A lightweight smart meter authentication method and system based on analog-digital grouping

Abstract

The application discloses a kind of lightweight smart meter authentication method and system based on analog-digital grouping, and the revocation of single smart meter user is realized by publishing secret random value bound with smart meter identity.The specific authentication scheme includes six stages of system initialization, key generation, smart meter registration, smart meter authentication, power consumption data billing and smart meter revocation.The application not only protects the security of smart meter power consumption data by encryption, but also resists identity attacks from internal and external adversaries by using hash function and timestamp, which can more effectively resist various attacks and protect the integrity and security of data transmission.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of power Internet of Things network information security, and in particular to a lightweight smart meter authentication method and system based on analog-to-digital grouping. Background Art

[0002] With the rapid development of smart grid technology, smart meters, as a key component of the smart grid, are becoming increasingly important. Smart meters not only accurately measure and record energy consumption data but also serve as a critical node for data transmission between the grid and users. Within the smart grid architecture, the security and reliability of smart meters are crucial for ensuring the stable operation of the entire grid. Power companies can use data from smart meters to plan the production and allocation of electricity resources, facilitating efficient utilization and ensuring stable grid operation. During data transmission between smart meters and power companies, unauthorized users often impersonate legitimate users to steal electricity resources. Therefore, effective identity authentication between both parties is crucial. Furthermore, attackers may exploit users' personal habits and privacy to target their electricity usage data, making the security of electricity usage data crucial.

[0003] In smart grids, the data collected and transmitted by smart meters affects both user privacy and the economic interests of power companies. Therefore, ensuring the integrity and security of data transmission and preventing data tampering or theft are the core goals of smart meter authentication solutions.

[0004] Currently, most smart meter authentication schemes use complex encryption algorithms, such as RSA. While these algorithms offer excellent security, they are computationally complex, leading to high energy consumption and slow response times for resource-constrained devices like smart meters. In practical applications, these issues can cause smart meters to malfunction and even threaten the stable operation of the entire smart grid. Meanwhile, while some lightweight authentication schemes reduce computational complexity, they lack security. These schemes are often vulnerable to various attacks, such as man-in-the-middle and replay attacks, leading to data leakage or tampering, resulting in losses for users and power companies.

[0005] A prior art document (CN11749447A) discloses a collusion-resistant smart meter authentication method. The method involves constructing a smart meter authentication system consisting of a trusted authority (TA), a data processing center (OC), a regional manager (RC), and smart meters (SM). The process of implementing this collusion-resistant smart meter authentication method based on this smart meter authentication system is divided into five phases: system initialization, registration, smart meter authentication, meter calculation and billing, and smart meter revocation.

[0006] However, existing technologies have high computational overhead, relatively long energy consumption and response time, and large storage requirements; there is only one regional manager, which faces the problem of authentication burden in large-scale smart grid environments; although it can resist collusion attacks, it cannot resist passive attacks, replay attacks and identity spoofing attacks; and when the trusted center TA fails or is attacked, it may cause the entire authentication system to be paralyzed or fail. Summary of the Invention

[0007] To address the shortcomings of the existing technology, the present invention aims to provide a lightweight smart meter authentication method and system based on modular grouping. This method and system takes into account the resource constraints of smart meters and employs a lightweight encryption algorithm to reduce computational complexity, energy consumption, and response time. Furthermore, the system offers high security, effectively resisting various attacks and ensuring the integrity and security of data transmission.

[0008] The present invention adopts the following technical solutions.

[0009] A first aspect of the present invention provides a lightweight smart meter authentication method based on analog-to-digital grouping, comprising the following contents:

[0010] Build a smart meter identity authentication system model, which includes a system initialization core (SIC), a data processing center (DPC), a regional coordinator (RC), and smart meters (SM). The SIC is used to inject the SM's identity information into the DPC, RC, and SM. The DPC is used to process power consumption data forwarded by the RC and verify the SM's identity. The RC is used to verify the identity of the SM within its RC area and forward the SM's power consumption data to the DPC.

[0011] During the system initialization phase, SIC selects a set of mutually prime numbers n1, n2, ..., n n 、A set of random numbers b1, b2, ..., b n and a system preset value S;

[0012] During the key generation phase, DPC generates the DPC private key skey DPC and DPC public key pkey DPC , RC generates RC private key skey RC and RC public key pkey RC ; and generate authentication information (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ), where ID i is the i-th SM i identity information, is the encryption algorithm, pkey RC is the public key of RC, H is the hash function, and Y is based on q i 、ni The value calculated based on the modulus grouping,

[0013]

[0014] During the smart meter registration phase, when the i-th SM i When registering with SIC, if (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) exists in the SIC database, SIC will (Y,n i ,b i ) loaded into SM i Otherwise, SIC randomly selects (Y,n i ,b i ), (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) loaded into the smart meter SM i and (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) is secretly sent to DPC, and (Y,n i ) Secretly sent to the RC corresponding to the SM;

[0015] Smart meter certification stage, SM i The registration information (Y,n i ,H(n i ,b i ),Time s )Use RC public key pkey RC Encrypted and sent to RC, RC uses RC private key skey RC After decryption, the registration information is obtained and the validity check is performed on the registration information. If the check result is valid, SM i Authentication is successful, otherwise, SM i Authentication failed;

[0016] During the electricity data billing phase, in SM i If the authentication is successful, SM i The power consumption data within the preset time period is stored using the RC public key pkey RC Encrypt and send to RC, RC uses private key skey RC After decryption, use the DPC public key pkey DPC The data is encrypted and signed and sent to DPC, which then checks the validity of the power consumption data.

[0017] Smart meter cancellation phase, when b i Leaked or SM i When the system is logged off, DPC broadcastsi Revoke SM to RC i permissions.

[0018] Optionally, the key generation phase generates authentication information (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ),include:

[0019] SIC chooses an elliptic curve E:y 2 ≡x 3 +cx+d(modp) and an elliptic curve group E p (c, d), and randomly select a generator J∈E p (c, d), the order of J is m;

[0020] SIC chooses a hash function H{01} * →E p (c, d), use the hash function to map the input data to the elliptic curve group, and output the public parameter pp = {E p (c, d), J, H, n}; where the input data includes the identity information of the SM;

[0021] SIC randomly selects a set of mutually prime numbers n1,n2,...,n n , a set of random numbers b1,b2,…,b n and a system preset value S, calculate Construct the following equation And use the modulus grouping to solve for Y;

[0022] According to the Y and n i ∈{n1,n2,…,n n}、b i ∈{b1,b2,…,b n} and SM i Identity information ID i Generate authentication information (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ).

