A heterogeneous platform digital authentication method

Abstract

The application provides a heterogeneous platform digital authentication method, relates to the technical field of platform digital authentication, and comprises the following steps: generating an ECC algorithm key pair by using a service center and issuing a digital certificate; obtaining a unique ID when each platform is in a factory state; encrypting the unique ID by using a public key in the digital certificate, storing the ciphertext ID and the plaintext ID in a database, and forming a platform identity binding record; reading the plaintext ID and the ciphertext ID of a platform to be authenticated by the service center, packing the plaintext ID and the ciphertext ID into a verification request package; sending the verification request package to a root authentication center for authentication, and feeding back a response package to the service center; and performing comparison and verification of the platform identity binding record in the database by the service center, and generating an authentication result. The application can achieve the technical target of a security authentication mechanism based on a high-strength encryption algorithm and a hardware-level identity authentication, and has the technical effects of improving system security, enhancing platform credibility, guaranteeing data integrity and preventing malicious attacks.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of platform digital authentication, and particularly relates to a heterogeneous platform digital authentication method. BACKGROUND

[0002] In the field of modern information security, digital authentication technology plays a crucial role in software and hardware authentication, data protection, and intellectual property protection. With the development of the Internet of Things, cloud computing, and edge computing, more and more devices are connected to the network, making identity verification and data security a key issue.

[0003] Currently, existing authentication technologies mostly rely on symmetric encryption or asymmetric encryption based on traditional public and private key systems. However, when dealing with complex hardware environments and distributed architectures, there are still many shortcomings. For example, symmetric encryption schemes require sharing keys between devices and servers, leading to complex key management and easy theft. Traditional asymmetric encryption methods gradually decline in security when facing high computing power attacks. In addition, many existing authentication systems store keys on the software side, which poses a risk of malicious extraction or tampering, affecting the overall security of the system.

[0004] In summary, the existing technology has the technical problems of complex key management and easy theft, gradual decline in security under high computing power attacks, and software-side key storage vulnerable to malicious extraction or tampering, resulting in reduced security of the authentication system and further affecting the reliability and integrity of the platform and data. SUMMARY

[0005] The purpose of the present application is to provide a heterogeneous platform digital authentication method to solve the technical problems of complex key management and easy theft, gradual decline in security under high computing power attacks, and software-side key storage vulnerable to malicious extraction or tampering, resulting in reduced security of the authentication system and further affecting the reliability and integrity of the platform and data.

[0006] In view of the above problems, the application provides a heterogeneous platform digital authentication method, comprising: generating an ECC algorithm key pair by a service center and issuing a digital certificate, wherein the digital certificate and a private key are held by a manufacturer; each platform obtains a unique ID in a factory state and sends the unique ID to the service center, the service center encrypts the unique ID by using a public key in the digital certificate, destroys the public key, and stores the ciphertext ID and the plaintext ID in a database to form a platform identity binding record; before software runs in a working state, the service center reads a plaintext ID of a platform to be authenticated and calls a corresponding ciphertext ID from the database, packs the read plaintext ID and the called ciphertext ID into a verification request package; sends the verification request package to a root authentication center for authentication, and encapsulates the plaintext ID, the ciphertext ID, an authentication result, a hash algorithm and a hash value into a response package and feeds back to the service center, the hash value is a hash value generated based on the plaintext ID, the ciphertext ID and the authentication result, and the hash value is used to check the data integrity of the response package; after receiving the response package, the service center performs comparison and verification of the platform identity binding record in the database to generate an authentication result.

[0007] The technical solution provided in the application has at least the following technical effects or advantages: by achieving the technical target of the security authentication mechanism based on the high-strength encryption algorithm and the hardware-level identity authentication, the technical effects of improving system security, enhancing platform credibility, protecting data integrity and preventing malicious attacks are achieved.

[0008] The above description is only a summary of the technical solution of the application. In order to more clearly understand the technical means of the application, the specific embodiments of the application can be implemented according to the content of the specification. In order to make the above and other purposes, characteristics and advantages of the application more obvious and easy to understand, the following specific embodiments of the application are described. It should be understood that the content described in this part is not intended to identify the key or important features of the embodiments of the application, nor is it used to limit the scope of the application. Other features of the application will become apparent from the following description. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0009] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the application or the prior art, the following will briefly introduce the drawings needed to be used in the embodiments or the prior art description. Obviously, the drawings in the following description are only exemplary, and those skilled in the art can obtain other drawings without creative labor on the basis of the provided drawings.

