Information security method for wireless communication

Abstract

The invention discloses an information security method for wireless communication, which relates to the technical field of information security, and comprises the following steps: extracting radio frequency fingerprints of wireless equipment, disassembling the radio frequency fingerprints to obtain basic and disturbance fingerprints, and extracting wireless communication environment characteristics to construct a steady-state environment characteristic library at the same time; obtaining a steady-state environment hash based on the steady-state environment feature library, comparing the steady-state environment hash with a dynamic environment hash generated by the current environment feature, and generating a communication correction signal when the current environment feature is not matched with the dynamic environment hash; calculating a transmission key by using the communication correction signal, correcting the equipment, and performing hierarchical fingerprint verification on the to-be-verified equipment which is not matched with the correction; if the equipment is not matched completely, analyzing the verification behavior, and judging the untrusted equipment; finally, dynamic environment Hash analysis is carried out on multiple monitoring periods, lagging environment Hash is used for replacing dissimilar dynamic environment Hash, communication environment abnormity can be detected, illegal equipment can be recognized, communication information safety is guaranteed, and verification efficiency and safety balance are improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of information security, and in particular to an information security method for wireless communications. Background Art

[0002] In today's digital age, wireless communication technology is widely used in various fields. However, with the popularization of wireless communication, information security issues have become increasingly prominent.

[0003] In the existing technology, it is difficult to monitor the communication environment in real time. When new interference signals or malicious interference appear in the environment, timely warning cannot be issued. By building a steady-state environment feature library and combining the matching judgment of steady-state environment hash and dynamic environment hash, abnormal changes in the communication environment can be monitored and security risks such as interference sources can be discovered in time.

[0004] Existing technologies often rely on a single detection method to detect illegal devices, and are unable to perform multi-level verification, or consume too many resources during the detection process, affecting communication efficiency. If a hierarchical fingerprint verification strategy is adopted, a gradual and in-depth verification can be performed according to the risk level of the device, illegal devices can be identified, and the device security can be dynamically evaluated. Existing methods may miss some cleverly disguised illegal devices, achieving a balance between verification efficiency and security.

[0005] In the existing technology, there is a lack of dynamic monitoring mechanism for equipment risks, and equipment risks are not tracked and evaluated in real time. If the equipment limit value is calculated, the equipment risk status is continuously monitored, and the communication of untrusted equipment is restricted in time, effective preventive measures can be taken when facing potential threat equipment, the security of the communication system cannot be guaranteed.

[0006] To this end, the present invention provides a method for information security of wireless communications. Summary of the invention

[0007] The object of the present invention is to provide a method for information security of wireless communication to solve at least one of the above-mentioned problems in the prior art.

[0008] In a first aspect, the present invention provides a method for information security of wireless communication, comprising the following steps: Step 1: Extract the radio frequency fingerprint of the wireless device, perform fingerprint decomposition, obtain the basic and disturbance fingerprints, extract the environmental characteristics of wireless communication, and build a steady-state environmental feature library; Step 2: Based on the steady-state environment feature library, a steady-state environment hash is extracted, the characteristics of the current environment are analyzed to obtain a dynamic environment hash, and a match is determined between the steady-state environment hash and the dynamic environment hash. If they do not match, a communication correction signal is generated; Step 3: Based on the communication correction signal, perform numerical analysis on the dynamic environment hash, calculate the transmission key, use the transmission key to correct the sending device and the receiving device, if the corrections do not match, obtain the device to be tested, and verify whether the device to be tested matches the registered device; Step 4: If there is no match at all, analyze the verification behavior of the device to obtain the device restriction value, and restrict the communication of the device based on the device restriction value to obtain an untrusted device; Step 5: Perform numerical analysis on the dynamic environment hash of multiple monitoring cycles to obtain the lagged environment hash, and perform similarity analysis with the dynamic environment hash. If they are not similar, the lagged environment hash replaces the dynamic environment hash.

