System and method for preventing quantum security key relay encryption from counterfeiting ciphertext

Abstract

The invention discloses a system and a method for preventing quantum security key relay encryption from counterfeiting a ciphertext. After receiving the ciphertext data, a receiving end can obtain an irreducible polynomial and an anti-counterfeiting true random number which are agreed in advance based on a session index carried in the ciphertext data, determines a topological matrix according to the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number, and obtains the anti-counterfeiting true random number through the topological matrix. Hash calculation is carried out on the session index, the pairing index and the packet sequence number to generate an anti-counterfeiting Hash value H ', and a receiving end compares the H' with the anti-counterfeiting Hash value H carried in the ciphertext data to quickly determine whether the ciphertext data is a forged ciphertext or not, so that the forged message is prevented from occupying encryption and decryption resources for a long time to influence the safety and efficiency of the receiving end. And the anti-counterfeiting hash value not only contains the feature information of the current session, but also integrates the randomness of the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number, so that a counterfeiter is difficult to generate an effective hash value only through a pure algorithm attack mode.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of information security and quantum encryption technology, and in particular to a system and method for preventing ciphertext forgery through quantum secure key relay encryption. Background Art

[0002] With the continuous advancement of information technology, network communication security has become an important issue that needs to be solved worldwide. Especially in the context of building a classical global quantum security network, ensuring the security of communication between quantum security devices (such as access base stations, key centers, border base stations, etc.) has become the cornerstone of the stable and secure operation of the entire network.

[0003] In the global quantum security network, quantum security key relay encryption communication is a key communication method. This method allows any two quantum security terminals that do not have direct symmetric keys to form symmetric keys at both ends of the communication by accessing the base station and the relay function of the quantum security network, thereby realizing quantum security encryption communication. This communication mode not only improves the security of communication, but also enhances the flexibility and scalability of the network. In this communication mode, when the sender sends ciphertext data, it needs to send the quantum key synchronously. Correspondingly, when the receiver decrypts the ciphertext data, it must also receive the quantum key forwarded by the relay. Only when the ciphertext data and the quantum key are completely matched can the decryption process be successful.

[0004] Although this communication method can rely on the powerful protection capabilities of the quantum security network and utilize the unique properties of quantum encryption technology to ensure that the real key is not stolen or tampered with during transmission, the transmission of ciphertext data may still face certain potential attack risks. Specifically, attackers may try to attack the receiving end by forging ciphertexts. Since the receiving end cannot find the relay key that matches these forged ciphertexts, these forged ciphertexts will not be decrypted and will continue to remain in the receiving end, waiting for a matching key that will never arrive. This situation not only wastes the precious resources of the receiving end, but may also pose a serious threat to the stability and operating efficiency of the receiving end.

[0005] Therefore, in order to ensure the stable and secure operation of the global quantum security network, there is an urgent need for a method to prevent attacks that forge ciphertext during quantum security key relay encryption. Summary of the invention

[0006] The present application provides a system and method for preventing quantum secure key relay encryption from forging ciphertext, so as to solve the problem that the existing quantum secure key relay encryption communication method cannot effectively resist forged ciphertext attacks. Such attacks occupy encryption and decryption resources for a long time until they are abandoned by the receiving end after a timeout, thereby affecting the security and efficiency of the receiving end.

[0007] In a first aspect, the present application provides a system for preventing ciphertext from being forged during quantum security key relay encryption, the system comprising: any two quantum security terminals added to a global quantum security network; wherein the any two quantum security terminals pre-agree on an irreducible polynomial, an anti-counterfeiting true random number, and a session index of each of the any two quantum security terminals;

[0008] A transmitting end, configured to obtain a quantum key based on data to be transmitted; perform quantum secure encryption on the data to be transmitted according to the quantum key to obtain ciphertext data; wherein the encryption header of the ciphertext data carries the session index of the receiving end, the pairing index of the quantum key and the packet sequence number of the ciphertext data; determine a Toplitz matrix based on the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number; perform hash calculation on the session index, the pairing index and the packet sequence number through the Toplitz matrix to determine an anti-counterfeiting hash value H; and send the ciphertext data carrying the H to the receiving end through a traditional network;

[0009] The receiving end is used to receive the ciphertext data sent by the sending end; based on the session index carried in the encryption header of the ciphertext data, obtain the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number; based on the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number, determine the Toplitz matrix; through the Toplitz matrix, perform hash calculation on the session index, and the pairing index and packet sequence number carried in the encryption header to determine the anti-counterfeiting hash value H'; if it is determined that H' is consistent with H carried in the ciphertext data, then the ciphertext data is determined to be legal; if it is determined that H' is inconsistent with H carried in the ciphertext data, then the ciphertext data is determined to be forged ciphertext.

[0010] In a second aspect, the present application provides a method for preventing ciphertext from being forged during quantum security key relay encryption, the method being applied to a sending end that joins a global quantum security network, the method comprising:

[0011] Obtaining a quantum key based on the data to be sent;

[0012] According to the quantum key, the data to be sent is quantum securely encrypted to obtain ciphertext data; wherein the encryption header of the ciphertext data carries a session index of the receiving end, a pairing index of the quantum key and a packet sequence number of the ciphertext data, and the sending end and the receiving end pre-agree on an irreducible polynomial, an anti-counterfeiting true random number and a session index corresponding to the sending end and the receiving end respectively;

[0013] Determine a Toplitz matrix based on the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number;

[0014] Performing hash calculation on the session index, the pairing index and the packet sequence number through the Toplitz matrix to determine an anti-counterfeiting hash value H;

[0015] The ciphertext data carrying the H is sent to the receiving end through a traditional network.

