Firmware trusted root implementation system and method, computer equipment and storage medium

Abstract

The invention relates to a firmware trusted root implementation system and method, computer equipment and a storage medium. The system comprises a hardware layer and a software layer established on the hardware layer, wherein the software layer comprises a user mode layer, an administrator mode layer and a machine mode layer which are connected in sequence; wherein the hardware layer comprises a storage space, an execution architecture kernel and a trusted root, the user mode layer comprises a non-trusted user application program and a trusted execution environment module, the administrator mode layer comprises a non-trusted operating system, a trusted operating system and a shared space, and the non-trusted operating system and the trusted operating system perform data interaction through the shared space; the user mode layer is used for calling the administrator mode layer to execute read-write operation on the data in the storage space; and the machine mode layer comprises a security key component and is used for receiving control instructions transmitted by the non-trusted operating system and the trusted operating system and running an operating system kernel. By adopting the system, the reliability of implementing the firmware trusted root on the RISC-V execution architecture can be improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of computer security technology, and in particular to a firmware trusted root implementation system, method, computer device and storage medium. Background Art

[0002] Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) provides hardware-enforced isolation in the processor, allowing applications to run in a separate execution area called an "isolated area". Its purpose is to increase the level of protection and defense against software vulnerability exploits. In this way, even if the system in the non-isolated area is compromised, the attacker cannot access the important assets of the user running in the isolated area. A recent trend in TEE development is the transition from dedicated TEEs controlled by a single vendor to open TEEs, allowing trusted applications (TAs) from multiple sources to run in them, which have different use cases. This transition has formed a TA ecosystem that provides more robust and customized security protection for applications and rich operating systems such as Linux and Android. For example, the firmware-based root of trust (fTPM) has also been widely used on many servers and mobile devices. fTPM solves the problem that on traditional hardware platforms, TPM (trusted root) needs to be inserted into a discrete, dedicated module on the platform to provide unlimited TPM functions. Although TEE has been widely deployed, most of these basic software systems or platform processors are based on the ARM platform architecture. As more and more vendors plan to adopt the RISC-V architecture in their products, it is necessary to define a way for RISC-V architecture implementations to reuse the existing TA ecosystem. Summary of the invention

[0003] Based on this, it is necessary to provide a firmware trusted root implementation system, method, computer device and storage medium that can improve the reliability of firmware trusted root implementation on the RISC-V execution architecture in response to the above technical problems.

[0004] In order to solve the above technical problems, in a first aspect, a firmware trusted root implementation system is provided, the system comprising: a hardware layer and a software layer built on the hardware layer, the software layer comprising a user mode layer, an administrator mode layer and a machine mode layer connected in sequence;

[0005] The hardware layer includes storage space, execution architecture core and trusted root. The storage space is used to store the persistent data of the firmware trusted root, and the execution architecture core is used to execute the storage space access rights.

[0006] The user mode layer includes untrusted user applications and a trusted execution environment module, and the user mode layer is used to execute applications;

[0007] The administrator mode layer includes an untrusted operating system, a trusted operating system, and a shared space. The untrusted operating system and the trusted operating system interact with each other through the shared space. The user mode layer is used to call the administrator mode layer to perform read and write operations on the data in the storage space.

[0008] The machine mode layer includes security-critical components, which are used to receive control instructions transmitted by the untrusted operating system and the trusted operating system, and run the operating system kernel according to the control instructions.

[0009] In one embodiment, a non-trusted user application and a non-trusted operating system are communicatively connected, the non-trusted user application and the non-trusted operating system are located in a non-trusted execution environment, the non-trusted application includes a first user layer application, a second user layer application and a software stack that are communicatively connected; the non-trusted operating system includes a first driver, a second driver and a third driver that are communicatively connected.

[0010] In one embodiment, the trusted execution environment module and the trusted operating system are communicatively connected, the trusted execution environment module and the trusted operating system are located in the trusted execution environment, the trusted execution environment module includes a communicatively connected operation module and a fourth driver; the trusted operating system includes a communicatively connected fifth driver and an encryption module.

[0011] In one of the embodiments, the control instruction includes an interrupt processing instruction, and the security critical component is used to transmit the interrupt processing instruction and implement the switching between the untrusted operating system and the trusted operating system according to the interrupt processing instruction.

[0012] In order to solve the above technical problem, in a second aspect, a firmware trusted root implementation method is provided, and a firmware trusted root implementation system according to any one of the above claims is applied, and the method comprises:

[0013] In response to receiving the execution architecture power-on instruction, loading the trusted root of the hardware layer, verifying the trusted operating system firmware according to the trusted root, and obtaining a verification result;

[0014] If the verification result is successful, the trusted operating system file is loaded into the storage space for storage;

[0015] Loading the fifth driver and encryption module in the trusted operating system, and setting a shared space to implement the operation of the trusted operating system;

[0016] Perform firmware loading, in response to the firmware being in the running process, generate a sending instruction, and send the sending instruction to the trusted operating system to load the trusted execution environment module, so as to use the trusted operating system to run the application layer program of the trusted execution environment module;

[0017] Initialize the trusted execution environment module and create a firmware trusted root device for use by the firmware;

[0018] Release the trusted root instance through the firmware, run the untrusted operating system, and then load the first driver and the second driver to create a trusted root device for use by the user layer;

[0019] In response to receiving a specific instruction, the initialization of the internal logical data of the trusted root is triggered, and the user application is completed through the software stack of the non-trusted user application.

[0020] In one embodiment, the method further comprises:

[0021] In response to the trusted execution environment module being loaded, determining whether the non-volatile random access memory has been initialized;

[0022] If the non-volatile random access memory has not been initialized, the trusted execution environment module writes the data structure data according to a preset specification;

[0023] The data structure data is transmitted to the fifth driver of the trusted operating system via the fourth driver of the trusted execution environment module. The fifth driver uses the encryption module of the trusted operating system and the cryptographic accelerator provided by the execution architecture to encrypt the data structure data to obtain the encrypted data, and saves the encrypted data to the shared space.

[0024] In response to receiving the data write operation instruction, an interrupt processing instruction is triggered, the trusted operating system sends the interrupt processing instruction, the data write operation instruction and the data write address to the safety critical component, the safety critical component switches to the non-trusted operating system according to the interrupt processing instruction, and transmits the data write operation instruction and the data write address to the non-trusted operating system;

[0025] In response to the third driver of the non-trusted operating system receiving the data write operation instruction and the data write address, the data write operation instruction and the data write address are forwarded to the second user layer application via the first user layer application, the second user layer application reads the data in the storage space through the first driver, and writes the data corresponding to the data write operation instruction into the storage space;

[0026] In response to writing the data corresponding to the data write operation instruction into the storage space, the third driver sends an interrupt processing instruction to the safety-critical component, and the safety-critical component switches to the trusted operating system according to the interrupt processing instruction and transmits the initialization result of the non-volatile random access memory to the trusted execution environment module;

[0027] If the non-volatile random access memory has been initialized, a firmware root startup instruction is obtained, and the trusted root memory logic data is initialized according to the firmware root startup instruction to implement firmware trusted root data initialization;

[0028] In response to the completion of initialization of the firmware trusted root data, the second driver of the untrusted operating system creates a trusted root device.

