Charging privacy protection method and device, equipment and storage medium

Abstract

The invention discloses a charging privacy protection method and device, equipment and a storage medium, and relates to the technical field of information security. The method comprises the steps that after communication connection information between a user side and a charging side is acquired, the user side and the charging side are controlled to generate a first secret key and a second secret key respectively; after confirmation information of the user side for the current charging bill information is obtained, the user side is controlled to generate a zero-knowledge proof according to the current charging bill information, and the user side is controlled to encrypt the current charging bill information and the zero-knowledge proof through a first secret key and then send the encrypted current charging bill information and zero-knowledge proof to the charging side; and controlling the charging end to decrypt the received current charging bill information and the zero-knowledge proof through the second key, and controlling the charging end to verify the zero-knowledge proof. The charging bill information is encrypted and transmitted between the user side and the charging side through the generated first secret key, the second secret key and the zero-knowledge proof, so that privacy information is not exposed in the charging process of a user, and the information transmission safety is ensured.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of information security technology, and specifically to a charging privacy protection method, device, equipment and storage medium. Background Art

[0002] With the rapid development of charging technology, charging functions have become increasingly rich, and the corresponding information exchange has become more frequent, which also increases the risk of privacy leakage during the user's charging process. However, existing charging facilities do not take into account the importance of privacy protection when charging. For example, sensitive data such as the user's charging trip trajectory and identity authentication information may be collected by the charging provider, making the user's privacy unprotected. Therefore, it is necessary to provide a solution that can protect the privacy of charging users. Summary of the invention

[0003] Purpose of the invention: The embodiments of the present application provide a charging privacy protection method, apparatus, device and storage medium to achieve user privacy protection during the charging process.

[0004] Technical solution: A charging privacy protection method described in an embodiment of the present application includes:

[0005] After obtaining the communication connection information between the user end and the charging end, controlling the user end and the charging end to generate a first key and a second key respectively;

[0006] After obtaining confirmation information of the user terminal on the current charging bill information, controlling the user terminal to generate a zero-knowledge proof according to the current charging bill information, and controlling the user terminal to encrypt the current charging bill information and the zero-knowledge proof using the first key and send them to the charging terminal;

[0007] The charging terminal is controlled to decrypt the received current charging bill information and the zero-knowledge proof by using the second key, and the charging terminal is controlled to verify the zero-knowledge proof.

[0008] In some embodiments, before the user terminal is connected to the charging terminal for communication, the method further includes:

[0009] Initialize the charging supervision service end, and control the charging supervision service end to generate a third key; and synchronize the third key to the user end and the charging end.

[0010] In some embodiments, after generating the zero-knowledge proof, the method further includes:

[0011] The user terminal is controlled to encrypt the current charging bill information and the zero-knowledge proof through the third key and send the encrypted information to the charging supervision service terminal.

[0012] In some embodiments, after verifying the zero-knowledge proof, the method further includes:

[0013] The charging terminal is controlled to encrypt the zero-knowledge proof through the third key and then send the encrypted zero-knowledge proof to the charging supervision service terminal.

[0014] In some embodiments, the controlling the user terminal to generate a zero-knowledge proof according to the current charging bill information includes:

[0015] Controlling the user terminal to generate a zero-knowledge proof key based on a preset circuit;

[0016] Generate signature information according to the current charging bill information;

[0017] The zero-knowledge proof is generated according to the zero-knowledge proof key, the signature information and a preset generation algorithm.

[0018] In some embodiments, controlling the charging terminal to verify the zero-knowledge proof includes:

[0019] Determine the output value of the zero-knowledge proof verification function;

[0020] The zero-knowledge proof is verified according to an output value of the zero-knowledge proof verification function.

[0021] In some embodiments, before obtaining the user's confirmation information on the current charging bill information, the method further includes:

[0022] After obtaining confirmation information of the user terminal on the current charging setting information, controlling the charging terminal to generate corresponding current charging bill information according to the current charging setting information;

[0023] And control the charging end to encrypt the current charging bill information through the second key and send it to the user end.

[0024] In some embodiments, the first key and the second key are the same; generating the first key comprises:

[0025] Controlling the charging terminal to send a preset challenge code to the user terminal;

[0026] Controlling the user terminal to determine a response code according to the preset challenge code and configuration information of the charging terminal;

[0027] The first key is generated according to the response code and the configuration information of the charging terminal.

[0028] In some embodiments, generating the first key according to the response code and the configuration information of the charging terminal includes:

[0029] Controlling the charging terminal to generate a first random number according to the response code;

[0030] Controlling the user terminal to generate a second random number according to the first random number;

[0031] The first key is generated according to the first random number, the second random number and configuration information of the charging terminal.

[0032] In some embodiments, the user terminal and the charging terminal are connected via Bluetooth communication.

