A method for sending text messages to prevent data leakage

Abstract

The present invention relates to the field of SMS security technology, and discloses an SMS sending system for preventing data leakage, including a session key generation module, an encryption module, an SMS sending module, and an SMS decryption module. Among them, the session key generation module sends a receiving request from the sender to the receiver and sends a random number. After receiving the request, the receiver generates another random number and uses a pre-agreed quantum secure key exchange protocol to generate a session key using the two random numbers. The receiver sends the other random number to the sender. After receiving the other random number, the sender also generates the same session key. In the present invention, the receiver can safely receive the SMS sent by the sender, and at the same time, the intermediate random relay and any third party cannot know the content of the SMS. The sending process utilizes a quantum-secure cryptographic protocol and secure multi-party computation, ensuring the security of SMS interaction in the era of quantum computers.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of SMS security, and more specifically, it relates to an SMS sending system for preventing data leakage. Background Art

[0002] Existing quantum computers have powerful parallel computing capabilities and can solve problems that are difficult for traditional computers to solve in a very short time, including basic cryptographic problems such as large integer factorization and discrete logarithm. This means that the security of traditional public key cryptosystems such as RSA and ECC will be severely threatened. The cracking of traditional public key cryptosystems also means data leakage and there are communication security risks.

[0003] Therefore, in the era of quantum computers, in order to achieve secure end-to-end encrypted SMS sending, in the face of quantum computers, an SMS sending system is needed to achieve the purpose that the SMS content will not be intercepted by a third party except the sender and the recipient. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The present invention provides an SMS sending system for preventing data leakage to solve the technical problems in the related art.

[0005] The present invention provides an SMS sending system for preventing data leakage, including:

[0006] A session key generation module for performing the following steps:

[0007] S100: The sender sends a reception request to the recipient and sends a random number ;

[0008] S200: After receiving the request, the recipient generates a random number , and uses a pre-agreed quantum secure key exchange protocol to generate a session key and the random number ; ;

[0009] S300: The recipient sends the random number to the sender. After receiving the random number , the sender also generates the same session key ;

[0010] An encryption module for performing the following steps:

[0011] S400: The sender encrypts the plaintext SMS to be sent with the session key and a pre-agreed quantum secure symmetric encryption algorithm to obtain the ciphertext ;

[0012] S500: The sender sends the ciphertext to the random relay. After receiving the ciphertext , the random relay generates a random symmetric key and re-encrypts the ciphertext with the random symmetric key to obtain the secondary ciphertext ;

[0013] The SMS sending module is used to perform the following steps:

[0014] S600: The random relay sends the secondary ciphertext to the receiver, completing the sending of the SMS.

[0015] Furthermore, the SMS sending module also performs the following step: sending the random symmetric key to the sender.

[0016] Furthermore, it also includes an SMS decryption module, which is used to perform the following steps:

[0017] S700: After the sender receives , using the secure multi-party computation protocol, without revealing and , it calculates the updated key ;

[0018] S800: The sender sends the updated key to the receiver. After the receiver receives the secondary ciphertext and the updated key , using the secure multi-party computation protocol, without revealing the session key , it recovers the random symmetric key from the updated key ;

[0019] S900: The receiver decrypts the secondary ciphertext with the random symmetric key to obtain the ciphertext . Then the receiver decrypts the ciphertext with the session key to obtain the original SMS plaintext .

[0020] Furthermore, the pre-agreed quantum-secure key exchange protocol is a symmetric encryption algorithm based on the learning with errors problem, a symmetric encryption algorithm based on the ring learning with errors problem, or a symmetric encryption algorithm based on supersingular elliptic curve isogeny encryption.

[0021] Furthermore, the random relay includes the following parts:

[0022] Relay server module: It includes one or more independent servers, which are used to forward encrypted SMS content between the sender and the receiver. The relay server can be distributed;

[0023] Quantum-secure cryptographic module: It is used to perform quantum-secure cryptographic operations;

[0024] Secure multi-party computation module: It is used to jointly complete certain computing tasks with the sender and the receiver without revealing sensitive information.

[0025] Furthermore, the secure multi-party computation protocol includes Yao's garbled circuit protocol, GMW protocol, BMR protocol or Shamir secret sharing protocol.

