Cross-non-cooperative domain identity authentication method

Abstract

The invention discloses a cross-non-cooperative domain identity authentication method, which comprises the following steps that: adjacent routers in a core network negotiate a first symmetric key and an MAC (Media Access Control) address list, a boundary router negotiates a global group key, a registration server verifies a network access user, generates a digital identity label, anonymizes the identity label and configures the MAC address list, the user negotiates a second symmetric key with an adjacent router and is associated with the adjacent router, the user obtains MAC information based on a neighbor discovery protocol, determines a third symmetric key, encrypts an anonymized identity identifier, randomly selects an MAC address as a source MAC, calculates an integrity check code and embeds the integrity check code, constructs a data packet, and uploads the data packet to a core network router; and performing intra-cooperative domain authentication and cross-non-cooperative domain authentication. According to the method, protection of user privacy information is considered from multiple perspectives, source address verification and user identity authentication can be realized, the data packet is allowed to cross multiple non-cooperative domains, and the method can be suitable for different scenes.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field of network security, and in particular relates to a cross-non-collaborative domain identity authentication method. Background Art

[0002] With the rapid development of computer technology, more and more users are pouring into the Internet. These users can be divided into different user groups according to the scope of resources they can access and the services they use, that is, they are given user identities. As the number of users increases, the identity authentication and authorization technology when accessing the network will face challenges. It is necessary not only to ensure the security of user identity information and reliable verification services, but also to ensure that the permissions for resource access restrictions are only granted to legitimate users who have passed identity authentication, to prevent third-party attackers or other illegal users from bypassing the verification mechanism to obtain network resources and services. For example, attackers may obtain the identity information of verified users for network communication. In addition, ensuring the privacy security of authenticated users in the system cannot be ignored. Address hopping comes into being. The ideal address hopping system can trace back each data packet to its sender, but at the same time, the identity of the sender itself and the content of the transmission need to be protected. Therefore, it is essential to build a unified and reliable identity authentication and privacy protection scheme. A sound identity authentication system can effectively prevent unauthorized access and identity theft, and ensure the security of sensitive data. In terms of user experience, seamless authentication mechanisms such as Single Sign On (SSO) allow users to access multiple applications after being authenticated by an authentication server once, without having to provide identity information credentials again, thereby reducing the user's operational burden without reducing security.

[0003] The prior art has the following disadvantages:

[0004] (1) Source address verification does not take privacy protection into consideration: The data collected during the source address verification process may not be properly encrypted and protected, which increases the risk of data leakage. If this data falls into the hands of malicious third-party attackers, the user's privacy may be seriously threatened.

[0005] (2) The new identifiers introduced by privacy protection reduce deployability: Although the common address hopping scheme protects user privacy, the process of introducing new identifiers involves a series of changes to existing Internet infrastructure and protocols, which not only includes software and hardware updates for network devices such as routers and switches, but may also involve large-scale modifications to DNS, routing protocols, and various network management and security protocols. These changes require the collaborative participation of multiple parties such as network operators and standardization organizations to ensure that the new identifiers can be applied in existing networks.

[0006] (3) Privacy protection is not thorough enough: Although measures have been taken to protect the privacy of IP addresses, the existing mechanism is not comprehensive because it only focuses on the anonymity of the network layer and fails to extend to the MAC address protection of the link layer. In some attack scenarios, attackers can still track and identify users through the MAC address in the data packet.

[0007] (4) Does not support cross-non-cooperative domain scenarios: A non-cooperative domain refers to an autonomous domain in the network that is opposite to a cooperative domain. Specific systems or services are usually deployed in a cooperative domain, and the nodes in the cooperative domain can work in coordination to achieve the expected functions of the system. In a non-cooperative domain, these systems or services are not deployed, and the nodes in the non-cooperative domain neither participate in nor cooperate with operations or behaviors in the cooperative domain. When a data packet with an address jump needs to cross a non-cooperative domain where the above system is not deployed during transmission, it may not be correctly routed to a specified host in another cooperative domain. Summary of the invention

[0008] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a method for cross-non-cooperative domain identity authentication to solve the problems existing in the above-mentioned prior art.

