Vehicle communication method, vehicle communication device, vehicle and storage medium

Abstract

The invention provides a vehicle communication method, a vehicle communication device, a vehicle and a storage medium, and relates to the field of vehicles. The method is applied to a vehicle-mounted gateway and comprises the steps that a target message sent by a braking system in a vehicle is received and verified, and the target message comprises a function signal; if the target message is verified successfully, a target verification field is generated based on the function signal, the target verification field is added to the target message, a processed target message is obtained, and the target verification field is used for safety verification of a vehicle-mounted host of the vehicle; and sending the processed target message to the vehicle-mounted host, so that the vehicle-mounted host performs security verification on the processed target message. According to the method, the abnormal function of the braking system caused by wrong verification of the message by the vehicle-mounted host can be avoided.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of vehicles, and more specifically, to a vehicle communication method, a vehicle communication device, a vehicle and a storage medium in the field of vehicles. Background Art

[0002] As car networking becomes more and more popular, the security of in-vehicle communication is becoming more and more important. However, in the current in-vehicle network, most data transmission is carried out without any security measures, and the credibility of the sending node cannot be verified. Therefore, Secure On Board Communication (SecOC) as a secure and reliable encryption communication solution has been included in the in-vehicle security communication standard to ensure the security of in-vehicle communication.

[0003] The electronic stability system and the integrated brake control system are different types of vehicle braking systems. During the signal safety verification process, the electronic stability system cannot adapt to the SecOC verification method, which may cause unexpected verification failures, and may further cause abnormal braking function of the vehicle.

[0004] Therefore, how to avoid the abnormal function of the braking system caused by the incorrect verification of the message by the vehicle host is an urgent problem to be solved. Summary of the invention

[0005] The present application provides a vehicle communication method, a vehicle communication device, a vehicle and a storage medium, which can avoid abnormal braking system function caused by erroneous verification of messages by a vehicle-mounted host.

[0006] In a first aspect, a vehicle communication method is provided, the method being applied to a vehicle gateway, the method comprising:

[0007] receiving a target message sent by a braking system in a vehicle and verifying the target message, wherein the target message includes a function signal;

[0008] If the target message verification succeeds, a target verification field is generated based on the functional signal, and the target verification field is added to the target message to obtain a processed target message, wherein the target verification field is used for safety verification of the vehicle's onboard host;

[0009] The processed target message is sent to the vehicle host so that the vehicle host performs a security check on the processed target message.

[0010] In the above technical scheme, for the message sent by the braking system, it is first processed in the middle by the vehicle gateway. Since the vehicle gateway adds a target verification field in the target message, the vehicle host can perform security verification on the processed message based on the target verification field, thereby avoiding the failure of the vehicle host to verify the message sent by the braking system due to the absence of the field required for security verification in the target message, which in turn causes abnormal function of the braking system; and the above scheme performs double verification on the target message by the vehicle gateway and the vehicle host, thereby improving the accuracy of the security verification and ensuring the security of vehicle network communications.

[0011] In addition, compared with the prior art in which the vehicle-mounted host performs security verification on the message, the vehicle-mounted gateway in this solution will only send the processed target message to the vehicle-mounted host when the message verification is successful, and will not send the message that fails the verification. This can reduce the amount of computing of the vehicle-mounted host and improve the efficiency of the security verification of the message.

[0012] In conjunction with the first aspect, in some possible implementations, verifying the target message includes:

[0013] Obtaining a configuration field and a candidate check field in a target message, wherein the configuration field is used to indicate a target type of a braking system;

[0014] Determine the target verification strategy of the target message based on the configuration field;

[0015] The target message is verified based on the functional signal, candidate verification fields and target verification strategy.

[0016] In the above technical solution, the target verification strategy corresponding to the configuration field indicating the type of the braking system in the target message is determined; and then the target message is verified in combination with the target verification strategy and the candidate verification field in the target message. By determining the target type of the braking system through the configuration field and then determining the target verification strategy, more targeted message verification can be achieved, and the flexibility of message verification can be improved to adapt to messages sent by different types of braking systems; and then possible security risks such as data tampering and erroneous data injection can be detected more accurately to ensure the security of vehicle network communications.

[0017] In combination with the first aspect and the above implementations, in some possible implementations, determining a target verification strategy for a target message based on a target type of a braking system includes:

[0018] If the target type is an electronic stability system, the target verification strategy will be determined by verifying it through a hash algorithm;

[0019] If the target type is an integrated braking control system, the target verification strategy will be determined through the target algorithm, where the target algorithm is the algorithm corresponding to the safe vehicle communication verification.

[0020] In the above technical solution, when it is determined that the type of the braking system is an electronic stability system, a hash algorithm is used to perform a security check on the target message; when it is determined that the type of the braking system is an integrated braking control system, a security check is performed using the target algorithm corresponding to the safe vehicle communication check. For electronic stability systems that do not support safe vehicle communication check, the use of a hash algorithm for check can ensure the security of the messages sent by the electronic stability system; for integrated braking control systems with higher configurations, the algorithm corresponding to the safe vehicle communication check can be used for security check; the way of customizing the check strategy according to the system type can accurately meet the security requirements of different systems, and further improve the flexibility and efficiency of message security check.

[0021] In combination with the first aspect and the above implementations, in some possible implementations, when the target type is an electronic stability system, the candidate check field is a first hash field;

[0022] Based on the functional signal, candidate check fields and target check strategy, the target message is checked, including:

[0023] Based on the function signal and the hash algorithm, obtain a second hash field;

[0024] The target message is verified based on the first hash field and the second hash field.

[0025] In the above technical solution, when the target type of the braking system is an electronic stability system, the vehicle gateway calculates the second hash field based on the function signal and the hash algorithm, and compares it with the first hash field in the target message to achieve security verification of the target message. The determinism and collision resistance of the hash algorithm ensure that the generated hash value will be different as long as the function signal changes slightly. By comparing the two hash fields, the vehicle gateway can determine whether the function signal maintains its original integrity, thereby ensuring that the function signal sent by the braking system is a true and reliable signal to ensure the safe execution of the vehicle's braking function.

[0026] In combination with the first aspect and the foregoing implementation manner, in some possible implementation manners, verifying the target message based on the first hash field and the second hash field includes:

[0027] If the first hash field and the second hash field are consistent, it is determined that the target message verification is successful;

[0028] If the first hash field and the second hash field are inconsistent, it is determined that the target message verification fails.

