GBA-based vehicle network security protection method and device, and medium

Abstract

The invention provides a GBA-based vehicle network security protection method and device and a medium, and the method comprises the steps: a vehicle-mounted terminal generates a key pair, and transmits a public key in the key pair to a USIM (Universal Subscriber Identity Module); the method comprises the following steps: in response to a network application function (NAF), performing a general boot architecture GBA process by adopting a general boot architecture GBAME mode based on mobile equipment, and initiating a secret key negotiation AKA process to bootstrap service function equipment (BSF) by the vehicle-mounted terminal to obtain first negotiation parameter information from the BSF; the vehicle-mounted terminal sends the first negotiation parameter information to a USIM (Universal Subscriber Identity Module) and receives second negotiation parameter information sent by the USIM based on the first negotiation parameter information; and the vehicle-mounted terminal decrypts the second negotiation parameter information by using a private key in the key pair to obtain a decryption parameter, and completes a key negotiation AKA process based on the decryption parameter. According to the invention, the vehicle network security performance can be greatly improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of communication technology, and in particular to a vehicle network security protection method, device and medium based on GBA. Background Art

[0002] GBA (Generic Bootstrapping Architecture) is a technology that is used for user authentication. The premise of authentication is that the user has a valid identity authentication of HLR (Home Location Register) or HSS (Home Subscriber Server).

[0003] GBA is standardized in 3GPP. User authentication is done by a shared secret key, and another entity in a smart card, such as the SIM card in a mobile phone, and another in the HLR / HSS. GBA works by having the network component challenge the smart card and verify that the answer is the one predicted by the HLR / HSS. Instead of requiring the service provider to trust the BSF (Bootstrapping Server Function) and rely on it for every authentication request, the BSF establishes a shared secret between the card and the service provider. This shared secret is limited in time and for a specific domain.

[0004] GBA can achieve two-way identity authentication and key sharing between the user terminal (UE) and the network, providing security for end-to-end communication at the application layer, so as to provide open GBA network security capabilities to IoT / IoV terminal users through USIM (Universal Subscriber Identity Module).

[0005] However, GBA currently has serious security vulnerabilities and is vulnerable to network attacks, leading to the leakage of user information and data. Summary of the invention

[0006] The technical problem to be solved by the present application is to provide a vehicle network security protection method, device and medium based on GBA in order to solve the problems existing in the prior art.

[0007] In a first aspect, the present application provides a vehicle network security protection method based on GBA, the method comprising:

[0008] S1. The vehicle terminal generates a key pair and sends the public key in the key pair to the universal user identity module USIM;

[0009] S2, in response to the network application function NAF adopting the mobile device-based general bootstrap architecture GBA_ME mode to perform the general bootstrap architecture GBA process, the vehicle terminal initiates a key negotiation AKA process to the bootstrap service function device BSF, and obtains the first negotiation parameter information from the BSF;

[0010] S3. The vehicle terminal sends the first negotiation parameter information to the USIM, and receives the second negotiation parameter information sent by the USIM based on the first negotiation parameter information, wherein the second negotiation parameter information is obtained by data encryption by the USIM based on the public key in the key pair;

[0011] S4. The vehicle-mounted terminal uses the private key in the key pair to decrypt the second negotiation parameter information to obtain a decrypted parameter, and completes the key negotiation AKA process based on the decrypted parameter.

[0012] In some embodiments, in S2, the first negotiation parameter information includes: at least one of a random number RAND, a network authentication token AUTN, an encryption key CK, and an integrity key IK.

[0013] In some embodiments, the second negotiation parameter information includes: at least one of an encryption key CK, an integrity key IK, and an authentication response RES.

[0014] In some embodiments, S4 includes:

[0015] The vehicle terminal uses the private key in the key pair to decrypt the second negotiation parameter information, obtains the encryption key CK, the integrity key IK, and the authentication response RES, and sends the RES to the BSF;

[0016] The vehicle terminal receives the boot transaction identifier B-TID sent by BSF after completing RES verification;

[0017] The vehicle terminal performs authentication based on the B-TID and obtains the session key Ks.

[0018] In some embodiments, the vehicle-mounted terminal generates a key pair using an asymmetric encryption algorithm;

[0019] The USIM uses an asymmetric encryption algorithm to encrypt data based on the public key in the key pair to obtain the second negotiation parameter information.

