Medical service management system based on national secret key segmentation algorithm

By adopting the private key segmentation and combination technology based on the national secret key segmentation algorithm in the medical service management system, the problem of being easily attacked during the key transmission process, and the efficient protection of the private key and the efficient protection of medical information.

CN119363343APending Publication Date: 2025-01-24HENAN INFORMATIZATION GRP CO LTD

Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411631733.5
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-11-15
Publication Date
2025-01-24

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The prior art is prone to illegal attacks when the key is divided and transmitted to different key management devices, resulting in the leakage of key information, which in turn causes problems such as forgery, tampering, impersonation and denial of medical information.

Method used

A medical service management system based on the national secret key segmentation algorithm is adopted. The private key calculation amount is divided into several parts through a special private key segmentation algorithm and saved to the mobile terminal and collaboration server respectively. When performing digital signature and certificate authentication, each operation component is operated separately, and the operation results are combined through a unique decryption algorithm to construct the signature operation result of the private key.

Benefits of technology

It ensures that the private key cannot be illegally stolen, improves the security and accuracy of medical information, and prevents forgery, tampering, impersonation and denial of medical information.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The invention discloses a medical service management system based on a national secret key segmentation algorithm, relates to the technical field of information management, and solves the problems of counterfeiting, tampering, pretending and denying of medical information caused by the fact that secret key components are easily attacked illegally in the transmission process of transmitting the secret key components to different secret key management devices, so that secret key information is leaked. The medical service management system comprises a cooperation server and a mobile terminal. The cooperation server comprises a management module, a transmission module and a cooperation module; the mobile terminal comprises a login module, an acquisition module and an authorization module; a private key operand is segmented into a plurality of parts through a special private key segmentation algorithm, the parts are respectively stored in a mobile terminal and a cooperative server, each operation component is respectively operated when digital signature and certificate authentication are carried out by using a private key, and then operation results are combined through a special decryption algorithm to obtain a digital signature result. And meanwhile, the private key cannot be illegally stolen, so that the safety and the accuracy of the medical information are improved.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of information management, and in particular to a medical service management system based on a national secret key splitting algorithm. Background Art

[0002] In recent years, with the development of information technology, medical informatization has gradually become the development direction of the medical industry. More and more medical institutions have begun to digitize patients' medical records, diagnostic reports, drug prescriptions, physicians' signatures and other information to facilitate recording, sharing, query and management. However, the leakage of these sensitive medical information will have a great impact on the privacy protection of patients and the reputation of medical institutions, and may also cause security and legal problems to society.

[0003] In order to ensure the security of medical information, the construction of medical informatization needs to adopt advanced encryption technology and security management strategies. The most critical part is to encrypt and decrypt medical data. The national secret key splitting algorithm is a public key cryptographic system with multiple properties. Its basic idea is to divide the key into multiple parts and distribute them to multiple servers for storage. When data needs to be decrypted, the system will obtain key fragments from multiple servers, and then reconstruct them to obtain the complete key and decrypt the data.

[0004] Patent No. CN2018110123275 discloses a decryption key splitting and decryption method, device, and medium based on the SM9 algorithm, which relates to the field of information processing technology and is used to solve the problem of how to ensure the security of private keys and ciphertext data. In the above application, the private key is equivalent to the decryption key. In the above method, the SM9 private key is divided into n private key components in the group G2; the n private key components are sent to different key management devices for storage. During decryption, the key management device only needs to provide the bilinear pairing calculation value of the private key component held, and the decryption device calculates the bilinear pairing value of the private key based on the bilinear pairing value of the private key component, and then decrypts the plaintext according to the national secret standard SM9 decryption algorithm. In this way, the key management device can only obtain the private key component but not the complete key, and the decryption device cannot obtain the complete private key and all private key components, thereby ensuring the security of the private key, and also protecting the security of the data that the user needs to encrypt.

