Characteristic classification method and system based on functional danger and task impact analysis
By adopting a characteristic classification method based on functional hazards and task impact analysis in the aircraft development process, and allocating characteristic levels from top to bottom, the problem of poor matching between characteristic level classification and safety analysis in the existing technology is solved, and comprehensive identification and hierarchical control of the characteristics of aircraft, system level and airborne equipment level is achieved, and the safety and task completion level of aircraft are improved.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411802422.0
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-12-09
- Publication Date
- 2025-04-04
- Estimated Expiration
- 2044-12-09
AI Technical Summary
In the process of aircraft development, the results of characteristic level classification and safety analysis and mission reliability analysis have poor matching, lacking top-down decomposition and transmission processes, relying on the experience of engineers, the analysis results are not objective and accurate enough, and it is difficult to adapt to the aircraft development assurance procedures based on system engineering.
Provide a characteristic classification method and system based on functional hazards and task impact analysis. Through aircraft-level and system-level characteristic analysis steps, the impact of functional failure on flight safety and missions is obtained, and the mapping relationship between the impact consequences and the characteristic level is established, and the characteristic level is allocated from top to bottom.
It has achieved comprehensive identification of aircraft-level, system-level and onboard equipment-level characteristics, improved the hierarchical control capabilities in aircraft design, manufacturing and use, and enhanced the safety and task completion level of the aircraft.
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Figure CN119760981A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present application belongs to the field of aircraft design technology, and specifically relates to a characteristic classification method and system based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis. Background Art
[0002] During the aircraft development process, implementing characteristic grade classification is an important measure to ensure product quality, which is conducive to improving product quality stability and traceability.
[0003] The current characteristic level classification work is poorly matched with the results of safety analysis and mission reliability analysis. The analysis method lacks a top-down decomposition and transfer process and mainly relies on the experience of engineers. The analysis results are not objective and accurate enough and are difficult to adapt to the aircraft development and support procedures based on system engineering. In view of this, this application is proposed. Summary of the invention
[0004] The purpose of this application is to provide a method and system for characteristic classification based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis to overcome or alleviate at least one aspect of the known technical deficiencies.
[0005] The technical solution of this application is:
[0006] On the one hand, a characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis is provided, including aircraft-level characteristic analysis steps and system-level characteristic analysis steps;
[0007] Aircraft-level characterization steps include:
[0008] S11. Obtain all aircraft-level functions applicable to functional hazard and mission impact analysis;
[0009] S12. Analyze the impact of aircraft-level functional failure on flight safety and mission, and establish the consequence level of aircraft-level functional failure on flight safety and flight mission;
[0010] S13. Establish a mapping relationship between the impact of functional failure on flight safety and mission and the characteristic level;
[0011] S14. Based on the mapping relationship, clarify the characteristic level of each aircraft-level function;
[0012] S15. Assign aircraft-level characteristics and levels to relevant systems;
[0013] The system-level characteristic analysis steps include the system-level top-level characteristic steps and the system-level bottom-level airborne equipment characteristic analysis steps;
[0014] The system-level top-level characterization steps include:
[0015] S211, undertake the distribution results of aircraft-level characteristic analysis;
[0016] S212. Obtain system-level capabilities suitable for functional hazard and mission impact analysis;
[0017] S213. Establish a mapping relationship between the impact of system-level functional failure on flight safety and mission and characteristic classification;
[0018] S214. According to the mapping relationship, clarify the characteristic level of each system-level function;
[0019] The system-level low-level airborne equipment characteristics analysis steps include:
[0020] S221, obtaining the function of the onboard device;
[0021] S222. Establish a mapping relationship between the development assurance level and the characteristic level of the airborne equipment function failure state;
[0022] S223. Based on the mapping relationship, the characteristic level of each airborne equipment function is clarified.
[0023] According to at least one embodiment of the present application, in the above-mentioned characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, in S12, the consequence level of the impact of aircraft-level functional failure on flight safety specifically includes catastrophic, severe, mild, slight, and no safety impact;
[0024] The consequences of aircraft-level functional failure on the flight mission include mission failure, mission degradation and no impact.