[0029] In the above technical solution, when the first hash field in the target message is consistent with the second hash field calculated by the vehicle gateway, it is determined that the target message verification is successful; when the first hash field and the second hash field are inconsistent, it is determined that the target message verification fails. By comparing whether the first hash field in the target message is consistent with the second hash field calculated by the vehicle gateway, it is determined whether the target message verification is successful, which improves the accuracy of the safety verification of the vehicle braking system related data and provides a reliable data basis for the safe operation of the vehicle.

[0030] In combination with the first aspect and the above implementations, in some possible implementations, when the target type is an integrated braking control system, the candidate check field is a first communication check field;

[0031] Based on the functional signal, candidate check fields and target check strategy, the target message is checked, including:

[0032] Based on the functional signal and the target algorithm, a second communication check field is obtained;

[0033] Verify the target message based on the first communication verification field and the second communication verification field;

[0034] The first communication check field, the second communication check field and the target check field are check fields of the same type.

[0035] In the above technical solution, when the target type of the vehicle's braking system is an integrated braking control system, the target algorithm is used to calculate the second communication check field according to the functional signal in the target message; the target message is checked by comparing the first communication check field and the second communication check field. It can accurately verify whether the message has been tampered with during transmission, ensure the integrity and authenticity of the instructions and data related to the integrated braking control system, and improve the message security verification efficiency and verification accuracy.

[0036] In combination with the first aspect and the above implementation manner, in some possible implementation manners, verifying the target message based on the first communication check field and the second communication check field includes:

[0037] If the first communication check field and the second communication check field are consistent, it is determined that the target message has been successfully checked;

[0038] If the first communication check field and the second communication check field are inconsistent, it is determined that the target message check fails.

[0039] In the above technical solution, when the first communication check field in the target message is consistent with the second communication check field calculated by the vehicle gateway, it is determined that the target message verification is successful; when the first communication check field and the second communication check field are inconsistent, it is determined that the target message verification fails. By comparing whether the first communication check field in the target message is consistent with the second communication check field calculated by the vehicle gateway, it is determined whether the target message verification is successful, which improves the accuracy of the safety verification of the relevant data of the vehicle braking system, provides a reliable data basis for the safe operation of the vehicle, and avoids vehicle braking control errors caused by abnormal message signal transmission, which affects driving safety.

[0040] In a second aspect, a vehicle communication device is provided, the device comprising:

[0041] A verification module, used for receiving a target message sent by a braking system in a vehicle and verifying the target message, wherein the target message includes a function signal;

[0042] A processing module, for generating a target check field based on the function signal if the target message is successfully checked, and adding the target check field to the target message to obtain a processed target message, wherein the target check field is used for a vehicle-mounted host to perform safety check;

[0043] The sending module is used to send the processed target message to the vehicle-mounted host, so that the vehicle-mounted host performs a security check on the processed target message.

[0044] In combination with the second aspect, in some possible implementations, the verification module is also used to obtain a configuration field and a candidate verification field in the target message, wherein the configuration field is used to indicate the target type of the braking system; based on the configuration field, a target verification strategy for the target message is determined; and based on the functional signal, the candidate verification field and the target verification strategy, the target message is verified.

[0045] In combination with the second aspect and the above-mentioned implementation methods, in some possible implementation methods, the verification module is also used to, if the target type is an electronic stability system, verify it through a hash algorithm to determine it as a target verification strategy; if the target type is an integrated braking control system, verify it through a target algorithm to determine the target verification strategy, where the target algorithm is the algorithm corresponding to the safe vehicle communication verification.

[0046] In combination with the second aspect and the above-mentioned implementation methods, in some possible implementation methods, when the target type is an electronic stability system, the candidate check field is a first hash field; the check module is also used to obtain a second hash field based on the functional signal and the hash algorithm; and the target message is checked based on the first hash field and the second hash field.

[0047] In combination with the second aspect and the above-mentioned implementation methods, in some possible implementation methods, the verification module is also used to determine that the target message verification is successful if the first hash field and the second hash field are consistent; if the first hash field and the second hash field are inconsistent, determine that the target message verification fails.

[0048] In combination with the second aspect and the above-mentioned implementation methods, in some possible implementation methods, when the target type is an integrated braking control system, the candidate check field is a first communication check field; the check module is also used to obtain a second communication check field based on the functional signal and the target algorithm; based on the first communication check field and the second communication check field, the target message is checked; wherein the first communication check field, the second communication check field and the target check field are check fields of the same type.

[0049] In combination with the second aspect and the above-mentioned implementation methods, in some possible implementation methods, the verification module is also used to determine that the target message verification is successful if the first communication verification field and the second communication verification field are consistent; if the first communication verification field and the second communication verification field are inconsistent, determine that the target message verification has failed.

[0050] In a third aspect, a vehicle is provided, comprising a memory and a processor. The memory is used to store executable program code, and the processor is used to call and run the executable program code from the memory, so that the vehicle executes the method in the first aspect or any possible implementation of the first aspect.

[0051] In a fourth aspect, a computer program product is provided, comprising: a computer program code, which, when executed on a computer, enables the computer to execute the method in the first aspect or any possible implementation of the first aspect.

[0052] In a fifth aspect, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, which stores a computer program code. When the computer program code runs on a computer, the computer executes the method in the above-mentioned first aspect or any possible implementation manner of the first aspect. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0053] Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of a vehicle system architecture provided by an embodiment of the present application;

[0054] Figure 2 is a schematic flow chart of a vehicle communication method provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0055] Figure 3 is a schematic flow chart of another vehicle communication method provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0056] Figure 4 is a structural schematic diagram of a vehicle communication device provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0057] Figure 5 It is a structural schematic diagram of a vehicle provided in an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0058] The technical solution in the present application will be described clearly and in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. In the description of the embodiments of the present application, unless otherwise specified, " / " means or, for example, A / B can mean A or B: "and / or" in the text is only a description of the association relationship of associated objects, indicating that there can be three relationships, for example, A and / or B can mean: A exists alone, A and B exist at the same time, and B exists alone. In addition, in the description of the embodiments of the present application, "multiple" means two or more than two.

[0059] In the following, the terms "first" and "second" are used for descriptive purposes only and are not to be understood as suggesting or implying relative importance or implicitly indicating the number of technical features indicated. Thus, a feature defined as "first" or "second" may explicitly or implicitly include one or more of the features.

