Lightweight Internet of Vehicles authentication method based on dynamic key

Abstract

The present invention discloses a lightweight vehicle network authentication method based on dynamic keys. The method uses a trusted authority TA responsible for generating and recording relevant information of each communication entity in the communication network and distributing keys, a roadside unit RSU that directly communicates with the vehicle and provides services to the vehicle, and a vehicle V that directly requests services from the RSU for authentication. The method includes: Step 1: System initialization, TA selects a secure one-way hash function as Hash() and a random sequence generation function Rands() and makes them public, and establishes a secure long connection between TA and RSU and between RSUs; Step 2: Vehicle registration; Step 3: Vehicle initial online authentication; Step 4: Vehicle switching to RSU for re-authentication; Step 5: Vehicle offline. This method improves the authentication efficiency between the vehicle and the RSU, reduces the authentication overhead when the vehicle frequently switches the RSU communication target, and improves the response efficiency of the vehicle receiving emergency messages from the vehicle network service while driving.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of vehicle networking, and in particular to a lightweight vehicle networking authentication method based on dynamic keys. Background Art

[0002] Currently, facing major challenges in modern transportation, such as improving traffic safety, alleviating congestion, and reducing fuel consumption and pollution, intelligent transportation systems (ITS) are key to achieving these goals. Advances in wireless network technology have led to the emergence of the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), a technology based on wireless sensors, offering a viable solution for ITS. IoVs are internet-enabled vehicles that connect to external devices such as networks, various entities (infrastructure, roadside units, mobile devices, etc.), applications, and services. In IoVs, vehicles can leverage the intelligent transportation services provided by the network to more effectively plan routes, proactively avoid hazards, and even achieve safe autonomous driving. While driving, vehicles primarily rely on wireless communications to request services from nearby RSUs. Therefore, vehicle-to-road (V2R) communication is a crucial component of data exchange within IoVs, providing a direct communication channel for the establishment of smart transportation.

[0003] When vehicles access intelligent transportation services through the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), insecure communication processes or high latency can easily expose them to malicious attacks, leading to various traffic accidents and potentially damaging personal and property safety. Traditional cryptographic schemes, such as elliptic curve cryptography, can address communication security issues to a certain extent, but their implementation requires high physical resources and results in high latency. Using overly simple cryptographic algorithms, while reducing the complexity of the authentication process, presents significant security limitations and uncertainties. Therefore, these methods are difficult to apply to V2R communication in practice. Furthermore, the extremely limited signal coverage of RSUs (Remote State Units) prevents a moving vehicle from maintaining a persistent connection with a fixed RSU. Frequent re-establishment of communication links complicates the communication process, and the frequent re-authentication required by traditional authentication significantly increases the vehicle's computational burden. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a lightweight Internet of Vehicles authentication method based on dynamic keys, which improves the authentication efficiency between vehicles and RSUs, reduces the authentication overhead of vehicles when frequently switching RSU communication targets, and improves the response efficiency of vehicles receiving emergency messages from Internet of Vehicles services while driving.

[0005] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention provides a lightweight vehicle network authentication method based on dynamic keys. The method uses a trusted authority (TA) responsible for generating and recording relevant information of each communication entity in the communication network and distributing keys, a roadside unit (RSU) that directly communicates with the vehicle and provides services to the vehicle, and a vehicle (V) that directly requests services from the RSU for authentication, including:

[0006] Step 1: System initialization. The TA selects a secure one-way hash function as Hash() and a random sequence generation function Rands() and makes them public. The TA establishes a secure long connection with the RSU and between the RSUs.

[0007] Step 2: Vehicle registration;

[0008] Step 3: Vehicle initial online certification;

[0009] Step 4: The vehicle switches to RSU for re-authentication;

[0010] Step 5: The vehicle is offline.

[0011] Preferably, step 2 includes:

[0012] Step 2.1: TA generates a unique vehicle identifier V for vehicle V id and the master communication key P m , and record the vehicle information;

[0013] Step 2.2: TA will V id and P m Sent to vehicle V via a secure tunnel.

