Quantum signature and identity authentication method based on quantum public key

Abstract

A quantum signature and identity authentication method based on a quantum public key addresses the technical fields of quantum signatures and quantum identity authentication. It addresses the low security of existing digital signatures and identity authentication systems, their inability to detect eavesdropping, and potential quantum computing threats. The method consists of a registration phase, an initialization phase, a signature phase, an identity verification phase, and a signature verification phase. This method designs a public key encryption algorithm based on quantum gate transformations, which is applied to the quantum public key identity authentication phase. This algorithm is used to encrypt the public key and authenticate the identity, ensuring the security of the signature. Furthermore, a quantum signature method based on unitary operations is used to ensure the security of the signature phase and its resistance to quantum attacks. Finally, a security analysis demonstrates that the security of this method relies on the indistinguishability of unknown quantum sequences and a quantum man-in-the-middle attack threat model. This method effectively improves the security of signatures and identity authentication.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of quantum signature and quantum identity authentication, and in particular to a quantum signature and identity authentication method based on a quantum public key. Background Art

[0002] In recent years, with the rapid advancement of global informatization, we are living in an era of information explosion, constantly processing massive data streams from all sources. While technological advances have greatly facilitated daily life, they have also brought with them increased information security issues, including the risk of private information leakage and data corruption. The development of science and technology and quantum computers has led to numerous security risks in digital signatures. In particular, the emergence of Shor's algorithm has exposed public key cryptography based on large integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems, such as RSA and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), to the risk of being cracked. The security of digital signatures relies on mathematical formulas and computational complexity, making them more vulnerable to security threats from powerful quantum adversaries during authentication and transmission. Ensuring the security of this sensitive information has become particularly important, and the security of digital signatures has become a major research topic. Conventional authentication and digital signature schemes suffer from low security, lack the ability to detect eavesdropping, and face potential quantum computing threats. Traditional digital signature methods struggle to meet the security and real-time processing requirements.

[0003] Currently, quantum signatures leverage the properties of quantum bits, such as the quantum no-cloning theorem, to ensure that signatures are unforgeable and non-repudiable. These methods aim to create a communication and authentication system that remains secure even in the presence of quantum computers. Furthermore, in identity authentication, the indivisibility and unpredictability of quantum information significantly enhances system security, effectively defending against man-in-the-middle attacks and other potential threats. Summary of the Invention

[0004] In order to solve the problems of low security, inability to detect eavesdropping and potential quantum computing threats in existing digital signatures and identity authentication, the present invention provides a quantum signature and identity authentication method based on quantum public key.

[0005] Based on the quantum public key-based quantum signature and identity authentication method, the method is implemented by the registration stage, initialization stage, signature stage, identity authentication stage and signature verification stage; the specific steps of the method are:

[0006] Step 1: Registration phase: User A registers his identity information with User C;

[0007] Step 2: Initialization phase, including key distribution initialization phase and quantum public key initialization phase;

[0008] The key distribution initialization phase obtains a sequence c of length 2n for quantum public key encryption;

[0009] The quantum public key initialization phase is specifically as follows:

[0010] Step B1: The encrypted identity information ID′ obtained by user A through hash function calculation A Perform a one-way function operation to change the length to n+1 and the state to |0 > or |1>, the quantum bit sequence is the quantum public key

[0011] Step B2: User A selects the corresponding quantum gate encryption operation based on the random combination value of sequence c to perform the quantum public key encryption. Encryption, obtain particle sequence ψ;

[0012] Step B3: User A randomly selects q decoy particles from the decoy particle sequence {|0>,|1>,|+>,|->} and inserts them into the particle sequence ψ to obtain the particle sequence ψ′. The user A records the position and original state of the decoy particles, q>>n+1, and sends the particle sequence ψ′ and the quantum gate encryption operation set C to user C.

[0013] Step 3: Signature stage;

[0014] User A converts the encrypted sequence of the original message M, the original message M and the particle sequence Sent to user B; the particle sequence The particle sequence obtained by inserting q decoy particles into the quantum signature of user A

[0015] Step 4: Identity authentication stage; the specific process is as follows:

[0016] Step 41: User C receives the particle sequence ψ′ sent by User A. User A announces the position and original state of the decoy particles in Step B3. Based on the information announced by User A, User C selects a corresponding measurement basis to measure the decoy particles and compares the measurement results with the original state of the decoy particles. If the error rate in the measurement results is higher than the established threshold, User C terminates the protocol; otherwise, the protocol continues.

