Hardware simplex communication encryption method and encryption device

Abstract

The invention provides a hardware simplex communication encryption method and an encryption device.The encryption method comprises the steps that a simplex communication system is encrypted through a second-order band-pass hardware filtering network, the second-order band-pass hardware filtering network comprises a first-order circuit and a second-order circuit, the first-order circuit is located at the transmitting end of the simplex communication system, and the second-order circuit is located at the receiving end of the simplex communication system; the second-order circuit is located at the receiving end of the simplex communication system. According to the encryption method disclosed by the invention, a more advanced hardware communication confidential mode is formed through a simplex communication receiving and transmitting end distributed second-order communication network, and the problems in the prior art are solved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention discloses a field of communication technology, and more particularly relates to a hardware simplex communication encryption method and an encryption device. Background Art

[0002] In the field of modern electrical system control, it is very common to use communication connections between various parts or units in the system. Among them, simplex communication is generally used for applications with large data volume and intensive communication sequence, which is similar to the one-way street in daily traffic. Simplex communication is conducive to smooth communication and carrying more and faster data communication.

[0003] Regardless of the communication method, the security of communication must be the first priority, among which the information security or information confidentiality of communication is an important indicator of communication security. Therefore, in the field of communication technology, communication encryption technology has always been the focus of research and development and deepening. The goal of communication encryption technology is to ensure that only communication nodes authorized to share communication content can normally identify the communication content, and illegal nodes that are not authorized to share communication content cannot identify or obtain communication content even if they are connected to the communication network. Communication encryption technology mainly ensures that communication information will not be leaked to the outside, and at the same time prevents malicious tampering or destruction of communication information from the outside. Since the concept was born, communication encryption technology has been continuously improving and enriching, and is increasingly attracting attention and complexity in the industry.

[0004] The simplex communication encryption methods currently in use are all software methods, including various software handshake algorithms, response algorithms, encoding algorithms, shift algorithms, etc. Although the specific measures and detailed schemes are different, the overall ideas and strategies of all software encryption methods are the same: the sender and receiver of the simplex communication connection communicate according to the pre-designed unique and exclusive communication protocol content, and the authorized node can normally identify or parse the communication content, while the unauthorized node cannot identify or parse the corresponding communication content.

[0005] The prior art specifically has the following shortcomings: 1. Reduced communication efficiency. Since the software communication encryption method requires special design of the encryption and decryption algorithm programs of the communication software, the program complexity increases and it will occupy timing resources, resulting in reduced communication efficiency and longer timing of sending and receiving responses. In some occasions where the timeliness of simplex communication is required to be higher, this problem is very prominent and difficult.

[0006] 2. Software communication encryption cannot prevent unauthorized illegal nodes from attacking and destroying the communication content that should be protected. Although software communication encryption can prevent illegal nodes from obtaining or parsing protected communication content to a certain extent, it cannot prevent illegal nodes from sending interference content or destructive illegal messages to the communication bus. Therefore, software communication encryption methods cannot actually guarantee that communications will not be destroyed or attacked.

[0007] 3. Software communication encryption technology cannot guarantee that the communication content cannot be obtained. After an unauthorized illegal node accesses the communication bus, it can actually obtain and download the protected communication content. Although it cannot immediately parse and identify the meaning of the content, it can obtain and copy all the original data. With the support of subsequent cracking software or other methods, it is still possible to crack the communication content.

[0008] 4. Software communication encryption technology is relatively easy to crack. Although software algorithms emerge in an endless stream, with the increasing computing power of computers, cracking and analysis are becoming faster and easier.

[0009] Therefore, the prior art needs to be improved. Summary of the invention

[0010] In view of the shortcomings of the prior art, the purpose of the present invention is to provide a hardware simplex communication encryption method and an encryption device. The hardware simplex communication encryption method forms a more advanced hardware communication confidentiality method through a distributed second-order communication network of a simplex communication transceiver, thereby solving the various shortcomings of the prior art mentioned above.

[0011] In order to solve the above technical problems, the present invention adopts the following technical solutions: According to aspects of the present invention, there is provided a hardware simplex communication encryption method, comprising: encrypting a simplex communication system through a second-order bandpass hardware filtering network, wherein the second-order bandpass hardware filtering network comprises a first-order circuit and a second-order circuit, wherein the first-order circuit is located at a transmitting end of the simplex communication system, and the second-order circuit is located at a receiving end of the simplex communication system.

[0012] In one embodiment of the present invention, the first-order circuit and the second-order circuit are connected via a communication bus of a simplex communication system.