[0009] In a second aspect, the present invention provides a system for information security of wireless communications, comprising the following modules: Feature construction module: used to extract the radio frequency fingerprint of wireless devices, perform fingerprint disassembly, obtain basic and perturbation fingerprints, extract environmental characteristics of wireless communications, and build a steady-state environmental feature library; Environment matching module: Based on the steady-state environment feature library, the steady-state environment hash is extracted, the characteristics of the current environment are analyzed to obtain the dynamic environment hash, and the steady-state environment hash and the dynamic environment hash are matched and judged. If they do not match, a communication correction signal is generated; Device matching module: Based on the communication correction signal, it is used to perform numerical analysis on the dynamic environment hash, calculate the transmission key, and use the transmission key to correct the sending device and the receiving device. If the correction does not match, the device to be tested is obtained, and it is verified whether the device to be tested matches the registered device; Trusted analysis module: If there is no match, it is used to analyze the verification behavior of the device, obtain the device restriction value, and restrict the communication of the device based on the device restriction value to obtain an untrusted device; Dynamic update module: used to perform numerical analysis on the dynamic environment hash of multiple monitoring cycles, obtain the lagged environment hash, and perform similarity analysis with the dynamic environment hash. If they are not similar, the lagged environment hash replaces the dynamic environment hash.

[0010] Beneficial effects of the present invention: 1. By utilizing the uniqueness of the RF fingerprint and disassembling it into the basic fingerprint and the disturbance fingerprint, the device can be accurately identified in the communication network. When the communication fails, the basic fingerprint matching verification can be used to perform security authentication and verify the legitimacy of the communication device, effectively preventing illegal device access and ensuring the security of communication data. A steady-state environment feature library is constructed, and a steady-state environment hash is generated based on it. By matching and judging with the dynamic environment hash, combined with the calculation and analysis of transmission anomalies, abnormal changes in the communication environment can be discovered in a timely manner. This is conducive to providing reliable early warnings to ensure the security of wireless communication information and to reducing the possibility of information transmission in an unsafe environment.

[0011] 2. Generate the initial key from the wireless channel status information, and then combine the dynamic environment hash to calculate the transmission key to encrypt and modify the communication transmission. The encryption system enhances the confidentiality and integrity of the communication data, reduces the risk of data being stolen or tampered with during transmission, and improves the security of the communication content; adopts a hierarchical fingerprint verification strategy to perform different levels of verification according to the risk level of the device. It can dynamically evaluate the security of the device, accurately identify illegal devices through gradually in-depth verification, and improve the verification efficiency at the same time, achieving a balance between verification efficiency and security, and effectively ensuring the normal operation of the communication system.

[0012] 3. By calculating the device limit value and comparing it with the preset threshold, the device credibility can be accurately determined. For untrusted devices, their communications are restricted in a timely manner, and devices with lower device limit values ​​are continuously monitored to dynamically grasp the risk status of the devices. Dynamic environmental hashes of multiple monitoring cycles are analyzed, and dissimilar dynamic environmental hashes are replaced with lagging environmental hashes, so that the system can better adapt to environmental changes, ensure the accuracy and timeliness of environmental characteristics, and further improve the security and stability of the communication system. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0013] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for use in the description of the embodiments. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative work.