[0017] Step 42: User C removes the decoy particles and obtains the particle sequence ψ. The received quantum gate encryption operation set C is used to perform the inverse operation of quantum gate encryption on the particle sequence ψ and measure the corresponding quantum state. The measurement result is recorded as and with ID′ in the database A For comparison, if It means that the identity authentication is passed and the identity authentication result K is recorded v=1, otherwise record K v =0, authentication will be terminated;

[0018] Step 43: After identity authentication, user C uses the key K shared with user B bc K v Encrypt to get the encrypted identity authentication result K′ v , and send it to user B;

[0019] Step 5: Signature verification phase;

[0020] Identity authentication is ultimately achieved through signature verification.

[0021] Beneficial effects of the present invention: In order to ensure the anti-eavesdropping and anti-quantum attack security of traditional digital signatures and identity authentication, the method described in the present invention designs a public key encryption algorithm based on quantum gate transformation, which is applied to the quantum public key identity authentication stage. On the one hand, it is used to encrypt the public key, thereby reducing the threat of information leakage. On the other hand, it is used in the identity authentication process to ensure the security of the signature identity. At the same time, a quantum signature method based on unitary operation is used to ensure the security and anti-quantum attack capability of the signature stage. Finally, the security analysis shows that the security of this method depends on the indistinguishability of unknown quantum sequences and the quantum man-in-the-middle attack threat model. Therefore, its security can be supported by formal proofs, and meets the requirements of non-forgeability, non-repudiation and better quantum bit efficiency. At the same time, it can resist counterfeiting attacks, retransmission attacks and laser man-in-the-middle attacks.

[0022] Experimental analysis using the method described in this paper demonstrates effective resistance to quantum man-in-the-middle attacks, impersonation attacks, retransmission attacks, and laser man-in-the-middle attacks. Formal analysis demonstrates the correctness, unforgeability, non-repudiation, and confidentiality of the private key, while also achieving improved quantum bit efficiency. This method leverages the physical properties of quantum mechanics in protecting information, effectively improving the security of signatures and identity authentication. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0023] Figure 1 Flowchart of the registration phase of the quantum signature and identity authentication method based on quantum public key according to the present invention;

[0024] Figure 2 Flowchart of the initialization phase of the quantum signature and identity authentication method based on quantum public key described in the present invention;

[0025] Figure 3 Flowchart of the quantum public key encryption algorithm in the quantum signature and identity authentication method based on quantum public key described in the present invention;

[0026] Figure 4Flowchart of the signing phase in the quantum signature and identity authentication method based on quantum public key described in the present invention;

[0027] Figure 5 Flowchart of the identity authentication phase in the quantum signature and identity authentication method based on quantum public key described in the present invention;

[0028] Figure 6 Flowchart of the signature verification phase in the quantum signature and identity authentication method based on quantum public key described in the present invention;

[0029] Figure 7 Flowchart of an example phase of quantum public key encryption in the quantum signature and identity authentication method based on quantum public key according to the present invention;

[0030] Figure 8 Flowchart of example stages of quantum public key identity authentication using the quantum public key-based quantum signature and identity authentication method described in the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0031] Specific implementation method 1. Combination Figures 1 to 8 This embodiment describes a quantum signature and identity authentication method based on a quantum public key. The method consists of the following stages: registration, initialization, signature, identity authentication, and signature verification. The method is implemented by the following steps:

[0032] Step 1: Registration stage;

[0033] In order to avoid the threat of identity fraud caused by man-in-the-middle attacks during the transmission process, user A needs to register her identity with user C first; Figure 1 As shown, the specific process is:

[0034] Step 11: User A provides his public identity information ID A Send to user C;

[0035] Step 12: User C uses a hash function to identify the ID A Calculation is performed to protect the security of information, and the encrypted identity information is recorded as ID' A :

[0036] ID′ A =hash(ID A ) (1)

[0037] Step 13: User C sends ID' A Sent to user A and saved to the database, and finally the registration is successful.