[0060] With the rapid development of science and technology, the automotive industry is undergoing a huge transformation from traditional mechanical transportation to intelligent mobile terminals. Modern cars are equipped with a large number of electronic control units (ECUs), which control various functions of the vehicle, such as engine management, braking system, body stability system, etc. At the same time, the connection between vehicles and external networks is becoming closer and closer. For example, the Internet of Vehicles technology enables vehicles to realize functions such as remote information processing, real-time traffic information acquisition, and online software upgrades.

[0061] The network architecture inside the vehicle is becoming increasingly complex, with multiple communication protocols such as CAN (Controller Area Network), LIN (Local Interconnect Network), and Ethernet being used simultaneously. Different ECUs communicate through these protocols, and in smart connected vehicles, the vehicle's internal network also needs to interact with external networks (such as 4G / 5G networks). Take the CAN bus as an example. It is a communication protocol widely used inside vehicles to connect key ECUs such as power systems and chassis systems. In traditional vehicles, the CAN bus mainly focuses on internal communication efficiency, but in a networked environment, it may become an entry point for cyber attacks.

[0062] Therefore, a new verification method, Secure On-Board Communication (SecOC), is proposed in the process of vehicle communication security verification. SecOC is a standard security communication module that uses the freshness value and the check value CMAC to verify whether the message in the transmission process is correct and whether it has been tampered with. The freshness value and the check value together ensure the security of vehicle CAN communication, and are usually applied to messages containing high-risk and important functional signals.

[0063] Figure 1 Schematic diagram of a vehicle system architecture provided by an embodiment of the present application. Figure 1 As shown, the braking system 101, the vehicle gateway (Gate Way, GW) 102 and the vehicle head unit (Head Unit, HUT) 103 and other system modules in the vehicle, during the operation of the vehicle, the vehicle braking system 101, the vehicle gateway 102 and the vehicle head unit 103 will transmit messages. The vehicle braking system 101 may include an integrated brake control system (Integrated Brake Control, IBC) and an electronic stability program (Electronic Stability Program, ESP).

[0064] Assume that HUT needs to send a message to IBC; since the message is composed of many signals, in order to detect whether the message or the signal in the message has been tampered with or attacked during the process of HUT transmitting to IBC, before the message is transmitted, HUT will calculate an additional value based on the value of the message and attach it to the message and send it to IBC. This additional value is called a Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC). After receiving the message, IBC uses the same algorithm to calculate the additional value and compares the calculated CMAC with the CMAC sent by HUT. If they are consistent, it means that this frame of message has not been tampered with.

[0065] Freshness value is used to detect whether the received message is the latest message; that is, to detect whether there is a jam during the message transmission process. SecOC communication is a master-slave architecture, usually with the vehicle gateway as the master node, and the vehicle gateway synchronizes the same freshness value to all slave nodes at regular intervals. If HUT wants to send a message frame to IBC, in addition to verifying the CMAC value, it is also necessary to verify the Freshness value. For example, the first frame of HUT is attached with a freshness value of 1. After IBC receives it, the local will store the freshness value 1. The second time the freshness value is sent is 3. After IBC receives it, the local will update the freshness value 1 to the freshness value 3. The freshness value does not necessarily increase in an arithmetic sequence, it may be 1.3.4.6.7, etc. There may be no logical relationship between adjacent freshness values, but the freshness value of the next frame must be greater than the freshness value of the previous frame. If the local IBC stores a freshness value of 3, and the next time the HUT sends a freshness value of 2, it means that the message may be stuck during the sending process, that is, this frame of the message is not fresh.

[0066] During the verification of CMAC and Freshness value, the signal may be stuck during transmission. For redundancy, the number of verifications can be set. For example, if CMAC is inconsistent five times, it is considered an error; if the freshness value is not fresh five times, it is considered an error.

[0067] There are differences in the configuration of the braking system in vehicles with different configuration levels. Low-configuration vehicles may be equipped with ESP; while high-configuration vehicles may be equipped with more advanced IBC. In the existing message signal verification process, the CMAC value and freshness value generated by the SecOC verification are attached to the message in the form of a CAN signal. The CMAC value occupies 6 bytes and the freshness value occupies 2 bytes. For traditional CAN data frame payloads, which are usually 8 bytes, if there are functional signals in the CAN message signal, the bytes occupied by the CMAC value and the freshness value cannot be carried, which will cause the message signal to be unable to perform SecOC verification.

[0068] For vehicles equipped with ESP, since ESP uses ordinary CAN signals during signal transmission, the message sent by ESP to GW does not contain the fields required for SecOC verification (such as CMAC value and freshness value); therefore, GW will not verify the message sent by ESP, but only route the message to HUT; at this time, the message signal still does not contain the fields required for SecOC verification, resulting in HUT being unable to perform SecOC verification on the message, which will cause HUT verification failure; the frame message will then be discarded and the result of functional abnormality will be output. However, this result may not be caused by functional signal abnormality, so there is a functional abnormality caused by incorrect verification during the verification process.

[0069] For vehicles equipped with IBC, since IBC uses the communication protocol developed based on the traditional CAN bus during signal transmission - CANFD (Controller Area Network Flexible Data-rate) signal, the data frame payload of CANFD can reach 64 bytes or more. Therefore, the message sent by IBC can contain the fields required for SecOC verification; GW routes it to HUT, and HUT can perform SecOC verification on the message based on the fields in the message.

[0070] In summary, the existing technology cannot achieve unified verification of message signals sent by different braking systems, and there may be problems of malfunction caused by incorrect verification; if two or more sets of software algorithms are designed for vehicles with different configurations, it will lead to increased costs.

[0071] In view of the problems existing in the above-mentioned prior art, the present application provides a vehicle communication method, a vehicle communication device, a vehicle and a storage medium. After receiving the target message sent by the braking system, the target message is verified; when the target message verification is successful, a target verification field is generated according to the functional signal in the target message; and the target verification field is added to the target message to obtain a processed target message; then, the processed target message is sent to the vehicle host for verification. This method can avoid functional abnormalities caused by incorrect verification of the message by the vehicle host, and will not increase the verification cost.

[0072] Combine the following Figure 2 and Figure 3 The vehicle communication method provided in the embodiment of the present application is described in detail.

[0073] Figure 2 It is a schematic flow chart of a vehicle communication method provided by an embodiment of the present application. It should be understood that the method can be applied to a vehicle; or, applied to a vehicle gateway in a vehicle; or, applied to a chip in a vehicle gateway installed in a vehicle.

[0074] For example, Figure 2 As shown, the method 200 includes the following steps S201 to S203.

