocol for UMTS. One of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that the techniques for protecting the SQN can be applied to other authentication protocols. For example, the various aspects presented herein can be used with the AKA protocol for 4G (LTE), the AKA protocol for 5G, the AKA used in IMS, and the like.
[0088] Figure 8 800 for wireless communication according to certain aspects of the present disclosure. Operations 800 may be performed, for example, by a UE to authenticate a network for subsequent communications with the network. Operations 800 may be implemented as a process on one or more processors (e.g., Figure 2 Further, signal transmission and reception by the UE in operation 800 may be performed by, for example, one or more antennas (e.g., Figure 2 In some aspects, the transmission and / or reception of signals by the UE may be implemented via a bus interface of one or more processors (eg, controller / processor 280) that obtain and / or output signals.
[0089] Operations 800 may begin at 802, where the UE receives an authentication request (e.g., a user authentication request) including at least a random challenge (e.g., R) from the network (e.g., CN 130). At 804, the UE, upon receiving the authentication request, authenticates the UE based at least in part on a key (e.g., K) shared by the network and the UE. IMSI ), the random challenge and a first MAC (eg, MAC-S) to generate a synchronization parameter (eg, AUTS). At 806, the UE transmits the synchronization parameter and the first MAC to the network in response to the authentication request.
[0090] Fig. 9An example improvement procedure 900 that can be used to generate an AUTS according to certain aspects of the present disclosure is illustrated (e.g., with respect to Figure 7 As shown, with Figure 7 Compared with AK* in Fig. 9 AK1 in is calculated according to the following formula with R and MAC-S as input using K (e.g., K IMSI ) generated by:
[0091] AK1 = f5* K (R, MAC-S) (6).
[0092] By using equation (6), we can protect SQN MS AUTS that is immune to replay attacks can be generated according to the following formula:
[0093] AUTS = SQN MS ⊕ AK1 || MAC-S (7).
[0094] In some aspects, the first MAC (eg, MAC-S) may be based on a key shared by the network and the UE, the random challenge, and a first sequence number (eg, SQN MS ) to generate (e.g., using equation (4)). In some aspects, the authentication request (e.g., at 802) may include additional authentication parameters (e.g., AUTN). For example, the authentication request may include a second sequence number (e.g., SQN HE ) and a second MAC (eg, a MAC in AUTN). The second MAC may be based on a first key (eg, K IMSI ), the random challenge and the second sequence number (eg, SQN HE ) to generate (e.g., using (2)). The first sequence number (e.g., SQN MS ) may be a sequence number associated with the UE and maintained in the UE, and the second sequence number (eg, SQN HE ) may be a sequence number associated with the UE maintained in the network.
[0095] In some aspects, the UE may detect a synchronization failure after receiving the authentication request (e.g., at 802). For example, the UE may detect a synchronization failure after determining a sequence number (e.g., SQN) sent with the authentication request. HE ) is not within the predetermined sequence number value range.
[0096] In some aspects, after transmitting the synchronization parameters (eg, at 806), the UE may receive from the network a message including a sequence number (eg, SQN HE =SQN MS+ threshold). The serial number (e.g., SQN HE =SQN MS + threshold) can be based on the first sequence number (e.g., SQN MS ) to set. If the UE detects the value of the sequence number (e.g., SQN HE =SQN MS + threshold) is within a predetermined sequence number value range, the UE may transmit an authentication response to the network.
[0097] Fig.10 Example operations 1000 for wireless communication according to certain aspects of the present disclosure are illustrated. Operations 1000 may be performed, for example, by a network entity (e.g., CN node 132a, one or more components of a guest / home network, such as CN 130, etc.) to authenticate a UE for subsequent communications with the UE. Operations 1000 may be implemented as software components executed and run on one or more processors of the network entity (e.g., a processor of CN node 132a). In addition, the transmission and reception of signals by the network entity in operation 1000 may be implemented, for example, by one or more antennas of the network entity. In some aspects, the transmission and / or reception of signals by the network entity may be implemented by obtaining and / or outputting signals via a bus interface of one or more processors.
