Low-Power Drone Stealth Control and Encrypted Communication Method and System Based on BLE 5.0

Abstract

The present invention relates to the technical field of unmanned aerial vehicles, in particular to a low-power unmanned aerial vehicle stealth control and encrypted communication method and system based on BLE 5.0. The method dynamically evaluates the link quality based on the BLE node detection frame, generates a path decision result, and constructs an adaptive scattering network topology structure in combination with the real-time position of the unmanned aerial vehicle and the change of the electromagnetic environment; encapsulates the unmanned aerial vehicle control instruction into a GATT characteristic value update message to generate a stealth control data stream; generates a frequency hopping sequence parameter set in combination with the time, space and channel dimensions; dynamically slices and pseudo-randomly recombines the stealth control data stream through a space-time dual encryption mechanism to generate an encrypted control instruction data stream; and transmits the encrypted control instruction data stream to the execution layer of the unmanned aerial vehicle through a dynamic scattering network. On the premise of maintaining the low-power characteristic, the unmanned aerial vehicle control system has high stealth, high reliability and high security, and at the same time cuts off the tracking path of the enemy to the real pilot through the dummy pilot layer.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of unmanned aerial vehicles, and particularly to a low-power unmanned aerial vehicle stealth control and encrypted communication method and system based on BLE 5.0. Background Art

[0002] In modern warfare, unmanned aerial vehicles have become key equipment due to their strong mobility and flexible combat capabilities. However, traditional unmanned aerial vehicle control systems have significant security risks: as the core operator, the radio signals of the pilot are easily intercepted by enemy electronic reconnaissance equipment, and their positions can be quickly exposed through spectrum positioning or thermal imaging tracking, making them key targets for attack. Existing unmanned aerial vehicle remote control technologies mostly use Wi-Fi or traditional Bluetooth communication, which have problems such as limited signal coverage, obvious protocol characteristics, and weak anti-interference ability, making it difficult to conceal the position of the pilot. In addition, conventional encryption methods (such as fixed-key AES) are easily cracked by long-term monitoring, and if the frequency hopping technology lacks adaptability to the dynamic environment, the communication mode can still be identified. Although some solutions have tried to extend the control distance through relay nodes, the static network topology cannot cope with the changes in the battlefield electromagnetic environment, and the relay equipment itself may become a new signal radiation source. To address the above problems, there is an urgent need for a stealth control system that integrates device camouflage, dynamic networking, and multi-dimensional encryption to hide the existence of the real pilot at the physical layer, eliminate recognizable signal characteristics at the communication layer, and extend the battlefield continuous operation time through low-power design. The present invention constructs a full-dimensional solution from physical stealth to communication encryption through the collaborative innovation of the thermodynamic camouflage of a dummy pilot and the BLE 5.0 dynamic scattering network. Summary of the Invention

[0003] The present invention overcomes the deficiencies of the prior art and provides a low-power unmanned aerial vehicle stealth control and encrypted communication method and system based on BLE 5.0.

[0004] The technical solution adopted by the present invention to achieve the above object is as follows:

[0005] The first aspect of the present invention discloses a low-power unmanned aerial vehicle stealth control and encrypted communication method based on BLE 5.0, including the following steps:

[0006] Dynamically evaluate the link quality based on the BLE node detection frame, select relay nodes through priority sorting and determine the optimal multi-hop path to generate a path decision result;

[0007] Construct an adaptive scattering network topology structure based on the path decision result and in combination with the real-time position of the unmanned aerial vehicle and the changes in the electromagnetic environment;

[0008] Encapsulate the unmanned aerial vehicle control instruction into a GATT characteristic value update message, and generate a stealth control data stream through the advertisement channel data injection technology in combination with the updated message;

[0009] Generate a dynamic encryption key based on the unique fingerprint of the preset hardware in the dummy pilot layer, construct a three-dimensional frequency hopping matrix by combining the time, space, and channel dimensions, and generate a frequency hopping sequence parameter set;

[0010] Perform dynamic slicing and pseudo-random recombination on the covert control data stream through a spatio-temporal dual encryption mechanism to generate an encrypted control instruction data stream;

[0011] Transmit the encrypted control instruction data stream to the UAV execution layer through a dynamic scattering network, and complete instruction decryption and covert control operations according to the frequency hopping sequence parameter set and the optimal configuration parameter set.

[0012] Preferably, dynamically evaluate the link quality based on the BLE node detection frame, preferentially select relay nodes through priority sorting and calculate the multi-hop path, coordinate the node to switch the communication mode and synchronize the configuration parameters, and construct an adaptive scattering network topology, specifically:

[0013] Send lightweight detection frames through the BLE 5.0 nodes in the dummy pilot layer and the UAV execution layer by alternately switching the broadcast channel to obtain the signal reception strength, bit error rate, and channel noise level of each node's detection frame;

[0014] Calculate the link quality coefficient of each node based on the signal reception strength, bit error rate, and channel noise level of the detection frame, and construct a timestamped distributed link quality table in the four-tuple structure of the source node, relay node, target node, and link quality coefficient;

[0015] Based on the link quality coefficient in the link quality table, combined with the remaining energy level and historical stability index of each node, determine the relay priority weight of each node, and generate a candidate node queue sorted by priority;

[0016] Select the first K nodes in the candidate node queue as the core relay points, and obtain the communication delay and energy consumption weight between the core relay points through a distributed flooding protocol;

[0017] Determine the optimal multi-hop path according to the communication delay and energy consumption weight between the core relay points, and generate a path decision result.

[0018] Preferably, construct an adaptive scattering network topology structure based on the path decision result and combined with the real-time position of the UAV and the change of the electromagnetic environment, specifically:

[0019] Real-time collect GPS coordinate information through the BLE 5.0 node carried by the UAV, and at the same time scan the electromagnetic environment characteristics within the preset range to form an environmental characteristic data set;

[0020] Analyze the applicability score of the 2M PHY mode and the CODED PHY mode according to the collected environmental characteristic data, and generate a recommended communication mode;

[0021] For the proposed communication mode, determine the optimal channel sequence in combination with the current channel occupancy situation, and at the same time adjust the transmit power level according to the link budget to form a draft configuration parameter including the specific communication mode, channel hopping sequence and power level;

[0022] Test the actual performance of the draft configuration parameters within the local network range, obtain index verification parameters to verify the effectiveness, and iteratively optimize the non-compliant parameter combinations to finally determine the optimal configuration parameter set;

[0023] Encode the optimal configuration parameter set into configuration instructions, and distribute the configuration instructions to the dummy pilot relay layer in a multi-hop manner through the optimal multi-hop path to complete the construction of the adaptive scattering network topology.

[0024] Preferably, encapsulate the UAV control instruction as a GATT characteristic value update message, and generate a covert control data stream by combining the updated message through the advertising channel data injection technology, specifically:

[0025] Divide the UAV control instruction of the real pilot layer into several equal-length data blocks, convert each data block into a characteristic value format conforming to the BLE GATT protocol through hash mapping, and then attach a virtual service UUID and characteristic handle to each characteristic value to generate a disguised GATT characteristic value update message;

[0026] Inject a randomized timestamp and hop counter into each message to form a baseband control unit with a dynamic context identifier;

[0027] According to the real-time interference level of the current advertising channel, adjust the fragment length and redundancy check bit configuration of the baseband control unit, and split a single characteristic value message into multiple advertising data fragments carrying fragment numbers and check codes;

[0028] Preempt the target advertising channel time slot at the physical layer, embed the advertising data fragments into the custom data field of the standard BLE broadcast packet, and obtain the status of the nearest relay node through the cooperative perception module of the dummy pilot relay layer, and select the unmonitored channel index and transmit power level to perform fragment injection to generate a spatio-temporally discretized covert fragment stream;

[0029] Based on the spatio-temporal discrete characteristics of the covert fragment stream, pseudo-randomly sort and reorganize the fragments through the dummy pilot relay nodes in the dynamic scattering network, and insert interference fragments to form redundant noise, and finally generate a covert control data stream with characteristics of timing confusion and energy concealment.