[0013] In one embodiment of the present invention, the amplification factor calculation formula of the second-order bandpass hardware filter network is:

[0014] Where: A is the amplification factor, R1 and R3 are the gain compensation resistor value and low-frequency blocking control resistor value of the first-order circuit respectively, R4, R5, and R6 are the bandpass compensation resistor value, gain control resistor value and output gain compensation control resistor value to ground of the second-order circuit respectively.

[0015] In one embodiment of the present invention, the center frequency calculation formula of the second-order bandpass hardware filter network is:

[0016] Where: ω0 is the center frequency, C is the capacitance of the passband frequency control capacitor of the first-order circuit, R1, R2 and R3 are the gain compensation resistor value, high-frequency block control resistor value and low-frequency block control resistor value of the first-order circuit respectively, and R6 is the output gain compensation control resistor value to ground of the second-order circuit.

[0017] In one embodiment of the present invention, the quality factor calculation formula of the second-order bandpass hardware filter network is:

[0018] Wherein: Q is the quality factor, R1, R2 and R3 are the gain compensation resistor value, high frequency block control resistor value and low frequency block control resistor value of the first order circuit respectively, R4, R5 and R6 are the passband compensation resistor value, gain control resistor value and output gain compensation control resistor value to ground of the second order circuit respectively.

[0019] In one embodiment of the present invention, under normal working conditions, the amplification factor is equal to 1.

[0020] In one embodiment of the present invention, the center frequency is equal to the baud rate of the simplex communication system.

[0021] In one embodiment of the present invention, the quality factor is greater than or equal to 200.

[0022] In one embodiment of the present invention, the signal of the communication bus is a negative feedback signal and an analog deformation signal.

[0023] On the other hand, the present invention also provides a hardware simplex communication encryption device, including a first-order bandpass filter formed by a first-order circuit and a second-order bandpass filter formed by a second-order circuit, the first-order bandpass filter is located at the transmitting end of the communication system, and the second-order bandpass filter is located at the receiving end of the communication system.

[0024] By adopting the above technical solution, the present invention has the following advantages compared with the prior art: 1. High communication efficiency. The signal transmission delay caused by the hardware network is usually considered to be 0. This solution does not require any changes to the communication program software, further ensuring that the software program timing is not affected or lost, and is also conducive to the simplification of the software program.

[0025] 2. It can effectively prevent unauthorized illegal nodes from attacking and destroying protected communication content. Any illegal node cannot effectively access the simplex communication network from the signal physical level, and thus cannot affect the communication content.

[0026] 3. It can effectively ensure that the communication content cannot be obtained. For the same reason as above, any illegal node cannot effectively access the simplex communication network from the signal physical level, and thus cannot obtain and download the protected communication content or crack the communication content.

[0027] 4. Simplex communication is extremely difficult to crack. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0028] Figure 1 The schematic diagram of the hardware simplex communication encryption method provided by the present invention is shown; Figure 2 The passband parameter control principle diagram of the hardware simplex communication encryption method provided by the present invention is shown. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0029] It should be understood that the embodiments of the present invention shown in the exemplary embodiments are only illustrative. Although only a few embodiments are described in detail in the present invention, it is easy for those skilled in the art to appreciate that multiple modifications are feasible without actually departing from the teaching of the subject matter of the present invention. Accordingly, all such modifications should be included within the scope of the present invention. Without departing from the gist of the present invention, other replacements, modifications, changes and deletions may be made to the design, operating conditions and parameters of the following exemplary embodiments.

[0030] like Figure 1 As shown, the present invention provides a hardware simplex communication encryption method, including: encrypting the simplex communication system through a second-order bandpass hardware filtering network, the second-order bandpass hardware filtering network includes a first-order circuit and a second-order circuit, the first-order circuit is located at the transmitting end of the simplex communication system, and the second-order circuit is located at the receiving end of the simplex communication system.

[0031] The above technical solution of the present invention forms a more advanced hardware communication confidentiality method through a distributed second-order communication network of simplex communication transceivers, solving the various shortcomings of the prior art mentioned above. It can effectively prevent unauthorized illegal nodes from attacking and destroying the protected communication content, and can effectively ensure that the communication content cannot be obtained.

[0032] In the above method, if Figure 1 As shown, the first-order circuit and the second-order circuit are connected via a communication bus of a simplex communication system.

[0033] In the above method, the amplification factor calculation formula of the second-order bandpass hardware filter network is as follows:

[0034] Where: A is the amplification factor, R1 and R3 are the gain compensation resistor value and low-frequency blocking control resistor value of the first-order circuit respectively, R4, R5, and R6 are the passband compensation resistor value, gain control resistor value and output gain compensation control resistor value to ground of the second-order circuit respectively.