[0016] In a third aspect, the present application also provides a method for preventing ciphertext from being forged during quantum security key relay encryption, the method being applied to a receiving end that joins a global quantum security network, the method comprising:

[0017] Receiving ciphertext data sent by a sending end; wherein the sending end and the receiving end pre-agree on an irreducible polynomial, a forgery-proof true random number, and a session index corresponding to the sending end and the receiving end respectively;

[0018] Based on the session index carried in the encryption header of the ciphertext data, obtaining the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number;

[0019] Determine a Toplitz matrix based on the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number;

[0020] Performing hash calculation on the session index, the pairing index and the packet sequence number carried in the encryption header through the Toplitz matrix to determine an anti-counterfeiting hash value H';

[0021] If it is determined that the H' is consistent with the H carried in the ciphertext data, then the ciphertext data is determined to be legal;

[0022] If it is determined that the H' is inconsistent with the H carried in the ciphertext data, then the ciphertext data is determined to be forged ciphertext.

[0023] In a fourth aspect, the present application also provides a quantum security terminal, including: a processor and a memory;

[0024] The processor is used to execute the method for preventing ciphertext from being forged during quantum security key relay encryption as applied to the sending end, or to execute the method for preventing ciphertext from being forged during quantum security key relay encryption as applied to the receiving end, by calling the program or instruction stored in the memory.

[0025] In a fifth aspect, the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium, wherein the non-transitory computer-readable storage medium stores a program or instruction, wherein the program or instruction enables a computer to execute the method for preventing ciphertext from being forged during quantum security key relay encryption as applied to the sending end as described above, or to execute the method for preventing ciphertext from being forged during quantum security key relay encryption as applied to the receiving end as described above.

[0026] In a sixth aspect, the present application also provides a computer program product, comprising: a computer program code, which, when executed on a computer, enables the computer to execute the method for preventing ciphertext from being forged during quantum security key relay encryption as applied to the sending end, or to execute the method for preventing ciphertext from being forged during quantum security key relay encryption as applied to the receiving end.

[0027] The beneficial effects of this application are as follows:

[0028] 1. The sender and the receiver pre-agreed on the irreducible polynomial, the anti-counterfeiting true random number, and the session indexes corresponding to the two quantum security terminals. Based on the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number, a Toplitz matrix can be constructed. Then, through the Toplitz matrix, combined with the characteristic data of the current session of the two quantum security terminals (including the session index, the pairing index, and the packet sequence number), the anti-counterfeiting mark required for the current session of the two quantum security terminals is generated - the anti-counterfeiting hash value. This anti-counterfeiting hash value not only contains the characteristic information of the current session, but also incorporates the randomness of the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number, making it difficult for a forger to generate a valid hash value only through a simple algorithm attack, which increases the difficulty for a forger to forge ciphertext data.

[0029] 2. Since the irreducible polynomial and anti-counterfeiting true random number are pre-agreed upon by the sender and the receiver, they are not transmitted during the subsequent quantum secure key relay encryption communication process, making it impossible for a counterfeiter to obtain or copy the irreducible polynomial and anti-counterfeiting true random number used to generate the anti-counterfeiting hash value. Therefore, it is difficult for a counterfeiter to generate a valid hash value through a simple algorithmic attack.

[0030] 3. After receiving the ciphertext data, the receiving end can obtain the pre-agreed irreducible polynomial and anti-counterfeiting true random number based on the session index carried in the ciphertext data, and then determine the Toplitz matrix based on the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number. Through the Toplitz matrix, the session index, pairing index and packet sequence number are hashed to generate an anti-counterfeiting hash value H'. By comparing H' with the anti-counterfeiting hash value H carried in the ciphertext data, the receiving end can quickly determine whether the ciphertext data is forged ciphertext, thereby preventing forged messages from occupying encryption and decryption resources for a long time, thereby affecting the security and efficiency of the receiving end. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0031] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application, the drawings required for use in the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present application. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative labor.

[0032] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of the structure of a system for preventing ciphertext from being forged during quantum secure key relay encryption provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0033] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of a specific process for preventing ciphertext from being forged during quantum secure key relay encryption provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0034] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of a process for preventing ciphertext from being forged during quantum secure key relay encryption provided by this application;

[0035] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of a process for preventing ciphertext from being forged during quantum secure key relay encryption provided by this application;

[0036] Figure 5 A schematic diagram of the structure of a quantum security terminal provided in an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0037] In order to make the purpose, technical solutions and advantages of the present application clearer, the present application will be further described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present application, rather than all the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without making creative work are within the scope of protection of the present application.

[0038] The global quantum security network can support secure and efficient quantum communication between any quantum security terminals connected to the global quantum security network, regardless of their geographical location. A core of the global quantum security network is to use the access base station as a communication hub to connect the quantum security terminal to the global quantum security network, and to achieve key relay between terminals connected to the quantum security network.

[0039] During the access process, when a quantum security terminal accesses an access base station, the access base station will assign a network access identifier to the quantum security terminal, that is, a unique terminal identifier of the entire quantum security network, to identify the quantum security terminal. The network access identifier carries information about the country, operator, region, cell, access base station, and quantum security terminal. With this network access identifier, the quantum security terminal can be identified in the global quantum security network through this network access identifier within the time range that the quantum security terminal has this network access identifier. Subsequently, the quantum security terminal can apply for services and request resources from the global quantum security network through the access base station.

[0040] In the key relay process, the sender will relay the key through the sender access base station through the quantum security network to the access base station of the decryption end, and then the decryption end access base station will forward the key to the decryption end, so as to ensure that a symmetric quantum security key is formed between the sender and the decryption end, and encryption and decryption communication can be achieved. The global quantum security network also includes a key center, which mainly distributes keys, i.e., quantum keys, to quantum security terminals connected to the global quantum security network.

[0041] Through this global quantum security network, the key relay process can be separated from the ciphertext data transmission process, thereby further improving the security of ciphertext data transmission. However, this quantum security key relay encryption communication method has the following problems:

[0042] During data transmission, the sender sends ciphertext data and simultaneously sends the quantum key. After receiving this data, the receiver needs to wait for the quantum key forwarded by the relay to decrypt it. The key to successful decryption is the exact match between the ciphertext data and the quantum key. However, attackers may try to attack the receiver by forging ciphertext.