[0005] Patent No. CN2023110650429 discloses a method and system for threshold key negotiation based on a national secret algorithm. The above method includes: communication party A selects a random number rA and calculates the elliptic curve point RA to convert it into an integer, and sends it to communication party B; communication party B selects a random number rB to calculate the elliptic curve point RB to convert it into an integer, sends it to communication party A, and executes a threshold algorithm to divide rB into several data items rBi, packages the data item rBi, adds authentication information and other operations, and then passes the data item rBi to communication party B; communication party B receives the cloud data packet dBi; communication party B selects a suitable Vi, performs Lagrange interpolation to restore point V, and verifies whether point V is on the elliptic curve. If not, reselect rBi for calculation and send it to communication party A. If data needs to be transmitted again, KB is restored through the KBi item to verify its security and confidentiality.

[0006] Although the above patents all utilize a key splitting algorithm to split the key so as to store it in different key management devices, thereby ensuring the security of the key; however, the transmission process of the split key to different key management devices is vulnerable to illegal attacks, resulting in the leakage of key information, thereby causing the forgery, tampering, impersonation and denial of medical information. Summary of the invention

[0007] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a medical service management system based on the national secret key splitting algorithm, which can split the private key operation amount into several parts through a special private key splitting algorithm, and save them to the mobile terminal and the collaborative server respectively. At the same time, when using the private key for digital signature and certificate authentication, each operation component is calculated separately, and then the operation results are combined through a unique decryption algorithm to construct the signature operation result of the private key, while ensuring that the private key cannot be illegally stolen, thereby ensuring the security and accuracy of medical information.

[0008] The present invention utilizes the following technical solutions:

[0009] A medical service management system based on a national secret key splitting algorithm includes a collaborative server and several mobile terminals, wherein:

[0010] The mobile terminal includes a login module, a collection module and an authorization module;

[0011] The mobile terminal completes user identification and login verification through the login module, obtains terminal device information through the acquisition module to build a unique identifier; the authorization module combines the terminal device information and the unique identifier to authorize the key operation, and cooperates with the collaborative server to perform key segmentation operations;

[0012] The collaboration server includes a management module, a transmission module and a collaboration module;

[0013] The collaboration server manages the business data of the mobile terminal through the management module, and performs key pair generation, collaborative signing, collaborative decryption and key splitting in cooperation with the user's mobile terminal through the collaboration module;

[0014] The collaboration server generates and obtains the first sub-private key and the first public key through the key pair, and the mobile terminal generates the second sub-private key and obtains the third public key according to the first public key;

[0015] A management module, used to manage the service data of the mobile terminal;

[0016] A transmission module, used for transmitting business data and key information;

[0017] Collaboration module, used to cooperate with the mobile terminal to complete key pair generation, collaborative signing, collaborative decryption and key splitting operations;

[0018] Login module, used to identify and verify the user's identity;

[0019] A collection module is used to collect terminal device information to construct a unique identification of the terminal device;

[0020] The authorization module is used to authorize key operations in combination with a PIN password and biometrics.

[0021] Preferably, the business data includes digital certificates, key pairs, user units, user permissions, system configurations, logs and mobile terminal operation data; the key information includes the first sub-private key, the second sub-private key, the third public key, the digital signature and the electronic seal; the terminal device information includes the device serial number, the device type, the International Mobile Subscriber Identity Code, the International Identity Code for Mobile Equipment, the MAC address and the mobile phone number; the authorization module includes the public key management center, the private key management center and the certificate registration center.

[0022] Preferably, the process of generating a key pair is as follows:

[0023] S11: The mobile terminal sends a unique identifier constructed by the terminal device information to the collaboration server through the transmission module as a terminal binding request;

[0024] S12: The collaboration server receives the terminal binding request, generates a first sub-private key D1∈[1,n-1] and a first public key P1 using a random number generator, and transmits the first public key P1 to the mobile terminal;

[0025] S13: The mobile terminal generates a second sub-private key D2∈[1,n-1] based on the first public key P1 using a random number generator, and then calculates the third public key P.