[0098] Operations 1000 begin at 1002, where the network entity transmits an authentication request (e.g., a user authentication request) including at least a random challenge (e.g., R) to the UE. At 1004, the network entity receives a synchronization parameter (e.g., AUTS) and a first MAC (e.g., MAC-S) after transmitting the authentication request. At 1006, the network entity transmits a key (e.g., K) shared with the UE to the UE. IMSI ), the random challenge and the first MAC derive a first sequence number (eg, SQN) from the synchronization parameter MS ).
[0099] In some aspects, the first authentication request may further include a second serial number (eg, SQN HE ) and a second MAC (eg, a MAC in AUTN). The second MAC may be based on a key shared with the UE and the network entity, the random challenge, and the second sequence number (eg, SQN HE ) to generate.
[0100] In some aspects, in response to receiving the synchronization parameter, the network entity may transmit a message including a sequence number based on a first sequence number (eg, SQN MS ) set the second sequence number (for example, SQN HE =SQN MS + threshold) for the second authentication request.
[0101] Fig.11 The description may include operations configured to perform the techniques disclosed herein (such as, Figure 8 1100 includes a communication device 1100 including various components (e.g., corresponding to means-plus-function components) of the operations illustrated in the foregoing. The communication device 1100 includes a processing system 1102 coupled to a transceiver 1108. The transceiver 1108 is configured to transmit and receive signals (such as various signals as described herein) for the communication device 1100 via an antenna 1110. The processing system 1102 may be configured to perform processing functions for the communication device 1100, including processing signals received and / or to be transmitted by the communication device 1100.
[0102] The processing system 1102 includes a processor 1104 coupled to a computer readable medium / memory 1112 via a bus 1106. In some aspects, the computer readable medium / memory 1112 is configured to store a program that, when executed by the processor 1104, causes the processor 1104 to execute Figure 8 1104, or instructions (e.g., computer executable code) for performing the operations illustrated in the or other operations of the various techniques discussed herein. In some aspects, the computer-readable medium / memory 1112 stores: code 1114 for receiving an authentication request including at least a random challenge from a network; code 1116 for generating synchronization parameters based at least in part on a key shared by the network and the UE, the random challenge, and a first MAC after receiving the authentication request; and code 1118 for transmitting the synchronization parameters and the first MAC to the network in response to the authentication request. In some aspects, the processor 1104 has a circuit system configured to implement the code stored in the computer-readable medium / memory 1112. Processor 1104 includes: a circuit system 1120 for receiving an authentication request including at least a random challenge from a network; a circuit system 1122 for generating synchronization parameters based at least in part on a key shared by the network and the UE, the random challenge, and a first MAC after receiving the authentication request; and a circuit system 1124 for transmitting the synchronization parameters and the first MAC to the network in response to the authentication request.
[0103] Fig.12 The following describes operations that may include being configured to perform the techniques disclosed herein (such as Fig.101200 includes a communication device 1200 including various components (e.g., corresponding to means-plus-function components) of the operations illustrated in the foregoing. The communication device 1200 includes a processing system 1202 coupled to a transceiver 1208. The transceiver 1208 is configured to transmit and receive signals (such as various signals as described herein) for the communication device 1200 via an antenna 1210. The processing system 1202 may be configured to perform processing functions for the communication device 1200, including processing signals received and / or to be transmitted by the communication device 1200.