[0020] In some embodiments, it also includes:

[0021] When the vehicle-mounted terminal interacts with external network elements, the information interaction content is securely monitored and processed through the software development kit SDK, wherein the external network elements include USIM, BSF, and NAF.

[0022] In some embodiments, the safety monitoring process includes at least one of the following:

[0023] Monitor whether the BSF / NAF communicating with the vehicle terminal is in the whitelist. If not, discard the data packets of the BSF / NAF that is not in the whitelist;

[0024] Monitor the communication traffic of the vehicle terminal to see if there are viruses or malicious attacks. If there are, discard the data packets containing viruses or malicious attacks.

[0025] Monitor the verification results of AUTN, and if the frequency of verification errors is higher than a preset threshold, discard the corresponding data packets;

[0026] The frequency of not receiving a response / directly receiving a response is monitored, and if the frequency of not receiving a response / directly receiving a response is higher than a preset threshold, the corresponding data packet is discarded.

[0027] In a second aspect, the present application provides a GBA-based vehicle network security protection device, which is applied to a vehicle terminal, and the device includes:

[0028] A key pair generation module, configured to generate a key pair and send a public key in the key pair to a universal subscriber identity module USIM;

[0029] A key negotiation initiating module, configured to initiate a key negotiation AKA process to a bootstrap service function device BSF in response to a network application function NAF adopting a mobile device-based general bootstrap architecture GBA_ME mode to perform a general bootstrap architecture GBA process, and obtain first negotiation parameter information from the BSF;

[0030] a negotiation parameter acquisition module, configured to send the first negotiation parameter information to a USIM, and receive second negotiation parameter information sent by the USIM based on the first negotiation parameter information, wherein the second negotiation parameter information is obtained by data encryption by the USIM based on a public key in a key pair;

[0031] The negotiation parameter decryption module is configured to use the private key in the key pair to decrypt the second negotiation parameter information to obtain a decryption parameter, and complete the key negotiation AKA process based on the decryption parameter.

[0032] In a third aspect, the present application provides a GBA-based vehicle network security protection device, comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and the processor is configured to run the computer program to implement the GBA-based vehicle network security protection method described in the first aspect above.

[0033] In a fourth aspect, the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the GBA-based vehicle network security protection method described in the first aspect above is implemented.

[0034] The vehicle network security protection method, device and medium based on GBA provided by the present application include: the vehicle terminal generates a key pair and sends the public key in the key pair to the global user identity module USIM; in response to the network application function NAF adopting the general bootstrap architecture GBA_ME mode based on the mobile device to perform the general bootstrap architecture GBA process, the vehicle terminal initiates the key negotiation AKA process to the bootstrap service function device BSF, and obtains the first negotiation parameter information from the BSF; the vehicle terminal sends the first negotiation parameter information to the USIM, and receives the second negotiation parameter information sent by the USIM based on the first negotiation parameter information, wherein the second negotiation parameter information is obtained by data encryption based on the public key in the key pair by the USIM; the vehicle terminal uses the private key in the key pair to decrypt the second negotiation parameter information, obtains the decryption parameter, and completes the key negotiation AKA process based on the decryption parameter. The present application provides a vehicle network security protection method based on GBA, which combines cryptographic technology with network data security analysis technology under the GBA system, GBA_ME adopts an asymmetric encryption algorithm, generates a key pair through the vehicle terminal, and makes the public key public, so as to realize the encryption of data transmitted between the vehicle terminal UE and the USIM card. Fully protect the confidentiality and integrity of the data exchanged between the USIM card and the vehicle terminal in GBA_ME mode. In addition, the interactive behavior of data transmitted in the channel is monitored and analyzed to form analysis features, effectively preventing attackers from launching network attacks using legitimate vehicle terminal identities, making up for the shortcomings of cryptographic technology and greatly improving vehicle network security performance. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0035] The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and constitute a part of this specification, illustrate embodiments consistent with the present application and, together with the description, serve to explain the principles of the present application.