[0009] To achieve the above object, the present invention provides a method for cross-non-cooperative domain identity authentication, comprising:

[0010] Negotiate the first symmetric key and the corresponding MAC address list of each router using the adjacent routers in the same autonomous domain in the core network, and negotiate the global group key using the border routers in each cooperative domain in the core network to complete system initialization;

[0011] After the system is initialized, the registration server in the core network verifies the validity of the network user who sends the identity registration request. After the verification is passed, the registration server is used to generate the digital identity and anonymous identity corresponding to the network user, and a MAC address list is configured for the network user. The registration server is used to construct a mapping relationship between the digital identity, the anonymous identity and the MAC address list, and the constructed mapping relationship is saved in the distributed infrastructure in the core network and sent to the network user to complete the user identity registration;

[0012] After the user identity registration is completed, the network user performs symmetric key negotiation with the adjacent router in the corresponding autonomous domain to generate a second symmetric key, and associates the second symmetric key with the MAC address list of the network user;

[0013] After the association is completed, the network user obtains the MAC information of the adjacent node based on the neighbor discovery protocol, determines the third symmetric key based on the obtained MAC information, encrypts the anonymous identity based on the address hopping engine in the network user in combination with the third symmetric key, obtains the privacy information and embeds it into the source IP address of the data packet, randomly selects a MAC address from the MAC address list of the network user as the source MAC address of the data packet, calculates the integrity check code of the data packet through a hash algorithm, and embeds the integrity check code into the data packet to complete the construction of the data packet;

[0014] The data packet is uploaded to each router in the core network, and during the uploading process, the data packet is authenticated within the cooperative domain and across non-cooperative domains.

[0015] Optionally, the negotiation process of the first symmetric key of each router and the corresponding MAC address list specifically includes:

[0016] Negotiating the first symmetric key between adjacent routers in the same autonomous domain through a secure channel and a key exchange protocol;

[0017] After the first symmetric key negotiation is completed, each router saves the first symmetric key and the corresponding MAC address list.

[0018] Optionally, after the system is initialized, the registration server in the core network verifies the validity of the network user who sends the identity registration request, including:

[0019] The network user submits identity information to the registration server through a secure channel for identity registration, and the registration server verifies the validity of the network user's identity. If there is a duplicate registration, the identity information is invalid and the registration request is rejected;

[0020] If there is no duplicate registration, the identity information is valid, and the registration server is used to generate a digital identity and an anonymous identity corresponding to the network user, and a MAC address list is configured for each interface of the network user device.

[0021] Optionally, the address jumping engine based on the network user encrypts the anonymous identity in combination with the third symmetric key, and the specific calculation formula is:

[0022] (EID||AVD)=E SK (AID||TS||IP dst )

[0023] In the formula, EID is the Embedded Identifier, AVD is the Additional ValidationData, AID is the anonymous identifier, TS is the timestamp, IP dst is the destination network layer IP address, E SK A symmetric key encryption algorithm using an SK key.

[0024] Optionally, the calculating the integrity check code of the data packet by using a hash algorithm specifically includes:

[0025] Based on the link address, network address, additional information and payload of the data packet, an integrity check code of the data packet is obtained in combination with a hash operation.

[0026] Optionally, the authentication process of the collaborative domain authentication specifically includes:

[0027] When the router within a single collaborative domain receives the data packet, it performs integrity verification on the integrity check code of the data packet. After the integrity verification is passed, it searches for the corresponding third symmetric key according to the source MAC address of the data packet. If the third symmetric key is not found, an error message is sent to the distributed infrastructure. If the third symmetric key is found, the anonymous identity and the destination IP address are decrypted based on the obtained third symmetric key, the destination IP address of the data packet is compared with the decrypted IP address, and the distributed infrastructure is used to verify the authenticity of the decrypted anonymous identity and the corresponding source IP address. If the destination IP address is inconsistent or the anonymous identity cannot be queried in the distributed infrastructure, the data packet is discarded and malicious information is reported. If the destination IP address is consistent and the anonymous identity is queried in the distributed infrastructure, the authenticity verification is passed and the identity authentication is completed.

[0028] Optionally, the performing integrity verification on the integrity check code of the data packet specifically includes:

[0029] The current integrity check code of the data packet is calculated based on a hash operation. If the current integrity check code is consistent with the original integrity check code of the data packet, the integrity verification is passed; if the current integrity check code is inconsistent with the original integrity check code of the data packet, the data packet is discarded.

[0030] Optionally, the authentication process of cross-non-collaborative domain authentication specifically includes:

[0031] When a data packet passes through several non-cooperative domains from a source cooperative domain and finally reaches a destination cooperative domain, the user's identity information is encrypted using the global group key to obtain privacy information and embed it into the source IP address of the data packet. A MAC address is randomly selected from the MAC address list of the networked user as the source MAC address of the data packet. The integrity check code of the data packet is calculated using a hash algorithm, and the integrity check code is embedded in the data packet. The data packet is uploaded to the non-cooperative domain. When the destination cooperative domain receives the data packet, the integrity check code of the data packet is verified. After the integrity verification passes, the source MAC address of the data packet is searched for. The corresponding global group key. If the global group key is not found, an error message is sent to the distributed infrastructure. If the global group key is found, the anonymous identity and destination IP address are decrypted based on the obtained global group key, the destination IP address of the data packet is compared with the decrypted IP address, and the distributed infrastructure is used to verify the authenticity of the decrypted anonymous identity, that is, the corresponding source IP address. If the destination IP address is inconsistent or the anonymous identity cannot be queried in the distributed infrastructure, the data packet is discarded and malicious information is reported. If the destination IP address is consistent and the anonymous identity is queried in the distributed infrastructure, the authenticity verification is passed and the identity authentication is completed.