[0029] In one of the embodiments, in response to the second driver receiving the trusted root device operation instruction sent by the software stack, the second driver sends an interrupt processing instruction and the trusted root device operation instruction to the security critical component, the security critical component switches to the trusted operating system according to the interrupt processing instruction, and transmits the trusted root device operation instruction to the trusted operating system;

[0030] In response to the trusted operating system receiving the trusted root device operation instruction, the trusted root operating system parses the trusted root device operation instruction to obtain a parsing result, and sends the trusted root device operation instruction to the operation module in the trusted execution environment module according to the parsing result, and the operation module of the trusted execution environment module performs the trusted root device operation according to the trusted root device operation instruction.

[0031] In one embodiment, the operation module of the trusted execution environment module performs the trusted root device operation according to the trusted root device operation instruction, including:

[0032] Parse the trusted root device operation instruction, obtain the trusted root device operation type, and determine whether the trusted root device operation includes data read and write operations;

[0033] If the trusted root device operation includes a data read and write operation, the operation module calls the fifth driver to perform a data read and write operation on the storage space;

[0034] If the data read / write operation type is a data read operation, an interrupt processing instruction is generated and transmitted to the safety-critical component. The safety-critical component switches to the non-trusted operating system according to the interrupt processing instruction and transmits the data read operation instruction to the non-trusted operating system. The data in the storage space is read through the non-trusted operating system and the read data is stored in the shared memory.

[0035] If the data read and write operation type is a data write operation, the data is encrypted through the encryption module to obtain the encrypted data, and the encrypted data is written into the shared space, an interrupt processing instruction is generated, and the interrupt processing instruction is transmitted to the security critical component. The security critical component switches to the non-trusted operating system according to the interrupt processing instruction and transmits the data write operation instruction and the encrypted data to the non-trusted operating system. The trusted operating system transmits the data write operation instruction and the encrypted data to the non-trusted operating system, and the encrypted data is written into the storage space through the non-trusted operating system.

[0036] In order to solve the above technical problem, a third aspect provides a computer device, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor implements the following steps when executing the computer program: the processor implements the steps of the above first aspect method when executing the computer program.

[0037] In order to solve the above technical problems, in a fourth aspect, the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the method of the above first aspect are implemented.

[0038] Different from the prior art, the present application provides a firmware trusted root implementation system, the system includes: a hardware layer and a software layer built on the hardware layer, the software layer includes a user mode layer, an administrator mode layer and a machine mode layer connected in sequence; wherein the hardware layer includes a storage space, an execution architecture kernel and a trusted root, the storage space is used to store persistent data of the firmware trusted root, and the execution architecture kernel is used to execute storage space access rights; the user mode layer includes an untrusted user application and a trusted execution environment module, and the user mode layer is used to execute the application; the administrator mode layer includes an untrusted operating system, a trusted operating system and a shared space, and the untrusted operating system and the trusted operating system interact with each other through the shared space; the user mode layer is used to call the administrator mode layer to perform read and write operations on data in the storage space; the machine mode layer includes security-critical components, and the security-critical components are used to receive control instructions transmitted by the untrusted operating system and the trusted operating system, and run the operating system kernel according to the control instructions. In this way, applications and operating systems in trusted execution environments and non-trusted execution environments are set up in the privileged user mode layer, administrator mode layer, and machine mode layer of the RSIC-V execution architecture, data interaction between the trusted execution environment and the non-trusted execution environment is achieved through memory space, and control instructions transmitted by the non-trusted operating system and the trusted operating system are received through security-critical components, and the operating system kernel is run according to the control instructions, which can improve the reliability of the firmware trusted root implementation. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0039] Figure 1 A structural block diagram of a firmware trusted root implementation system in the prior art;

[0040] Figure 2 A structural block diagram of a firmware trusted root implementation system in one embodiment;

[0041] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of a process for implementing a firmware trusted root in one embodiment;

[0042] Figure 4 It is a flowchart of a firmware trusted root implementation method in another embodiment;

[0043] Figure 5 A flowchart of a firmware trusted root implementation method in another embodiment;

[0044] Figure 6 FIG. 4 is a diagram showing the internal structure of a computer device in one embodiment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0045] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the present application more clearly understood, the present application is further described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are only used to explain the present application and are not used to limit the present application.

[0046] In addition to the conventional independent chip technology solution soldered on the machine motherboard, CPU vendors have also integrated trusted computing features into their processors. For example, Intel introduced Platform Trust Technology (PTT) to implement TPM (trusted root) functionality in the system firmware. AMD-based Ryzen Pro CPUs have built-in TPM functionality. Another technical solution is to use firmware TPM (fTPM), which are pure software TPMs that run only on the CPU's trusted execution environment (TEE), and virtual TPM (vTPM).

[0047] Under the ARMv8 architecture, in the prior art, fTPM (firmware trusted root) is a TA (Trust Application) running TEEOS (trusted operating system), and the implementation method is as follows: Figure 1 ARM platform firmware root of trust implementation architecture diagram, Figure 1 In the implementation of fTPM, an fTPM TA (fTPM Trust Application) is implemented in TEEOS to realize the computing function of TPM, and RPMB or rich OS FS file system is used as the trusted storage of fTPM in Rich OS (operating system). The secure storage function of TEE (trusted execution environment) is used to store the persistent data of TPM in this securely encrypted RPMB or Rich OS fs in the read and write mode of shared memory; the ftpm driver on the REE side interacts with the ftpm TA on the TEE side through the SMC instruction of ARM, which is switched to the secure world by the EL3 firmware layer and forwarded to the TEE OS to the ftpmTA application. This interaction process is a kind of interaction mode, and other modes are forwarded, thereby ensuring security.

[0048] Although the existing technology is relatively convenient, its implementation is based on the ARM platform or other architecture platforms and cannot be applied to the RISC-V architecture platform. All of the above technical logic cannot be reused on RISC-V.

[0049] In view of the above technical problems, in one embodiment, Figure 2 As shown, the present application provides a firmware trusted root implementation system, which includes a hardware layer and a software layer built on the hardware layer. The software layer includes a user mode layer, an administrator mode layer, and a machine mode layer connected in sequence.

[0050] Specifically, the execution architecture used in the present application is RSIC-V. The RSIC-V execution architecture has three privileged modes in terms of the operating system, wherein the three privileged modes include a user mode layer, an administrator mode layer, and a machine mode layer.

[0051] The machine mode layer (m-mode in the figure) is the highest privileged mode in the RISC-V architecture and the mode in which the operating system kernel runs. In m-mode, the operating system has full control and can access all resources and registers, including physical memory, devices, and peripherals. m-mode is usually used for booting and initializing the operating system, as well as handling exceptions and interrupts.

[0052] The supervisor mode layer (shown as s-mode) is the second-highest privileged mode in the RISC-V architecture and is used to run the kernel of the operating system. In s-mode, the operating system can access restricted resources and registers, but cannot directly access physical memory and devices. s-mode is usually used for core functions of the operating system, such as process management, memory management, and device drivers.

[0053] The user mode layer (u-mode in the figure) is the least privileged mode in the RISC-V architecture. It cannot access hardware resources, but can only access certain registers and general instructions, and is generally used to point to applications.

[0054] m-mode and s-mode are two privileged modes in the RISC-V architecture, which are used to implement the privilege level and resource access control of the operating system. Their existence can improve the security and stability of the system, and also facilitate the development and debugging of the operating system.