[0026] Furthermore, the sender, the receiver, and the random relay can all perform traditional computing and quantum-resistant computing;

[0027] Both the sender and the receiver need to pre-agree on a quantum-secure key exchange protocol and a quantum-secure symmetric encryption algorithm;

[0028] There are authenticated quantum-secure channels and traditional channels between the sender, the receiver, and the random relay.

[0029] Furthermore, the sender and the receiver also need to perform identity authentication. The sender and the receiver prove their identities through a trusted identity authentication mechanism, and the identity authentication process should use a quantum-secure protocol.

[0030] Furthermore, the sender and the receiver also need to generate, store, and manage their own public keys, private keys, and other cryptographic keys. The keys should be generated using quantum-secure algorithms and adopt a unified key storage mechanism.

[0031] The present invention also proposes a storage medium storing non-transitory computer-readable instructions for executing the functions of the modules in the foregoing SMS sending system for preventing data leakage.

[0032] The beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows:

[0033] In the present invention, the receiver can securely receive the SMS sent by the sender through the above SMS sending system. At the same time, the random relay in the middle and any third party cannot know the SMS content, even if they have quantum computing capabilities. The sending process utilizes quantum-secure cryptographic protocols and secure multi-party computation to ensure security in the era of quantum computers. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0034] Figure 1 It is a flowchart of a method for sending SMS to prevent data leakage proposed by the present invention;

[0035] Figure 2 This is the structural block diagram of a short message sending system for preventing data leakage proposed by the present invention. Detailed implementation mode

[0036] Now, the subject matter described herein will be discussed with reference to exemplary implementation modes. It should be understood that discussing these implementation modes is only to enable those skilled in the art to better understand and thus implement the subject matter described herein. Without departing from the scope of protection of the content of this specification, changes can be made to the functions and arrangements of the elements discussed. Each example can omit, substitute, or add various processes or components as needed. Additionally, the features described relative to some examples can also be combined in other examples.

[0037] Embodiment 1

[0038] As Figure 1 shown, a short message sending method for preventing data leakage includes the following steps:

[0039] S100: The sender sends a receiving request to the receiver and sends a random number ;

[0040] S200: After receiving the request, the receiver generates a random number , and uses a pre-agreed quantum secure key exchange protocol to generate a session key and the random number : :

[0041] ;

[0042] where is the quantum secure key exchange function;

[0043] S300: The receiver sends the random number to the sender. After receiving the random number , the sender also generates the same session key ;

[0044] S400: The sender uses the session key and a pre-agreed quantum secure symmetric encryption algorithm to encrypt the clear text of the short message to be sent , obtaining the cipher text :

[0045] ;

[0046] where is the quantum secure symmetric encryption function;

[0047] In one embodiment of the present invention, the pre-agreed quantum-secure key exchange protocol is a symmetric encryption algorithm based on the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem: wherein, the LWE problem is to find the solution in a system of random linear equations that contains a certain amount of error. The encryption process based on LWE is as follows:

[0048] ;

[0049] ;

[0050] wherein , is a random matrix, , n is a random n-dimensional vector, is the modulus, where represents the integer ring of the modulus , is the key, , is a small random error that follows a discrete Gaussian distribution, , is the bit to be encrypted, , represents the floor function, and the ciphertext ;

[0051] S500: The sender sends the ciphertext to a random relay. After receiving the ciphertext , the random relay generates a random symmetric key and re-encrypts the ciphertext with the random symmetric key to obtain a second-level ciphertext :

[0052] ;

[0053] S600: The random relay sends the second-level ciphertext to the receiver and sends the random symmetric key to the sender;

[0054] S700: After receiving , the sender uses a secure multi-party computation protocol (such as Yao's Garbled Circuit) to calculate the updated key and without revealing :

[0055] ;

[0056] wherein Represents a secure multi-party computation function;

[0057] In one embodiment of the present invention, the random relay includes the following parts:

[0058] Relay server module: includes one or more independent servers, used to forward encrypted SMS content between the sender and the receiver, where the relay server can be distributed;

[0059] Quantum-secure cryptographic module: The relay server is equipped with a quantum-secure cryptographic module, used to perform quantum-secure cryptographic operations, such as generating random keys, encryption and decryption, etc. Even if the relay server is attacked by a quantum computer, the used cryptographic system cannot be cracked;

[0060] Secure multi-party computation module: used to jointly complete certain computational tasks with the sender and the receiver without disclosing sensitive information, such as the secure multi-party computation in process S700;

[0061] In one embodiment of the present invention, the secure multi-party computation protocol includes:

[0062] 1. Yao's Garbled Circuit:

[0063] Participants: Two parties, usually referred to as A and B;

[0064] Function: Allows A and B to jointly calculate the output of any function without disclosing their respective inputs;

[0065] Basic principle: A represents the function as a Boolean circuit and "garbles" the circuit to generate a "garbled circuit". A sends the garbled circuit to B, and both parties exchange the secret values of the input lines through the Oblivious Transfer protocol. Finally, B can calculate the output of the circuit, and A cannot know B's input.