[0075] S201, receiving a target message sent by a braking system in a vehicle, and verifying the target message, wherein the target message includes a function signal.

[0076] Exemplarily, after the vehicle-mounted gateway receives the target message sent to it by the braking system in the vehicle, it performs a safety check on the target message; the braking system may include an electronic stability program (ESP) or an integrated braking control system (IBC).

[0077] The target message may include a message identifier (ID) and a data part; the ID may be used to distinguish different types of messages, so that the vehicle gateway can quickly identify the source of the message; the data part may include a functional signal, and the vehicle gateway may identify the purpose of the message based on the functional signal.

[0078] Exemplarily, the ID of the target message is 0x137 ESP, and the vehicle gateway can determine, based on the ID, that the target message is a message sent by ESP.

[0079] Exemplarily, the functional signal may include a brake pressure value signal, a brake mode signal, and a brake component status signal. The brake system converts the pressure value in the brake line into a digital code, which is reflected in the message. The brake system also includes multiple modes, such as normal mode. Emergency braking, anti-lock braking (ABS) mode, and electric parking brake (EPB) mode. There will be corresponding codes in the message data field to reflect these modes. Taking a byte as an example, 00 may be used to represent normal braking, 01 to represent emergency braking, 10 to represent ABS mode is working, and 11 to represent EPB mode is started. When the brake system enters a specific mode, the corresponding byte in the message data field will be updated, and the corresponding mode code will be sent to the vehicle gateway. The brake system also includes multiple components, such as brake pads, brake discs, brake pumps, etc. The status of these components will also be reflected in the message. For example, for the wear status of the brake pads, one byte can be used to represent it. If the byte value is 0-3, it means the brake pad thickness is normal, 4-6 means the brake pad is about to wear to the limit, and 7 means the brake pad has worn to the limit and needs to be replaced. Through this encoding method, the brake system can transmit component status information to other systems (for example, the vehicle gateway) in a timely manner.

[0080] In one implementation, the process of verifying the target message may include: obtaining a configuration field and a candidate verification field in the target message, wherein the configuration field is used to indicate a target type of the braking system; based on the configuration field, determining a target verification strategy for the target message; and verifying the target message based on a functional signal, a candidate verification field, and a target verification strategy.

[0081] Among them, the types of candidate check fields contained in the target messages sent by different types of braking systems are different.

[0082] For example, the configuration field corresponding to ESP is predefined as EAA01, and the configuration field of IBC is predefined as EAA02. The configuration field will be stored in the target message. When the vehicle gateway obtains the configuration field in the target message as EAA01, it can be determined that the vehicle is equipped with ESP and the target message is sent by ESP; when the vehicle gateway obtains the configuration field in the target message as EAA02, it can be determined that the vehicle is equipped with IBC and the target message is sent by IBC. Correspondingly,

[0083] Since different types of braking systems can adapt to different verification strategies, after determining the type of braking system according to the configuration field, the corresponding target verification strategy can be determined according to the type of braking system; and the target verification strategy is used to verify the target message in combination with the candidate verification field in the target message.

[0084] In the embodiment of the present application, the target verification strategy corresponding to the configuration field indicating the type of the braking system in the target message is determined; and then the target message is verified in combination with the target verification strategy and the candidate verification field in the target message. By determining the target type of the braking system through the configuration field and then determining the target verification strategy, more targeted message verification can be achieved, and the flexibility of message verification can be improved to adapt to messages sent by different types of braking systems; and then possible security risks such as data tampering and erroneous data injection can be detected more accurately to ensure the security of vehicle network communications.

[0085] In one implementation, based on the target type of the braking system, the process of determining the target verification strategy of the target message may specifically include: if the target type is an electronic stability system, verification will be performed through a hash algorithm to determine the target verification strategy; if the target type is an integrated braking control system, verification will be performed through a target algorithm to determine the target verification strategy, wherein the target algorithm is an algorithm corresponding to the safe vehicle communication verification.

[0086] Hash algorithm, also known as hash algorithm, is a function that can map data of any length to shorter data of fixed length (hash value). This fixed-length hash value is usually a number or a string. For example, the output of a common hash algorithm may be binary data of lengths such as 128 bits or 256 bits, which is then converted to hexadecimal.

[0087] The secure on-board communication (SecOC) verification is a verification method that determines whether there is any abnormality in the message signal by comparing the freshness value and the CMAC value.

[0088] Exemplarily, when the target type of the vehicle's braking system is the electronic stability program (ESP), due to the low configuration of the system, the algorithm corresponding to the secure on-board communication (SecOC) verification cannot be used, and a hash algorithm can be used for safety verification, that is, verification through the hash algorithm is determined as the target verification strategy; when the target type of the vehicle's braking system is the integrated braking control system (IBC), the system can be adapted to the SecOC verification, and the algorithm corresponding to the SecOC verification can be used for safety verification, that is, verification through the target algorithm is used to determine the target verification strategy.

[0089] In the embodiment of the present application, when it is determined that the type of the braking system is an electronic stability system, a hash algorithm is used to perform a security check on the target message; when it is determined that the type of the braking system is an integrated braking control system, a security check is performed using a target algorithm corresponding to the safe vehicle communication check. For electronic stability systems that do not support safe vehicle communication checks, the use of a hash algorithm for verification can ensure the security of messages sent by the electronic stability system; for integrated braking control systems with higher configurations, the algorithm corresponding to the safe vehicle communication check can be used for security verification; the way of customizing the verification strategy according to the system type can accurately meet the security requirements of different systems, and further improve the flexibility and efficiency of message security verification.

[0090] In one implementation, when the target type is an electronic stability system, the candidate check field is a first hash field; based on the functional signal, the candidate check field and the target check strategy, the process of checking the target message may include: obtaining a second hash field based on the functional signal and the hash algorithm; and checking the target message based on the first hash field and the second hash field.

[0091] Exemplarily, when the target type of the braking system is ESP, a hash algorithm is used for security verification; accordingly, during the signal processing process, ESP will calculate a first hash field based on the function signal, and the first hash field and the function signal will be sent to the vehicle gateway at the same time; after receiving the target message, the vehicle gateway uses a hash algorithm to calculate a second hash field based on the function signal in the target message; and then the first hash field and the second hash field can be compared to verify the target message to determine whether the target message has been tampered with or other abnormal conditions during transmission.