[0055] Among them, the hardware layer includes storage space, execution architecture core and trusted root. The storage space is used to store the persistent data of the firmware trusted root, and the execution architecture core is used to execute storage space access rights.

[0056] Specifically, the Silicon Root of Trust, as the first element of the trust chain, maintains the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of sensitive or privileged computing and data. It is implemented through a combination of software, hardware and cryptographic isolation technologies, and generally appears in the form of a certificate provided by the manufacturer to ensure the trust of the implementation.

[0057] The physical memory protection (PMP) provided by the execution architecture core (RSIC-V Core) is part of the RISC-V privileged architecture specification, which describes the interface of a standard RISC-V memory protection unit. PMP defines a limited set of PMP areas that can be individually configured to enforce access rights within the memory address range, thereby achieving physical isolation of the trusted execution environment.

[0058] The storage space (Secure Storage) is used as the persistent storage space of the tpm (trusted root) to store the persistent data of the ftpm (firmware trusted root), such as initialization data, nvram data, etc.

[0059] The user mode layer includes non-trusted user applications and a trusted execution environment module. The user mode layer is used to execute applications. The administrator mode layer includes a non-trusted operating system, a trusted operating system, and a shared space. The non-trusted operating system and the trusted operating system interact with each other through the shared space. The user mode layer is used to call the administrator mode layer to perform read and write operations on data in the storage space.

[0060] For more details, see Figure 2 , the untrusted user application and the untrusted operating system are communicatively connected, the untrusted user application and the untrusted operating system are located in an untrusted execution environment, the untrusted application includes a first user layer application, a second user layer application and a software stack that are communicatively connected; the untrusted operating system includes a first driver, a second driver and a third driver that are communicatively connected.

[0061] The trusted execution environment module and the trusted operating system are communicatively connected, the trusted execution environment module and the trusted operating system are located in the trusted execution environment, the trusted execution environment module includes a communicatively connected operation module and a fourth driver; the trusted operating system includes a communicatively connected fifth driver and an encryption module.

[0062] Specifically, the trusted execution environment (ftpm TA): the logical implementation defined by the trusted platform module is realized through the operation module (tpm lib), that is, the logical implementation of the trusted root is defined. The fourth driver can be a storage driver. The fourth driver is used for the storage function of persistent data. This driver will forward the read and write operations of the persistent data to the fifth driver in the trusted operating system. The fifth driver can also be a storage driver. It is forwarded to the third driver and the first user layer application and the second application layer application in the non-trusted space through the security-critical component. The second application layer application calls the first driver in the non-trusted execution environment. The first driver can be a storage driver, and the storage space is read and written through the first driver. In the process of data transmission, the data to be read and written will be encrypted and stored in the shared space, thereby realizing data transmission.

[0063] The operation module of the trusted execution environment defines and implements the functional logic implementation defined by the TPM specification.

[0064] The fourth driver of the trusted execution environment implements the persistent storage required by TPM, especially the reading and writing of NVRAM, and forwards instructions and data.

[0065] The fifth driver of the trusted execution environment processes the TPM persistent data read and write instructions, and saves the data in a shared space after encryption. The interrupt processing instructions and data operation instructions defined by SBI can be transmitted to the security-critical components. The security-critical components switch to the non-trusted execution environment according to the interrupt processing instructions, and forward the data operation instructions to the non-trusted execution environment for reading and writing storage space.

[0066] The cryptographic module of the Trusted Execution Environment is hardware accelerated by RSIC-V to implement asymmetric encryption and decryption, signature, and signature verification. It supports RSA and ECC using prime curves, symmetric encryption and decryption, all the most commonly used block cipher modes, hashing, symmetric signature and signature verification using HMAC, symmetric and asymmetric key generation, random number generation for random numbers, key generation, and signatures.

[0067] In one embodiment, the encryption module may include a key generator, a key storage, a key manager, and a key buffer. Among them, the key generator is responsible for the generation, detection, selection and production of various keys of the trusted computing module; the key storage is an important infrastructure of the cryptographic coprocessor, and the data in the key storage needs to be encrypted and stored. The key manager is the core of the cryptographic coprocessor and is the entrance and exit of all operations of the cryptographic coprocessor, including key management and key transmission; the key buffer implements the management of the key segments in the data protection key and the hierarchical keys protected by the storage root key, which can improve the reliability of the system.

[0068] The non-trusted execution environment operating system (illustrated operating system OS / firmware) can be an operating system similar to Linux, BSD, or it can be similar to BIOS, uboot, UEFI firmware, etc.

[0069] The third driver of the non-trusted execution environment is responsible for functions such as generating and forwarding instructions or interrupts that interact with the trusted execution environment.

[0070] The second driver of the non-trusted execution environment is responsible for registering and initializing the trusted platform module device, receiving the TPM operation of the user layer, and forwarding the TPM operation to the third driver.

[0071] The first driver of the non-trusted execution environment is responsible for receiving the read and write operations of the storage space of the user layer and implementing the read and write functions.

[0072] The second user layer application of the non-trusted execution environment belongs to the non-trusted execution environment user layer application, which is responsible for data reading and writing, and decryption and reading and writing of shared memory.

[0073] The first user layer application of the non-trusted execution environment belongs to the non-trusted execution environment user layer application, and is responsible for receiving and sending tee instructions.

[0074] In this application, by setting up a trusted execution environment in the user mode layer, administrator mode layer and machine mode layer of the RSIC-V execution architecture and data interaction between applications and operating systems in the non-trusted execution environment, the operating system in the non-trusted execution environment can provide ftpm functions for users; and realize communication between a secure trusted execution environment and an insecure non-trusted execution environment.

[0075] The machine mode layer includes safety-critical components such as Figure 1 As shown, the safety-critical component is connected to the non-trusted operating system and the trusted operating system for communication. The safety-critical component is used to receive control instructions transmitted by the non-trusted operating system and the trusted operating system, and to run the operating system kernel according to the control instructions.

[0076] The security-critical component (Secure Monitor) can achieve interrupt isolation by switching the PLIC interrupt enable mode, realize the switching of the trusted execution environment and the untrusted execution environment context, and forward the instructions between the trusted execution environment and the untrusted execution environment.

[0077] In one embodiment, the control instruction may be an interrupt handling instruction, and the illustrated SBI is an interrupt handling instruction for switching between a feasible execution environment and a non-trusted execution environment. The illustrated SMC instruction is an interrupt or exception handling instruction for switching between a trusted environment and a non-trusted execution environment. The present application integrates a driver of a firmware trusted root in an operating system, and the driver sends and receives instructions to the firmware trusted root and switches contexts by calling an interface provided by SBI, rather than sending and receiving instructions through a physical trusted root register, thereby improving the reliability of switching execution environments.

[0078] In this application, by utilizing the existing TEE support for RISC-V, in a trusted execution environment, using the spatial isolation of the trusted execution environment, information flow control and other characteristics, the ftpm TA application is designed and implemented to implement the functions defined by the trusted platform module. The logical implementation includes key generation, storage and use of encrypted keys, software authentication, remote authentication, etc. A driver module for ftpm persistence operations is added to the TEE OS. In a non-trusted execution environment, a firmware trusted root driver and a data read and write driver for firmware trusted root persistence data are designed and implemented. In order to ensure data interaction, shared memory is added.