[0104] The processing system 1202 includes a processor 1204 coupled to a computer readable medium / memory 1212 via a bus 1206. In some aspects, the computer readable medium / memory 1212 is configured to store a program that, when executed by the processor 1204, causes the processor 1204 to execute Fig.10 In some aspects, the computer-readable medium / memory 1212 stores: code 1214 for transmitting an authentication request including at least a random challenge to a UE; code 1216 for receiving synchronization parameters and a first MAC after transmitting the authentication request; and
[0105] Code 1218 for deriving a first sequence number from the synchronization parameter using at least a key shared with the UE, the random challenge, and the first MAC. In certain aspects, the processor 1204 has a circuit system configured to implement the code stored in the computer-readable medium / memory 1212. The processor 1204 includes: a circuit system 1220 for transmitting an authentication request including at least a random challenge to the UE; a circuit system 1222 for receiving the synchronization parameter and the first MAC after transmitting the authentication request; and a circuit system 1224 for deriving a first sequence number from the synchronization parameter using at least a key shared with the UE, the random challenge, and the first MAC.
[0106] The techniques described herein may be used for various wireless communication technologies, such as NR (e.g., 5G NR), 3GPP Long Term Evolution (LTE), Advanced LTE (LTE-A), Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA), Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA), Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA), Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDMA), Single Carrier Frequency Division Multiple Access (SC-FDMA), Time Division Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access (TD-SCDMA), and other networks. The terms "network" and "system" are often used interchangeably. A CDMA network may implement radio technologies such as Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (UTRA), cdma2000, and the like. UTRA includes Wideband CDMA (WCDMA) and other variants of CDMA. cdma2000 covers IS-2000, IS-95, and IS-856 standards. A TDMA network may implement radio technologies such as Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM). OFDMA networks can implement radio technologies such as NR (e.g., 5G RA), Evolved UTRA (E-UTRA), Ultra Mobile Broadband (UMB), IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi), IEEE 802.16 (WiMAX), IEEE 802.20, Flash-OFDMA, etc. UTRA and E-UTRA are parts of Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS). LTE and LTE-A are versions of UMTS that use E-UTRA. UTRA, E-UTRA, UMTS, LTE, LTE-A, and GSM are described in documents from an organization named "3rd Generation Partnership Project" (3GPP). cdma2000 and UMB are described in documents from an organization named "3rd Generation Partnership Project 2" (3GPP2). NR is an emerging wireless communication technology under development.
[0107] The techniques described herein may be used for the wireless networks and radio technologies mentioned above as well as other wireless networks and radio technologies. For clarity, although various aspects may be described herein using terms commonly associated with 3G, 4G and / or 5G wireless technologies, various aspects of the present disclosure may be applied in communication systems based on other generations (e.g., 2G wireless technologies).
[0108] In 3GPP, the term "cell" may refer to the coverage area of a B node (NB) and / or a NB subsystem serving the coverage area, depending on the context in which the term is used. In NR systems, the terms "cell" and BS, next-generation B node (gNB or g B node), access point (AP), distributed unit (DU), carrier, or transmission reception point (TRP) may be used interchangeably. The BS may provide communication coverage for macro cells, pico cells, femto cells, and / or other types of cells. A macro cell may cover a relatively large geographic area (e.g., a radius of several thousand meters) and may allow unrestricted access by UEs with service subscriptions. A pico cell may cover a relatively small geographic area and may allow unrestricted access by UEs with service subscriptions. A femto cell may cover a relatively small geographic area (e.g., a residence) and may allow restricted access by UEs associated with the femto cell (e.g., UEs in a closed subscriber group (CSG), UEs of users in a residence, etc.). A BS for a macro cell may be referred to as a macro BS. A BS for a pico cell may be referred to as a pico BS. A BS for a femto cell may be referred to as a femto BS or a home BS.
