A method and device for detecting optimal stealth attack in power grid system based on double adaptive observer and medium

Abstract

The present application relates to a kind of optimal covert attack detection method, device and medium based on double adaptive observer in power grid system, for detecting optimal covert attack based on the vulnerability of adaptive unknown input observer in direct current micro grid system, for the direct current micro grid system with ZIP load, the dynamic model of distributed power generation unit is established;Adaptive unknown input observer and adaptive distributed observer are deployed for each distributed power generation unit, monitor its state when decoupling with neighbor distributed power generation unit;Adaptive distributed observer accepts the output of neighbor adaptive unknown input observer and predicts the output of distributed power generation unit;Based on the detection residual between actual output and estimated system output of system through adaptive unknown input observer and adaptive distributed observer, it is judged whether distributed power generation unit is attacked.Compared with prior art, the reliability and security of direct current micro grid system are effectively improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of network security of a DC microgrid system, and in particular to an expandable detection method for optimal covert attacks on a DC microgrid system with a ZIP load. Background Art

[0002] The increasing proportion of renewable energy in the power grid places new demands on power system architecture. DC microgrids, with their ability to integrate flexible power loads, energy storage, and distributed generation units, are meeting future energy needs. They are already widely used in electric vehicle charging stations, military bases, and smart buildings. However, due to the extensive interconnectivity of DC microgrids and the open nature of their communication networks, hackers could exploit inherent vulnerabilities to launch malicious cyberattacks against distributed generation units, triggering cascading effects. If malicious adversaries sustain attacks on DC microgrids, they could cause large-scale power outages and irreversible damage to critical infrastructure. Therefore, timely detection of attacks and implementation of appropriate protective measures are crucial.

[0003] Current detection techniques primarily target classic false data injection attacks and can be categorized as model-based or learning-based approaches. The former requires system model knowledge to design a residual generator capable of real-time monitoring of system anomalies; the latter, on the other hand, leverages machine learning algorithms to learn patterns and regularities from collected data, enabling the distinction between normal and corrupted data. However, new optimal covert attacks not only maximize attack effectiveness within limited energy constraints but also render the detected residuals or system data non-significantly abnormal, effectively evading existing detection mechanisms. Furthermore, after a damaged distributed generation unit is removed from a DC microgrid system, the detection mechanisms in the remaining distributed generation units must be globally redesigned, which not only imposes a significant computational burden but also potentially leads to detection omissions. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a plug-and-play detection solution for optimal covert attacks in DC microgrid systems to address the problems that existing detection methods lack scalability and are difficult to detect optimal covert attacks.

[0005] The purpose of the present invention can be achieved by the following technical solutions:

[0006] As a first aspect of the present invention, a method for detecting an optimal covert attack in a power grid system based on a dual adaptive observer is provided, which is used to detect an optimal covert attack based on the vulnerability of an adaptive unknown input observer in a DC microgrid system, comprising the following steps:

[0007] For a DC microgrid system with ZIP loads, a dynamic model of distributed generation units is established;

[0008] Deploying an adaptive unknown input observer and an adaptive distributed observer for each distributed generation unit to monitor its state when decoupled from neighboring distributed generation units; wherein the adaptive distributed observer receives the output of the neighboring adaptive unknown input observer and predicts the output of the distributed generation unit;

[0009] Based on the detection residual between the actual system output and the system output estimated by the adaptive unknown input observer and the adaptive distributed observer, it is determined whether the distributed generation unit is under attack.

[0010] As a preferred technical solution, the dynamic model of the distributed generation unit considers the control problem of voltage balancing and current sharing in a DC microgrid system with ZIP loads. The state equation of the distributed generation unit i is expressed as:

[0011]

[0012] Where, is the state variable, V i Indicates the voltage at the common connection point, I ti represents the RLC filter i current, v i represents the integral of the voltage tracking error; and are the primary and secondary control inputs, V ti represents the output voltage of step-down inverter i; is the common connection point reference voltage; is the total load current, Y li , and P li is the load constant; I i , A ii , A ij , C i is the corresponding grid system structure parameter matrix; y i (t) is the output of distributed generation unit i.

[0013] As a preferred technical solution, the adaptive unknown input observer dynamics of the distributed generation unit i is expressed as:

[0014]

[0015] Where, and are the state of the adaptive unknown input observer i and the estimated system state, respectively; and is the gain of the adaptive unknown input observer i; is the external input; M is the coefficient matrix i = [-1 / C ti , 0; 0, 0; 0, 1]; is the unknown input, and satisfies

[0016] is the adaptive parameter of the unknown input observer.

