A fly-by-wire flight control system including a non-similarly designed ACE and an ACE reconstruction method

Abstract

The present invention relates to a fly-by-wire flight control system including dissimilar ACEs and an ACE reconfiguration method. The fly-by-wire flight control system of the present invention primarily comprises multiple dissimilar ACEs, multiple FCMs, multiple remote control electronics, and multiple signal processing units. The dissimilar ACE design mitigates the risk of ACE common mode. When one or more ACEs fail or enter direct mode, the fly-by-wire flight control system can reconfigure these dissimilar ACEs, enhancing the system's reconfiguration capabilities in the event of ACE failure, maximizing control of control surfaces, and minimizing the impact of mixed modes.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of aircraft flight control, and in particular to a fly-by-wire flight control system including an ACE of non-similar design and an ACE reconstruction method. Background Art

[0002] An existing aircraft fly-by-wire flight control system uses three flight control modules (FCMs), four actuator control electronics (ACEs), and multiple remote control electronics (REUs) to achieve aircraft flight control. The four ACEs use the same configuration, with each ACE controlling one-quarter of the control surfaces.

[0003] If one ACE fails, a quarter of the actuator control is lost. Furthermore, if another ACE enters direct mode while the system remains in normal mode, a mixed mode situation can occur, leading to adverse effects such as force contention on the control surfaces. Furthermore, using the same configuration for all four ACEs creates the risk of a common mode, rendering the system completely uncontrollable if all four fail. An existing aircraft model employs a similar architectural design, demonstrating compliance with Section 25.1309 through development assurance, without employing a completely dissimilar design or backup design.

[0004] Therefore, there is an urgent need for an improved fly-by-wire flight control system and a corresponding method thereof that are improved upon the prior art. Summary of the Invention

[0005] This Summary is provided to introduce some concepts in a simplified form that are further described below in the Detailed Description. This Summary is not intended to identify key features or essential features of the claimed subject matter, nor is it intended to be used as an aid in determining the scope of the claimed subject matter.

[0006] In response to the problems in the prior art, in order to enhance the reconstruction capability of the fly-by-wire flight control system when ACE fails or ACE is in direct mode to reduce the impact of mixed mode and alleviate common mode risks, the present invention proposes a non-similar flight control system architecture that alleviates ACE common mode, and proposes a reconstruction method after ACE failure to control the control surfaces as much as possible and reduce the impact of mixed mode.

[0007] Specifically, in one embodiment of the present invention, a fly-by-wire flight control system including actuator control electronics (ACE) of a non-similar design is disclosed, the system comprising:

[0008] A plurality of ACEs, the plurality of ACEs having two different configurations and divided into two groups of ACEs according to the configurations, each ACE in each group of ACEs forming pairs with a corresponding ACE in the other group of ACEs serving as backup ACEs for each other;

[0009] a plurality of remotely controlled electronic REUs, the plurality of REUs having a plurality of different configurations and arranged on each control surface to control corresponding actuators, such that at least two REUs of different configurations are arranged on each main control surface, each REU of the at least two REUs of different configurations being associated with one of the pairs of mutually backup ACEs and being controlled by one ACE or the other ACE of the pair of mutually backup ACEs; and

[0010] A plurality of flight control modules (FCMs) are configured to:

[0011] Normally controlling the multiple ACEs when confirming that the status signals of the multiple ACEs are normal;

[0012] When it is confirmed that one of the multiple ACEs fails or enters the direct mode, the backup ACE of the ACE is activated to take over the control of the corresponding REU;

[0013] activating backup ACEs of the plurality of ACEs to take over control of corresponding REUs when it is confirmed that the plurality of ACEs of the same configuration fail; and

[0014] In the event that more than one ACE of different configurations among the plurality of ACEs is confirmed to have failed:

[0015] If the more than one ACEs do not include the pairs of mutually backup ACEs, activating the backup ACEs of the more than one ACEs to take over control of the corresponding REUs;

[0016] If the more than one ACEs include one or more pairs of the mutually backup ACEs, then the other REU on the main control surface where the REU controlled by the one or more pairs of mutually backup ACEs is located takes over the control of the main control surface through its corresponding actuator, and the pair of mutually backup ACEs associated with the other REU is not included in the one or more pairs of mutually backup ACEs.