[0032] The technical effects of the present invention are:

[0033] The present invention strongly binds user identity information with the source address of a data packet, and simultaneously implements source address verification and user identity authentication.

[0034] The present invention considers the protection of user privacy information from multiple perspectives of link address and network address, and does not introduce new identifiers, and will not affect the normal operation of the existing network protocol stack.

[0035] The present invention considers performing source address authentication in scenarios across non-cooperative domains, allowing data packets carrying user privacy information to cross multiple non-cooperative domains, and can be better applied to different scenarios. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0036] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.

[0037] The drawings constituting a part of the present application are used to provide a further understanding of the present application. The illustrative embodiments and descriptions of the present application are used to explain the present application and do not constitute an improper limitation on the present application. In the drawings:

[0038] Figure 1 This is an example diagram of an application of an embodiment of the present invention in a single collaboration domain;

[0039] Figure 2 This is an example diagram of an application of an embodiment of the present invention in cross-cooperative domain communication;

[0040] Figure 3 This is an example diagram of the application of the embodiment of the present invention in an attacker forging identity information;

[0041] Figure 4 This is an example diagram of an application of an embodiment of the present invention when an attacker tampers with a data packet;

[0042] Figure 5 This is an authentication flow chart in an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0043] Various exemplary embodiments of the present invention will now be described in detail. This detailed description should not be considered as limiting the present invention, but should be understood as a more detailed description of certain aspects, features, and embodiments of the present invention.

[0044] It should be understood that the terms described in the present invention are only for describing special embodiments and are not intended to limit the present invention. In addition, for the numerical range in the present invention, it should be understood that each intermediate value between the upper and lower limits of the scope is also specifically disclosed. Each smaller range between the intermediate value in any stated value or stated range and any other stated value or intermediate value in the described range is also included in the present invention. The upper and lower limits of these smaller ranges can be independently included or excluded in the scope.

[0045] Unless otherwise indicated, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meanings as those of ordinary skill in the art generally understood by the present invention. Although the present invention describes only preferred methods, any method similar or equivalent to that described herein may also be used in the implementation or testing of the present invention. All documents mentioned in this specification are incorporated by reference to disclose and describe the methods related to the documents. In the event of a conflict with any incorporated document, the content of this specification shall prevail.

[0046] It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that various modifications and variations may be made to the specific embodiments of the present invention description without departing from the scope or spirit of the present invention. Other embodiments derived from the present invention description will be apparent to those skilled in the art. The present application description and examples are exemplary only.

[0047] The words “include,” “including,” “have,” “contain,” etc. used in this article are open-ended terms, meaning including but not limited to.

[0048] It should be noted that, in the absence of conflict, the embodiments and features in the embodiments of the present application can be combined with each other. The present application will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and in combination with the embodiments.

[0049] Embodiment 1

[0050] like Figure 1 - Figure 5 As shown, this embodiment provides a cross-non-collaborative domain identity authentication method, including:

[0051] Negotiate the first symmetric key and the corresponding MAC address list of each router using the adjacent routers in the same autonomous domain in the core network, and negotiate the global group key using the border routers in each cooperative domain in the core network to complete system initialization;

[0052] After the system is initialized, the registration server in the core network verifies the validity of the network user who sends the identity registration request. After the verification is passed, the registration server is used to generate the digital identity and anonymous identity corresponding to the network user, and a MAC address list is configured for the network user. The registration server is used to construct a mapping relationship between the digital identity, the anonymous identity and the MAC address list, and the constructed mapping relationship is saved in the distributed infrastructure in the core network and sent to the network user to complete the user identity registration;

[0053] After the user identity registration is completed, the network user performs symmetric key negotiation with the adjacent router in the corresponding autonomous domain to generate a second symmetric key, and associates the second symmetric key with the MAC address list of the network user;

[0054] After the association is completed, the network user obtains the MAC information of the adjacent node based on the neighbor discovery protocol, determines the third symmetric key based on the obtained MAC information, encrypts the anonymous identity based on the address hopping engine in the network user in combination with the third symmetric key, obtains the privacy information and embeds it into the source IP address of the data packet, randomly selects a MAC address from the MAC address list of the network user as the source MAC address of the data packet, calculates the integrity check code of the data packet through a hash algorithm, and embeds the integrity check code into the data packet to complete the construction of the data packet;

[0055] The data packet is uploaded to each router in the core network, and during the uploading process, the data packet is authenticated within the cooperative domain and across non-cooperative domains.