[0014] Preferably, step 3 includes:

[0015] Step 3.1: Vehicle V selects a random number x, message sequence number s, and current timestamp T s , calculate x′=Vid⊕x⊕s⊕Ts, calculate the authentication message e x’＝ En(P m ,x′,T s ), send the message {e x′ ,V id ,s,T s} to RSU1 to request authentication;

[0016] Step 3.2: RSU1 receives the message {e x′ ,V id ,s,T s}, send the message {e x′ ,V id ,s,T s ,RSU id} to TA;

[0017] Step 3.3: TA receives the message {e x′ ,V id ,s,T s ,RSU id}, calculate x′=Dec(P m ,e x′ ,T s ), x″=x′⊕V id ⊕T s , calculate the temporary key P t =TKGen(x″∥V id ∥T s ∥P m ), TA will use the temporary key P t Distributed to RSU1;

[0018] Step 3.4: RSU1 receives the temporary key P t , RSU1 selects a message sequence number k, the current timestamp T k , calculate the private communication key P r =RKGen(P t ∥V id ∥RSU id ∥T k ), e rsu =En(P t ,V id ⊕RSU id ⊕T s ⊕T k ,T k ), send the message {e rsu ,RSU id ,k,T k} to vehicle V;

[0019] Step 3.5: Vehicle receives message {e rsu ,RSU id ,k,T k}, calculate P t =TKGen(x‖V id ‖T s ‖P m ), check e rsu =En(P t ,V id ⊕RSU id ⊕T s ⊕T k ,T k ), if the equation holds, calculate the private communication key P with RSU1 r =RKGen(P t ∥V id ∥RSU id ∥T k), use P r Send an authentication success signal to RSU1; otherwise, disconnect;

[0020] Step 3.6: RSU1 receives and detects the authentication success signal. If the authentication is successful, it will t Distribute to nearby RSUs; otherwise, disconnect.

[0021] Preferably, step 4 includes:

[0022] Step 4.1: Vehicle V selects a random number x, the current message sequence number s′, and the current timestamp T s′ , calculate x′=V id ⊕x⊕s′⊕T s′ , calculate the authentication message e x′＝ En(Pt,x′,T s′ ), send the message {e x′ ,V id ,s′,T s′} to RSU2 to request authentication;

[0023] Step 4.2: RSU2 receives the message {e x′ , V id ,s′,T s′}, calculate x′=Dec(Pm,e x′ ,T s′ ), x″=x′⊕Vid⊕T s′ ⊕s′, select a message sequence number k′, the current timestamp T k′ , calculate the private communication key P r2 =RKGen(P t ‖V id ‖RSU id2 ‖T k′ ‖x″), calculate the authentication message e rsu2 =En(P r2 , V id ⊕RSU id ⊕T s′ ⊕T k′ ,T k′ ), send the message {e rsu2 , RSU id2 ,k′,T k′} to vehicle V;

[0024] Step 4.3: Vehicle V receives the message {e rsu2 , RSU id2 ,k′,T k′}, calculate the private communication key P r2 =RKGen(P t ∥V id ∥RSUid2 ∥T k′ ), check e rsu2 =En(P r2 , V id ⊕RSU id ⊕T s′ ⊕T k′ ,T k′ ), if the equation holds, use the communication key P r2 Send an authentication success signal to RSU2; otherwise, disconnect;

[0025] Step 4.4: RSU2 receives and detects the authentication success signal. If the authentication is successful, it will t Distribute to nearby RSUs; otherwise, disconnect.

[0026] Preferably, step 5 includes:

[0027] Step 5.1: The vehicle completes the trip and sends an offline message to the RSU;

[0028] Step 5.2: When the RSU receives the vehicle offline message, if it has the vehicle information, it releases its own resources and spreads the message to the surrounding area; if it does not have the vehicle information, it directly discards the message.

[0029] Preferably, the steps of the encryption operation En(P, m, t) and the decryption operation Dec(P, m, t) are:

[0030] Step a: Input parameters key P, message m and timestamp t;

[0031] Step b: Calculate the random number seed P'=Hash(P|t)+t, and the message length is L=len(m);

[0032] Step c: Calculate a random sequence stream S = RandS(P', L) of the same length as the message;

[0033] Step d: Perform an XOR operation on the message and the random sequence stream to obtain an encryption result or a decryption result M=S⊕m.