[0025] According to at least one embodiment of the present application, in the above-mentioned characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, in S13, a mapping relationship between the impact consequences of functional failure on flight safety and mission and the characteristic level is established, specifically:
[0026] The characteristic level of aircraft-level functions is critical:
[0027] The failure status development assurance level of the aircraft-level function is A-level or the function failure directly leads to catastrophic consequences; or the aircraft-level function development assurance level is B-level and the function failure directly leads to serious consequences;
[0028] Aircraft-level functions are ranked as follows:
[0029] The failure status development assurance level of the aircraft-level function is B-level and the consequence level of the function failure on the flight mission is mission failure;
[0030] The characteristic level of aircraft-level functions is general:
[0031] The characteristic level of aircraft-level functions is neither critical nor important.
[0032] According to at least one embodiment of the present application, in the above-mentioned characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, in S213, a mapping relationship between the impact consequences of system-level functional failure on flight safety and mission and characteristic classification is established, specifically:
[0033] System-level functionality is key
[0034] The failure status development assurance level of the system-level function is A-level or the functional failure directly leads to catastrophic consequences; or, the failure status development assurance level of the system-level function is B-level and the functional failure directly leads to serious consequences;
[0035] The characteristics of system-level functions are ranked as important:
[0036] The failure status development assurance level of the system-level function is B-level and the consequence level of the function failure on the flight mission is mission failure;
[0037] The feature level of system-level functions is General:
[0038] The level of features of system-level functions is neither critical nor important.
[0039] According to at least one embodiment of the present application, in the above-mentioned characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, in S221, the development assurance level of the functional failure state of the airborne equipment is directly assigned by utilizing system-level fault tree analysis.
[0040] According to at least one embodiment of the present application, in the above-mentioned characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, in S222, a mapping relationship between the development assurance level and the characteristic level of the functional failure state of the airborne equipment is established, specifically:
[0041] The characteristic level of the onboard equipment functions is critical:
[0042] The development assurance level of the onboard equipment in the state of functional failure is A; or, the development assurance level of the onboard equipment in the state of functional failure is B and the onboard equipment is a single point failure;
[0043] The characteristics of the onboard equipment functions are ranked as important:
[0044] The development assurance level of the airborne equipment function failure state does not meet the requirement of critical characteristic level, but the development assurance level is B;
[0045] The characteristic level of the onboard equipment functions is general:
[0046] The level of performance of the onboard equipment is neither critical nor important.
[0047] On the other hand, a characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis is provided to implement the above-mentioned characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, including an aircraft-level characteristic analysis module and a system-level characteristic analysis module;
[0048] The aircraft-level characteristic analysis module is used to perform aircraft-level characteristic analysis, including:
[0049] Capture all aircraft-level functions applicable to functional hazard and mission impact analysis;
[0050] Analyze the impact of aircraft-level functional failure on flight safety and mission, and establish the consequence level of aircraft-level functional failure on flight safety and flight mission;
[0051] Establish a mapping relationship between the impact of functional failure on flight safety and mission and the characteristic level;
[0052] Based on the mapping relationship, the characteristic level of each aircraft-level function is clarified;
[0053] Assign aircraft-level characteristics and ratings to relevant systems;
[0054] The system-level characteristic analysis module includes a system-level top-level characteristic unit and a system-level bottom-level airborne equipment characteristic analysis unit;
[0055] The system-level top-level characteristic analysis unit is used to carry out system-level top-level characteristic analysis, including:
[0056] Undertake the assigned results of aircraft-level characteristic analysis;
[0057] Acquire system-level capabilities suitable for functional hazard and mission impact analysis;
[0058] Establish a mapping relationship between the impact of system-level functional failure on flight safety and mission and characteristic classification;
[0059] Based on the mapping relationship, clarify the characteristic level of each system-level function;
[0060] The system-level underlying airborne equipment characteristic analysis unit is used to carry out system-level underlying airborne equipment characteristic analysis, including:
[0061] Get the capabilities of onboard equipment;
[0062] Establish the mapping relationship between the development assurance level and characteristic level of the functional failure status of airborne equipment;
[0063] Based on the mapping relationship, the characteristic level of each airborne equipment function is clarified.