[0056] Existing address hopping authentication schemes have some unresolved problems, such as difficulty in deployment on the existing network architecture after the introduction of new identifiers, insufficient privacy protection, and unsuitability for cross-non-collaborative domain scenarios.

[0057] In view of the above problems, this embodiment proposes the following solutions:

[0058] First, a lightweight address label framework is designed to modify the link layer address and network layer address. After obtaining the hopping parameters on the registration management server, the hopping engine performs anonymization and generates new network layer addresses and link layer addresses to achieve a strong binding relationship between user identity information and source address, ensuring the identity privacy of data packets during network transmission. After that, the identity information carried by the source network layer address in the data packet is decrypted by the symmetric key algorithm, and then the distributed infrastructure server performs authentication confirmation, realizing source address verification and identity authentication at the same time. Then, the hash algorithm is used to check the integrity of the data packet to promptly detect the tampering of the data packet by third-party attackers during the transmission process.

[0059] Secondly, it is proposed to use the global group key to encrypt the identity information of the egress router in the cooperative domain in the cross-non-cooperative domain scenario and decrypt it by the ingress router of the data packet carried to another cooperative domain to realize cross-non-cooperative domain communication.

[0060] In summary, this embodiment introduces address hopping into the identity authentication system, realizes a strong binding relationship between the source address and the user identity, and realizes source address identity authentication. This embodiment designs a lightweight address label framework, completes authentication and identity privacy protection during network transmission through network layer address and link layer address hopping, and uses integrity verification and distributed infrastructure servers for authentication confirmation, meeting the security and reliability requirements of data. This solution uses group keys across non-collaborative domains to achieve secure communication between different collaborative domains, while ensuring the security of data transmission, it also takes into account the practicality of network communication.

[0061] This embodiment is applicable to various industries and fields that need to strengthen network security and protect identity privacy and data integrity during data transmission, including but not limited to enterprises, financial services, cloud services, the Internet of Things, government, healthcare, e-commerce, smart cities, military and defense, education research, cross-domain communications, and mobile devices and remote work environments, and has the following advantages:

[0062] 1) This embodiment strongly binds the user identity information to the source address of the data packet, and simultaneously implements source address verification and user identity authentication.

[0063] 2) This embodiment considers the protection of user privacy information from multiple perspectives of link address and network address, and does not introduce new identifiers, which will not affect the normal operation of the existing network protocol stack.

[0064] 3) This embodiment considers performing source address authentication in scenarios across non-cooperative domains, allowing data packets carrying user privacy information to cross multiple non-cooperative domains, which can be better applied to different scenarios.

[0065] The authentication scheme provided in this embodiment is divided into five stages.

[0066] The first phase is the system initialization phase, during which the key negotiation process between routers is mainly performed.

[0067] The second stage is that the user submits identity information to the registration server for registration and obtains a legal user identity.

[0068] The third stage is that the user who has obtained a legal identity negotiates a symmetric key with the adjacent router in the autonomous domain.

[0069] The fourth stage is the data packet sending stage, where the address jump engine performs necessary operations to make the data packet behavior conform to the authentication process.

[0070] The fifth stage is that the router verifies the identity of the data packet. This stage can be divided into two situations. The first situation is that the egress router within a single collaborative domain authenticates the data packet. The successfully authenticated data packet can be sent to the external network. The second situation is the authentication across non-collaborative domains, mainly the ingress routers of other domains verify the data packet.

[0071] Phase 1: System initialization.

[0072] At this stage, adjacent routers in the same autonomous domain need to negotiate symmetric keys in advance. The negotiation of symmetric keys requires the establishment of a secure channel between routers. Usually, a pair of symmetric keys is generated without exchanging keys through key exchange protocols such as the Diffie-Hellman algorithm. The negotiation process needs to ensure the randomness and unpredictability of the keys. After the negotiation is completed, each router obtains the symmetric key and a set of MAC address lists MACList, which are usually continuous and maintained by the distributed infrastructure. When a data packet needs to be sent for communication, the communication user will randomly select an item in the MAC address list as the source MAC address of the data packet, ensuring that the source MAC address of the data packet sent by the same host will change continuously within a certain range. It should be noted that MACList is not necessarily a continuous MAC, but the difficulty of maintaining continuous MAC addresses is relatively low. In order to ensure that the MAC addresses used by different users do not conflict, the distributed infrastructure needs to manage and maintain the association between MACList and user devices, and update them in a timely manner. After that, the router maintains the mapping relationship between the MACList of the peer communication entity and the key.