[0023] Optionally, during the key generation phase, the DPC generates a DPC private key skey DPC and DPC public key pkey DPC , RC generates RC private key skey RC and RC public key pkey RC ,include:

[0024] DPC randomly selects a number n from 1 to m-1 DPC ∈[1,m-1] as the DPC private key, and use the random number nDPC and generator J by pkey DPC =n DPC J calculates the DPC public key, and DPC outputs the DPC public key pkey to the smart meter identity authentication system DPC And the DPC private key skey DPC =n DPC Confidentiality;

[0025] RC randomly selects a number n from 1 to m-1 RC ∈[1,m-1] as the RC private key, and use the random number n RC and generator J by pkey RC =n RC J calculates the RC public key, and RC outputs the RC public key pkey to the smart meter identity authentication system RC And RC private key skey RC =n RC Confidential.

[0026] Optionally, smart meter certification includes:

[0027] SM i The registration information (Y,n i ,H(n i ,b i ),Time s ) is encoded as point Q m ∈E p (c,d), where Time s By SM i timestamp of the selection;

[0028] S M i Randomly select a number k SM ∈[1,m-1], and press C i ={k SM J,Q m +k SM pkey RC}Calculate the ciphertext C i , and C i Send to RC;

[0029] RC receives the ciphertext C i Then, follow Q m =Q m +k SM pkey RC -skey RC k SM J calculates Q m and decoded by Q m Get(Y,n i,H(n i ,b i ),Time s );

[0030] RC check timestamp Time s Is it invalid? If invalid, return SM i RC authentication fails; otherwise calculate q i =Ymodn i and is the decryption algorithm, S and n respectively i The predicted value of

[0031] RC comparison Is it equal to the system preset value S, and compare Is it equal to n i ,like is equal to S, and Equal to n i Then return to SM i Successfully authenticated RC, otherwise, returns to SM i RC authentication failed.

[0032] Optionally, electricity data billing includes:

[0033] SM i Get the power consumption data EP within the preset time range ow , select a timestamp Time s ' and Time s ′ and EP ow Encoded as point Q m ′∈E p (c, d), and calculate h=H(b i ,EP ow ,Time s ') Get the hash value h; randomly select a number k' SM ∈[1,m-1] and calculate C1′={k′ SM J,Q′ m +k′ SM pkey RC}, and send (h,C′1) to RC;

[0034] After RC receives (h, C′1), it uses skey RC Calculate Q′ m =Q′ m +k′ SM pkey RC -skey RC k′ SM J gets Q′m , and by decoding Q′ m Get Time s ′, EP ow ;

[0035] RC check timestamp Time′ s Is it valid? If not, exit. Otherwise, send the message (Y,n i ,EP ow ,Time′ s ) is encoded as point Q″ m ∈E p After (a,b), randomly select a number k RC ∈[1,m-1], and calculate C′2={k RC J,Q″ m +k RC pkey DPC}, and use the ECDSA signature algorithm to sign C2′, and get After that, (C′2, C′3, h) is sent to DPC;

[0036] After receiving (C′2, C′3, h), DPC verifies the validity of signature C′3. If it is invalid, it exits. Otherwise, it passes DPC private key skey DPC Calculate Q″ m =Q″ m +k RC pkey DPC -skey DPC k RC J is obtained and decoded by Q″ m Get Time′ s and (Y,n i ,EP ow ,Time′ s );

[0037] DPC check timestamp Time′ s Is it valid? If not, exit. Otherwise, execute the query in the local database that matches (Y,n i ) corresponding to b i , and calculate H(b i ,EP ow ,Time' S ) is consistent with the hash value h. If they are consistent, it means that the power consumption data is valid. By using (Y,n i ,b i ) Confirm SM i The real identity of the user is used to complete the billing of electricity consumption data.

[0038] Optionally, during the smart meter cancellation phase, if the cancelled user SMi Register with RC, SM i Need to send registration information to RC (Y,n i ,H(n i ,b i ),Time s ), after receiving the registration information, RC uses the revocation message b sent by DPC i and SM i Provide i Calculate the hash value H(n i ,b i ); If the calculated hash value is equal to SM i If the hash values ​​sent are equal, authentication is rejected, indicating that SM i has been revoked.

[0039] Optionally, the method further includes:

[0040] A threat model of a smart meter identity authentication system is constructed, wherein the threat model is used to simulate attacks from threat sources on the smart meter identity authentication system model.

[0041] Optionally, the threat sources include SM, dishonest regional coordinator RC and external attackers, and the attacks include at least one of the following: passive attack, replay attack, collusion attack, forged power ledger attack and identity deception attack.

[0042] A second aspect of the present invention provides a lightweight smart meter authentication system, the system comprising:

[0043] A construction module is used to construct a smart meter identity authentication system model. The system model includes a system initialization core (SIC), a data processing center (DPC), a regional coordinator (RC), and a smart meter (SM). The SIC is used to inject the SM's identity information into the DPC, RC, and SM. The DPC is used to process power consumption data forwarded by the RC and verify the SM's identity. The RC is used to verify the identity of the SM within its RC area and forward the SM's power consumption data to the DPC.

[0044] System initialization module, used by SIC to select a set of coprime numbers n1, n2, ..., n n 、A set of random numbers b1, b2, ..., b n and a system preset value S;

[0045] Key generation module, used by DPC to generate DPC private key skey DPC and DPC public key pkey DPC , RC generates RC private key skey RC and RC public key pkey RC ; and generate authentication information (Y,ni ,b i ,ID i ), where ID i is the i-th SM i identity information, is the encryption algorithm, pkey RC is the public key of RC, H is the hash function, Y is based on q i 、n i The value calculated based on the modulus grouping;

[0046] Smart meter registration module, used when the i-th SM i When registering with SIC, if (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) exists in the SIC database, SIC will (Y,n i ,b i ) loaded into SM i Otherwise, SIC randomly selects (Y,n i ,b i ), (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) loaded into the smart meter SM i and (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) is secretly sent to DPC, and (Y,n i ) Secretly sent to the RC corresponding to the SM;

[0047] Smart meter authentication module for SM i The registration information (Y,n i ,H(n i ,b i ),Time s )Use RC public key pkey RC Encrypted and sent to RC, RC uses RC private key skey RC After decryption, the registration information is obtained and the validity check is performed on the registration information. If the check result is valid, SM i Authentication is successful, otherwise, SM i Authentication failed;

[0048] Electricity data billing module, used in SM i If the authentication is successful, SM i The power consumption data within the preset time period is stored using the RC public key pkey RC Encrypt and send to RC, RC uses private key skey RCAfter decryption, use the DPC public key pkey DPC The data is encrypted and signed and sent to DPC, which then checks the validity of the power consumption data.

[0049] Smart meter cancellation module, used when b i Leaked or SM i When the system is logged off, DPC broadcasts i Revoke SM to RC i permissions.

[0050] A third aspect of the present invention provides an electronic device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the computer program implements the aforementioned lightweight smart meter authentication method based on analog-to-digital grouping when loaded into the processor.

[0051] A fourth aspect of the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, which implements the above-mentioned lightweight smart meter authentication method based on analog-to-digital grouping when executed by a processor.