[0079] In one embodiment, Figure 3 As shown, a firmware trusted root implementation method is provided, and the method is applied to Figure 1 The firmware trusted root implementation system in the example is used as an example to illustrate, including the following steps:

[0080] Step 101, in response to receiving an execution architecture power-on instruction, loading a trusted root of a hardware layer, and verifying a trusted operating system firmware according to the trusted root to obtain a verification result.

[0081] Step 102: If the verification result is successful, the trusted operating system file is loaded into the storage space for storage.

[0082] Step 103, loading the fifth driver and encryption module in the trusted operating system, and setting a shared space to implement the operation of the trusted operating system.

[0083] Specifically, in response to receiving the power-on instruction of the execution architecture (RISC-V) device, the trusted root of the hardware layer will be loaded first. The trusted root usually appears in the form of a certificate provided by the manufacturer to ensure the trust of the implementation, which serves as the trusted root of trusted startup; after completing the loading of the trusted root, continue to load and start the hardware-related drivers. During the startup process, the trusted operating system will be verified using the trusted root. After the verification passes, the trusted operating system file will be loaded into the specified memory area set by the PMP, that is, the storage space. This memory area is an isolated area, and other programs have no permission to read, write and execute. Further, the trusted operating system is started, the fifth driver of the trusted operating system and the encryption module in the trusted operating system are loaded, and a shared space is set for data interaction between the non-trusted execution environment and the trusted execution environment. At this time, the trusted operating system becomes a trusted operating system that runs independently in a trusted execution space.

[0084] Step 104, loading the firmware. In response to the firmware being in operation, generating a sending instruction, and sending the sending instruction to the trusted operating system to load the trusted execution environment module, so as to use the trusted operating system to run the application layer program of the trusted execution environment module.

[0085] Step 105, initializing the trusted execution environment module, and creating a firmware trusted root device for use by the firmware.

[0086] Step 106, release the trusted root instance through the firmware, run the untrusted operating system, and then load the first driver and the second driver to create a trusted root device for use by the user layer.

[0087] Specifically, after setting up the trusted operating system, firmware loading can be performed. For example, it can be uboot, uefi or bios firmware model loading and running, running the third driver, the first user layer application, the second user layer application and loading the first driver, etc.; during the firmware running process, it will load and send instructions to the trusted operating system to load the trusted execution environment module, and the trusted operating system will run the trusted user layer program in the trusted execution environment module.

[0088] Step 107 , in response to receiving a specific instruction, triggering the initialization of the internal logical data of the trusted root, and completing the user application through the software stack of the non-trusted user application.

[0089] Specifically, the trusted execution environment module can be loaded and instantiated, and the initialization operation can be performed to create a firmware-based trusted root device for use by the firmware. During the initialization process, the data in the storage space will be read, and if it has not been initialized, the secure storage will be initialized.

[0090] The initialization process is to send initialization instructions through the software stack in the non-trusted operating system, and the operation module in the firmware trusted root determines the format and content of the data, and writes it into the shared memory after encryption through the fourth driver in the trusted execution environment, and sends the operation instructions from the security-critical component to the first user layer application in the non-trusted execution environment, and the second user layer application is then written into the storage space by the first driver in the non-trusted execution environment; and the operation of reading data is also to send instructions for reading by the software stack in the non-trusted operating system, and the operation module of the trusted execution environment module determines the data kernel and format to be read, and then forwards the operation instructions to the third driver in the non-trusted execution environment through the security-critical component, the third driver forwards the operation instructions to the first user layer application, and then reads the data in the storage space through the second user layer application, saves it in the shared space, and the trusted execution environment module reads the data in the shared space and decrypts it to complete the data reading.

[0091] It can be understood that the firmware trusted root is similar to the physical trusted root. Specific instructions (such as the TPM2_Startup instruction in the TPM2.0 chip and the TCM_Startup instruction in the TCM chip) are required to trigger the initialization of the internal logical data of the trusted root and complete the initialization of the internal data of the firmware trusted root. After successful initialization, the trusted root can operate normally and can be applied, such as implementing secure boot based on the trusted root.

[0092] Furthermore, the firmware releases the trusted root instance and loads the operating system. During the boot process of the operating system, the second driver and the first driver are loaded and a trusted root (such as / dev / tpm0) device is created for use by the user layer. During this process, the firmware trusted root is reloaded and the trusted root device is started. For example, the initialization of the firmware trusted root in the firmware configures the firmware trusted root operation status according to the firmware trusted root status data, and loads the persistent data stored by the user in the firmware trusted root.

[0093] like Figure 4 As shown, the firmware trusted root initialization process of this application is as follows:

[0094] S10: In response to the trusted execution environment module (Ftpm TA in the figure) being loaded, it is determined whether the non-volatile random access memory has been initialized (the initialization state is obtained).

[0095] S20: If the non-volatile random access memory has not been initialized, the trusted execution environment module writes the data structure data according to a preset specification.

[0096] Specifically, after the trusted execution environment is loaded, it can check whether the NVRAM (non-volatile random access memory) has been initialized. If it has not been initialized, it is necessary to implement nvram initialization on the storage space. The nvram initialization instruction can be initiated by the trusted execution environment module, and then the operation module in the trusted execution environment performs the specification processing of the data structure and data to be written according to the trusted root specification defined by the operation module.

[0097] S201: The data structure data is transmitted to the fifth driver of the trusted operating system via the fourth driver of the trusted execution environment module. The fifth driver uses the encryption module of the trusted operating system and the cryptographic accelerator provided by the execution architecture to encrypt the data structure data, obtain the encrypted data, and save the encrypted data to the shared space.

[0098] S202: In response to receiving a data write operation instruction, an interrupt handling instruction is triggered, and the trusted operating system sends the interrupt handling instruction, the data write operation instruction, and the data write address to the security-critical component. The security-critical component switches to the non-trusted operating system according to the interrupt handling instruction, and transmits the data write operation instruction and the data write address to the non-trusted operating system.

[0099] S203: In response to the third driver of the non-trusted operating system receiving a data write operation instruction and a data write address, the data write operation instruction and the data write address are forwarded to the second user layer application via the first user layer application. The second user layer application reads the data in the storage space through the first driver and writes the data corresponding to the data write operation instruction into the storage space.

[0100] S204: In response to writing the data corresponding to the data write operation instruction into the storage space, the third driver sends an interrupt processing instruction to the security critical component, and the security critical component switches to the trusted operating system according to the interrupt processing instruction and transmits the initialization result of the non-volatile random access memory to the trusted execution environment module.

[0101] Specifically, to initialize NVRAM, it is first necessary to obtain the nvram initialization instruction initiated by the trusted execution environment module, and send the data structure data to the fifth driver of the trusted operating system kernel layer through the fourth driver of the trusted execution environment; the fifth driver will use the encryption module and use the cryptographic accelerator provided by the RSIC-V execution architecture to encrypt the data, and then the fifth driver of the kernel layer will save the encrypted data in the shared space.