[0017] In one embodiment of the present invention, the system further comprises:

[0018] A plurality of signal processing units are configured to perform processing on the cockpit signals and transmit the processed cockpit signals to the plurality of FCMs and the plurality of ACEs.

[0019] In one embodiment of the present invention, the system further comprises:

[0020] a front-side bus network for communication between the plurality of signal processing units, the plurality of FCMs, and the plurality of ACEs, comprising a default first front-side bus network and a backup second front-side bus network, so that when the first front-side bus network fails, the plurality of FCMs switch to using the second front-side bus network to communicate with the plurality of ACEs; and

[0021] The back-end bus network used for communication between the multiple ACEs and the multiple REUs includes a first back-end bus network and a second back-end bus network of different types, wherein the multiple ACEs always send instructions to the multiple REUs through the first back-end bus network and the second back-end bus network at the same time and the multiple REUs give priority to instructions on the first back-end bus network.

[0022] In the above-described embodiment of the present invention, each REU of the plurality of REUs has two bus network interfaces associated with the first backend bus network and the second backend bus network.

[0023] In one embodiment of the present invention, the plurality of FCMs are further configured to:

[0024] causing the system to enter the direct mode if two or more of the plurality of ACEs are confirmed to enter the direct mode; and

[0025] The system is caused to enter the direct mode when it is confirmed that one or more ACEs among the plurality of ACEs fail and another ACE enters the direct mode.

[0026] In one embodiment of the present invention, the plurality of FCMs are further configured to, when it is confirmed that only one ACE is left valid, instruct the ACE to control at most half of the control surfaces to meet the minimum controllable configuration.

[0027] In one embodiment of the present invention, each ACE in the plurality of ACEs is configured to:

[0028] Outputting direct mode commands when the FCM it is communicating with fails or is powered off; and

[0029] In the event of a communication failure with the corresponding FCM, a direct mode command is output and the corresponding FCM activates the backup ACE corresponding to the ACE.

[0030] In one embodiment of the present invention, the number of configurations in the plurality of REUs corresponds to the number of mutually backing up ACE pairs in the pairs of mutually backing up ACEs.

[0031] In another embodiment of the present invention, a method for ACE reconfiguration performed at the fly-by-wire flight control system described in the above embodiment is disclosed, the method comprising:

[0032] When it is confirmed that one of the multiple ACEs fails or enters the direct mode, the backup ACE of the ACE is activated to take over the control of the corresponding REU;

[0033] activating backup ACEs of the plurality of ACEs to take over control of corresponding REUs when it is confirmed that the plurality of ACEs of the same configuration fail; and

[0034] In the event that more than one ACE of different configurations among the plurality of ACEs is confirmed to have failed:

[0035] If the more than one ACEs do not include the pairs of mutually backup ACEs, activating the backup ACEs of the more than one ACEs to take over control of the corresponding REUs;

[0036] If the more than one ACEs include one or more pairs of the mutually backup ACEs, then the other REU on the main control surface where the REU controlled by the one or more pairs of mutually backup ACEs is located takes over the control of the main control surface through its corresponding actuator, and the pair of mutually backup ACEs associated with the other REU is not included in the one or more pairs of mutually backup ACEs.

[0037] In one embodiment of the present invention, the method further comprises:

[0038] If two or more ACEs among the plurality of ACEs are confirmed to have entered the direct mode, the system is caused to enter the direct mode;

[0039] If it is determined that one or more ACEs of the plurality of ACEs fail and another ACE enters the direct mode, the system enters the direct mode; and

[0040] When it is confirmed that only one ACE is valid, the ACE is instructed to control at most half of the control surfaces to meet the minimum controllable configuration.

[0041] In yet another embodiment of the present invention, a computer storage medium is disclosed, which stores instructions for ACE reconstruction, including:

[0042] An instruction for activating a backup ACE of one of the plurality of ACEs to take over control of a corresponding REU when it is confirmed that the ACE fails or enters a direct mode;

[0043] Instructions for activating backup ACEs of the more than one ACEs of the same configuration in the plurality of ACEs to take over control of corresponding REUs when failure of the more than one ACEs is confirmed; and

[0044] Instructions for performing the following operations upon confirming that more than one ACE of different configurations in the plurality of ACEs has failed:

[0045] If the more than one ACEs do not include the pairs of mutually backup ACEs, activating the backup ACEs of the more than one ACEs to take over control of the corresponding REUs;

[0046] If the more than one ACEs include one or more pairs of the mutually backup ACEs, then the other REU on the main control surface where the REU controlled by the one or more pairs of mutually backup ACEs is located takes over the control of the main control surface through its corresponding actuator, and the pair of mutually backup ACEs associated with the other REU is not included in the one or more pairs of mutually backup ACEs.