[0038] Step 2: Initialization phase;

[0039] like Figure 2As shown in Figure 1, this stage is divided into two parts: key distribution and quantum public key initialization.

[0040] Key distribution initialization;

[0041] Step A21: User B and user C establish a shared key K using the quantum key generation protocol (QKDP). bc ,User A generates two key sequences A and B of length n.

[0042] A={a1,a2,a3…a n}∈{0,1} n

[0043] B={b1,b2,b3…b n}∈{0,1} n (2)

[0044] Step A22: Use the hash function to calculate the key sequences A and B respectively to ensure the irreversibility of the key. The encrypted key sequences are recorded as A' and B':

[0045] A′=hash(A)={a′1,a′2,a′3…a′n}

[0046] B′=hash(B)={b′1,b′2,b′3…b′ n} (3)

[0047] Step A23: Randomly combine sequences A′ and B′ to generate a sequence c={c1, c2, c3…c 2n}, used for quantum public key encryption operations.

[0048] Quantum public key initialization; such as Figure 3 shown.

[0049] Step B21: User A obtains the ID′ through the hash function A After the "classical-quantum" one-way function F() operation, it becomes a quantum bit sequence with a length of n+1 and a state of |0> or |1>, which serves as the quantum public key.

[0050] Recorded as

[0051]

[0052] Step B22: User A selects the corresponding quantum gate encryption operation based on the random combination value of sequence c to encrypt the quantum public key. The following quantum X gate is used to implement quantum bit flipping, quantum Z gate is used to implement quantum bit rotation, quantum CNOT gate is a two-qubit controlled NOT gate, and quantum SWAP gate is used to exchange the states of two qubits.

[0053] X→00,CNOT→01,SWAP→10,Z→11 (5)

[0054] Will Apply the corresponding quantum gate encryption operation to obtain the particle sequence ψ. For the relevant quantum gate operation, there is the following matrix:

[0055]

[0056] Among them, O(C n ) represents the corresponding quantum gate operation, and the set C={O(C1),O(C2),…,O(C n )} represents a set of encryption operations, such as Figure 3 and as shown in formula (7).

[0057]

[0058] Finally, the particle sequence ψ is obtained after quantum gate encryption operation.

[0059] Step B23: User A randomly selects q decoy particles from the sequence {|0>,|1>,|+>,|->} and inserts them into the particle sequence ψ, resulting in the particle sequence ψ′. The position and original state of the decoy particles are recorded. To ensure the security of these sequences, the number of decoy particles q in any of these sequences must satisfy q>>n+1. Finally, the particle sequence ψ′ and the encryption operation set C are sent to user C.

[0060] Step 3: Signature phase; Figure 4 shown.

[0061] Step 31: Assume that user A has an original message M of length n = {m1,m2,…,m i ,…,m n}∈{0,1} n At the same time, user A connects the message M with the key sequences A and B, and then uses the hash function to calculate the encrypted sequences of the original message, which are recorded as α and β:

[0062] α=hash(M||A)=(α1,α2,α3,…,α n )

[0063] β=hash(M||B)=(β1,β2,β3,…,β n ) (8)

[0064] Step 32: User A converts the original message M into quantum bits by performing a "classical-quantum" one-way function F() operation on it, forming a quantum summary, denoted as |M>:

[0065] |M>=F(M)=(|m1>,|m2>,…,|m i >,…,|m n >) (9)

[0066] Step 33: User A uses Table 1 and encryption sequence α, β to generate the encrypted data in |m i > performs the unitary operator on and in H 0 =Y 0 =I, and obtain the quantum signature. Table 1 shows the unitary operation.

[0067]

[0068] Afterwards, is the tensor product notation, and |S> is the quantum signature on the original message N.

[0069] Table 1

[0070]

[0071] Step 34: User A inserts q decoy particles into the quantum signature |S> to obtain the particle sequence And record the position and original state of the decoy particle. Then the encrypted sequence α, β of the original message, the original message M and the particle sequence Sent to user B.

[0072] Step 4: Identity authentication stage; Figure 5 shown.