[0102] In one embodiment, for data write operations, the trusted operating system transmits the instructions and data memory address and size to be written via SBI by the security-critical component by interrupting the operating system's usage rights, and reaches the third driver in the non-trusted execution environment after switching the trusted and non-trusted contexts; after receiving the signal, the third driver forwards the data to the first user layer application of the user layer for processing, and the first user layer application will hand over the specific read and write transactions to the second user layer application; the second user layer application reads the data in the shared space through the first driver in the non-trusted execution environment, and writes it to the storage space; after the data is written to the storage space, the third driver sends an SBI instruction to the security-critical component, and the security-critical component switches to the trusted operating system according to the interrupt processing instruction and transmits the initialization result of the storage space to the trusted operating system, and the trusted operating system then transmits the initialization result of the storage space to the trusted execution environment module.

[0103] S21: If the non-volatile random access memory has been initialized, a firmware root startup instruction is obtained, and the trusted root memory logic data is initialized according to the firmware root startup instruction to implement firmware trusted root data initialization (firmware trusted root startup instruction).

[0104] S22: In response to the completion of initialization of the firmware trusted root data, the second driver of the untrusted operating system creates a trusted root device (creates a trusted root device).

[0105] If the storage space has been initialized before, or the operation of initializing the storage space has been completed, the firmware root startup instruction can be obtained, and the trusted root memory logical data can be initialized according to the firmware root startup instruction to realize the firmware trusted root data initialization, and then create a trusted root device for use by the user layer.

[0106] The firmware trusted root startup of this application is similar to the physical trusted root. It requires specific instructions (such as the TPM2_Startup instruction in the TPM2.0 chip and the TCM_Startup instruction in the TCM chip) to trigger the initialization of the internal logical data of the trusted root and complete the initialization of the internal data of the firmware trusted root. This process involves the reading and writing of nvram and persistent data. The writing process is consistent with the initialization process of nvram, but the data structure transmitted is different. The process of reading persistent data is as follows:

[0107] A read operation instruction is sent by the trusted execution environment module, and specifically, the operation module operating in the trusted execution environment module sends the read operation instruction to the fifth driver, and the fifth driver sends the read operation instruction to the third driver of the non-trusted execution environment through the security key component; the third driver receives the data read operation instruction, and forwards the data read operation instruction to the second user layer application via the first user layer application, and the second user layer application reads the data in the shared space through the first driver, and stores the data corresponding to the data read operation instruction in the shared storage.

[0108] After the non-trusted execution environment stores the data corresponding to the read operation instruction in the shared storage, it triggers a signal interrupt instruction and switches to the trusted execution environment through the security-critical component. The fifth driver in the trusted operating system reads the data in the shared tea space, decrypts it using the encryption module, and then sends the decrypted data to the fourth driver and operation module in the user space of the trusted execution environment, and returns the result to the trusted execution environment module to complete the reading of the persistent data.

[0109] After the device is initialized, a trusted root device (such as / dev / tpm0) is created in the non-trusted execution environment by loading the operation module. The software stack uses the trusted root device, and the second driver is responsible for processing the instructions, forwarding the instructions to the trusted execution environment to process the specific logic, so that ordinary programs cannot tamper with the data therein, which can improve the reliability of the firmware trusted root implementation.

[0110] In one embodiment, see Figure 5 In one embodiment, in response to the second driver receiving the trusted root device operation instruction sent by the software stack, the second driver sends an interrupt processing instruction and the trusted root device operation instruction to the security critical component, and the security critical component switches to the trusted operating system according to the interrupt processing instruction, and transmits the trusted root device operation instruction to the trusted operating system; in response to the trusted operating system receiving the trusted root device operation instruction, the trusted root operating system parses the trusted root device operation instruction to obtain a parsing result, and sends the trusted root device operation instruction to the operation module in the trusted execution environment module according to the parsing result, and the operation module of the trusted execution environment module performs the trusted root device operation according to the trusted root device operation instruction.

[0111] Specifically, the non-trusted operating system or firmware uses the software stack to execute the trusted root operation command; the software stack will operate the trusted root device, and then interact with the kernel layer, that is, the non-trusted operating system, through ioctl; the second driver of the non-trusted operating system receives the trusted root operation instruction passed from the user layer and sends the SBI instruction to call the trusted execution environment module through the third driver; after receiving the SBI instruction, an interrupt processing instruction will be generated, and when the key security component receives the instruction and interrupt signal, the context of the non-trusted execution environment is saved and the context is switched to the trusted execution environment for execution; the trusted operating system will determine which TA the information sent by the security-critical component is for, and if it is for the firmware trusted root, it will be forwarded to the trusted execution environment module; the trusted execution environment module receives the information, determines the specific trusted root instruction, that is, whether it is a data read instruction or a data write instruction, and hands it over to the execution module to implement the specific logical function.

[0112] In one embodiment, the operation module of the trusted execution environment module performs the trusted root device operation according to the trusted root device operation instruction, including:

[0113] Parse the trusted root device operation instruction, obtain the trusted root device operation type, and determine whether the trusted root device operation includes data read and write operations;

[0114] If the trusted root device operation includes a data read and write operation, the operation module calls the fifth driver to perform a data read and write operation on the storage space;

[0115] If the data read / write operation type is a data read operation, an interrupt processing instruction is generated and transmitted to the safety-critical component. The safety-critical component switches to the non-trusted operating system according to the interrupt processing instruction and transmits the data read operation instruction to the non-trusted operating system. The data in the storage space is read through the non-trusted operating system and the read data is stored in the shared memory.

[0116] If the data read and write operation type is a data write operation, the data is encrypted through the encryption module to obtain the encrypted data, and the encrypted data is written into the shared space, an interrupt processing instruction is generated, and the interrupt processing instruction is transmitted to the security critical component. The security critical component switches to the non-trusted operating system according to the interrupt processing instruction and transmits the data write operation instruction and the encrypted data to the non-trusted operating system. The trusted operating system transmits the data write operation instruction and the encrypted data to the non-trusted operating system, and the encrypted data is written into the storage space through the non-trusted operating system.

[0117] Specifically, first, the operation module of the trusted execution environment module receives the information and determines whether the trusted root device operation includes data reading and writing operations; if it does not involve data reading and writing operations on the storage space, the result is delivered to the trusted execution environment module, and the trusted execution environment module sends the result to the trusted operating system; if it involves data reading and writing operations on the storage space, the operation module calls the fourth driver to perform data reading and writing operations on the storage space; if the data reading and writing operation type is a data reading operation, an interrupt processing instruction is generated, and the interrupt processing instruction is transmitted to the security-critical component, and the security-critical component switches to the non-trusted operating system according to the interrupt processing instruction and transmits the data reading operation instruction to the non-trusted operating system, reads the data in the storage space through the non-trusted operating system and stores the read data in the shared memory.

[0118] If the data read and write operation type is a data write operation, the data is encrypted through the encryption module to obtain the encrypted data, and the encrypted data is written into the shared space, an interrupt processing instruction is generated, and the interrupt processing instruction is transmitted to the security critical component. The security critical component switches to the non-trusted operating system according to the interrupt processing instruction and transmits the data write operation instruction and the encrypted data to the non-trusted operating system. The trusted operating system transmits the data write operation instruction and the encrypted data to the non-trusted operating system, and the encrypted data is written into the storage space through the non-trusted operating system.