[0073] In addition, a global group key will be negotiated between the border routers in all cooperative domains. This key is used to establish a trust relationship between different cooperative domains and is the basis for data exchange across non-cooperative domains.

[0074] Phase 2: Identity registration phase.

[0075] At this stage, the user who joins the network submits his identity information to the registration server (RSs) through a secure channel for registration. RSs checks and verifies the validity of the user's identity, such as whether there is a duplicate registration. If the identity information is invalid, the registration request is rejected. If valid, RSs generates a digital identity DID associated with the user's identity for the user, and uses a hash function to generate an anonymous identity AID = hash (DID). In order to achieve link layer address hopping, each interface of the user's device that joins the network will also obtain a set of MACList. When sending a data packet for communication, it will randomly select an item from the MACList as the source MAC address of the data packet. After that, RSs saves the mapping relationship of {DID, AID, MACList} in the distributed infrastructure. In order to further enhance security, both AID and MACList can be set with an expiration time, and AID and MACList are updated when a security threat is detected or the life cycle ends.

[0076] Finally, RSs returns {DID, AID, MACList} to the registered user. When the user receives the return information of successful registration, a bidirectional mapping table of the real IP address and AID used will be maintained locally to restore the real source IP of the data packet.

[0077] Phase 3: Symmetric key negotiation phase.

[0078] Users who have obtained legal identities will negotiate symmetric keys with adjacent routers in their autonomous domain. This process is similar to the key negotiation process between adjacent routers in the first phase. It requires users and adjacent routers to generate symmetric keys through a secure channel. The key is used for subsequent encryption and decryption of identity privacy information. Only the two parties involved in the negotiation hold the corresponding key. The key negotiated between adjacent entities needs to establish an association with the MACList of the negotiation object, and multiple MAC addresses in the MAC list are mapped to the symmetric key. The symmetric key mapped by MACList ensures that the user identity information required for authentication carried in the data packet can be encrypted and authenticated with the correct key during the change of the source MAC address.

[0079] Phase 4: Communication initiation phase.

[0080] Before sending a data packet, the user device first obtains the MAC information of the adjacent node through the neighbor discovery protocol NDP, and uses the next-hop MAC to determine the symmetric key SK used for this decryption. When the discovered next-hop MAC address cannot be matched with any MAC address in the currently saved neighbor MACList, different performances may be performed according to different network functions, such as sending according to the original data packet processing flow. Normally, when the neighbor's MAC address is not included in any MACList, it will be considered that the current user has not completed the registration phase or the symmetric key negotiation phase, and all packet sending behaviors of the user should be blocked. This is because the absence of a symmetric key means that the user's privacy cannot be hidden from attackers who maliciously capture the data packet through encryption and decryption. Once the data packet is transmitted on the network, even if the domain border gateway router does not allow the data packet to be exported, it cannot guarantee that the user's identity information will not be leaked.

[0081] After obtaining the symmetric key SK, the address hopping engine on the user device needs to symmetric-key encrypt the user's AID, timestamp information, and destination IP address to generate private information that can be embedded in the data packet, that is, (EID||AVD)=E SK (AID||TS||IP dst ), where EID is Embedded Identifier and AVD is Additional Validation Data. The timestamp is used to ensure that different encryption results can be obtained when the same AID is used, so as to ensure that the source IP address of each data packet is different. EID will be embedded in the last few bits of the source IP address of the data packet. Usually, in order to meet the balance between the network prefix and the number of hosts, a 64-bit EID is used. The remaining part of the encryption result is AVD. The length of AVD will depend on the specific symmetric encryption algorithm and will be added to the data packet extension field together with other additional information for identity authentication by the router. These additional information do not contain plaintext information of the user's identity and are only transmitted as necessary information required for authentication. Even if the attacker captures the data packet, he cannot steal the privacy information of the data sender through this information.

[0082] The successful embedding of EID means that the network address jump is successful. Next, the user device will randomly select an item from the MACList maintained by itself as the source MAC address of the data packet and write it into the corresponding field of the data packet.

[0083] Finally, based on the link address, network address, additional information and payload of the data packet, the data packet integrity check code ICC (Integrity Checksum Code) is obtained through hash operation, and then the data packet carrying additional authentication information and ICC is sent to the network for transmission.

[0084] Phase 5: Identity authentication phase.

[0085] The identity authentication stage requires the routers on the data packet transmission path to verify the identity information carried by the data packet. On the one hand, it prevents malicious traffic from spreading on the network and affecting the normal operation of the system; on the other hand, it checks whether the user's identity information is protected. The identity authentication stage is divided into the following two cases. The first case is authentication within a single collaborative domain, mainly the domain boundary egress router performs authentication, and the authenticated data packet can be allowed to enter the network. The second case involves crossing non-collaborative domains. The egress router in the source domain and the ingress router in the destination domain need to coordinate and jointly perform identity authentication.