[0017] As a preferred technical solution, the optimal covert attack injects false data into the channel to damage the integrity of the data and thus reduce the performance of the system.

[0018] The false data injection attack in the forward channel of the distributed power generation unit i is described as:

[0019]

[0020] wherein, represents the damaged input signal, represents the normal input signal, ζ(·) represents the step function, represents the attack start time, represents the attack signal;

[0021] The optimal covert attack signal is described as:

[0022]

[0023] wherein:

[0024]

[0025] satisfies the following dynamics:

[0026]

[0027] wherein, and are the coefficient matrices of the augmented system of the attacked and normal system, respectively, is the state of the augmented system of the attacked and normal system, is the input of the augmented system of the attacked and normal system.

[0028] As a preferred technical solution, the adaptive distributed observer of the adaptive distributed power generation unit state is:

[0029]

[0030] wherein, and are the estimated state and output of the distributed power generation unit i by the observer, is the adaptive distributed observer gain, is the adaptive parameter of the adaptive distributed observer;

[0031] The global error dynamics of a DC microgrid containing n distributed generation units is expressed as:

[0032]

[0033] The sufficient condition for the error system to be asymptotically stable is:

[0034] For a given adaptive parameter H infinite performance index γ i > 0, there exists a matrix U of appropriate dimension i , P i >0 and free matrix Q i So that:

[0035]

[0036] in:

[0037]

[0038] The distributed observer gain is:

[0039]

[0040] As a preferred technical solution, the adaptive parameters of the adaptive distributed observer Satisfy the following adaptive rules:

[0041]

[0042] Where, is a positive adaptive parameter.

[0043] As a preferred technical solution, the adaptive distributed observer is designed in a decentralized manner. The coupling between distributed power generation units is eliminated through a fixed-structure relaxation matrix, giving the adaptive distributed observer plug-and-play capabilities and achieving scalable optimal covert attack detection. The details are as follows:

[0044] The sufficient condition for the asymptotic stability of the adaptive distributed observer error system is transformed into:

[0045] For a given adaptive parameter H infinite performance index γ i > 0, there exists a matrix U of appropriate dimension i , P i >0 and free matrix So that:

[0046]

[0047] In the formula Distributed observer gain

[0048] As a preferred technical solution, the determination of whether a distributed power generation unit is under attack is specifically as follows:

[0049] Based on the designed adaptive unknown input observer and adaptive distributed observer, the system output is estimated to obtain the detection residual:

[0050]

[0051] Where: y i (t) is the actual output of the system, is the system output estimated by the observer;

[0052] like If the communication in the distributed generation unit i is normal, it is considered that the distributed generation unit i is under attack. Represents the threshold for detecting residuals.

[0053] As a second aspect of the present invention, an electronic device is provided, comprising:

[0054] one or more processors;

[0055] a memory for storing one or more programs;

[0056] When the one or more programs are executed by the one or more processors, the one or more processors implement the optimal covert attack detection method in a power grid system based on dual adaptive observers as described above.

[0057] As a third aspect of the present invention, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, wherein the computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the optimal covert attack detection method in the power grid system based on the dual adaptive observer are implemented as described above.

[0058] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0059] 1) This paper proposes a scalable detection method for optimal covert attacks in DC microgrid systems based on dual adaptive observers, fully accounting for the volatility of ZIP loads in DC microgrids. A dual adaptive observer-based attack detection scheme is designed, using distributed observers to monitor the status of distributed generation units. The adaptive distributed observers not only utilize local information but also receive the output of neighboring adaptive unknown input observers. This method is immune to the influence of neighboring generation units and local optimal covert attacks, effectively improving the reliability and security of the DC microgrid system.

[0060] 2) The present invention also provides an adaptive distributed observer designed in a decentralized manner to eliminate the coupling between distributed power generation units through a relaxation matrix, thereby realizing a scalable design of an optimal covert attack detection mechanism in a DC microgrid with ZIP loads.