[0033] Accordingly, the embodiment of the present application further provides a charging privacy protection device, including:

[0034] A key generation module, configured to control the user terminal and the charging terminal to generate a first key and a second key respectively after obtaining communication connection information between the user terminal and the charging terminal;

[0035] A zero-knowledge proof generation module, configured to control the user terminal to generate a zero-knowledge proof according to the current charging bill information after obtaining confirmation information of the user terminal on the current charging bill information;

[0036] An encryption and sending module, used to control the user end to encrypt the current charging bill information and the zero-knowledge proof through the first key and send them to the charging end;

[0037] A decryption module, used to control the charging terminal to decrypt the received current charging bill information and the zero-knowledge proof through the second key;

[0038] A verification module is used to control the charging terminal to verify the zero-knowledge proof.

[0039] Correspondingly, an embodiment of the present application also provides an electronic device, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor implements the charging privacy protection method as described above when executing the computer program.

[0040] Correspondingly, an embodiment of the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the charging privacy protection method as described above is implemented.

[0041] Beneficial effects: Compared with the prior art, the charging privacy protection method, device, equipment and storage medium of the embodiment of the present application include: after obtaining the communication connection information between the user end and the charging end, controlling the user end and the charging end to generate a first key and a second key respectively; after obtaining the confirmation information of the user end on the current charging bill information, controlling the user end to generate a zero-knowledge proof according to the current charging bill information, and controlling the user end to encrypt the current charging bill information and the zero-knowledge proof with the first key and send them to the charging end; controlling the charging end to decrypt the received current charging bill information and zero-knowledge proof with the second key, and controlling the charging end to verify the zero-knowledge proof. The charging privacy protection method provided by the present application can realize the encrypted transmission of the charging bill information between the user end and the charging end through the generated first key, second key and zero-knowledge proof, so that the user will not expose the privacy information during the charging process, and ensure the security of information transmission. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0042] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application, the drawings required for use in the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present application. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative work.

[0043] Figure 1 is a flow chart of a charging privacy protection method provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0044] Figure 2 is a flow chart of another charging privacy protection method provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0045] Figure 3 It is a structural diagram of the topological relationship of each end provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0046] Figure 4 It is a schematic diagram of the overall process of the charging privacy protection method provided in the embodiment of the present application;

[0047] Figure 5 It is a principle structural block diagram of a charging privacy protection device provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0048] Figure 6 It is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0049] Reference numerals:

[0050] 10-key generation module; 20-zero-knowledge proof generation module; 30-encryption and transmission module; 40-decryption module; 50-verification module; 100-charging privacy protection device. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0051] The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be described clearly and completely below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present application, rather than all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present application.

[0052] It should be understood that although the terms first, second, etc. may be used herein to describe various components, these components should not be limited by these terms. These terms are used to distinguish one component from another component. Therefore, the first component discussed below can be referred to as the second component without departing from the teachings of the concepts of the present application. As used herein, the term "and / or" includes any one of the associated listed items and all combinations of one or more.

[0053] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the drawings are only schematic diagrams of example embodiments and may not be to scale. The modules or processes in the drawings are not necessarily required to implement the present application and therefore cannot be used to limit the scope of protection of the present application.

[0054] Existing charging equipment does not take into account the importance of privacy protection when charging. For example, smart car charging piles sometimes ignore the importance of privacy protection when providing charging services. For example, sensitive data such as users' charging trip tracks and identity authentication information may be collected by charging pile manufacturers, which is often something users do not want to see. In order to protect user privacy, charging pile manufacturers should take effective measures to ensure that the collection, storage and use of such sensitive information comply with the requirements of relevant laws and regulations, and respect users' right to know and right to choose.

[0055] In view of this, the embodiments of the present application provide a charging privacy protection method, apparatus, device and storage medium. The present application realizes encrypted transmission of charging bill information between the user end and the charging end through the generated first key, second key and zero-knowledge proof, so that the user's privacy information will not be exposed during the charging process, thereby ensuring the security of information transmission.

[0056] The embodiment of the present application provides a charging privacy protection method for realizing user privacy protection of the charging device for the power-consuming device during the charging process. Among them, the charging device includes a vehicle charging pile, a mobile device charging terminal, etc. Among them, the power-consuming device includes vehicles such as two-wheeled vehicles, three-wheeled vehicles, and four-wheeled vehicles, as well as mobile devices such as mobile phones and tablets. Exemplarily, in the technical solution of the embodiment of the present application, the charging device is a vehicle charging pile, and the power-consuming device is a vehicle for example, which will not be repeated below.

[0057] Figure 1 This is a flow chart of a charging privacy protection method provided in an embodiment of the present application. This method can be applied to the case where the user's privacy information during the vehicle charging process is protected in the vehicle charging management platform. This method can be executed by a charging privacy protection device, which can be implemented by software and / or hardware, and the device can be configured in the processor or controller of the vehicle charging management platform. Please refer to Figure 1 , the method comprises the following steps:

[0058] Step 110: After obtaining the communication connection information between the user end and the charging end, control the user end and the charging end to generate a first key and a second key respectively.

[0059] The user end is a user or user APP end (such as a mobile phone, tablet, etc.) who needs to charge the device to be charged. The charging end is a device that provides charging services, such as a charging pile.

