Unmanned aerial vehicle operation network and lightweight data encryption authentication method

Abstract

The invention provides an unmanned aerial vehicle operation network and a lightweight data encryption authentication method. The unmanned aerial vehicle operation network comprises a central control unit and at least one node. The central control unit is used for broadcasting IDs of all the nodes in the public generator and unmanned aerial vehicle operation network to all the nodes and transmitting corresponding private information to all the nodes; when a sending node needs to send information to a target node, the sending node is used for generating a first type of sending message according to a plaintext to be sent, the ID of the target node, a public generator and the ID of the target node, and transmitting the first type of sending message to the target node, and the target node is used for determining whether the first verification value is qualified or not according to the ID of the sending node and the first verification identification information, and if the first verification value is qualified, decrypting the first ciphertext to obtain the corresponding plaintext. And the security of the communication environment is ensured through encryption verification.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of communication technology, and in particular to an unmanned aerial vehicle operation network and a lightweight data encryption authentication method. Background Art

[0002] The UAV operation network is a network designed for communication, management and monitoring of aircraft such as unmanned aerial vehicles. The UAV operation network can realize real-time data exchange between drones and various ground entities to ensure the safe operation of drones. In recent years, the network has been widely used in many fields such as pesticide spraying, package delivery, terrain surveying and disaster monitoring. However, the resulting information security issues have gradually been paid attention to by people.

[0003] The drone adjusts its flight strategy based on the information sent by the ground entity and obtains various data when performing tasks, such as flight log data, sensor data, environmental data, etc. The open network communication environment is easily invaded by attackers, such as attackers who can steal data transmitted on the network or send false information to the drone performing the task to interfere with and disrupt the operation. This has also become a difficulty that troubles technicians in this field. Summary of the invention

[0004] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a drone operation network and a lightweight data encryption authentication method to improve the above-mentioned problems.

[0005] In order to achieve the above purpose, the technical solution adopted by the embodiment of the present invention is as follows:

[0006] In a first aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a drone operation network, the drone operation network comprising a central control unit and at least one node, the node being any one of a drone, a drone operation server, a drone data support server, and a user terminal device of the drone;

[0007] The central control unit is used to broadcast the public generator and the ID of each node in the drone operation network to each node, and transmit its corresponding private information to each node;

[0008] When a sending node needs to send information to a target node, the sending node is used to generate a first type of sending message according to the plaintext to be sent, the ID of the target node, the public generator and the ID of the target node, and transmit the first type of sending message to the target node, wherein the first type of sending message includes the ID of the sending node, the first type of ciphertext and the first verification identification information, the first verification identification information is the identification corresponding to the first type of verification value, the first type of ciphertext is the encryption result of the plaintext, and the first type of verification value is the hash operation result corresponding to the first type of ciphertext;

[0009] The target node is used to determine whether the first type of verification value is qualified according to the ID of the sending node and the first verification identification information. If qualified, the first type of ciphertext is decrypted to obtain the corresponding plaintext.

[0010] Optionally, the sending node is used to generate public information corresponding to the target node according to the ID of the target node and the public generator;

[0011] The sending node is further used to generate a first session key according to the public information of the target node and the private information of the sending node;

[0012] The sending node is further used to generate a first authentication key and a first encryption key according to the first session key;

[0013] The sending node is further used to perform a hash operation according to the first authentication key, the ID of the target node and the ID of the sending node to generate a first initial vector;

[0014] The sending node is further configured to generate a first type of ciphertext according to the first initial vector, the first encryption key and the plaintext;

[0015] The sending node is further used to perform a hash operation according to the first authentication key, the first type of ciphertext and the ID of the sending node to generate a first type of verification value;

[0016] The sending node is further used to generate the first type of sending message according to the ID of the sending node, the first type of ciphertext and the first type of verification value.

[0017] Optionally, the target node is used to generate public information corresponding to the sending node according to the ID of the sending node and the public generator;

[0018] The target node is further used to generate a second session key according to the public information of the sending node and the private information of the target node;

[0019] The target node is further configured to generate a second authentication key and a second encryption key according to the second session key;

[0020] The target node is further used to perform a hash operation according to the second authentication key, the first type of ciphertext and the ID of the sending node to generate a second type of verification value;

[0021] The target node is further used to determine whether the first type of verification value is qualified according to the second type of verification value and the first verification identification information;

[0022] If qualified, the target node is further used to perform a hash operation according to the second authentication key, the ID of the target node and the ID of the sending node to generate a second initial vector;

[0023] The target node is further configured to decrypt the first type of ciphertext according to the second initial vector and the second encryption key to obtain corresponding plaintext.

[0024] Optionally, the first verification identification information is the first preset number of bytes in the first type of verification value.