[0030] Preferably, generate a dynamic encryption key based on the unique fingerprint of the preset hardware in the dummy pilot layer, construct a three-dimensional frequency hopping matrix in combination with the time, space and channel dimensions, and generate a frequency hopping sequence parameter set, specifically:

[0031] The PUF module based on the dummy pilot layer node collects the unique fingerprint of the preset hardware and generates a device-specific static key seed through hash operation;

[0032] Taking the current communication timestamp, the UAV position coordinates and the channel interference state as dynamic parameters, perform XOR fusion with the static key seed and output the spatio-temporal dynamic key;

[0033] Taking time as the horizontal axis, space coordinates as the vertical axis, and channel index as the vertical axis, map the spatio-temporal dynamic key bit by bit to each cell of the three-dimensional matrix to generate a three-dimensional frequency hopping matrix;

[0034] Extract the channel switching sequence from the three-dimensional frequency hopping matrix according to the preset path, and perturb and encrypt the path in combination with the spatio-temporal dynamic key, and finally output an anti-interception frequency hopping sequence parameter set;

[0035] Among them, the frequency hopping sequence parameter set includes channel switching timing, dwell time and power control instructions.

[0036] Preferably, the covert control data stream is dynamically sliced and pseudo-randomly reorganized through a spatio-temporal double encryption mechanism to generate an encrypted control instruction data stream, specifically:

[0037] Cut the covert control data stream into multiple data slices according to the dynamic slicing strategy, and attach a timestamp and a sequence identifier accurate to the microsecond level to each slice to generate a group of sliced units with timing marks;

[0038] Based on the current three-dimensional coordinates of the UAV and the preset motion trajectory after a preset time, determine the spatial position sequence of the next N communication time slots, reorder the group of sliced units according to the spatial sequence, and insert pseudo-random filling slices based on position hashing to form a spatially confused data block;

[0039] According to the current channel sequence of the three-dimensional frequency hopping matrix, further split the spatially confused data block into channel adaptation units, and bind the target channel index and dwell time parameters to each unit to ensure that adjacent units are distributed on non-consecutive channels;

[0040] First, perform AES-128 encryption on each channel adaptation unit using the physical fingerprint-derived key unit by unit, and then perform a second stream cipher encryption based on the timestamp on all units as a whole to generate a data unit matrix with spatio-temporal double encryption characteristics;

[0041] Sort by the timestamp entropy value of the encrypted data unit matrix, and dynamically adjust the sending order in combination with the frequency hopping sequence parameters, and finally output an encrypted control instruction data stream with spatio-temporal discreteness and channel hopping.

[0042] Preferably, the encrypted control instruction data stream is transmitted to the UAV execution layer through a dynamic scattering network, and the instruction decryption and covert control operations are completed according to the frequency hopping sequence parameter set and the optimal configuration parameter set. Specifically:

[0043] Based on the channel switching time sequence in the frequency hopping sequence parameter set, select relay nodes that match the current channel state from the dynamic scattering network topology, generate a time-varying multi-hop transmission path, and ensure that the encrypted control instruction data stream is forwarded according to a pseudo-random path;

[0044] Adjust the transmission power and modulation mode of each data slice according to the optimal configuration parameter set, dynamically switch between the 2M PHY high-speed mode and the CODED PHY long-distance mode, and at the same time insert redundant check slices to improve the anti-interference ability, forming a robust transmission stream;

[0045] After the UAV execution layer node receives the data stream, first restore the channel interleaving order according to the frequency hopping sequence parameter set, then reorganize the data slices according to the time stamp and the spatial coordinate sequence, and finally use the physical fingerprint-derived key to decrypt layer by layer to restore the original control instruction;

[0046] After the decrypted instruction is verified by the flight control system, it is injected into the UAV control queue through a preset instruction obfuscation strategy, mixed with the regular navigation instructions for execution, and at the same time, the link quality index is fed back to the dummy pilot layer for dynamic parameter optimization;

[0047] After the instruction transmission is completed, immediately clear all the temporary routing records and decryption contexts of the relay nodes, and update the iteration parameters of the physical fingerprint-derived key to ensure that there is no residue of the pilot identity information.

[0048] The electromagnetic environment characteristics include the signal interference intensity, background noise level and multipath fading characteristics of each channel; the index verification parameters include bit error rate, throughput and delay.

[0049] The dummy pilot is designed with a bionic thermal radiation structure, and multi-region independent temperature control units are arranged inside the bionic shell. Each unit is divided into a head high-temperature area, a torso constant-temperature area and a limb gradient temperature area according to human anatomical characteristics. By controlling the power output of the heating elements in each temperature area, the surface temperature fluctuation characteristics of a real human body in a static / moving state are simulated.

[0050] The second aspect of the present invention discloses a low-power UAV covert control and encrypted communication system based on BLE 5.0. The system includes a memory and a processor. The memory stores a low-power UAV covert control and encrypted communication method program based on BLE 5.0. When the low-power UAV covert control and encrypted communication method program based on BLE 5.0 is executed by the processor, the steps of any of the low-power UAV covert control and encrypted communication methods described above are implemented.

[0051] The present invention solves the technical defects existing in the background art and has the following beneficial effects: The present invention realizes physical layer concealment through dummy pilot thermal camouflage and BLE advertising channel injection technology, adopts a dynamic scattering network and a three-dimensional frequency hopping matrix to ensure anti-interference at the transport layer, and combines hardware fingerprint encryption and spatio-temporal dual encryption mechanisms to ensure data layer security. On the premise of maintaining the low-power characteristic, the UAV control system has high concealment (signal characteristics cannot be recognized), high reliability (stable transmission in complex environments), and high security (resistant to interception and cracking). At the same time, the dummy pilot layer cuts off the tracking path of the enemy to the real pilot. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0052] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention or the prior art, the following will briefly introduce the drawings required for use in the description of the embodiments or the prior art. Obviously, the following drawings are only some embodiments of the present invention. For those of ordinary skill in the art, without creative efforts, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings.

[0053] Figure 1 It is the overall method flowchart of the UAV stealth control and encrypted communication method of the present invention;

[0054] Figure 2 It is a partial method flowchart of the UAV stealth control and encrypted communication method of the present invention;

[0055] Figure 3 It is the system block diagram of the UAV stealth control and encrypted communication system of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE EMBODIMENTS

[0056] In order to be able to more clearly understand the above-mentioned objects, features, and advantages of the present invention, the present invention will be further described in detail below in conjunction with the drawings and specific embodiments. It should be noted that, without conflict, the embodiments of the present application and the features in the embodiments can be combined with each other.

[0057] Many specific details are set forth in the following description in order to fully understand the present invention. However, the present invention can also be implemented in other ways different from those described herein. Therefore, the protection scope of the present invention is not limited by the specific embodiments disclosed below.