[0010] Figure 1 A flowchart of a heterogeneous platform digital authentication method of the application;

[0011] Figure 2A flowchart of a process of sending the verification request packet to a root authentication center for authentication in the digital authentication method of the heterogeneous platform. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0012] The present application provides a digital authentication method of a heterogeneous platform, which solves the technical problem in the prior art that the security of an authentication system is reduced due to the complexity of key management and the fact that keys are easily stolen, the security gradually decreases under high computing power attacks, and keys stored in a software end are easily maliciously extracted or tampered with, further affecting the reliability and integrity of a platform and data. The technical target of a security authentication mechanism based on a high-strength encryption algorithm and hardware-level identity authentication is achieved, and the technical effects of improving system security, enhancing platform credibility, guaranteeing data integrity, and preventing malicious attacks are achieved.

[0013] The technical solutions in the present application will be described clearly and completely below with reference to the drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some of the embodiments of the present application, rather than all the embodiments of the present application. It should be understood that the present application is not limited by the example embodiments described herein. Based on the embodiments of the present application, all other embodiments obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without creative work fall within the scope of protection of the present application. In addition, it should be noted that, for the convenience of description, only parts related to the present application are shown in the drawings rather than all parts.

[0014] Please refer to the drawings Figure 1 The present application provides a digital authentication method of a heterogeneous platform, which specifically includes the following steps:

[0015] S1: generating an ECC algorithm key pair by using a service center and issuing a digital certificate, wherein the digital certificate and a private key are held by a manufacturer.

[0016] Specifically, the service center is a central system responsible for managing and processing authentication requests, generating and maintaining key information required for encryption. The ECC algorithm is an Elliptic Curve Cryptography, a public-key encryption algorithm based on the mathematical structure of elliptic curves. A key pair refers to a pair of interrelated encryption keys, where the public key is used for encrypting data or performing identity verification, while the private key is used for decrypting data or generating digital signatures. By generating an ECC algorithm key pair using the service center, first, a secure elliptic curve is selected through the service center, and relevant elliptic curve parameters are set, such as defining the equation of the curve and the location of the base point. Elliptic curve parameters determine the security and calculation rules of the ECC algorithm. Next, a private key is randomly generated by the service center, which is an integer within a predefined range. Then, the public key is calculated using the private key by performing point multiplication of the base point of the elliptic curve according to the numerical value of the private key, resulting in a new point whose coordinates are the public key. Finally, the generated public key and private key are stored by the service center, and the public key is used for encryption and verification in subsequent processes, while the private key is strictly confidential and only allowed to be used by devices or authorized institutions.

[0017] After completing the generation of the key pair, the service center issues a digital certificate. The digital certificate is an electronic document that proves the ownership of the public key, issued by a certification authority (CA), which contains the holder's information, public key, signature of the issuing authority, and the validity period of the certificate, ensuring that both parties can securely exchange encrypted information while preventing man-in-the-middle attacks.

[0018] The digital certificate and private key are held by the manufacturer, meaning that the device manufacturer is responsible for maintaining the security of the key. The manufacturer refers to the producer of the device or the certification authority, which needs to ensure that the private key is not leaked, because if the private key is stolen, attackers can fake the device's identity or decrypt data that should be protected, to ensure that the device's identity authentication process is trustworthy and secure.

[0019] S2: Each platform obtains a unique ID in the factory state and sends it to the service center. The service center encrypts the unique ID using the public key in the digital certificate, destroys its own public key, and stores the ciphertext ID and plaintext ID in the database, forming a platform identity binding record.

[0020] Specifically, each platform refers to different hardware devices or computing platforms, including servers, smart terminals, Internet of Things devices, embedded systems, etc. Each platform needs to be authenticated in the security system to ensure its legitimacy and credibility. Since different platforms may have different computing capabilities and communication protocols, when designing the identity authentication mechanism, compatibility and scalability need to be considered to ensure that different types of platforms can safely access the system.