[0025] Optionally, when the sending node needs to send information to the central control unit, the sending node is used to generate public information corresponding to the sending node according to the ID of the sending node and the public generator;

[0026] The sending node is further used to generate a third session key according to the public information of the sending node and the private information of the sending node;

[0027] The sending node is further used to generate a third authentication key and a third encryption key according to the third session key;

[0028] The sending node is further used to perform a hash operation according to the third authentication key and the ID of the sending node to generate a third initial vector;

[0029] The sending node is further used to generate a third type of ciphertext according to the third initial vector, the third encryption key and the plaintext to be sent;

[0030] The sending node is further used to perform a hash operation according to the third authentication key, the third type of ciphertext and the ID of the sending node to generate a third type of verification value;

[0031] The sending node is further used to generate a third type of sending message according to the ID of the sending node, the third type of ciphertext and the third verification identification information corresponding to the third type of verification value;

[0032] The central control unit is further used to generate a fourth session key according to the public information of the sending node and the private information of the sending node;

[0033] The central control unit is further used to generate a fourth authentication key and a fourth encryption key according to the fourth session key;

[0034] The central control unit is further used to perform a hash operation according to the fourth authentication key, the third type of ciphertext and the ID of the sending node to generate a fourth type of verification value;

[0035] The central control unit is further used to determine whether the third type of verification value is qualified according to the fourth type of verification value and the third verification identification information;

[0036] If qualified, the central control unit is further used to perform a hash operation according to the fourth authentication key and the ID of the sending node to generate a fourth initial vector;

[0037] The central control unit is further configured to decrypt the third type of ciphertext according to the fourth initial vector and the fourth encryption key to obtain corresponding plaintext.

[0038] Optionally, the central control unit is used to generate a common matrix according to the ID of each node, and the common matrix includes common information of each node;

[0039] The central control unit is used to generate a random secret symmetric matrix, and obtain a private information matrix according to the public matrix and the random secret symmetric matrix, wherein the private information matrix includes private information of each node.

[0040] Optionally, the random secret symmetric matrix is ​​updated according to a preset period;

[0041] After the random secret symmetric matrix is ​​updated, the central control unit is used to obtain an updated private information matrix based on the public matrix and the updated random secret symmetric matrix. The updated private information matrix includes the updated private information of each node, and transmits the updated private information corresponding to each node to each node.

[0042] Optionally, after acquiring the updated private information, the nodes uniformly wait for a preset time interval and then enable the updated private information.

[0043] Optionally, when a new node is added to the drone operation network, the central control unit assigns an ID to the new node and broadcasts the ID of the new node in the drone operation network;

[0044] The central control unit is also used to obtain the private information of the new node, and transmit the private information of the new node and the public generator to the new node.

[0045] In a second aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a lightweight data encryption authentication method, which is applied to the above-mentioned drone operation network, and the method includes: the central control unit broadcasts a public generator and the ID of each node in the drone operation network to each node, and transmits its corresponding private information to each node; when the sending node needs to send information to the target node, the sending node generates a first type of sending message according to the plaintext to be sent, the ID of the target node, the public generator and the ID of the target node, and transmits the first type of sending message to the target node, wherein the first type of sending message includes the ID of the sending node, the first type of ciphertext and the first verification identification information, the first verification identification information is the identification corresponding to the first type of verification value, the first type of ciphertext is the encryption result of the plaintext, and the first type of verification value is the hash operation result corresponding to the first type of ciphertext; the target node determines whether the first type of verification value is qualified according to the ID of the sending node and the first verification identification information, and if qualified, the first type of ciphertext is decrypted to obtain the corresponding plaintext.

[0046] Compared with the prior art, the embodiment of the present invention provides a drone operation network and a lightweight data encryption authentication method, wherein the drone operation network includes a central control unit and at least one node, wherein the node is any one of a drone, a drone operation server, a drone data support server, and a user terminal device of the drone; the central control unit is used to broadcast a public generator and the ID of each node in the drone operation network to each node, and transmit its corresponding private information to each node; when the sending node needs to send information to the target node, the sending node is used to generate a first type of sending message according to the plaintext to be sent, the ID of the target node, the public generator, and the ID of the target node, and transmit the first type of sending message to the target node, wherein the first type of sending message includes the ID of the sending node, the first type of ciphertext, and the first verification identification information, the first verification identification information is the identification corresponding to the first type of verification value, the first type of ciphertext is the encryption result of the plaintext, and the first type of verification value is the hash operation result corresponding to the first type of ciphertext; the target node is used to determine whether the first type of verification value is qualified according to the ID of the sending node and the first verification identification information, and if qualified, the first type of ciphertext is decrypted to obtain the corresponding plaintext. The security of the communication environment is guaranteed by performing encryption verification.

[0047] In order to make the above-mentioned objects, features and advantages of the present invention more obvious and easy to understand, preferred embodiments are given below and described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0048] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the drawings required for use in the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. It should be understood that the following drawings only show certain embodiments of the present invention and therefore should not be regarded as limiting the scope. For ordinary technicians in this field, other related drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.

[0049] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of the structure of a drone operation network provided in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0050] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of a flow chart of a lightweight data encryption authentication method provided by an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0051] In order to make the purpose, technical solutions and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Generally, the components of the embodiments of the present invention described and shown in the drawings here can be arranged and designed in various different configurations.