[0064] According to at least one embodiment of the present application, in the above-mentioned characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, in the aircraft-level characteristic analysis module, the consequence level of aircraft-level functional failure on flight safety specifically includes catastrophic, severe, mild, slight, and no safety impact;
[0065] The consequences of aircraft-level functional failure on the flight mission include mission failure, mission degradation and no impact.
[0066] According to at least one embodiment of the present application, in the above-mentioned characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, in the aircraft-level characteristic analysis module, a mapping relationship between the impact consequences of functional failure on flight safety and mission and the characteristic level is established, specifically:
[0067] The characteristic level of aircraft-level functions is critical:
[0068] The failure status development assurance level of the aircraft-level function is A-level or the function failure directly leads to catastrophic consequences; or the aircraft-level function development assurance level is B-level and the function failure directly leads to serious consequences;
[0069] Aircraft-level functions are ranked as follows:
[0070] The failure status development assurance level of the aircraft-level function is B-level and the consequence level of the function failure on the flight mission is mission failure;
[0071] The characteristic level of aircraft-level functions is general:
[0072] The characteristic level of aircraft-level functions is neither critical nor important.
[0073] According to at least one embodiment of the present application, in the above-mentioned feature classification system based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, in the system-level top-level feature unit, a mapping relationship between the impact consequences of system-level functional failure on flight safety and mission and feature classification is established, specifically:
[0074] System-level functionality is key
[0075] The failure status development assurance level of the system-level function is A-level or the functional failure directly leads to catastrophic consequences; or, the failure status development assurance level of the system-level function is B-level and the functional failure directly leads to serious consequences;
[0076] The characteristics of system-level functions are ranked as important:
[0077] The failure status development assurance level of the system-level function is B-level and the consequence level of the function failure on the flight mission is mission failure;
[0078] The feature level of system-level functions is General:
[0079] The level of features of system-level functions is neither critical nor important.
[0080] According to at least one embodiment of the present application, in the above-mentioned characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, in the system-level underlying airborne equipment characteristic analysis unit, the development assurance level of the airborne equipment functional failure state is directly assigned by utilizing system-level fault tree analysis.
[0081] According to at least one embodiment of the present application, in the above-mentioned characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, in the system-level underlying airborne equipment characteristic analysis unit, a mapping relationship between the development assurance level and the characteristic level of the airborne equipment functional failure state is established, specifically:
[0082] The characteristic level of the onboard equipment functions is critical:
[0083] The development assurance level of the onboard equipment in the state of functional failure is A; or, the development assurance level of the onboard equipment in the state of functional failure is B and the onboard equipment is a single point failure;
[0084] The characteristics of the onboard equipment functions are ranked as important:
[0085] The development assurance level of the airborne equipment function failure state does not meet the requirement of the characteristic level being a key characteristic, but the development assurance level is B;
[0086] The characteristic level of the airborne equipment function is general characteristics:
[0087] The level of performance of the onboard equipment is neither critical nor important.
[0088] This application has at least the following beneficial technical effects:
[0089] A feature classification method and system based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis is provided, which analyzes functions from the perspective of safety and mission impact, applies system engineering concepts to feature analysis, implements a top-down feature capture, decomposition and transfer process, and constructs a feature analysis process that covers the entire chain of the aircraft, from aircraft to system to airborne equipment. Following the decomposition and transfer of top-down analysis, a comprehensive identification of key, important and general features at the aircraft level, system level and airborne equipment level is achieved, which can provide input conditions for hierarchical management and control in the process of aircraft design, manufacturing and use assurance, thereby improving aircraft safety and mission completion level. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0090] Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of a characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and task impact analysis provided in an embodiment of the present application;
[0091] Figure 2 It is a schematic diagram of the implementation of the characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis provided by the embodiment of the present application in the whole chain of the aircraft;
[0092] Figure 3 It is a schematic diagram of a characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and task impact analysis provided in an embodiment of the present application.