[0034] Preferably, the steps of the temporary dynamic key generation operation TKGen(x) and the random dynamic key generation operation RKGen(x) are:

[0035] Step a': Input dynamic key generation parameter x and initialize P to an empty binary string;

[0036] Step b': Calculate S = Hash(x), P = P ‖ S, x = x + 1;

[0037] Step c': If the P sequence has reached the key length, intercept the corresponding sequence from P and output it; otherwise, repeat step b'.

[0038] Preferably, the target RSU distributes P to other nearby RSU nodes. t There is no restriction on the mode of key distribution.

[0039] According to the above technical solution, the communication entities used in the present invention include a trusted authority TA, a roadside unit RSU, and a vehicle V. The authentication method includes five processes: system initialization, vehicle registration, vehicle initial online authentication, vehicle switching RSU re-authentication, and vehicle offline. This method realizes lightweight authentication and key synchronization between the vehicle and the RSU while ensuring secure authentication between the vehicle and the RSU. Among them, the use of dynamic key technology allows the communicating parties to calculate the key by themselves to reduce the risk of key leakage. The use of the trust transfer mode makes the re-authentication of the vehicle when switching the RSU communication entity more efficient. This can better adapt to the situation where the vehicle frequently switches the RSU communication entity while driving at high speed, reduces the overhead of repeated vehicle and RSU authentication, and can better meet the efficient authentication needs of the vehicle during actual driving.

[0040] Other features and advantages of the present invention will be described in detail in the following detailed description. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0041] The accompanying drawings are used to provide a further understanding of the present invention and constitute a part of the specification. Together with the following detailed description, they are used to explain the present invention but do not constitute a limitation of the present invention. In the accompanying drawings:

[0042] Figure 1 2 is a schematic diagram of an authentication process in a lightweight vehicle network authentication method based on a dynamic key according to the present invention;

[0043] Figure 2 This is a flow chart of the initial online authentication of a vehicle in the lightweight vehicle networking authentication method based on dynamic keys provided by the present invention;

[0044] Figure 3 The present invention provides a flowchart of a vehicle switching RSU re-authentication in a lightweight vehicle networking authentication method based on a dynamic key. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0045] The following describes the specific embodiments of the present invention in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are only used to illustrate and explain the present invention and are not intended to limit the present invention.

[0046] See also Figures 1 to 3The present invention provides a lightweight vehicle network authentication method based on dynamic keys. The method uses a trusted authority (TA) responsible for generating and recording relevant information of each communication entity in the communication network and distributing keys, a roadside unit (RSU) that directly communicates with the vehicle and provides services to the vehicle, and a vehicle (V) that directly requests services from the RSU for authentication, including:

[0047] Step 1: System initialization. The TA selects a secure one-way hash function as Hash() and a random sequence generation function Rands() and makes them public. The TA establishes a secure long connection with the RSU and between the RSUs.

[0048] Step 2: Vehicle registration;

[0049] Specifically, step 2 includes:

[0050] Step 2.1: TA generates a unique vehicle identifier V for vehicle V id and the master communication key P m , and record the vehicle information;

[0051] Step 2.2: TA will V id and P m Sent to vehicle V via a secure tunnel.

[0052] Step 3: Vehicle initial online certification;

[0053] Specifically, step 3 includes:

[0054] Step 3.1: Vehicle V selects a random number x, message sequence number s, and current timestamp T s , calculate x′=Vid⊕x⊕s⊕Ts, calculate the authentication message e x’＝ En(P m ,x′,T s ), send the message {e x′ ,V id ,s,T s} to RSU1 to request authentication;

[0055] Step 3.2: RSU1 receives the message {e x′ ,V id ,s,T s}, send the message {e x′ ,V id ,s,T s ,RSU id} to TA;