[0026] Preferably, the collaborative signature process is:

[0027] S21: The mobile terminal initiates a signature request for the message to be signed, and the collaboration server receives and responds through the transmission module;

[0028] S22: The mobile terminal uses a hash function to sign the message M to be signed, and extracts the message digest e of the signed message M′;

[0029] S23: The mobile terminal generates a first random number k1∈[1,n-1] using a random number generator, and obtains a first partial signature value Q1 through the first random number k1 and the elliptic curve base point G;

[0030] S24: The collaboration server receives the first partial signature value Q1, and generates a second random number k2∈[1,n-1] using a random number generator, and obtains the second partial signature value Q2 through the second random number k2 and the elliptic curve base point G;

[0031] S25: The collaboration server generates a third random number k3∈[1,n-1] using a random number generator, and operates the third random number k3 with the first partial signature value Q1 and the second partial signature value Q2 to obtain the first digital signature coordinates (x1, y1);

[0032] S26: After operating x1 in the first digital signature (x1, y1) and the message digest e, a third signature value r is obtained, and the third signature value r is judged;

[0033] S27: If the third partial signature value r≠0, the fourth partial signature value s2 and the fifth partial signature value s3 are calculated respectively using the sub-private key D1, the third random number k3, the second random number k2 and the third partial signature value r, and r, s2 and s3 are transmitted to the mobile terminal; if the third partial signature value r=0, return to step S26;

[0034] S28: The mobile terminal calculates the sixth signature value s by using the second sub-private key D2, the first random number k1, r, s2 and s3, and judges the sixth signature value s;

[0035] S29: If the sixth partial signature value s≠0 and s≠nr, output the complete signature value (r, s) and obtain the ciphertext C; if the sixth partial signature value s=0 or s=nr, return to step S23.

[0036] Preferably, the process of collaborative decryption is:

[0037] S31: The mobile terminal extracts the first bit string C1 from the ciphertext C and performs type conversion using an automatic type conversion algorithm;

[0038] S32: verifying the first bit string C1 that has completed the type conversion: if C1 is a non-infinity point of the elliptic curve E, the mobile terminal generates a fourth random number K using a random number generator, calculates a first temporary public key T1, and transmits it to the collaboration server at the same time; if C1 is not a non-infinity point of the elliptic curve E, an error is reported and the system exits;

[0039] S33: The collaboration server receives the first temporary public key T1 and the first bit string C1, calculates the second temporary public key T2 using the first sub-private key D1, and transmits it to the mobile terminal;

[0040] S34: The mobile terminal calculates a second digital signature (x2, y2) according to the second sub-private key D2, the fourth random number K, the second temporary public key T2 and the first bit string C1;

[0041] S35: The mobile terminal obtains the initial key t according to the second digital signature (x2, y2), and makes a judgment on the initial key t;

[0042] S36: If the initial key t≠0, extract the second bit string C2 from the ciphertext C, and calculate the initial plaintext M″; if the initial key t=0, report an error and exit;

[0043] 37: The mobile terminal uses the second digital signature (x2, y2) and the initial plaintext M″ to calculate the plaintext hash value u, and judges the plaintext hash value u, and extracts the third bit string C3 from the ciphertext C;

[0044] S38: If the plaintext hash value u=C3, the initial plaintext M″ is output as the complete plaintext; if the plaintext hash value u≠C3, an error is reported and the process is exited.

[0045] Preferably, the key splitting process is:

[0046] S41: The mobile terminal transmits the third public key P to the public key management center CA;

[0047] S42: The public key management center CA generates a digital certificate based on the third public key P and the terminal device information obtained by the acquisition module; the public key management center CA generates an encryption and decryption certificate using the encryption and decryption key pair (D′, P′) generated by the private key management center KM according to the improved SM2;

[0048] S43: The private key management center encrypts the private key D′ using the third public key P and transmits it to the mobile terminal;

[0049] S44: After the mobile terminal and the collaboration server complete collaborative decryption of the private key D′, the mobile terminal generates and stores a third sub-private key D11 using a random number generator;

[0050] S45: The mobile terminal calculates the fourth sub-private key D22 according to the third sub-private key D11 and the private key D′;

[0051] S46: The mobile terminal encrypts the fourth sub-private key D22 using the third public key P, and transmits it to the collaboration server for storage.