[0060] In some embodiments, the user end and the charging end are connected via Bluetooth communication.

[0061] In the technical solution of the embodiment of the present application, by using Bluetooth to achieve communication between the user end and the charging end, it is conducive to achieving: it can improve the poor experience caused by slow 4G / 5G traffic transmission speed and severe data packet loss when charging in poor network conditions such as underground parking lots or remote areas, especially it can improve the problem that when paying for charging fees in remote areas or underground parking lots, the impact of network environment fluctuations may cause payment delays or even payment failures. This application uses Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) technology to achieve fast matching between the user end and the charging end, effectively avoiding various problems caused by poor network environment, thereby improving user experience.

[0062] The process of establishing a Bluetooth communication connection between the user end and the charging end is as follows: when the user needs to charge the device to be charged (such as a vehicle), the user end (with the Bluetooth function turned on) reads the charging end information contained in the QR code of the charging end (such as the QR code set on the vehicle charging pile) by scanning the QR code or other means, such as the charging pile company, charging pile number, etc. The user end pairs with the charging end through the BLE method, sets a random address and uses a number comparison method to connect to the charging end, thereby realizing the Bluetooth connection between the user end and the charging end.

[0063] Specifically, after a communication connection is established between the user terminal and the charging terminal, the user terminal is controlled to generate a first key, and the charging terminal is controlled to generate a second key. The first key and the second key are the same, and the generation methods of the first key and the second key are also the same. Specifically, the generation method of the first key includes the following steps:

[0064] Step 1: Control the charging end to send a preset challenge code to the user end.

[0065] Specifically, after the charging terminal establishes a Bluetooth connection with the user terminal, the charging terminal sends a preset challenge code to the user terminal, wherein the preset challenge code is a random number sent by the charging terminal.

[0066] Step 2: The control user terminal determines the response code according to the preset challenge code and the configuration information of the charging terminal.

[0067] Specifically, after the user terminal receives the preset random number, it obtains the response code according to the preset challenge code and the configuration information of the charging terminal. Among them, the specific implementation process of obtaining the response code according to the preset challenge code and the configuration information of the charging terminal is: calculate the challenge response number according to the preset challenge code and the configuration information of the charging terminal, and use the challenge response number as the response code. For example, assuming that the random number N is 0x10 (a string of hexadecimal data), the configuration information of the charging terminal is serialized into a byte stream 0xff, and the byte streams 0xff and N are spliced ​​according to the preset splicing method (wherein the preset splicing method can be customized or a simple string splicing, which can be set according to actual conditions and is not specifically limited here) to obtain 0x10ff, and then encrypted with a third key (such as a system public key) to obtain the challenge response number R, and the charging terminal can then decrypt it with the private key of the charging terminal to obtain the validity of the confirmation response code.

[0068] The configuration information of the charging terminal includes hardware information such as the location information of the charging terminal and the model of the charging terminal. The user terminal can obtain the configuration information of the charging terminal by scanning the QR code, which can further increase the difficulty of information cracking and enhance the security of information transmission.

[0069] Step 3: Generate a first key based on the response code and the configuration information of the charging terminal.

[0070] The first key is a temporary session key. Both the charging end and the user end generate a temporary session key for subsequent information encryption transmission, thereby improving information security and ensuring user privacy.

[0071] In some embodiments, generating the first key according to the response code and the configuration information of the charging terminal specifically includes the following steps:

[0072] Step 1: Control the charging terminal to generate a first random number according to the response code.

[0073] Specifically, after receiving the response code, the charging terminal verifies the response code locally. When the response code passes the verification, the charging terminal sends the first random number to the user terminal.

[0074] Step 2: Control the user terminal to generate a second random number according to the first random number.

[0075] Specifically, after the user terminal receives the first random number, the user terminal generates a second random number locally and sends it to the charging terminal.

[0076] Step 3: Generate the first key according to the first random number, the second random number and the configuration information of the charging terminal.

[0077] Specifically, the user end generates a first key, that is, a temporary session key, according to the first random number, the second random number, and the configuration information of the charging end. At the same time, after receiving the second random number, the charging end generates a second key, that is, a temporary session key, according to the first random number, the second random number, and the configuration information of the charging end. Among them, the specific algorithm for generating a temporary session key can be customized. For example, assuming that the first random number N1 is 0x10, the second random number N2 is 0x20, and the configuration information of the charging end is serialized into a byte stream 0xff, the first random number N1, the second random number N2, and the byte stream 0xff are spliced, and after splicing, a hash value digest is generated through a hash function (Message-Digest Algorithm 5, MD5) as an encryption key, that is, a temporary session key.

[0078] Step 120: After obtaining the user terminal's confirmation information on the current charging bill information, control the user terminal to generate a zero-knowledge proof based on the current charging bill information, and control the user terminal to encrypt the current charging bill information and the zero-knowledge proof using a first key and send them to the charging terminal.