[0061] 3) The present invention also designs an optimal covert attack, which fully exploits the vulnerability of the DC microgrid system based on the unknown input observer, effectively degrading the system performance while evading the monitoring of traditional technologies. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0062] Figure 1 Flowchart of a scalable detection method for optimal covert attacks in a DC microgrid system with ZIP loads according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0063] Figure 2 This is a structural diagram of a DC microgrid system with a ZIP load in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0064] Figure 3 : is a topological diagram of a DC microgrid including six distributed power generation units in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0065] Figure 4 1 is an attack effect diagram of the optimal covert attack in the distributed power generation unit 2 in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0066] Figure 5 Schematic diagram of the concealment of the optimal concealed attack in the distributed power generation unit 2 in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0067] Figure 6 Schematic diagram of detection results of a scalable detection mechanism based on dual adaptive observers in an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0068] The present invention is described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments. This embodiment is implemented based on the technical solution of the present invention, and provides a detailed implementation method and specific operation process, but the protection scope of the present invention is not limited to the following embodiments.

[0069] Example 1

[0070] The application provides an extensible detection method for optimal covert attack in a direct-current micro-grid system based on double adaptive observers. Considering the influence of ZIP load disturbance in the direct-current micro-grid system, a dynamic model of the system is established. The vulnerability of the direct-current micro-grid system based on an unknown input observer is analyzed, and an optimal covert attack is designed. An adaptive distributed observer is designed to monitor the state of the distributed power generation unit, and a fixed structure relaxation matrix is designed to eliminate the coupling between the distributed power generation units, so as to realize the extensible design of the optimal covert attack detection mechanism in the direct-current micro-grid system.

[0071] As shown in Figure 1 , in one embodiment, an extensible detection method for optimal covert attack in a direct-current micro-grid system based on double adaptive observers, the method comprises the following steps:

[0072] Step S1, the control problem of voltage balance and current sharing in a direct-current micro-grid system with a ZIP load is analyzed, and a dynamic model of a distributed power generation unit is established.

[0073] Based on the quasi-static linearization assumption, Kirchhoff's voltage and current law, and according to the direct-current micro-grid structure diagram shown in Figure 2 , the following is derived:

[0074]

[0075] In the formula, R ti , L ti and C ti represent the capacitance, inductance and resistance of the RLC filter i; V i represents the common connection point voltage, I ti represents the RLC filter i current, Y li , and P li are load constants.

[0076] The state vector v i is defined, the integral, first and second control inputs of the voltage tracking error are and , the common connection point reference voltage is , and the state equation of the distributed power generation unit i is:

[0077]

[0078] In the formula, is the total load current, I i , A ii , Aij , C i is a matrix of appropriate dimension.

[0079]

[0080] In step S2, the vulnerability of the DC microgrid system based on the unknown input observer is analyzed and an optimal covert attack is designed.

[0081] A DC microgrid is a typical system consisting of multiple interconnected subsystems (distributed generation units). When a distributed generation unit encounters an attack, it triggers a cascading effect. Therefore, it is necessary to deploy a diagnostic for each distributed generation unit to monitor its status when decoupled from its neighboring distributed generation units. An effective approach is the unknown input observer, which treats the interconnection information from neighbors as unknown input. Specifically, the unknown input observer dynamics of distributed generation unit i is formulated as:

[0082]

[0083] Where, is the state of observer i, is the system state estimated by observer i, As external input, Unknown input is recorded as and satisfy Coefficient matrix M i =[-1 / C ti , 0; 0, 0; 0, 1], the gain of observer i satisfies It's Hurwitz. is the adaptive parameter of the unknown input observer and satisfies:

[0084]

[0085] Where, is a positive adaptive parameter.

[0086] Malicious adversaries often inject false data into the channel to destroy data integrity and thus degrade system performance. To quantify the impact of the attack on system performance, the false data injection attack in the forward channel of distributed generation unit i can be described as:

[0087]

[0088] Where ζ(·) represents the step function, Indicates the attack start time, Indicates normal input signal, Indicates an attack signal. Indicates a corrupted input signal.

[0089] Optimal covert attack signal It can be described as:

[0090]

[0091] Satisfy the following dynamics:

[0092]

[0093] in:

[0094]

[0095] Where, are the system coefficient matrices, states, and inputs after the attack and normal systems are augmented.

[0096] The estimated error of the unknown input observer i is recorded as Combining equations (2), (3), (4) and (5), the error system of the unknown input observer i of distributed generation unit i when it is attacked by the optimal covert attack can be described as:

[0097]

[0098] The above formula does not include the optimal hidden attack signal, which is consistent with the error system of the unknown input observer i when there is no attack.

[0099] Step S3: Design an adaptive distributed observer to monitor the status of distributed power generation units and establish a design criterion for the observer gain under ZIP load.