[0052] Therefore, the following detailed description of the embodiments of the present invention provided in the accompanying drawings is not intended to limit the scope of the invention claimed for protection, but merely represents selected embodiments of the present invention. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0053] It should be noted that similar reference numerals and letters represent similar items in the following drawings, so once an item is defined in one drawing, it does not need to be further defined and explained in the subsequent drawings. At the same time, in the description of the present invention, the terms "first", "second", etc. are only used to distinguish the description and cannot be understood as indicating or implying relative importance.

[0054] It should be noted that, in this article, relational terms such as first and second, etc. are only used to distinguish one entity or operation from another entity or operation, and do not necessarily require or imply any such actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Moreover, the terms "include", "comprise" or any other variants thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, so that a process, method, article or device including a series of elements includes not only those elements, but also other elements not explicitly listed, or also includes elements inherent to such process, method, article or device. In the absence of further restrictions, the elements defined by the sentence "comprise a ..." do not exclude the existence of other identical elements in the process, method, article or device including the elements.

[0055] In the description of the present invention, it should be noted that the terms "upper", "lower", "inside", "outside", etc. indicate directions or positional relationships based on the directions or positional relationships shown in the accompanying drawings, or are directions or positional relationships in which the product of the invention is usually placed when in use. They are only for the convenience of describing the present invention and simplifying the description, and do not indicate or imply that the device or element referred to must have a specific direction, be constructed and operated in a specific direction, and therefore should not be understood as a limitation on the present invention.

[0056] In the description of the present invention, it is also necessary to explain that, unless otherwise clearly specified and limited, the terms "disposed" and "connected" should be understood in a broad sense, for example, it can be a fixed connection, a detachable connection, or an integral connection; it can be a mechanical connection or an electrical connection; it can be a direct connection, or it can be an indirect connection through an intermediate medium, or it can be the internal communication of two elements. For ordinary technicians in this field, the specific meanings of the above terms in the present invention can be understood according to specific circumstances.

[0057] Some embodiments of the present invention are described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. In the absence of conflict, the following embodiments and features in the embodiments can be combined with each other.

[0058] Complex encryption and verification of large amounts of operating data will bring huge operating burdens to drones with limited performance (such as computing power, endurance, etc.). Therefore, it is urgent to design a lightweight data encryption and authentication solution to solve the above problems.

[0059] Please refer to Figure 1 , Figure 1 A schematic diagram of the structure of a drone operation network provided by an embodiment of the present invention. The drone operation network includes a central control unit and at least one node, where the node is any one of a drone, a drone operation server, a drone data support server, and a user terminal device of the drone.

[0060] The central control unit is also called the Low-altitude air traffic management system (LATM). LATM is responsible for the operation management and monitoring of the other physical nodes, supervises drone operators, and provides communication interfaces for communication between physical nodes. As the center of the entire drone operation network, LATM has extremely high security.

[0061] The drone operation server, also known as the drone service operator, mainly provides users with drone-related services and support, and ensures the safety of drones and the smooth progress of missions. It communicates directly with user terminal equipment (operators) and drones, and provides them with a variety of information related to drone operations obtained from LATM and supplementary data providers, including drone flight plans, route information, take-off and landing airport information, operating specifications and systems, etc.

[0062] The drone data support server, also known as the supplementary data provider, mainly provides auxiliary data and information support to LATM and drone service operators, such as meteorological data, airspace restrictions, terrain and obstacles, to ensure the safe, efficient and legal operation of drones.

[0063] The user terminal device of the drone is also called the drone operator. In the actual execution of the mission, the drone operator is responsible for supervising and controlling the drone to complete the target mission, and exchanging the drone's operating data with LATM and the drone service operator in real time, and adjusting the operation of the drone based on the information transmitted by the two.

[0064] It should be noted that the communication mode between the central control unit and the nodes and the communication mode between the nodes can be air-to-air communication, air-to-ground communication, ground-to-ground communication, etc.

[0065] exist Figure 1 On this basis, regarding how the UAV operation network completes communication, the embodiment of the present invention also provides an optional implementation method, please refer to the following.

[0066] The central control unit is used to broadcast the public generator and the ID of each node in the drone operation network to each node, and transmit its corresponding private information to each node.

[0067] After the central control unit is started, a public generator g is randomly generated and broadcast to each node in the drone operation network. Then, the central control unit assigns corresponding IDs to each node in the drone operation network according to the preset priority order and broadcasts the IDs of each node in the drone operation network.

[0068] The central control unit is used to generate a public matrix according to the ID of each node, and the public matrix includes the public information of each node.

[0069] Optionally, the public parameters corresponding to the node are determined according to the node ID and the public generator g. ID =g ID , g ID It represents the public parameters of the node corresponding to ID, and g represents the public generator.

[0070] Then, the common information of each node is generated based on the common parameters corresponding to the nodes, where the formula for the common information is (g ID 0 ,g ID 1 ,g ID 2 ,…,g ID λ ) T , λ is a preset integer parameter, and the common information of the rth node is used as the corresponding column vector β in the public matrix B r , 1≤r≤N, N represents the total number of nodes in the UAV operation network.