[0086] ① Authentication within a single collaborative domain:

[0087] When a router in a single collaborative domain receives a data packet sent by a user host, it first performs an integrity check ICC. Based on the link address, network address, additional information other than ICC, and payload of the data packet, a hash operation is performed to obtain the current ICC of the data packet. n , and the original ICC carried by the data packet o Compare, if the results are inconsistent, it is considered that the data packet has been tampered by a malicious middleman, and the data packet should be discarded. If the results are consistent, the data packet passes the integrity check, and the subsequent identity authentication can continue.

[0088] Identity authentication first needs to find the corresponding symmetric key SK based on the source MAC address of the data packet. It is worth noting that the source MAC in the data packet is not the real MAC address of the router / user host of the previous hop, but a randomly selected item from its corresponding MACList. Since the mapping table between MACList and symmetric key is established in advance during the system initialization and symmetric key negotiation phase, SK can still be found from the source MAC of the data packet. If the SK is not found, it is considered that the previous hop of the data packet transmission path uses a false MAC address or an error occurs during key negotiation, and the error needs to be reported to the distributed infrastructure.

[0089] After obtaining SK, use it to decrypt the EID and AVD embedded in the data packet to obtain (AID||TS||IP dst )=D SK(EID||AVD), then the router will first compare the destination IP address of the data packet with the decrypted IP address, and then verify the authenticity of the AID through the distributed infrastructure and restore the original source IP address. Once the destination IP address is inconsistent or the user identity of the AID cannot be queried from the distributed infrastructure, the data packet may be sent by a forged false user identity. At this time, the data packet is discarded and malicious information is reported. Otherwise, the data packet is authenticated. Since the solution of this embodiment strongly binds the user identity information to the IP address, the completion of this step means that the source address verification and user identity authentication are achieved at the same time.

[0090] ② Authentication across non-collaborative domains:

[0091] When the data packet needs to be transferred from the source cooperation domain CS s Pass through several non-cooperative domains NCS and finally reach the destination cooperative domain CS d The process of forwarding data packets to NCS is similar to the communication initiation phase. The difference is that due to the CS s There is no symmetric key negotiated between the egress router and the next-hop device in NCS, and the SK cannot be found through the next-hop MAC address. Therefore, the user identity information can only be encrypted using the global group key negotiated during the system initialization phase. After encryption, the ICC is calculated and the information required for authentication is embedded in the data packet. Finally, an item is randomly selected from the MACList as the source MAC address of the data packet, and then the data packet is forwarded to NCS. The network devices in NCS will neither authenticate the data packet nor modify the additional information in the data packet. They will only perform regular routing and forwarding based on the destination address. It should be noted that CS s The ICC in the data packet sent by the egress router to the NCS no longer needs to include the link address check, because regardless of whether the link address changes, the source MAC address will change during the transmission process within the NCS. d CS is no longer available s The MAC address used.

[0092] In CS d When the ingress router receives a data packet forwarded by NCS, it first performs an integrity check, performs a hash operation on the network address, additional information other than ICC, and payload in the data packet, and then compares the result with the ICC field carried in the data packet. If the results are inconsistent, the data packet is considered to have been tampered with and should be discarded. Otherwise, it is considered to have passed the integrity check.

[0093] After CS dThe ingress router no longer matches the corresponding MACList based on the previous hop MAC address, but uses the global group key to decrypt the AID and then determines the user's true identity through the distributed infrastructure.

[0094] Example description:

[0095] Example 1:

[0096] Application of this embodiment in a single collaboration domain:

[0097] ① The system is first initialized. The users in the terminal group send a request to the registration server for legal registration to obtain the necessary user identity information and MACList, and then negotiate a symmetric key with the border router through a secure channel.

[0098] ② When a user sends a data packet trying to enter the core network, the symmetric key is first searched for based on the MAC address of the border router. After the symmetric key is found, it is used to encrypt the anonymous identity information, which is then embedded into the source IP address part of the data packet. An item in the MACList is randomly selected as the source MAC address of the data packet, and the ICC is calculated before sending it to the border router.

[0099] ③ The border router first verifies the ICC. When it is determined that the data packet has not been tampered with, it finds the symmetric key used to encrypt the identity information of the data packet according to the source MAC address of the data packet and decrypts it to obtain the sender's user identity privacy information, and then verifies the authenticity of the user identity from the infrastructure server. The specific authentication process has been described in detail in the above embodiment scheme, and will not be repeated here.