[0047] After studying the description of specific exemplary embodiments of the present invention below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, other aspects, features and embodiments of the present invention will be apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art. Although features of the present invention may be discussed below with respect to certain embodiments and drawings, all embodiments of the present invention may include one or more of the advantageous features discussed herein. In other words, although one or more embodiments may be discussed as having certain advantageous features, one or more of such features may also be used according to the various embodiments of the present invention discussed herein. In a similar manner, although exemplary embodiments may be discussed below as device, system or method embodiments, it should be appreciated that such exemplary embodiments may be implemented in various devices, systems, and methods. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0048] In order that the manner in which the above-recited features of the present disclosure may be understood in detail, a more particular description of the content briefly summarized above may be obtained by reference to various aspects, some of which are illustrated in the accompanying drawings. It should be noted, however, that the drawings illustrate only certain typical aspects of the disclosure and are therefore not to be considered limiting of its scope, as the description may admit to other equally effective aspects.

[0049] Figure 1 FIG. 1 is a system architecture diagram of a fly-by-wire control system including a non-similar design ACE according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0050] Figure 2 FIG. 4 is a logic diagram of ACE failure reconstruction according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0051] Figure 3 FIG. 4 is a logic diagram of ACE reconstructed in direct mode according to one embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0052] Figure 4 is a logic diagram of ACE instruction selection and output according to one embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0053] Figure 5 A flowchart of a method for ACE reconstruction according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0054] The various embodiments will be described in more detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings that form a part of the present invention and illustrate specific exemplary embodiments. However, the embodiments may be implemented in many different forms and should not be construed as limiting the embodiments set forth herein; rather, these embodiments are provided so that this disclosure is thorough and complete and the scope of these embodiments is fully conveyed to those skilled in the art. The embodiments may be implemented as a method, system, or device. Accordingly, the embodiments may be implemented in hardware, in full software, or in a combination of software and hardware. Therefore, the following detailed description is not intended to be limiting.

[0055] The steps in each flowchart may be performed by hardware (e.g., a processor, an engine, a memory, a circuit), software (e.g., an operating system, an application, a driver, a machine / processor executable instruction), or a combination thereof. As will be understood by those skilled in the art, the methods involved in each embodiment may include more or fewer steps than shown.

[0056] To address the technical issues in the prior art, the present invention relates to a fly-by-wire flight control system including dissimilar ACEs and an ACE reconstruction method. The fly-by-wire flight control system of the present invention primarily comprises multiple dissimilar ACEs, multiple FCMs, multiple remote control electronic units (REUs), and multiple signal processing units. The dissimilar ACE design mitigates the risk of ACE common mode. When one or more ACEs fail or enter direct mode, the fly-by-wire flight control system can reconstruct these dissimilar ACEs, enhancing the system's reconstruction capabilities in the event of ACE failure, maximizing control of control surfaces, and minimizing the impact of mixed modes. Various aspects of the present invention are described in detail below.

[0057] Figure 1 FIG. 1 is a system architecture diagram of a fly-by-wire control system including a non-similar design ACE according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0058] like Figure 1 As shown, the fly-by-wire flight control system may include multiple FCMs, multiple ACEs, and multiple REUs. In one embodiment of the present invention, for the sake of simplicity, as an example rather than a limitation, Figure 1Three FCMs (indicated by reference numeral 1) and four ACEs (indicated by reference numeral 9) are shown. As will be appreciated by those skilled in the art, in other embodiments of the present invention, the fly-by-wire flight control system may include other numbers of FCMs and other numbers of ACEs, rather than being limited to three FCMs and four ACEs. All four ACEs participate in control of the control surfaces, with each ACE controlling approximately one-quarter of the control surfaces in a priority control manner.