[0056] Step 3.3: TA receives the message {e x′ ,V id ,s,T s ,RSU id}, calculate x′=Dec(P m ,e x′ ,T s ), x″=x′⊕V id ⊕T s , calculate the temporary key P t =TKGen(x″∥V id ∥T s ∥P m ), TA will use the temporary key P t Distributed to RSU1;

[0057] Step 3.4: RSU1 receives the temporary key P t , RSU1 selects a message sequence number k, the current timestamp T k , calculate the private communication key P r =RKGen(P t ∥V id ∥RSU id ∥T k ), e rsu =En(P t ,V id ⊕RSU id ⊕T s ⊕T k ,T k ), send the message {e rsu ,RSU id ,k,T k} to vehicle V;

[0058] Step 3.5: Vehicle receives message {e rsu ,RSU id ,k,T k}, calculate P t =TKGen(x‖V id ‖T s ‖P m ), check e rsu =En(P t ,V id ⊕RSU id ⊕T s ⊕T k ,T k ), if the equation holds, calculate the private communication key P with RSU1 r =RKGen(P t ∥V id ∥RSU id ∥T k ), use P r Send an authentication success signal to RSU1; otherwise, disconnect;

[0059] Step 3.6: RSU1 receives and detects the authentication success signal. If the authentication is successful, it will t Distribute to nearby RSUs; otherwise, disconnect.

[0060] Step 4: The vehicle switches to RSU for re-authentication;

[0061] Specifically, step 4 includes:

[0062] Step 4.1: Vehicle V selects a random number x, the current message sequence number s′, and the current timestamp T s′ , calculate x′=V id ⊕x⊕s′⊕T s′ , calculate the authentication message e x′＝ En(Pt,x′,T s′ ), send the message {e x′ ,V id ,s′,T s′} to RSU2 to request authentication;

[0063] Step 4.2: RSU2 receives the message {e x′ , V id ,s′,T s′}, calculate x′=Dec(Pm,e x′ ,T s′ ), x″=x′⊕Vid⊕T s′ ⊕s′, select a message sequence number k′, the current timestamp T k′ , calculate the private communication key P r2 =RKGen(P t ‖V id ‖RSU id2 ‖T k′ ‖x″), calculate the authentication message e rsu2 =En(P r2 , V id ⊕RSU id ⊕T s′ ⊕T k′ ,T k′ ), send the message {e rsu2 , RSU id2 ,k′,T k′} to vehicle V;

[0064] Step 4.3: Vehicle V receives the message {e rsu2 , RSU id2 ,k′,T k′}, calculate the private communication key P r2 =RKGen(P t ∥V id ∥RSU id2 ∥Tk′ ), check e rsu2 =En(P r2 , V id ⊕RSU id ⊕T s′ ⊕T k′ ,T k′ ), if the equation holds, use the communication key P r2 Send an authentication success signal to RSU2; otherwise, disconnect;

[0065] Step 4.4: RSU2 receives and detects the authentication success signal. If the authentication is successful, it will t Distribute to nearby RSUs; otherwise, disconnect.

[0066] Step 5: The vehicle is offline;

[0067] Specifically, step 5 includes:

[0068] Step 5.1: The vehicle completes the trip and sends an offline message to the RSU;

[0069] Step 5.2: When the RSU receives the vehicle offline message, if it has the vehicle information, it releases its own resources and spreads the message to the surrounding area; if it does not have the vehicle information, it directly discards the message.

[0070] In this embodiment, the steps of the encryption operation En(P, m, t) and the decryption operation Dec(P, m, t) are preferably as follows:

[0071] Step a: Input parameters key P, message m and timestamp t;

[0072] Step b: Calculate the random number seed P'=Hash(P|t)+t, the message length is L=len(m), where t is the current timestamp;

[0073] Step c: Calculate a random sequence stream S = RandS(P', L) of the same length as the message;

[0074] Step d: Perform an XOR operation on the message and the random sequence stream to obtain an encryption result or a decryption result M=S⊕m.