[0071] The central control unit is used to generate a random secret symmetric matrix, and obtain a private information matrix according to the public matrix and the random secret symmetric matrix. The private information matrix includes private information of each node.

[0072] The random secret symmetric matrix S is a symmetric matrix of (λ+1) rows × (λ+1) columns, and each element thereof is randomly generated.

[0073] Optionally, the private information matrix A is a transposed matrix of a multiplication result of a public matrix and a random secret symmetric matrix, and the rth row in the private information matrix A is the private information of the rth node.

[0074] In an optional implementation, the central control unit can also generate a key matrix K based on the private information matrix A and the public matrix B. Wherein, K = A·B. It should be noted that the key matrix K is a symmetric matrix, and the element (K ij ) and the j-th row and i-th column element (K ji ), 1≤i≤N, 1≤j≤N, i≠j. K ij and K ji represents the session key between the i-th node and the j-th node. The i-th row and i-th column element of the key matrix K (K ii ) represents the session key between the ith node and the central control unit.

[0075] After obtaining the private information matrix A, the central control unit can transmit the corresponding private information to each node through a secure channel (such as physical transmission, based on digital certificates or public key infrastructure, Diffie-Hellman key exchange, etc.).

[0076] It should be noted that when a node receives its corresponding private information, it can save it. The private information can be used to calculate the session key between other nodes in the drone operation network, thereby realizing communication with other nodes.

[0077] When the sending node needs to send information to the target node, the sending node is used to generate a first type of sending message according to the plaintext to be sent, the ID of the target node, the public generator and the ID of the target node, and transmit the first type of sending message to the target node.

[0078] Among them, the first type of sent message includes the ID of the sending node, the first type of ciphertext and the first verification identification information, the first verification identification information is the identification corresponding to the first type of verification value, the first type of ciphertext is the encryption result of the plaintext, and the first type of verification value is the hash operation result corresponding to the first type of ciphertext.

[0079] In an optional implementation, the sending node is the i-th node, and the target node is the j-th node. The sending process of the first type of message sending is described below.

[0080] The sending node is used to generate public information corresponding to the target node according to the ID of the target node and the public generator.

[0081] It should be understood that the sending node determines the public parameters of the target node according to the ID of the target node and the public generator, and then brings the public parameters into the formula (g ID 0 ,g ID 1 ,g ID 2 ,…,g ID λ ) T , determine the public information β corresponding to the target node j .

[0082] The sending node is further used to generate a first session key according to the public information of the target node and the private information of the sending node.

[0083] Optionally, the first session key K ij The formula is K ij =α i β j , where α i represents the private information of the sending node (i-th node), β jRepresents the public information of the target node (j-th node).

[0084] The sending node is further used to generate a first authentication key and a first encryption key according to the first session key.

[0085] Optionally, let f(·) represent the key derivation function, and the sending node (i-th node) calculates f(K ij )=(EK ij ,AK ij ) to obtain the first encryption key EK ij and the first authentication key AK ij .

[0086] The sending node is further used to perform a hash operation according to the first authentication key, the ID of the target node and the ID of the sending node to generate a first initial vector.

[0087] Optionally, the formula for the first initial vector is: Among them, IV i Represents the first initial vector, AK ij Indicates the first authentication key, ID i Indicates the ID of the sending node, ID j represents the ID of the target node, and H represents the hash function. The first initial vector IV i It is an important input to the SM4 algorithm and is used to increase the randomness and security of the password.

[0088] The sending node is further configured to generate a first type of ciphertext according to the first initial vector, the first encryption key and the plaintext.

[0089] Optionally, the formula for the first type of ciphertext is Among them, c i represents the first type of ciphertext, m i Indicates plain text, IV i represents the first initial vector, EK ij represents the first encryption key, Indicates the use of the first session key K ij Encryption function.

[0090] The sending node is further used to perform a hash operation according to the first authentication key, the first type of ciphertext and the ID of the sending node to generate a first type of verification value.

[0091] Optionally, the formula for the first type of verification value is Among them, MAC1 represents the first type of authentication value, AK ij Indicates the first authentication key, ID i Indicates the ID of the sending node, c i represents the first type of ciphertext, and H represents the hash function.

[0092] The sending node is further used to generate a first type of sending message according to the ID of the sending node, the first type of ciphertext and the first type of verification value.

[0093] It should be noted that the first verification identification information in the first type of sent message is the first preset number of bytes in the first type of verification value, and the value of the first preset number is greater than or equal to 4. Alternatively, the first verification identification information is a complete first type of verification value.

[0094] The target node is used to determine whether the first type of verification value is qualified according to the ID of the sending node and the first verification identification information. If qualified, the first type of ciphertext is decrypted to obtain the corresponding plaintext.

[0095] Regarding the plaintext decryption and authentication process, the embodiment of the present invention also provides an optional implementation method, which is as follows.

[0096] The target node is used to generate public information corresponding to the sending node according to the ID of the sending node and the public generator.

[0097] Optionally, the target node (jth node) determines the public parameter of the sending node according to the ID of the sending node (ith node) and the public generator, and then substitutes the public parameter into the formula (g ID 0 ,g ID 1 ,g ID 2 ,…,g ID λ ) T , determine the public information β corresponding to the sending node i .