[0014] Figure 1 It is a flow chart of an information security method for wireless communication of the present invention; Figure 2 is a flow chart for determining an untrusted device provided by Embodiment 2 of the present invention; Figure 3 It is a module diagram of a system for information security of wireless communications provided by a fourth embodiment of the present invention; Figure 4 It is a structural diagram of a computer device provided in Embodiment 5 of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0015] In order to enable those skilled in the art to better understand the scheme of the present invention, the technical scheme in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work should fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0016] Embodiment 1 like Figure 1 As shown, a method for information security of wireless communication provided by an embodiment of the present invention specifically includes the following steps: Step 1: Extract the radio frequency fingerprint of the wireless device, perform fingerprint decomposition, obtain the basic and disturbance fingerprints, extract the environmental characteristics of wireless communication, and build a steady-state environmental feature library; In some embodiments, the radio frequency fingerprint of the wireless device is divided into a basic fingerprint and a disturbance fingerprint, and the carrier frequency offset of the wireless device in a steady state is collected during multiple monitoring cycles, and the carrier frequency offset is binary-encoded as the basic fingerprint of the wireless communication device; By intercepting the carrier frequency offset of the wireless device in a steady state and in a transient oscillation phase of the power amplifier startup stage, the carrier frequency offset is binary-encoded as a disturbance fingerprint of the wireless communication device; It should be noted that the RF fingerprint is derived from the manufacturing tolerance and drift tolerance of the hardware components of the wireless device. The steady state of the wireless device refers to a specific state in which the working state of the wireless device is relatively stable and the fluctuation of various parameters is small; storing the basic fingerprint and the perturbation fingerprint of the wireless device in a database, and marking the wireless device as a registered device; In some embodiments, the initial key of the wireless communication device is obtained by obtaining the MAC address of the wireless device and performing AES-128 algorithm processing; It should be noted that the wireless transmitting device and the receiving device use the initial key to encrypt and transmit the data packet; The functions of collecting RF fingerprints are: Function 1: It is used to accurately identify devices in communication networks; Function 2: Used for security authentication. When wireless communication fails, the system will match and verify the collected basic fingerprints. Function three: used for communication encryption transmission; In some embodiments, when the wireless device is in a steady state, a signal is received through multiple spatially distributed antennas, the signal arrival angle is calculated using the phase difference of the signal arriving at different array elements, and the signal arrival angle variance of the multiple antennas is calculated using a variance formula; In some embodiments, the wireless device is in a steady state, separates multipath components from a channel impulse response, records the delay and power of each path, and obtains a distribution of signal power over time delay; The obtained power delay distribution is normalized to obtain the normalized power delay distribution , Indicates delay; Normalized power delay distribution , calculate the delay spread entropy through the information entropy formula; Based on the arrival angle variance and delay spread entropy, the dimensions are removed and concatenated into a high-dimensional vector, and the high-dimensional vector is normalized by Min-Max to obtain a normalized high-dimensional vector; Obtain normalized high-dimensional vectors under different environments and build a steady-state environment feature library; It should be noted that if there are less than 3 dominant paths, the delay spread entropy is 0, where the environments include: home environment, office environment, commercial environment, etc.; Among them, the role of building a steady-state environment feature library is: Role 1: The collected RF fingerprints can be combined to detect abnormal behaviors in the communication environment; Function 2: To identify interference, information such as delay spread entropy and arrival angle variance in the environmental feature vector can reflect the signal interference situation.