[0100] Example 2:

[0101] Application of this embodiment in cross-cooperative domain communication:

[0102] ① The system is first initialized, and the global group key is negotiated between the egress router of the source collaboration domain and the ingress router of the destination collaboration domain. The users in the terminal group send requests to the registration server for legal registration to obtain the necessary user identity information and MACList, and then negotiate a symmetric key with the border routers in their respective domains through a secure channel.

[0103] ② The user sends a data packet that attempts to traverse the non-cooperative domain, which is encrypted with a symmetric key and executes the detailed process described in the above embodiment before reaching the egress router of the domain. In order to coordinate with the destination cooperative domain, the egress router uses the global group key to encrypt the user identity information and sends the data packet to the non-cooperative domain.

[0104] ③ The additional information of the data packet will not change during the process of passing through the non-cooperative domain. After reaching the ingress router of the destination cooperative domain, the ingress router decrypts the identity information through the global group key and then determines the authenticity of the user identity. The specific authentication process has been described in detail in the above embodiment scheme and will not be repeated here.

[0105] Example 3:

[0106] Application of this embodiment in attacker forging identity information

[0107] ① The system is first initialized. Users in the terminal group and third-party attackers send requests to the registration server for legal registration to obtain the necessary user identity information and MACList, and then negotiate a symmetric key with the border router through a secure channel.

[0108] ② A third-party attacker uses forged false identity information to encrypt and modify the source address information of the outgoing data packet. After receiving it, the border router decrypts it through the previous hop address and verifies it through the infrastructure server. If the infrastructure server returns that the user identity information does not exist, the border router immediately discards the data packet and reports an error message. The specific authentication process has been described in detail in the above embodiment scheme, and will not be repeated here.

[0109] Example 4:

[0110] Application of this embodiment in the case where an attacker tampers with a data packet

[0111] ① The system is first initialized. Users in the terminal group send requests to the registration server for legal registration to obtain the necessary user identity information and MACList, and then negotiate a symmetric key with the border router through a secure channel. Third-party attackers do not affect the negotiation of the symmetric key at this stage.

[0112] ② The user sends a data packet trying to enter the core network. After address hopping and ICC calculation, the data packet carrying privacy information is sent to the network for transmission and is captured by a third-party attacker. The third-party attacker modifies some fields in the data packet, but does not modify the source address information, and then forwards it to the border router.

[0113] ③ The border router performs integrity check and finds that the ICC calculated based on the data packet information is inconsistent with the ICC carried by the data packet itself, discards the data packet and reports the error to the infrastructure server. The specific authentication process has been described in detail in the above embodiment scheme, and will not be repeated here.

[0114] The lightweight address label framework designed in this embodiment directly modifies the source address to make it appear to change randomly hop by hop, thereby hiding user privacy information and enabling incremental deployment on the existing network architecture, thereby increasing deployability. The strong binding relationship between the network layer address and the user identity can simultaneously meet the requirements of identity authentication and source address authentication, thereby enhancing the security of the system.

[0115] This embodiment uses the authentication method across non-cooperative domain scenarios, thereby improving the system's ability to be applicable to different scenarios.

[0116] The above is only a preferred specific implementation of the present application, but the protection scope of the present application is not limited thereto. Any changes or substitutions that can be easily thought of by a person skilled in the art within the technical scope disclosed in the present application should be included in the protection scope of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the present application should be based on the protection scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A method for cross-non-cooperative domain identity authentication, characterized in that: include: Negotiate the first symmetric key and the corresponding MAC address list of each router using the adjacent routers in the same autonomous domain in the core network, and negotiate the global group key using the border routers in each cooperative domain in the core network to complete system initialization; After the system is initialized, the registration server in the core network verifies the validity of the network user who sends the identity registration request. After the verification is passed, the registration server is used to generate the digital identity and anonymous identity corresponding to the network user, and a MAC address list is configured for the network user. The registration server is used to construct a mapping relationship between the digital identity, the anonymous identity and the MAC address list, and the constructed mapping relationship is saved in the distributed infrastructure in the core network and sent to the network user to complete the user identity registration; After the user identity registration is completed, the network user performs symmetric key negotiation with the adjacent router in the corresponding autonomous domain to generate a second symmetric key, and associates the second symmetric key with the MAC address list of the network user; After the association is completed, the network user obtains the MAC information of the adjacent node based on the neighbor discovery protocol, determines the third symmetric key based on the obtained MAC information, encrypts the anonymous identity based on the address hopping engine in the network user in combination with the third symmetric key, obtains the privacy information and embeds it into the source IP address of the data packet, randomly selects a MAC address from the MAC address list of the network user as the source MAC address of the data packet, calculates the integrity check code of the data packet through a hash algorithm, and embeds the integrity check code into the data packet to complete the construction of the data packet; The data packet is uploaded to each router in the core network, and during the uploading process, the data packet is authenticated within the cooperative domain and across non-cooperative domains.