[0052] Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the present invention include at least:

[0053] This invention utilizes the mathematical principle of modular grouping to transform the complex authentication process into a series of smaller problems where the modular numbers are relatively prime, significantly reducing computational complexity and thus the energy consumption and response time of smart meters. Furthermore, while reducing computational complexity, this invention also uses hash functions and timestamps to resist identity attacks from both internal and external adversaries, maintaining high security, effectively defending against various attacks, and safeguarding the integrity and security of data transmission.

[0054] The present invention adopts a lightweight encryption algorithm based on modular grouping to reduce computational complexity, energy consumption and response time, improve authentication efficiency, and is more suitable for resource-constrained devices such as smart meters. It introduces a hierarchical structure of regional manager devices to reduce the burden on centralized authentication servers and improve the scalability of the system. It can resist passive attacks, replay attacks, collusion attacks, forged power ledger attacks, and identity deception attacks to ensure the integrity and security of data transmission. It establishes a system initialization core with high anti-attack capabilities to ensure that key information such as keys in the system initialization core will not be leaked.

[0055] During the electricity data billing stage of the present invention, users can obtain electricity data billing results and confirmation information more quickly; and the present invention ensures the accuracy of data transmission between the power grid and users by improving the security and reliability of smart meter authentication.

[0056] In smart meter authentication, this invention allows for the selection of appropriate moduli based on practical circumstances to meet diverse security requirements. Furthermore, this authentication scheme based on modulo grouping can be combined with other security technologies, such as physical security measures and secure storage, to further enhance the security of smart meters. Because modulo grouping has well-established mathematical principles and a wide range of applications, this invention can be easily extended to other fields, such as computer science, cryptography, and coding theory. This not only facilitates the further development of smart meter technology but also provides further technical support for the construction of smart grids. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0057] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for describing the embodiments. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. Those skilled in the art can also derive other drawings based on these drawings without inventive effort. Among them:

[0058] Figure 1 A schematic flow chart of a lightweight smart meter authentication method based on analog-to-digital grouping provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0059] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of a lightweight smart grid authentication system based on analog-to-digital grouping provided by an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0060] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the present invention more clear, the technical solutions of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. The embodiments described in this application are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of them. Based on the spirit of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without making creative efforts are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0061] Combine Figure 1 As shown, embodiment 1 of the present invention provides a lightweight smart meter authentication method based on analog-to-digital grouping, including the following contents:

[0062] S1. Build a smart meter identity authentication system model, which includes the SIC (System Initialization Core), DPC (Data Processing Center), RC (Regional Coordinator), and SM (Smart Meter). There can be multiple RCs, including multiple layers, and one or more SMs, with each RC managing one or more SMs. The SIC injects identity information into the DPC, RC, and SMs. The DPC processes power consumption data forwarded by the RC and verifies the identity of the SM. The RC verifies the identity of the SMs in its region and forwards their power consumption data to the DPC.

[0063] like Figure 2 As shown in the figure, the smart meter identity authentication system consists of four parts:

[0064] (1) System Initialization Core (SIC). There is only one SIC in the system, which is responsible for initializing the system and injecting identity information into the data processing center (DPC), regional coordinator (RC) and smart meter (SM). It also builds a special protection system and deploys advanced firewalls, intrusion detection systems and intrusion prevention systems to protect the SIC from attacks, prevent information leakage and attack time, and ensure the stable operation of the entire authentication system.

[0065] (2) Data Processing Center (DPC): There is only one DPC in the system, which is responsible for processing the power consumption data forwarded by the regional coordinator (RC) and verifying the identity of the smart meter (SM).

[0066] (3) Regional Coordinator (RC). The system includes multiple RCs. The number of RCs is determined by the DPC based on actual needs. For example, it can be divided by region, with one RC for each region. Hierarchical RCs are also established to further reduce the certification burden of a single RC certification system. The RC's task is to verify the identity of smart meters (SMs) within its region and forward their power consumption data to the DPC.

[0067] (4) Smart Meter (SM). The system contains multiple SMs, but each RC can manage up to multiple SMs. The SM authenticates with the RC and connects to the grid.

[0068] S2. Construct a threat model for the smart meter identity authentication system.

[0069] Specifically, in smart grids, security issues may arise due to system vulnerabilities or compromises. Threat sources include internal smart meters (SMs), dishonest regional coordinators (RCs), and external attackers. The following are threats related to smart meter authentication methods:

[0070] S2.1. Model and characterize each threat.

[0071] (1) Passive Attack. The attacker illegally monitors the data transmitted in the smart grid, endangering the confidentiality of the data. The goal of a passive attack is to monitor data transmission to obtain sensitive information. A passive attack is expressed as follows:

[0072]

[0073] Among them, P a represents the amount of data obtained by the passive attacker, D(t) represents the amount of data transmitted at time t, and t0 and t1 are the monitored time ranges.

[0074] (2) Replay Attack. The attacker repeatedly sends data that the receiver has already received in an attempt to trick the receiver into accepting the message and undermine identity authentication. A replay attack involves repeatedly sending a previous message. A replay attack is expressed as follows:

[0075] R m ={m i |m i ∈Mandt i <t current}

[0076] Among them, R m represents the set of messages to be replayed, M is the set of messages that have been accepted, and t i It is message m i The receiving time, t current is the current time.

[0077] (3) Collusion Attack. Internal smart meters (SM) collude with each other to attack the identities of other smart meters, and then use this identity to attack. Collusion attack refers to the cooperation between multiple internal smart meters. Collusion attack is expressed as follows:

[0078] C s ={SM i ,SM j |SM i andSM j collude}

[0079] Among them, C sRepresents the set of smart meters participating in the collusion.

[0080] (4) Forging Electricity Ledger Attack. A dishonest regional coordinator (RC) impersonates a smart meter and forges electricity consumption data to launch an attack. A forging attack involves a dishonest regional coordinator forging data. The forging electricity ledger attack is expressed as follows:

[0081] F d ={d i |d i ≠D actual}

[0082] Among them, F d Denote as a fake data set, D actual This is the actual power consumption data.

[0083] (5) Identity Spoofing Attack. The attacker impersonates an already authenticated identity to launch an attack. Identity spoofing attacks involve impersonating an already authenticated identity. Identity spoofing attacks are expressed as follows:

[0084] S i ={ID j |ID j is spoofed}

[0085] Among them, S i Indicates the identity ID being impersonated j A collection of .

[0086] S2.2. Calculate the threat model of the smart meter authentication system and the impact of attacks on the smart meter authentication system.