[0109] UE may also be referred to as a mobile station, terminal, access terminal, subscriber unit, station, customer premises equipment (CPE), cellular phone, smart phone, personal digital assistant (PDA), wireless modem, wireless communication device, handheld device, laptop computer, cordless phone, wireless local loop (WLL) station, tablet computer, camera, gaming device, netbook, smartbook, ultrabook, appliance, medical device or medical equipment, biometric sensor / device, wearable device (such as smart watch, smart clothing, smart glasses, smart wristband, smart jewelry (e.g., smart ring, smart bracelet, etc.)), entertainment device (e.g., music device, video device, satellite radio, etc.), transportation component or sensor, smart meter / sensor, industrial manufacturing equipment, global positioning system device, or any other suitable device configured to communicate via wireless or wired medium. Some UEs may be considered machine type communication (MTC) devices or evolved MTC (eMTC) devices. MTC and eMTC UEs include, for example, robots, drones, remote devices, sensors, meters, monitors, location tags, etc., which can communicate with a BS, another device (e.g., a remote device), or some other entity. A wireless node can provide connectivity for or to a network (e.g., a wide area network (such as the Internet) or a cellular network), for example, via a wired or wireless communication link. Some UEs may be considered Internet of Things (IoT) devices, which may be narrowband IoT (NB-IoT) devices.
[0110] Some wireless networks (e.g., LTE) utilize orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) on the downlink and single carrier frequency division multiplexing (SC-FDM) on the uplink. OFDM and SC-FDM divide the system bandwidth into multiple (K) orthogonal subcarriers, which are also often referred to as frequency modulation, frequency bins, etc. Each subcarrier can be modulated with data. In general, modulation symbols are sent in the frequency domain for OFDM and in the time domain for SC-FDM. The spacing between adjacent subcarriers can be fixed, and the total number of subcarriers (K) can depend on the system bandwidth. For example, the spacing of subcarriers can be 15kHz, and the minimum resource allocation (called a "resource block" (RB)) can be 12 subcarriers (or 180kHz). Therefore, for system bandwidths of 1.25, 2.5, 5, 10, or 20 megahertz (MHz), the nominal fast Fourier transform (FFT) size can be equal to 128, 256, 512, 1024, or 2048, respectively. The system bandwidth may also be divided into subbands. For example, a subband may cover 1.08 MHz (e.g., 6 RBs), and there may be 1, 2, 4, 8, or 16 subbands for system bandwidths of 1.25, 2.5, 5, 10, or 20 MHz, respectively. In LTE, the basic transmission time interval (TTI) or packet duration is a 1 ms subframe.
[0111] NR can utilize OFDM with CP on the uplink and downlink and includes support for half-duplex operation using TDD. In NR, a subframe is still 1ms, but the basic TTI is called a time slot. A subframe contains a variable number of time slots (e.g., 1, 2, 4, 8, 16...time slots), depending on the subcarrier spacing. NR RB is 12 consecutive frequency subcarriers. NR can support a base subcarrier spacing of 15KHz, and other subcarrier spacings can be defined relative to the base subcarrier spacing, such as 30kHz, 60kHz, 120kHz, 240kHz, etc. The symbol and time slot lengths scale with the subcarrier spacing. The CP length also depends on the subcarrier spacing. Beamforming can be supported and the beam direction can be dynamically configured. MIMO transmission with precoding can also be supported. In some examples, the MIMO configuration in the DL can support up to 8 transmit antennas (multi-layer DL transmission with up to 8 streams) and up to 2 streams per UE. In some examples, multi-layer transmission of up to 2 streams per UE may be supported. Aggregation of multiple cells may be supported using up to 8 serving cells.
[0112] In some examples, access to the air interface may be scheduled. A scheduling entity (e.g., BS) allocates resources for communication between some or all devices and equipment within its service area or cell. A scheduling entity may be responsible for scheduling, assigning, reconfiguring, and releasing resources for one or more subordinate entities. That is, for scheduled communications, subordinate entities utilize resources allocated by the scheduling entity. The base station is not the only entity that can be used as a scheduling entity. In some examples, a UE may be used as a scheduling entity, and resources for one or more subordinate entities (e.g., one or more other UEs) may be scheduled, and other UEs may use resources scheduled by the UE for wireless communications. In some examples, a UE may act as a scheduling entity in a peer-to-peer (P2P) network and / or in a mesh network. In a mesh network example, UEs may communicate directly with each other in addition to communicating with a scheduling entity.