[0093] In order to better illustrate the present embodiment, some parts of the drawings may be omitted, enlarged or reduced, and do not represent the size of the actual product. In addition, the drawings are only used for illustrative purposes and should not be construed as limitations on the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0094] In order to make the technical solution and advantages of the present application clearer, the technical solution of the present application will be described in further detail in detail and in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. It can be understood that the specific embodiments described here are only partial embodiments of the present application, which are only used to explain the present application, not to limit the present application. It should be noted that, for the convenience of description, only the parts related to the present application are shown in the accompanying drawings, and other related parts can refer to the general design.
[0095] In addition, unless otherwise defined, the technical terms or scientific terms used in the description of this application shall have the usual meanings understood by those of ordinary skill in the art to which this application belongs. The words used in the description of this application to indicate orientation are only used to indicate relative directions or positional relationships. When the absolute position of the described object changes, its relative positional relationship may also change accordingly. The word "include" used in the description of this application indicates that the elements or objects appearing before the word include the elements or objects listed after the word and their equivalents, but does not exclude other elements or objects.
[0096] In addition, it should be noted that, unless otherwise clearly specified and limited, the words "installation", "connection" and similar terms used in the description of this application should be understood in a broad sense. For example, the connection can be a fixed connection or a detachable connection; it can be a mechanical connection or an electrical connection; it can be a direct connection or an indirect connection through an intermediate medium. Technical personnel in the field can understand its specific meaning in this application according to the specific circumstances.
[0097] A characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and task impact analysis, such as Figure 1 As shown, it includes aircraft-level characteristic analysis steps and system-level characteristic analysis steps.
[0098] Aircraft-level characteristic analysis steps Aircraft-level characteristic analysis can be carried out during the aircraft scheme design stage by characteristic professionals to generate an aircraft-level characteristic analysis report, as follows:
[0099] S11. Capture all aircraft-level functions applicable to functional hazard and mission impact analysis.
[0100] S12. Establish the consequence level of aircraft-level functional failure on flight safety and flight mission.
[0101] The consequence levels of aircraft-level functional failures on flight safety may include catastrophic, severe, mild, slight, and no safety impact.
[0102] The consequences of aircraft-level functional failure on the flight mission may include mission failure, mission degradation and no impact.
[0103] S13. Analyze the impact of aircraft-level functional failures on flight safety and missions, and establish a mapping relationship between the consequences of functional failures on flight safety and missions and the characteristic levels, as follows:
[0104] The characteristic level of aircraft-level functions is critical:
[0105] The failure status development assurance level of the aircraft-level function is A-level or the function failure directly leads to catastrophic consequences; or the aircraft-level function development assurance level is B-level and the function failure directly leads to serious consequences;
[0106] Aircraft-level functions are ranked as follows:
[0107] The failure status development assurance level of the aircraft-level function is B-level and the consequence level of the function failure on the flight mission is mission failure;
[0108] The characteristic level of aircraft-level functions is general:
[0109] The characteristic level of aircraft-level functions is neither critical nor important.
[0110] “Directly cause” means that the failure of a single function will lead to the corresponding level of impact consequences. If the probability of an external event occurring in a combined function failure is 1, it should also be considered as “directly cause” (for example, icing weather).
[0111] S14. Based on the mapping relationship, clarify the characteristic level of each aircraft-level function.
[0112] S15. Allocate aircraft-level characteristics and grades to relevant systems, and generate an aircraft-level characteristics analysis report. The aircraft-level characteristics analysis results and allocation table are as follows;
[0113] The system-level characteristic analysis steps can be carried out in the preliminary design stage of the aircraft by system professionals, including the system-level top-level characteristic steps and the system-level bottom-level airborne equipment characteristic analysis steps.
[0114] System-level top-level characteristic analysis steps Carry out system-level top-level characteristic analysis and generate a system-level top-level characteristic analysis report, as follows:
[0115] S211. Undertake the distribution results of aircraft-level characteristic analysis.
[0116] S212. Obtain system-level capabilities suitable for functional hazard and mission impact analysis.