[0087] Specifically, the impact of the threat model of the smart meter identity authentication system on attacks on the smart meter identity authentication system is calculated according to the following formula:

[0088]

[0089] I stage,i It represents the impact of the i-th attack on each stage, which can be expressed as:

[0090] I stage,i =I init,i +I keygen,i +I reg,i +I auth,i +I billing,i +I revoke,i

[0091] I init,P=α1·D init

[0092] I auth,R =β2·M auth

[0093] I reg,C =γ3·S reg

[0094] I auth,S =∈4·ID auth

[0095] I billing,F =δ5·L billing

[0096] Among them, I init,i Indicates the impact of the i-th attack on the system initialization phase, I keygen,i represents the impact of the i-th attack on the key generation stage, I reg,i represents the impact of the i-th attack on the smart meter registration phase, I auth,i It represents the impact of the i-th attack on the smart meter authentication stage, I billing,i represents the impact of the i-th attack on the electricity data billing stage, I revoke,i Denotes the impact of the ith attack on the smart meter revocation phase, D init is the amount of data in the initialization phase, M auth is the number of messages in the smart meter authentication phase, S reg is the number of smart meters in the registration phase, ID auth is the amount of identity data in the smart meter authentication phase, L billing is the amount of account data in the electricity data billing stage, and α1, β2, γ3, ∈4 and δ5 are influencing parameters. init,P Indicates the impact of passive attack on the system initialization phase, I auth,R Represents the impact of replay attack on smart meter authentication phase, I reg,C represents the impact of collusion attack on the smart meter registration phase, I auth,S represents the impact of identity deception attack on the smart meter authentication stage, I billing,F Represents the impact of the forged power ledger attack on the electricity data billing stage.

[0097] Specifically, passive attacks affect data confidentiality and integrity, particularly during system initialization and smart meter authentication. Replay attacks affect message validity, particularly during smart meter registration and authentication. Collusion attacks affect trust between smart meters, potentially compromising user authentication during registration and authentication, impacting smart meter registration. Identity spoofing attacks affect the validity of authentication, primarily during the authentication phase, impacting smart meter authentication. Power ledger forgery attacks affect data authenticity, particularly during electricity billing.

[0098] S2.3. Determine the target of attack.

[0099] The attack target can be expressed by the following equation:

[0100] T d ={D transmitted ,ID SM ,K secret}

[0101] Among them, T d Represents the attack target data set, including the transmission data D transmitted , smart meter ID SM and key K secret .

[0102] In this embodiment, a threat model is used to simulate attacks on attack targets in the smart meter identity authentication system model to verify whether the smart meter identity authentication system model can resist the impact of the above attacks.

[0103] S3. System initialization

[0104] System initialization is a key stage in lightweight identity authentication systems, which ensures that all components can communicate and operate securely and effectively. Specifically, SIC selects a set of mutually prime numbers n1,n2,…,n n 、A set of random numbers b1, b2, ..., b n and a system preset value S. The system preset value is generated according to the public parameters and input data, and the smart meter uses this system preset value and other parameters to generate authentication information.

[0105] S4, key generation phase

[0106] S4.1. SIC selects an elliptic curve: E:y 2 ≡x 3 +cx+d(modp) and an elliptic curve group E p (c, d), and randomly select a generator J∈E p(c, d). Assume that the order of J is m. Randomly select a hash function H{01} * →E p (c, d), the hash function maps the input data, such as the identity ID of the smart meter, random number, timestamp, etc., to the elliptic curve group to generate a unique hash value for the subsequent authentication process. Output public parameter pp = {E p (c,d),J,H,n}.

[0107] S4.2, SIC randomly selects mutually prime numbers n1,n2,...,n n , a system preset value S, and numbers b1, b2, ..., b n ,calculate in, is the encryption algorithm, pkey RC is the public key, and H is the hash function.

[0108] S4.3. Construct the following equation And use the modular grouping to solve to get Y, which represents the component of the authentication information in the subsequent authentication process.

[0109] S4.4, DPC randomly selects a number n from 1 to m-1 DPC ∈[1,m-1] as its private key, and use the random number n DPC Calculate the DPC public key with generator J, and DPC outputs the public key pkey DPC Give the entire authentication system the private key skey DPC =n DPC Confidential. According to pkey DPC =n DPC J calculates the DPC public key.

[0110] S4.5, RC randomly selects a number n RC ∈[1,m-1] as its private key and calculate the RC public key. RC outputs the public key pkey RC Give the entire authentication system the private key skey RC =n RC Confidential. According to pkey RC =n RC J calculates the RC public key.

[0111] S5. Smart meter registration stage

[0112] When the i-th meter SM i When registering with the System Initialization Core (SIC), if (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) exists in the SIC database, where ID iFor the i-th meter SM i The identity information of SIC will be (Y,n i ,b i ) loaded into SM i Otherwise, randomly select (Y,n i ,b i ), (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) loaded into the smart meter SM i Then (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) is secretly sent to the data processing center (DPC), and finally (Y,n i ) is secretly sent to the corresponding regional coordinator (RC).

[0113] S6, Smart Meter Certification Stage

[0114] Specifically, RC's SM i The identity verification process specifically includes:

[0115] S6.1, SM i The registration information (Y,n i ,H(n i ,b i ),Time s ) is encoded as point Q m ∈E p (c,d), where Time s By SM i Specifically, the registration information is mapped to the coordinates of the elliptic curve through a hash function.

[0116] S6.2, SM i Randomly select a number k SM ∈[1,m-1], calculate the ciphertext C i ={k SM J,Q m +k SM pkey RC}, pkey RC is the public key of RC, and C i Sent to the Regional Coordinator (RC).

[0117] S6.3, RC receives the ciphertext C i After that, through the RC private key skey RC Calculate Q m =Q m +k SM pkey RC -skeyRC k SM J, and by decoding Q m Get the plaintext (Y,n i ,H(n i ,b i ),Time s ).

[0118] S6.4, RC check timestamp Time s Is it invalid? If invalid, return δ=0, indicating that SM fails to authenticate RC. If valid, calculate q i =Ymodn i and is the decryption algorithm, S and n respectively i The predicted value of .

[0119] Specifically, checking whether the timestamp is expired includes determining whether the timestamp is within a preset time range. If not, the timestamp is considered expired; otherwise, the timestamp is considered valid. This allows the authentication message to be verified to ensure it meets the specified timeliness requirements, thereby improving the authentication performance and efficiency of the system.

[0120] It should be noted that the preset time range can be set according to actual application requirements, and the embodiment of the present invention does not specifically limit the preset time range.

[0121] S6.5, RC comparison Is it equal to the system preset value S, and Is it equal to n i If both are equal, then return δ=1, indicating SM i RC has been successfully authenticated. Otherwise, return δ=0.

[0122] In this embodiment, by utilizing the mathematical principle of modulus grouping, the complex authentication process is converted into a series of small problems with coprime moduli, which greatly reduces the computational complexity, reduces the energy consumption and response time of the smart meter, and further improves the efficiency of authentication.

[0123] S7, electricity data billing stage:

[0124] Electricity data billing specifically includes:

[0125] S7.1, SM i Summarize the power consumption data within a period of time (e.g. one month) and get EP ow .

[0126] S7.2, SM i Select a timestamp Time′ sAnd Time′ s and EP ow Encoded as point Q m ′∈E p (c,d).

[0127] S7.3, SM i Calculate h = H (b i ,EP ow ,Time′ s ).

[0128] S7.4, SM i Randomly select a number k′ SM ∈[1,m-1] and calculate C′1={k′ SM J,Q′ m +k′ SM pkey RC}.

[0129] S7.5, SM i Send (h,C′1) to RC.