[0017] Step 2: Based on the steady-state environment feature library, a steady-state environment hash is extracted, the characteristics of the current environment are analyzed to obtain a dynamic environment hash, and a match is determined between the steady-state environment hash and the dynamic environment hash. If they do not match, a communication correction signal is generated; Based on the steady-state environment feature library, the hash value of the normalized high-dimensional vector of each scene is calculated through the SHA-256 hash function to obtain the steady-state environment hash; The signal arrival angle variance and delay spread entropy of wireless devices are collected in real time, and the normalized high-dimensional vector is obtained by splicing and calculating. The normalized high-dimensional vector is hashed to obtain the dynamic environment hash; It should be noted that since the same hash function is used, the length of the dynamic environment hash and the steady-state environment hash are the same; By the Hamming distance formula: , get the Hamming distance D between dynamic environment hash and steady-state environment hash hm , where X and Y are binary string sequences of dynamic environment hash and steady-state environment hash, respectively. is the exclusive OR operator; If the Hamming distance between the dynamic environment hash and the steady-state environment hash is 0, it means that the dynamic environment and the steady-state environment have exactly the same characteristics; It should be noted that the Hamming distance measures the number of different characters at the same position of two binary strings of equal length, reflecting the degree of difference between the dynamic environment hash and the steady-state environment hash; Since the hash value is calculated based on the normalized high-dimensional vector of environmental features, the larger the Hamming distance, the greater the difference between the dynamic environment of the wireless device collected in real time and the scene in the steady-state environment feature library; the smaller the Hamming distance, the more similar the dynamic environment is to the steady-state environment; If the Hamming distance between the dynamic environment hash and the steady-state environment hash is not 0, the sum of the characters of the hash values ​​of the dynamic environment hash and the steady-state environment hash is obtained to obtain the hash character sum; Ratio the Hamming distance to the hash character sum to obtain the Hamming distance ratio; Obtaining the number of unmatched data packets and the number of sent data packets by the wireless device after using the initial key for communication encryption; It should be noted that the wireless device includes a wireless transmitting device and a wireless receiving device. Professionals and technicians in this field classify data packets by matching and checking data packets to obtain unmatched data packets. The matching check includes a hash check and a CRC check. The number of unmatched data packets is subtracted from the number of sent data packets, and the obtained result is then compared with the number of sent data packets to obtain a matching weight value; The transmission anomaly value is calculated based on the matching weight value and the Hamming distance ratio through a weighted formula. The weights of the matching weight value and the Hamming distance ratio are 0.65 and 0.43 respectively. Compare the transmission anomaly value with the preset transmission anomaly threshold. If the transmission anomaly value is higher than the preset transmission anomaly threshold, it is considered that the dynamic environment of the wireless device collected in real time does not match the scene in the steady-state environment feature library, and the transmission mismatch data packet exceeds expectations, generate a communication correction signal, and record the current communication signal; If the transmission anomaly value is lower than the preset transmission anomaly threshold, it is considered that the matching difference between the dynamic environment of the wireless device collected in real time and the scene in the steady-state environment feature library is within the expected range and no processing is performed; It should be noted that the preset transmission anomaly threshold is set by professionals in this field, and the purpose of obtaining the transmission anomaly value is: Detecting abnormal communication environment: The transmission abnormal value is calculated based on the matching of the steady-state environment hash and the dynamic environment hash. By monitoring the transmission abnormal value, abnormal changes in the communication environment can be discovered in time, providing early warning to ensure the security of wireless communication information; The technical solution of this embodiment is: extract the radio frequency fingerprint of the wireless device, perform fingerprint disassembly, obtain basic and disturbance fingerprints, extract environmental characteristics of wireless communication, build a steady-state environment feature library, extract a steady-state environment hash based on the steady-state environment feature library, analyze the characteristics of the current environment to obtain a dynamic environment hash, and perform a match judgment on the steady-state environment hash and the dynamic environment hash. If there is a mismatch, generate a communication correction signal, which can monitor abnormal changes in the communication environment and promptly discover safety hazards such as interference sources.