[0092] In an embodiment of the present application, when the target type of the braking system is an electronic stability system, the vehicle gateway calculates the second hash field based on the function signal and the hash algorithm, and compares it with the first hash field in the target message to achieve security verification of the target message. The determinism, anti-collision and other characteristics of the hash algorithm ensure that the generated hash value will be different as long as the function signal changes slightly. By comparing the two hash fields, the vehicle gateway can determine whether the function signal maintains its original integrity, thereby ensuring that the function signal sent by the braking system is a true and reliable signal to ensure the safe execution of the vehicle's braking function.

[0093] In one implementation, if the first hash field and the second hash field are consistent, it is determined that the target message verification succeeds; if the first hash field and the second hash field are inconsistent, it is determined that the target message verification fails.

[0094] For example, assuming that the first hash field in the target message obtained by the vehicle gateway is 3, if the second hash field calculated according to the function signal in the target message is also 3, which is consistent with the first hash field, it can be determined that the target message verification is successful, and the data information contained therein has not been tampered with or other abnormal conditions; if the second hash field calculated according to the function signal in the target message is 7, which is different from the first hash field 3, it can be determined that the target message verification has failed, indicating that the target message may have a transmission abnormality during the transmission process.

[0095] Optionally, a preset number of times is set, for example, 5 times. The target message is security-checked 5 times, and if the 5 checks all indicate that the first hash field and the second hash field are inconsistent, it is determined that the target message has failed the check.

[0096] In the embodiment of the present application, when the first hash field in the target message is consistent with the second hash field calculated by the vehicle gateway, it is determined that the target message verification is successful; when the first hash field and the second hash field are inconsistent, it is determined that the target message verification fails. By comparing whether the first hash field in the target message is consistent with the second hash field calculated by the vehicle gateway, it is determined whether the target message verification is successful, thereby improving the accuracy of the safety verification of the vehicle braking system related data and providing a reliable data basis for the safe operation of the vehicle.

[0097] In one implementation, when the target type is an integrated braking control system, the candidate check field is a first communication check field; based on the function signal, the candidate check field and the target check strategy, the process of checking the target message may include:

[0098] Based on the functional signal and the target algorithm, a second communication check field is obtained;

[0099] Verify the target message based on the first communication verification field and the second communication verification field;

[0100] The first communication check field, the second communication check field and the target check field are check fields of the same type; all of them are of SecOC type. Specifically, the first communication check field includes a first freshness value and a first CMAC value; the second communication check field includes a second freshness value and a second CMAC value. The second freshness value is used to indicate the freshness value stored when the previous message was sent.

[0101] Exemplarily, when the target type of the braking system is IBC, a target algorithm (the algorithm corresponding to the SecOC check) is used for safety verification; accordingly, during the signal processing process of IBC, a first communication check field is calculated based on the functional signal, and the first communication check field and the functional signal are sent to the vehicle gateway at the same time; after receiving the target message, the vehicle gateway uses the target algorithm to calculate the second communication check field based on the functional signal in the target message; and then the first communication check field and the second communication check field can be compared to verify the target message to determine whether the target message has been tampered with or other abnormal conditions during transmission.

[0102] In the embodiment of the present application, when the target type of the vehicle's braking system is an integrated braking control system, the target algorithm is used to calculate the second communication check field according to the functional signal in the target message; the target message is checked by comparing the first communication check field and the second communication check field. It can accurately verify whether the message has been tampered with during transmission, ensure the integrity and authenticity of the instructions and data related to the integrated braking control system, and improve the message security verification efficiency and verification accuracy.

[0103] In one implementation, if the first communication check field and the second communication check field are consistent, it is determined that the target message verification succeeds; if the first communication check field and the second communication check field are inconsistent, it is determined that the target message verification fails.

[0104] Exemplarily, assuming that the first communication check field in the target message acquired by the vehicle gateway includes a first CMAC value of CMAC1 and a first freshness value of 2, if the second CMAC value calculated according to the function signal in the target message is consistent with CMAC1, and the first freshness value is greater than the second freshness value stored when the previous message was sent (for example, 0, 1), it can be determined that the target message verification is successful, and the data information contained in the target message has not been tampered with or other abnormal conditions; if the second CMAC value calculated according to the function signal in the target message is inconsistent with CMAC1, and / or the first freshness value is less than or equal to the second freshness value stored when the previous message was sent, it can be determined that the target message verification has failed, indicating that the target message may have a transmission abnormality during the transmission process.

[0105] Optionally, a preset number of times, for example, 5 times, is set. The target message is security-checked 5 times. If the 5 checks all indicate that the first CMAC value and the second CMAC value are inconsistent, and / or the first freshness value is less than or equal to the second freshness value stored when the message was previously sent, it is determined that the target message has failed the check.

[0106] In the embodiment of the present application, when the first communication check field in the target message is consistent with the second communication check field calculated by the vehicle gateway, it is determined that the target message verification is successful; when the first communication check field and the second communication check field are inconsistent, it is determined that the target message verification fails. By comparing whether the first communication check field in the target message is consistent with the second communication check field calculated by the vehicle gateway, it is determined whether the target message verification is successful, thereby improving the accuracy of the safety verification of the relevant data of the vehicle braking system, providing a reliable data basis for the safe operation of the vehicle, and avoiding vehicle braking control errors caused by abnormal message signal transmission, which affects driving safety.

[0107] S202, if the target message verification succeeds, a target verification field is generated based on the functional signal, and the target verification field is added to the target message to obtain a processed target message, wherein the target verification field is used for safety verification of the vehicle's onboard host.

[0108] The target verification field includes a freshness value and a CMAC value.

[0109] Exemplarily, the vehicle gateway performs a security check on the received target message; if the target message check is successful, a target check field for SecOC check is generated according to the functional signal in the target message; after the target check field is calculated, the check field carried in the target message is discarded, and the target check field is added to the target message to obtain a processed target message.

[0110] Specifically, when the target message is sent by ESP, the field in the target message used for security verification of the vehicle gateway is the first hash field; when the target message verification is successful, the target algorithm is used to calculate the corresponding target verification field according to the functional signal in the target message; and the hash field in the target message is replaced with the target verification field to obtain the processed target message.

[0111] When the target message is sent by IBC, the field in the target message used for security verification of the vehicle gateway is the first communication verification field; when the target message verification is successful, the target algorithm is used to calculate the corresponding target verification field according to the functional signal in the target message; and the first communication verification field in the target message is replaced with the target verification field to obtain the processed target message.

[0112] S203, sending the processed target message to the vehicle-mounted host, so that the vehicle-mounted host performs a security check on the processed target message.