[0079] Among them, the current charging bill information is the electricity bill amount required for the user's current charging device to be charged.

[0080] Specifically, when the user terminal obtains the current charging bill information, it will be decrypted through the first key, and the decrypted current charging bill information will be popped up for the user to confirm. If the user clicks cancel, the user terminal will disconnect the communication connection with the charging terminal. After the user confirms that the current charging bill information is correct and clicks confirm on the user terminal (such as APP), the user terminal generates a zero-knowledge proof based on the current charging bill information. In addition, the user terminal will encrypt the current charging bill information and the generated zero-knowledge proof with the first key and send them to the charging terminal.

[0081] In some embodiments, controlling the user terminal to generate a zero-knowledge proof based on the current charging bill information specifically includes the following steps:

[0082] Step 1: Control the user end to generate a zero-knowledge proof key based on a preset circuit.

[0083] Among them, the preset circuit C is an abstract computing model here, which is used to represent the computing task. In the zero-knowledge proof circuit implementation, the computing relationship to be proved is represented as a Boolean circuit. For example, in the embodiment of the present application, the relationship to be proved is that the user paid for charging, not that other people paid. Among them, the preset circuit C includes logic gates (such as AND gates, OR gates, NOT gates, etc.) and connections, and specifically implements zero-knowledge proof by operating the input and output of the circuit. For example, the constructed Boolean circuit is converted into a form that can be processed by a computer. For example, a matrix representation can be used. Among them, in the matrix representation, the row represents the logic gate, the column represents the input and output line, and the connection relationship between the logic gate and the input and output line is represented by the value of the matrix element. Alternatively, a graph representation can be used, with the logic gate as a node and the connection as an edge, and a graph data structure is used to store and process circuit information. Then, the circuit is encoded and converted into a byte stream or other data format suitable for cryptographic operations.

[0084] Among them, the zero-knowledge proof key includes the zero-knowledge proof public key and the zero-knowledge proof private key, for example:

[0085] {PK π , VK π} = GenKey(C);

[0086] Among them, PK π VK represents zero-knowledge proof public key; π It represents the zero-knowledge proof private key and the verification key; GenKey(C) is the key generation algorithm based on the preset circuit C.

[0087] Specifically, the process of generating a zero-knowledge proof key based on a preset circuit is as follows: First, clarify the specific calculation relationship corresponding to the constructed Boolean circuit, for example, whether it is used to verify an arithmetic equation (such as proving that the value that satisfies a+b=c) and a polynomial calculation relationship, or a more complex calculation logic such as password verification and privacy transaction. At the same time, determine some key parameters, such as the number of variables involved in the calculation, the type and number of logic gates in the circuit, the finite field used (if it is based on finite field operations), and other information. These parameters will affect the subsequent configuration of zero-knowledge proof public key and key generation.

[0088] Exemplarily, the zero-knowledge proof protocol zk-SNARK is used as an example to illustrate the scheme of the embodiment of the present application, and the same is true below and will not be repeated. Zero-knowledge proof private key generation often involves generating a set of secret parameters, which are usually selected from a suitable random number space. For example, in some pairing-based zk-SNARK implementations, multiple random elements (which may be points on an elliptic curve or elements in a finite field, etc.) are generated by a cryptographically secure random number generator, and these random elements are subjected to specific calculations and combinations to form a zero-knowledge proof private key. The specific calculation method may be based on the mathematical structure and algorithm defined by the protocol, combined with certain fixed parameters in the preset circuit (such as the representation coefficients of the logic gate, etc.) to perform operations to generate the final zero-knowledge proof private key structure.

[0089] Step 2: Generate signature information based on the current charging bill information.

[0090] Specifically, the user end signs the current charging bill information to generate signature information. The specific implementation process is: the user end first passes the user end private key SK VU Sign to get the initial σ VU 1, and then the initial signature σ VU 1 Use the hash function H to map and get the final signature information σ VU .

[0091] Step 3: Generate a zero-knowledge proof based on the zero-knowledge proof key, signature information, and a preset generation algorithm.

[0092] Among them, the preset generation algorithm is a series of complex cryptographic calculations, such as elliptic curve operations and polynomial evaluations, etc., which can be set according to actual conditions and are not specifically limited here.

[0093] Specifically, the process of generating a zero-knowledge proof is as follows: the prover generates a proof, i.e., a zero-knowledge proof, through a preset generation algorithm based on the input of the preset circuit (assuming it is a secret input), polynomial constraints, public statements, and the zero-knowledge proof private key. This proof is a relatively concise object that can convince the verifier that the prover knows the input that satisfies the preset circuit calculation relationship without leaking the input information.

[0094] Among them, zero-knowledge proof π VU for:

[0095] π VU =GenProof(σ VU , PK π ,sta,PP);

[0096] Among them, σ VU Is the signature information; PK πis the zero-knowledge proof public key; sta is the state information or statement, that is, the public information that needs to be verified, which is a public statement known to both parties; PP is the public parameter, including all public information generated when the system is initialized.