[0035] In the above method, the center frequency calculation formula of the second-order bandpass hardware filter network is formula 2:

[0036] Where: ω0 is the center frequency, C is the capacitance of the passband frequency control capacitor of the first-order circuit, R1, R2 and R3 are the gain compensation resistor value, high-frequency block control resistor value and low-frequency block control resistor value of the first-order circuit respectively, and R6 is the output gain compensation control resistor value to ground of the second-order circuit.

[0037] In the above method, the quality factor calculation formula of the second-order bandpass hardware filter network is formula 3:

[0038] Wherein: Q is the quality factor, R1, R2 and R3 are the gain compensation resistor value, high frequency block control resistor value and low frequency block control resistor value of the first order circuit respectively, R4, R5 and R6 are the passband compensation resistor value, gain control resistor value and output gain compensation control resistor value to ground of the second order circuit respectively.

[0039] In the above method, under normal working conditions, the magnification is equal to 1.

[0040] In the above method, the center frequency is equal to the baud rate of the simplex communication system.

[0041] In the above method, the quality factor is greater than or equal to 200.

[0042] In the above method, the signals of the communication bus are negative feedback signals and analog deformation signals.

[0043] On the other hand, the present invention also provides a hardware simplex communication encryption device, including a first-order bandpass filter formed by a first-order circuit and a second-order bandpass filter formed by a second-order circuit, the first-order bandpass filter is located at the transmitting end of the communication system, and the second-order bandpass filter is located at the receiving end of the communication system.

[0044] The technical solution is a second-order bandpass network composed of a sending node and a receiving node, wherein the first-order circuit part is located at the sending node, the second-order circuit part is located at the receiving node, and the connection between the first-order circuit and the second-order circuit is used as a communication bus. Formulas 1, 2, and 3 can be obtained by calculating the transfer function of the second-order bandpass network and the corresponding transformation. Under normal working conditions, the passband gain A=1, the baud rate of the communication is set to the center frequency ω0, and the quality factor Q controls the noise suppression capability of the communication network.

[0045] Based on the principle of the above method, the following describes in detail how this solution implements the communication encryption function: like Figure 1 As shown in the figure, this scheme adopts the design that the first-order circuit and the second-order circuit are distributed at both ends of the simplex communication. Only when the design matches the appropriate transceiver nodes to be connected to each other can a complete second-order communication network that meets the design be formed, and can the compliance with the following be achieved. Figure 2 Normal communication and signal-to-noise separation functions are shown. For illegal nodes that intend to access the communication bus, since they cannot correctly match the transceiver nodes on the communication bus to form a designed second-order communication network, effective communication cannot be established on the physical layer.

[0046] Correctly match the transceiver nodes on the communication bus to form a second-order communication network that meets the design, that is, Figure 2 The correct passband waveform shown needs to satisfy the above formulas 1, 2, and 3 at the same time. Regardless of the specific communication protocol used by the nodes of the simplex communication transmitter and receiver, the physical signal level quality is uniformly required. Therefore, the passband gain A of the second-order communication network should be strictly equal to 1, otherwise it will cause abnormalities or damage to the receiving unit, resulting in abnormalities in the communication transmission and reception, and communication errors and failures. The passband gain A is determined by formula 1, which is a five-dimensional algebraic equation, which is solved by a five-dimensional array consisting of five parameters R1, R3, R4, R5, and R6.

[0047] All types of communications, including simplex communication, need to specify and unify the communication baud rate to ensure that the sending and receiving nodes of the communication can accurately communicate and analyze the communication content. In this scheme, the center frequency of the second-order communication network is strictly equal to the communication baud rate specified by the simplex communication, such as Figure 2 As shown, any signal outside the bandwidth (B=ω0 / Q) around the center frequency of the second-order network will be rapidly weakened and unable to pass through the network. In practical applications, for any simplex communication with a determined baud rate, only a second-order communication network with a strictly adapted center frequency can be established and passed normally, otherwise the communication will not be established due to the signal falling in the attenuation interval. The center frequency ω0 is determined by Formula 2, which is also a five-dimensional algebraic equation, with five parameters C, R1, R2, R3, and R6 forming a five-dimensional array solution.

[0048] The quality factor of the second-order communication network determines the signal-to-noise separation capability and communication reliability capability of the communication bandpass network. In this solution, the quality factor Q of the second-order communication network is not less than 200, thereby ensuring that the signal frequency tolerance bandwidth that can pass through the network normally meets the communication requirements. If the quality factor Q does not meet the requirements, it will cause difficulties in signal-to-noise separation in the second-order communication network, affect communication information recognition and ultimately lead to communication failure. The quality factor Q is determined by formula three, which is a six-dimensional algebraic equation composed of six parameters R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, and R6 to form a six-dimensional array solution.