[0043] Since the receiving end cannot find the relay key that matches these forged ciphertexts, these forged ciphertexts cannot be successfully decrypted. These forged ciphertexts that cannot be decrypted will continue to stay at the receiving end, waiting for a matching key that will never come. This situation not only takes up the receiving end's valuable resources, such as storage space and processing power, but may also pose a serious threat to the stability and operating efficiency of the receiving end.

[0044] In short, attacks that forge ciphertext will cause the receiving end's resources to be ineffectively occupied, thus affecting its stability and efficiency.

[0045] In order to solve the above problems, the present application provides a system and method for preventing quantum secure key relay encryption from forging ciphertext, so that under the quantum secure key relay encryption communication mode, the receiving end can promptly detect and discard forged ciphertext, thereby preventing forged messages from occupying encryption and decryption resources for a long time, thereby affecting the security and efficiency of the receiving end.

[0046] Embodiment 1:

[0047] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of the structure of a system for preventing forgery of ciphertext during quantum security key relay encryption provided in an embodiment of the present application, the system comprising: any two quantum security terminals added to a global quantum security network; wherein the any two quantum security terminals pre-agree on an irreducible polynomial, an anti-counterfeiting true random number, and a session index of each of the any two quantum security terminals;

[0048] A transmitting end, configured to obtain a quantum key based on data to be transmitted; perform quantum secure encryption on the data to be transmitted according to the quantum key to obtain ciphertext data; wherein the encryption header of the ciphertext data carries the session index of the receiving end, the pairing index of the quantum key and the packet sequence number of the ciphertext data; determine a Toplitz matrix based on the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number; perform hash calculation on the session index, the pairing index and the packet sequence number through the Toplitz matrix to determine an anti-counterfeiting hash value H; and send the ciphertext data carrying the H to the receiving end through a traditional network;

[0049] The receiving end is used to receive the ciphertext data sent by the sending end; based on the session index carried in the encryption header of the ciphertext data, obtain the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number; based on the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number, determine the Toplitz matrix; through the Toplitz matrix, perform hash calculation on the session index, and the pairing index and packet sequence number carried in the encryption header to determine the anti-counterfeiting hash value H'; if it is determined that H' is consistent with H carried in the ciphertext data, then the ciphertext data is determined to be legal; if it is determined that H' is inconsistent with H carried in the ciphertext data, then the ciphertext data is determined to be forged ciphertext.

[0050] In the global quantum security network, it is crucial to ensure the security of quantum security key relay encryption communication and the integrity of data. To achieve this goal, any two quantum security terminals added to the global quantum security network need to pre-agree on key parameters such as irreducible polynomials, anti-counterfeiting true random numbers, and the session indexes corresponding to the two quantum security terminals before they officially conduct quantum security key relay encryption communication. Through these key parameters, combined with the characteristic data of the current session of the two quantum security terminals, the anti-counterfeiting mark required for each session of the two quantum security terminals is generated - the anti-counterfeiting hash value. This anti-counterfeiting hash value not only contains the characteristic information of the current session, but also incorporates the randomness of the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number, making it difficult for counterfeiters to generate valid hash values ​​only through simple algorithmic attacks. Even if counterfeiters can partially crack or forge the hash algorithm, they still cannot generate forged hash values ​​that can deceive the receiving end because they cannot accurately predict or copy the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number.

[0051] The method for the two quantum security terminals to pre-agree on these key parameters may be achieved by manually filling the two quantum security terminals with the key parameters.

[0052] Based on the above embodiment, after the two quantum security terminals that need to communicate have determined the irreducible polynomial, the anti-counterfeiting true random number and the session indexes of the two quantum security terminals respectively, they can perform formal quantum security key relay encryption communication.

[0053] Exemplarily, the following is an explanation through a specific quantum secure key relay encryption communication process:

[0054] When there is data to be sent to the receiving end at the sending end, the sending end obtains a quantum key for the data to be sent from the saved key pool. For example, the quantum key is determined from the saved key pool according to the data length of the data to be sent and a pre-configured encryption ratio. The encryption ratio is used to indicate the ratio between the length of the quantum key per bit and the length of the data that can be encrypted by the quantum key per bit.

[0055] Next, the sender can perform quantum encryption on the data to be sent based on the quantum key through a pre-configured quantum encryption algorithm to obtain ciphertext data. For example, the sender encrypts the data to be sent through the quantum key according to the encryption ratio and the pre-configured quantum encryption algorithm to obtain ciphertext data. The encryption header of the ciphertext data is determined according to the saved session index of the receiving end, the pairing index of the quantum key and the packet sequence number of the ciphertext data. The encryption header is assembled into the ciphertext data. Among them, the session index of the receiving end is used to indicate the receiving end to distinguish different sessions and locate the irreducible polynomial and anti-counterfeiting true random number required for the current session. The pairing index is used to indicate the receiving end to locate the quantum key corresponding to the ciphertext data from the relay key obtained from the global quantum security network. The packet sequence number is used to indicate the sending order of the current data packet.

[0056] In order to prevent the ciphertext data from being forged, in this application, the sender will also determine the Toplitz matrix based on the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number. Through the Toplitz matrix, the feature information of the current session (including the session index, the pairing index and the packet sequence number) is hashed to determine the anti-counterfeiting hash value (for the convenience of description, the following embodiments may represent the anti-counterfeiting hash value determined by the sender as H).

[0057] For example, the irreducible polynomial p and the anti-counterfeiting true random number s are used as parameters to generate a Toplitz matrix, including:

[0058] 1) The number of rows and columns of the Toplitz matrix is ​​related to the degree of the irreducible polynomial p: Assume that the highest degree of p is n;

[0059] 2) The elements of the first row are equal to the elements of the anti-counterfeiting true random number s;

[0060] 3) Starting from the second row, the elements of each row are equal to the elements of the previous row shifted right by one position and multiplied by the coefficient of the irreducible polynomial p;

[0061] 4) For the anti-counterfeiting true random number s = [s0, s1, ..., s n-1 ] and the irreducible polynomial p = a0*x^0+a1*x^1+…+a n-1 *x^(n-1), the i-th row of the Toplitz matrix T will be [s i ,s i-1 *a0,s i-2 *a1,…,s i-n+1 *a n-2 ,s i-n *a n-1 ].