[0021] Factory state refers to the state of each platform just after production, before it is put into use. In the factory state, the hardware and software configurations of each platform are in the default state, without personalized settings or user binding. The platform in the factory state needs to go through an initialization process to ensure that it can safely access the network and accept remote management.

[0022] Unique ID refers to the unique identifier of the device, which can be a numerical value or a string, used to distinguish different platforms. The generation of the unique ID can be based on hardware characteristics, such as the physical address of the device, the manufacturing serial number, or a random identifier generated through an encryption algorithm. The role of the unique ID is to ensure that each platform can be uniquely identified, thereby preventing identity conflicts or forgery.

[0023] Each platform obtains the unique ID in the factory state, and each platform transmits its unique ID to the service center through network connection, preventing interception or tampering during transmission, and protecting it through the use of secure communication protocols such as TLS (Transport Layer Security) or other encryption methods. After receiving the unique ID, the service center will further process the information to ensure its authenticity and security.

[0024] The service center uses the public key in the digital certificate to encrypt the unique ID to improve security, ensuring that even if an attacker steals the stored ciphertext data, they cannot directly obtain the unique ID of the device.

[0025] After encryption is complete, the service center will destroy its own public key to enhance security and prevent malicious misuse of the public key. The role of the public key is to encrypt data, and after data encryption is complete, the public key is no longer needed, so destroying it can reduce potential attack risks. Even if an attacker infiltrates the service center, they cannot use the public key to further encrypt data or forge authentication requests.

[0026] The service center then stores the ciphertext ID and plaintext ID in the database, meaning that both the encrypted unique ID and the original unique ID are retained to facilitate comparison during subsequent identity verification processes. The ciphertext ID is used to improve the security of data storage, while the plaintext ID is used for fast indexing and matching. The choice of database usually needs to consider security, storage efficiency, and access speed, for example, a distributed key-value database can provide efficient storage and retrieval capabilities while supporting multi-node synchronization to improve reliability.

[0027] Finally, this process forms a platform identity binding record, that is, the unique ID of the device, the encrypted unique ID, and related identity information are stored in the database of the service center, and serve as the basis for subsequent authentication and management. This identity binding mechanism ensures the authenticity of the device, prevents identity forgery, and provides a trusted source of data for subsequent authentication processes.

[0028] S3: Before the working state software runs, the service center reads the plaintext ID of the platform to be authenticated and calls the corresponding ciphertext ID from the database, and packs the read plaintext ID and the called ciphertext ID into a verification request package.

[0029] Specifically, before the working software of each platform is formally run, identity authentication is required to ensure that its identity is consistent with the database record, so as to ensure the legality and security of the working software. The working state software refers to the software required by the platform in the normal running process, which may include system startup, network connection, security access and other functions.

[0030] The platform to be authenticated refers to a platform that is about to enter a working state and needs to be authenticated, such as a smart gateway, a connected car or an industrial control device. During the authentication process, the service center reads the plaintext ID of the platform to be authenticated to confirm whether the identity of the platform to be authenticated has been registered, and retrieves the corresponding information from the database.

[0031] The database is a system for storing device identity information, containing the plaintext ID and ciphertext ID of all registered devices. The service center finds the corresponding ciphertext ID in the database according to the read plaintext ID, and extracts it. The ciphertext ID is an encrypted version of the device identity, generated by a public key encryption algorithm, and cannot be directly read to protect the platform identity information from tampering or forgery.

[0032] The read plaintext ID and the called ciphertext ID both belong to the identity information of the platform, and then the read plaintext ID and the called ciphertext ID are packed into a verification request package, that is, the service center combines the two data together for identity verification. Packing means encapsulating multiple data items in a specific format for transmission and processing in the network. The verification request package is a structured data package containing plaintext ID and ciphertext ID. After the service center generates the request package, it will be sent to the authentication center, which will further verify the identity of the device.

[0033] S4: Send the verification request package to the root authentication center for authentication, and pack the plaintext ID, ciphertext ID, authentication result, hash algorithm and hash value into a response package and feed back to the service center. The hash value is a hash value generated based on the plaintext ID, ciphertext ID and authentication result, and is used to verify the data integrity of the response package.