[0049] In actual applications, the simplex communication second-order network designed in this scheme is composed of distributed sending and receiving nodes. Only when the sending and receiving nodes of the original design are connected to each other can a complete second-order communication network be established, and normal simplex communication can be achieved; the simplex communication bus is located between the first and second order circuits in the middle of the second-order network, and the signal on the bus is in the stage of negative feedback and analog deformation, so it is impossible to directly obtain communication information and content from the bus. This is the first layer of protection for the simplex communication encryption implemented in this scheme.

[0050] If the communication content and information are to be obtained normally from the communication bus of this solution, it can only be restored to the complete second-order communication network of the original design, and the communication information can be separated from the signal and noise and the strength is qualified and can be analyzed. Similarly, since the simplex communication second-order network designed in this solution is composed of distributed sending and receiving nodes, it is not a complete second-order communication network from any point on the bus to the sending node and the receiving node. Any node that needs to establish communication must be supplemented with the sending node or the receiving node separately to form the original design complete second-order network with the original node parameters adapted. As mentioned above, the second-order communication network in this solution requires the above formulas 1, 2 and 3 to be established at the same time to communicate normally, so from a mathematical point of view, it is necessary to solve a set of equations with a total of 7 unknowns including three equations. In theory, there will be no valid solutions to the set of equations. In the normal design stage, a unique 7-dimensional array solution can be determined by the local fixed value method plus the make-up method to ensure the establishment of the second-order communication network. However, for any illegal node trying to access the network, it is mathematically very unlikely to match the sending node or receiving node individually from the signal physical level, complete the original unique 7-dimensional array solution, and restore the original second-order communication network to establish the original effective communication. This is the second layer of protection for this solution to achieve simplex communication encryption.

[0051] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the scope of implementation of the present invention. If the present invention is modified or replaced by equivalents without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention, it should be included in the protection scope of the claims of the present invention.

Claims

1. A hardware simplex communication encryption method, characterized in that: include: The simplex communication system is encrypted through a second-order bandpass hardware filtering network, wherein the second-order bandpass hardware filtering network includes a first-order circuit and a second-order circuit, wherein the first-order circuit is located at the transmitting end of the simplex communication system, and the second-order circuit is located at the receiving end of the simplex communication system.

2. The hardware simplex communication encryption method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The first-order circuit and the second-order circuit are connected via a communication bus of the simplex communication system.

3. The hardware simplex communication encryption method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The amplification calculation formula of the second-order bandpass hardware filter network is: Wherein: A is the amplification factor, R1 and R3 are the gain compensation resistor value and the low-frequency blocking control resistor value of the first-order circuit respectively, and R4, R5, and R6 are the passband compensation resistor value, the gain control resistor value and the output gain compensation control resistor value to ground of the second-order circuit respectively.

4. The hardware simplex communication encryption method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The center frequency calculation formula of the second-order bandpass hardware filter network is: Wherein: ω0 is the center frequency, C is the capacitance of the passband frequency control capacitor of the first-order circuit, R1, R2 and R3 are the gain compensation resistor value, high-frequency blocking resistor value and low-frequency blocking resistor value of the first-order circuit respectively, and R6 is the output gain compensation control resistor value to ground of the second-order circuit.

5. The hardware simplex communication encryption method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The quality factor calculation formula of the second-order bandpass hardware filter network is: Wherein: Q is the quality factor, R1, R2 and R3 are the gain compensation resistor value, high-frequency blocking control resistor value and low-frequency blocking control resistor value of the first-order circuit respectively, and R4, R5 and R6 are the passband compensation resistor value, gain control resistor value and output gain compensation control resistor value to ground of the second-order circuit respectively.

6. The hardware simplex communication encryption method according to claim 3, characterized in that: Under normal working conditions, the magnification factor is equal to 1.

7. The hardware simplex communication encryption method according to claim 4, characterized in that: The center frequency is equal to the baud rate of the simplex communication system.

8. The hardware simplex communication encryption method according to claim 5, characterized in that: The quality factor is greater than or equal to 200.

9. The hardware simplex communication encryption method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The signals of the communication bus are negative feedback signals and analog deformation signals.

10. A hardware simplex communication encryption device, characterized in that: It comprises a first-order bandpass filter formed by a first-order circuit and a second-order bandpass filter formed by a second-order circuit. The first-order bandpass filter is located at the transmitting end of the communication system, and the second-order bandpass filter is located at the receiving end of the communication system.

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