[0066] 2. Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson (GMW) Protocol:

[0067] Participants: Multiple parties (n≥2);

[0068] Function: Allows multiple participants to jointly calculate the output of any function without disclosing their respective inputs;

[0069] Basic principle: Similar to Yao's Garbled Circuit, the GMW protocol also represents a function as a Boolean circuit. However, the GMW protocol encrypts the input and intermediate values using Secret Sharing. The participating parties evaluate the circuit through interactive Secret Sharing calculations, finally obtaining the Secret Sharing of the output, and then reconstructing the secret to get the actual output.

[0070] 3. Beaver - Micali - Rogaway (BMR) Protocol:

[0071] Participating parties: Multiple parties (n ≥ 2);

[0072] Function: Allows multiple participating parties to jointly calculate the output of any function without revealing their respective inputs;

[0073] Basic principle: The BMR protocol is a hybrid of Yao's Garbled Circuit and the GMW protocol. It represents a function as an arithmetic circuit and uses Secret Sharing and Oblivious Transfer to evaluate the circuit. Compared with the Yao protocol, the BMR protocol supports multi - party computation; compared with the GMW protocol, the BMR protocol has better efficiency.

[0074] 4. Shamir's Secret Sharing:

[0075] Participating parties: Multiple parties (n ≥ 2);

[0076] Function: Splits a secret into multiple shares and distributes them to multiple participating parties, ensuring that only when enough participating parties collaborate can the original secret be recovered, and any fewer than a certain number of participating parties cannot obtain any information about the secret;

[0077] Basic principle: Based on the idea of polynomial interpolation, the secret owner selects a polynomial of degree t - 1 with the constant term being the secret value and randomly selects other coefficients. For n participating parties, the secret owner calculates the values of the polynomial at n different points as shares and distributes them to each participating party. Any t participating parties can recover the original polynomial through Lagrange interpolation and thus obtain the secret value; while fewer than t participating parties cannot recover the polynomial and thus cannot obtain the secret;

[0078] S800: The sender sends the updated key to the receiver. After the receiver receives the secondary ciphertext and the updated key and uses the secure multi - party computation protocol, without revealing the session key from the updated key Recover the random symmetric key :

[0079] ;

[0080] where is the reverse recovery function of the secure multi-party computation function;

[0081] S900: The receiver uses the random symmetric key to decrypt the secondary ciphertext and obtains the ciphertext :

[0082] ;

[0083] where is the decryption function;

[0084] The receiver then uses the session key to decrypt the ciphertext and obtains the original SMS plaintext :

[0085] ;

[0086] In an embodiment of the present invention, the sender, the receiver, and the random relay can all perform traditional calculations and quantum-resistant calculations.

[0087] The sender and the receiver pre-agree on a quantum-secure key exchange protocol (such as lattice-based key exchange) and a quantum-secure symmetric encryption algorithm (such as lattice-based encryption algorithm).

[0088] There are authenticated quantum-secure channels and traditional channels between the sender, the receiver, and the random relay.

[0089] In an embodiment of the present invention, the sender and the receiver also need to have the following functions:

[0090] Authentication: Both the sender and the receiver need to prove their identities through a trusted authentication mechanism (such as public key infrastructure, digital certificates, etc.).

[0091] The authentication process should use a quantum-secure protocol to resist attacks from quantum computers.

[0092] Key management: The sender and the receiver need to securely generate, store, and manage their public keys, private keys, and other cryptographic keys.

[0093] The keys should be generated using quantum-secure algorithms (such as lattice-based cryptosystems) and stored using a unified key storage mechanism (such as a hardware security module).

[0094] Communication Security: The communication between the sender and the receiver should use a unified communication protocol (such as the Signal protocol) to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of the messages.

[0095] During the communication process, a quantum-secure key exchange protocol (such as NewHope, Frodo, etc.) should be used to establish a session key.