2. A method for cross-non-cooperative domain identity authentication according to claim 1, characterized in that: The negotiation process of the first symmetric key of each router and the corresponding MAC address list specifically includes: Negotiating the first symmetric key between adjacent routers in the same autonomous domain through a secure channel and a key exchange protocol; After the first symmetric key negotiation is completed, each router saves the first symmetric key and the corresponding MAC address list.

3. A method for cross-non-cooperative domain identity authentication according to claim 1, characterized in that: After the system is initialized, the registration server in the core network verifies the validity of the user who sent the identity registration request, including: The network user submits identity information to the registration server through a secure channel for identity registration, and the registration server verifies the validity of the network user's identity. If there is a duplicate registration, the identity information is invalid and the registration request is rejected; If there is no duplicate registration, the identity information is valid, and the registration server is used to generate a digital identity and an anonymous identity corresponding to the network user, and a MAC address list is configured for each interface of the network user device.

4. A method for cross-non-cooperative domain identity authentication according to claim 1, characterized in that: The address jump engine based on the network user encrypts the anonymous identity in combination with the third symmetric key, and the specific calculation formula is: (EID||AVD)=E SK (AID||TS||IP dst ) In the formula, EID is the Embedded Identifier, AVD is the Additional Validation Data, AID is the anonymous identity, TS is the timestamp, IP dst is the destination network layer IP address, E SK A symmetric key encryption algorithm using an SK key.

5. A method for cross-non-cooperative domain identity authentication according to claim 1, characterized in that: The calculating the integrity check code of the data packet by using a hash algorithm specifically includes: Based on the link address, network address, additional information and payload of the data packet, an integrity check code of the data packet is obtained in combination with a hash operation.

6. A method for cross-non-cooperative domain identity authentication according to claim 1, characterized in that: The authentication process of the collaborative domain authentication specifically includes: When the router within a single collaborative domain receives the data packet, it performs integrity verification on the integrity check code of the data packet. After the integrity verification is passed, it searches for the corresponding third symmetric key according to the source MAC address of the data packet. If the third symmetric key is not found, an error message is sent to the distributed infrastructure. If the third symmetric key is found, the anonymous identity and the destination IP address are decrypted based on the obtained third symmetric key, the destination IP address of the data packet is compared with the decrypted IP address, and the distributed infrastructure is used to verify the authenticity of the decrypted anonymous identity and the corresponding source IP address. If the destination IP address is inconsistent or the anonymous identity cannot be queried in the distributed infrastructure, the data packet is discarded and malicious information is reported. If the destination IP address is consistent and the anonymous identity is queried in the distributed infrastructure, the authenticity verification is passed and the identity authentication is completed.

7. A method for cross-non-cooperative domain identity authentication according to claim 6, characterized in that: The integrity verification of the integrity check code of the data packet specifically includes: The current integrity check code of the data packet is calculated based on a hash operation. If the current integrity check code is consistent with the original integrity check code of the data packet, the integrity verification is passed; if the current integrity check code is inconsistent with the original integrity check code of the data packet, the data packet is discarded.

8. A method for cross-non-cooperative domain identity authentication according to claim 1, characterized in that: The authentication process of cross-non-cooperative domain authentication specifically includes: When a data packet passes through several non-cooperative domains from a source cooperative domain and finally reaches a destination cooperative domain, the user's identity information is encrypted using the global group key to obtain privacy information and embed it into the source IP address of the data packet. A MAC address is randomly selected from the MAC address list of the networked user as the source MAC address of the data packet. The integrity check code of the data packet is calculated using a hash algorithm, and the integrity check code is embedded in the data packet. The data packet is uploaded to the non-cooperative domain. When the destination cooperative domain receives the data packet, the integrity check code of the data packet is verified. After the integrity verification passes, the source MAC address of the data packet is searched for. The corresponding global group key. If the global group key is not found, an error message is sent to the distributed infrastructure. If the global group key is found, the anonymous identity and destination IP address are decrypted based on the obtained global group key, the destination IP address of the data packet is compared with the decrypted IP address, and the distributed infrastructure is used to verify the authenticity of the decrypted anonymous identity, that is, the corresponding source IP address. If the destination IP address is inconsistent or the anonymous identity cannot be queried in the distributed infrastructure, the data packet is discarded and malicious information is reported. If the destination IP address is consistent and the anonymous identity is queried in the distributed infrastructure, the authenticity verification is passed and the identity authentication is completed.

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