[0058] As Figure 1 shown, the first aspect of the present invention discloses a low-power UAV stealth control and encrypted communication method based on BLE 5.0, including the following steps:

[0059] S102. Dynamically evaluate the link quality based on the BLE node detection frame, preferentially select relay nodes through priority sorting and determine the optimal multi-hop path to generate a path decision result;

[0060] S104. Construct an adaptive scattering network topology based on the path decision result in combination with the real-time position of the unmanned aerial vehicle and the changes in the electromagnetic environment;

[0061] S106. Encapsulate the unmanned aerial vehicle control instruction into a GATT characteristic value update message, and generate a covert control data stream through the advertising channel data injection technology in combination with the updated message;

[0062] S108. Generate a dynamic encryption key based on the unique fingerprint of the preset hardware in the dummy pilot layer, construct a three-dimensional frequency hopping matrix in combination with the time, space and channel dimensions, and generate a frequency hopping sequence parameter set;

[0063] S110. Dynamically slice and pseudo-randomly reorganize the covert control data stream through a spatio-temporal double encryption mechanism to generate an encrypted control instruction data stream;

[0064] S112. Transmit the encrypted control instruction data stream to the unmanned aerial vehicle execution layer through the dynamic scattering network, and complete the instruction decryption and covert control operation according to the frequency hopping sequence parameter set and the optimal configuration parameter set.

[0065] Preferably, dynamically evaluate the link quality based on the BLE node detection frame, preferentially select relay nodes through priority sorting and calculate the multi-hop path, coordinate the node to switch the communication mode and synchronize the configuration parameters, and construct an adaptive scattering network topology, as Figure 2 shown, specifically:

[0066] S202. Send lightweight detection frames through the BLE 5.0 nodes in the dummy pilot layer and the unmanned aerial vehicle execution layer by alternately switching the broadcast channel, and obtain the signal reception strength, bit error rate and channel noise level of each node's detection frame;

[0067] Among them, the detection frame is a lightweight broadcast data packet periodically sent between BLE 5.0 nodes, carrying the source node identifier and channel status probe information, and is used to measure the link quality parameters (including signal reception strength, bit error rate and noise level) in real time, providing underlying communication status perception data for the topology construction of the dynamic scattering network.

[0068] S204. Calculate the link quality coefficient of each node based on the signal reception strength, bit error rate and channel noise level of the detection frame, and construct a timestamped distributed link quality table in the four-tuple structure of source node, relay node, target node and link quality coefficient;

[0069] Among them, the calculation formula of the link quality coefficient is:

[0070] ;

[0071] In the formula, is the link quality coefficient; is the normalized signal receiving strength; is the bit error rate; is the channel noise level; Maximum noise threshold; is the weight coefficient of each parameter, satisfying .

[0072] S206, based on the link quality coefficient in the link quality table, combined with the residual energy level and historical stability index of each node, determine the relay priority weight of each node, and generate a candidate node queue sorted by priority;

[0073] It should be noted that, first, the link quality coefficient of each node is read from the link quality table (the higher the value, the better the communication quality), and then the comprehensive score of each node is obtained through weighted calculation based on the current remaining power of each node (the higher the power, the higher the priority) and the stable performance in the past period of time (nodes that frequently disconnect will be downgraded). Then, all nodes are sorted from high to low by score, and nodes with scores below the threshold are eliminated, and finally a "candidate list of relay nodes" is generated for priority recommendation. In actual communication, the system will give priority to nodes ranked higher in the list to transmit data to ensure stable signals and save power.

[0074] S208, selecting the first K nodes in the candidate node queue as core relay points, and obtaining the communication delay and energy consumption weight between the core relay points through a distributed flooding protocol;

[0075] Among them, the distributed flooding protocol is a data diffusion method that is decided autonomously by network nodes. After receiving the data, each relay node independently decides whether to forward and how to forward it according to local policies (such as hop limit, energy loss, etc.), and transmits the information to the entire network through multi-node relay broadcasting without the need for coordination by a central controller. By allowing each core relay node to send a lightweight test data packet to the neighboring node, other nodes will automatically record the receiving time and calculate the transmission delay after receiving it, and estimate the power consumed by sending these data packets. These data will spread in the network along with the test packets, and eventually all nodes will be able to collect the communication delay and energy consumption between each other. Based on these measured data, the system automatically generates a communication efficiency list, clearly marking the speed and power consumption of data transmission between any two relay nodes, so as to obtain the communication delay and energy consumption weights.

[0076] S210: Determine an optimal multi-hop path according to the communication delay and energy consumption weight between the core relay points, and generate a path decision result.

[0077] It should be noted that by checking the communication efficiency list (including transmission speed and power consumption) among all relay nodes, various possible paths from the starting point to the ending point are automatically calculated. Then, a route with fast overall transmission, fewer relay times, and low total power consumption is preferentially selected. Finally, a golden path (i.e., the optimal multi-hop path) with the best comprehensive performance is determined, and the list of relay nodes on this path is sent to each device.

[0078] In summary, through the dynamic link evaluation and priority relay election mechanism, the present invention constructs an adaptive scattering network that can be real-time reconstructed, improving the anti-interception and environmental robustness of the communication system; at the same time, the combination of distributed topology decision-making and multi-hop path optimization can still maintain reliable data transmission with low power consumption and high concealment in a complex electromagnetic environment, effectively blocking the possibility for the enemy to locate the real drone operator through signal tracing.

[0079] Preferably, based on the path decision result and combined with the real-time position of the drone and the changes in the electromagnetic environment, an adaptive scattering network topology structure is constructed, specifically as follows:

[0080] The BLE 5.0 nodes carried by the drone are used to collect GPS coordinate information in real time, and at the same time, scan the electromagnetic environment characteristics within a preset range to form an environmental characteristic data set; the electromagnetic environment characteristics include the signal interference intensity, background noise level, and multipath fading characteristics of each channel;

[0081] According to the collected environmental characteristic data, the applicability scores of the 2M PHY mode and the CODED PHY mode are analyzed to generate a recommended communication mode;

[0082] Among them, the above 2M PHY mode is a physical layer protocol that provides 2Mbps high-speed transmission in the Bluetooth 5.0 standard, suitable for low-interference short-distance communication scenarios. The CODED PHY mode is an enhanced physical layer protocol newly added to Bluetooth 5.0, which improves the anti-interference ability through forward error correction coding and symbol repetition technology, and is designed specifically for high-noise long-distance transmission environments.

[0083] It should be noted that according to the collected electromagnetic environment characteristic data (such as signal interference intensity, background noise, etc.), the applicability of the 2M PHY mode and the CODED PHY mode is evaluated respectively. For example, when the signal interference intensity is higher than -75dBm, the background noise is lower than -85dBm, and the communication distance is within 50 meters, it is determined as a "low-interference short-distance" scenario, and the 2M PHY mode is automatically selected; when the interference intensity exceeds -75dBm, the noise level is higher than -85dBm, or the communication distance exceeds 80 meters, it is determined as a "high-interference long-distance" scenario, and the CODED PHY mode is switched to. Finally, the system generates a recommended communication mode suggestion based on the evaluation result.

[0084] For the proposed communication mode, determine the optimal channel sequence in combination with the current channel occupancy situation, and adjust the transmission power level according to the link budget to form a draft configuration parameter including the specific communication mode, channel hopping sequence, and power level;

[0085] Exemplarily, when the system determines to adopt the 2M PHY mode, first scan the 40 channels (including 3 broadcast channels) specified by the BLE protocol, and exclude the occupied channels with an instantaneous interference intensity exceeding -75 dBm through energy detection; generate a pseudo-random hopping sequence based on the remaining channels, and preferentially select a sequence combination with a channel spacing ≥ 5 MHz (such as [19 → 8 → 32 → 15]) to avoid adjacent channel interference. At the same time, determine the link budget and adjust the transmission power level according to the real-time distance between the UAV and the relay node (measured by GPS) and relevant historical path loss data. For example, use a transmission power of 4 dBm within 50 meters, 8 dBm for 50 - 100 meters, and switch to the CODED PHY mode and increase to 10 dBm when exceeding 100 meters. Finally, output a draft configuration parameter, and the example format is: {communication mode: 2M PHY; channel sequence: [19, 8, 32, 15]; power level: 8 dBm}.