[0119] After the data read and write operations are completed, the results are returned to the first user layer application and the second user layer application. The first user layer application returns the results to the third driver. The third driver sends the SBI instruction again. After receiving the SBI instruction, an interrupt processing instruction is generated. After the key security component receives the instruction and the interrupt signal, the context of the non-trusted execution environment is saved, and the context is switched to the trusted execution environment for execution. After passing through the fifth driver and the fourth driver in turn, the result is returned to the operation module; the operation module completes the specific logic implementation and then hands it over to the trusted execution environment module. The trusted execution environment module sends an instruction to return the result to the trusted operating system. The trusted operating system sends the SBI instruction again. After receiving the SBI instruction, the security-critical component switches to the non-trusted execution environment for operation. After passing through the third driver, the second driver and the trusted root device of the non-trusted operating system, the final processing result is returned to the software stack and the user.

[0120] In this application, the trusted root function can also be provided to the operating system through a pure software implementation. The firmware trusted root runs in a trusted execution environment independent of the operating system, and ordinary programs cannot tamper with the data therein. At the same time, the encryption and decryption hardware acceleration provided by RSIC-V is used in the operation module to improve the speed of trusted computing. Therefore, compared with the virtual trusted root or the trusted root implemented by software, this method is safer.

[0121] It should be understood that although Figure 3-Figure 5 The steps in the flowchart are shown in sequence as indicated by the arrows, but these steps are not necessarily executed in the order indicated by the arrows. Unless otherwise specified in this document, there is no strict order restriction for the execution of these steps, and these steps can be executed in other orders. Moreover, Figure 3-Figure 5 At least part of the steps may include multiple sub-steps or multiple stages. These sub-steps or stages are not necessarily executed at the same time, but can be executed at different times. The execution order of these sub-steps or stages is not necessarily sequential, but can be executed in turn or alternately with other steps or at least part of the sub-steps or stages of other steps.

[0122] For the specific definition of the firmware trusted root implementation system, please refer to the definition of the firmware trusted root implementation method above, which will not be repeated here. Each module in the above-mentioned firmware trusted root implementation system can be implemented in whole or in part by software, hardware and their combination. The above-mentioned modules can be embedded in or independent of the processor in the computer device in the form of hardware, or can be stored in the memory of the computer device in the form of software, so that the processor can call and execute the operations corresponding to the above modules.

[0123] In one embodiment, a computer device is provided. The computer device may be a terminal, and its internal structure diagram may be as follows: Figure 6 As shown. The computer device includes a processor, a memory, a network interface, a display screen and an input device connected through a system bus. Among them, the processor of the computer device is used to provide computing and control capabilities. The memory of the computer device includes a non-volatile storage medium and an internal memory. The non-volatile storage medium stores an operating system and a computer program. The internal memory provides an environment for the operation of the operating system and the computer program in the non-volatile storage medium. The network interface of the computer device is used to communicate with an external terminal through a network connection. When the computer program is executed by the processor, a firmware trusted root implementation method is implemented. The display screen of the computer device can be a liquid crystal display screen or an electronic ink display screen, and the input device of the computer device can be a touch layer covered on the display screen, or a key, trackball or touchpad set on the computer device housing, or an external keyboard, touchpad or mouse, etc.

[0124] Those skilled in the art will understand that Figure 6 The structure shown in the figure is only a block diagram of a part of the structure related to the solution of the present application, and does not constitute a limitation on the computer device to which the solution of the present application is applied. The specific computer device may include more or fewer components than those shown in the figure, or combine certain components, or have a different arrangement of components.

[0125] In one embodiment, the present application also provides a computer program product, which includes a computer program stored on a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, and the computer program includes program instructions. When the program instructions are executed by a computer, the computer can execute the firmware trusted root implementation method provided by the above methods.

[0126] In one embodiment, a computer device is provided, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor implements the following steps when executing the computer program:

[0127] Step 101, in response to receiving an execution architecture power-on instruction, loading a trusted root of a hardware layer, and verifying a trusted operating system firmware according to the trusted root to obtain a verification result.

[0128] Step 102: If the verification result is successful, the trusted operating system file is loaded into the storage space for storage.

[0129] Step 103, loading the fifth driver and encryption module in the trusted operating system, and setting a shared space to implement the operation of the trusted operating system.

[0130] Step 104, loading the firmware. In response to the firmware being in operation, generating a sending instruction, and sending the sending instruction to the trusted operating system to load the trusted execution environment module, so as to use the trusted operating system to run the application layer program of the trusted execution environment module.

[0131] Step 105, initializing the trusted execution environment module, and creating a firmware trusted root device for use by the firmware.

[0132] Step 106, release the trusted root instance through the firmware, run the untrusted operating system, and then load the first driver and the second driver to create a trusted root device for use by the user layer.

[0133] Step 107 , in response to receiving a specific instruction, triggering the initialization of the internal logical data of the trusted root, and completing the user application through the software stack of the non-trusted user application.

[0134] In one embodiment, when the processor executes the computer program, the processor further implements the following steps:

[0135] In response to the trusted execution environment module being loaded, determining whether the non-volatile random access memory has been initialized;

[0136] If the non-volatile random access memory has not been initialized, the trusted execution environment module writes the data structure data according to a preset specification;

[0137] The data structure data is transmitted to the fifth driver of the trusted operating system via the fourth driver of the trusted execution environment module. The fifth driver uses the encryption module of the trusted operating system and the cryptographic accelerator provided by the execution architecture to encrypt the data structure data to obtain the encrypted data, and saves the encrypted data to the shared space.

[0138] In response to receiving the data write operation instruction, an interrupt processing instruction is triggered, the trusted operating system sends the interrupt processing instruction, the data write operation instruction and the data write address to the safety critical component, the safety critical component switches to the non-trusted operating system according to the interrupt processing instruction, and transmits the data write operation instruction and the data write address to the non-trusted operating system;

[0139] In response to the third driver of the non-trusted operating system receiving the data write operation instruction and the data write address, the data write operation instruction and the data write address are forwarded to the second user layer application via the first user layer application, the second user layer application reads the data in the storage space through the first driver, and writes the data corresponding to the data write operation instruction into the storage space;

[0140] In response to writing the data corresponding to the data write operation instruction into the storage space, the third driver sends an interrupt processing instruction to the safety-critical component, and the safety-critical component switches to the trusted operating system according to the interrupt processing instruction and transmits the initialization result of the non-volatile random access memory to the trusted execution environment module;

[0141] If the non-volatile random access memory has been initialized, a firmware root startup instruction is obtained, and the trusted root memory logic data is initialized according to the firmware root startup instruction to implement firmware trusted root data initialization;

[0142] In response to the completion of initialization of the firmware trusted root data, the second driver of the untrusted operating system creates a trusted root device.

[0143] In one embodiment, when the processor executes the computer program, the processor further implements the following steps:

[0144] In response to the second driver receiving the trusted root device operation instruction sent by the software stack, the second driver sends an interrupt processing instruction and the trusted root device operation instruction to the security critical component, the security critical component switches to the trusted operating system according to the interrupt processing instruction, and transmits the trusted root device operation instruction to the trusted operating system;

[0145] In response to the trusted operating system receiving the trusted root device operation instruction, the trusted root operating system parses the trusted root device operation instruction to obtain a parsing result, and sends the trusted root device operation instruction to the operation module in the trusted execution environment module according to the parsing result, and the operation module of the trusted execution environment module performs the trusted root device operation according to the trusted root device operation instruction.