[0059] In this embodiment, the four ACEs have two different configurations (Type A and Type B) and are divided into two groups of ACEs according to the configuration (i.e., A1, A2 and B1, B2). Each ACE in each group forms two pairs of mutual backup ACEs with a corresponding ACE in the other group (i.e., A1 and B1 are one pair of mutual backup ACEs, and A2 and B2 are another pair of mutual backup ACEs). As will be appreciated by those skilled in the art, other embodiments of the present invention may also include six ACEs, divided into A1, A2, A3 and B1, B2, B3 according to the configuration, and formed into three pairs of mutual backup ACEs, i.e., A1 and B1, A2 and B2, and A3 and B3. Other even numbers of ACEs may also be included, and the grouping and pairing methods may be similar.

[0060] In one embodiment of the present invention, in the normal mode or degraded mode of the system, the four ACEs can be configured to receive control law instructions from the corresponding FCM and transmit the instructions to the corresponding REU to control the actuator corresponding to the REU to drive the control surface movement, thereby achieving control of the aircraft attitude.

[0061] In one embodiment of the present invention, the system may further include multiple signal processing units (as shown in reference numeral 3) configured to process cockpit signals in normal or degraded mode and transmit the processed cockpit signals to the multiple FCMs and the multiple ACEs. In this embodiment, the cockpit signal processing may include demodulating, filtering, performing analog-to-digital conversion, and performing comparative monitoring on the cockpit signals, RVDT signals, and switch signals, and forwarding the processed and integrated cockpit digital signals.

[0062] In another embodiment of the present invention, when the system enters direct mode, these signal processing units 3 complete the connection with the cockpit equipment and complete the processing of RVDT signals and switch signals, including demodulation, filtering, analog-to-digital conversion and comparative monitoring, and send the processed and integrated cockpit digital signals to ACE through the front-end network bus (as shown in the figure mark 2) (including front-end bus network 1 and front-end bus network 2). ACE performs integrity check on the received signal, and the result is used for direct mode control law calculation, and the generated control law instruction is output to the corresponding REU through the back-end network bus 1 (as shown in the figure mark 5) and the back-end network bus 2 (as shown in the figure mark 6). The instruction signal controls the actuator corresponding to the REU to drive the control surface movement, thereby realizing the control of the aircraft attitude.

[0063] In one embodiment of the present invention, the front-end bus network can be used for communication between multiple signal processing units, multiple FCMs and multiple ACEs, and includes a default front-end bus network 1 and a spare second front-end bus network 2, so that when the front-end bus network 1 fails, it can switch to using the front-end bus network 2 for communication.

[0064] In one embodiment of the present invention, a backend bus network is used for communication between multiple ACEs and multiple REUs, and includes different types of backend bus network 1 and a second backend bus network 2. An ACE can always send control law instructions to a corresponding REU via both backend bus network 1 and backend bus network 2, with the REU prioritizing instructions on backend bus network 1. When only one valid instruction is available on a backend bus network, the REU selects the valid instruction; when two valid instructions are available, the REU prioritizes normal mode instructions.

[0065] In one embodiment of the present invention, Figure 1 As shown, the multiple remote control electronic REUs (as shown by reference numeral 7) in the fly-by-wire flight control system of the present invention can have multiple different configurations and can be arranged on each control surface to control the corresponding actuator, so that at least two REUs of different configurations are arranged on each main control surface. Figure 1 As shown, by way of example and not limitation, the control surfaces may include main control surfaces (including elevators, ailerons, and rudders), seven spoilers on each of the left and right wings, and a horizontal stabilizer (reference numeral 8 designates the motor control electronics (MCE). In various embodiments, the relationship between the REU and the actuator may be one-to-one, with master-master control or master-master-master control (rudder) being employed between the actuators. The spoilers may utilize single actuators (each spoiler is equipped with a single REU), and the actuators may be hydraulic actuators, but are not limited to hydraulic actuators.

[0066] Each REU in the at least two different configurations of REU is associated with one of the pairs of mutually backing up ACEs and is controlled by one or the other ACE in the pair of mutually backing up ACEs. Figure 1 As shown, each REU is associated with a pair of mutually backing-up ACEs. For example, the four REUs on the left aileron are associated with mutually backing-up ACE pairs A1-B1, A2-B2, B1-A1, and B2-A2, respectively. In other words, they are controlled by two ACEs in the corresponding mutually backing-up ACE pairs. Each pair of mutually backing-up ACEs may include a priority control ACE and a reconfiguration control ACE. When the priority control ACE is not failed and has not entered direct mode, the priority control ACE controls the REU. When the priority control ACE fails or enters direct mode, the reconfiguration control ACE controls the REU.