[0062] 5) According to the dimension of the Toplitz matrix, the size of the data block is determined, and then according to the size of the data block, the feature data after the session index, the pairing index and the packet sequence number are combined, for example, the combined feature data is expressed as session index ‖ pairing index ‖ packet sequence number length, etc., and divided into several data blocks. For example: M = [m0, m1, ...], where m represents the data block obtained by the division, and M is the combined feature data;

[0063] 6) Treat each data block as a column vector; for each data block, multiply it with the Toplitz matrix T and obtain the hash value of the first row of the multiplication result;

[0064] 7) Repeat step 6) above, perform multiplication on each data block, and combine the first row of each result to form the final hash value H(M) = [h0, h1, ...].

[0065] After the transmitting end obtains H based on the above embodiment, the H can be encapsulated into ciphertext data, and then the ciphertext data carrying H is sent to the receiving end through a traditional network.

[0066] At the same time, the sending end also needs to relay the quantum key to the receiving end through the global quantum security network. Exemplarily, the sending end will send the key index of the quantum key and the second network access identifier to the access base station (referred to as the first access base station) to which the sending end accesses. The first access base station obtains the quantum key from the key pool paired with the sending end based on the key index. Then, the first access base station relays the quantum key and the second network access identifier to the access base station (referred to as the second access base station) to which the receiving end accesses based on the second network access identifier. The second access base station can encrypt the quantum key and send it to the receiving end based on the second network access identifier.

[0067] For the receiving end, after receiving the ciphertext data sent by the sending end, the receiving end can parse the ciphertext data to obtain the session index, pairing index and packet sequence number carried in the encryption header of the ciphertext data. Then, the same method as the above-mentioned sending end is adopted, based on the session index, pairing index and packet sequence number, combined with the stored irreducible polynomial and anti-counterfeiting true random number, the legitimacy of the ciphertext data is verified to determine whether the ciphertext data is a forged ciphertext. Exemplarily, the receiving end obtains the session index carried in the encryption header of the ciphertext data, and then locates the irreducible polynomial and anti-counterfeiting true random number agreed in advance for the session according to the session index. Then, based on the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number, the Toplitz matrix is ​​determined. Through the Toplitz matrix, the session index, pairing index and packet sequence number carried in the encryption header of the ciphertext data are hashed to determine the anti-counterfeiting hash value (for the convenience of distinction, the anti-counterfeiting hash value determined by the receiving end in the following embodiments can be expressed as H').

[0068] Under normal circumstances, the method for determining the anti-counterfeiting hash value, the required irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number are all secret information unique to the sender and the receiver. The two use the same method and can only calculate the same anti-counterfeiting hash value based on consistent data. For counterfeiters, since they cannot obtain the irreducible polynomial and anti-counterfeiting true random number used by the sender and the receiver to generate the anti-counterfeiting hash value, and the irreducible polynomial and anti-counterfeiting true random number are not transmitted during the quantum security key relay encryption communication process, it is difficult for counterfeiters to generate a valid hash value only by a simple algorithm attack, that is, to generate the same anti-counterfeiting hash value as the receiver. Therefore, in this application, after obtaining H', the receiver can compare H' with the H carried by the ciphertext data to ensure the authenticity and integrity of the ciphertext data. If H is consistent with H', it means that the ciphertext data is indeed generated by the sender, and the ciphertext data is determined to be legal. If H is inconsistent with H', it means that the ciphertext data is forged by the counterfeiter, and the ciphertext data is determined to be a forged ciphertext.

[0069] In a possible implementation, the receiving end may perform a format check on the encryption header of the received ciphertext data, so as to identify forged ciphertext whose format does not meet the requirements before calculating the ciphertext data. For example, the data length carried by the encryption header meets the preset data length range, whether the data carried by the encryption header is of a pre-configured specified type, etc. The receiving end determines that the format of the encryption header of the ciphertext data passes the format check, and then further determines H' based on the data carried in the encryption header of the ciphertext data. If the receiving end determines that the format of the encryption header of the ciphertext data does not pass the format check, it means that the ciphertext data is forged, and then refuses to respond to the ciphertext data.

[0070] For example, when the device structure at the receiving end includes an encryption area, an isolation area, and a communication area, and the encryption area is connected to the isolation area, and the isolation area is connected to the communication area, the communication area of ​​the receiving end can pass the ciphertext data to the isolation area of ​​the receiving end after receiving the ciphertext data. The isolation area can perform a format check on the encryption header of the ciphertext data. When it is determined that the encryption header passes the format check, the isolation area will pass the ciphertext data to the encryption area to determine H' based on the data carried in the encryption header of the ciphertext data through the encryption area; when it is determined that the encryption header does not pass the format check, the isolation area can directly discard the forged ciphertext data, so that the forged ciphertext data will not enter the encryption area of ​​the receiving end, which is conducive to ensuring the security of the encryption area.

[0071] In general, the sending end will relay the quantum key to the receiving end through the global quantum security network, and the receiving end can receive the quantum keys relayed by each sending end through the global quantum security network. When the receiving end determines that a certain ciphertext data received is legal based on the above embodiment, the quantum key corresponding to the ciphertext data can be determined from the received quantum keys based on the pairing index carried in the ciphertext data. For example, the quantum key carrying the pairing index is determined from the received quantum keys. Then, the ciphertext data is decrypted based on the quantum key corresponding to the ciphertext data.

[0072] The beneficial effects of this application are as follows:

[0073] 1. The sender and the receiver pre-agreed on the irreducible polynomial, the anti-counterfeiting true random number, and the session indexes corresponding to the two quantum security terminals. Based on the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number, a Toplitz matrix can be constructed. Then, through the Toplitz matrix, combined with the characteristic data of the current session of the two quantum security terminals (including the session index, the pairing index, and the packet sequence number), the anti-counterfeiting mark required for the current session of the two quantum security terminals is generated - the anti-counterfeiting hash value. This anti-counterfeiting hash value not only contains the characteristic information of the current session, but also incorporates the randomness of the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number, making it difficult for a forger to generate a valid hash value only through a simple algorithm attack, which increases the difficulty for a forger to forge ciphertext data.