[0146] In one embodiment, when the processor executes the computer program, the processor further implements the following steps:

[0147] The operation module of the trusted execution environment module performs the trusted root device operation according to the trusted root device operation instruction, including:

[0148] Parse the trusted root device operation instruction, obtain the trusted root device operation type, and determine whether the trusted root device operation includes data read and write operations;

[0149] If the trusted root device operation includes a data read and write operation, the operation module calls the fifth driver to perform a data read and write operation on the storage space;

[0150] If the data read / write operation type is a data read operation, an interrupt processing instruction is generated and transmitted to the safety-critical component. The safety-critical component switches to the non-trusted operating system according to the interrupt processing instruction and transmits the data read operation instruction to the non-trusted operating system. The data in the storage space is read through the non-trusted operating system and the read data is stored in the shared memory.

[0151] If the data read and write operation type is a data write operation, the data is encrypted through the encryption module to obtain the encrypted data, and the encrypted data is written into the shared space, an interrupt processing instruction is generated, and the interrupt processing instruction is transmitted to the security critical component. The security critical component switches to the non-trusted operating system according to the interrupt processing instruction and transmits the data write operation instruction and the encrypted data to the non-trusted operating system. The trusted operating system transmits the data write operation instruction and the encrypted data to the non-trusted operating system, and the encrypted data is written into the storage space through the non-trusted operating system.

[0152] In one embodiment, a computer readable storage medium is provided, on which a computer program is stored, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the following steps are implemented:

[0153] Step 101, in response to receiving an execution architecture power-on instruction, loading a trusted root of a hardware layer, and verifying a trusted operating system firmware according to the trusted root to obtain a verification result.

[0154] Step 102: If the verification result is successful, the trusted operating system file is loaded into the storage space for storage.

[0155] Step 103, loading the fifth driver and encryption module in the trusted operating system, and setting a shared space to implement the operation of the trusted operating system.

[0156] Step 104, loading the firmware. In response to the firmware being in operation, generating a sending instruction, and sending the sending instruction to the trusted operating system to load the trusted execution environment module, so as to use the trusted operating system to run the application layer program of the trusted execution environment module.

[0157] Step 105, initializing the trusted execution environment module, and creating a firmware trusted root device for use by the firmware.

[0158] Step 106, release the trusted root instance through the firmware, run the untrusted operating system, and then load the first driver and the second driver to create a trusted root device for use by the user layer.

[0159] Step 107 , in response to receiving a specific instruction, triggering the initialization of the internal logical data of the trusted root, and completing the user application through the software stack of the non-trusted user application.

[0160] In one embodiment, when the computer program is executed by a processor, the following steps are also implemented:

[0161] In response to the trusted execution environment module being loaded, determining whether the non-volatile random access memory has been initialized;

[0162] If the non-volatile random access memory has not been initialized, the trusted execution environment module writes the data structure data according to a preset specification;

[0163] The data structure data is transmitted to the fifth driver of the trusted operating system via the fourth driver of the trusted execution environment module. The fifth driver uses the encryption module of the trusted operating system and the cryptographic accelerator provided by the execution architecture to encrypt the data structure data to obtain the encrypted data, and saves the encrypted data to the shared space.

[0164] In response to receiving the data write operation instruction, an interrupt processing instruction is triggered, the trusted operating system sends the interrupt processing instruction, the data write operation instruction and the data write address to the safety critical component, the safety critical component switches to the non-trusted operating system according to the interrupt processing instruction, and transmits the data write operation instruction and the data write address to the non-trusted operating system;

[0165] In response to the third driver of the non-trusted operating system receiving the data write operation instruction and the data write address, the data write operation instruction and the data write address are forwarded to the second user layer application via the first user layer application, the second user layer application reads the data in the storage space through the first driver, and writes the data corresponding to the data write operation instruction into the storage space;

[0166] In response to writing the data corresponding to the data write operation instruction into the storage space, the third driver sends an interrupt processing instruction to the safety-critical component, and the safety-critical component switches to the trusted operating system according to the interrupt processing instruction and transmits the initialization result of the non-volatile random access memory to the trusted execution environment module;

[0167] If the non-volatile random access memory has been initialized, a firmware root startup instruction is obtained, and the trusted root memory logic data is initialized according to the firmware root startup instruction to implement firmware trusted root data initialization;

[0168] In response to the completion of initialization of the firmware trusted root data, the second driver of the untrusted operating system creates a trusted root device.

[0169] In one embodiment, when the computer program is executed by a processor, the following steps are also implemented:

[0170] In response to the second driver receiving the trusted root device operation instruction sent by the software stack, the second driver sends an interrupt processing instruction and the trusted root device operation instruction to the security critical component, the security critical component switches to the trusted operating system according to the interrupt processing instruction, and transmits the trusted root device operation instruction to the trusted operating system;

[0171] In response to the trusted operating system receiving the trusted root device operation instruction, the trusted root operating system parses the trusted root device operation instruction to obtain a parsing result, and sends the trusted root device operation instruction to the operation module in the trusted execution environment module according to the parsing result, and the operation module of the trusted execution environment module performs the trusted root device operation according to the trusted root device operation instruction.

[0172] In one embodiment, when the computer program is executed by a processor, the following steps are also implemented:

[0173] The operation module of the trusted execution environment module performs the trusted root device operation according to the trusted root device operation instruction, including:

[0174] Parse the trusted root device operation instruction, obtain the trusted root device operation type, and determine whether the trusted root device operation includes data read and write operations;

[0175] If the trusted root device operation includes a data read and write operation, the operation module calls the fifth driver to perform a data read and write operation on the storage space;

[0176] If the data read / write operation type is a data read operation, an interrupt processing instruction is generated and transmitted to the safety-critical component. The safety-critical component switches to the non-trusted operating system according to the interrupt processing instruction and transmits the data read operation instruction to the non-trusted operating system. The data in the storage space is read through the non-trusted operating system and the read data is stored in the shared memory.

[0177] If the data read and write operation type is a data write operation, the data is encrypted through the encryption module to obtain the encrypted data, and the encrypted data is written into the shared space, an interrupt processing instruction is generated, and the interrupt processing instruction is transmitted to the security critical component. The security critical component switches to the non-trusted operating system according to the interrupt processing instruction and transmits the data write operation instruction and the encrypted data to the non-trusted operating system. The trusted operating system transmits the data write operation instruction and the encrypted data to the non-trusted operating system, and the encrypted data is written into the storage space through the non-trusted operating system.

[0178] Those skilled in the art can understand that all or part of the processes in the above-mentioned embodiment methods can be completed by instructing the relevant hardware through a computer program, and the computer program can be stored in a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium. When the computer program is executed, it can include the processes of the embodiments of the above-mentioned methods. Among them, any reference to memory, storage, database or other media used in the embodiments provided in this application can include non-volatile and / or volatile memory. Non-volatile memory can include read-only memory (ROM), programmable ROM (PROM), electrically programmable ROM (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable ROM (EEPROM) or flash memory. Volatile memory can include random access memory (RAM) or external cache memory. As an illustration and not limitation, RAM is available in many forms, such as static RAM (SRAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), double data rate SDRAM (DDRSDRAM), enhanced SDRAM (ESDRAM), synchronous link (Synchlink) DRAM (SLDRAM), memory bus (Rambus) direct RAM (RDRAM), direct memory bus dynamic RAM (DRDRAM), and memory bus dynamic RAM (RDRAM).