[0086] Test the actual performance of the draft configuration parameter within the local network range, obtain the index verification parameters to verify the effectiveness of the parameters, and iteratively optimize the unqualified parameter combinations to finally determine the optimal configuration parameter set; the index verification parameters include bit error rate, throughput, and latency;

[0087] It should be noted that after selecting the draft configuration parameter including the communication mode, channel sequence, and power level, the system deploys a test process in the local network. For example: control the UAV to establish a connection with the nearest relay node, continuously send standard test data packets (length 150 bytes) at a cycle of 1 second, and synchronously collect the actual communication metrics - when the bit error rate exceeds 10 to the negative third power (i.e., 0.001), the throughput is lower than 500 kbps, or the end-to-end latency is greater than 50 ms, it is determined as unqualified. When it is determined as unqualified, perform parameter combination optimization. For example: if the bit error rate is high, increase the transmission power by 2 dBm and retest; if the throughput is insufficient, replace the channel with the maximum interference in the channel sequence; if the latency exceeds the standard, switch to the 2M PHY mode (when it was originally the CODED PHY); after iteration, output the optimal configuration parameter set that meets all the metrics, and distribute it to all network nodes through an encrypted channel. The test data packet format includes a timestamp, a sequence number, and a check field to ensure the accuracy of metric collection.

[0088] Encode the optimal configuration parameter set into a configuration instruction, and distribute the configuration instruction to the dummy UAV relay layer in a multi-hop manner through the optimal multi-hop path to complete the construction of the adaptive scattering network topology.

[0089] In summary, in order to solve the problems of poor anti-interference ability and weak environmental adaptability of traditional UAV communication networks due to fixed communication modes and static parameter configurations, the present invention constructs a scattering network that can autonomously adapt to changes in the electromagnetic environment and the movement of UAV positions through real-time environmental perception and dynamic parameter optimization, improves the reliability and concealment of the communication system, and ensures rapid convergence of network topology based on the parameter distribution mechanism of the optimal path, realizes low-power, high-robustness adaptive networking, and effectively responds to communication needs in complex battlefield environments.

[0090] Preferably, the drone control instruction is encapsulated as a GATT characteristic value update message, and the updated message is combined with the advertising channel data injection technology to generate a covert control data stream, specifically:

[0091] The drone control instructions of the real pilot layer are divided into several equal-length data blocks, each of which is converted into a characteristic value format that complies with the BLE GATT protocol through hash mapping, and then a virtual service UUID and characteristic handle are attached to each characteristic value to generate a disguised GATT characteristic value update message;

[0092] For example, the drone control instructions of the real pilot layer (such as altitude +50m, heading 120°) are divided into 16-byte equal-length data blocks, and each data block is mapped to a 128-bit characteristic value (such as 0x12A4F8...C3) through a preset conversion rule; and a virtual service UUID (such as a randomly generated 6E40F2A0-F5F8-4B8F-B8C1-2A1D2C3D4E5F) and a characteristic handle (such as 0x0025) are dynamically allocated for the characteristic value, and combined to generate an update message that complies with the BLE GATT specification (format example: {UUID, Handle, Value, Properties}). The service UUID is changed every 30 seconds, and the characteristic handle is allocated cyclically from 0x0001 to 0xFFFF, so that the message appears in the protocol analyzer as a characteristic value update flow of an ordinary Bluetooth low-power device. The conversion rule retains a bidirectional mapping table between the original data block and the characteristic value for reverse restoration by the receiving end.

[0093] Inject a random timestamp and hop counter into each message to form a baseband control unit with dynamic context identification;

[0094] After generating the GATT characteristic value update message, the system adds dynamic identification information to each message: for example, the timestamp adopts the 32-bit Unix time format (accurate to milliseconds, such as "1715589123456"), and the initial value of the hop counter is 0 and recorded as an 8-bit unsigned integer (range 0-255). The timestamp is uniformly timed by the master node of the drone layer to ensure that the time synchronization error of the entire network is less than 50 ms; the hop counter is automatically incremented by 1 when passing through each relay node, and the message is discarded when the count value reaches the preset threshold (such as 15 hops). The example of the final formed baseband control unit structure is: {characteristic value data (16B) + timestamp (4B) + hop counter (1B) + CRC check (2B)}, where the timestamp and the hop counter occupy the fixed offset positions of the message (bytes 17-21), for the relay node to quickly extract and update. The randomness of the timestamp comes from the unpredictability of the actual communication moment, and the hop limit mechanism can prevent the data packet from circulating infinitely in the network.

[0095] According to the real-time interference level of the current advertising channel, adjust the fragmentation length and redundancy check bit configuration of the baseband control unit, and split a single characteristic value message into multiple advertising data fragments carrying fragment numbers and check codes;

[0096] Among them, the real-time interference level refers to the instantaneous electromagnetic environment quality of the BLE broadcast channels (37 / 38 / 39) during communication, including co-channel interference intensity, background noise level, channel occupancy rate, bit error rate, and multipath fading characteristics.

[0097] The system monitors the interference levels of the three BLE advertising channels (37 / 38 / 39) in real time. For example, when it is detected that the bit error rate of channel 37 exceeds 10 to the negative third power (i.e., 0.001) or the signal interference intensity is higher than -75 dBm, the fragmentation adjustment is automatically started: the standard fragmentation length of the baseband control unit is reduced from 20 bytes to 12 bytes, and 2 bytes of CRC check code are added to the end of each fragment; the fragment number is marked at the fragment head with 3-bit binary coding (000-111) and stored bound to the hash identifier of the original characteristic value message. For example, a complete 48-byte characteristic value message is split into 4 fragments (12-byte data + 2-byte check code) under strong interference, and the fragment numbers are arranged in a pseudo-random sequence of "001→010→011→100". When reassembling the fragments, the continuity of the numbers and the CRC check need to be verified, and any check failure triggers the retransmission of the fragments. After the interference level returns to normal, the fragmentation length gradually returns to 20 bytes and the redundant check bits are reduced.

[0098] Preempt the target advertising channel time slot at the physical layer, fragment the advertising data and embed it into the custom data field of the standard BLE broadcast packet, and obtain the status of the nearest relay node through the cooperative sensing module of the dummy drone relay layer. Select an unmonitored channel index and transmission power level to perform fragment injection, generating a spatiotemporally discretized covert fragment stream;

[0099] Based on the spatiotemporal discrete characteristics of the covert fragment stream, the dummy drone relay nodes in the dynamic scattering network perform pseudo-random sorting and recombination on the fragments, and insert interference fragments to form redundant noise, finally generating a covert control data stream with characteristics of timing confusion and energy concealment.

[0100] It should be noted that the system adopts a time-division multiplexing mechanism at the BLE physical layer, preempts communication resources within the fixed time slot window (the 0 - 10 ms period every 100 ms) of the target advertising channel (such as channel 38), and embeds the fragmented advertising data into the manufacturer-specific data field of the standard BLE broadcast packet (writing 12-byte fragmented data starting from the 10th byte). The cooperative sensing module of the dummy drone relay layer monitors the channel occupancy status of the surrounding 3 relay nodes in real time (sampling period 50 ms). When detecting that the enemy device scans in the 2.4 GHz band, it automatically switches to an unmonitored channel (such as jumping from channel 38 to channel 37) and reduces the transmission power from 4 dBm to -10 dBm to perform fragment injection. When the fragment stream is relayed through 3 relay nodes, each node performs pseudo-random recombination on the fragment sequence according to a preset rule (such as adjusting the original sequence [A→B→C] to [B→F→A→C], where F is an inserted 8-byte random interference fragment). Finally, the effective fragments account for 60% and the interference fragments account for 40% in the output data stream, and the transmission time interval between adjacent fragments fluctuates randomly within 10 - 100 ms, making it impossible for the spectrum analyzer to identify the effective communication mode. All fragments carry a uniformly encrypted time synchronization identifier (accuracy ±1 ms), which is used by the receiving end to filter out interference fragments according to the time stamp and recombine the effective data.