[0074] 2. Since the irreducible polynomial and anti-counterfeiting true random number are pre-agreed upon by the sender and the receiver, they are not transmitted during the subsequent quantum secure key relay encryption communication process, making it impossible for a counterfeiter to obtain or copy the irreducible polynomial and anti-counterfeiting true random number used to generate the anti-counterfeiting hash value. Therefore, it is difficult for a counterfeiter to generate a valid hash value through a simple algorithmic attack.

[0075] 3. After receiving the ciphertext data, the receiving end can obtain the pre-agreed irreducible polynomial and anti-counterfeiting true random number based on the session index carried in the ciphertext data, and then determine the Toplitz matrix based on the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number. Through the Toplitz matrix, the session index, pairing index and packet sequence number are hashed to generate an anti-counterfeiting hash value H'. By comparing H' with the anti-counterfeiting hash value H carried in the ciphertext data, the receiving end can quickly determine whether the ciphertext data is forged ciphertext, thereby preventing forged messages from occupying encryption and decryption resources for a long time, thereby affecting the security and efficiency of the receiving end.

[0076] Embodiment 2:

[0077] In order to securely determine the irreducible polynomial, the anti-counterfeiting true random number and the session indexes corresponding to the two quantum security terminals, based on the above embodiments, in the present application, the arbitrary two quantum security terminals include a first quantum security terminal and a second quantum security terminal;

[0078] The first quantum security terminal is specifically used to obtain the irreducible polynomial and the first session index of the first quantum security terminal; generate a handshake request; wherein the handshake request carries the irreducible polynomial, the first session index, the first network access identifier of the first quantum security terminal and the second network access identifier of the second quantum security terminal; through the global quantum security network, based on the second network access identifier, the handshake request is relayed to the second quantum security terminal; and, through the global quantum security network, a handshake response message fed back by the second quantum security terminal is received; the first session index, the irreducible polynomial, and the anti-counterfeiting true random number carried in the handshake response message are associated and saved with the second session index;

[0079] The second quantum security terminal is specifically used to receive the handshake request through the global quantum security network; obtain the anti-counterfeiting true random number and the second session index of the second quantum security terminal; associate and save the second session index, the anti-counterfeiting true random number, and the irreducible polynomial carried by the handshake request with the first session index; generate a handshake response message; wherein the handshake response message carries the first network access identifier, the anti-counterfeiting true random number and the second session index; and relay the handshake response message to the first quantum security terminal through the global quantum security network based on the first network access identifier.

[0080] In the present application, two quantum security terminals that need quantum security key relay encryption communication in the global quantum security network can negotiate irreducible polynomials, anti-counterfeiting true random numbers, and session indexes corresponding to the two quantum security terminals during the handshake connection establishment phase. Among them, in order to facilitate the distinction of the functions of the two quantum security terminals during the handshake connection establishment phase, the quantum security terminal that actively initiates the handshake request can be called the first quantum security terminal, and the quantum security terminal that passively responds to the handshake request can be called the second quantum security terminal. The following is an explanation of the process of negotiating irreducible polynomials, anti-counterfeiting true random numbers, and session indexes corresponding to the two quantum security terminals by the two quantum security terminals in the handshake connection establishment process:

[0081] Firstly, the first quantum security terminal may first obtain an irreducible polynomial and a session index of the first quantum security terminal (referred to as a first session index).

[0082] In a possible implementation, the first quantum security terminal may first obtain a true random number from a stored random number pool, and then determine an irreducible polynomial based on the true random number. For example, based on the true random number, an n-th order irreducible polynomial based on the GF(2) field is generated.

[0083] Subsequently, the first quantum security terminal generates a handshake request based on the irreducible polynomial and the first session index. The handshake request not only includes the irreducible polynomial and the first session index, but also includes the first network access identifier of the first quantum security terminal and the second network access identifier of the second quantum security terminal. The first network access identifier is used to inform the second quantum security terminal which first quantum security terminal in the current global quantum security network wants to establish a connection with it. The second network access identifier is used to indicate the destination of the handshake request.

[0084] After the first quantum security terminal obtains the handshake request, it can relay the handshake request to the second quantum security terminal through the global quantum security network based on the second network access identifier. Exemplarily, the first quantum security terminal sends the handshake request to the access base station accessed by the first quantum security terminal. The access base station routes the handshake request to the access base station accessed by the second quantum security terminal based on the second network access identifier carried in the handshake request. The access base station accessed by the second quantum security terminal then forwards the handshake request to the second quantum security terminal.

[0085] The access base station accessed by the first quantum security terminal may be the same as or different from the access base station accessed by the second quantum security terminal. In other words, the first quantum security terminal and the second quantum security terminal may be connected to different access base stations or to the same access base station.

[0086] For the second quantum security terminal, once the second quantum security terminal receives the relayed handshake request through the global quantum security network, the second quantum security terminal can extract the first session index, the irreducible polynomial and the first network access identifier from the handshake request, and assign an anti-counterfeiting true random number and the session index of the second quantum security terminal (recorded as the second session index) to the handshake request.

[0087] In a possible implementation manner, before allocating the anti-counterfeiting true random number and the second session index to the handshake request, the second quantum security terminal may determine the current

[0088] The second quantum security terminal then associates and stores the first session index, the second session index, the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number for subsequent verification and communication. A handshake response message is generated based on the anti-counterfeiting true random number, the second session index and the first network access identifier.

[0089] The second quantum security terminal relays the handshake response message to the first quantum security terminal based on the second network access identifier through the global quantum security network.

[0090] It should be noted that the specific relay process of the handshake response message is similar to the relay process of the handshake request in the above embodiment, and will not be described in detail here.