[0052] The present invention divides the private key calculation amount into several parts through a special private key splitting algorithm, and saves them to the mobile terminal and the collaborative server respectively. At the same time, when using the private key for digital signature and certificate authentication, each calculation component is calculated separately, and then the calculation results are combined through a unique decryption algorithm to construct the signature calculation result of the private key, while ensuring that the private key cannot be illegally stolen, thereby improving the security and accuracy of medical information. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0053] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention or related technologies, the drawings required for use in the embodiments or related technical descriptions are briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on the provided drawings without paying creative work.

[0054] Figure 1 This is the principle block diagram of the medical service management system;

[0055] Figure 2 Generate a workflow diagram for key pairs;

[0056] Figure 3 Signing workflow diagram for collaboration;

[0057] Figure 4 Decrypting workflow diagrams for collaboration;

[0058] Figure 5 Diagram of the key splitting workflow. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0059] The present invention is described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments:

[0060] like Figure 1 As shown, the medical service management system based on the national secret key splitting algorithm described in the present invention includes a collaborative server and several mobile terminals, wherein:

[0061] The mobile terminal includes a login module, a collection module and an authorization module;

[0062] The mobile terminal completes user identification and login verification through the login module, obtains terminal device information through the acquisition module to build a unique identifier; the authorization module combines the terminal device information and the unique identifier to authorize the key operation, and cooperates with the collaborative server to perform key segmentation operations;

[0063] The collaboration server includes a management module, a transmission module and a collaboration module;

[0064] The collaboration server manages the business data of the mobile terminal through the management module, and performs key pair generation, collaborative signing, collaborative decryption and key splitting in cooperation with the user's mobile terminal through the collaboration module;

[0065] The collaboration server generates and obtains the first sub-private key and the first public key through the key pair, and the mobile terminal generates the second sub-private key and obtains the third public key according to the first public key;

[0066] In the present invention, the management module is used to manage the service data of the mobile terminal;

[0067] A transmission module, used for transmitting business data and key information;

[0068] Collaboration module, used to cooperate with the mobile terminal to complete key pair generation, collaborative signing, collaborative decryption and key splitting operations;

[0069] Login module, used to identify and verify the user's identity;

[0070] A collection module is used to collect terminal device information to construct a unique identification of the terminal device;

[0071] An authorization module, used to authorize key operations in combination with a PIN password and biometrics;

[0072] In the present invention, the authorization module includes a public key management center, a private key management center and a certificate registration center;

[0073] In this embodiment, the business data includes digital certificates, key pairs, user units, user permissions, system configurations, logs, and mobile terminal operation data; key information includes the first sub-private key, the second sub-private key, the third public key, digital signatures, and electronic signatures; terminal device information includes device serial number, device type, international mobile subscriber identity code, mobile device international identity code, MAC address, and mobile phone number;

[0074] like Figure 2 As shown, in the present invention, the process of generating a key pair is as follows:

[0075] S11: The mobile terminal sends a unique identifier constructed by the terminal device information to the collaboration server through the transmission module as a terminal binding request;

[0076] S12: The collaboration server receives the terminal binding request, generates a first sub-private key D1∈[1,n-1] and a first public key P1 using a random number generator, and transmits the first public key P1 to the mobile terminal;

[0077] P1=D1-1 *G (1)

[0078] Among them, -1 represents the inverse operation, G represents the base point of the elliptic curve, and the order is n;

[0079] S13: The mobile terminal generates a second sub-private key D2∈[1,n-1] using a random number generator according to the first public key P1, and then calculates a third public key P;

[0080] P=D2 -1 *P1-G (2)

[0081] like Figure 3 As shown, in the present invention, the process of collaborative signing is:

[0082] S21: The mobile terminal initiates a signature request for the message to be signed, and the collaboration server receives and responds through the transmission module;

[0083] S22: The mobile terminal uses a hash function to sign the message M to be signed, and extracts the message digest e of the signed message M′;

[0084] Z=Hv(ENTLA||IDA||a||b||Gx||Gy||Px||Py) (3)

[0085] M′=Z||M (4)

[0086] e=Hash(M′) (5)