[0073] Step 41: Once user C receives the particle sequence ψ′ from user A, user A publishes the positions and original states of the decoy particles recorded in step B23. Based on this information, user C selects a measurement basis to measure those decoy particles. The measurement results are compared with the original states of the decoy particles. If the error rate in the measurement results exceeds an established threshold, user C terminates the protocol; otherwise, the protocol continues.

[0074] Step 42: User C first removes the decoy particles and obtains the particle sequence ψ. Then, using the received encryption operation set C, user C performs the inverse operation of quantum gate encryption and measures the corresponding quantum state. The result of the measurement is recorded as

[0075]

[0076] and the encrypted identity information ID′ A Compare, if ID A * =ID′ A , then the identity authentication is passed, K v Indicates the authentication result and records K v =1, otherwise record K v =0 will terminate the authentication;

[0077] Step 43: After identity authentication, user C uses the key K previously shared with user B bc ID card recognition result K v Encrypt to get the encrypted identity authentication result K′ v , and sent to user B.

[0078]

[0079] Where ID A is the identity information of user A, and ts is the timestamp.

[0080] Step 5: Signature verification phase; Figure 6 shown.

[0081] Step 51: User B receives the particle sequence Encrypted sequence α, β, original message M and encrypted identity authentication result K′ v .

[0082] Step 52: User B uses the shared key K bc For K′ v Decrypt and obtain the identity information ID A , identity authentication result K v and timestamp ts. If K v The value is 1, and the identity information ID A If it is the identity information of user A, then the identity of the sender of the verification message is user A. Otherwise, the agreement is terminated;

[0083] At the same time, user A announces the original state and position of the decoy particle in step 34 to user B. After receiving the information, user B selects the corresponding measurement basis to measure the decoy particle based on the information announced by user A and obtains the quantum signature |S>. Then, user B performs the inverse unitary operation on the signature information using the encryption sequence α, β sent by user A:

[0084]

[0085] Afterwards,

[0086] Step 53: User B measures the quantum signature |S′> after the operation and records the measurement result as

[0087]

[0088] If M * =M, it means that the message has not been tampered with or attacked during the transmission process, and user B declares that he accepts this quantum signature, otherwise he will refuse to sign.

[0089] Specific implementation method 2: Figures 7 and 8 This embodiment is an example of the quantum signature and identity authentication method based on a quantum public key described in Specific Embodiment 1. In this embodiment, the output of the selected SHA-3 hash function is 256 bits, and it is assumed that the generated key and the original message M are both 7 bits long. For ease of understanding, only 8 bits are selected for the SHA-3 hash function implementation process of this method for method example analysis. The method is implemented by the following steps:

[0090] Assume that the original message M to be signed by user A is {1,1,1,0,1,0,0} and perform the following process.

[0091] 1. Registration stage;

[0092] In order to avoid the threat of identity fraud caused by man-in-the-middle attacks during the transmission process, user A needs to first register her identity with user C. The main steps are as follows:

[0093] Step 1: Assume user A’s public identity information ID A ={1,0,1,1,0,1,0}, put your public identity information ID A Sent to user C.

[0094] Step 2: User C receives the public identity information ID of user A A Then use the SHA-3 hash function to identify the ID A Calculate and record it as ID′ A :

[0095] ID′ A =hash(ID A )={0,1,0,1,1,0,0,1} (15)

[0096] After the calculation is completed, user C will A It is sent to user A and saved to the database at the same time. Finally, the registration is successful at this stage.

[0097] 2. Initialization phase;

[0098] This phase is divided into two parts: key distribution and quantum public key initialization phase, which are described in detail below. Figure 2 shown.

[0099] 1. Key distribution initialization;

[0100] Step 1: Through the quantum key distribution protocol (QKDP), user A generates key sequences A and B, and user B and user C establish a shared key Kbc.

[0101] A={1,0,1,1,0,1,1}

[0102] B={1,1,0,1,0,0,1} (16)

[0103] Step 2: Use the SHA-3 hash function to calculate the key sequences A and B to improve the confidentiality and irreversibility of the key, denoted as A′ and B′:

[0104] A′=hash(A)={0,1,1,1,0,1,0}

[0105] B′=hash(B)={1,1,1,0,0,0,0} (17)

[0106] Step 3: Sequences A′ and B′ are paired and combined to generate the sequence c = {01, 11, 11, 10, 00, 10, 00}, which is used for the selection of quantum gates during the quantum public key encryption operation.