[0018] Embodiment 2 like Figure 1 As shown, a method for information security of wireless communication also includes the following steps: Step 3: Based on the communication correction signal, perform numerical analysis on the dynamic environment hash, calculate the transmission key, use the transmission key to correct the sending device and the receiving device, if the corrections do not match, obtain the device to be tested, and verify whether the device to be tested matches the registered device; Subtract the Hamming distance ratio of the wireless device from the preset Hamming distance ratio threshold and take the absolute value to obtain a proportional threshold difference; The dynamic environment hash of the wireless device is multiplied by the proportional threshold difference, and the result is rounded up to obtain a dynamic key number; The dynamic environment is hashed and processed according to the dynamic key number to obtain a dynamic verification code; It should be noted that the code fetching process refers to: intercepting from the starting point of the dynamic environment hash according to the dynamic key number; The initial key and the dynamic verification code are concatenated to obtain the transmission key; In some embodiments, the wireless device utilizes a transmission key, and the wireless device converts data into ciphertext using an encryption algorithm and the transmission key, and only a recipient holding the correct key can decrypt and restore the original data to encrypt and modify the communication transmission; Obtain the number of unmatched data packets after encryption correction, and calculate the matching weight value after encryption correction; Based on the encrypted matching weight value, the encrypted transmission anomaly value is calculated again; If the encrypted and corrected transmission anomaly value is still higher than the preset transmission anomaly threshold, the wireless device is marked as a device to be inspected; Start time domain signal backtracking to obtain the matching weight value of the device to be tested within the signal transmission period; The matching weight values ​​are divided into three levels from small to large, and the verification fingerprint in the radio frequency fingerprint of the device to be verified is extracted to perform hierarchical fingerprint verification; A1. Simple fingerprint verification: The basic fingerprint of the device to be verified is intercepted as the verification fingerprint for matching verification; A2, Intermediate fingerprint verification: All basic fingerprints of the device to be verified and the intercepted part of the perturbation fingerprint are used as the verification fingerprint for matching verification; A3. Complex fingerprint verification: Treat all basic fingerprints and all disturbance fingerprints of the verification device as verification fingerprints and perform matching verification; It should be noted that professionals in this field intercept the basic fingerprint or disturbance fingerprint of the wireless device according to a fixed ratio, wherein the hierarchical fingerprint verification is performed to: Function 1: Dynamically evaluate device security: Hierarchical fingerprint verification can dynamically evaluate the security of the device based on the verification results of the device at different stages, such as the change of matching weight value; Function 2: Identify illegal devices: Through a step-by-step verification method, illegal devices can be identified to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of communication content; Function 3: Improve the balance between verification efficiency and security: hierarchical fingerprint verification performs targeted verification at different levels according to the risk level of the device. While ensuring information security, it optimizes the verification process and improves the overall performance of the communication system; Specifically, based on different levels of fingerprint verification, a verification fingerprint of the device to be verified and a radio frequency fingerprint of the device registered in the database are obtained; Calculate the Hamming distance between the verification fingerprint of the device to be verified and the radio frequency fingerprint of the registered device; If the Hamming distance between the verification fingerprint of the device to be verified and the RF fingerprint of the registered device is 0, it means that the device to be verified is a registered device; If the Hamming distance between the verification fingerprint of the device to be verified and the radio frequency fingerprint of the registered device is not 0, the radio frequency fingerprint of the device to be verified is stored in the database, and the Hamming distance ratio between the radio frequency fingerprint of the device to be verified and the registered device is calculated; It should be noted that by obtaining the hash character sum of the radio frequency fingerprints of the device to be verified and the registered device, the Hamming distance ratio of the device to be verified and the registered device is further calculated; If the Hamming distance ratio between the verification fingerprint of the device to be verified and the radio frequency fingerprint of the registered device is higher than the preset Hamming distance threshold, it is considered that the device to be verified does not match the registered device at all; If the Hamming distance ratio between the verification fingerprint of the device to be verified and the radio frequency fingerprint of the registered device is lower than the preset Hamming distance threshold, it is considered that the device to be verified and the registered device do not completely match, and a matching analysis signal is generated; It should be noted that, when the device to be verified does not completely match the registered device, the Hamming distance between the verification fingerprint of the device to be verified and the radio frequency fingerprint of the registered device is not 0; After multiple signal transmission cycles, the disturbance fingerprint of the registered device is collected, the disturbance fingerprint is segmented according to the Poisson distribution, and the disturbance fingerprint fragment of the segmented part of the registered device is updated; Step 4: If there is no match at all, analyze the verification behavior of the device to obtain the device restriction value, and restrict the communication of the device based on the device restriction value to obtain an untrusted device; Based on the matching analysis signal, the device to be verified is verified again within multiple signal transmission cycles, the matching weight value of the device to be verified within the signal transmission cycle is calculated, and the classification of the fingerprint verification of the device to be verified is judged to see whether it shows an increasing trend; Exemplarily, if the level of fingerprint verification of the device to be verified is from A1 to A2, A3, or A2 to A3, it is considered that the level of fingerprint verification of the device to be verified presents an increasing trend; If the fingerprint verification level of the device to be verified shows an increasing trend, the difference between the Hamming distance ratios of the device to be verified twice in the time dimension is obtained to obtain the distance ratio difference; From the database, obtain the historical inspection times of the device to be inspected and the historical times of generating matching analysis signals; The number of times of historically generated matching analysis signals is processed with the number of historical tests to obtain the analysis test ratio; The equipment limit value is obtained by summing the difference between the analysis inspection ratio and the distance ratio; like Figure 2 As shown, the device limit value is compared with the preset device limit threshold value. If the device limit value is higher than the preset device limit threshold value, the device to be inspected is marked as an untrusted device. If the device limit value is lower than the preset device limit threshold, it is still necessary to continuously monitor the device limit value of the device to be inspected; It should be noted that the functions of the device limit value are as follows: Function 1. Determine the trustworthiness of the device: It can determine whether the device to be verified is trustworthy, which helps to timely identify devices that may threaten information security, prevent them from accessing the communication network, prevent illegal devices from stealing and tampering with communication data, and ensure the confidentiality and integrity of communication information; Function 2: Dynamically monitor equipment risks: If the equipment limit value is lower than the preset threshold, the value will continue to be monitored to understand the equipment risk status in real time.