[0100] The adaptive distributed observer i is designed for distributed generation unit i as follows:

[0101]

[0102] Where, and is the state and output of distributed generation unit i estimated by the observer, is the designed distributed observer gain, is an adaptive parameter and satisfies the following adaptive rule:

[0103]

[0104] Where, is a positive adaptive parameter. is the estimation error of the adaptive distributed observer i, and the error system is described as:

[0105]

[0106] in:

[0107]

[0108] Considering that the DC microgrid contains n distributed generation units, the global error dynamics can be expressed as:

[0109]

[0110] The sufficient condition for the error system to be asymptotically stable is: for a given adaptive parameter H infinite performance index γ i > 0, there exists a matrix U of appropriate dimension i , P i >0 and free matrix Q i So that:

[0111]

[0112] in:

[0113]

[0114] Distributed observer gain:

[0115]

[0116] Prove the above sufficient conditions and construct the Lyapunov function:

[0117]

[0118] in:

[0119]

[0120] So:

[0121]

[0122] because, Pick Combining (8) we can get:

[0123]

[0124] in:

[0125]

[0126] From formula (11), we can see that J d (t)≤0, under zero initial conditions, we can obtain:

[0127]

[0128] Since V d (∞∞)≥0, and J d (t)≤0, we can get:

[0129]

[0130] Then the global error system (10) is asymptotically stable and satisfies the H-infinity performance constraint.

[0131] Based on the above analysis, it can be seen that the adaptive distributed observer designed by the present invention can estimate the state of distributed generation units in the DC microgrid in real time. From (7), it can be seen that the adaptive distributed observer i not only uses local information, but also needs to accept the output of the neighboring adaptive unknown input observer and It is not affected by neighboring power generation units and is not affected by local optimal covert attacks, that is, the signal received by the adaptive distributed observer i Therefore, the safety status of distributed generation unit i can be monitored in real time based on the residual calculated from the output of adaptive distributed observer i.

[0132] Step S4, designing a fixed-structure relaxation matrix to eliminate coupling between distributed generation units and developing a scalable optimal covert attack detection algorithm.

[0133] It's worth noting that the design of the adaptive distributed observer i in step S3 incorporates global DG unit information. This means that after removing a damaged DG unit from the DC microgrid or inserting a repaired one, all distributed observers must be redesigned. The following provides a decentralized approach to designing distributed observers, enabling plug-and-play detection solutions.

[0134] Furthermore, the sufficient condition for the asymptotic stability of the global error system (10) can be transformed into:

[0135] For a given adaptive parameter H infinite performance index γ i > 0, there exists a matrix U of appropriate dimension i , P i >0 and free matrix So that:

[0136]

[0137] Where: Distributed observer gain:

[0138]

[0139] To prove the above sufficient conditions, firstly transform the above J d (t) is decomposed into:

[0140]

[0141] in:

[0142]

[0143] By the free matrix Q i The structure of :

[0144]

[0145] So The positive or negative definiteness of is equivalent to the positive or negative definiteness of the following matrix:

[0146]

[0147] because is the Laplace matrix, that is Then there is also (12) makes In summary, J d (t)≤0. Similarly, the global error system (10) is asymptotically stable and satisfies the H-infinity performance constraint.

[0148] From the above analysis, we can see that when designing the adaptive distributed observer, this patent uses the free matrix Q i The structure of is restricted, and the Lyapunov function is divided into two categories, including global information and local information. The new matrix formed by taking the inverse of the matrix elements containing global information is exactly the Laplace matrix, which can be determined to be negative definite. Thus, J d (t) The positivity depends only on the information of the local power generation unit, that is, the coupling between distributed power generation units is eliminated.

[0149] Based on the adaptive unknown input observer and the adaptive distributed observer designed by the present invention, the diagnostic device in the distributed generation unit i can obtain the detection residual like If the communication in the distributed generation unit i is normal, it is considered that the distributed generation unit i is under attack. Represents the threshold for detecting residuals.

[0150] A specific simulation experiment is provided below to verify the method of the present invention:

[0151] Consider a DC microgrid system consisting of 6 distributed generation units, whose topology is as follows: Figure 3As shown in the figure, each distributed generation unit has a ZIP load, with constant impedance load parameters of 0.0333S, 0.0370S, 0.0303S, 0.0303S, 0.0333S, and 0.0317S, constant current load parameters of 1.6667A, 2A, 2.3333A, 2.1667A, 2.6667A, and 2.5000A, and constant power load parameters of 33.3333W, 40W, 35W, 31.6667W, 36.6667W, and 35W. The common coupling point reference voltages are 47V, 48V, 45V, 50V, 46V, and 49V, respectively. The power supply voltage of each distributed generation unit is 80V, and the switching frequency of the insulated gate bipolar transistors is 15kHz.