[0130] S7.6, after RC receives (h, C′1), RC uses RC private key skey RC Calculate Q′ m =Q′ m +k′ SM pkey RC -skey RC k′ SM J, and by decoding Q′ m Get Time s ′, EP ow .

[0131] S7.7. RC checks the timestamp Time′ s Is it valid? If not, exit. Otherwise, execute the following S7.8.

[0132] S7.8, RC will send the message (Y,n i ,EP ow ,Time′ s ) is encoded as point Q″ m ∈E p (a,b).

[0133] S7.9, RC randomly selects a number k RC ∈[1,m-1], and calculate C′2={k RC J,Q″ m +k RC pkey DPC}.

[0134] S7.10. RC uses ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) to sign C′2 and obtain

[0135] S7.11. RC sends (C′2, C′3, h) to DPC.

[0136] S7.12. After receiving (C′2, C′3, h), DPC verifies the validity of signature C′3. If it is invalid, it exits. Otherwise, it executes the following S7.13.

[0137] S7.13, DPC through private key skey DPC Calculate Q″ m =Q″ m +k RC pkey DPC -skey DPC k RC J, and by decoding Q″ m Get Time′ s ,(Y,n i ,EP ow ,Time′ s ).

[0138] S7.14, DPC check timestamp Time′ s Is it valid? If not, exit. Otherwise, execute the following S7.15.

[0139] S7.15, DPC finds the same as (Y,n i ) corresponding to b i , and calculate H(b i ,EP ow ,Time' S ) is consistent with h. If so, it indicates that the power consumption data is valid.

[0140] S7.16, DPC uses (Y,n i ,b i ), you can confirm SM i The true identity of the user is obtained, thereby completing the billing structure of electricity consumption.

[0141] S8, smart meter cancellation stage

[0142] When b i Leaked or SM i When logging off the system, DPC can broadcast b i Give RC to revoke SM i If the revoked user SMi Register with RC, SM i Need to send registration information to RC (Y,n i ,H(n i ,b i ),Time s After receiving the registration information, RC can use the revocation message sent by DPC i and SM i Provide i Calculate the hash value H(n i ,b i ). If the calculated hash value is the same as SM i If the hash values ​​sent are equal, authentication is rejected, indicating that SM i has been revoked.

[0143] In this embodiment, a single smart meter user is effectively revoked through the random number in the hash function, thereby improving the security of the system.

[0144] S9. Accuracy Analysis

[0145] The correctness of the solution includes the correctness of smart meter authentication, the correctness of electricity data billing, and the correctness of smart meter revocation. S9 includes:

[0146] S9.1. During the smart meter authentication phase, the smart meter sends the ciphertext C i ={k SM J,Q m +k SM pkey RC} gives RC. RC is calculated as follows:

[0147] Q m +k SM pkey RC -skey RC k SM J

[0148] =Q m +k SM pkey RC -k SM (skey RC J)

[0149] =Q m +k SM pkey RC -k SM (pkey RC )

[0150] =Q m

[0151] Therefore, RC can decode Qm Get(Y,n i ,H(n i ,b i ),Time s ), and calculate q i =Y modn i .because RC can be decrypted to get Then get Therefore, according to and S and and n i Are they equal to correctly output δ∈{0,1}, if is equal to the system preset value S, and Equal to n i , then the output is δ=1, indicating that the authentication is successful. Otherwise, the output is δ=0, indicating that the authentication fails.

[0152] S9.2, in the electricity consumption data billing stage, RC can similarly decrypt the ciphertext C′1 to obtain (Time′ S ,EP ow ). DPC can verify the validity of C′3 through the validity of the signature and decrypt it to obtain (Y,n i ,EP ow ,Time′ S Since the hash function is collision-resistant, by verifying H(b i ,EP ow ,Time' S ) is equal to h, the validity of the ledger and the smart meter SM can be determined. i The real identity of i Power consumption EP ow billing.

[0153] S9.3, during the smart meter cancellation phase, DPC can broadcast b i Give RC to revoke SM i In the smart meter authentication phase, RC can obtain (Y,n i ,H(n i ,b i ),Time s ). RC passes b i and n i Calculate the hash value and compare it with H(n i ,b i ) to compare. If the hash values ​​are equal, the SM is rejected i SM authentication, thereby revoking i DPC deletes b from the local database iRelevant information, thereby revoking SM i .

[0154] S10. Security Analysis

[0155] The smart meter authentication scheme is divided into six phases. Because the system initialization and smart meter registration phases are completed offline or via secure channels, adversary considerations are not necessary. The smart meter deregistration phase is performed by the owners' corporation and does not require adversary considerations. The remaining three phases require security analysis because information is transmitted over an open network. The security of the proposed scheme is analyzed from both internal and external adversary perspectives.

[0156] S10.1. In order to resist passive attacks from internal smart meters (SM), dishonest regional coordinators (RC) or external adversaries, during the smart meter authentication phase, the message sent by the smart meter is the ciphertext C i During the electricity consumption data billing phase, the messages transmitted over the open network are the hash value H and the ciphertexts C1', C'2, and C3'. Due to the security of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) (based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem) and the properties of hash values ​​(one-way and collision resistance), it can be seen that the adversary cannot obtain any useful information from the hash value and ciphertext, so the authentication scheme is secure against passive attacks.

[0157] S10.2, in order to resist the replay attack from the internal dishonest smart meter (SM), dishonest regional coordinator (RC) or external adversary, in the smart meter authentication phase and the electricity consumption data billing phase, if the smart meter forwards the intercepted ciphertext C i ={k SM J,Q m +k SM pkey RC} and C′1={k′ SM J,Q′ m +k′ SM pkey RC} to RC, which can decode Q m and Q′ m Get the timestamp Time s and Time s ', these times are decrypted by C i and C′1. Since RC needs to check the timestamp Time s and Time′ s If the timestamp is invalid, the RC will reject the message, thus ensuring that the system is immune to replay attacks.

[0158] S10.3, in order to resist the collusion attack from internal dishonest smart meters (SM) and external adversaries, during the smart meter authentication phase, the smart meter SM i When performing authentication, an additional hash value H(n i ,b i ). Because even if smart meter users collude to attack and obtain n j , due to the one-way and collision-resistant properties of the hash function, they cannot guess b i Or hash value H(n i ,b i ) Therefore, the authentication scheme can effectively resist collusion attacks. Even if attackers join forces to attack the system, they cannot infer the secret information of other smart meters and thus cannot destroy the security of the system.

[0159] S10.4. In order to resist the forged power ledger attack from the dishonest regional coordinator (RC), during the power consumption data billing phase, the dishonest RC impersonates the identity of the successfully authenticated smart meter and forges the power consumption data EP of the smart meter. ow And send it to the data processing center (DPC). Due to the one-way nature of the hash function, from h=H(b i ,EP ow ,Time' S ) cannot calculate b i Therefore, RC does not know the b of the smart meter that has been successfully authenticated. i , and the corresponding hash value h cannot be calculated. Therefore, RC can only randomly select a hash value and send it to DPC. When DPC searches the local database for the hash value corresponding to (Y,n i ) records, H(b i ,EP ow ,Time' S ) and h are not equal, thus rejecting the ledger and resisting the forged electricity ledger attack.