[0113] Exemplarily, after obtaining the processed target message, the vehicle gateway sends the processed target message to the vehicle host (HUT); since the processed target message contains a target check field for SecOC check, the vehicle host can perform a security check on the processed target message. Specifically, the security check performed by the vehicle host is a secure vehicle communication check, i.e., a SecOC check.

[0114] In one implementation, the process of the vehicle-mounted host performing a security check on the processed target message may include: the vehicle-mounted host obtains the target check field in the processed target message, and uses the target algorithm to obtain a second check field according to the functional signal in the target message; compares the target check field and the second check field, and determines the check result according to the comparison result.

[0115] Exemplarily, the target check field includes a freshness value of A and a CMAC value of CMAC2; the second check field calculated by the vehicle host includes a CMAC value of CMAC3 and a freshness value of the message received last time of B. If CMAC3 in the second check field is consistent with CMAC2 in the target check field, and the freshness value A in the target check field is greater than the freshness value B of the message received last time, it can be determined that the processed target message is successfully checked; if CMAC3 in the second check field is inconsistent with CMAC2 in the target check field, and / or the freshness value A in the target check field is less than or equal to the freshness value B of the message received last time, it can be determined that the processed target message fails to be checked.

[0116] In summary, in the embodiment of the present application, the vehicle-mounted gateway receives the target message sent by the braking system in the vehicle, and performs a security check on the target message; when the target message is successfully checked, a target check field is generated according to the functional signal in the target message, and it is added to the target message to obtain a processed target message; and then the processed target message is sent to the vehicle-mounted host for security check. For the message sent by the braking system, it is first processed in the middle section by the vehicle-mounted gateway. Since the vehicle-mounted gateway adds a target check field to the target message, the vehicle-mounted host can perform a security check on the processed message based on the target check field, avoiding the failure of the vehicle-mounted host to check the message sent by the braking system due to the absence of the field required for security check in the target message, thereby causing the braking system to malfunction; and the above scheme performs double verification on the target message by the vehicle-mounted gateway and the vehicle-mounted host, thereby improving the accuracy of the security check and ensuring the security of vehicle network communications.

[0117] In addition, compared with the prior art in which the vehicle-mounted host performs security verification on the message, the vehicle-mounted gateway in this solution will only send the processed target message to the vehicle-mounted host when the message verification is successful, and will not send the message that fails the verification. This can reduce the amount of computing of the vehicle-mounted host and improve the efficiency of the security verification of the message.

[0118] Figure 3 It is a schematic flow chart of another vehicle communication method provided by an embodiment of the present application. It should be understood that the method can be applied to a vehicle; or, applied to a vehicle gateway in a vehicle; or, applied to a chip in a vehicle gateway installed in a vehicle.

[0119] For example, Figure 3 As shown, the method 300 includes the following steps S301 to S306.

[0120] S301, the vehicle gateway receives a message sent by the braking system of the vehicle, wherein the message includes a configuration field.

[0121] Among them, the vehicle's braking system may include an electronic stability system and an integrated braking control system.

[0122] For example, during the vehicle signal communication process, the braking system will send a message to the vehicle host for use by the vehicle host or other systems. In this process, the message needs to be routed through the vehicle gateway. The vehicle gateway receives the message sent by the vehicle's braking system. The message may include a configuration field for indicating the type of braking system, a function signal for indicating the function of the message, and a check field. For example, the configuration field may be EAA01 or EAA02.

[0123] Optionally, the implementation of S301 can refer to Figure 2 The relevant description of S201 in the present application embodiment will not be repeated here.

[0124] S302, judging whether the braking system of the vehicle is an electronic stability system or an integrated braking control system according to the configuration field; if it is an electronic stability system, executing S303; if it is an integrated braking control system, executing S304.

[0125] For example, the correspondence between the configuration field and the type of the brake system is preset as follows: EAA01 corresponds to the electronic stability system (ESP), and EAA02 corresponds to the integrated brake control system (IBC). After obtaining a message containing the configuration field, according to the configuration field in the message and the preset correspondence, it can be determined that the brake system of the vehicle is an electronic stability system or an integrated brake control system.

[0126] Optionally, the implementation of S302 can refer to Figure 2 The relevant description of S202 in the present application embodiment will not be repeated here.

[0127] S303, the vehicle gateway verifies the hash value in the message a preset number of times.

[0128] Exemplarily, when the braking system of the vehicle is an electronic stability system, the message includes a hash value; the vehicle gateway performs a preset number of (for example, 5) security checks on the message according to the hash value in the message.

[0129] It should be understood that the preset number of times can be set according to the accuracy requirements in the actual application process. For example, if higher accuracy is required, a larger preset number of times can be set, such as 10 times, 20 times, etc.; if the required accuracy requirement is lower, a smaller preset number of times can be set, such as 3 times, 5 times, etc. The embodiment of the present application does not specifically limit the value of the preset number of times.

[0130] Exemplarily, the process of the vehicle gateway verifying the hash value in the message may include: the vehicle gateway uses a hash algorithm to calculate the target hash value based on the functional signal in the message; compares the hash value carried in the message with the target hash value; if the two are consistent, it can be determined that the message verification is successful; if the two are inconsistent, it can be determined that the message verification has failed.

[0131] Optionally, the implementation of S303 can refer to Figure 2 The relevant description of S202 in the present application embodiment will not be repeated here.

[0132] S304: The vehicle gateway verifies the first secure vehicle communication value in the message for a preset number of times.

[0133] Exemplarily, when the vehicle's braking system is an integrated braking control system, the message contains a first safety vehicle communication value; the vehicle gateway performs a preset number of (for example, 5) safety checks on the message based on the first safety vehicle communication value in the message.

[0134] Exemplarily, the process of the vehicle gateway verifying the hash value in the message may include: the vehicle gateway uses the target algorithm to calculate the target safe vehicle communication value according to the functional signal in the message; compares the first safe vehicle communication value carried in the message with the target safe vehicle communication value; if the two are consistent, it can be determined that the message verification is successful; if the two are inconsistent, it can be determined that the message verification has failed.

[0135] Optionally, the implementation of S304 can refer to Figure 2 The relevant description of S202 in the present application embodiment will not be repeated here.

[0136] S305, determine whether the verification is successful; if the verification is successful, execute S306; if the verification fails, end the verification.

[0137] Exemplarily, after the message has been subjected to multiple security checks, it is determined whether the message check is successful.