[0113] In some examples, two or more subordinate entities (e.g., UEs) may communicate with each other using sidelink signals. Real-world applications of such sidelink communications may include public safety, proximity services, UE-to-network relay, vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications, Internet of Everything (IoE) communications, IoT communications, mission-critical mesh networks, and / or various other coordinated applications. Generally, a sidelink signal may refer to a signal that is communicated from one subordinate entity (e.g., UE1) to another subordinate entity (e.g., UE2) without relaying the communication through a scheduling entity (e.g., UE or BS), even though the scheduling entity may be used for scheduling and / or control purposes. In some examples, the sidelink signal may be communicated using a licensed spectrum (unlike wireless local area networks, which typically use an unlicensed spectrum).
[0114] Each method disclosed herein includes one or more steps or actions for implementing the method. These method steps and / or actions can be interchangeable with each other without departing from the scope of the claims. In other words, unless a specific order of steps or actions is specified, the order and / or use of specific steps and / or actions can be changed without departing from the scope of the claims.
[0115] As used herein, a phrase referring to "at least one" of a list of items refers to any combination of those items, including single members. As an example, "at least one of a, b, or c" is intended to cover: a, b, c, ab, ac, bc, and abc, as well as any combination with multiple identical elements (e.g., aa, aaa, aab, aac, abb, acc, bb, bbb, bbc, cc, and ccc, or any other ordering of a, b, and c).
[0116] As used herein, the term "determining" encompasses a wide variety of actions. For example, "determining" may include calculating, computing, processing, deriving, investigating, searching (e.g., searching in a table, a database, or another data structure), ascertaining, and the like. Also, "determining" may include receiving (e.g., receiving information), accessing (e.g., accessing data in a memory), and the like. Also, "determining" may include resolving, selecting, choosing, establishing, and the like.
[0117] The previous description is provided to enable any person skilled in the art to practice the various aspects described herein. Various modifications to these aspects will be easily understood by those skilled in the art, and the universal principles defined herein can be applied to other aspects. Thus, the claims are not intended to be limited to the various aspects shown herein, but should be granted the full scope consistent with the language of the claims, wherein the singular reference to the element is not intended to mean "there is and only one" (unless specifically stated) but "one or more". Unless otherwise specifically stated, the term "some / some" refers to one or more. The elements of the various aspects described throughout this disclosure are all structural and functional equivalents currently or hereafter known to those of ordinary skill in the art and are expressly incorporated herein by reference, and are intended to be covered by the claims. In addition, nothing disclosed herein is intended to be donated to the public, regardless of whether such disclosure is explicitly recorded in the claims. Any element of the claim should not be interpreted under the provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (f), unless the element is explicitly stated using the phrase "device for..." or in the case of a method claim, the element is stated using the phrase "step for...".
[0118] The various operations of the methods described above may be performed by any suitable device capable of performing the corresponding functions. These devices may include various hardware and / or software components and / or modules, including but not limited to circuits, application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), or processors. Generally, where there are operations illustrated in the accompanying drawings, these operations may have corresponding paired device-plus-function components with similar numbers.
[0119] The various illustrative logical blocks, modules, and circuits described in conjunction with the present disclosure may be implemented or executed with a general purpose processor, a digital signal processor (DSP), an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field programmable gate array (FPGA) or other programmable logic device (PLD), discrete gate or transistor logic, discrete hardware components, or any combination thereof designed to perform the functions described herein. A general purpose processor may be a microprocessor, but in the alternative, the processor may be any commercially available processor, controller, microcontroller, or state machine. The processor may also be implemented as a combination of computing devices, for example, a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, a plurality of microprocessors, one or more microprocessors in conjunction with a DSP core, or any other such configuration.