[0067] As can be understood by those skilled in the art, Figure 1 The connection correspondence between ACE and REU in the architecture diagram shown is not limited to the lines in the diagram. There are multiple connection relationships, which can be comprehensively considered based on factors such as the aircraft's minimum controllable configuration and energy configuration.

[0068] In one embodiment of the present invention, Figure 1 Each REU in the system may have two bus network interfaces associated with backend bus network 1 and backend bus network 2. The backend network buses may be of different types to avoid the risk of simultaneous bus failure.

[0069] In one embodiment of the present invention, Figure 1 The FCM can be configured to control the four ACEs normally if the status signals of the four ACEs are confirmed to be normal. The FCM can also be configured to activate the backup ACE corresponding to the failed ACE to take over control of the corresponding REU if it determines that one of the four ACEs has failed. For example, if an FCM determines that A1 has failed, it can activate A1's backup ACE, namely B1 of a different configuration, to take over reconfiguration control of the REU that was originally controlled by A1.

[0070] In one embodiment of the present invention, the FCM can be further configured to activate backup ACEs of the four ACEs to take over control of the corresponding REUs if more than one ACE of the same configuration is confirmed to have failed. For example, if one or more FCMs confirm that A1 and A2 have failed, the one or more FCMs can activate backup ACEs, namely B1 and B2 of different configurations, respectively, to take over control of the REUs originally controlled by A1 and A2.

[0071] In one embodiment of the present invention, the FCM can also be configured to, when confirming that more than one ACE of different configurations among the four ACEs has failed: if the more than one ACEs do not include the pairs of backup ACEs for each other, activate the backup ACEs of the more than one ACEs to take over control of the corresponding REU. For example, when one or more FCMs confirm that A1 and B2 (A1 and B2 do not belong to a mutual backup ACE pair, that is, the failed more than one ACE does not include a mutual backup ACE pair) have failed, the one or more FCMs may respectively activate the backup ACEs of the two failed ACEs, that is, B1 and A2, to obtain reconstruction control of the REU originally controlled by A1 and B2; if the more than one ACE includes one or more pairs of mutual backup ACEs among the pairs of mutual backup ACEs, then instruct another REU on the main rudder surface where the REU controlled by the one or more pairs of mutual backup ACEs is located to take over control of the main rudder surface through its corresponding actuator (by ensuring that one actuator is controllable to ensure that the main rudder surface is controllable (the prerequisite for the controllability of the main rudder surface may be that at least one actuator is controllable), wherein the pair of mutual backup ACEs associated with the other REU is not included in the one or more pairs of mutual backup ACEs.

[0072] For example, when one or more FCMs confirm that A1 and B1 have failed, the one or more FCMs may determine that A1 and B1 belong to a pair of mutually backed-up ACEs, that is, the more than one failed ACEs include a pair of mutually backed-up ACEs, and instruct the REU that is preferentially controlled and reconstructed by A1 and B1 or another REU that is not associated with the pair of mutually backed-up ACEs on the main control surface where the REU that is preferentially controlled and reconstructed by B1 and A1 is located to take over control of the main control surface through its corresponding actuator. In the above example, the REU that is preferentially controlled and reconfigured by A1 and B1 may be, for example, the left REU on the outer left aileron. In this case, the REU used to take over control of the outer left aileron may be the right REU on the outer left aileron that is associated with the surviving backup ACE pair A2 and B2 (the outer left aileron is controlled by the actuator corresponding to the right REU); the REU that is preferentially controlled and reconfigured by B1 and A1 may be, for example, the left REU on the inner left aileron. In this case, the REU used to take over control of the inner left aileron may be the right REU on the inner left aileron that is associated with the surviving backup ACE pair B2 and A2 (the inner left aileron is controlled by the actuator corresponding to the right REU).