[0087] Wherein, Z represents a hash function, Hv() represents a hash operation, ENTLA represents a bit length, IDA represents a unique identifier of a user, a represents a first encryption parameter of an elliptic curve, b represents a second encryption parameter of an elliptic curve, (Gx, Gy) represents the coordinates of the base point G of the elliptic curve, (Px, Py) represents the coordinates of the third public key P of the elliptic curve, M′ represents a signed message, M represents a message to be signed, and Hash() represents a hash operation;

[0088] S23: The mobile terminal generates a first random number k1∈[1,n-1] using a random number generator, and obtains a first partial signature value Q1 through the first random number k1 and the elliptic curve base point G: Q1=k1*G;

[0089] S24: The collaboration server receives the first partial signature value Q1, and generates a second random number k2∈[1,n-1] using a random number generator, and obtains the second partial signature value Q2 through the second random number k2 and the elliptic curve base point G: Q2=k2*G;

[0090] S25: The collaboration server generates a third random number k3∈[1,n-1] using a random number generator, and operates the third random number k3 with the first partial signature value Q1 and the second partial signature value Q2 to obtain the first digital signature coordinate (x1, y1): (x1, y1)=k3*Q1+Q2;

[0091] S26: After calculating x1 in the first digital signature (x1, y1) and the message digest e, a third signature value r is obtained: r = (x1 + e) ​​mod n, where mod represents remainder, and the third signature value r is judged;

[0092] S27: If the third partial signature value r≠0, the fourth partial signature value s2 and the fifth partial signature value s3 are calculated respectively using the sub-private key D1, the third random number k3, the second random number k2 and the third partial signature value r, and r, s2 and s3 are transmitted to the mobile terminal;

[0093] s2=(D1*k3)mod n; s3=(D1*(r+k2))mod n;

[0094] If the third part signature value r=0, return to step S26;

[0095] S28: The mobile terminal calculates the sixth signature value s by using the second sub-private key D2, the first random number k1, r, s2 and s3, and judges the sixth signature value s;

[0096] s=((D2*k1)*s2+(D2*s3-r))mod n;

[0097] S29: If the sixth partial signature value s≠0 and s≠nr, output the complete signature value (r, s) and obtain the ciphertext C; if the sixth partial signature value s=0 or s=nr, return to step S23;

[0098] like Figure 4 As shown, in the present invention, the process of collaborative decryption is:

[0099] S31: The mobile terminal extracts the first bit string C1 from the ciphertext C, and performs type conversion using an automatic type conversion algorithm; C=C1||C2||C3;

[0100] S32: Verify the first bit string C1 that has completed the type conversion: if C1 is a non-infinity point of the elliptic curve E, the mobile terminal generates a fourth random number K using a random number generator, and calculates a first temporary public key T1: T1=K*C1, and transmits it to the collaboration server at the same time; if C1 is not a non-infinity point of the elliptic curve E, an error is reported and the system exits;

[0101] S33: The collaboration server receives the first temporary public key T1 and the first bit string C1, and calculates the second temporary public key T2 using the first sub-private key D1: T2 = D1 -1 *T1, and transmit to the mobile terminal;

[0102] S34: The mobile terminal calculates the second digital signature (x2, y2) according to the second sub-private key D2, the fourth random number K, the second temporary public key T2 and the first bit string C1:

[0103] (x2,y2)=K -1 *D2 -1 *T2-C1;

[0104] S35: The mobile terminal obtains the initial key t according to the second digital signature (x2, y2), and makes a judgment on the initial key t;

[0105] t=KDF(x2||y2,len), KDF() represents the key derivation function, and len represents the key length;

[0106] S36: If the initial key t≠0, extract the second bit string C2 from the ciphertext C and calculate the initial plaintext M″: Indicates the XOR symbol; if the initial key t=0, an error is reported and the program exits;

[0107] 37: The mobile terminal uses the second digital signature (x2, y2) and the initial plaintext M″ to calculate the plaintext hash value u, and judges the plaintext hash value u, and extracts the third bit string C3 from the ciphertext C;

[0108] u = Hash(x2||M″||y2);

[0109] S38: If the plaintext hash value u=C3, the initial plaintext M″ is output as the complete plaintext; if the plaintext hash value u≠C3, an error is reported and the process is exited;