[0107] 2. Quantum public key initialization;

[0108] Step 1: When user A receives the ID' sent by user C A ={0,1,0,1,1,0,0,1}, the quantum sequence is obtained by quantizing the "classical-quantum" one-way function As the initial quantum public key, it is used in the next quantum public key encryption process.

[0109] Step 2: User A selects the corresponding quantum gate operation based on the value of the combined sequence c. Apply CNOT, Z, Z, SWAP, X, SWAP, X quantum gate encryption in sequence to obtain the particle sequence ψ={|0>,-|1>,|0>,|1>,-|0>,|0>,|0>,|0>}, and the obtained particle sequence ψ is used as the encrypted quantum public key. An example of quantum public key encryption is as follows Figure 7 shown.

[0110] Step 3: User A randomly selects 8 decoy particles from {|0>,|1>,|+>,|->} and inserts them into the particle sequence ψ to obtain ψ′, and records the position and original state of the decoy particles. Finally, the particle sequence ψ′, the quantum gate encryption operation set C and ID′ are combined. A Sent to user C.

[0111] 3. Signature stage;

[0112] Step 1: Assume that user A uses the SHA-3 hash function to calculate the original message M = {1,1,1,0,1,0,0}:

[0113] α=h(M||A)=(1,0,0,1,0,1,1)

[0114] β=h(M||B)=(0,0,1,0,1,1,1) (18)

[0115] Step 2: The message M is converted into quantum bits through the "classical-quantum" one-way function F() to form a quantum summary:

[0116] |M>=F(M)=(|1>,|1>,|1>,|0>,|1>,|0>,|0>) (19)

[0117] Step 3: User A, according to Table 1 and (α, β), i > performs the unitary operator on and And get:

[0118]

[0119] make |S> is the signature on the original message M;

[0120] Step 4: User A inserts 8 decoy particles into the signature to obtain a particle sequence And record the position and original state of the decoy particle. Then the sequence α, β, message M and particle sequence Sent to user B.

[0121] 4. Identity verification stage;

[0122] Step 1: User C receives the particle sequence ψ′. User A announces the position and original state of the decoy particles. Based on this information, User C selects a measurement basis to measure the decoy particles. The measurement results are compared with the original states of the decoy particles. If the error rate in the measurement results exceeds an established threshold, User C terminates the protocol; otherwise, the protocol continues.

[0123] Step 2: Use the received encryption operation set C to perform the inverse operation of the quantum gate encryption operation on the particle sequence ψ after removing the decoy particles and measure it, and record the measured result as With the ID' in the database A Compare and result ID A * =ID′ A , indicating that the identity authentication is passed and K is recorded v =1. An example of quantum public key authentication is Figure 8 shown.

[0124] Step 3: After identity authentication, user C uses the key K previously shared with user B bc ID A , K v Encrypt to get K′ v , and sent to user B.

[0125]

[0126] Where ID A is the identity information of user A, and ts is the timestamp.

[0127] 5. Signature verification phase;

[0128] Step 1: User B receives the particle sequence sent Sequence α, β, messages M and K′ v .

[0129] Step 2: User B uses K bc For K′ v Decrypt and get the result ID A , K v and ts. Results K v The value of is 1, ID A This is the identity information of user A, indicating that the sender of the verification message is user A.

[0130] Step 3: After user B knows the original state and position of the decoy particle from user A, he selects the corresponding measurement basis and measures the decoy particle. He obtains the quantum signature |S> and then performs the inverse operation of the unitary operation on the signature information through the sequence α, β.

[0131]

[0132] make

[0133] Step 4: User B measures the particle sequence |S′> after the operation, denoted as M *=(1,1,1,0,1,0,0).

[0134]

[0135] And M * =M, user B declares that he accepts this signature, otherwise he will refuse to sign.