[0101] It should be noted that the above GATT characteristic value refers to the readable and writable data unit defined in the Bluetooth Low Energy protocol. As a standardized carrier for transmitting control instructions and status information between devices, it realizes the encapsulation and covert transmission of instruction data through the characteristic value update message. The BLE GATT protocol is a standardized specification that defines the data interaction structure between devices in Bluetooth Low Energy technology. It establishes a hierarchical data model of services, characteristic values, and descriptors through an attribute table to realize a structured data transmission framework that can be discovered and read / written between low-power devices.

[0102] In summary, to solve the technical problem that drone control instructions are easily detected and recognized by the enemy during wireless transmission. The present invention disguises the control instructions as ordinary BLE device data and uses the advertising channel for dynamic fragmentation transmission, so that the control instructions are perfectly hidden in the conventional Bluetooth communication data stream, thereby reducing the probability of being discovered by radio detection devices; and through spatio-temporal discretization and pseudo-random recombination technology, the data stream loses the recognizable pattern features, effectively counteracting signal feature analysis; in addition, the dynamic fragmentation and redundant noise insertion mechanism enhances the anti-interference ability, ensuring reliable transmission in a complex electromagnetic environment.

[0103] Preferably, a dynamic encryption key is generated based on the unique fingerprint of the preset hardware in the dummy pilot layer, and a three-dimensional frequency hopping matrix is constructed by combining the time, space, and channel dimensions to generate a set of frequency hopping sequence parameters, specifically:

[0104] The unique fingerprint of the preset hardware is collected by the PUF module of the dummy pilot layer node, and a static key seed exclusive to the device is generated through hash operation; the preset hardware includes an SRAM memory, a ring oscillator circuit of the FPGA, and a Bluetooth 5.0 dual-mode radio frequency front end;

[0105] Taking the current communication timestamp, the drone position coordinates, and the channel interference status as dynamic parameters, perform XOR fusion with the static key seed, and output the spatio-temporal dynamic key;

[0106] Taking time as the horizontal axis, space coordinates as the vertical axis, and channel index as the vertical axis, map the spatio-temporal dynamic key bit by bit to each unit of the three-dimensional matrix to generate a three-dimensional frequency hopping matrix;

[0107] Extract the channel switching sequence from the three-dimensional frequency hopping matrix according to a preset path (such as spiral / zigzag), and perturb and encrypt the path in combination with the spatio-temporal dynamic key, and finally output a set of frequency hopping sequence parameters resistant to interception;

[0108] Among them, the set of frequency hopping sequence parameters includes channel switching timing, dwell time, and power control instructions.

[0109] Exemplarily, when the dummy pilot layer node is powered on, 256-bit startup noise values (such as 0x3A7F...E2) are collected through the SRAM PUF module, and 128-bit static key seeds are generated through SHA-256 operation. Every 5 minutes, the system concatenates the current Unix timestamp (such as 1715592300), the drone's GPS coordinates (such as 39.9042°N, 116.4074°E), and the channel interference status (such as interference level 2 on channel 37) into 64-bit dynamic parameters, and generates 192-bit spatio-temporal dynamic keys by bitwise XOR with the static key seeds. The keys are filled into a 10×10×10 three-dimensional matrix in groups of 6 bits (the X-axis is the time modulo 10, the Y-axis is the last two decimal places of the latitude modulo 10, and the Z-axis is the channel number modulo 10). Starting from the position (0, 0, 0) of the matrix, 32 channel numbers are extracted in a zigzag path (such as [19→8→32→15...]), and the last 16 bits of the key are taken as the adjustment parameters for the dwell time (100 - 500 ms) and power level (-20 to +10 dBm). The final output example is: {channel sequence: [19, 8, 32, 15], dwell time: [120, 200, 180, 150] ms, power level: [4, 0, -5, 2] dBm}. All parameters are updated every 5 minutes and are strictly synchronized with the receiving end.

[0110] In summary, to solve the security hidden danger problems caused by the static encryption keys of traditional drone communication and the predictable frequency hopping mode. The present invention generates encryption keys with device uniqueness and environmental adaptability through the fusion of hardware fingerprints and spatio-temporal dynamic parameters, making the frequency hopping sequence have both physical unclonability and spatio-temporal randomness; the frequency hopping mode based on the three-dimensional matrix effectively breaks the statistical analysis of the communication law by the enemy, improves the anti-interception and anti-jamming capabilities, and the finally output frequency hopping parameter set realizes three-dimensional collaborative encryption of channels, time, and space, forming a dynamic defense barrier while ensuring the real-time nature of communication.

[0111] Preferably, a dynamic slicing and pseudo-random recombination are performed on the covert control data stream through a spatio-temporal dual encryption mechanism to generate an encrypted control instruction data stream, specifically:

[0112] The covert control data stream is cut into multiple data slices according to a dynamic slicing strategy, and each slice is attached with a timestamp and a sequence identifier accurate to the microsecond level to generate a group of sliced units with time series marks;

[0113] Based on the current three-dimensional coordinates of the drone and the preset movement trajectory after a preset time, a sequence of spatial positions for the next N communication time slots is determined, and the group of sliced units is reordered according to the spatial sequence, and pseudo-random padding slices based on position hashing are inserted to form a spatially confused data block;

[0114] According to the current channel sequence of the three-dimensional frequency hopping matrix, the spatially scrambled data block is further split into channel adaptation units, and each unit is bound with a target channel index and a dwell time parameter to ensure that adjacent units are distributed on discontinuous channels;

[0115] First, each channel adaptation unit is encrypted by AES-128 unit by unit using a physical fingerprint-derived key, and then all units are encrypted a second time by a stream cipher based on a timestamp to generate a data unit matrix with dual space-time encryption characteristics;

[0116] Sort by the timestamp entropy value of the encrypted data unit matrix, dynamically adjust the transmission order in combination with the frequency hopping sequence parameters, and finally output an encrypted control instruction data stream with space-time discreteness and channel hopping.

[0117] Exemplarily, the system dynamically cuts a 128-byte covert control data stream into 8 16-byte data slices according to the current channel quality, and adds 6-byte identification information (including a 32-bit microsecond-level timestamp and a 16-bit serial number) to the head of each slice. According to the current coordinates of the UAV (such as 116.4° east longitude, 39.9° north latitude, altitude 50m) and the trajectory prediction for the next 10 seconds, a spatial position sequence [P1→P3→P2→P4] is generated and the slice order is rearranged accordingly. At the same time, 4-byte pseudo-random padding slices (the padding content is the last 4 bits of the position coordinate hash value) are inserted between every two valid slices. The recombined data block is split into channel adaptation units according to the current channel sequence [19→8→32→15] of the three-dimensional frequency hopping matrix, and each unit is bound with a target channel number (such as unit 1→channel 19 dwells for 120ms, unit 2→channel 8 dwells for 200ms). After block-encrypting each unit using a 256-bit physical fingerprint key, stream encryption is performed on the overall data using the timestamp as a seed. Finally, the unit transmission order is adjusted to [2→4→1→3] according to the timestamp entropy value, forming an encrypted control stream that switches channels every 500ms. Among them, the receiving end restores the original instruction through reverse chronological synchronization and dual-key decryption.