[0073] In one embodiment of the present invention, REU may have multiple configurations, and the number of REU configurations corresponds to the number of ACE pairs that serve as backup for each other. Figure 1Two configurations are shown as examples: one associated with a pair of mutually backup ACEs A1 and B1, and another associated with a pair of mutually backup ACEs A2 and B2. When two failed ACEs control the same REU (i.e., the REU is controlled by the failed pair of mutually backup ACEs (including priority control and reconfiguration control)), another REU (associated with the surviving pair of mutually backup ACEs) with a different configuration on the main control surface where the REU is located can take over control of the main control surface through the actuator corresponding to the other REU (in other words, originally, the two actuators on the main control surface simultaneously controlled the main control surface. When the two mutually backup ACEs fail, the actuators corresponding to the REUs controlled by the two ACEs are in a follow-up state, and the main control surface is instead controlled solely by the other actuator (which is controlled by the surviving pair of mutually backup ACEs)). As can be understood by those skilled in the art, when six ACEs (A1, A2, A3, B1, B2, B3) are included, the REU can have three different configurations, respectively associated with A1-B1, A2-B2, A3-B3, and so on.

[0074] In one embodiment of the present invention, the FCM may be further configured to, if only one ACE is confirmed to be active, instruct that ACE to control at most half of the control surfaces to meet a minimum controllable configuration. This minimum controllable configuration may include, but is not limited to, ensuring that all main control surfaces and half of the spoilers are controllable. This minimum controllable configuration is well known in the art and will not be described in detail here.

[0075] The above are ACE failure reconstruction operations performed by FCM to ensure that more (main) control surfaces can be controlled in the event of ACE failure, thereby ensuring better flight quality. More specifically, Figure 2 A logical diagram of ACE failure reconstruction according to one embodiment of the present disclosure is shown.

[0076] like Figure 2 As shown, in Figure 1 In the exemplary embodiment shown, which includes four ACEs, the FCM transmits instructions to the ACEs via the front-end network bus (switching to network bus 2 when network bus 1 fails), and all four ACEs participate in the control of the control surfaces.

[0077] When one of the ACEs fails, the failed ACE is cut off and the corresponding backup ACE takes over control to ensure that all control surfaces can be controlled.

[0078] When two ACEs fail (two different configurations), if the two ACEs control different REUs, the corresponding other ACE takes over control to ensure that all actuators and rudder surfaces are controllable; if the two ACEs control the same REU, the other REU of the main rudder surface takes over control of the main rudder surface by controlling the corresponding actuator (that is, the other REU controls the main rudder surface alone through its corresponding actuator) to ensure that one actuator is controllable and the main rudder surface is controllable.

[0079] When two ACEs fail simultaneously due to common mode or other reasons (in the same configuration, A1 and A2 fail or B1 and B2 fail), the corresponding other ACE takes over control to ensure that all control surfaces are controllable.

[0080] When three ACEs fail, all main control surfaces and half of the spoilers are guaranteed to be controllable.

[0081] Back to Figure 1 In one embodiment of the present invention, the FCM may be configured to activate a backup ACE of an ACE to take over control of the corresponding REU when confirming that the ACE has entered direct mode. In this embodiment, the FCM may obtain a signal indicating whether each ACE is in direct mode via the front-end network bus.

[0082] In one embodiment of the present invention, the FCM may also be configured to cause the fly-by-wire flight control system to enter direct mode if two or more ACEs are confirmed to have entered direct mode, and to cause the fly-by-wire flight control system to downgrade to direct mode if one or more ACEs are confirmed to have failed and another ACE has entered direct mode. When the system enters direct mode, the ACE selects direct mode instructions for execution.

[0083] In another embodiment of the present invention, the ACE may be configured to output direct mode instructions when the FCM with which it communicates fails or is powered off; and to output direct mode instructions when communication with the corresponding FCM fails and the corresponding FCM activates a backup ACE corresponding to the ACE.

[0084] The above is the ACE entering direct mode reconfiguration operation executed by FCM to alleviate the impact of the control surface force conflict and thus ensure better flight quality. More specifically, Figure 3 A logic diagram illustrating ACE reconfiguration in direct mode according to one embodiment of the present disclosure is shown.

[0085] like Figure 3As shown, after an ACE enters direct mode, the system reconfigures control. The FCM obtains signals from each ACE via the network bus indicating whether it is in direct mode. When the FCM confirms that an ACE is in direct mode, it reconfigures control of the ACE, with the corresponding backup ACE taking over control. When the FCM receives signals that two or more ACEs have entered direct mode, the system enters direct mode.