[0098] The target node is also used to generate a second session key according to the public information of the sending node and the private information of the target node.

[0099] Optionally, the second session key K ji The formula is K ji =α j β i , where α j represents the private information of the target node (jth node), β i Represents the public information of the sending node (the i-th node).

[0100] The target node is further configured to generate a second authentication key and a second encryption key according to the second session key.

[0101] Optionally, let f(·) denote the key derivation function, and the target node (j-th node) is obtained by computing f(K ji )=(EKji ,AK ji ) to obtain the second encryption key EK ji and the second authentication key AK ji .

[0102] The target node is further used to perform a hash operation according to the second authentication key, the first type of ciphertext and the ID of the sending node to generate a second type of verification value.

[0103] Optionally, the formula for the second type of verification value is Among them, MAC2 represents the second type of authentication value, AK ji Indicates the second authentication key, ID i Indicates the ID of the sending node, c i represents the first type of ciphertext, and H represents the hash function.

[0104] The target node is also used to determine whether the first type of verification value is qualified according to the second type of verification value and the first verification identification information.

[0105] When the first verification identification information in the first type of sent message is the first preset number of bytes in the first type of verification value, determine whether the first preset number of bytes of the second type of verification value matches the first verification identification information, and if so, determine that it is qualified. When the first verification identification information is a complete first type of verification value, determine whether the second type of verification value matches the first verification identification information, and if so, determine that it is qualified.

[0106] It should be noted that when the first verification identification information in the first type of sent message is the first preset number of bytes in the first type of verification value, the communication overhead between the entities can be effectively reduced.

[0107] If the verification fails, the target node is used to feed back a retransmission request corresponding to the first type of sent message to the sending node.

[0108] If qualified, the target node is further used to perform a hash operation according to the second authentication key, the ID of the target node and the ID of the sending node to generate a second initial vector.

[0109] Optionally, the formula for the second initial vector is: Among them, IV j Represents the second initial vector, AK ji Indicates the second authentication key, ID i Indicates the ID of the sending node, ID j represents the ID of the target node, and H represents the hash operation function.

[0110] If the drone's operating network is not damaged and its communication environment is safe, the first initial vector and the second initial vector are equal.

[0111] The target node is further configured to decrypt the first type of ciphertext according to the second initial vector and the second encryption key to obtain corresponding plaintext.

[0112] Optionally, the formula for decrypting the first type of ciphertext is: Among them, m i0 represents the decrypted plaintext, c i Represents the first type of ciphertext, IV j represents the second initial vector, EK ji represents the second encryption key, Indicates the use of the second session key K ji SM4 decryption function.

[0113] In order to ensure the authenticity and consistency of messages transmitted between nodes, the method of encryption first and then authentication is used to process the plaintext information of inter-node communication. First, the plaintext is encrypted to obtain the ciphertext, and then the MAC value of the ciphertext is calculated for verification. Each node uses the national secret algorithm SM4 to encrypt and decrypt the message; the MAC generated by the key hash function ensures the integrity and authenticity of the received message. The main advantages of the SM4 algorithm used are easy implementation, low computational overhead, and fast speed, which can reduce the computational overhead and time delay caused by encryption operations.

[0114] In an optional implementation, the plaintext m i The header contains the timestamp TS when the message is sent ij , the receiver (including the target node or central control unit), after decryption is completed, can timestamp TS in it ij When it is greater than the retransmission monitoring time, a retransmission request corresponding to the first type of message is fed back to the sending node to resist replay attacks.

[0115] In an optional implementation, the sending node may also send a message to the central control unit. The specific process is as follows.

[0116] When the sending node needs to send information to the central control unit, the sending node is used to generate public information corresponding to the sending node according to the ID of the sending node and the public generator.

[0117] Optionally, the sending node (the i-th node) determines the public parameter of the sending node according to the ID of the sending node (the i-th node) and the public generator, and then substitutes the public parameter into the formula (g ID 0 ,g ID 1 ,g ID 2 ,…,g ID λ ) T , determine the public information β corresponding to the sending nodei .

[0118] The sending node is further used to generate a third session key according to the public information of the sending node and the private information of the sending node.

[0119] Optionally, the third session key K ii The formula is K ii =α i β i , where α i represents the private information of the sending node (i-th node), β i Represents the public information of the sending node (the i-th node).

[0120] The sending node is further used to generate a third authentication key and a third encryption key according to the third session key.

[0121] Optionally, let f(·) represent the key derivation function, and the sending node (i-th node) calculates f(K ii )=(EK ii ,AK ii ) to obtain the third encryption key EK ii and the third authentication key AK ii .

[0122] The sending node is further used to perform a hash operation according to the third authentication key and the ID of the sending node to generate a third initial vector.

[0123] Optionally, the formula of the third initial vector is: Among them, IV ii Denotes the third initial vector, AK ii Indicates the third authentication key, ID i represents the ID of the sending node, and H represents the hash operation function.