[0110] like Figure 5 As shown, in the present invention, the process of key splitting is:

[0111] S41: The mobile terminal transmits the third public key P to the public key management center CA;

[0112] S42: The public key management center CA generates a digital certificate based on the third public key P and the terminal device information obtained by the acquisition module; the public key management center CA generates an encryption and decryption certificate using the encryption and decryption key pair (D′, P′) generated by the private key management center KM according to the improved SM2;

[0113] S43: The private key management center encrypts the private key D′ using the third public key P and transmits it to the mobile terminal;

[0114] S44: After the mobile terminal and the collaboration server complete collaborative decryption of the private key D′, the mobile terminal generates and stores a third sub-private key D11 using a random number generator;

[0115] S45: The mobile terminal calculates the fourth sub-private key D22 according to the third sub-private key D11 and the private key D′: D22=((D ′ +1) -1 *D1 -1 )mod n;

[0116] S46: The mobile terminal encrypts the fourth sub-private key D22 using the third public key P, and transmits it to the collaboration server for storage.

[0117] Example:

[0118] The user registers an account and logs in through the login module of the mobile terminal. The collection module of the mobile terminal collects the terminal device information (such as device serial number, device type, international mobile subscriber identity code, mobile device international identity code, MAC address and mobile phone number, etc.) to construct a unique identification of the terminal device;

[0119] The authorization module of the mobile terminal authorizes the key operation of the collaboration module in combination with the PIN password and biometrics, and then completes the key pair generation, collaborative signature, collaborative decryption and key splitting operations: the authorization module initiates a key pair generation request, and the mobile terminal sends a unique identifier constructed by the terminal device information to the collaboration server through the transmission module as a terminal binding request; the collaboration server receives the terminal binding request, and uses a random number generator to generate a first sub-private key and a first public key, and transmits the first public key P1 to the mobile terminal; the mobile terminal uses a random number generator to generate a second sub-private key based on the first public key to calculate the third public key;

[0120] The authorization module initiates a signature request to the message to be signed, and the collaborative server receives and responds through the transmission module; the mobile terminal uses a hash function to sign the message to be signed and extracts the message digest of the signed message; the mobile terminal uses a random number generator to generate a first random number, and obtains the first part of the signature value through the random number and the elliptic curve base point; the collaborative server receives the first part of the signature value, and uses the random number generator to generate a second random number and the elliptic curve base point to obtain the second part of the signature value; the collaborative server uses the random number generator to generate a third random number, and calculates it with the first part of the signature value and the second part of the signature value to obtain the first digital signature coordinates; after calculating the first digital signature and the message digest, The third part of the signature value is obtained and judged: if the third part of the signature value r≠0, the fourth part of the signature value s2 and the fifth part of the signature value s3 are calculated respectively by using the sub-private key D1, the third random number k3, the second random number k2 and the third part of the signature value r, and r, s2 and s3 are transmitted to the mobile terminal; if the third part of the signature value r=0, the third part of the signature value is calculated and judged again; the mobile terminal calculates and judges the sixth part of the signature value by using the second sub-private key, the first random number, r, s2 and s3: if the sixth part of the signature value s≠0 and s≠nr, the complete signature value (r, s) is output, and the ciphertext C is obtained; if the sixth part of the signature value s=0 or s=nr, the first part of the signature value is obtained again;

[0121] The authorization module initiates a request for collaborative decryption. The mobile terminal extracts the first bit string C1 from the ciphertext C and performs type conversion using an automatic type conversion algorithm. The first bit string C1 that has completed type conversion is verified: if C1 is a non-infinity point of the elliptic curve E, the mobile terminal generates a fourth random number K using a random number generator, calculates the first temporary public key T1, and transmits it to the collaborative server at the same time. If C1 is not a non-infinity point of the elliptic curve E, an error is reported and the collaborative server exits. The collaborative server receives the first temporary public key T1 and the first bit string C1, calculates the second temporary public key T2 using the first sub-private key D1, and transmits it to the mobile terminal. The mobile terminal calculates the second temporary public key T2 based on the second sub-private key D2, the fourth random number K, the second temporary public key T2 and the first bit string C1 calculate the second digital signature; the mobile terminal obtains the initial key according to the second digital signature, and judges the initial key: if the initial key t≠0, the second bit string C2 is extracted from the ciphertext C, and the initial plaintext M″ is calculated; if the initial key t=0, an error is reported and the program is exited; the mobile terminal uses the second digital signature and the initial plaintext M″ to calculate the plaintext hash value u, and judges the plaintext hash value u, and at the same time extracts the third bit string C3 from the ciphertext C; if the plaintext hash value u=C3, the initial plaintext M″ is output as the complete plaintext; if the plaintext hash value u≠C3, an error is reported and the program is exited;