[0086] Figure 4 is a logic diagram of ACE instruction selection and output according to one embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0087] like Figure 4 As shown, the ACE instruction output selection logic is as follows:

[0088] a) When the system is in normal mode, the FCM and ACE communicate normally and the ACE has not entered direct mode, the FCM controls the ACE to select normal mode instruction execution through the ACE enable signal;

[0089] b) When the system is in normal mode, the FCM and ACE communicate normally, but the ACE enters direct mode. The ACE outputs direct mode instructions, and the FCM activates the corresponding backup ACE to take over control;

[0090] c) When the system is in normal mode, the communication between FCM and ACE fails, ACE enters direct mode and outputs direct mode instructions, and FCM activates the corresponding backup ACE to take over control;

[0091] When the system enters direct mode, ACE selects direct mode instructions to execute.

[0092] The final command output of the ACE is controlled by the FCM. When the FCM is valid, the ACE receives the FCM enable signal. If the FCM enable signal is 1, the ACE outputs the control command; otherwise, the ACE does not output the control command. When all FCMs fail, the ACE command output is no longer controlled by the FCM and defaults to outputting direct mode control commands. When communication between the ACE and FCM fails and the ACE does not receive the FCM failure status, the ACE command outputs direct mode commands. At the same time, the FCM does not receive the ACE status, and the FCM controls the corresponding backup ACE to take over control.

[0093] Figure 5 A flow chart of a method 500 for ACE reconstruction according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown.

[0094] like Figure 5 As shown, the method 500 starts at step 502 . When it is confirmed that one of the plurality of ACEs fails or enters the direct mode, the backup ACE of the ACE is activated to take over the control of the corresponding REU.

[0095] Then the method 500 proceeds to step 504 , where, if it is confirmed that more than one ACE of the same configuration among the plurality of ACEs fails, backup ACEs of the more than one ACEs are activated to take over control of corresponding REUs.

[0096] Then, the method 500 continues to step 506. When it is confirmed that more than one ACE of different configurations in the multiple ACEs has failed, if the more than one ACEs do not include the pairs of backup ACEs for each other, the backup ACEs of the more than one ACEs are activated to take over control of the corresponding REU.

[0097] Finally, method 500 continues to step 508. When it is confirmed that more than one ACE of different configurations among the multiple ACEs has failed, if the more than one ACEs include one or more pairs of mutual backup ACEs among the pairs of mutual backup ACEs, then another REU on the main control surface where the REU controlled by the one or more pairs of mutual backup ACEs is located is instructed to take over control of the main control surface through its corresponding actuator, and the pair of mutual backup ACEs associated with the other REU is not included in the one or more pairs of mutual backup ACEs.

[0098] After step 508 , method 500 ends.

[0099] In summary, the present invention proposes a fly-by-wire flight control system architecture with a non-similar design, which can alleviate the impact of common mode and has strong scalability and scalability. It can be used for complex civil passenger aircraft as well as general aviation aircraft and electric vertical take-off and landing (e-VTOL) aircraft.

[0100] Embodiments of the present invention have been described above with reference to the block diagrams and / or operational descriptions of methods, systems, and computer program products according to embodiments of the present invention. The functions / actions indicated in the blocks may appear in an order different from that shown in any flow chart. For example, depending on the functions / actions involved, two blocks shown in succession may actually be executed substantially simultaneously, or the blocks may sometimes be executed in the reverse order.

[0101] The above description is merely a preferred embodiment of the present invention, but the scope of protection of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any changes or substitutions that can be easily conceived by a person skilled in the art within the technical scope disclosed in the present invention should be included in the scope of protection of the present invention. Therefore, the scope of protection of the present invention should be based on the scope of protection of the claims.

Claims

1. A fly-by-wire flight control system including actuator control electronics (ACE) of dissimilar design, the system comprising: A plurality of ACEs, wherein the plurality of ACEs have two different configurations and are divided into two groups of ACEs according to the configurations, wherein each ACE in each group of ACEs forms pairs with a corresponding ACE in the other group of ACEs, serving as backup ACEs for each other; a plurality of remotely controlled electronic REUs, the plurality of REUs having a plurality of different configurations and being arranged on each control surface to control a corresponding actuator, such that at least two REUs of different configurations are arranged on each main control surface, each REU of the at least two REUs of different configurations being associated with one of the pairs of mutually backup ACEs and being controlled by one ACE or the other ACE of the pair of mutually backup ACEs; and A plurality of flight control modules (FCMs) are configured to: Normally controlling the multiple ACEs when confirming that the status signals of the multiple ACEs are normal; When it is confirmed that one of the plurality of ACEs fails or enters a direct mode, a backup ACE of the ACE is activated to take over control of the corresponding REU; When more than one ACE of the same configuration among the plurality of ACEs is confirmed to be failed, activating backup ACEs of the more than one ACEs to take over control of corresponding REUs; as well as In the event that more than one ACE of different configurations among the plurality of ACEs is confirmed to have failed: If the more than one ACEs do not include the pairs of ACEs that are backups of each other, Then the backup ACE of the more than one ACE is activated to take over the control of the corresponding REU. system; If the more than one ACEs include one or more pairs of ACEs that are backup for each other, it is indicated that the one or more pairs of ACEs that are backup for each other are backup for each other. Another REU on the main control surface where the REU controlled by ACE is located takes over the control of the main control surface through its corresponding actuator, and the pair of mutual backup ACEs associated with the other REU are not included in the one or more pairs of mutual backup ACEs.