[0036] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of the existing GBA networking architecture;

[0037] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of information interaction between network elements in the existing GBA networking architecture;

[0038] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of a GBA-based vehicle network security protection system provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0039] Figure 4A schematic diagram of a GBA-based vehicle network security protection method provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0040] Figure 5 Another schematic diagram of the GBA-based vehicle network security protection method provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0041] Figure 6 A schematic diagram of a security monitoring process provided by an embodiment of the present application;

[0042] Figure 7 A schematic diagram of the structure of a GBA-based vehicle network security protection device provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0043] Figure 8 A schematic diagram of the structure of another GBA-based vehicle network security protection device provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0044] The above drawings have shown clear embodiments of the present application, which will be described in more detail later. These drawings and text descriptions are not intended to limit the scope of the present application in any way, but to illustrate the concept of the present application to those skilled in the art by referring to specific embodiments. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0045] In order to enable those skilled in the art to better understand the technical solution of the present application, the implementation mode of the present application will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0046] It should be understood that the specific embodiments and drawings described herein are only used to explain the present application, rather than to limit the present application.

[0047] It can be understood that, in the absence of conflict, the various embodiments in the present application and the various features in the embodiments can be combined with each other.

[0048] It can be understood that, for the convenience of description, the drawings of the present application only show the parts related to the present application, while the parts unrelated to the present application are not shown in the drawings.

[0049] It can be understood that each unit and module involved in the embodiments of the present application may correspond to only one physical structure, or may be composed of multiple physical structures, or multiple units and modules may be integrated into one physical structure.

[0050] It can be understood that the terms "first", "second", etc. in the embodiments of the present application are used to distinguish different objects, or to distinguish different processing of the same object, rather than to describe a specific order of objects.

[0051] It is understandable that, in the absence of conflict, the functions and steps marked in the flowcharts and block diagrams of the present application may occur in an order different from that marked in the drawings.

[0052] It is understood that the flowcharts and block diagrams of the present application illustrate the possible architectures, functions, and operations of the systems, devices, equipment, and methods according to the various embodiments of the present application. Among them, each box in the flowchart or block diagram may represent a unit, module, program segment, code, which contains executable instructions for implementing the specified functions. Moreover, each box or combination of boxes in the block diagram and flowchart may be implemented by a hardware-based system that implements the specified functions, or by a combination of hardware and computer instructions.

[0053] It can be understood that the units and modules involved in the embodiments of the present application can be implemented by software or hardware, for example, the units and modules can be located in a processor.

[0054] Figure 1 It is a schematic diagram of the existing GBA network architecture. Figure 2 The following is a schematic diagram of information interaction between network elements in the existing GBA networking architecture. Figure 1 as well as Figure 2 As shown in the figure, the BSF (Bootstrapping Server Function) in GBA, as the anchor point in the entire GBA architecture, is used to obtain the authentication vector from the HSS to complete the verification of the user terminal UE (vehicle terminal), and derive the session key based on the intermediate key provided by the USIM. In addition, another important network element in GBA is the NAF (Network Application Function), which implements the function of third-party application services obtaining session keys from the operator network.

[0055] Business service platforms such as CA need to integrate NAF. After receiving the access request from the Internet of Vehicles terminal, they need to access BSF to obtain the communication session key and basic user information. The session key is used to ensure the entire process of subsequent certificate application and distribution.

[0056] According to the different physical capabilities and division of labor of UE, GBA can be divided into GBA (GBA_Me) based on mobile equipment (Mobile Equipment, Me) and GBA (GBA_U) based on Universal Integrated Circuit Card (Universal Integrated Circuit Card, UICC).

[0057] The existing GBA framework has the following two technical defects:

[0058] First, there are two application modes of GBA: GBA_ME and GBA_U. When GBA_ME is used, key negotiation AKA and key generation are both generated in the terminal device UE (vehicle terminal). USIM is mainly used to store the key K. An attacker can obtain the key parameters CK\IK\RES by monitoring the interface between the terminal and the USIM card, and then obtain Ks, which leads to serious security vulnerabilities in the system.

[0059] Second, with the development of quantum computing and the improvement of hacker attack capabilities, hackers can build fake base stations, downgrade the system, obtain big data samples on the vehicle side through relay or bypass, and use plaintext and ciphertext guessing attacks to try to access the system and decipher the terminal root key. They can also send abnormal data packets through data channels, carrying zombie worms to attack vehicle terminals, and achieve the purpose of remote terminal control.

[0060] Therefore, the security authentication technology based on the current GBA framework can solve the confidentiality and completeness of transmitted data, but it cannot prevent network attacks using legitimate identities.