[0019] The technical solution of this embodiment is: based on the communication correction signal, the dynamic environment hash is numerically analyzed to calculate the transmission key, and the sending device and the receiving device are corrected using the transmission key. If the correction does not match, a device to be tested is obtained, and it is verified whether the device to be tested matches the registered device. If there is no match at all, the verification behavior of the device is analyzed to obtain the device restriction value, and the communication restriction judgment of the device is made based on the device restriction value to obtain an untrusted device, which is beneficial to improving the security and stability of the communication system.

[0020] Embodiment 3 like Figure 1As shown, a method for information security of wireless communication also includes the following steps: Step 5: Perform numerical analysis on the dynamic environment hashes of multiple monitoring cycles to obtain the lagged environment hashes, and perform similarity analysis with the dynamic environment hashes. If they are not similar, the lagged environment hashes replace the dynamic environment hashes. Based on the untrusted device, a tag signal is sent to other communication devices through the database, and other wireless devices restrict communication with the untrusted device based on the radio frequency fingerprint; Obtaining a dynamic environment hash within a plurality of signal transmission cycles to obtain a delayed environment hash; It should be noted that the length of the lagging environment hash and the dynamic environment hash remain consistent; Calculate the Hamming distance between dynamic environment hashing and lagged environment hashing; If the Hamming distance between the dynamic environment hash and the delayed environment hash is 0, it means that the dynamic environment and the steady-state environment characteristics are completely consistent in multiple transmission cycles, and no processing is performed; If the Hamming distance between the dynamic environment hash and the lagged environment hash is not 0, split the dynamic environment hash and the lagged environment hash into multiple sub-segments, and calculate the Hamming distance ratio of each sub-segment; It should be noted that the positions of the sub-segments split by the dynamic environment hash and the lagged environment hash remain consistent, that is, the sub-segments of the dynamic environment hash and the lagged environment hash are one-to-one corresponding; Comparing the Hamming distance ratio of each sub-segment with a preset Hamming distance ratio threshold, if the Hamming distance ratio of each sub-segment is higher than the preset Hamming distance ratio threshold, marking the sub-segment as a characteristic sub-segment; In some embodiments, the number of consecutively appearing characteristic sub-segments and the number of all sub-segments are obtained by a run-length detection method; It should be noted that the run detection method checks the sub-segments in order, starting from the starting position of the sub-segment, and scans in order to see if there are characteristic sub-segments. If the characteristic sub-segments appear continuously, they are regarded as a run. During the scanning process, the number of runs is continuously recorded, and finally the number of characteristic sub-segments that appear continuously is obtained. The number of consecutively appearing characteristic sub-segments is processed by ratio processing with the number of all sub-segments to obtain a continuous segment ratio; Calculate the mean of the Hamming distance ratios of all feature sub-segments, perform deviation calculation with the preset Hamming distance ratio threshold, and obtain the distance difference ratio; The continuous segment ratio and the distance difference ratio are summed to obtain the segment similarity; It should be noted that the larger the continuous segment ratio is, the more similar they are, and the smaller the distance difference ratio is, the more similar they are. Therefore, when summing up, the inverse of the distance difference ratio is taken and then summed with the continuous segment ratio. Compare the segment similarity with the preset similarity threshold value. If the segment similarity is lower than the preset similarity threshold value, it is considered that the dynamic environment hash and the lagging environment hash are not similar. Otherwise, the change of the similarity threshold value is continuously monitored. If the dynamic environment hash and the lagged environment hash are not similar, the lagged environment hash is used instead of the dynamic environment hash.

[0021] Embodiment 4 like Figure 3 As shown, a wireless communication information security system is used to implement a wireless communication information security method, including the following modules: Feature construction module: used to extract the radio frequency fingerprint of wireless devices, perform fingerprint disassembly, obtain basic and perturbation fingerprints, extract environmental characteristics of wireless communications, and build a steady-state environmental feature library; Environment matching module: Based on the steady-state environment feature library, the steady-state environment hash is extracted, the characteristics of the current environment are analyzed to obtain the dynamic environment hash, and the steady-state environment hash and the dynamic environment hash are matched and judged. If they do not match, a communication correction signal is generated; Device matching module: Based on the communication correction signal, it is used to perform numerical analysis on the dynamic environment hash, calculate the transmission key, and use the transmission key to correct the sending device and the receiving device. If the correction does not match, the device to be tested is obtained, and it is verified whether the device to be tested matches the registered device; Trusted analysis module: If there is no match, it is used to analyze the verification behavior of the device, obtain the device restriction value, and restrict the communication of the device based on the device restriction value to obtain an untrusted device; Dynamic update module: used to perform numerical analysis on the dynamic environment hash of multiple monitoring cycles, obtain the lagged environment hash, and perform similarity analysis with the dynamic environment hash. If they are not similar, the lagged environment hash replaces the dynamic environment hash.

[0022] Embodiment 5 Reference Figure 4 The embodiment of the present invention further provides a computer device 3, comprising: a memory 302 and a processor 301 and a computer program 303 stored in the memory 302. When the computer program 303 is executed on the processor 301, a method for information security of wireless communication as described in any one of the above methods is implemented.