[0152] Take the adaptive parameters as λ i =300, and the adaptive observer gain is obtained by solving LMI (12). The simulation time of this experiment is set to 5 seconds. First, each distributed generation unit operates independently. At the second second, each distributed generation unit operates according to Figure 3 The secondary controller is activated. Figure 4 As shown in Figure 2, proportional current sharing is achieved under the regulation of secondary control, namely At the same time, voltage balance is achieved, that is, Then, at the 4th second, the distributed generation unit 2 is subjected to the optimal covert attack (4). Figure 4 It can be seen that the malicious attack effectively destroyed the system performance, and the DC microgrid could not maintain the balance between load demand and power generation, that is, and The diagnostic results of the detector based on the adaptive unknown input observer are as follows: Figure 5 As shown in the figure, before and after the attack, the detection residuals in each distributed power generation unit did not change significantly, and the detection residuals did not exceed the threshold. That is, the optimal covert attack designed by the present invention can effectively reduce system performance while evading monitoring by traditional technologies.

[0153] The present invention further conducts simulation experiments to verify the effectiveness of the designed detection scheme based on dual adaptive observers. Similarly, considering that the distributed generation unit is operating independently in the first 2 seconds, at the 3rd second, the distributed generation unit 2 is subjected to the optimal covert attack. The detection results of the scheme designed in this embodiment are as follows: Figure 6 As shown in the figure, the detection residual in DG unit 2 showed obvious abnormality and quickly exceeded the detection threshold. At the 4th second, the operator proactively unplugged DG unit 2 to prevent the attack from spreading and causing a cascading effect. At the same time, the neighbors of DG unit 2 autonomously updated the detector structure, while the detectors in the other power generation units remained unchanged. At the 4.5th second, DG unit 6 was attacked by the optimal covert attack. Figure 6 It can be seen that the detection residual in distributed power generation unit 6 shows obvious abnormality and quickly exceeds the detection threshold, while the detection residuals in other power generation units do not show abnormality.

[0154] The above simulation experiments demonstrate that, considering a DC microgrid with ZIP loads, the optimal covert attack proposed in this invention can still disrupt system performance despite limited energy, while exploiting system vulnerabilities to evade detection. The dual-adaptive observer-based detection scheme in this embodiment can quickly and accurately detect and locate the optimal covert attack, while also exhibiting good scalability.

[0155] Example 2

[0156] As a second aspect of the present invention, the present application further provides an electronic device comprising: one or more processors; a memory for storing one or more programs; when the one or more programs are executed by the one or more processors, the one or more processors implement the above-mentioned optimal covert attack detection method in a power grid system based on a dual adaptive observer. In addition to the above-mentioned processor, memory, and interface, any device with data processing capabilities in which the apparatus in the embodiment is located may also include other hardware, generally based on the actual functions of the device with data processing capabilities, which will not be described in detail.

[0157] Example 3

[0158] As a third aspect of the present invention, the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium having computer instructions stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implement the above-mentioned optimal covert attack detection method in a power grid system based on a dual adaptive observer. The computer-readable storage medium can be an internal storage unit of any device with data processing capabilities described in any of the aforementioned embodiments, such as a hard disk or memory. The computer-readable storage medium can also be an external storage device, such as a plug-in hard disk, smart media card (SMC), SD card, flash card, etc. equipped on the device. Furthermore, the computer-readable storage medium can also include both an internal storage unit of any device with data processing capabilities and an external storage device. The computer-readable storage medium is used to store the computer program and other programs and data required by any device with data processing capabilities, and can also be used to temporarily store data that has been output or is to be output.

[0159] The above describes in detail the preferred embodiments of the present invention. It should be understood that those skilled in the art can make numerous modifications and variations based on the concepts of the present invention without inventive effort. Therefore, any technical solutions that can be derived by those skilled in the art through logical analysis, reasoning, or limited experimentation based on the concepts of the present invention and the prior art should be within the scope of protection defined by the claims.