[0097] After generating the zero-knowledge proof, the user will VU , verification key VK π , the charging amount M corresponding to the current charging bill information, and the current timestamp T are encrypted by the first key and sent to the charging end.

[0098] Step 130: Control the charging end to decrypt the received current charging bill information and zero-knowledge proof using the second key, and control the charging end to verify the zero-knowledge proof.

[0099] Specifically, after the charging end receives the encrypted current charging bill information and zero-knowledge proof sent by the user end, the encrypted current charging bill information and zero-knowledge proof are decrypted using the second key, and the zero-knowledge proof is verified.

[0100] In some embodiments, controlling the charging terminal to verify the zero-knowledge proof specifically includes the following steps:

[0101] Step 1: Determine the output value of the zero-knowledge proof verification function.

[0102] Before determining the output value of the zero-knowledge proof verification function, the process also includes: verifying the validity of the current timestamp. If the verification is invalid, the charging terminal directly refuses to provide charging services. If the verification is valid, the output value of the zero-knowledge proof verification function is determined. This ensures that the current session is within the validity period, prevents replay attacks, and enhances security.

[0103] Among them, the zero-knowledge proof verification function is: VerProof(σ VU , VK π ,sta,pp).

[0104] Specifically, the calculation process of the output value of the zero-knowledge proof verification function is as follows: after receiving the zero-knowledge proof, the verifier (i.e., the user end) checks whether the proof is valid through the verification algorithm based on the public statement, polynomial constraints, and the zero-knowledge proof itself. If the proof is valid, the verifier can be sure that the prover knows the input that satisfies the calculation relationship and does not obtain other redundant information.

[0105] Among them, the design of the verification algorithm corresponds to the proof generation algorithm (ie, the preset generation algorithm).

[0106] Step 2: Verify the zero-knowledge proof based on the output value of the zero-knowledge proof verification function.

[0107] Specifically, if the output value of the zero-knowledge proof verification function is 1, it means that the zero-knowledge proof verification is successful, and the charging service is provided to the user accordingly. The user leaves after charging, and the transaction is completed. Otherwise, the verification fails and the charging service is refused to the user.

[0108] It is understandable that the charging privacy protection method provided by this application can realize the encrypted transmission of charging bill information between the user end and the charging end through the generated first key, second key and zero-knowledge proof, so that the user's privacy information will not be exposed during the charging process, ensuring the security of information transmission. In addition, the communication connection between the user end and the charging end is achieved through Bluetooth, which can improve the poor experience caused by slow 4G / 5G traffic transmission speed and severe data packet loss when charging in poor network conditions such as underground parking lots or remote areas, effectively avoiding various problems caused by poor network environment, thereby improving user experience.

[0109] Figure 2 This is a flow chart of another charging privacy protection method provided in an embodiment of the present application. Figure 2 , the charging privacy protection method includes the following steps:

[0110] Step 210: Initialize the charging supervision server, and control the charging supervision server to generate a third key; and synchronize the third key to the user terminal and the charging terminal.

[0111] Among them, the charging supervision service end is a third-party trusted and authoritative regulatory agency, which is used to store relevant information of the user end and the charging end. For example, it is mainly responsible for receiving and processing registration applications submitted by vehicle users and generating zero-knowledge proofs for car owners. It has a local storage server for storing user privacy information. When a dispute occurs, the user or related party can request the charging supervision service end to query the charging bill information with encrypted credentials, thereby achieving effective traceability.

[0112] The specific process of initializing the charging supervision server is as follows: select a security parameter λ and generate a public parameter pp = {e, G1, G2, G T , g1, g2, p, H}. Where e represents a bilinear mapping function, satisfying e: G1*G2=G T . Among them, G1 and G2 represent two additive cyclic groups, G T is a multiplication cyclic group, g1 and g2 are the generators of G1 and G2 respectively, p represents the prime order of the cyclic group, and H is a hash function. Generate the third key, i.e., the system master key pair (system public key PK RB , system private key SK RB ), select a random number X RB Belong to Z p As the system private key, Zp is a finite field of G1 and G2, and the system private key is e(X RB ), the system private key is stored locally, and the pp parameter and the system public key PK RB Published to all user terminals and charging terminals.

[0113] The charging terminal and the user terminal register with the charging supervision server. The process of the charging terminal registering with the charging supervision server is as follows: the charging supervision server generates a charging terminal public key PK for the charging terminal CC and the charging end private key SK CC The charging supervision server saves the charging end public key PK CC , the charging end saves the charging end private key SK CC .

[0114] The process of user end registering with charging supervision server end is as follows: charging supervision server end releases self-developed charging client APP, and user end can download APP through various channels; when user downloads and completes registration, charging supervision server end generates a pair of charging end public key PK for user end VU and the charging end private key SK VU , charging end public key PK VU Saved in the charging supervision server, the charging end private key SK VU Saved in the user APP. The charging supervision service end publishes the charging end public key PK CC To the user APP.