[0117] S213. Establish a mapping relationship between the impact of system-level functional failure on flight safety and mission and the characteristic classification. This can be done by referring to the mapping relationship between the impact of functional failure on flight safety and mission and the characteristic level. The details are as follows:
[0118] System-level functionality is key
[0119] The failure status development assurance level of the system-level function is A-level or the functional failure directly leads to catastrophic consequences; or, the failure status development assurance level of the system-level function is B-level and the functional failure directly leads to serious consequences;
[0120] The characteristics of system-level functions are ranked as important:
[0121] The failure status development assurance level of the system-level function is B-level and the consequence level of the function failure on the flight mission is mission failure;
[0122] The feature level of system-level functions is General:
[0123] The level of features of system-level functions is neither critical nor important.
[0124] S214. Based on the mapping relationship, the characteristic level of each system-level function is clarified, and a system-level top-level characteristic analysis report can be generated. The form of the system-level top-level characteristic analysis result is shown in the following table: Serial number Function Failure state Functional development assurance level Feature level
[0125] System-level underlying airborne equipment characteristics analysis steps Carry out system-level underlying airborne equipment characteristics analysis and generate a system-level underlying airborne equipment characteristics analysis report, as follows:
[0126] S221. Acquire the function of the onboard device.
[0127] System-level fault tree analysis can be used to directly assign development assurance levels for functional failure states of airborne equipment.
[0128] S222. Establish the mapping relationship between the development assurance level and the characteristic level of the airborne equipment functional failure status, as follows:
[0129] The characteristic level of the onboard equipment functions is critical:
[0130] The development assurance level of the onboard equipment in the state of functional failure is A; or, the development assurance level of the onboard equipment in the state of functional failure is B and the onboard equipment is a single point failure;
[0131] The characteristic level of the airborne equipment function is heavy:
[0132] The development assurance level of the airborne equipment function failure state does not meet the requirement of the characteristic level being a key characteristic, but the development assurance level is B;
[0133] The characteristic level of the airborne equipment function is general characteristics:
[0134] The characteristic level of the development assurance level of the functional failure state of airborne equipment is neither a critical characteristic nor an important characteristic.
[0135] S223. According to the mapping relationship, the characteristic level of each airborne equipment function is clarified, and an airborne equipment characteristic analysis report can be generated. The form of the airborne equipment characteristic analysis result is shown in the following table:
[0136] The characteristic analysis results can be transmitted to the airborne equipment research and development unit through the airborne equipment protocol, providing input for the research and development unit to carry out airborne equipment characteristic analysis work.
[0137] The characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis disclosed in the above embodiment analyzes the function from the perspective of safety and mission impact, applies the system engineering concept to perform characteristic analysis, implements a top-down characteristic capture, decomposition and transfer process, and constructs a characteristic analysis process covering the entire chain of the aircraft, from the aircraft to the system and then to the airborne equipment, and distributes it from top to bottom. Following the decomposition and transfer of the top-down analysis, it realizes the comprehensive identification of key, important and general characteristics at the aircraft level, system level and airborne equipment level, such as Figure 2 As shown, it can provide input conditions for realizing hierarchical control in the process of aircraft design, manufacturing, and use assurance, thereby improving aircraft safety and mission completion level.
[0138] A characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis is used to implement the characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis disclosed in the above embodiment, such as Figure 3 As shown, it includes an aircraft-level characteristic analysis module and a system-level characteristic analysis module;
[0139] The aircraft-level characteristic analysis module is used to perform aircraft-level characteristic analysis, including:
[0140] Capture all aircraft-level functions applicable to functional hazard and mission impact analysis;
[0141] Analyze the impact of aircraft-level functional failure on flight safety and mission, and establish the consequence level of aircraft-level functional failure on flight safety and flight mission;
[0142] Establish a mapping relationship between the impact of functional failure on flight safety and mission and the characteristic level;
[0143] Based on the mapping relationship, the characteristic level of each aircraft-level function is clarified;
[0144] Assign aircraft-level characteristics and ratings to relevant systems;
[0145] The system-level characteristic analysis module includes a system-level top-level characteristic unit and a system-level bottom-level airborne equipment characteristic analysis unit;
[0146] The system-level top-level characteristic analysis unit is used to carry out system-level top-level characteristic analysis, including:
[0147] Undertake the assigned results of aircraft-level characteristic analysis;
[0148] Acquire system-level capabilities suitable for functional hazard and mission impact analysis;
[0149] Establish a mapping relationship between the impact of system-level functional failure on flight safety and mission and characteristic classification;
[0150] Based on the mapping relationship, clarify the characteristic level of each system-level function;
[0151] The system-level underlying airborne equipment characteristic analysis unit is used to carry out system-level underlying airborne equipment characteristic analysis, including:
[0152] Get the capabilities of onboard equipment;
[0153] Establish the mapping relationship between the development assurance level and characteristic level of the functional failure status of airborne equipment;
[0154] Based on the mapping relationship, the characteristic level of each airborne equipment function is clarified.