[0138] Optionally, when the number of times the check values ​​are consistent in the preset number of check results is greater than or equal to the number threshold, it can be determined that the message check is successful; when the number of times the check values ​​are consistent in the preset number of check results is less than the number threshold, it can be determined that the message check fails. When the message check fails, the frame message can be discarded without routing the frame message to the vehicle host.

[0139] Optionally, the implementation of S305 can refer to Figure 2 The relevant description of S202 in the present application embodiment will not be repeated here.

[0140] S306, the vehicle gateway adds a second safe vehicle communication value to the message, and sends the processed message to the vehicle host.

[0141] Exemplarily, when the vehicle-mounted gateway successfully verifies the message, the vehicle-mounted gateway recalculates the second safe vehicle-mounted communication value according to the functional signal in the message; and adds the second safe vehicle-mounted communication value to the message to replace the verification value originally carried in the message to obtain a processed message; and then sends the processed message to the vehicle-mounted host so that the vehicle-mounted host can perform a security verification on the processed message.

[0142] Optionally, the implementation of S306 can refer to Figure 2 The relevant description of S202 and S203 in the embodiment of the present application is not repeated here.

[0143] In summary, in the embodiment of the present application, firstly, according to the configuration field in the message, it is determined that the type of the vehicle's control system is an electronic stability system or an integrated braking control system; and then the message is checked in a manner that matches the braking system to improve the efficiency of message verification. Through this method, adaptive message verification for two different braking systems can be achieved, without the need to design two or more sets of software to adapt to different systems, reducing the cost of security verification. The hash value or the safe vehicle communication value in the message is checked for a preset number of times using a corresponding strategy to determine whether the verification is successful; in the case of successful verification, the vehicle gateway calculates a new safe vehicle communication value based on the functional signal and adds it to the message; finally, the processed message is sent to the vehicle host for verification; the vehicle gateway is used for mid-section verification and processing, and only the message that has been successfully verified is sent to the vehicle host, avoiding the vehicle host from processing a large number of erroneous or unsafe messages, and improving the efficiency of vehicle network communication; the vehicle gateway uniformly adds the safe vehicle communication value, which can ensure that the vehicle host can perform safe vehicle communication verification on the message to ensure the security of the message data sent by the braking system.

[0144] Combination of the above Figures 1 to 3 The vehicle communication method provided by the embodiment of the present application is described in detail; Figure 4 and Figure 5 The device embodiments of the present application are described in detail. It should be understood that the device in the embodiments of the present application can execute the various methods of the aforementioned embodiments of the present application, that is, the specific working processes of the following various products can refer to the corresponding processes in the aforementioned method embodiments.

[0145] Figure 4 It is a structural schematic diagram of a vehicle communication device provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0146] For example, Figure 4 As shown, the vehicle communication device 400 includes:

[0147] The verification module 401 is used to receive a target message sent by a braking system in a vehicle and verify the target message, wherein the target message includes a function signal;

[0148] The processing module 402 is used to generate a target check field based on the function signal if the target message is successfully checked, and add the target check field to the target message to obtain a processed target message, wherein the target check field is used for a vehicle-mounted host to perform safety check;

[0149] The sending module 403 is used to send the processed target message to the vehicle-mounted host, so that the vehicle-mounted host performs a security check on the processed target message.

[0150] In one possible implementation, the verification module 401 is also used to obtain a configuration field and a candidate verification field in the target message, wherein the configuration field is used to indicate the target type of the braking system; based on the configuration field, a target verification strategy of the target message is determined; and based on the functional signal, the candidate verification field and the target verification strategy, the target message is verified.

[0151] In one possible implementation, the verification module 401 is also used to, if the target type is an electronic stability system, verify it through a hash algorithm to determine the target verification strategy; if the target type is an integrated braking control system, verify it through a target algorithm to determine the target verification strategy, where the target algorithm is the algorithm corresponding to the safe vehicle communication verification.

[0152] In one possible implementation, when the target type is an electronic stability system, the candidate check field is a first hash field; the check module 401 is also used to obtain a second hash field based on the functional signal and the hash algorithm; and to check the target message based on the first hash field and the second hash field.

[0153] In a possible implementation, the verification module 401 is further used to determine that the verification of the target message is successful if the first hash field and the second hash field are consistent; if the first hash field and the second hash field are inconsistent, determine that the verification of the target message fails.

[0154] In one possible implementation, when the target type is an integrated braking control system, the candidate check field is a first communication check field; the check module 401 is also used to obtain a second communication check field based on a functional signal and a target algorithm; based on the first communication check field and the second communication check field, the target message is checked; wherein the first communication check field, the second communication check field and the target check field are check fields of the same type.

[0155] In a possible implementation, the verification module 401 is further configured to determine that the target message verification succeeds if the first communication verification field and the second communication verification field are consistent; and to determine that the target message verification fails if the first communication verification field and the second communication verification field are inconsistent.

[0156] It should be noted that the above vehicle communication device is embodied in the form of a functional unit. The term "module" here can be implemented in the form of software and / or hardware, and is not specifically limited to this.

[0157] For example, a "module" may be a software program, a hardware circuit, or a combination of the two that implements the above functions. The hardware circuit may include an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), an electronic circuit, a processor (such as a shared processor, a dedicated processor, or a group processor, etc.) and a memory for executing one or more software or firmware programs, a combined logic circuit, and / or other suitable components that support the described functions.

[0158] Therefore, the units of each example described in the embodiments of the present application can be implemented by electronic hardware, or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether these functions are performed in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Professional and technical personnel can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered to be beyond the scope of the present application.

[0159] Figure 5 It is a structural schematic diagram of a vehicle provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0160] For example, Figure 5 As shown, the vehicle 500 includes: a memory 501 and a processor 502, wherein the memory 501 stores an executable program code 503, and the processor 502 is used to call and execute the executable program code 503 to perform a vehicle communication method.

[0161] In addition, an embodiment of the present application also protects a device, which may include a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores an executable program code, and the processor is used to call and execute the executable program code to execute a vehicle communication method provided by an embodiment of the present application.

[0162] In this embodiment, the functional modules of the device can be divided according to the above method example. For example, each functional module can be corresponded, or two or more functions can be integrated into one processing module. The above integrated module can be implemented in the form of hardware. It should be noted that the division of modules in this embodiment is schematic and is only a logical function division. There may be other division methods in actual implementation.