[0115] The charging end obtains the charging end private key SK generated by the charging supervision server CC After that, deploy a charging pile with low-power Bluetooth function. When the charging pile is deployed, the private key SK CC Write to the charging pile. When the user is charging, the charging pile will display a scan code on the screen, such as a QR code. The QR code includes information such as the charging pile operating company and the charging pile number.

[0116] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the topological relationship between the terminals provided in the embodiment of the present application. The charging privacy protection method provided in the embodiment of the present application involves the user terminal, the charging terminal and the charging supervision service terminal. For example, the topological relationship between the terminals is illustrated by taking the user terminal as the user's mobile phone, the charging terminal as the charging pile and the charging supervision service terminal as the third-party supervision agency. For example, please refer to Figure 3, the user's mobile phone and the charging pile communicate and interact through BLE. The third-party regulatory agency generates a system public key and a system private key, and generates a user public key and a user private key for the user's mobile phone, and generates a charging pile public key and a charging pile private key for the charging pile. The user's mobile phone downloads the APP to obtain a series of parameters, keys (such as user public key, user private key and system public key, etc.) and other data. The charging pile is connected to the cloud platform of the charging pile operating company, and registers through a third-party regulatory agency to obtain a series of parameters, keys (such as charging pile public key, charging pile private key and system public key, etc.) and other data. Therefore, by setting up the three parties of the user end, the charging end and the charging supervision service end, the privacy protection of the user during the charging process is realized by using zero-knowledge proof and low-power Bluetooth, and barrier-free charging can be achieved even when the signal is poor.

[0117] Step 220: After obtaining the communication connection information between the user end and the charging end, control the user end and the charging end to generate a first key and a second key respectively.

[0118] Step 230: After obtaining the user's confirmation information on the current charging setting information, control the charging end to generate corresponding current charging bill information according to the current charging setting information; and control the charging end to encrypt the current charging bill information using the second key and send it to the user.

[0119] The current charging setting information includes information such as the current charging time required and the current charging power required.

[0120] Specifically, when the user needs to charge, after establishing a communication connection between the user terminal and the charging terminal, the user sets the current charging setting information through the APP and confirms it. For example, the user selects the duration required for the current charging on the charging pile screen and clicks to confirm. After the user terminal confirms the current charging setting information, the charging terminal generates the corresponding current charging bill information based on the current charging setting information, and encrypts the current charging bill information with the second key and sends it to the user terminal for confirmation.

[0121] Step 240: After obtaining the user terminal's confirmation information on the current charging bill information, control the user terminal to generate a zero-knowledge proof based on the current charging bill information, and control the user terminal to encrypt the current charging bill information and the zero-knowledge proof using the first key and send them to the charging terminal.

[0122] Step 250: The control user terminal encrypts the current charging bill information and zero-knowledge proof using a third key and sends the encrypted information to the charging supervision service terminal.

[0123] Specifically, after the user generates the zero-knowledge proof, it will encrypt the zero-knowledge proof and the current charging bill information through a third key (such as the system public key) and send it to the charging supervision server for storage for future tracing. In particular, when a dispute occurs, the user or related party can use the encrypted certificate to request the charging supervision server to query the bill information, thereby achieving effective tracing.

[0124] Step 260: Control the charging end to decrypt the received current charging bill information and zero-knowledge proof using the second key, and control the charging end to verify the zero-knowledge proof.

[0125] Step 270: Control the charging end to encrypt the zero-knowledge proof using a third key and send the encrypted zero-knowledge proof to the charging supervision service end.

[0126] Specifically, after successfully verifying the zero-knowledge proof, the charging terminal will send the zero-knowledge proof π VU The current charging bill information is stored locally, and the zero-knowledge proof π is also sent through a third key (such as the system public key). VU The current charging bill information (including the charging amount M and the current timestamp T corresponding to the current charging bill information) is encrypted and sent to the charging supervision server for storage for future tracing.

[0127] In addition, the charging pile operating company corresponding to the charging end settles funds with the charging supervision service end at regular intervals (for example, one week). For example, only all payments made two weeks ago are settled. If the charging pile operating company has questions about orders within two weeks, it can trace them back. The specific tracing process includes the following steps:

[0128] Step 1: Filter out a unique zero-knowledge proof based on the charging time and charging amount, and send it to the charging supervision server to request decryption.

[0129] Step 2: Since the charging supervision server knows the algorithm for generating the zero-knowledge proof, it can decrypt the zero-knowledge proof and obtain the corresponding signature information and charging bill information, and then verify it through the system public key to ensure authenticity, so as to find the charging party.

[0130] Step 3: Considering that the network environment is poor, the charging end fails to communicate with the cloud platform of the charging pile operating company in time, so an overdue bill will be generated. The bill will be settled when the network is unobstructed.

[0131] It should be noted that if the user has any questions about the charging bill information later, they can also trace it back. The specific tracing process is the same as that of the charging end, so it will not be repeated here.