[0124] The sending node is further configured to generate a third type of ciphertext according to a third initial vector, a third encryption key and the plaintext to be sent.

[0125] Optionally, the formula for the third type of ciphertext is Among them, c ii Represents the third type of ciphertext, m i Indicates plain text, IV ii represents the third initial vector, EK ii represents the third encryption key, Indicates the use of the third session key K ii Encryption function.

[0126] The sending node is further used to perform a hash operation according to the third authentication key, the third type of ciphertext and the ID of the sending node to generate a third type of verification value.

[0127] Optionally, the formula for the third type of verification value is Among them, MAC3 represents the third type of verification value, AK ii Indicates the third authentication key, ID i Indicates the ID of the sending node, c ii represents the third type of ciphertext, and H represents the hash operation function.

[0128] The sending node is further used to generate a third type of sending message according to the ID of the sending node, the third type of ciphertext and the third verification identification information corresponding to the third type of verification value.

[0129] It should be understood that the third type of sent message includes the ID of the sending node, the third type of ciphertext and the third verification identification information corresponding to the third type of verification value. The third verification identification information is the identification corresponding to the third type of verification value, which can be the first preset number of bytes in the third type of verification value.

[0130] The central control unit is further used to generate a fourth session key according to the public information of the sending node and the private information of the sending node.

[0131] It should be understood that the central control unit stores the fourth session key corresponding to the public information of the sending node and the private information of the sending node, that is, the i-th row and i-th column element (K ii ), the session key between the ith node and the central control unit. If the drone operation network has not been invaded, the fourth session key should be the same as the third session key mentioned above.

[0132] The central control unit is also used to generate a fourth authentication key and a fourth encryption key according to the fourth session key.

[0133] It should be noted that the generation process of the fourth authentication key and the fourth encryption key is the same as that of the third authentication key and the third encryption key, and will not be repeated here.

[0134] The central control unit is also used to perform a hash operation according to the fourth authentication key, the third type of ciphertext and the ID of the sending node to generate a fourth type of verification value.

[0135] It should be noted that the generation process of the fourth type of verification value is the same as the generation process of the third type of verification value, which will not be repeated here.

[0136] The central control unit is also used to determine whether the third type of verification value is qualified according to the fourth type of verification value and the third verification identification information.

[0137] When the third verification identification information in the third type of sent message is the first preset number of bytes in the third type of verification value, determine whether the first preset number of bytes of the fourth type of verification value matches the third verification identification information, and if so, determine that it is qualified. When the third verification identification information is a complete third type of verification value, determine whether the fourth type of verification value matches the third verification identification information, and if so, determine that it is qualified.

[0138] If the verification fails, the central control unit is used to feed back a retransmission request corresponding to the third type of sending message to the sending node.

[0139] If qualified, the central control unit is further used to perform a hash operation according to the fourth authentication key and the ID of the sending node to generate a fourth initial vector.

[0140] It should be noted that the fourth initial vector is generated in the same manner as the third initial vector, which will not be described in detail herein.

[0141] The central control unit is further used to decrypt the third type of ciphertext according to the fourth initial vector and the fourth encryption key to obtain the corresponding plaintext.

[0142] Optionally, the formula for decrypting the third type of ciphertext is: Among them, m i1 represents the decrypted plaintext, c ii Represents the third type of ciphertext, IV ii represents the fourth initial vector, EK ii represents the fourth encryption key, Indicates the use of the fourth session key K ii SM4 decryption function.

[0143] To further ensure the security of communication between nodes, the session key should be updated regularly and the random secret symmetric matrix should be updated according to the preset period. The specific process is as follows.

[0144] After the random secret symmetric matrix is ​​updated, the central control unit is used to obtain an updated private information matrix based on the public matrix and the updated random secret symmetric matrix. The updated private information matrix includes the updated private information of each node, and transmits the updated private information corresponding to each node to each node.

[0145] By updating private information, the session keys between nodes are continuously updated to avoid the risk of exposure due to long-term use of the same key.

[0146] Optionally, the updated random secret symmetric matrix is ​​S new , the updated private information matrix is ​​A new , where A new =(S new B) T , Anew The rth row in It is the updated private information of the rth node.

[0147] Before sending the updated private information to the rth node, the central control unit and α r Perform an XOR operation to generate α', where α r Represents the current private information of the rth node.

[0148] The central control unit generates a fifth type of verification value according to the XOR operation result α'.

[0149] The formula for the fifth type of verification value is Among them, MAC5 represents the fifth type of verification value, AK rr Represents the current private information α of the rth node r The corresponding authentication key, ID LATM It represents the ID of the central control unit, and H represents the hash operation function.

[0150] The central control unit sends the XOR operation result α' and the fifth type of verification value to the rth node.

[0151] The rth node verifies the fifth type of verification value according to the authentication key corresponding to the private information currently stored. If the verification is qualified, the XOR operation result α' and the private information currently stored determine the updated private information of the rth node.