[0061] Based on the above defects in the prior art, the main idea of ​​the technical solution of this application is:

[0062] First, when the GBA_ME mode is adopted in the GBA security framework, the vehicle terminal generates a key pair by implanting a cryptographic algorithm engine and a key generation engine in the vehicle terminal, and transmits the public key to the USIM. The confidentiality of CK\IK\RES output by the USIM is protected by public key encryption in the USIM to prevent hackers from obtaining Ks by monitoring data. The vehicle terminal does not need to pre-generate keys in the vehicle terminal in advance.

[0063] Second, during the GBA process of the vehicle terminal, hackers can send abnormal data to the vehicle terminal through fake base stations, data eavesdropping, platform forgery, etc., and can use the network layer and application layer channels, including application layer data packets that violate GBA interactions, to bypass attacks, guess attacks, and launch DDOS attacks through the network layer. This application solution implants security monitoring software in the vehicle terminal to monitor the traffic entering the vehicle terminal and the logs of password interactions, integrates it into the existing GBA interaction process, and promptly discovers attack behaviors, and perceives and defends terminal risks in advance.

[0064] The technical solution of the present application and how the technical solution of the present application solves the above-mentioned technical problems are described in detail below with specific embodiments. The following specific embodiments can be combined with each other, and the same or similar concepts or processes may not be repeated in some embodiments. The embodiments of the present application will be described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

[0065] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of a GBA-based vehicle network security protection system provided in an embodiment of the present application, Figure 4 A schematic diagram of a GBA-based vehicle network security protection method provided in an embodiment of the present application, Figure 5 Another schematic diagram of the GBA-based vehicle network security protection method provided in the embodiment of the present application is as follows: Figures 3 to 5 As shown, the present application provides a vehicle network security protection method based on GBA, the method includes S1-S4, which are as follows:

[0066] S1. The vehicle terminal generates a key pair and sends the public key in the key pair to the universal user identity module USIM;

[0067] In this step, a cryptographic algorithm engine and a key generation engine are implanted in the vehicle terminal UE. After the vehicle terminal is powered on, a key pair (pk, sk) is generated by the vehicle terminal, and the public key pk is passed to the USIM. The parameters generated by the USIM are subsequently encrypted by pk and passed to the vehicle terminal to ensure that the parameter information is not leaked.

[0068] Optionally, the vehicle-mounted terminal uses an asymmetric encryption algorithm to generate a key pair; specifically, asymmetric encryption requires two keys, one is a public key and the other is a private key. The data encryptor encrypts the plaintext with the public key according to the encryption algorithm to obtain an unreadable ciphertext. The data decryptor decrypts the ciphertext with the private key according to the encryption algorithm to obtain the original plaintext.

[0069] Optionally, the vehicle terminal transmits the public key in the key pair to the USIM card through the 7816 or SPI interface, and the USIM card writes the public key pk into the key security area. This step is performed before starting the GBA process.

[0070] S2, in response to the network application function NAF adopting the mobile device-based general bootstrap architecture GBA_ME mode to perform the general bootstrap architecture GBA process, the vehicle terminal initiates a key negotiation AKA process to the bootstrap service function device BSF, and obtains the first negotiation parameter information from the BSF;

[0071] In some embodiments, in S2, the first negotiation parameter information includes: at least one of a random number RAND, a network authentication token AUTN, an encryption key CK, and an integrity key IK.

[0072] Since the UE is responsible for the key negotiation AKA and key generation process in the GBA_ME mode, the CK and IK data transmitted between the USIM and the UE can be obtained through interface monitoring, thereby achieving the purpose of cracking the secret key. Based on this problem, this application optimizes the key negotiation process. The vehicle terminal UE initiates the GBA initialization process and determines the GBA mode through NAF negotiation. When the GBA_ME mode is adopted, the vehicle terminal UE connects to the BSF and initiates the key negotiation AKA process. The BSF calculates RAND, AUTN, CK, and IK in conjunction with the HSS, and the BSF passes RAND and AUTN to the vehicle terminal.

[0073] S3. The vehicle terminal sends the first negotiation parameter information to the USIM, and receives the second negotiation parameter information sent by the USIM based on the first negotiation parameter information, wherein the second negotiation parameter information is obtained by data encryption by the USIM based on the public key in the key pair;

[0074] In some embodiments, the second negotiation parameter information includes: at least one of an encryption key CK, an integrity key IK, and an authentication response RES.