[0179] The technical features of the above embodiments may be combined arbitrarily. To make the description concise, not all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments are described. However, as long as there is no contradiction in the combination of these technical features, they should be considered to be within the scope of this specification.

[0180] The above-mentioned embodiments only express several implementation methods of the present application, and the descriptions thereof are relatively specific and detailed, but they cannot be understood as limiting the scope of the invention patent. It should be pointed out that, for a person of ordinary skill in the art, several variations and improvements can be made without departing from the concept of the present application, and these all belong to the protection scope of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the patent of the present application shall be subject to the attached claims.

Claims

1. A firmware trusted root implementation system, characterized in that: include: A hardware layer and a software layer built on the hardware layer, wherein the software layer includes a user mode layer, an administrator mode layer and a machine mode layer connected in sequence; The hardware layer includes a storage space, an execution architecture core, and a trusted root, wherein the storage space is used to store persistent data of the firmware trusted root, and the execution architecture core is used to execute storage space access permissions; The user mode layer includes an untrusted user application and a trusted execution environment module, and the user mode layer is used to execute the application; The administrator mode layer includes an untrusted operating system, a trusted operating system and a shared space, and the untrusted operating system and the trusted operating system perform data interaction through the shared space; the user mode layer is used to call the administrator mode layer to perform read and write operations on the data in the storage space; The machine mode layer includes a security-critical component, which is used to receive control instructions transmitted by the untrusted operating system and the trusted operating system, and run the operating system kernel according to the control instructions.

2. The system according to claim 1, characterized in that The non-trusted user application and the non-trusted operating system are communicatively connected, the non-trusted user application and the non-trusted operating system are located in a non-trusted execution environment, the non-trusted application includes a first user layer application, a second user layer application and a software stack that are communicatively connected; the non-trusted operating system includes a first driver, a second driver and a third driver that are communicatively connected.

3. The system according to claim 1, characterized in that The trusted execution environment module and the trusted operating system are communicatively connected, the trusted execution environment module and the trusted operating system are located in a trusted execution environment, the trusted execution environment module includes a communicatively connected operation module and a fourth driver; the trusted operating system includes a communicatively connected fifth driver and an encryption module.

4. The system according to claim 1, characterized in that The control instructions include interrupt processing instructions. The safety-critical component is used to transmit the interrupt processing instructions and implement the switching between the untrusted operating system and the trusted operating system according to the interrupt processing instructions.

5. A firmware trusted root implementation method, based on the firmware trusted root implementation system according to any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that: The method comprises: In response to receiving an execution architecture power-on instruction, loading a trusted root of hardware layer, and verifying the trusted operating system firmware according to the trusted root to obtain a verification result; If the verification result is successful, the trusted operating system file is loaded into the storage space for storage; Loading the fifth driver and encryption module in the trusted operating system, and setting a shared space to implement the operation of the trusted operating system; Perform firmware loading, in response to the firmware being in the process of running, generate a sending instruction, and send the sending instruction to the trusted operating system to load the trusted execution environment module, so as to use the trusted operating system to run the application layer program of the trusted execution environment module; Initialize the trusted execution environment module to create a firmware trusted root device for use by the firmware; Release the trusted root instance through the firmware, run the untrusted operating system, and then load the first driver and the second driver to create a trusted root device for use by the user layer; In response to receiving a specific instruction, the initialization of the internal logical data of the trusted root is triggered, and the user application is completed through the software stack of the non-trusted user application.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that The method further comprises: In response to the trusted execution environment module being loaded, determining whether the non-volatile random access memory has been initialized; If the non-volatile random access memory has not been initialized, the trusted execution environment module writes the data structure data according to a preset specification; The data structure data is transmitted to the fifth driver of the trusted operating system via the fourth driver of the trusted execution environment module, and the fifth driver uses the encryption module of the trusted operating system and the cryptographic accelerator provided by the execution architecture to encrypt the data structure data to obtain encrypted data, and saves the encrypted data to the shared space; In response to receiving a data write operation instruction, an interrupt processing instruction is triggered, the trusted operating system sends the interrupt processing instruction, the data write operation instruction and the data write address to the safety-critical component, the safety-critical component switches to the non-trusted operating system according to the interrupt processing instruction, and transmits the data write operation instruction and the data write address to the non-trusted operating system; In response to the third driver of the non-trusted operating system receiving the data write operation instruction and the data write address, the data write operation instruction and the data write address are forwarded to the second user layer application via the first user layer application, the second user layer application reads the data in the storage space through the first driver, and writes the data corresponding to the data write operation instruction into the storage space; In response to writing the data corresponding to the data write operation instruction into the storage space, the third driver sends an interrupt processing instruction to the safety-critical component, and the safety-critical component switches to the trusted operating system according to the interrupt processing instruction and transmits the initialization result of the non-volatile random access memory to the trusted execution environment module; If the non-volatile random access memory has been initialized, a firmware root startup instruction is obtained, and the trusted root memory logic data is initialized according to the firmware root startup instruction to implement firmware trusted root data initialization; In response to completion of initialization of the firmware trusted root data, the second driver of the untrusted operating system creates a trusted root device.

7. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that The method further comprises: In response to the second driver receiving the trusted root device operation instruction sent by the software stack, the second driver sends an interrupt processing instruction and the trusted root device operation instruction to the security critical component, the security critical component switches to the trusted operating system according to the interrupt processing instruction, and transmits the trusted root device operation instruction to the trusted operating system; In response to the trusted operating system receiving the trusted root device operation instruction, the trusted root operating system parses the trusted root device operation instruction to obtain a parsing result, and sends the trusted root device operation instruction to the operation module in the trusted execution environment module according to the parsing result, and the operation module of the trusted execution environment module performs the trusted root device operation according to the trusted root device operation instruction.

8. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that The operation module of the trusted execution environment module performs the trusted root device operation according to the trusted root device operation instruction, including: Parsing the trusted root device operation instruction, obtaining the trusted root device operation type, and determining whether the trusted root device operation includes a data read and write operation; If the trusted root device operation includes a data read and write operation, the operation module calls the fifth driver to perform a data read and write operation on the storage space; If the data read / write operation type is a data read operation, an interrupt processing instruction is generated, and the interrupt processing instruction is transmitted to the security-critical component, the security-critical component switches to the non-trusted operating system according to the interrupt processing instruction and transmits the data read operation instruction to the non-trusted operating system, reads the data in the storage space through the non-trusted operating system and stores the read data in the shared memory; If the data read and write operation type is a data write operation, the data is encrypted through the encryption module to obtain the encrypted data, and the encrypted data is written into the shared space, an interrupt handling instruction is generated, and the interrupt handling instruction is transmitted to the security-critical component, the security-critical component switches to the non-trusted operating system according to the interrupt handling instruction and transmits the data write operation instruction and the encrypted data to the non-trusted operating system, the trusted operating system transmits the data write operation instruction and the encrypted data to the non-trusted operating system, and the encrypted data is written into the storage space through the non-trusted operating system.

9. A computer device comprising a memory, a processor and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, characterized in that: When the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the method according to any one of claims 5 to 8 are implemented.

10. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the method according to any one of claims 5 to 8 are implemented.

Images