[0118] In summary, the present invention solves the technical problem that UAV control instructions are easily intercepted and cracked during transmission. Through a dual encryption mechanism of timestamp binding and spatial sequence scrambling, the data stream has both temporal randomness and spatial unpredictability. Combined with channel frequency hopping and unit-by-unit encryption, a multi-dimensional three-dimensional protection system is formed, effectively resisting replay attacks and spectrum analysis. The finally generated encrypted control instruction data stream has dynamically changing transmission characteristics, which not only ensures the real-time and reliable transmission of instructions, but also ensures that the enemy cannot restore the complete control logic by intercepting fragments, improving the anti-jamming ability and battlefield survivability of the UAV communication system.

[0119] Preferably, the encrypted control instruction data stream is transmitted to the UAV execution layer through a dynamic scattering network, and the instruction decryption and stealth control operations are completed according to the frequency hopping sequence parameter set and the optimal configuration parameter set. Specifically:

[0120] Based on the channel switching time sequence in the frequency hopping sequence parameter set, select a relay node that matches the current channel state from the dynamic scattering network topology, and generate a time-varying multi-hop transmission path to ensure that the encrypted control instruction data stream is forwarded along a pseudo-random path;

[0121] Adjust the transmission power and modulation mode of each data shard according to the optimal configuration parameter set, dynamically switch between the 2M PHY high-speed mode and the CODED PHY long-distance mode, and insert redundant check shards at the same time to improve the anti-interference ability, forming a robust transmission stream;

[0122] After the UAV execution layer node receives the data stream, first restore the channel interleaving order according to the frequency hopping sequence parameter set, then reorganize the data slices according to the time stamp and the spatial coordinate sequence, and finally decrypt layer by layer using the physical fingerprint-derived key to restore the original control instruction;

[0123] After the decrypted instruction is verified by the flight control system, it is injected into the UAV control queue through a preset instruction obfuscation strategy, and executed in combination with the conventional navigation instruction. At the same time, the link quality index is fed back to the dummy pilot layer for dynamic parameter optimization;

[0124] After the instruction transmission is completed, immediately clear all the temporary routing records and decryption contexts of the relay nodes, and update the iteration parameters of the physical fingerprint-derived key to ensure that there is no residue of the pilot identity information.

[0125] Exemplarily, the system reads the frequency hopping sequence parameter set (such as the channel sequence [19→8→32→15], and the dwell time [120, 200, 180, 150] ms), and selects 3 nodes (Node A / B / C) with the best current channel state (such as the bit error rate <0.001) from 15 available relay nodes in the dynamic scattering network to construct a transmission path: the first hop is forwarded through Node A at a transmission power of 4 dBm on channel 19, the second hop switches to channel 8 and is relayed through Node B at 0 dBm power, and the last hop is transmitted by Node C at -5 dBm power on channel 32 to the UAV. The data fragments dynamically select the communication mode according to the link quality during transmission (the fragment length of the 2M PHY mode is 20 bytes, and the fragment length of the CODED PHY mode is 10 bytes), and 1 8-byte check fragment (including the CRC-16 checksum of the first 5 fragments) is inserted every 5 valid fragments. The UAV receiver reconstructs the fragments in the reverse order of the frequency hopping sequence [15→32→8→19], decrypts them using the pre-shared 256-bit physical fingerprint key, and mixes the control instructions (such as a 30° heading adjustment) and the conventional navigation data (such as maintaining an altitude of 100 m) in a 3:7 ratio for execution. After the transmission is completed, all relay nodes clear the routing cache within 500 ms and update the iteration number of the physical fingerprint key (such as from 0x12 to 0x13).

[0126] Among them, the above 2M PHY high-speed mode is the physical layer operating mode in the Bluetooth 5.0 standard to achieve a high data transmission rate of 2 Mbps, which is suitable for low-interference short-distance communication. The CODED PHY long-distance mode enhances the signal anti-interference ability through forward error correction coding and symbol repetition technology, and is designed specifically for reliable long-distance transmission in high-noise environments.

[0127] In summary, the present invention solves the technical problems of low transmission reliability and easy traceability of encrypted UAV control instructions in a complex battlefield environment. Through the synergistic effect of the dynamic scattering network and the frequency hopping sequence, the multi-hop pseudo-random transmission of encrypted instructions is realized, effectively blocking the prediction and interference of the communication path by the enemy; the adaptive power adjustment and dual-mode switching mechanism ensure the transmission robustness in different environments, while the time-space dual decryption and instruction confusion strategy ensure the integrity and concealment of the control instructions; the fast information cleaning mechanism after transmission completely eliminates the communication traces, forming a full-process security protection from transmission to execution, and enhancing the battlefield survival ability and combat concealment of the UAV system.

[0128] In this embodiment, the UAV stealth control and encryption communication method may further include the following steps:

[0129] Real-time capture the channel interference signals through the broadband RF front-end, extract the pulse repetition interval, spectrum leakage characteristics and duty cycle parameters of the interference source, and construct a multi-dimensional interference pulse fingerprint library including interference type identifiers, time-frequency energy distribution and attack intention classification;

[0130] Based on the interference type identifiers in the fingerprint database, the threat weights of each channel interference pattern are calculated using the entropy weight method, and combined with the path curvature characteristics of the UAV movement trajectory, a two-dimensional interference entropy weight matrix of channel-time is generated;

[0131] In the entropy weight matrix, if the variance of the interference duration of a certain channel is lower than the set threshold and the pulse density continuously exceeds the critical value, it is determined as a persistent strong interference channel; if the pulse density of a certain channel shows the characteristics of Poisson distribution and the variance of the duration is higher than the set value, it is determined as a burst interference channel;

[0132] Shorten the residence time of the persistent strong interference channel to the lowest safety threshold, and increase the transmit power of the burst interference channel to the instantaneous anti-noise threshold to generate a power-residence joint optimization vector;

[0133] Encode the joint optimization vector into a control signal, broadcast it to the whole network through the priority relay nodes of the scattering network, and after each node parses it, synchronously update the local frequency hopping sequence parameters and take effect in the next communication time slot.

[0134] Exemplarily, the system scans the 2.4 GHz band through the broadband RF front-end carried by the UAV, and detects an interference signal with a pulse repetition interval of 2 ms and a duty cycle of 35% in channel 19 (the spectrum leakage characteristic is -50 dBm@2425 MHz), and records it as the interference type ID 001 , and stores it in the fingerprint database (format example: {ID 001 , frequency band 2420 - 2430 MHz, pulse density 4 times per second, attack intention classification: jamming suppression}. Based on the statistical results of the fingerprint database, the threat weight of channel 19 is calculated to be 0.7 (highest 1.0) using the statistical analysis method, and combined with the current movement trajectory of the UAV (curvature radius 50 m) to generate an entropy weight matrix, where channel 19 is marked as persistent interference within the time window 08:00:00 - 08:05:00 (interference duration variance < 300 ms, pulse density > 3 times per second). The system immediately shortens the residence time of channel 19 from 200 ms to 50 ms, and increases the transmit power from 0 dBm to 10 dBm to generate an optimization vector {channel 19, residence 50 ms, power 10 dBm}. This vector is encoded into a hexadecimal control instruction (such as 0x13A45F) and broadcast to the whole network through the priority relay node on channel 37.

[0135] It should be noted that this method realizes the intelligent identification and threat quantification of interference sources by constructing an interference fingerprint library and an entropy weight matrix, enabling the system to accurately distinguish continuous / sudden interference and generate targeted avoidance strategies. While reducing the risk of channel exposure, it ensures the reliable transmission of critical instructions, forming a closed-loop confrontation ability of "perception - decision - execution", and enhancing the survivability and concealment of the UAV communication link in a complex electromagnetic environment.