[0091] When the first quantum security terminal receives the handshake response message, it can associate and save the first session index, the irreducible polynomial, and the anti-counterfeiting true random number carried in the handshake response message with the second session index. In this way, the two quantum security terminals have completed the establishment of a mutual session, as well as the agreement of the irreducible polynomial, the anti-counterfeiting true random number, and their respective session indexes, providing a basis for subsequent secure communication.

[0092] Embodiment 3:

[0093] The following is a description of a method for preventing ciphertext from being forged during quantum secure key relay encryption provided by the present application through a specific embodiment. Figure 2 A schematic diagram of a specific process for preventing forgery of ciphertext during quantum secure key relay encryption provided in an embodiment of the present application. The process mainly includes a handshake phase and a communication phase, and each phase is described below:

[0094] Phase 1: Handshake phase.

[0095] S201: Quantum security terminal A obtains a true random number from a stored true random number pool, and determines an irreducible polynomial based on the true random number.

[0096] S202: Quantum security terminal A generates a first session index, and generates a handshake request based on the first session index, an irreducible polynomial, a first network access identifier of quantum security terminal A, and a second network access identifier of quantum security terminal B.

[0097] S203: Quantum security terminal A sends a handshake request to the access base station BSa.

[0098] S204: The access base station BSa relays the handshake request to the access base station BSb to which the quantum security terminal B accesses based on the second network access identifier carried in the handshake request.

[0099] S205: The access base station BSb forwards the handshake request to the quantum security terminal B based on the second network access identifier carried in the handshake request.

[0100] S206: Quantum security terminal B receives the handshake request, and extracts the first network access identifier, the first session index, and the irreducible polynomial from the handshake request.

[0101] S207: Quantum security terminal B generates an anti-counterfeiting true random number and a second session index of a second quantum security terminal.

[0102] S208: Quantum security terminal B associates and saves the second session index, the anti-counterfeiting true random number, and the irreducible polynomial carried in the handshake request with the first session index.

[0103] S209: Quantum security terminal B generates a handshake response message.

[0104] The handshake response message carries the first network access identifier, an anti-counterfeiting true random number and a second session index.

[0105] S210: Quantum security terminal B sends a handshake response message to access base station BSb.

[0106] S211: The access base station BSb routes the handshake response message to the access base station BSa based on the first network access identifier carried in the handshake response message.

[0107] S212: The access base station BSa forwards the handshake response message to the quantum security terminal A based on the first network access identifier carried in the handshake response message.

[0108] S213: Quantum security terminal A receives the handshake response message and extracts the anti-counterfeiting true random number and the second session index carried in the handshake response message.

[0109] S214: Quantum security terminal A associates and stores the first session index, the irreducible polynomial, and the anti-counterfeiting true random number carried in the handshake response message with the second session index.

[0110] When the handshake phase is completed based on the above embodiment, quantum security terminal A and quantum security terminal B can perform quantum security key relay encryption communication, that is, phase two.

[0111] Phase 2: Communication phase.

[0112] The following example uses quantum security terminal A as the transmitter and quantum security terminal B as the receiver to illustrate:

[0113] S215: Quantum security terminal A obtains the quantum key based on the data to be sent.

[0114] S216: Quantum security terminal A performs quantum security encryption on the data to be sent according to the quantum key to obtain ciphertext data.

[0115] The encryption header of the ciphertext data carries the session index of the receiving end, the pairing index of the quantum key and the packet number of the ciphertext data.

[0116] S217: Quantum security terminal A determines the Toplitz matrix based on the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number, and performs hash calculation on the session index, pairing index and packet sequence number through the Toplitz matrix to determine the anti-counterfeiting hash value H.

[0117] S218: Quantum security terminal A sends the ciphertext data carrying the anti-counterfeiting hash value to quantum security terminal B through the traditional network.

[0118] It should be noted that quantum security terminal A will also relay the quantum key to quantum security terminal B through the global quantum security network.

[0119] S219: Quantum security terminal B receives the ciphertext data and obtains an irreducible polynomial and an anti-counterfeiting true random number based on the session index carried in the encryption header of the ciphertext data.

[0120] S220: Quantum security terminal B determines the Toplitz matrix based on the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number, and uses the Toplitz matrix to perform hash calculation on the session index, the pairing index and the packet sequence number carried in the encryption header to determine the anti-counterfeiting hash value H'.

[0121] S221: Quantum security terminal B determines whether H' is consistent with H carried in the ciphertext data. If so, execute S222; otherwise, execute S223.

[0122] S222: Quantum security terminal B determines that the ciphertext data is legal.

[0123] S223: Quantum security terminal B determines that the ciphertext data is forged ciphertext.

[0124] Embodiment 4:

[0125] Based on the same inventive concept, the present application also provides a method for preventing ciphertext from being forged during quantum secure key relay encryption. The method is applied to a sender that joins a global quantum secure network. Figure 3 A schematic diagram of a process for preventing ciphertext from being forged during quantum secure key relay encryption provided by this application, the process comprising:

[0126] S301: Obtain a quantum key based on the data to be sent.

[0127] S302: According to the quantum key, the data to be sent is quantum securely encrypted to obtain ciphertext data; wherein the encryption header of the ciphertext data carries the session index of the receiving end, the pairing index of the quantum key and the packet number of the ciphertext data, and the sending end and the receiving end pre-agree on an irreducible polynomial, an anti-counterfeiting true random number and the session indexes corresponding to the sending end and the receiving end respectively.

[0128] S303: Determine a Toplitz matrix based on the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number.

[0129] S304: Perform hash calculation on the session index, the pairing index and the packet sequence number through the Toplitz matrix to determine an anti-counterfeiting hash value H.

[0130] S305: Send the encrypted data carrying the H to the receiving end through a traditional network.

[0131] In the present application, the method for preventing ciphertext from being forged during quantum security key relay encryption is applied to a sending end that joins a global quantum security network. The sending end can be a quantum security terminal, such as a quantum security privacy computer, a quantum security all-in-one machine, etc.

[0132] It should be noted that the principle of solving the technical problem of the method for preventing ciphertext forgery during quantum secure key relay encryption provided in this embodiment is the same as the principle of solving the technical problem in the above-mentioned system embodiment, and the repeated parts will not be repeated.