[0163] In the case of dividing each functional module according to each function, the device may also include a verification module, a processing module, a sending module, etc. It should be noted that all relevant contents of each step involved in the above method embodiment can be referred to the functional description of the corresponding functional module, which will not be repeated here.

[0164] It should be understood that the device provided in this embodiment is used to execute the above-mentioned vehicle communication method, and thus can achieve the same effect as the above-mentioned implementation method.

[0165] In the case of an integrated unit, the device may include a processing module and a storage module. When the device is applied to a vehicle, the processing module may be used to control and manage the actions of the vehicle. The storage module may be used to support the vehicle in executing relevant program codes, etc.

[0166] The processing module may be a processor or a controller, which may implement or execute various exemplary logic blocks, modules and circuits described in conjunction with the disclosure of this application. The processor may also be a combination that implements computing functions, such as a combination of one or more microprocessors, a combination of digital signal processing (DSP) and a microprocessor, etc. The storage module may be a memory.

[0167] In addition, the device provided in the embodiments of the present application may specifically be a chip, a component or a module, and the chip may include a connected processor and a memory; wherein the memory is used to store instructions, and when the processor calls and executes the instructions, the chip can execute a vehicle communication method provided in the above embodiments.

[0168] This embodiment also provides a computer-readable storage medium, in which a computer program code is stored. When the computer program code is executed on a computer, the computer executes the above-mentioned related method steps to implement a vehicle communication method provided by the above-mentioned embodiment.

[0169] Among them, computer-readable storage media may include but are not limited to any type of disk, including floppy disks, optical disks, digital versatile disks (Digital Video Disc, DVD), compact disc read-only memory (Compact Disc Read-Only Memory, CD-ROM), microdrives and magneto-optical disks, read-only memory (Read-Only Memory, ROM), random access memory (Random Access Memory, RAM), erasable programmable read-only memory (Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory, EPROM), electrically erasable programmable read only memory (Electrically Erasable Programmable read only memory, EEPROM), dynamic random access memory (Dynamic Random Access Memory, DRAM), video random access memory (Video Random Access Memory, VRAM), flash memory devices, magnetic cards or optical cards, nanosystems (including molecular memory ICs), or any type of medium or device suitable for storing instructions and / or data.

[0170] This embodiment also provides a computer program product. When the computer program product is run on a computer, the computer is caused to execute the above-mentioned related steps to implement a vehicle communication method provided by the above-mentioned embodiment.

[0171] Among them, the device, computer-readable storage medium, computer program product or chip provided in this embodiment is used to execute the corresponding method provided above. Therefore, the beneficial effects that can be achieved can refer to the beneficial effects in the corresponding method provided above, and will not be repeated here.

[0172] Through the description of the above implementation methods, technical personnel in the relevant field can understand that for the convenience and simplicity of description, only the division of the above-mentioned functional modules is used as an example. In actual applications, the above-mentioned functions can be assigned to different functional modules as needed, that is, the internal structure of the device can be divided into different functional modules to complete all or part of the functions described above.

[0173] In the embodiments provided in the present application, it should be understood that the disclosed devices and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the device embodiments described above are only schematic, for example, the division of modules or units is only a logical function division, and there may be other division methods in actual implementation, such as multiple units or components can be combined or integrated into another device, or some features can be ignored or not executed. Another point is that the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed can be through some interfaces, indirect coupling or communication connection of devices or units, which can be electrical, mechanical or other forms.

[0174] The above contents are only specific implementation methods of the present application, but the protection scope of the present application is not limited thereto. Any technician familiar with the technical field can easily think of changes or substitutions within the technical scope disclosed in the present application, which should be included in the protection scope of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the present application should be based on the protection scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A vehicle communication method, characterized in that: The method is applied to a vehicle-mounted gateway, and the method includes: Receiving a target message sent by a braking system in a vehicle and verifying the target message, wherein the target message includes a function signal; If the target message verification succeeds, a target verification field is generated based on the function signal, and the target verification field is added to the target message to obtain a processed target message, wherein the target verification field is used for a vehicle-mounted host to perform safety verification; The processed target message is sent to the vehicle-mounted host, so that the vehicle-mounted host performs a security check on the processed target message.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The verifying the target message includes: Acquire a configuration field and a candidate check field in the target message, wherein the configuration field is used to indicate a target type of the braking system; Determining a target verification strategy for the target message based on the configuration field; The target message is verified based on the functional signal, the candidate verification field and the target verification strategy.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The determining of the target verification strategy of the target message based on the target type of the braking system includes: If the target type is an electronic stability system, a hash algorithm is used to perform verification to determine the target verification strategy; If the target type is an integrated braking control system, the target verification strategy will be determined by verifying the target algorithm, wherein the target algorithm is an algorithm corresponding to the safety vehicle communication verification.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that When the target type is an electronic stability system, the candidate check field is a first hash field; The verifying the target message based on the function signal, the candidate verification field and the target verification strategy includes: Based on the function signal and the hash algorithm, obtain a second hash field; The target message is verified based on the first hash field and the second hash field.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that The verifying the target message based on the first hash field and the second hash field includes: If the first hash field and the second hash field are consistent, it is determined that the target message verification succeeds; If the first hash field and the second hash field are inconsistent, it is determined that the target message verification fails.

6. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that When the target type is an integrated brake control system, the candidate check field is a first communication check field; The verifying the target message based on the function signal, the candidate verification field and the target verification strategy includes: Based on the function signal and the target algorithm, obtain a second communication check field; Verifying the target message based on the first communication verification field and the second communication verification field; The first communication check field, the second communication check field and the target check field are check fields of the same type.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that The verifying the target message based on the first communication verification field and the second communication verification field includes: If the first communication check field and the second communication check field are consistent, it is determined that the target message has been successfully checked; If the first communication check field and the second communication check field are inconsistent, it is determined that the target message check fails.

8. A vehicle communication device, characterized in that: The device is applied to a vehicle-mounted gateway, and the device includes: A verification module, used for receiving a target message sent by a braking system in a vehicle and verifying the target message, wherein the target message includes a function signal; a processing module, configured to generate a target check field based on the function signal if the target message is successfully checked, and to add the target check field to the target message to obtain a processed target message, wherein the target check field is used for a vehicle-mounted host to perform safety check; The sending module is used to send the processed target message to the vehicle-mounted host, so that the vehicle-mounted host performs a security check on the processed target message.

9. A vehicle, characterized in that: The vehicle comprises: A memory for storing executable program codes; A processor, configured to call and run the executable program code from the memory, so that the vehicle executes the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7 is implemented.

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