[0155] Optionally, in the above-mentioned characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, in the aircraft-level characteristic analysis module, the consequence levels of aircraft-level functional failure on flight safety specifically include catastrophic, severe, mild, slight, and no safety impact;
[0156] The consequences of aircraft-level functional failure on the flight mission include mission failure, mission degradation and no impact.
[0157] Optionally, in the above-mentioned characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, in the aircraft-level characteristic analysis module, a mapping relationship between the impact consequences of functional failure on flight safety and mission and the characteristic level is established, specifically:
[0158] The characteristic level of aircraft-level functions is critical:
[0159] The failure status development assurance level of the aircraft-level function is A-level or the function failure directly leads to catastrophic consequences; or the aircraft-level function development assurance level is B-level and the function failure directly leads to serious consequences;
[0160] Aircraft-level functions are ranked as follows:
[0161] The failure status development assurance level of the aircraft-level function is B-level and the consequence level of the function failure on the flight mission is mission failure;
[0162] The characteristic level of aircraft-level functions is general:
[0163] The characteristic level of aircraft-level functional failures is neither critical nor significant.
[0164] Optionally, in the above-mentioned feature classification system based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, in the system-level top-level feature unit, a mapping relationship between the impact consequences of system-level functional failure on flight safety and mission and feature classification is established, specifically:
[0165] System-level functionality is key
[0166] The failure status development assurance level of the system-level function is A-level or the functional failure directly leads to catastrophic consequences; or, the failure status development assurance level of the system-level function is B-level and the functional failure directly leads to serious consequences;
[0167] The characteristics of system-level functions are ranked as important:
[0168] The failure status development assurance level of system-level functions is B-level and the consequence level of the failure status on the flight mission is mission failure;
[0169] The feature level of system-level functions is General:
[0170] The level of features of system-level functions is neither critical nor important.
[0171] Optionally, in the above-mentioned characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, in the system-level underlying airborne equipment characteristic analysis unit, the development assurance level of the airborne equipment functional failure state is directly assigned by utilizing system-level fault tree analysis.
[0172] Optionally, in the above-mentioned characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, in the system-level bottom-level airborne equipment characteristic analysis unit, a mapping relationship between the development assurance level of the airborne equipment functional failure state and the characteristic level is established, specifically:
[0173] The characteristic level of the onboard equipment functions is critical:
[0174] The development assurance level of the onboard equipment in the state of functional failure is A; or, the development assurance level of the onboard equipment in the state of functional failure is B and the onboard equipment is a single point failure;
[0175] The characteristics of the onboard equipment functions are ranked as important:
[0176] The development assurance level of the airborne equipment function failure state does not meet the requirement of critical characteristic level, but the development assurance level is B;
[0177] The characteristic level of the onboard equipment functions is general:
[0178] The level of performance of the onboard equipment is neither critical nor important.
[0179] The characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis disclosed in the above embodiment corresponds to the characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis disclosed in the above embodiment, and the description is relatively simple. For specific related matters, please refer to the relevant description of the characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis. Its technical effects can also refer to the technical effects of the relevant parts of the characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, which will not be repeated here.
[0180] In addition, technicians in the field should also be able to realize that the various modules and units of the characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and task impact analysis disclosed in the embodiments of the present application can be implemented by electronic hardware, computer software, or a combination of the two. In order to clearly illustrate the interchangeability of hardware and software, this application generally describes them according to their functions. Whether these functions are performed in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Technicians in the field can choose to adopt different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application and its actual constraints, but such implementation should not be considered to be beyond the scope of this application.