[0133] Embodiment 5:

[0134] Similarly, the present application also provides a method for preventing ciphertext from being forged during quantum secure key relay encryption, which is applied to a receiving end that joins a global quantum secure network. Figure 4 A schematic diagram of a process for preventing ciphertext from being forged during quantum secure key relay encryption provided by this application, the process comprising:

[0135] S401: Receive ciphertext data sent by a sender; wherein the sender and the receiver pre-agree on an irreducible polynomial, a forgery-proof true random number, and a session index corresponding to the sender and the receiver respectively.

[0136] S402: Based on the session index carried in the encryption header of the ciphertext data, the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number are obtained.

[0137] S403: Determine a Toplitz matrix based on the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number.

[0138] S404: Perform hash calculation on the session index, the pairing index and the packet sequence number carried in the encryption header through the Toplitz matrix to determine an anti-counterfeiting hash value H'.

[0139] S405: If it is determined that the H' is consistent with the H carried in the ciphertext data, the ciphertext data is determined to be legal.

[0140] S406: If it is determined that the H' is inconsistent with the H carried in the ciphertext data, the ciphertext data is determined to be forged ciphertext.

[0141] In the present application, the method for preventing ciphertext from being forged during quantum security key relay encryption is applied to a receiving end that joins a global quantum security network. The receiving end can be a quantum security terminal, such as a quantum security privacy computer, a quantum security all-in-one machine, etc.

[0142] It should be noted that the principle of solving the technical problem of the method for preventing ciphertext forgery during quantum secure key relay encryption provided in this embodiment is the same as the principle of solving the technical problem in the above-mentioned system embodiment, and the repeated parts will not be repeated.

[0143] Embodiment 6:

[0144] Based on the above embodiments, the present application also provides a quantum security terminal. Figure 5 A schematic diagram of the structure of a quantum security terminal provided in an embodiment of the present application is shown in FIG. Figure 5 As shown, it includes: a processor 41, a communication interface 42, a memory 43 and a communication bus 44, wherein the processor 41, the communication interface 42, and the memory 43 communicate with each other through the communication bus 44;

[0145] The memory 43 stores a computer program. When the program is executed by the processor 41, the processor 41 can perform the following steps:

[0146] Obtaining a quantum key based on the data to be sent;

[0147] According to the quantum key, the data to be sent is quantum securely encrypted to obtain ciphertext data; wherein the encryption header of the ciphertext data carries a session index of the receiving end, a pairing index of the quantum key and a packet sequence number of the ciphertext data, and the sending end and the receiving end pre-agree on an irreducible polynomial, an anti-counterfeiting true random number and a session index corresponding to the sending end and the receiving end respectively;

[0148] Determine a Toplitz matrix based on the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number;

[0149] Performing hash calculation on the session index, the pairing index and the packet sequence number through the Toplitz matrix to determine an anti-counterfeiting hash value H;

[0150] The ciphertext data carrying the H is sent to the receiving end through a traditional network.

[0151] Or, perform the following steps:

[0152] Receiving ciphertext data sent by a sending end; wherein the sending end and the receiving end pre-agree on an irreducible polynomial, a forgery-proof true random number, and a session index corresponding to the sending end and the receiving end respectively;

[0153] Based on the session index carried in the encryption header of the ciphertext data, obtaining the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number;

[0154] Determine a Toplitz matrix based on the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number;

[0155] Performing hash calculation on the session index, the pairing index and the packet sequence number carried in the encryption header through the Toplitz matrix to determine an anti-counterfeiting hash value H';

[0156] If it is determined that the H' is consistent with the H carried in the ciphertext data, then the ciphertext data is determined to be legal;

[0157] If it is determined that the H' is inconsistent with the H carried in the ciphertext data, then the ciphertext data is determined to be forged ciphertext.

[0158] Since the principle of the above-mentioned quantum security terminal to solve the problem is similar to the method of preventing ciphertext from being forged during quantum security key relay encryption, the implementation of the above-mentioned quantum security terminal can refer to the embodiment of the method, and the repeated parts will not be repeated.

[0159] Embodiment 7:

[0160] On the basis of the above embodiments, an embodiment of the present application further provides a computer-readable storage medium, in which a computer program executable by a processor is stored. When the program runs on the processor, the processor implements the following steps when executing:

[0161] Obtaining a quantum key based on the data to be sent;

[0162] According to the quantum key, the data to be sent is quantum securely encrypted to obtain ciphertext data; wherein the encryption header of the ciphertext data carries a session index of the receiving end, a pairing index of the quantum key and a packet sequence number of the ciphertext data, and the sending end and the receiving end pre-agree on an irreducible polynomial, an anti-counterfeiting true random number and a session index corresponding to the sending end and the receiving end respectively;

[0163] Determine a Toplitz matrix based on the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number;

[0164] Performing hash calculation on the session index, the pairing index and the packet sequence number through the Toplitz matrix to determine an anti-counterfeiting hash value H;

[0165] The ciphertext data carrying the H is sent to the receiving end through a traditional network.

[0166] Or, implement the following steps:

[0167] Receiving ciphertext data sent by a sending end; wherein the sending end and the receiving end pre-agree on an irreducible polynomial, a forgery-proof true random number, and a session index corresponding to the sending end and the receiving end respectively;

[0168] Based on the session index carried in the encryption header of the ciphertext data, obtaining the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number;

[0169] Determine a Toplitz matrix based on the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number;

[0170] Performing hash calculation on the session index, the pairing index and the packet sequence number carried in the encryption header through the Toplitz matrix to determine an anti-counterfeiting hash value H';

[0171] If it is determined that the H' is consistent with the H carried in the ciphertext data, then the ciphertext data is determined to be legal;

[0172] If it is determined that the H' is inconsistent with the H carried in the ciphertext data, then the ciphertext data is determined to be forged ciphertext.