[0122] The authorization module initiates a request for key splitting, and the mobile terminal transmits the third public key P to the public key management center CA; the public key management center CA produces a digital certificate based on the third public key P and the terminal device information obtained by the acquisition module; the public key management center CA uses the private key management center KM to generate an encryption and decryption certificate based on the encryption and decryption key pair (D′, P′) generated by the improved SM2; the private key management center encrypts the private key D′ using the third public key P, and transmits it to the mobile terminal; after the mobile terminal and the collaborative server complete the collaborative decryption of the private key D′, the mobile terminal uses a random number generator to generate and store the third sub-private key D11; the mobile terminal calculates the fourth sub-private key D22 based on the third sub-private key D11 and the private key D′: the mobile terminal encrypts the fourth sub-private key D22 using the third public key P, and transmits it to the collaborative server for storage; the management module of the collaborative server manages the business data of the mobile terminal (digital certificates, key pairs, user units, user permissions, system configurations, logs, and mobile terminal operation data).

Claims

1. A medical service management system based on a national secret key splitting algorithm, characterized in that: It includes a collaborative server and several mobile terminals, including: The mobile terminal includes a login module, a collection module and an authorization module; The mobile terminal completes user identification and login verification through the login module, obtains terminal device information through the acquisition module to build a unique identifier; the authorization module combines the terminal device information and the unique identifier to authorize the key operation, and cooperates with the collaborative server to perform key segmentation operations; The collaboration server includes a management module, a transmission module and a collaboration module; The collaboration server manages the business data of the mobile terminal through the management module, and performs key pair generation, collaborative signing, collaborative decryption and key splitting in cooperation with the user's mobile terminal through the collaboration module; The collaboration server generates and obtains the first sub-private key and the first public key through a key pair, and the mobile terminal generates the second sub-private key and obtains the third public key according to the first public key.

2. The medical service management system based on the national secret key splitting algorithm according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The management module is used to manage the service data of the mobile terminal; A transmission module, used for transmitting business data and key information; Collaboration module, used to cooperate with the mobile terminal to complete key pair generation, collaborative signing, collaborative decryption and key splitting operations; Login module, used to identify and verify the user's identity; A collection module is used to collect terminal device information to construct a unique identification of the terminal device; The authorization module is used to authorize key operations in combination with a PIN password and biometrics.

3. The medical service management system based on the national secret key splitting algorithm according to claim 2 is characterized in that: Business data includes digital certificates, key pairs, user units, user permissions, system configurations, logs and mobile terminal operation data; key information includes the first sub-private key, the second sub-private key, the third public key, digital signatures and electronic seals; terminal device information includes device serial number, device type, International Mobile Subscriber Identity Code, International Mobile Equipment Identity Code, MAC address and mobile phone number; authorization modules include public key management center, private key management center and certificate registration center.

4. The medical service management system based on the national secret key splitting algorithm according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The process of generating the key pair is as follows: S11: The mobile terminal sends a unique identifier constructed by the terminal device information to the collaboration server through the transmission module as a terminal binding request; S12: The collaboration server receives the terminal binding request, generates a first sub-private key D1∈[1,n-1] and a first public key P1 using a random number generator, and transmits the first public key P1 to the mobile terminal; S13: The mobile terminal generates a second sub-private key D2∈[1,n-1] based on the first public key P1 using a random number generator, and then calculates the third public key P.