[0181] So far, the technical solution of the present application has been described in conjunction with the preferred embodiments shown in the accompanying drawings. Those skilled in the art should understand that the scope of protection of the present application is obviously not limited to these specific embodiments. Without departing from the principles of the present application, those skilled in the art can make equivalent changes or substitutions to the relevant technical features, and the technical solutions after these changes or substitutions will fall within the scope of protection of the present application.
Claims
1. A characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and task impact analysis, characterized in that: Includes aircraft-level characteristic analysis steps and system-level characteristic analysis steps; Aircraft-level characterization steps include: S11. Obtain all aircraft-level functions applicable to functional hazard and mission impact analysis; S12. Analyze the impact of aircraft-level functional failure on flight safety and mission, and establish the consequence level of aircraft-level functional failure on flight safety and flight mission; S13. Establish a mapping relationship between the impact of functional failure on flight safety and mission and the characteristic level; S14. Based on the mapping relationship, clarify the characteristic level of each aircraft-level function; S15. Assign aircraft-level characteristics and levels to relevant systems; The system-level characteristic analysis steps include the system-level top-level characteristic steps and the system-level bottom-level airborne equipment characteristic analysis steps; The system-level top-level characterization steps include: S211, undertake the distribution results of aircraft-level characteristic analysis; S212. Obtain system-level capabilities suitable for functional hazard and mission impact analysis; S213. Establish a mapping relationship between the impact of system-level functional failure on flight safety and mission and characteristic classification; S214. According to the mapping relationship, the characteristic level of each system-level function is clarified; The system-level low-level airborne equipment characteristics analysis steps include: S221, obtaining the function of the onboard device; S222. Establish a mapping relationship between the development assurance level and the characteristic level of the airborne equipment function failure state; S223. Based on the mapping relationship, the characteristic level of each airborne equipment function is clarified.
2. The characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and task impact analysis according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In S12, the consequence levels of aircraft-level functional failures on flight safety include catastrophic, severe, mild, slight, and no safety impact; The consequences of aircraft-level functional failure on the flight mission include mission failure, mission degradation and no impact.
3. The characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and task impact analysis according to claim 2 is characterized in that: In S13, a mapping relationship between the impact of functional failure on flight safety and mission and the characteristic level is established, specifically: The characteristic level of aircraft-level functions is critical: The failure status development assurance level of the aircraft-level function is A-level or the function failure directly leads to catastrophic consequences; or the failure status development assurance level of the aircraft-level function is B-level and the function failure directly leads to serious consequences; Aircraft-level functions are ranked as follows: The failure status development assurance level of the aircraft-level function is B-level and the consequence level of the function failure on the flight mission is mission failure; The characteristic level of aircraft-level functions is general: Aircraft-level functions have a characteristic level that is neither critical nor significant.
4. The characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and task impact analysis according to claim 3 is characterized in that: In S213, a mapping relationship between the impact of system-level functional failure on flight safety and mission and characteristic classification is established, specifically: System-level functionality is key The failure status development assurance level of the system-level function is A-level or the functional failure directly leads to catastrophic consequences; or, the failure status development assurance level of the system-level function is B-level and the functional failure directly leads to serious consequences; The characteristics of system-level functions are ranked as important: The failure status development assurance level of the system-level function is B-level and the consequence level of the function failure on the flight mission is mission failure; The feature level of system-level functions is General: The level of features of system-level functions is neither critical nor important.
5. The characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and task impact analysis according to claim 4 is characterized in that: In S221, the system-level fault tree analysis is used to directly assign the development assurance level of the airborne equipment functional failure state.
6. The characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and task impact analysis according to claim 5 is characterized in that: In S222, a mapping relationship between the development assurance level and the characteristic level of the airborne equipment functional failure state is established, specifically: The characteristic level of the onboard equipment functions is critical: The development assurance level of the onboard equipment in the state of functional failure is A; or, the development assurance level of the onboard equipment in the state of functional failure is B and the onboard equipment is a single point failure; The characteristics of the onboard equipment functions are ranked as important: The development assurance level of the airborne equipment function failure state does not meet the requirement of the characteristic level being a key characteristic, but the development assurance level is B; The characteristic level of the onboard equipment functions is general: The level of performance of the onboard equipment is neither critical nor important.