[0160] S10.5. To resist identity spoofing attacks from internal smart meters (SM) or external adversaries, unauthenticated smart meters impersonate the identities of successfully authenticated smart meters and forge the power consumption data EP of smart meters. ow And send it to the regional coordinator (RC). Since the uncertified smart meter does not know the b of the certified smart meter i , so it cannot calculate the true hash value h=H(b i ,EP ow ,Time' S ). Similar to the forged electricity ledger attack, when the data processing center (DPC) searches the local database for the corresponding (Y,n i )i When H(b i ,EP ow ,Time' S ) and h are not equal, thus rejecting the ledger and resisting identity spoofing attacks.

[0161] In the proposed scheme, when illegal users try to enter the system, they first need to perform identity authentication. In the identity authentication stage, the smart meter user needs to provide the registration information (Y, n i ,H(n i ,b i ),Time s ) is sent to the Regional Coordinator (RC). However, during the transmission process, this information is sent in ciphertext form, so the adversary cannot obtain valid information (in this case, it is a passive attack, even if the attacker intercepts the ciphertext message, they cannot decrypt the valid information). If the adversary replays the intercepted message, according to the timestamp Time s , the system rejects the message (in this case, it is a replay attack).

[0162] If the adversary wants to impersonate another legitimate user for identity authentication, the adversary needs to know the legitimate user's secret random number b i or its corresponding hash value H(n i ,b i ). However, the user's b i is hidden in the hash function, and the one-way and collision-resistant properties of the hash function indicate that it is impossible to find the secret random number b of other legitimate users. i . Therefore, it is not possible to impersonate another user (in this case, it is an identity spoofing attack).

[0163] If the adversary colludes with some dishonest users to impersonate other legitimate users, then the adversary and the dishonest users also need to collude to calculate the secret random number b of other legitimate users. i or its corresponding hash value H(n i ,b i ). Although there is a high probability that a coprime integer n can be calculated i , but the input to the hash function still contains a b i , and the random number b i is hidden in the hash function, and each user’s b i are independent of each other, which leads to the failure of collusion attacks.

[0164] Even if the adversary is very powerful and obtains all the registration information (Y,n i ,H(n i ,b i ),Time s), that is, the adversary has obtained a valid hash value H(n i ,b i ) and passed the identity authentication (because the hash value is random, unless the attacker is a dishonest RC, otherwise the probability can be ignored). However, according to the one-way property of the hash function, the adversary cannot obtain the real b i , so it is impossible to calculate h=H(b i ,EP ow ,Time' S ). Therefore, the adversary cannot forge the electricity ledger and thus cannot cause economic losses to users within the system (in this case, it is a forged electricity ledger attack).

[0165] Embodiment 2 of the present invention provides a lightweight smart meter authentication system, which runs the method described in Embodiment 1. The system includes: a construction module, a system initialization module, a key generation module, a smart meter registration module, a smart meter authentication module, an electricity consumption data billing module, and a smart meter revocation module.

[0166] The construction module is used to build a smart meter identity authentication system model. The system model includes a system initialization core SIC, a data processing center DPC, a regional coordinator RC, and a smart meter SM. The SIC is used to inject the SM's identity information into the DPC, RC, and SM. The DPC is used to process the power consumption data forwarded by the RC and verify the SM's identity. The RC is used to verify the identity of the SM in the RC area and forward the SM's power consumption data to the DPC.

[0167] System initialization module, used by SIC to select a set of coprime numbers n1,n2,...,n n 、A set of random numbers b1, b2, ..., b n and a system preset value S;

[0168] Key generation module, used by DPC to generate DPC private key skey DPC and DPC public key pkey DPC , RC generates RC private key skey RC and RC public key pkey RC ; and generate authentication information (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ), where ID i is the i-th SM i identity information, is the encryption algorithm, pkey RC is the public key of RC, H is the hash function, Y is based on q i 、n iThe value calculated based on the modulus grouping;

[0169] Smart meter registration module, used when the i-th SM i When registering with SIC, if (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) exists in the SIC database, SIC will (Y,n i ,b i ) loaded into SM i Otherwise, SIC randomly selects (Y,n i ,b i ), (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) loaded into the smart meter SM i and (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) is secretly sent to DPC, and (Y,n i ) Secretly sent to the RC corresponding to the SM;

[0170] Smart meter authentication module for SM i The registration information (Y,n i ,H(n i ,b i ),Time s )Use RC public key pkey RC Encrypted and sent to RC, RC uses RC private key skey RC After decryption, the registration information is obtained and the validity check is performed on the registration information. If the check result is valid, SM i Authentication is successful, otherwise, SM i Authentication failed;

[0171] Electricity data billing module, used in SM i If the authentication is successful, SM i The power consumption data within the preset time period is stored using the RC public key pkey RC Encrypt and send to RC, RC uses private key skey RC After decryption, use the DPC public key pkey DPC The data is encrypted and signed and sent to DPC, which then checks the validity of the power consumption data.

[0172] Smart meter cancellation module, used when b i Leaked or SM i When the system is logged off, DPC broadcasts i Revoke SM to RC i permissions.

[0173] In one embodiment, the system further includes a simulation module, which is used to construct a threat model of the smart meter identity authentication system. The threat model is used to simulate attacks from threat sources on the smart meter identity authentication system model.

[0174] Embodiment 3 of the present invention provides an electronic device, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the computer program implements the method described in embodiment 1 when loaded into the processor.

[0175] Embodiment 4 of the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium, wherein the computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the method according to embodiment 1 is implemented.

[0176] Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the present invention include at least:

[0177] This invention utilizes the mathematical principle of modular grouping to transform the complex authentication process into a series of smaller problems where the modular numbers are relatively prime, significantly reducing computational complexity and thus the energy consumption and response time of smart meters. Furthermore, while reducing computational complexity, this invention also uses hash functions and timestamps to resist identity attacks from both internal and external adversaries, maintaining high security, effectively defending against various attacks, and safeguarding the integrity and security of data transmission.

[0178] The present invention adopts a lightweight encryption algorithm based on modular grouping to reduce computational complexity, energy consumption and response time, improve authentication efficiency, and is more suitable for resource-constrained devices such as smart meters. It introduces a hierarchical structure of regional manager devices to reduce the burden on centralized authentication servers and improve the scalability of the system. It can resist passive attacks, replay attacks, collusion attacks, forged power ledger attacks, and identity deception attacks to ensure the integrity and security of data transmission. It establishes a system initialization core with high anti-attack capabilities to ensure that key information such as keys in the system initialization core will not be leaked.

[0179] During the electricity data billing stage of the present invention, users can obtain electricity data billing results and confirmation information more quickly; and the present invention ensures the accuracy of data transmission between the power grid and users by improving the security and reliability of smart meter authentication.