[0075] In this embodiment, the steps of the temporary dynamic key generation operation TKGen(x) and the random dynamic key generation operation RKGen(x) are preferably as follows:

[0076] Step a': Input dynamic key generation parameter x and initialize P to an empty binary string;

[0077] Step b': Calculate S = Hash(x), P = P ‖ S, x = x + 1;

[0078] Step c': If the P sequence has reached the key length, intercept the corresponding sequence from P and output it; otherwise, repeat step b'.

[0079] Among them, the target RSU distributes P to other nearby RSU nodes t There is no restriction on the mode of key distribution.

[0080] Through the above technical solution, the present invention utilizes communication entities including a trusted authority (TA), a roadside unit (RSU), and a vehicle (V). The authentication method includes five steps: system initialization, vehicle registration, initial vehicle online authentication, vehicle switching to an RSU re-authentication, and vehicle offline. This method only uses low-computation hash functions and pseudo-random number algorithms to implement mutual authentication and key negotiation between the vehicle and the RSU, effectively improving the efficiency of the authentication process. A temporary key mechanism is introduced, where the RSU pushes the vehicle's temporary key to other nearby RSU nodes, achieving trust transfer. This allows the vehicle to authenticate with other RSUs without directly going through the TA and without leaking the TA's master key, thus ensuring the security of the TA and reducing the authentication burden and communication overhead on the TA. The direct authentication between the vehicle and the RSU and the re-communication of an independent random communication key further improve the efficiency of authentication and protect the security between the RSUs. In addition, compared with the direct key sharing method currently used in vehicle-to-vehicle networks, in the method provided by the present invention, the RSU obtains a temporary key generated by the TA through the TA. The RSU completes authentication and key exchange with the vehicle using the temporary key, effectively protecting the security of the original key and preventing the spread of risks caused by a single communication key leak. At the same time, compared with the current authentication technology in the Internet of Vehicles, the communication key of the vehicle in the present invention will be dynamically generated by both communicating parties when it goes back online and switches the RSU, which avoids the risk of leakage caused by key exchange. In addition, the variability of the key can also effectively resist empirical attacks.

[0081] The preferred embodiments of the present invention are described in detail above in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. However, the present invention is not limited to the specific details in the above embodiments. Within the technical concept of the present invention, various simple modifications can be made to the technical solution of the present invention, and these simple modifications all fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0082] It should also be noted that the various specific technical features described in the above specific embodiments can be combined in any appropriate manner without contradiction. In order to avoid unnecessary repetition, the present invention will not further describe various possible combinations.

[0083] In addition, the various embodiments of the present invention may be arbitrarily combined, and as long as they do not violate the concept of the present invention, they should also be regarded as the contents disclosed by the present invention.