[0023] The computer device 3 may be a computing device such as a desktop computer, a notebook, a PDA, a cloud server, etc. The computer device 3 may include, but is not limited to, a processor 301 and a memory 302. Those skilled in the art may understand that; Figure 4It is only an example of computer device 3 and does not constitute a limitation on computer device 3. It may include more or fewer components than shown in the figure, or a combination of certain components, or different components, for example, it may also include input and output devices, network access devices, etc.

[0024] The processor 301 may be a central processing unit (CPU), or other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSP), application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA) or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, etc. A general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor or any conventional processor, etc.

[0025] In some embodiments, the memory 302 may be an internal storage unit of the computer device 3, such as a hard disk or memory of the computer device 3. In other embodiments, the memory 302 may also be an external storage device of the computer device 3, such as a plug-in hard disk, a smart memory card (SmartMediaCard, SMC), a secure digital (Secure Digital, SD) card, a flash card (Flash Card), etc. equipped on the computer device 3. Further, the memory 302 may also include both an internal storage unit of the computer device 3 and an external storage device. The memory 302 is used to store an operating system, an application program, a boot loader (BootLoader), data, and other programs, such as the program code of the computer program, etc. The memory 302 may also be used to temporarily store data that has been output or is to be output.

[0026] Embodiment 6 An embodiment of the present invention further provides a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon. When the computer program is executed by a processor, a method for information security of wireless communications as described in any one of the above methods is implemented.

[0027] In this embodiment, if the integrated unit is implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the present application implements all or part of the processes in the above-mentioned embodiment method, which can be completed by instructing the relevant hardware through a computer program. The computer program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. When the computer program is executed by the processor, the steps of the above-mentioned various method embodiments can be implemented. Among them, the computer program includes computer program code, and the computer program code can be in source code form, object code form, executable file or some intermediate form. The computer-readable medium can at least include: any entity or device that can carry the computer program code to the camera / terminal device, recording medium, computer memory, read-only memory (ROM, Read-Only Memory), random access memory (RAM, Random Access Memory), electric carrier signal, telecommunication signal and software distribution medium. For example, USB flash drive, mobile hard disk, disk or optical disk. In some jurisdictions, according to legislation and patent practice, computer-readable media cannot be electric carrier signals and telecommunication signals.

[0028] In the above embodiments, the description of each embodiment has its own emphasis. For parts that are not described or recorded in detail in a certain embodiment, reference can be made to the relevant descriptions of other embodiments.

[0029] Those of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that the units and algorithm steps of each example described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether these functions are performed in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Professional and technical personnel can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered to be beyond the scope of this application.

[0030] In the embodiments disclosed in the present application, it should be understood that the disclosed devices / terminal equipment and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the device / terminal equipment embodiments described above are only schematic. For example, the division of the modules or units is only a logical function division. There may be other division methods in actual implementation, such as multiple units or components can be combined or integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed. Another point is that the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed can be through some interfaces, indirect coupling or communication connection of devices or units, which can be electrical, mechanical or other forms.

[0031] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components shown as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed on multiple network units. Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of this embodiment.

[0032] The above formulas are all dimensionless and numerical calculations. The formula is a formula for the most recent real situation obtained by collecting a large amount of data and performing software simulation. The preset parameters in the formula are set by technicians in this field according to actual conditions.

[0033] The above is a detailed description of an embodiment of the present invention, but the content is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and cannot be considered to limit the scope of implementation of the present invention. All equivalent changes and improvements made within the scope of the present invention should still fall within the scope of the patent coverage of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for information security of wireless communication, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: Perform numerical analysis on the dynamic environment hash to calculate the transmission key, use the transmission key to correct the sending device and the receiving device, if the corrections do not match, get the device to be tested, and verify whether the device to be tested matches the registered device; If there is no match at all, the verification behavior of the device is analyzed to obtain the device restriction value, and based on the device restriction value, the device is restricted from communication and determined to be an untrusted device; The dynamic environment hash of multiple monitoring cycles is numerically analyzed to obtain the lagged environment hash, which is then analyzed for similarity with the dynamic environment hash. If they are not similar, the lagged environment hash replaces the dynamic environment hash.

2. The method for ensuring information security of wireless communication according to claim 1, characterized in that: The dynamic environment hash is obtained as follows: Extract the environmental characteristics of wireless communications and build a steady-state environmental characteristics library; Based on the steady-state environment feature library, the steady-state environment hash is extracted, the characteristics of the current environment are analyzed to obtain the dynamic environment hash, and the steady-state environment hash and the dynamic environment hash are matched and judged.