[0136] In this embodiment, the UAV stealth control and encrypted communication method may further include the following steps:

[0137] Extract the time - frequency energy distribution characteristics of the enemy detection device within a preset time window through a multi - dimensional signal analysis module, including pulse duty cycle, frequency band residence period, and variance of frequency hopping interval, to generate a time - frequency joint distribution matrix;

[0138] In the time - frequency joint distribution matrix, if the energy gradient change rate of a certain time - frequency unit is less than the critical value, then determine that this unit is a low - energy unit, and enclose all low - energy units to obtain a low - energy region;

[0139] Based on the low - energy region in the time - frequency joint distribution matrix, combined with the spatio - temporal projection relationship of the UAV motion trajectory, identify the set of safe time slots and the sequence of low - risk frequency bands corresponding to the enemy detection blind area, and generate a spatio - temporal security mapping table;

[0140] According to the spatio - temporal security mapping table, allocate discontinuous transmission time slots and random frequency - hopping band indices for each data fragment, where the time slot interval follows a Poisson distribution and the band index is generated according to a chaotic sequence, forming a spatio - temporal interleaved recombination strategy table;

[0141] Encode the recombination strategy table into a fragment control instruction set, where the instruction set includes a unique fragment identifier, a transmission time slot offset, and a target channel index, and control the physical layer to inject the fragment control instruction set at the specified time slot - channel combination according to a pseudo - random time sequence.

[0142] Exemplarily, within a 10-second time window, the system scans the enemy detection equipment through the multi-dimensional signal analysis module, and detects the energy distribution characteristics in the 2.4GHz frequency band (such as the pulse duty cycle of channel 25 is 30% within the time window 08:00:00 - 08:00:05, the dwell period is 2 seconds, and the variance of the frequency hopping interval is 0.3), and generates a time-frequency joint distribution matrix (matrix cell size: 100ms × 1MHz). It is found that the energy gradient change rate of channel 19 (2425 - 2426MHz) in the matrix is lower than 0.1 during the time window 08:00:03 - 08:00:04, and it is marked as a low-energy cell, and encloses with the low-energy cells of adjacent channels 18 / 20 to form a low-energy area with a 3MHz bandwidth. Combining with the UAV flight trajectory (east longitude 116.4° → 116.405°), it is determined that the corresponding spatio-temporal safe time slot for this area is 08:00:03.200 - 08:00:03.800, and a spatio-temporal safety mapping table is generated (example entry: {time slot ID_T1, frequency band 2423 - 2428MHz, safety level A}). According to the mapping table, transmission time slots (such as fragment F01 → time slot 08:00:03.250 ± 20ms, and the interval follows a Poisson distribution) and channel indexes (such as [19 → 23 → 17] pseudo-random sequence) are assigned to each data fragment to form a recombination strategy table.

[0143] It should be noted that to solve the technical problems of insufficient utilization of the enemy detection blind area and high predictability of the communication mode in UAV stealth communication. This method locates the spatio-temporal blind area of the enemy detection system through time-frequency energy feature modeling and low-energy area identification technology, combines with the dynamic mapping of the UAV movement trajectory, constructs a safe communication window with environmental adaptability, and through the coordinated control of discontinuous time slots and chaotic frequency band indexes, makes the fragment stream present non-stationary and non-periodic transmission characteristics, effectively destroying the enemy's statistical analysis ability of the communication mode; finally realizes the dual stealth transmission of "time-domain discretization + frequency-domain randomization" of control commands, and on the premise of ensuring communication reliability, makes it impossible for the enemy to predict the transmission timing and difficult to lock the effective frequency band.

[0144] The dummy pilot is designed with a bionic heat radiation structure, and multi-region independent temperature control units are arranged inside the bionic shell. Each unit is divided into a head high-temperature area, a torso constant-temperature area, and limb gradient temperature areas according to human anatomical characteristics. By controlling the power output of the heating elements in each temperature area, the surface temperature fluctuation characteristics of a real human body in a static / moving state are simulated.

[0145] It should be noted that the dummy drone pilot can effectively counter the enemy's infrared detection and thermal imaging tracking by simulating the thermal radiation distribution characteristics of a real human body. Specifically, based on the characteristics of temperature differences in different parts of the human body (such as higher temperature in the head and lower temperature at the extremities of the limbs), the zonal temperature control technology is adopted to accurately reproduce the typical thermal radiation map of the human body, making the dummy present the same thermodynamic characteristics as a real drone pilot in the infrared monitoring device, thus misleading the enemy reconnaissance system's judgment of the position of the real drone pilot. Moreover, by dynamically adjusting the power output of each temperature zone, it is also possible to simulate the temperature fluctuation pattern during human activities, further enhancing the credibility of thermal camouflage and providing a physical protection barrier for the covert control of the real drone pilot.

[0146] As Figure 3 shown, the second aspect of the present invention discloses a low-power drone covert control and encrypted communication system 8 based on BLE 5.0. The system includes a memory 60 and a processor 80. The memory 60 stores a low-power drone covert control and encrypted communication method program based on BLE 5.0. When the low-power drone covert control and encrypted communication method program based on BLE 5.0 is executed by the processor 80, the steps of any of the low-power drone covert control and encrypted communication methods described above are realized.

[0147] The above is only the specific implementation manner of the present invention, but the protection scope of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any person skilled in the art within the technical scope disclosed by the present invention can easily think of changes or substitutions, which should all be covered within the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A low-power UAV covert control and encrypted communication method based on BLE 5.0, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: Dynamically evaluate link quality based on BLE node detection frames, select relay nodes by priority sorting, determine the optimal multi-hop path, and generate path decision results; Based on the path decision result and combined with the real-time position of the UAV and the change of the electromagnetic environment, an adaptive scattering network topology structure is constructed; Encapsulate the drone control instructions into GATT characteristic value update messages, and generate covert control data streams through advertising channel data injection technology combined with the updated messages; Generate dynamic encryption keys based on the unique fingerprint of the preset hardware in the dummy pilot layer, build a three-dimensional frequency hopping matrix based on the time, space and channel dimensions, and generate a frequency hopping sequence parameter set; Through the dual encryption mechanism of time and space, the hidden control data stream is dynamically sliced ​​and pseudo-randomly reorganized to generate an encrypted control instruction data stream; The encrypted control command data stream is transmitted to the UAV execution layer through the dynamic scattering network, and the command decryption and covert control operations are completed according to the frequency hopping sequence parameter set and the optimal configuration parameter set.

2. According to the BLE 5.0-based low-power UAV covert control and encrypted communication method according to claim 1, it is characterized in that: Based on the BLE node detection frame, the link quality is dynamically evaluated, the relay node is selected by priority sorting and the multi-hop path is calculated, the node is coordinated to switch the communication mode and synchronize the configuration parameters, and the adaptive scattering network topology is constructed. Specifically: By alternately switching broadcast channels, lightweight detection frames are sent to the BLE 5.0 nodes at the dummy pilot layer and the drone execution layer to obtain the signal reception strength, bit error rate and channel noise level of the detection frames of each node; The link quality coefficient of each node is calculated based on the signal reception strength, bit error rate and channel noise level of the detection frame, and a distributed link quality table with a timestamp is constructed according to the four-tuple structure of source node, relay node, target node and link quality coefficient; Based on the link quality coefficient in the link quality table, combined with the residual energy level and historical stability index of each node, the relay priority weight of each node is determined, and a candidate node queue sorted by priority is generated; Select the first K nodes in the candidate node queue as core relay points, and obtain the communication delay and energy consumption weights between the core relay points through a distributed flooding protocol; The optimal multi-hop path is determined according to the communication delay and energy consumption weight between the core relay points, and a path decision result is generated.