2. The system of claim 1 , wherein the system further comprises: A plurality of signal processing units are configured to perform processing on cockpit signals and transmit the processed cockpit signals to the plurality of FCMs and the plurality of ACEs.

3. The system of claim 1 , wherein the system further comprises: a front-side bus network for communication between the plurality of signal processing units, the plurality of FCMs, and the plurality of ACEs, comprising a default first front-side bus network and a backup second front-side bus network, so that when the first front-side bus network fails, the plurality of FCMs switch to using the second front-side bus network to communicate with the plurality of ACEs; as well as The back-end bus network used for communication between the multiple ACEs and the multiple REUs includes a first back-end bus network and a second back-end bus network of different types, wherein the multiple ACEs always send instructions to the multiple REUs through the first back-end bus network and the second back-end bus network at the same time and the multiple REUs give priority to instructions on the first back-end bus network.

4. The system of claim 3, wherein each REU of the plurality of REUs has two bus network interfaces associated with a first back-end bus network and a second back-end bus network.

5. The system of claim 1 , wherein the plurality of FCMs are further configured to: causing the system to enter direct mode if confirming that two or more ACEs among the plurality of ACEs enter direct mode; and The system is caused to enter the direct mode when it is confirmed that one or more ACEs among the plurality of ACEs fail and another ACE enters the direct mode.

6. The system of claim 1, wherein the plurality of FCMs are further configured to, upon confirming that only one ACE is left valid, instruct the ACE to control at most half of the control surfaces to meet a minimum controllable configuration.

7. The system of claim 1 , wherein each ACE of the plurality of ACEs is configured to: Outputting direct mode commands when the FCM it is communicating with fails or is powered off; and In the event of a communication failure with the corresponding FCM, a direct mode command is output and the corresponding FCM activates the backup ACE corresponding to the ACE.

8. The system of claim 1, wherein the number of configurations in the plurality of REUs corresponds to the number of mutually backing-up ACE pairs in the pairs of mutually backing-up ACEs.

9. A method for ACE reconfiguration performed at the fly-by-wire flight control system of claim 1, the method comprising: When it is confirmed that one of the plurality of ACEs fails or enters a direct mode, a backup ACE of the ACE is activated to take over control of the corresponding REU; When more than one ACE of the same configuration among the plurality of ACEs is confirmed to be failed, activating backup ACEs of the more than one ACEs to take over control of corresponding REUs; as well as In the event that more than one ACE of different configurations among the plurality of ACEs is confirmed to have failed: If the more than one ACEs do not include the pairs of mutually backup ACEs, activating the backup ACEs of the more than one ACEs to take over control of the corresponding REUs; If the more than one ACEs include one or more pairs of mutual backup ACEs among the pairs of mutual backup ACEs, then the other REU on the main rudder surface where the REU controlled by the one or more pairs of mutual backup ACEs is located is instructed to take over the control of the main rudder surface through its corresponding actuator, and the pair of mutual backup ACEs associated with the other REU is not included in the one or more pairs of mutual backup ACEs.

10. The method of claim 9, wherein the method further comprises: causing the system to enter the direct mode if two or more ACEs among the plurality of ACEs are confirmed to enter the direct mode; Enabling the system to enter the direct mode when it is determined that one or more ACEs among the plurality of ACEs fail and another ACE enters the direct mode; as well as When it is confirmed that only one ACE is valid, the ACE is instructed to control at most half of the control surfaces to meet the minimum controllable configuration.

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