[0075] In this step, in order to complete the verification, the vehicle terminal UE passes AUTN and RAND to the USIM, and the process inherits the GBA process. Based on AUTN and RAND, the USIM needs to complete the calculation of the vehicle terminal CK, IK, and RES, and pass them to the vehicle terminal.

[0076] In some embodiments, the USIM uses an asymmetric encryption algorithm to encrypt data based on a public key in the key pair to obtain the second negotiation parameter information.

[0077] Specifically, in order to prevent CK, IK, and RES from being eavesdropped on during the process of being transmitted to the vehicle terminal, the USIM adopts an asymmetric algorithm engine to encrypt CK, IK, and RES, and adopts the P1 format to improve efficiency.

[0078] S4. The vehicle-mounted terminal uses the private key in the key pair to decrypt the second negotiation parameter information to obtain a decrypted parameter, and completes the key negotiation AKA process based on the decrypted parameter.

[0079] In some embodiments, S4 includes:

[0080] The vehicle terminal uses the private key in the key pair to decrypt the second negotiation parameter information, obtains the encryption key CK, the integrity key IK, and the authentication response RES, and sends the RES to the BSF;

[0081] The vehicle terminal receives the boot transaction identifier B-TID sent by BSF after completing RES verification;

[0082] The vehicle terminal performs authentication based on the B-TID and obtains the session key Ks.

[0083] Specifically, the vehicle terminal UE uses the private key to decrypt the second negotiation parameter information received to obtain CK, IK, and RES, and passes RES to the BSF. The BSF completes the verification of RES, calculates Ks, and feeds back the B-TID to the vehicle terminal UE. The vehicle terminal UE completes the authentication based on the received B-TID and calculates Ks. At this point, the AKA process of GBA ends.

[0084] In some embodiments, the method further comprises:

[0085] When the vehicle terminal interacts with external network elements, the information interaction content is securely monitored and processed through the software development kit SDK (Software Development Kit), wherein the external network elements include USIM, BSF, and NAF.

[0086] Specifically, to prevent hackers from sending abnormal data by posing as legitimate identities, this application monitors the network traffic in each process of GBA authentication between the vehicle terminal and the cloud, and combines data monitoring and analysis to discover abnormal attack behaviors on vehicle equipment, including guessing attacks, bypass attacks, and bot attacks. After the attack or abnormality is discovered, it can be intercepted or alarmed at the terminal, and the log is recorded and reported to the cloud platform to achieve security monitoring of the vehicle terminal. Security policies can be configured in the cloud to achieve dynamic updates over the Internet.

[0087] In some embodiments, the safety monitoring process includes at least one of the following:

[0088] Monitor whether the BSF / NAF communicating with the vehicle terminal is in the whitelist. If not, discard the data packets of the BSF / NAF that is not in the whitelist;

[0089] Monitor the communication traffic of the vehicle terminal to see if there are viruses or malicious attacks. If there are, discard the data packets containing viruses or malicious attacks.

[0090] Monitor the verification results of AUTN, and if the frequency of verification errors is higher than a preset threshold, discard the corresponding data packets;

[0091] The frequency of not receiving a response / directly receiving a response is monitored, and if the frequency of not receiving a response / directly receiving a response is higher than a preset threshold, the corresponding data packet is discarded.

[0092] Specifically, Figure 6 A schematic diagram of the security monitoring process provided by the embodiment of the present application, such as Figure 6As shown, the present application implants a monitoring SDK in the vehicle terminal UE, and the rules of the SDK are placed in the USIM. The vehicle terminal UE filters and analyzes the cellular traffic passing through the UE-SDK, and the specific implementation is as follows:

[0093] (1) When the vehicle terminal UE is powered on, the UE-SDK is initialized and serial or parallel access can be completed according to the configuration.

[0094] (2) Set up an external IP whitelist for the vehicle terminal through UE-SDK, including NAF and BSF. Monitor the address and port of the UE connection in real time, and issue an alarm and discard the data packet when an illegal address connection is found.

[0095] (3) UE-SDK monitors the traffic in real time and uses the built-in rule base to detect bots, worms, and DDOS attacks and discard packets.

[0096] (4) Monitor the verification results of AUTN through UE-SDK. If the monitoring finds that more than 100 verification errors are received per second on average, there is a risk of guessing attack. The data packet is discarded, and UE-SDK records the time and number of times and reports it.