3. The low-power UAV covert control and encrypted communication method based on BLE 5.0 according to claim 1 is characterized in that: Based on the path decision results and combined with the real-time position of the UAV and the changes in the electromagnetic environment, an adaptive scattering network topology is constructed, specifically: The BLE 5.0 node carried by the drone collects GPS coordinate information in real time, and scans the electromagnetic environment characteristics within the preset range to form an environmental feature data set; Analyze the applicability scores of the 2M PHY mode and the CODED PHY mode based on the collected environmental feature data, and generate a recommended communication mode; For the proposed communication mode, the optimal channel sequence is determined in combination with the current channel occupancy, and the transmit power level is adjusted according to the link budget to form a configuration parameter draft including the specific communication mode, channel hopping sequence and power level; Test the actual performance of the draft configuration parameters within the local network, obtain indicators to verify the validity of the parameters, iteratively optimize the parameter combinations that do not meet the standards, and finally determine the optimal configuration parameter set; The optimal configuration parameter set is encoded into a configuration instruction, and the configuration instruction is distributed to the dummy pilot relay layer in a multi-hop manner through the optimal multi-hop path to complete the construction of the adaptive scattering network topology structure.

4. The low-power UAV covert control and encrypted communication method based on BLE 5.0 according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The drone control command is encapsulated as a GATT characteristic value update message, and the advertising channel data injection technology is used to generate a covert control data stream in combination with the updated message, specifically: The drone control instructions of the real pilot layer are divided into several equal-length data blocks, each of which is converted into a characteristic value format that complies with the BLE GATT protocol through hash mapping, and then a virtual service UUID and characteristic handle are attached to each characteristic value to generate a disguised GATT characteristic value update message; Inject a random timestamp and hop counter into each message to form a baseband control unit with dynamic context identification; According to the real-time interference level of the current advertising channel, the fragment length and redundant check bit configuration of the baseband control unit are adjusted to split the single characteristic value message into multiple advertising data fragments carrying fragment sequence numbers and check codes; Seize the target advertising channel time slot at the physical layer, embed the advertising data fragments into the custom data field of the standard BLE broadcast packet, obtain the status of the nearest relay node through the cooperative perception module of the dummy pilot relay layer, select the unmonitored channel index and transmission power level to perform fragment injection, and generate a covert fragment stream with time and space discretization; Based on the time-space discrete characteristics of the covert slice flow, the slices are pseudo-randomly sorted and reorganized through the dummy pilot relay nodes in the dynamic scattering network, and interference slices are inserted to form redundant noise, finally generating a covert control data flow with timing confusion and energy concealment characteristics.

5. The low-power UAV covert control and encrypted communication method based on BLE 5.0 according to claim 1 is characterized in that: Based on the unique fingerprint of the preset hardware in the dummy pilot layer, a dynamic encryption key is generated, and a three-dimensional frequency hopping matrix is ​​constructed by combining the time, space and channel dimensions to generate a frequency hopping sequence parameter set, specifically: The PUF module based on the dummy pilot layer node collects the unique fingerprint of the preset hardware and generates a static key seed exclusive to the device through hash operation; The current communication timestamp, drone location coordinates and channel interference status are used as dynamic parameters, XOR-ed with the static key seed to output the spatiotemporal dynamic key; With time as the horizontal axis, space coordinates as the vertical axis, and channel index as the vertical axis, the spatiotemporal dynamic key is bit-mapped to each unit of the three-dimensional matrix to generate a three-dimensional frequency hopping matrix; Extracting a channel switching sequence from the three-dimensional frequency hopping matrix according to a preset path, encrypting the path with disturbances in combination with a spatiotemporal dynamic key, and finally outputting a set of frequency hopping sequence parameters that are resistant to interception; The frequency hopping sequence parameter set includes channel switching timing, dwell time and power control instructions.

6. The low-power UAV covert control and encrypted communication method based on BLE 5.0 according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The hidden control data stream is dynamically sliced ​​and pseudo-randomly reorganized through the time-space dual encryption mechanism to generate an encrypted control instruction data stream, specifically: The hidden control data stream is cut into multiple data slices according to the dynamic slicing strategy. Each slice is attached with a timestamp and sequence identifier accurate to the microsecond level to generate a slice unit group with a time sequence mark. Based on the current three-dimensional coordinates of the drone and the preset motion trajectory after the preset time, determine the spatial position sequence of the future N communication time slots, reorder the slice unit group according to the spatial sequence, and insert pseudo-random filling slices based on the position hash to form a spatial obfuscation data block; According to the current channel sequence of the three-dimensional frequency hopping matrix, the spatial confusion data block is further split into channel adaptation units, each unit is bound to the target channel index and dwell time parameters to ensure that adjacent units are distributed on non-continuous channels; First, each channel adaptation unit is encrypted unit by unit using AES-128 with a physical fingerprint derived key, and then all units are encrypted again with a timestamp-based stream cipher to generate a data unit matrix with dual encryption characteristics of time and space. The encrypted data unit matrix is ​​weighted and sorted according to the timestamp entropy value, and the sending order is dynamically adjusted in combination with the frequency hopping sequence parameters, and finally an encrypted control instruction data stream with time-space discreteness and channel hopping is output.

7. The low-power UAV covert control and encrypted communication method based on BLE 5.0 according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The encrypted control command data stream is transmitted to the UAV execution layer through the dynamic scattering network, and the command decryption and covert control operations are completed according to the frequency hopping sequence parameter set and the optimal configuration parameter set. Specifically: Based on the channel switching timing in the frequency hopping sequence parameter set, a relay node matching the current channel state is selected from the dynamic scattering network topology to generate a time-varying multi-hop transmission path to ensure that the encrypted control instruction data stream is forwarded along a pseudo-random path; Adjust the transmission power and modulation mode of each data slice according to the optimal configuration parameter set, dynamically switch between 2M PHY high-speed mode and CODED PHY long-distance mode, and insert redundant check slices to improve anti-interference ability to form a robust transmission stream; After receiving the data stream, the drone execution layer node first restores the channel interleaving order according to the frequency hopping sequence parameter set, then reassembles the data slices according to the timestamp and spatial coordinate sequence, and finally uses the physical fingerprint derived key to decrypt layer by layer to restore the original control command; After the decrypted instructions are verified by the flight control system, they are injected into the drone control queue through the preset instruction obfuscation strategy and mixed with the conventional navigation instructions for execution. At the same time, the link quality indicators are fed back to the dummy pilot layer for dynamic parameter optimization. After the command transmission is completed, the temporary routing records and decryption contexts of all relay nodes are immediately cleared, and the iteration parameters of the physical fingerprint derived key are updated to ensure that there is no residual pilot identity information.

8. The low-power UAV covert control and encrypted communication method based on BLE 5.0 according to claim 3 is characterized in that: The electromagnetic environment characteristics include the signal interference strength, background noise level and multipath fading characteristics of each channel; the indicator verification parameters include bit error rate, throughput and delay.

9. The low-power UAV covert control and encrypted communication method based on BLE 5.0 according to claim 1, characterized in that: The dummy pilot adopts a bionic thermal radiation structure design, and multiple independent temperature control units are arranged inside the bionic shell. Each unit is divided into a high-temperature zone of the head, a constant temperature zone of the trunk, and a gradient temperature zone of the limbs according to the anatomical characteristics of the human body. By controlling the power output of the heating plate in each temperature zone, the surface temperature fluctuation characteristics of a real human body in a static / moving state are simulated.

10. Low-power UAV covert control and encrypted communication system based on BLE 5.0, characterized by: The system includes a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a low-power UAV covert control and encrypted communication method program based on BLE 5.

0. When the low-power UAV covert control and encrypted communication method program based on BLE 5.0 is executed by the processor, the steps of the low-power UAV covert control and encrypted communication method based on BLE 5.0 as described in any one of claims 1 to 9 are implemented.

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