Claims

1. An optimal covert attack detection method in a power grid system based on dual adaptive observers, characterized in that: The optimal covert attack for detecting the vulnerability of an adaptive unknown input observer in a DC microgrid system includes the following steps: For a DC microgrid system with ZIP loads, a dynamic model of distributed generation units is established; Deploying an adaptive unknown input observer and an adaptive distributed observer for each distributed generation unit to monitor its state when decoupled from neighboring distributed generation units; wherein the adaptive distributed observer receives the output of the neighboring adaptive unknown input observer and predicts the output of the distributed generation unit; Based on the detection residual between the actual system output and the system output estimated by the adaptive unknown input observer and the adaptive distributed observer, it is determined whether the distributed generation unit is under attack.

2. The optimal covert attack detection method in a power grid system based on a dual adaptive observer according to claim 1, characterized in that: The dynamic model of the distributed generation unit considers the control problem of voltage balancing and current sharing in the DC microgrid system with ZIP load. i The state equation is expressed as: Where, is the state variable, Indicates the voltage at the common connection point, Represents an RLC filter i current, represents the integral of the voltage tracking error; and are the primary and secondary control inputs respectively, Buck inverter i Output voltage; is the common connection point reference voltage; is the total load current, , and is the load constant; , , , , , , is the corresponding power grid system structure parameter matrix; Distributed power generation units i Output.

3. The optimal covert attack detection method in a power grid system based on a dual adaptive observer according to claim 2, characterized in that: The distributed power generation unit i The dynamics of the adaptive unknown input observer is expressed as: Where, and Adaptive unknown input observer i status and estimated system status; , , , and is an adaptive unknown input observer i Gain; is external input; coefficient matrix ; is an unknown input and satisfies , ; are the adaptive parameters of the unknown input observer.

4. The optimal covert attack detection method in a power grid system based on a dual adaptive observer according to claim 3, characterized in that: The optimal covert attack injects false data into the channel to destroy the integrity of the data and thus degrade system performance; Distributed Generation Units i The false data injection attack in the forward channel is described as follows: in, represents a damaged input signal, Indicates normal input signal, represents a step function, Indicates the attack start time, Indicates an attack signal; Optimal covert attack signal Described as: in: Satisfy the following dynamics: Where, , are the coefficient matrices of the augmented systems of the attacked and normal systems, is the state of the system after the attack and normal system augmentation, It is the input of the system after the attack and normal system are augmented.

5. The optimal covert attack detection method in a power grid system based on dual adaptive observers according to claim 3, characterized in that: The adaptive distributed observer of the adaptive distributed power generation unit is: Where, and is the distributed generation unit estimated by the observer i Status and output, is the adaptive distributed observer gain, is the adaptive parameter of the adaptive distributed observer; The global error dynamics of a DC microgrid containing n distributed generation units is expressed as: The sufficient condition for the error system to be asymptotically stable is: For a given adaptive parameter , H infinite performance index , there exists a matrix of appropriate dimension , and free matrix So that: in: ， ， ， The distributed observer gain is: 。 6. The optimal covert attack detection method in a power grid system based on dual adaptive observers according to claim 5, characterized in that: The adaptive parameters of the adaptive distributed observer Satisfy the following adaptive rules: Where, is a positive adaptive parameter.

7. The optimal covert attack detection method in a power grid system based on a dual adaptive observer according to any one of claims 5-6, characterized in that: The adaptive distributed observer is designed in a decentralized manner. The coupling between distributed power generation units is eliminated through a fixed-structure relaxation matrix, which gives the adaptive distributed observer plug-and-play capabilities and realizes scalable optimal covert attack detection. The details are as follows: The sufficient condition for the asymptotic stability of the adaptive distributed observer error system is transformed into: For a given adaptive parameter , H infinite performance index , there exists a matrix of appropriate dimension , and free matrix So that: In the formula , distributed observer gain .

8. The optimal covert attack detection method in a power grid system based on dual adaptive observers according to claim 1, characterized in that: The determination of whether the distributed power generation unit is under attack is as follows: Based on the designed adaptive unknown input observer and adaptive distributed observer, the system output is estimated to obtain the detection residual: Where: is the actual output of the system, is the system output estimated by the observer; like , then the distributed generation unit is considered i The communication within is normal, otherwise it is considered that the distributed generation unit i Under attack, including Represents the threshold for detecting residuals.

9. An electronic device, characterized in that: include: one or more processors; a memory for storing one or more programs; When the one or more programs are executed by the one or more processors, the one or more processors implement the optimal covert attack detection method in a power grid system based on a dual adaptive observer as described in any one of claims 1 to 8.

10. A computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, characterized in that: When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the optimal covert attack detection method in a power grid system based on a dual adaptive observer are implemented as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 8.

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