[0097] (5) UE-SDK monitoring finds that response 2 is directly received without response 1. If this happens 10 times within 1 minute, there is a risk of bypass attack. The data packet is discarded. UE-SDK reports the event to an alarm.

[0098] The present application provides a vehicle network security protection method based on GBA, which combines cryptographic technology with network data security analysis technology under the GBA system. GBA_ME adopts an asymmetric encryption algorithm, generates a key pair through the vehicle terminal, and makes the public key public to realize the encryption of data transmitted between the vehicle terminal UE and the USIM card. The confidentiality and integrity of the interactive data between the USIM card and the vehicle terminal in the GBA_ME mode are fully protected. In addition, the interactive behavior of the data transmitted in the channel is securely monitored and analyzed to form analysis features, which effectively prevents the possibility of attackers using the legitimate vehicle terminal identity to launch network attacks, makes up for the shortcomings of cryptographic technology, and greatly improves the vehicle network security performance.

[0099] It should be understood that, although the various steps in the flowcharts in the above-described embodiments are sequentially displayed according to the indications of the arrows, these steps are not necessarily executed sequentially in the order indicated by the arrows. Unless there is a clear description in this article, the execution of these steps is not strictly limited in order, and they can be executed in other orders. Moreover, at least a portion of the steps in the figure may include a plurality of sub-steps or a plurality of stages, and these sub-steps or stages are not necessarily executed at the same time, but can be executed at different times, and their execution order is not necessarily to be carried out sequentially, but can be executed in turn or alternately with other steps or at least a portion of the sub-steps or stages of other steps.

[0100] Figure 7 A schematic diagram of a GBA-based vehicle network security protection device provided in an embodiment of the present application, such as Figure 7 As shown, the present application provides a vehicle network security protection device based on GBA, which is applied to a vehicle terminal, and the device includes:

[0101] A key pair generation module 11, which is configured to generate a key pair and send a public key in the key pair to a universal subscriber identity module USIM;

[0102] The key negotiation initiating module 12 is configured to initiate a key negotiation AKA process to the bootstrap service function device BSF in response to the network application function NAF adopting the mobile device-based general bootstrap architecture GBA_ME mode to perform the general bootstrap architecture GBA process, and obtain the first negotiation parameter information from the BSF;

[0103] a negotiation parameter acquisition module 13, configured to send the first negotiation parameter information to a USIM, and receive second negotiation parameter information sent by the USIM based on the first negotiation parameter information, wherein the second negotiation parameter information is obtained by data encryption by the USIM based on a public key in a key pair;

[0104] The negotiation parameter decryption module 14 is configured to use the private key in the key pair to decrypt the second negotiation parameter information to obtain a decryption parameter, and complete the key negotiation AKA process based on the decryption parameter.

[0105] Regarding the limitation of the GBA-based vehicle network security protection device, reference may be made to the limitation of the GBA-based vehicle network security protection method in the above-mentioned embodiments of the present application, which will not be elaborated in this embodiment.

[0106] Figure 8 Another schematic diagram of a GBA-based vehicle network security protection device provided in an embodiment of the present application is shown in FIG. Figure 8As shown, in some embodiments, the present application provides a GBA-based vehicle network security protection device, including a memory 22 and a processor 21, the memory stores a computer program, and the processor is configured to run the computer program to execute the GBA-based vehicle network security protection method in the above-mentioned embodiments of the present application.

[0107] The memory is connected to the processor, the memory may be a flash memory or a read-only memory or other memory, and the processor may be a central processing unit or a single-chip microcomputer.

[0108] In some embodiments, the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the GBA-based vehicle network security protection method in the above-mentioned embodiments of the present application is implemented.

[0109] The computer-readable storage medium includes volatile or non-volatile, removable or non-removable media implemented in any method or technology for storing information (such as computer-readable instructions, data structures, computer program modules or other data). Computer-readable storage media include, but are not limited to, RAM (Random Access Memory), ROM (Read-Only Memory), EEPROM (Electrically Erasable Programmable read only memory), flash memory or other memory technology, CD-ROM (Compact Disc Read-Only Memory), digital versatile disk (DVD) or other optical disk storage, magnetic cassettes, magnetic tapes, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other medium that can be used to store the desired information and can be accessed by a computer.