Claims

1. A lightweight vehicle network authentication method based on dynamic keys, characterized in that: The method uses a trusted authority TA responsible for generating and recording relevant information of each communication entity in the communication network and distributing keys, a roadside unit RSU that directly communicates with the vehicle and provides services to the vehicle, and a vehicle V that directly requests services from the RSU for authentication, including: Step 1: System initialization, TA selects a secure one-way hash function as Hash ( ) and random sequence generation function Rands ( ) and publicly, a secure long connection is established between TA and RSU and between RSUs; Step 2: Vehicle registration; Step 3: Vehicle initial online certification; Step 4: The vehicle switches to RSU for re-authentication; Step 5: The vehicle is offline; Step 2 includes: Step 2.1: TA generates a unique vehicle identifier for vehicle V V id and master communication key P m , and record the vehicle information; Step 2.2: TA will V id and P m Send to vehicle V through a secure tunnel; Step 3 includes: Step 3.1: Vehicle V selects a random number x , message sequence number s , current timestamp T s ,calculate x′ =Vid⊕x⊕s⊕Ts , calculate the authentication message e x’ = En ( P m , x′ , T s ), send message { e x′ , V id , s , T s } to RSU1 to request authentication; Step 3.2: RSU1 receives the message { e x′ , V id , s , T s }, send message { e x′ , V id , s , T s , RSU id } to TA; Step 3.3: TA receives the message { e x′ , V id , s , T s , RSU id },calculate x′ = Dec ( P m , e x′ , T s ), x″ = x′ ⊕ V id ⊕ T s , calculate the temporary key P t = TKGen ( x″ ‖ V id ‖ T s ‖ P m ), TA will use the temporary key P t Distributed to RSU1; Step 3.4: RSU1 receives the temporary key P t , RSU1 selects a message sequence number k , current timestamp T k , calculate the private communication key P r = RKGen ( P t ‖ V id ‖ RSU id ‖ T k ), e rsu = En ( P t , V id ⊕ RSU id ⊕ T s ⊕ T k , T k ), send message { e rsu , RSU id , k , T k } to vehicle V; Step 3.5: Vehicle receives message { e rsu , RSU id , k , T k },calculate P t = TKGen ( x ‖ V id ‖ T s ‖ P m ),examine e rsu = En ( P t , V id ⊕ RSU id ⊕ T s ⊕ T k , T k ), if the equation holds, calculate the private communication key with RSU1 P r = RKGen ( P t ‖ V id ‖ RSU id ‖ T k ),use P r Send an authentication success signal to RSU1; otherwise, disconnect; Step 3.6: RSU1 receives and detects the authentication success signal. If the authentication is successful, P t Distribute to nearby RSUs; otherwise, disconnect; Step 4 includes: Step 4.1: Vehicle V selects a random number x , current message sequence number s′ , current timestamp T s′ ,calculate x′ = V id ⊕ x ⊕ s′ ⊕ T s′ , calculate the authentication message e x′ = En ( Pt , x′ , T s′ ), send message { e x′ , V id , s′ , T s′ } to RSU2 to request authentication; Step 4.2: RSU2 receives the message { e x′ , V id , s′ , T s′ },calculate x′ = Dec ( Pm , e x′ , T s′ ), x″ = x′ ⊕ Vid ⊕ T s′ ⊕ s′， Select a message sequence number k′ , current timestamp T k′ , calculate the private communication key P r2 = RKGen ( P t ‖ V id ‖ RSU id2 ‖ T k′ ‖ x″ ), calculate the authentication message e rsu2 = En ( P r2 , V id ⊕ RSU id ⊕ T s′ ⊕ T k′ , T k′ ), send message { e rsu2 , RSU id2 , k′ , T k′ } to vehicle V; Step 4.3: Vehicle V receives the message { e rsu2 , RSU id2 , k′ , T k′ }, calculate the private communication key P r2 = RKGen ( P t ‖ V id ‖ RSU id2 ‖ T k′ ),examine e rsu2 = En ( P r2 , V id ⊕ RSU id ⊕ T s′ ⊕ T k′ , T k′ ), if the equality holds, use the communication key P r2 Send an authentication success signal to RSU2; otherwise, disconnect; Step 4.4: RSU2 receives and detects the authentication success signal. If the authentication is successful, it will P t Distribute to nearby RSUs; otherwise, disconnect; Cryptographic Operations En ( P , m , t ) and decryption operations Dec ( P , m , t ) are as follows: Step a: Enter parameter key P ,information m and timestamp t ; Step b: Calculate the random number seed P ' = Hash ( P ‖ t )+ t , the message length is L = len( m ); Step c: Calculate a random sequence stream of the same length as the message S = RandS ( P ', L ); Step d: XOR the message with the random sequence stream to obtain the encryption result or decryption result M = S ⊕ m ; Temporary dynamic key generation operation TKGen ( x ) and random dynamic key generation operations RKGen ( x ) are: Step a': Enter dynamic key generation parameters x ,initialization P is an empty binary string; Step b': Calculate S = Hash ( x ), P = P ‖ S , x = x +1; Step c': If the P sequence has reached the key length, intercept the corresponding sequence from P and output it; otherwise, repeat step b'; Step 5 includes: Step 5.1: The vehicle completes the trip and sends an offline message to the RSU; Step 5.2: When the RSU receives the vehicle offline message, if it has the vehicle information, it releases its own resources and spreads the message to the surrounding area; if it does not have the vehicle information, it directly discards the message.

2. The lightweight vehicle network authentication method based on dynamic keys according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The target RSU distributes to other nearby RSU nodes P t There is no restriction on the mode of key distribution.

Images