[0136] The quantum signature and identity authentication processes in this embodiment are both quantized. During the identity authentication process, quantum gate encryption operations on quantum states enhance the security of the public key. This encrypts the public key, reducing the threat of information leakage, and ensures the security of the signer's identity during the identity authentication process. A unitary operation-based quantum signature method is used during the quantum signature process, ensuring security and resistance to quantum attacks.

[0137] Formal experimental testing using the method described in this invention demonstrates third-party participant, information-theoretic security, unforgeability, and non-repudiation. It is also robust against quantum man-in-the-middle attacks, impersonation attacks, retransmission attacks, and laser man-in-the-middle attacks. The security performance of this method is shown in Tables 2 and 3.

[0138] Table 2

[0139] Third participant Information Theoretical Security Unforgeability Non-repudiation Method of the present invention Yes (credible) Yes Yes Yes

[0140] Table 3

[0141]

[0142] This method uses quantum technology to implement both signature and identity authentication, and the signer and the receiver do not need to share a key in advance, which improves the efficiency of signature. Finally, we analyze the quantum bit efficiency of this method. The concept of quantum bit efficiency is defined as where b s The number of bits representing the message M, q m represents the number of quantum bits transmitted on the quantum channel, b m represents the number of classical bits exchanged to decode the message (ignoring the decoy particles used to check for eavesdropping). In this scheme, the quantum system sequence (public key) and signature are transmitted in the quantum channel. Therefore, in the proposed scheme, b s =n,q m =2n,b m =n, so the quantum bit efficiency of the proposed scheme is And recorded in Table 4, which is the performance analysis of this method.

[0143] Table 4

[0144]

[0145] The technical features of the above-mentioned embodiments can be combined arbitrarily. In order to make the description concise, not all possible combinations of the technical features in the above-mentioned embodiments are described. However, as long as there is no contradiction in the combination of these technical features, they should be considered to be within the scope of this specification.

[0146] The above-described embodiments merely illustrate the implementation methods of the present invention. While the descriptions are relatively specific and detailed, they should not be construed as limiting the scope of the patent. It should be noted that a person skilled in the art would be able to make various modifications and improvements without departing from the spirit of the present invention, all of which fall within the scope of protection of the present invention. Therefore, the scope of protection of the patent for this invention shall be determined by the appended claims.

Claims

1. The quantum signature and identity authentication method based on quantum public key is characterized by: The method is implemented by the registration phase, initialization phase, signature phase, identity authentication phase and signature verification phase; the specific steps of the method are: Step 1: Registration phase: User A registers his identity information with User C; Step 2: Initialization phase, including key distribution initialization phase and quantum public key initialization phase; The key distribution initialization phase obtains a sequence c of length 2n for quantum public key encryption; The quantum public key initialization phase is specifically as follows: Step B1: The encrypted identity information ID′ obtained by user A through hash function calculation A Perform a one-way function operation to convert it into a quantum bit sequence of length n+1 and state |0> or |1>, which is the quantum public key Step B2: User A selects the corresponding quantum gate encryption operation based on the random combination value of sequence c to perform the quantum public key encryption. Encryption, obtain particle sequence ψ; Step B3: User A randomly selects q decoy particles from the decoy particle sequence {|0>, |1>, |+>, |->} and inserts them into the particle sequence ψ to obtain the particle sequence ψ′. The user A records the position and original state of the decoy particles, q>>n+1, and sends the particle sequence ψ′ and the quantum gate encryption operation set C to user C. Step 3: Signature stage; User A converts the encrypted sequence of the original message M, the original message M and the particle sequence Sent to user B; the particle sequence The particle sequence obtained by inserting q decoy particles into the quantum signature of user A Step 4: Identity authentication stage; the specific process is as follows: Step 41: User C receives the particle sequence ψ′ sent by User A. User A announces the position and original state of the decoy particles in Step B3. Based on the information announced by User A, User C selects a corresponding measurement basis to measure the decoy particles and compares the measurement results with the original state of the decoy particles. If the error rate in the measurement results is higher than the established threshold, User C terminates the protocol; otherwise, the protocol continues. Step 42: User C removes the decoy particles and obtains the particle sequence ψ. The received quantum gate encryption operation set C is used to perform the inverse operation of quantum gate encryption on the particle sequence ψ and measure the corresponding quantum state. The measurement result is recorded as and with ID′ in the database A For comparison, if It means that the identity authentication is passed and the identity authentication result K is recorded v =1, otherwise record K v =0, authentication will be terminated; Step 43: After identity authentication, user C uses the key K shared with user B bc K v Encrypt to get the encrypted identity authentication result K′ v , and send it to user B; Step 5: Signature verification phase; Identity authentication is ultimately achieved through signature verification.