7. A characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, used to implement the characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: Including aircraft-level characteristic analysis module and system-level characteristic analysis module; The aircraft-level characteristic analysis module is used to perform aircraft-level characteristic analysis, including: Capture all aircraft-level functions applicable to functional hazard and mission impact analysis; Analyze the impact of aircraft-level functional failure on flight safety and mission, and establish the consequence level of aircraft-level functional failure on flight safety and flight mission; Establish a mapping relationship between the impact of functional failure on flight safety and mission and the characteristic level; Based on the mapping relationship, the characteristic level of each aircraft-level function is clarified; Assign aircraft-level characteristics and ratings to relevant systems; The system-level characteristic analysis module includes a system-level top-level characteristic unit and a system-level bottom-level airborne equipment characteristic analysis unit; The system-level top-level characteristic analysis unit is used to carry out system-level top-level characteristic analysis, including: Undertake the assigned results of aircraft-level characteristic analysis; Acquire system-level capabilities suitable for functional hazard and mission impact analysis; Establish a mapping relationship between the impact of system-level functional failure on flight safety and mission and characteristic classification; Based on the mapping relationship, clarify the characteristic level of each system-level function; The system-level underlying airborne equipment characteristic analysis unit is used to carry out system-level underlying airborne equipment characteristic analysis, including: Get the capabilities of onboard equipment; Establish the mapping relationship between the development assurance level and characteristic level of the functional failure status of airborne equipment; Based on the mapping relationship, the characteristic level of each airborne equipment function is clarified.
8. The characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and task impact analysis according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In the aircraft-level characteristic analysis module, the consequence levels of aircraft-level functional failure on flight safety include catastrophic, severe, mild, slight, and no safety impact; The consequences of aircraft-level functional failure on the flight mission include mission failure, mission degradation and no impact.
9. The characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and task impact analysis according to claim 8, characterized in that: In the aircraft-level characteristic analysis module, a mapping relationship between the impact of functional failure on flight safety and mission and the characteristic level is established, specifically: The characteristic level of aircraft-level functions is critical: The failure status development assurance level of the aircraft-level function is A-level or the function failure directly leads to catastrophic consequences; or the aircraft-level function development assurance level is B-level and the function failure directly leads to serious consequences; Aircraft-level functions are ranked as follows: The failure status development assurance level of the aircraft-level function is B-level and the consequence level of the function failure on the flight mission is mission failure; The characteristic level of aircraft-level functions is general: The characteristic level of aircraft-level functions is neither critical nor important.
10. The characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and task impact analysis according to claim 9, characterized in that: In the system-level top-level characteristic unit, a mapping relationship between the impact of system-level functional failure on flight safety and mission and characteristic classification is established, specifically: System-level functionality is key The failure status development assurance level of the system-level function is A-level or the functional failure directly leads to catastrophic consequences; or, the failure status development assurance level of the system-level function is B-level and the functional failure directly leads to serious consequences; The characteristics of system-level functions are ranked as important: The failure status development assurance level of the system-level function is B-level and the consequence level of the function failure on the flight mission is mission failure; The feature level of system-level functions is General: The level of features of system-level functions is neither critical nor important.
11. The characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and task impact analysis according to claim 10, characterized in that: In the system-level underlying airborne equipment characteristic analysis unit, the system-level fault tree analysis is used to directly assign the development assurance level of the airborne equipment functional failure status.
12. The characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and task impact analysis according to claim 11, characterized in that: In the system-level bottom-level airborne equipment characteristic analysis unit, a mapping relationship between the development assurance level and characteristic level of the airborne equipment functional failure state is established, specifically: The characteristic level of the onboard equipment functions is critical: The development assurance level of the onboard equipment in the state of functional failure is A; or, the development assurance level of the onboard equipment in the state of functional failure is B and the onboard equipment is a single point failure; The characteristics of the onboard equipment functions are ranked as important: The development assurance level of the airborne equipment function failure state does not meet the requirement of the characteristic level being a key characteristic, but the development assurance level is B; The characteristic level of the onboard equipment functions is general: The level of performance of the onboard equipment is neither critical nor important.
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