[0096] Embodiment 2

[0097] In this embodiment, a method for sending text messages to prevent data leakage includes the following steps:

[0098] S100: The sender sends a reception request to the receiver and sends a random number ;

[0099] S200: After receiving the request, the receiver generates a random number , and uses a pre-agreed quantum-secure key exchange protocol to generate a session key using and : :

[0100] ;

[0101] S300: The receiver sends to the sender. After receiving , the sender also generates the same session key ;

[0102] S400: The sender uses the session key and a pre-agreed quantum-secure symmetric encryption algorithm to encrypt the plaintext of the text message to be sent , obtaining the ciphertext :

[0103] ;

[0104] In an embodiment of the present invention, the pre-agreed quantum-secure key exchange protocol is a symmetric encryption algorithm based on the Ring Learning with Errors (RLWE) problem: RLWE is a variant of LWE on a polynomial ring, with higher security and better efficiency;

[0105] The encryption process is as follows:

[0106] ;

[0107] ;

[0108] Where , is a random polynomial, , represents the polynomial ring modulo and the modulus . is the key polynomial, i.e., the key, , is a small random error polynomial, , is the polynomial to be encrypted, with coefficients being 0 or 1, is the modulus, , represents the floor function, which rounds each coefficient of the polynomial, and the ciphertext is .

[0109] S500: The sender sends the ciphertext to the random relay. After receiving the ciphertext , the random relay generates a random symmetric key and re - encrypts the ciphertext using the random symmetric key to obtain the secondary ciphertext :

[0110] ;

[0111] S600: The random relay sends the secondary ciphertext to the receiver and sends the random symmetric key to the sender;

[0112] S700: After receiving , the sender uses the secure multi - party computation protocol to calculate the updated key and without revealing :

[0113] ;

[0114] S800: The sender sends the updated key to the receiver. After receiving the secondary ciphertext and the updated key , the receiver uses the secure multi - party computation protocol to recover the random symmetric key from the updated key without revealing the session key :

[0115] ;

[0116] S900: The receiver uses the random symmetric key Decrypt the secondary ciphertext to obtain the ciphertext :

[0117] ;

[0118] The receiving party then uses the session key to decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the original SMS plaintext :

[0119] .

[0120] Embodiment III

[0121] In this embodiment, a method for sending SMS to prevent data leakage includes the following steps:

[0122] S100: The sender sends a receiving request to the receiver and sends a random number ;

[0123] S200: After receiving the request, the receiver generates a random number , and uses a pre-agreed quantum-secure key exchange protocol to use and to generate a session key :

[0124] ;

[0125] S300: The receiver sends to the sender. After receiving , the sender also generates the same session key ;

[0126] S400: The sender uses the session key and a pre-agreed quantum-secure symmetric encryption algorithm to encrypt the SMS plaintext to obtain the ciphertext :

[0127] ;

[0128] In an embodiment of the present invention, the pre-agreed quantum-secure key exchange protocol is a symmetric encryption algorithm based on Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation (SIKE): SIKE uses the isogeny mapping between supersingular elliptic curves to construct a key encapsulation mechanism, and then combines symmetric encryption to achieve quantum-secure encryption;

[0129] The key exchange process is as follows:

[0130] ; ; ; ;

[0131] where , is the initial supersingular elliptic curve defined over the finite field , and are two generators defined on the curve respectively, , is the private key, that is, the pre-agreed quantum-secure symmetric encryption algorithm, , represents the isogeny mapping, , , is the j-invariant of the initial supersingular elliptic curve, and both parties calculate the same and as the shared key, , is the public key, that is, the j-invariant of the image of the initial supersingular elliptic curve under the isogeny mapping. In this embodiment, it is the aforementioned session key ;

[0132] S500: The sender sends the ciphertext to the random relay. After receiving the ciphertext , the random relay generates a random symmetric key , and uses the random symmetric key to encrypt the ciphertext twice to obtain the secondary ciphertext :

[0133] ;

[0134] S600: The random relay sends the secondary ciphertext to the receiver and sends the random symmetric key to the sender;

[0135] S700: After receiving , the sender uses the secure multi-party computation protocol to calculate the updated key and without revealing :

[0136] ;

[0137] S800: The sender sends the updated key to the receiver, and the receiver receives the secondary ciphertext and the updated key After that, using the secure multi-party computation protocol, without revealing the session key , the random symmetric key is recovered from the updated key : :

[0138] ;

[0139] S900: The receiver decrypts the secondary ciphertext with the random symmetric key , and obtains the ciphertext : :

[0140] ;

[0141] The receiver then decrypts the ciphertext with the session key , and obtains the original short message plaintext :

[0142] .