[0180] In smart meter authentication, this invention allows for the selection of appropriate moduli based on practical circumstances to meet diverse security requirements. Furthermore, this authentication scheme based on modulo grouping can be combined with other security technologies, such as physical security measures and secure storage, to further enhance the security of smart meters. Because modulo grouping has well-established mathematical principles and a wide range of applications, this invention can be easily extended to other fields, such as computer science, cryptography, and coding theory. This not only facilitates the further development of smart meter technology but also provides further technical support for the construction of smart grids.

[0181] It should be understood that the size of the serial numbers of the steps in the above embodiments does not mean the order of execution. The execution order of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiments of the present invention.

[0182] The present disclosure may be a system, method and / or computer program product. The computer program product may include a computer-readable storage medium carrying computer-readable program instructions for causing a processor to implement various aspects of the present disclosure.

[0183] A computer-readable storage medium can be a tangible device that can hold and store instructions for use by an instruction execution device. A computer-readable storage medium can be, for example, but not limited to, an electrical storage device, a magnetic storage device, an optical storage device, an electromagnetic storage device, a semiconductor storage device, or any suitable combination thereof. More specific examples (a non-exhaustive list) of computer-readable storage media include: a portable computer disk, a hard disk, a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), a static random access memory (SRAM), a portable compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM), a digital versatile disk (DVD), a memory stick, a floppy disk, a mechanical encoding device, such as a punch card or a raised structure in a groove on which instructions are stored, and any suitable combination thereof. As used herein, a computer-readable storage medium is not to be construed as a transient signal per se, such as a radio wave or other freely propagating electromagnetic wave, an electromagnetic wave propagating through a waveguide or other transmission medium (e.g., a light pulse through a fiber optic cable), or an electrical signal transmitted through an electrical wire.

[0184] The computer-readable program instructions described herein can be downloaded from a computer-readable storage medium to each computing / processing device, or downloaded to an external computer or external storage device via a network, such as the Internet, a local area network, a wide area network, and / or a wireless network. The network can include copper transmission cables, fiber optic transmission, wireless transmission, routers, firewalls, switches, gateway computers, and / or edge servers. The network adapter card or network interface in each computing / processing device receives the computer-readable program instructions from the network and forwards the computer-readable program instructions to be stored in the computer-readable storage medium in each computing / processing device.

[0185] The computer program instructions for performing the operations of the present disclosure may be assembly instructions, instruction set architecture (ISA) instructions, machine instructions, machine-dependent instructions, microcode, firmware instructions, state setting data, or source code or object code written in any combination of one or more programming languages, including object-oriented programming languages ​​such as Smalltalk, C++, and conventional procedural programming languages ​​such as "C" language or similar programming languages. Computer-readable program instructions may be executed entirely on a user's computer, partially on a user's computer, as an independent software package, partially on a user's computer, partially on a remote computer, or entirely on a remote computer or server. In the case of a remote computer, the remote computer may be connected to the user's computer via any type of network, including a local area network (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN), or may be connected to an external computer (e.g., utilizing an Internet service provider to connect via the Internet). In some embodiments, an electronic circuit, such as a programmable logic circuit, a field programmable gate array (FPGA), or a programmable logic array (PLA), may be personalized by utilizing the state information of the computer-readable program instructions. The electronic circuit may execute the computer-readable program instructions, thereby realizing various aspects of the present disclosure.

[0186] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention rather than to limit it. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the above embodiments, ordinary technicians in the field should understand that the specific implementation methods of the present invention can still be modified or replaced by equivalents. Any modification or equivalent replacement that does not depart from the spirit and scope of the present invention should be covered by the scope of protection of the claims of the present invention.

Claims

1. A lightweight smart meter authentication method based on modular grouping, characterized in that: Includes the following: Build a smart meter identity authentication system model, which includes a system initialization core (SIC), a data processing center (DPC), a regional coordinator (RC), and smart meters (SM). The SIC is used to inject the SM's identity information into the DPC, RC, and SM. The DPC is used to process power consumption data forwarded by the RC and verify the SM's identity. The RC is used to verify the identity of the SM within its RC area and forward the SM's power consumption data to the DPC. During the system initialization phase, SIC selects a set of mutually prime numbers n1, n2, ..., n n 、A set of random numbers b1, b2, ..., b n and a system preset value S; During the key generation phase, DPC generates the DPC private key skey DPC and DPC public key pkey DPC , RC generates RC private key skey RC and RC public key pkey RC ; and generate authentication information (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ), where ID i is the i-th SM i identity information, is the encryption algorithm, pkey RC is the public key of RC, H is the hash function, and Y is based on q i 、n i The value calculated based on the modulus grouping, During the smart meter registration phase, when the i-th SM i When registering with SIC, if SM i Authentication information (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) exists in the SIC database, SIC will (Y,n i ,b i ) loaded into SM i Otherwise, SIC randomly selects a set of (Y,n i ,b i ), combined with ID i , and (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) loaded into the smart meter SM i and (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) is secretly sent to DPC, and (Y,n i ) Secretly sent to the RC corresponding to the SM; Smart meter certification stage, SM i The registration information (Y,n i ,H(n i ,b i ),Time s ) is encoded as point Q m ∈E p (c, d), using RC public key pkey RC Encrypted and sent to RC, RC uses RC private key skey RC After decryption, the registration information is obtained and the validity check is performed on the registration information. If the check result is valid, SM i Authentication is successful, otherwise, SM i Authentication failed; Time s For SM i Timestamp, H(n i ,b i ) is n i and b i The hash value of During the electricity data billing phase, in SM i If the authentication is successful, SM i The power consumption data within the preset time period is stored using the RC public key pkey RC Encrypted and sent to RC, RC uses the private key skey RC After decryption, use the DPC public key pkey DPC The data is encrypted and signed and sent to DPC, which then checks the validity of the power consumption data. Smart meter cancellation stage, when b i Leaked or SM i When the system is logged off, DPC broadcasts i Revoke SM to RC i authority; The key generation phase generates authentication information (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ),include: SIC chooses an elliptic curve E:y 2 ≡x 3 +cx+d(mod p) and an elliptic curve group E p (c, d), and randomly select a generator J∈E p (c, d), the order of J is m; SIC chooses a hash function H{01} * →E p (c, d), use the hash function to map the input data to the elliptic curve group, and output the public parameter pp = {E p (c, d), J, H, n}; where the input data includes the identity information of the SM; SIC randomly selects a set of mutually prime numbers n1,n2,…,n n , a set of random numbers b1,b2,…,b n and a system preset value S, calculate Construct the following equation And use the modulus grouping to solve for Y; According to the obtained Y, n i ∈{n1,n2,...,n n }、b i ∈{b1,b2,...,b n } and SM i Identity information ID i Generate authentication information (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ).