2. The quantum signature and identity authentication method based on quantum public key according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The specific process of step one is: Step 1: User A will provide his / her public identity information ID A Send to user C; Step 1 and 2: User C uses a hash function to identify the ID A Perform calculations and obtain the encrypted identity information, recorded as ID′ A ; Step 13: User C sends the encrypted identity information ID' A Sent to user A and saved to the database, and finally the registration is successful.

3. The quantum signature and identity authentication method based on quantum public key according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In step 2, the key distribution initialization phase is specifically as follows: Step A1: According to the quantum key generation protocol QKDP, user B and user C establish a shared key K bc , user A generates two key sequences A and B, both of length n; Step A2: Use a hash function to calculate the key sequences A and B respectively to obtain encrypted key sequences A′ and B′; Step A3: Randomly combine the encrypted key sequences A′ and B′ to generate a sequence c={c1, c2, c3...c 2n }, for quantum public key encryption.

4. The quantum signature and identity authentication method based on quantum public key according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step B2, the specific process of obtaining the particle sequence ψ is as follows: Set quantum gate X to flip the quantum bit, quantum gate Z to rotate the quantum bit, quantum gate CNOT as a two-qubit controlled NOT gate, and quantum gate SWAP to exchange the states of the two quantum bits; where: X→00,CNOT→01,SWAP→10,Z→11 It is expressed in matrix form as: Quantum gate encryption operation O(C n )The formula is as follows: Quantum gate encryption operation set C = {O(C1), O(C2), ..., O(C n )), and finally obtain the particle sequence ψ after quantum gate encryption operation.

5. The quantum signature and identity authentication method based on quantum public key according to claim 3 is characterized in that: The specific process of step three is: Step 31: Assume that user A has an original message M of length n. At the same time, user A concatenates the original message M with key sequences A and B and uses a hash function to calculate the encrypted sequences of the original message, which are recorded as α and β; Step 32: User A converts the original message M into quantum bits by performing a one-way function F() on the original message M, forming a quantum summary |M>, which can be expressed as follows: |M>=F(M)=(|m1>,|m2>,...,|m i >,...,|m n >) Step 3. User A uses the unitary operation and the encryption sequence denoted as α and β to perform the unitary operation on the quantum bit |m i >Perform unitary operation on it to obtain quantum signature |s i >: The quantum signature on the original message M is |S>; Step 3 and 4: User A inserts q decoy particles into the quantum signature |S> to obtain the particle sequence And record the position and original state of the decoy particle, then convert the encrypted sequence α, β, the original message M and the particle sequence Sent to user B.

6. The quantum signature and identity authentication method based on quantum public key according to claim 5, characterized in that: The specific process of the signature verification phase in step 5 is as follows: Step 5.1: User B receives the particle sequence Encrypted sequence α, β, original message M and encrypted identity authentication result K′ v ; Step 52: User B uses the shared key K bc The encrypted identity authentication result K′ v Decrypt and obtain identity information ID A , identity authentication result K v and timestamp ts; if the authentication result K v The value is 1, and the identity information ID A If it is the identity information of user A, then the identity of the sender of the verification message is user A. Otherwise, the agreement is terminated; At the same time, user A announces the original state and position of the decoy particles described in steps 3 and 4 to user B. After receiving the information, user B selects the corresponding measurement basis to measure the decoy particles based on the information announced by user A, obtains the quantum signature |S>, and then performs the inverse unitary operation on the signature information using the encryption sequence α, β sent by user A to obtain the particle sequence |S′>. Step 5.3: User B measures the particle sequence |S′> and records the measurement result as M * , if M * =M, it means that the message has not been tampered with or attacked during transmission, and user B declares that he accepts this signature, otherwise he will refuse to sign.

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