[0132] It is understandable that the charging privacy protection method provided by this application can realize the encrypted transmission of charging bill information between the user end and the charging end through the generated first key, second key and zero-knowledge proof, so that the user's privacy information will not be exposed during the charging process, ensuring the security of information transmission. In addition, the communication connection between the user end and the charging end is achieved through Bluetooth, which can improve the poor experience caused by slow 4G / 5G traffic transmission speed and severe data packet loss when charging in poor network conditions such as underground parking lots or remote areas, effectively avoiding various problems caused by poor network environment, thereby improving user experience.

[0133] In addition, this application also stores zero-knowledge proof and charging bill information by setting up a third party (i.e., charging supervision service end) to facilitate subsequent information tracing and improve user experience. Compared with the related technology that uses blockchain technology to ensure the authenticity and reliability of bill information, this application does not need to use blockchain technology, but manages charging bill information through the charging supervision service end during the payment process, which not only achieves user privacy protection, but also saves the construction of blockchain, as well as the server and other related costs of using digital currency for payment.

[0134] Figure 4 is a schematic diagram of the overall flow of the charging privacy protection method provided in the embodiment of the present application. Figure 4 , the implementation process of the charging privacy protection method includes: first, the charging supervision server initializes the parameters and publishes the APP. Then, the user end and the charging end register with the charging supervision server and obtain the corresponding parameters. Secondly, the user end and the charging end establish a BLE connection to complete the authentication process of privacy protection (that is, generate the first key and the second key). Finally, the user end and the charging pile perform zero-knowledge proof interaction. Therefore, by using low-power Bluetooth for communication, the data interaction problem in scenarios with weak data signals is solved. Through the zero-knowledge proof system, users will not disclose any privacy information when charging. And introduce a trusted regulatory agency (that is, the charging supervision server) to make information traceable.

[0135] Figure 5 This is a principle structure diagram of a charging privacy protection device provided in an embodiment of the present application. Correspondingly, an embodiment of the present application also provides a charging privacy protection device, see Figure 5The charging privacy protection device 100 includes: a key generation module 10, which is used to control the user end and the charging end to generate a first key and a second key respectively after obtaining the communication connection information between the user end and the charging end; a zero-knowledge proof generation module 20, which is used to control the user end to generate a zero-knowledge proof according to the current charging bill information after obtaining the confirmation information of the user end on the current charging bill information; an encryption and sending module 30, which is used to control the user end to encrypt the current charging bill information and the zero-knowledge proof through the first key and send them to the charging end; a decryption module 40, which is used to control the charging end to decrypt the received current charging bill information and zero-knowledge proof through the second key; and a verification module 50, which is used to control the charging end to verify the zero-knowledge proof.

[0136] It can be understood that the charging privacy protection device provided in the embodiment of the present application can realize the encrypted transmission of charging bill information between the user end and the charging end through the generated first key, second key and zero-knowledge proof, so that the user's privacy information will not be exposed during the charging process, thereby ensuring the security of information transmission.

[0137] In some embodiments, the charging privacy protection pile further includes: an initialization module for initializing the charging supervision server; a third key generation module for controlling the charging supervision server to generate a third key; and a key synchronization module for synchronizing the third key to the user terminal and the charging terminal.

[0138] In some embodiments, the encryption and sending module 30 is further used to: control the user end to encrypt the current charging bill information and zero-knowledge proof through a third key and send them to the charging supervision service end.

[0139] In some embodiments, the encryption and sending module 30 is further used to: control the charging terminal to encrypt the zero-knowledge proof through a third key and send it to the charging supervision service terminal.

[0140] In some embodiments, the zero-knowledge proof generation module 20 is also used to: control the user terminal to generate a zero-knowledge proof key based on a preset circuit; generate signature information based on the current charging bill information; generate a zero-knowledge proof based on the zero-knowledge proof key, signature information and a preset generation algorithm.

[0141] In some embodiments, the verification module 50 is further used to: determine an output value of the zero-knowledge proof verification function; and verify the zero-knowledge proof according to the output value of the zero-knowledge proof verification function.

[0142] In some embodiments, the charging privacy protection device also includes: a current charging bill information generation module, which is used to control the charging end to generate corresponding current charging bill information according to the current charging setting information after obtaining the user end's confirmation information on the current charging setting information.

[0143] The encryption and sending module 30 is also used to control the charging end to encrypt the current charging bill information through the second key and send it to the user end.

[0144] In some embodiments, the first key and the second key are the same; the key generation module 10 is also used to: control the charging end to send a preset challenge code to the user end; control the user end to determine a response code based on the preset challenge code and the configuration information of the charging end; generate the first key based on the response code and the configuration information of the charging end.

[0145] In some embodiments, the key generation module 10 is further used to: control the charging end to generate a first random number according to the response code; control the user end to generate a second random number according to the first random number;

[0146] A first key is generated according to the first random number, the second random number and configuration information of the charging terminal.

[0147] In some embodiments, the user end and the charging end are connected via Bluetooth communication.