[0143] As Figure 2 shown, based on the above-mentioned multiple embodiments, at least one embodiment further disclosed by the present invention provides a short message sending system, including:

[0144] A session key generation module, configured to execute S100 - S300;

[0145] An encryption module, configured to execute S400 and S500;

[0146] A short message sending module, configured to execute S600;

[0147] A short message decryption module, configured to execute S700 - S900.

[0148] Based on the above-mentioned multiple embodiments, at least one embodiment further disclosed by the present invention provides a storage medium, storing non-temporary computer-readable instructions for executing one or more steps in the foregoing short message sending method for preventing data leakage.

[0149] The computer program can be stored / distributed on a suitable medium, such as an optical storage medium or a solid-state medium supplied together with other hardware or as part of other hardware, but can also be distributed in other forms, such as via the Internet or other wired or wireless telecommunication systems. Any reference signs in the claims shall not be construed as limiting the scope.

[0150] The above has described the embodiments of this example, but this example is not limited to the above specific implementation manners. The above specific implementation manners are merely illustrative rather than restrictive. Under the inspiration of this example, those of ordinary skill in the art can also make many forms, all of which fall within the protection scope of this example.

Claims

1. A method for sending text messages to prevent data leakage, characterized in that, Comprising: S100: The sender sends a reception request to the receiver and sends a random number ; S200: After the recipient receives the request, generate a random number , and use a pre-agreed quantum-secure key exchange protocol to generate a session key using the random number and the random number ; ; S300: The recipient sends the random number to the sender. After receiving the random number , the sender also generates the same session key ; S400: The sender uses the session key and the pre-agreed quantum-secure symmetric encryption algorithm to encrypt the plaintext of the SMS to be sent , obtaining the ciphertext ; S5 00: The sender sends the ciphertext to the random relay. After receiving the ciphertext , the random relay generates a random symmetric key and uses the random symmetric key to encrypt the ciphertext again to obtain the secondary ciphertext ; S600: The random relay sends the secondary ciphertext to the receiver to complete the sending of the short message; Send the random symmetric key to the sender; S700: After the sender receives , it uses a secure multi-party computation protocol to calculate the updated key and without revealing ; S800: The sender sends the updated key to the receiver, and the receiver receives the secondary ciphertext and the updated key . After that, using the secure multi-party computation protocol, without revealing the session key , the receiver recovers the random symmetric key from the updated key ; S900: The recipient uses a random symmetric key to decrypt the secondary ciphertext and obtain the ciphertext . Then the recipient uses the session key to decrypt the ciphertext and obtain the original SMS plaintext .

2. The method for sending text messages to prevent data leakage according to claim 1, wherein, The pre-agreed quantum-secure key exchange protocol is a symmetric encryption algorithm based on the learning with errors problem, a symmetric encryption algorithm based on the learning with errors problem on rings, or a symmetric encryption algorithm based on supersingular elliptic curve isogeny encryption.

3. The method for sending text messages to prevent data leakage according to claim 2, characterized in that The secure multi-party computation protocol includes Yao's garbled circuit protocol, GMW protocol, BMR protocol, or Shamir secret sharing protocol.

4. A method for sending text messages to prevent data leakage according to claim 3, characterized in that, The sender, receiver, and random relay can all perform classical computations and quantum-resistant computations; Both the sender and the receiver need a pre-agreed quantum-secure key exchange protocol and a quantum-secure symmetric encryption algorithm; There are authenticated quantum-secure channels and classical channels between the sender, receiver, and random relay.

5. The method for sending text messages to prevent data leakage according to claim 4, wherein The sender and receiver also need to perform authentication. The sender and receiver prove their identities through a trusted authentication mechanism, and the authentication process should use a quantum-secure protocol.

6. The method for sending text messages to prevent data leakage according to claim 5, wherein, The sender and receiver also need to generate, store, and manage their own public keys, private keys, and other cryptographic keys. The keys should be generated using quantum-secure algorithms and a unified key storage mechanism should be adopted.

7. A storage medium, characterized in that, Stored with non-transitory computer-readable instructions for performing the steps in a method for sending text messages to prevent data leakage as described in any one of claims 1-6.

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