[0120] If implemented in hardware, an example hardware configuration may include a processing system in a wireless node. The processing system may be implemented using a bus architecture. Depending on the specific application and overall design constraints of the processing system, the bus may include any number of interconnecting buses and bridges. The bus may link together various circuits including a processor, a machine-readable medium, and a bus interface. The bus interface may be used to connect a network adapter, etc., to the processing system via the bus. The network adapter may be used to implement the signal processing functions of the PHY layer. In the user terminal 120 (see Figure 1 ), a user interface (e.g., a keypad, display, mouse, joystick, etc.) may also be connected to the bus. The bus may also link various other circuits, such as timing sources, peripherals, voltage regulators, power management circuits, and the like, which are well known in the art and will not be described further. The processor may be implemented with one or more general and / or special purpose processors. Examples include microprocessors, microcontrollers, DSP processors, and other circuit systems capable of executing software. Those skilled in the art will recognize how to best implement the functionality described with respect to the processing system, depending on the specific application and the overall design constraints imposed on the overall system.
[0121] If implemented in software, each function may be stored on or transmitted by a computer-readable medium as one or more instructions or codes. Software should be broadly interpreted to mean instructions, data, or any combination thereof, whether referred to as software, firmware, middleware, microcode, hardware description language, or other. Computer-readable media include both computer storage media and communication media, which include any media that facilitate the transfer of computer programs from one place to another. The processor may be responsible for managing the bus and general processing, including executing software modules stored on a machine-readable storage medium. A computer-readable storage medium may be coupled to a processor so that the processor can read and write information from / to the storage medium. In an alternative, a storage medium may be integrated into a processor. As an example, a machine-readable medium may include a transmission line, a carrier modulated by data, and / or a computer-readable storage medium having instructions stored thereon that is separated from a wireless node, all of which may be accessed by a processor through a bus interface. Alternatively or additionally, a machine-readable medium or any part thereof may be integrated into a processor, such as a cache and / or a general register file, which may be the case. As an example, examples of machine-readable storage media may include RAM (random access memory), flash memory, ROM (read only memory), PROM (programmable read only memory), EPROM (erasable programmable read only memory), EEPROM (electrically erasable programmable read only memory), registers, magnetic disks, optical disks, hard drives, or any other suitable storage media, or any combination thereof. Machine-readable media may be implemented in a computer program product.
[0122] A software module may include a single instruction, or many instructions, and may be distributed over several different code segments, distributed between different programs, and distributed across multiple storage media. A computer-readable medium may include several software modules. These software modules include instructions that cause a processing system to perform various functions when executed by an apparatus such as a processor. These software modules may include a transmission module and a receiving module. Each software module may reside in a single storage device or may be distributed across multiple storage devices. As an example, when a triggering event occurs, a software module may be loaded into a RAM from a hard drive. During the execution of a software module, a processor may load some instructions into a cache to increase access speed. One or more cache lines may then be loaded into a general register file for execution by the processor. When describing the functionality of a software module as described below, it will be understood that such functionality is implemented by the processor when the processor executes instructions from the software module.
[0123] Any connection is also properly referred to as a computer-readable medium. For example, if the software is transmitted from a website, server, or other remote source using a coaxial cable, fiber optic cable, twisted pair, digital subscriber line (DSL), or wireless technology (such as infrared (IR), radio, and microwave), then the coaxial cable, fiber optic cable, twisted pair, DSL, or wireless technology (such as infrared, radio, and microwave) is included in the definition of medium. Disk and disc, as used herein, include compact disc (CD), laser disc, optical disc, digital versatile disc (DVD), floppy disk, and Disks, where disks often reproduce data magnetically, and discs reproduce data optically with lasers. Thus, in some aspects, computer-readable media may include non-transitory computer-readable media (e.g., tangible media). Additionally, for other aspects, computer-readable media may include transient computer-readable media (e.g., signals). Combinations of the above should also be included within the scope of computer-readable media.