2. The lightweight smart meter authentication method based on analog-to-digital grouping according to claim 1, characterized in that: During the key generation phase, DPC generates the DPC private key skey DPC and DPC public key pkey DPC , RC generates RC private key skey RC and RC public key pkey RC ,include: DPC randomly selects a number n from 1 to m-1 DPC ∈[1,m-1] as the DPC private key, and use the random number n DPC and generator J by pkey DPC =n DPC J calculates the DPC public key, and DPC outputs the DPC public key pkey to the smart meter identity authentication system DPC And the DPC private key skey DPC =n DPC Confidentiality; RC randomly selects a number n from 1 to m-1 RC ∈[1,m-1] as the RC private key, and use the random number n RC and generator J by pkey RC =n RC J calculates the RC public key, and RC outputs the RC public key pkey to the smart meter identity authentication system RC And RC private key skey RC =n RC Confidential.

3. The lightweight smart meter authentication method based on analog-to-digital grouping according to claim 2, characterized in that: Smart meter certification includes: SM i Randomly select a number k SM ∈[1,m-1], and press C i ={k SM J,Q m +k SM pkey RC }Calculate the ciphertext C i , and C i Send to RC; RC receives the ciphertext C i Then, follow Q m =Q m +k SM pkey RC -skey RC k SM J calculates Q m and decoded by Q m Get(Y,n i ,H(n i ,b i ),Time s ); RC check timestamp Time s Is it invalid? If invalid, return SM i RC authentication fails; otherwise calculate q i =Ymodn i and is the decryption algorithm, S and n respectively i The predicted value of RC comparison Is it equal to the system preset value S, and compare Is it equal to n i ,like is equal to S, and Equal to n i Then return to SM i Successfully authenticated RC, otherwise, returns to SM i RC authentication failed.

4. The lightweight smart meter authentication method based on analog-to-digital grouping according to claim 3 is characterized in that: Electricity data billing includes: SM i Get the power consumption data EP within the preset time range ow , select a timestamp Time′ s And Time′ s and EP ow Encoded as point Q m ′∈E p (c, d), and calculate h=H(b i ,EP ow ,Time′ s ) Get the hash value h; randomly select a number k′ SM ∈[1,m-1] and calculate C′1={k′ SM J,Q′ m +k′ SM pkey RC }, and send (h,C′1) to RC; After RC receives (h, C′1), it uses skey RC Calculate Q′ m =Q′ m +k′ SM pkey RC -skey RC k′ SM J gets Q′ m , and by decoding Q′ m Get Time′ s , EP ow ; RC check timestamp Time′ s Is it valid? If not, exit. Otherwise, send the message (Y,n i ,EP ow ,Time′ s ) is encoded as point Q″ m ∈E p After (a,b), randomly select a number k RC ∈[1,m-1], and calculate C′2={k RC J,Q″ m +k RC pkey DPC }, and use the ECDSA signature algorithm to sign C′2, and get After that, (C′2, C′3, h) is sent to DPC; After receiving (C′2, C′3, h), DPC verifies the validity of signature C′3. If it is invalid, it exits. Otherwise, it passes DPC private key skey DPC Calculate Q″ m =Q″ m +k RC pkey DPC -skey DPC k RC J is obtained and decoded by Q″ m Get Time′ s and (Y,n i ,EP ow ,Time′ s ); DPC check timestamp Time′ s Is it valid? If not, exit. Otherwise, execute the query in the local database that matches (Y,n i ) corresponding to b i , and calculate H(b i ,EP ow ,Time' S ) is consistent with the hash value h. If they are consistent, it means that the power consumption data is valid. By using (Y,n i ,b i ) Confirm SM i The real identity of the user is used to complete the billing of electricity consumption data.

5. The lightweight smart meter authentication method based on analog-to-digital grouping according to claim 4 is characterized in that: During the smart meter withdrawal phase, If the revoked user SM i Register with RC, SM i Need to send registration information to RC (Y,n i ,H(n i ,b i ),Time s ), after receiving the registration information, RC uses the revocation message b sent by DPC i and SM i Provide i Calculate the hash value H(n i ,b i ); If the calculated hash value is equal to SM i If the hash values ​​sent are equal, authentication is rejected, indicating that SM i has been revoked.

6. The lightweight smart meter authentication method based on analog-to-digital grouping according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that: The method further comprises: A threat model of a smart meter identity authentication system is constructed, wherein the threat model is used to simulate attacks from threat sources on the smart meter identity authentication system model.

7. The lightweight smart meter authentication method based on analog-to-digital grouping according to claim 6, characterized in that: The threat sources include SM, dishonest regional coordinator RC and external attackers, and the attacks include at least one of the following: passive attack, replay attack, collusion attack, forged power ledger attack and identity deception attack.

8. A lightweight smart meter authentication system using the lightweight smart meter authentication method based on analog-to-digital grouping according to any one of claims 1 to 7, the system comprising: A construction module is used to construct a smart meter identity authentication system model. The system model includes a system initialization core (SIC), a data processing center (DPC), a regional coordinator (RC), and a smart meter (SM). The SIC is used to inject the SM's identity information into the DPC, RC, and SM. The DPC is used to process power consumption data forwarded by the RC and verify the SM's identity. The RC is used to verify the identity of the SM within its RC area and forward the SM's power consumption data to the DPC. System initialization module, used by SIC to select a set of coprime numbers n1, n2, ..., n n 、A set of random numbers b1, b2, ..., b n and a system preset value S; Key generation module, used by DPC to generate DPC private key skey DPC and DPC public key pkey DPC , RC generates RC private key skey RC and RC public key pkey RC ; and generate authentication information (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ), where ID i is the i-th SM i identity information, is the encryption algorithm, pkey RC is the public key of RC, H is the hash function, Y is based on q i 、n i The value calculated based on the modulus grouping; Smart meter registration module, used when the i-th SM i When registering with SIC, if (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) exists in the SIC database, SIC will (Y,n i ,b i ) loaded into SM i Otherwise, SIC randomly selects (Y,n i ,b i ), (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) loaded into the smart meter SM i and (Y,n i ,b i ,ID i ) is secretly sent to DPC, and (Y,n i ) Secretly sent to the RC corresponding to the SM; Smart meter authentication module for SM i The registration information (Y,n i ,H(n i ,b i ),Time s )Use RC public key pkey RC Encrypted and sent to RC, RC uses RC private key skey RC After decryption, the registration information is obtained and the validity check is performed on the registration information. If the check result is valid, SM i Authentication is successful, otherwise, SM i Authentication failed; Electricity data billing module, used in SM i If the authentication is successful, SM i The power consumption data within the preset time period is stored using the RC public key pkey RC Encrypt and send to RC, RC uses private key skey RC After decryption, use the DPC public key pkey DPC The data is encrypted and signed and sent to DPC, which then checks the validity of the power consumption data. Smart meter cancellation module, used when b i Leaked or SM i When the system is logged off, DPC broadcasts i Revoke SM to RC i permissions.

9. An electronic device comprising a processor and a storage medium; characterized in that: The storage medium is used to store instructions; The processor is configured to operate according to the instructions to execute the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7.

10. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the program is executed by a processor, the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7 are implemented.

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