[0152] Optionally, Subsequent use To calculate the new session key with other nodes

[0153] Optionally, after obtaining the updated private information, the node uniformly waits for a preset time interval and then activates the updated private information. After activating the updated private information, when a message needs to be sent, the session key corresponding to the updated private information is used.

[0154] When the drone network is large in scale, factors such as network fluctuations may cause all network nodes to be unable to receive updated secret messages at the same time, so it is necessary to wait for a preset time interval before enabling the updated private information.

[0155] In an optional implementation, when a new node is added to the drone operation network, the central control unit assigns an ID to the new node and broadcasts the ID of the new node in the drone operation network.

[0156] The central control unit is also used to obtain private information of the new node, and transmit the private information of the new node and the public generator to the new node.

[0157] The embodiment of the present invention also provides a lightweight data encryption authentication method, which is applied to the above-mentioned drone operation network, please refer to Figure 2 , Figure 2 A schematic flow chart of a lightweight data encryption authentication method provided by an embodiment of the present invention. The lightweight data encryption authentication method includes: S100, S200 and S300, which are specifically described as follows.

[0158] S100, the central control unit broadcasts the public generator and the ID of each node in the drone operation network to each node, and transmits its corresponding private information to each node.

[0159] S200, when the sending node needs to send information to the target node, the sending node generates a first type of sending message according to the plaintext to be sent, the ID of the target node, the public generator and the ID of the target node, and transmits the first type of sending message to the target node.

[0160] The first type of sent message includes the ID of the sending node, the first type of ciphertext and the first verification identification information, the first verification identification information is the identification corresponding to the first type of verification value, the first type of ciphertext is the encryption result of the plaintext, and the first type of verification value is the hash operation result corresponding to the first type of ciphertext;

[0161] S300, the target node determines whether the first type of verification value is qualified according to the ID of the sending node and the first verification identification information, and if qualified, decrypts the first type of ciphertext to obtain the corresponding plaintext.

[0162] It should be noted that the lightweight data encryption authentication method provided in this embodiment can perform the functional purposes shown in the above-mentioned drone operation network embodiment to achieve the corresponding technical effects. For the sake of brief description, for parts not mentioned in this embodiment, please refer to the corresponding content in the above-mentioned embodiment.

[0163] In summary, an embodiment of the present invention provides a drone operation network and a lightweight data encryption authentication method, wherein the drone operation network includes a central control unit and at least one node, wherein the node is any one of a drone, a drone operation server, a drone data support server, and a user terminal device of the drone; the central control unit is used to broadcast a public generator and the ID of each node in the drone operation network to each node, and transmit its corresponding private information to each node; when the sending node needs to send information to the target node, the sending node is used to generate a first type of sending message according to the plaintext to be sent, the ID of the target node, the public generator, and the ID of the target node, and transmit the first type of sending message to the target node, wherein the first type of sending message includes the ID of the sending node, the first type of ciphertext, and the first verification identification information, the first verification identification information is the identification corresponding to the first type of verification value, the first type of ciphertext is the encryption result of the plaintext, and the first type of verification value is the hash operation result corresponding to the first type of ciphertext; the target node is used to determine whether the first type of verification value is qualified according to the ID of the sending node and the first verification identification information, and if qualified, the first type of ciphertext is decrypted to obtain the corresponding plaintext. The security of the communication environment is guaranteed by performing encryption verification.

[0164] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention. For those skilled in the art, the present invention may have various modifications and variations. Any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement, etc. made within the spirit and principle of the present invention shall be included in the protection scope of the present invention.

[0165] It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that the invention is not limited to the details of the exemplary embodiments described above and that the invention can be implemented in other specific forms without departing from the spirit or essential features of the invention. Therefore, the embodiments should be considered exemplary and non-limiting in all respects, and the scope of the invention is defined by the appended claims rather than the foregoing description, and it is intended that all variations falling within the meaning and scope of the equivalent elements of the claims be included in the invention. Any reference numeral in a claim should not be considered as limiting the claim to which it relates.

Claims

1. A drone operation network, characterized in that: The drone operation network includes a central control unit and at least one node, wherein the node is any one of a drone, a drone operation server, a drone data support server, and a user terminal device of the drone; The central control unit is used to broadcast the public generator and the ID of each node in the drone operation network to each node, and transmit its corresponding private information to each node; When a sending node needs to send information to a target node, the sending node is used to generate a first type of sending message according to the plaintext to be sent, the ID of the target node, the public generator and the ID of the target node, and transmit the first type of sending message to the target node, wherein the first type of sending message includes the ID of the sending node, the first type of ciphertext and the first verification identification information, the first verification identification information is the identification corresponding to the first type of verification value, the first type of ciphertext is the encryption result of the plaintext, and the first type of verification value is the hash operation result corresponding to the first type of ciphertext; The target node is used to determine whether the first type of verification value is qualified according to the ID of the sending node and the first verification identification information. If qualified, the first type of ciphertext is decrypted to obtain the corresponding plaintext.