[0124] Thus, certain aspects may include a computer program product for performing the operations presented herein. For example, such a computer program product may include a computer-readable medium having stored (and / or encoded) thereon instructions that can be executed by one or more processors to perform the operations described herein, such as for performing the operations described herein and in Figure 8-10 Instructions for the operations explained in .
[0125] In addition, it should be appreciated that modules and / or other appropriate means for performing the methods and techniques described herein may be downloaded and / or otherwise obtained by a user terminal and / or base station where applicable. For example, such a device can be coupled to a server to facilitate the transfer of means for performing the methods described herein. Alternatively, the various methods described herein can be provided via a storage device (e.g., RAM, ROM, a physical storage medium such as a compact disc (CD) or a floppy disk, etc.) so that once the storage device is coupled to or provided to a user terminal and / or base station, the device can obtain the various methods. In addition, any other suitable technology suitable for providing the methods and techniques described herein to a device may be utilized.
[0126] It will be understood that the claims are not limited to the precise configuration and components illustrated above. Various changes, substitutions and variations may be made in the arrangement, operation and details of the methods and apparatus described above without departing from the scope of the claims.
Claims
1. A device for wireless communication, include: a memory including computer executable instructions; as well as one or more processors configured to execute the computer-executable instructions and cause the apparatus to: transmitting a first authentication request including at least a random challenge to a user equipment UE; After transmitting the first authentication request, receiving a synchronization parameter and a first message authentication code MAC; as well as A first sequence number is derived from the synchronization parameter using at least a key shared with the UE and the device, the random challenge, and the first MAC.
2. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the one or more processors are further configured to cause the apparatus to: transmit, in response to the synchronization parameter, a second authentication request including a second sequence number, the value of the second sequence number being set based on the first sequence number.
3. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the first authentication request further comprises a second sequence number and a second MAC.
4. The apparatus of claim 3, wherein the one or more processors are further configured to cause the apparatus to: generate the second MAC based on the key shared with the UE and the apparatus, the random challenge, and the second sequence number.
5. The device as claimed in claim 3, in: The first sequence number is a sequence number associated with the apparatus maintained in the UE; and The second serial number is a serial number associated with the device maintained in a network.
6. A method for authenticating a user equipment UE by a network entity for wireless communication, include: transmitting a first authentication request including at least a random challenge to the UE; After transmitting the first authentication request, receiving a synchronization parameter and a first message authentication code MAC; as well as A first sequence number is derived from the synchronization parameter using at least a key shared with the UE and the network entity, the random challenge, and the first MAC.
7. The method of claim 6, further comprising: include: In response to the synchronization parameter, a second authentication request is transmitted including a second sequence number, the value of the second sequence number being set based on the first sequence number.
8. The method of claim 6, wherein the first authentication request further comprises a second sequence number and a second MAC.
9. The method of claim 8, wherein the second MAC is generated based on the key shared with the UE and the network entity, the random challenge, and the second sequence number.
10. The method according to claim 8, in: The first sequence number is a sequence number maintained in the UE and associated with the network entity; and The second sequence number is a sequence number maintained in a network and associated with the network entity.
11. A device for wireless communication, include: means for transmitting a first authentication request comprising at least a random challenge to a user equipment UE; means for receiving synchronization parameters and a first message authentication code MAC after transmitting said first authentication request; as well as means for deriving a first sequence number from the synchronization parameter using at least a key shared with the UE and the device, the random challenge, and the first MAC.
12. The device of claim 11, further comprising: include: Means for transmitting, in response to the synchronization parameter, a second authentication request including a second sequence number, the value of the second sequence number being set based on the first sequence number.
13. The apparatus of claim 11, wherein the first authentication request further comprises a second sequence number and a second MAC.
14. The device of claim 13, further comprising: include: means for generating the second MAC based on the key shared with the UE and the device, the random challenge, and the second sequence number.
15. The device according to claim 13, in: The first sequence number is a sequence number associated with the device maintained in the UE; and The second serial number is a serial number associated with the device maintained in a network.