5. The medical service management system based on the national secret key splitting algorithm according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The process of collaborative signing is as follows: S21: The mobile terminal initiates a signature request for the message M to be signed, and the collaboration server receives and responds through the transmission module; S22: The mobile terminal uses a hash function to sign the message M to be signed, and extracts the message digest e of the signed message M′; S23: The mobile terminal generates a first random number k1∈[1,n-1] using a random number generator, and obtains a first partial signature value Q1 through the first random number k1 and the elliptic curve base point G; S24: The collaboration server receives the first partial signature value Q1, and generates a second random number k2∈[1,n-1] using a random number generator, and obtains the second partial signature value Q2 through the second random number k2 and the elliptic curve base point G; S25: The collaboration server generates a third random number k3∈[1,n-1] using a random number generator, and operates the third random number k3 with the first partial signature value Q1 and the second partial signature value Q2 to obtain the first digital signature coordinates (x1, y1); S26: After operating x1 in the first digital signature (x1, y1) and the message digest e, a third signature value r is obtained, and the third signature value r is judged; S27: If the third partial signature value r≠0, the fourth partial signature value s2 and the fifth partial signature value s3 are calculated respectively using the sub-private key D1, the third random number k3, the second random number k2 and the third partial signature value r, and r, s2 and s3 are transmitted to the mobile terminal; if the third partial signature value r=0, return to step S26; S28: The mobile terminal calculates the sixth signature value s by using the second sub-private key D2, the first random number k1, r, s2 and s3, and judges the sixth signature value s; S29: If the sixth partial signature value s≠0 and s≠nr, output the complete signature value (r, s) and obtain the ciphertext C; if the sixth partial signature value s=0 or s=nr, return to step S23.

6. The medical service management system based on the national secret key splitting algorithm according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The process of collaborative decryption is as follows: S31: The mobile terminal extracts the first bit string C1 from the ciphertext C and performs type conversion using an automatic type conversion algorithm; S32: verifying the first bit string C1 that has completed the type conversion: if C1 is a non-infinity point of the elliptic curve E, the mobile terminal generates a fourth random number K using a random number generator, calculates a first temporary public key T1, and transmits it to the collaboration server at the same time; if C1 is not a non-infinity point of the elliptic curve E, an error is reported and the system exits; S33: The collaboration server receives the first temporary public key T1 and the first bit string C1, calculates the second temporary public key T2 using the first sub-private key D1, and transmits it to the mobile terminal; S34: The mobile terminal calculates a second digital signature (x2, y2) according to the second sub-private key D2, the fourth random number K, the second temporary public key T2 and the first bit string C1; S35: The mobile terminal obtains the initial key t according to the second digital signature (x2, y2), and makes a judgment on the initial key t; S36: If the initial key t≠0, extract the second bit string C2 from the ciphertext C, and calculate the initial plaintext M″; if the initial key t=0, report an error and exit; 37: The mobile terminal uses the second digital signature (x2, y2) and the initial plaintext M″ to calculate the plaintext hash value u, and judges the plaintext hash value u, and extracts the third bit string C3 from the ciphertext C; S38: If the plaintext hash value u=C3, the initial plaintext M″ is output as the complete plaintext; if the plaintext hash value u≠C3, an error is reported and the process is exited.

7. The medical service management system based on the national secret key splitting algorithm according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The process of key splitting is as follows: S41: The mobile terminal transmits the third public key P to the public key management center CA; S42: The public key management center CA generates a digital certificate based on the third public key P and the terminal device information obtained by the collection module; The public key management center CA uses the private key management center KM to produce encryption and decryption certificates based on the encryption and decryption key pair (D′, P′) generated by the improved SM2; S43: The private key management center encrypts the private key D′ using the third public key P and transmits it to the mobile terminal; S44: After the mobile terminal and the collaboration server complete collaborative decryption of the private key D′, the mobile terminal generates and stores a third sub-private key D11 using a random number generator; S45: The mobile terminal calculates the fourth sub-private key D22 according to the third sub-private key D11 and the private key D′; S46: The mobile terminal encrypts the fourth sub-private key D22 using the third public key P, and transmits it to the collaboration server for storage.

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