2. The drone operation network according to claim 1, characterized in that: The sending node is used to generate the public information corresponding to the target node according to the ID of the target node and the public generator; The sending node is further used to generate a first session key according to the public information of the target node and the private information of the sending node; The sending node is further used to generate a first authentication key and a first encryption key according to the first session key; The sending node is further used to perform a hash operation according to the first authentication key, the ID of the target node and the ID of the sending node to generate a first initial vector; The sending node is further configured to generate a first type of ciphertext according to the first initial vector, the first encryption key and the plaintext; The sending node is further used to perform a hash operation according to the first authentication key, the first type of ciphertext and the ID of the sending node to generate a first type of verification value; The sending node is further configured to generate the first-type sending message according to the ID of the sending node, the first-type ciphertext, and the first-type verification value.

3. The drone operation network according to claim 2, characterized in that: The target node is used to generate the public information corresponding to the sending node according to the ID of the sending node and the public generator; The target node is further used to generate a second session key according to the public information of the sending node and the private information of the target node; The target node is further configured to generate a second authentication key and a second encryption key according to the second session key; The target node is further used to perform a hash operation according to the second authentication key, the first type of ciphertext and the ID of the sending node to generate a second type of verification value; The target node is further used to determine whether the first type of verification value is qualified according to the second type of verification value and the first verification identification information; If qualified, the target node is further used to perform a hash operation according to the second authentication key, the ID of the target node and the ID of the sending node to generate a second initial vector; The target node is further configured to decrypt the first type of ciphertext according to the second initial vector and the second encryption key to obtain corresponding plaintext.

4. The drone operation network according to claim 3, characterized in that: The first verification identification information is the first preset number of bytes in the first type of verification value.

5. The drone operation network according to claim 1, characterized in that: When the sending node needs to send information to the central control unit, the sending node is used to generate public information corresponding to the sending node according to the ID of the sending node and the public generator; The sending node is further used to generate a third session key according to the public information of the sending node and the private information of the sending node; The sending node is further used to generate a third authentication key and a third encryption key according to the third session key; The sending node is further used to perform a hash operation according to the third authentication key and the ID of the sending node to generate a third initial vector; The sending node is further used to generate a third type of ciphertext according to the third initial vector, the third encryption key and the plaintext to be sent; The sending node is further used to perform a hash operation according to the third authentication key, the third type of ciphertext and the ID of the sending node to generate a third type of verification value; The sending node is further used to generate a third type of sending message according to the ID of the sending node, the third type of ciphertext and the third verification identification information corresponding to the third type of verification value; The central control unit is further used to generate a fourth session key according to the public information of the sending node and the private information of the sending node; The central control unit is further used to generate a fourth authentication key and a fourth encryption key according to the fourth session key; The central control unit is further used to perform a hash operation according to the fourth authentication key, the third type of ciphertext and the ID of the sending node to generate a fourth type of verification value; The central control unit is further used to determine whether the third type of verification value is qualified according to the fourth type of verification value and the third verification identification information; If qualified, the central control unit is further used to perform a hash operation according to the fourth authentication key and the ID of the sending node to generate a fourth initial vector; The central control unit is further configured to decrypt the third type of ciphertext according to the fourth initial vector and the fourth encryption key to obtain corresponding plaintext.

6. The drone operation network according to claim 1, characterized in that: The central control unit is used to generate a public matrix according to the ID of each node, and the public matrix includes public information of each node; The central control unit is used to generate a random secret symmetric matrix, and obtain a private information matrix according to the public matrix and the random secret symmetric matrix, wherein the private information matrix includes private information of each node.

7. The drone operation network according to claim 6, characterized in that: The random secret symmetric matrix is ​​updated according to a preset period; After the random secret symmetric matrix is ​​updated, the central control unit is used to obtain an updated private information matrix based on the public matrix and the updated random secret symmetric matrix. The updated private information matrix includes the updated private information of each node, and transmits the updated private information corresponding to each node to each node.

8. The drone operation network according to claim 7, characterized in that: After obtaining the updated private information, the nodes uniformly wait for a preset time interval and then enable the updated private information.

9. The drone operation network according to claim 1, characterized in that: When a new node is added to the drone operation network, the central control unit assigns an ID to the new node and broadcasts the ID of the new node in the drone operation network; The central control unit is also used to obtain the private information of the new node, and transmit the private information of the new node and the public generator to the new node.

10. A lightweight data encryption authentication method, characterized in that: Applied to the drone operation network described in any one of claims 1 to 9, the method comprising: The central control unit broadcasts the public generator and the ID of each node in the drone operation network to each node, and transmits its corresponding private information to each node; When a sending node needs to send information to a target node, the sending node generates a first type of sending message according to the plaintext to be sent, the ID of the target node, the public generator and the ID of the target node, and transmits the first type of sending message to the target node, wherein the first type of sending message includes the ID of the sending node, the first type of ciphertext and the first verification identification information, the first verification identification information is the identification corresponding to the first type of verification value, the first type of ciphertext is the encryption result of the plaintext, and the first type of verification value is the hash operation result corresponding to the first type of ciphertext; The target node determines whether the first type of verification value is qualified according to the ID of the sending node and the first verification identification information. If qualified, the target node decrypts the first type of ciphertext to obtain the corresponding plaintext.

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