3. The method for ensuring information security of wireless communication according to claim 2, characterized in that: The matching judgment method for the steady-state environment hash and the dynamic environment hash is: Obtain the Hamming distance between dynamic environment hash and steady-state environment hash through the Hamming distance formula; If the Hamming distance between the dynamic environment hash and the steady-state environment hash is not 0, the dynamic environment hash is analyzed to obtain the Hamming distance ratio; Obtain the number of unmatched data packets and the number of sent data packets after communication encryption; Calculate the deviation ratio between the number of unmatched data packets and the number of sent data packets to obtain the matching weight value; The transmission anomaly value is obtained by weighted calculation of the matching weight value and the Hamming distance; If the transmission anomaly value is higher than the preset transmission anomaly threshold, the dynamic environment of the wireless device collected in real time does not match the scene in the steady-state environment feature library.

4. The method for ensuring information security of wireless communication according to claim 1, characterized in that: The transmission key is obtained in the following manner: Subtract the Hamming distance ratio of the wireless device from the preset Hamming distance ratio threshold and take the absolute value to obtain a proportional threshold difference; The dynamic environment hash of the wireless device is multiplied and rounded by the ratio threshold difference to obtain a dynamic key number, and the dynamic environment hash is coded to obtain a dynamic check code; Get the initial key, concatenate the initial key and the dynamic verification code to get the transmission key.

5. The method for ensuring information security of wireless communication according to claim 1, characterized in that: The method to verify whether the device to be tested matches the registered device is: Obtain the matching weight value of the device to be tested within the signal transmission period; The matching weight values ​​are divided into grades according to the numerical values, and the verification fingerprint in the radio frequency fingerprint of the device to be verified is extracted to perform hierarchical fingerprint verification; By calculating the Hamming distance ratio between the verification fingerprint of the device to be verified and the radio frequency fingerprint of the registered device, and performing a matching judgment, it is verified whether the device to be verified matches the registered device.

6. The method for ensuring information security of wireless communications according to claim 5, characterized in that: The classification method is as follows: By intercepting the basic fingerprint of the device to be verified as the verification fingerprint, matching verification is performed; All basic fingerprints of the device to be verified and the intercepted part of the disturbance fingerprint are used as verification fingerprints for matching verification; All basic fingerprints and all disturbance fingerprints of the device to be verified are used as verification fingerprints for matching verification.

7. The method for ensuring information security of wireless communications according to claim 1, characterized in that: The method for obtaining the untrusted device is as follows: Re-verify the device to be verified, calculate the matching weight value of the device to be verified within the signal transmission period, and if the fingerprint verification level of the device to be verified shows an increasing trend, perform quantitative analysis on the verification behavior of the device to be verified to obtain the device limit value; If the device limit value is higher than the preset device limit threshold, the device to be inspected will be marked as an untrusted device.

8. The method for ensuring information security of wireless communications according to claim 7, characterized in that: The method for quantitatively analyzing the calibration behavior of the device to be calibrated is: Obtain the difference between the Hamming distance ratios of two adjacent devices to be verified, and obtain the distance ratio difference; The number of times of historically generated matching analysis signals is processed with the number of historical tests to obtain the analysis test ratio; The equipment limit value is obtained based on the sum of the analysis inspection ratio and the distance ratio difference.

9. The method for ensuring information security of wireless communications according to claim 1, characterized in that: The method of performing similarity analysis is: Obtaining a dynamic environment hash within a plurality of signal transmission cycles to obtain a delayed environment hash; Numerical analysis of the Hamming distance of the lagged ambient hash is performed to obtain the segment similarity; If the segment similarity is lower than the preset similarity threshold, the dynamic environment hash and the delayed environment hash are considered to be dissimilar.

10. The method for information security of wireless communication according to claim 9, characterized in that: The segment similarity is obtained as follows: Split the dynamic environment hash and the delayed environment hash into multiple sub-segments, and if the Hamming distance ratio of each sub-segment is higher than a preset Hamming distance ratio threshold, mark the sub-segment as a characteristic sub-segment; Calculate the proportion of the number of consecutive characteristic sub-segments to obtain the continuous segment ratio; Calculate the deviation ratio between the mean of the Hamming distance ratio of all feature sub-segments and the preset Hamming distance ratio threshold to obtain the distance difference ratio; The continuous segment ratio and the distance difference ratio are summed to obtain the segment similarity.

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