[0110] It is to be understood that the above embodiments are merely exemplary embodiments used to illustrate the principles of the present application, but the present application is not limited thereto. For those skilled in the art, various modifications and improvements can be made without departing from the spirit and substance of the present application, and these modifications and improvements are also considered to be within the scope of protection of the present application.

Claims

1. A vehicle network security protection method based on GBA, characterized in that: The method comprises: S1. The vehicle terminal generates a key pair and sends the public key in the key pair to the universal user identity module USIM; S2, in response to the network application function NAF adopting the mobile device-based general bootstrap architecture GBA_ME mode to perform the general bootstrap architecture GBA process, the vehicle terminal initiates a key negotiation AKA process to the bootstrap service function device BSF, and obtains the first negotiation parameter information from the BSF; S3. The vehicle terminal sends the first negotiation parameter information to the USIM, and receives second negotiation parameter information sent by the USIM based on the first negotiation parameter information, wherein the second negotiation parameter information is obtained by data encryption by the USIM based on the public key in the key pair; S4. The vehicle-mounted terminal uses the private key in the key pair to decrypt the second negotiation parameter information to obtain a decrypted parameter, and completes the key negotiation AKA process based on the decrypted parameter.

2. The GBA-based vehicle network security protection method according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In S2, the first negotiation parameter information includes: at least one of a random number RAND, a network authentication token AUTN, an encryption key CK, and an integrity key IK.

3. The GBA-based vehicle network security protection method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The second negotiation parameter information includes: at least one of an encryption key CK, an integrity key IK, and an authentication response RES.

4. The GBA-based vehicle network security protection method according to claim 3 is characterized in that: S4, including: The vehicle terminal uses the private key in the key pair to decrypt the second negotiation parameter information, obtains the encryption key CK, the integrity key IK, and the authentication response RES, and sends the RES to the BSF; The vehicle terminal receives the boot transaction identifier B-TID sent by BSF after completing RES verification; The vehicle terminal performs authentication based on the B-TID and obtains the session key Ks.

5. The GBA-based vehicle network security protection method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The vehicle-mounted terminal uses an asymmetric encryption algorithm to generate a key pair; The USIM uses an asymmetric encryption algorithm to encrypt data based on the public key in the key pair to obtain the second negotiation parameter information.

6. The GBA-based vehicle network security protection method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that: Also includes: When the vehicle-mounted terminal interacts with external network elements, the information interaction content is securely monitored and processed through the software development kit SDK, wherein the external network elements include USIM, BSF, and NAF.

7. The GBA-based vehicle network security protection method according to claim 6, characterized in that: The safety monitoring process includes at least one of the following: Monitor whether the BSF / NAF communicating with the vehicle terminal is in the whitelist. If not, discard the data packets of the BSF / NAF that is not in the whitelist; Monitor the communication traffic of the vehicle terminal to see if there are viruses or malicious attacks. If there are, discard the data packets containing viruses or malicious attacks. Monitor the verification results of AUTN, and if the frequency of verification errors is higher than a preset threshold, discard the corresponding data packets; The frequency of not receiving a response / directly receiving a response is monitored, and if the frequency of not receiving a response / directly receiving a response is higher than a preset threshold, the corresponding data packet is discarded.

8. A vehicle network security protection device based on GBA, characterized in that: Applied to a vehicle-mounted terminal, the device comprises: A key pair generation module, configured to generate a key pair and send a public key in the key pair to a universal subscriber identity module USIM; A key negotiation initiating module, configured to initiate a key negotiation AKA process to a bootstrap service function device BSF in response to a network application function NAF adopting a mobile device-based general bootstrap architecture GBA_ME mode to perform a general bootstrap architecture GBA process, and obtain first negotiation parameter information from the BSF; a negotiation parameter acquisition module, configured to send the first negotiation parameter information to a USIM, and receive second negotiation parameter information sent by the USIM based on the first negotiation parameter information, wherein the second negotiation parameter information is obtained by data encryption by the USIM based on a public key in a key pair; The negotiation parameter decryption module is configured to use the private key in the key pair to decrypt the second negotiation parameter information to obtain a decryption parameter, and complete the key negotiation AKA process based on the decryption parameter.

9. A vehicle network security protection device based on GBA, characterized in that: The method comprises a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and the processor is configured to run the computer program to implement the GBA-based vehicle network security protection method according to any one of claims 1 to 7.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by the processor, the GBA-based vehicle network security protection method according to any one of claims 1 to 7 is implemented.

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