[0148] Accordingly, the present application also provides an electronic device, see Figure 6 , Figure 6 The structure diagram of the electronic device of the embodiment of the present application is illustrated. The electronic device includes a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor. When the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the charging privacy protection method are implemented. Since the charging privacy protection method is described in detail above, it will not be repeated here.

[0149] Accordingly, an embodiment of the present application further provides a computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the charging privacy protection method are implemented. Since the charging privacy protection method is described in detail above, it will not be repeated here.

[0150] In the above embodiments, the description of each embodiment has its own emphasis. For parts that are not described in detail in a certain embodiment, reference can be made to the relevant descriptions of other embodiments.

[0151] The charging privacy protection method, device, equipment and storage medium provided in the embodiments of the present application are introduced in detail above, and the principles and implementation methods of the present application are explained by using specific examples. The description of the above embodiments is only used to help understand the technical solution and its core idea of ​​the present application; ordinary technicians in this field should understand that they can still modify the technical solutions recorded in the aforementioned embodiments, or replace some of the technical features therein with equivalents; and these modifications or replacements do not make the essence of the corresponding technical solution deviate from the scope of the technical solution of the embodiments of the present application.

Claims

1. A charging privacy protection method, characterized in that: include: After obtaining the communication connection information between the user end and the charging end, controlling the user end and the charging end to generate a first key and a second key respectively; After obtaining confirmation information of the user terminal on the current charging bill information, controlling the user terminal to generate a zero-knowledge proof according to the current charging bill information, and controlling the user terminal to encrypt the current charging bill information and the zero-knowledge proof using the first key and send them to the charging terminal; The charging terminal is controlled to decrypt the received current charging bill information and the zero-knowledge proof by using the second key, and the charging terminal is controlled to verify the zero-knowledge proof.

2. The charging privacy protection method according to claim 1, characterized in that: Before the user end is connected to the charging end for communication, the method further includes: Initialize the charging supervision service end, and control the charging supervision service end to generate a third key; and synchronize the third key to the user end and the charging end.

3. The charging privacy protection method according to claim 2, characterized in that: After generating the zero-knowledge proof, the method further includes: The user terminal is controlled to encrypt the current charging bill information and the zero-knowledge proof through the third key and send the encrypted information to the charging supervision service terminal.

4. The charging privacy protection method according to claim 2, characterized in that: After verifying the zero-knowledge proof, it also includes: The charging terminal is controlled to encrypt the zero-knowledge proof through the third key and then send the encrypted zero-knowledge proof to the charging supervision service terminal.

5. The charging privacy protection method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The controlling the user terminal to generate a zero-knowledge proof according to the current charging bill information includes: Controlling the user terminal to generate a zero-knowledge proof key based on a preset circuit; Generate signature information according to the current charging bill information; The zero-knowledge proof is generated according to the zero-knowledge proof key, the signature information and a preset generation algorithm.

6. The charging privacy protection method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The controlling the charging terminal to verify the zero-knowledge proof includes: Determine the output value of the zero-knowledge proof verification function; The zero-knowledge proof is verified according to an output value of the zero-knowledge proof verification function.

7. The charging privacy protection method according to claim 1, characterized in that: Before obtaining the confirmation information of the user end on the current charging bill information, it also includes: After obtaining confirmation information of the user terminal on the current charging setting information, controlling the charging terminal to generate corresponding current charging bill information according to the current charging setting information; And control the charging end to encrypt the current charging bill information through the second key and send it to the user end.

8. The charging privacy protection method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The first key and the second key are the same; generating the first key comprises: Controlling the charging terminal to send a preset challenge code to the user terminal; Controlling the user terminal to determine a response code according to the preset challenge code and configuration information of the charging terminal; The first key is generated according to the response code and the configuration information of the charging terminal.

9. The charging privacy protection method according to claim 8, characterized in that: The generating the first key according to the response code and the configuration information of the charging terminal includes: Controlling the charging terminal to generate a first random number according to the response code; Controlling the user terminal to generate a second random number according to the first random number; The first key is generated according to the first random number, the second random number and configuration information of the charging terminal.

10. The charging privacy protection method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The user end is connected to the charging end via Bluetooth communication.

11. A charging privacy protection device, characterized in that: include: A key generation module, configured to control the user terminal and the charging terminal to generate a first key and a second key respectively after obtaining communication connection information between the user terminal and the charging terminal; A zero-knowledge proof generation module, configured to control the user terminal to generate a zero-knowledge proof according to the current charging bill information after obtaining confirmation information of the user terminal on the current charging bill information; An encryption and sending module, used to control the user end to encrypt the current charging bill information and the zero-knowledge proof through the first key and send them to the charging end; A decryption module, used to control the charging terminal to decrypt the received current charging bill information and the zero-knowledge proof through the second key; A verification module is used to control the charging terminal to verify the zero-knowledge proof.

12. An electronic device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein: When the processor executes the computer program, the charging privacy protection method according to any one of claims 1 to 10 is implemented.

13. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the computer program is executed by a processor, the charging privacy protection method according to any one of claims 1 to 10 is implemented.

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