[0173] Since the principle of solving the problem by the above-mentioned computer-readable storage medium is similar to the method for preventing ciphertext from being forged during quantum secure key relay encryption, the implementation of the above-mentioned computer-readable storage medium can refer to the embodiment of the method, and the repeated parts will not be repeated.

Claims

1. A system for preventing ciphertext from being forged during quantum secure key relay encryption, characterized in that: The system comprises: any two quantum security terminals added to the global quantum security network; wherein the two quantum security terminals pre-agree on an irreducible polynomial, a counterfeit-proof true random number, and a session index of each of the two quantum security terminals; A transmitting end, configured to obtain a quantum key based on data to be transmitted; perform quantum secure encryption on the data to be transmitted according to the quantum key to obtain ciphertext data; wherein the encryption header of the ciphertext data carries the session index of the receiving end, the pairing index of the quantum key and the packet sequence number of the ciphertext data; determine a Toplitz matrix based on the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number; perform hash calculation on the session index, the pairing index and the packet sequence number through the Toplitz matrix to determine an anti-counterfeiting hash value H; and send the ciphertext data carrying the H to the receiving end through a traditional network; The receiving end is used to receive the ciphertext data sent by the sending end; based on the session index carried in the encryption header of the ciphertext data, obtain the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number; based on the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number, determine the Toplitz matrix; through the Toplitz matrix, perform hash calculation on the session index, and the pairing index and packet sequence number carried in the encryption header to determine the anti-counterfeiting hash value H'; if it is determined that H' is consistent with H carried in the ciphertext data, then the ciphertext data is determined to be legal; if it is determined that H' is inconsistent with H carried in the ciphertext data, then the ciphertext data is determined to be forged ciphertext.

2. The system according to claim 1, characterized in that The transmitting end is further used to relay the quantum key to the receiving end through the global quantum security network; The receiving end is further used to receive the relayed quantum key through the global quantum security network; when it is determined that the ciphertext data is legal, based on the pairing index carried in the ciphertext data, determine the quantum key corresponding to the ciphertext data from the received quantum keys; The ciphertext data is decrypted based on the quantum key corresponding to the ciphertext data.

3. The system according to claim 1, characterized in that The arbitrary two quantum security terminals include a first quantum security terminal and a second quantum security terminal; The first quantum security terminal is specifically used to obtain the irreducible polynomial and the first session index of the first quantum security terminal; generate a handshake request; wherein the handshake request carries the irreducible polynomial, the first session index, the first network access identifier of the first quantum security terminal and the second network access identifier of the second quantum security terminal; through the global quantum security network, based on the second network access identifier, the handshake request is relayed to the second quantum security terminal; and, through the global quantum security network, a handshake response message fed back by the second quantum security terminal is received; the first session index, the irreducible polynomial, and the anti-counterfeiting true random number carried in the handshake response message are associated and saved with the second session index; The second quantum security terminal is specifically used to receive the handshake request through the global quantum security network; obtain the anti-counterfeiting true random number and the second session index of the second quantum security terminal; associate and save the second session index, the anti-counterfeiting true random number, and the irreducible polynomial carried by the handshake request with the first session index; generate a handshake response message; wherein the handshake response message carries the first network access identifier, the anti-counterfeiting true random number and the second session index; and relay the handshake response message to the first quantum security terminal through the global quantum security network based on the first network access identifier.

4. The system according to claim 3, characterized in that The first quantum security terminal is specifically configured to obtain a true random number from a stored true random number pool; and determine the irreducible polynomial based on the true random number.

5. The system according to claim 1, wherein: The receiving end is further used to determine that the encryption header of the ciphertext data passes the format check before obtaining the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number based on the session index carried in the encryption header of the ciphertext data.

6. A method for preventing ciphertext from being forged during quantum secure key relay encryption, characterized in that: The method is applied to a sending end that joins a global quantum security network, and the method comprises: Obtaining a quantum key based on the data to be sent; According to the quantum key, the data to be sent is quantum securely encrypted to obtain ciphertext data; wherein the encryption header of the ciphertext data carries a session index of the receiving end, a pairing index of the quantum key and a packet sequence number of the ciphertext data, and the sending end and the receiving end pre-agree on an irreducible polynomial, an anti-counterfeiting true random number and a session index corresponding to the sending end and the receiving end respectively; Determine a Toplitz matrix based on the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number; Performing hash calculation on the session index, the pairing index and the packet sequence number through the Toplitz matrix to determine an anti-counterfeiting hash value H; The ciphertext data carrying the H is sent to the receiving end through a traditional network.

7. A method for preventing ciphertext from being forged during quantum secure key relay encryption, characterized in that: The method is applied to a receiving end that joins a global quantum security network, and the method comprises: Receiving ciphertext data sent by a sending end; wherein the sending end and the receiving end pre-agree on an irreducible polynomial, a forgery-proof true random number, and a session index corresponding to the sending end and the receiving end respectively; Based on the session index carried in the encryption header of the ciphertext data, obtaining the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number; Determine a Toplitz matrix based on the irreducible polynomial and the anti-counterfeiting true random number; Performing hash calculation on the session index, the pairing index and the packet sequence number carried in the encryption header through the Toplitz matrix to determine an anti-counterfeiting hash value H'; If it is determined that the H' is consistent with the H carried in the ciphertext data, then the ciphertext data is determined to be legal; If it is determined that the H' is inconsistent with the H carried in the ciphertext data, then the ciphertext data is determined to be forged ciphertext.

8. A quantum security terminal, characterized in that: include: Processor and memory; The processor is used to execute the method for preventing ciphertext from being forged during quantum security key relay encryption as applied to the sending end as claimed in claim 6, or to execute the method for preventing ciphertext from being forged during quantum security key relay encryption as applied to the receiving end as claimed in claim 7, by calling the program or instruction stored in the memory.

9. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium stores a program or instruction, which enables a computer to execute the method for preventing ciphertext from being forged during quantum security key relay encryption as applied to a sending end as claimed in claim 6, or to execute the method for preventing ciphertext from being forged during quantum security key relay encryption as applied to a receiving end as claimed in claim 7.

Images