[0034] Specifically, sending the verification request package to the root authentication center for authentication means that in the authentication process, the service center needs to submit the verification request package containing the plaintext ID and the ciphertext ID to the root authentication center for identity verification. The verification request package contains the plaintext ID and the ciphertext ID of the device. The root authentication center is responsible for verifying the matching of these IDs to determine whether the device is legal. Among them, the root authentication center will use the stored private key to decrypt the ciphertext ID to recover the original unique ID, and then compare it with the plaintext ID to determine whether the platform is real and effective. If the comparison is successful, it means that the identity of the platform is trustworthy, otherwise the device may be counterfeit or tampered with, and the root authentication center will reject its authentication request.

[0035] After completing the authentication, the root authentication center needs to generate a response package and encapsulate the plaintext ID, ciphertext ID, authentication result, hash algorithm and hash value in it. The response package is a data structure that contains all the key data of the authentication process for the service center to perform subsequent verification. The authentication result is a flag indicating whether the authentication is successful or failed, indicating whether the platform has passed the authentication, the hash algorithm is used to calculate the hash value, and the hash value is used to ensure the integrity of the data.

[0036] The hash value is a fixed-length string calculated by combining the plaintext ID, ciphertext ID and authentication result using the hash algorithm, which is used to ensure that the data has not been tampered with during transmission. The hash algorithm is a mathematical function that maps input data to a fixed-length hash value, which is irreversible and unique, so even a slight change in the input data will result in a completely different hash value.

[0037] The hash value is used to verify the data integrity of the response package, which means that after the service center receives the response package from the root authentication center, it will use the same hash algorithm to recalculate the hash value and compare it with the hash value in the response package. If they are the same, it means that the data in the response package has not been modified during transmission, otherwise the data may have been tampered with, and the service center needs to reject the response package.

[0038] S5: The service center receives the response package and performs comparison verification of the platform identity binding record in the database to generate an authentication result.

[0039] Specifically, when the response packet returns from the root authentication center, it contains key information such as plaintext ID, ciphertext ID, authentication result, etc. The service center needs to compare these data with the identity binding record stored in the database in advance. The identity binding record stored in the database is uploaded by the manufacturer when the platform is manufactured, containing the unique identity information of the platform, so that the comparison process can ensure that the currently authenticated platform is consistent with the identity information at the time of manufacture. After the comparison verification is completed, the service center will generate the final authentication result according to the comparison result and decide the subsequent processing flow. If the comparison is successful, it means that the identity of the platform is legal, and the related functions of the platform can continue to be used. If the comparison fails, it means that the identity information of the platform does not match the record in the database, which may be a platform trying to impersonate a legal platform, or the data has been tampered with during transmission. The service center will reject the access request of the platform and may trigger a security alarm.

[0040] Further, the present application also includes: after parsing the response packet, using the parsed hash algorithm to calculate the hash value based on the plaintext ID, ciphertext ID, and authentication result to generate a verification hash value; judging whether the verification hash value is the same as the hash value, if the verification hash value is different from the hash value, generating a tampering exception and reporting the tampering exception.

[0041] Specifically, the parsing of the response packet means that after the service center receives the response packet returned by the root authentication center, it needs to disassemble the data structure in it and extract each key field. The response packet contains multiple data items, including plaintext ID, ciphertext ID, authentication result, hash algorithm, and hash value. The parsing process involves data format recognition, field extraction, and data storage. After completing the parsing, the service center will use the parsed hash algorithm to calculate the hash value of the plaintext ID, ciphertext ID, and authentication result, thereby generating a verification hash value. The hash algorithm can convert input data of any length into a fixed-length output value, so that even if the input data changes slightly, the output hash value will change significantly.

[0042] After calculating the verification hash value, the service center needs to compare it with the hash value in the response packet to determine whether they are consistent. If the verification hash value is the same as the hash value in the response packet, it means that the data has not been modified during transmission, and the authentication result is valid; if they are different, it means that the data may have been tampered with or attacked during transmission, and the authentication result cannot be trusted.

[0043] If the verification hash value is not consistent with the hash value in the response packet, a tampering exception is generated and reported. Tampering exception is a security event indicating that the authentication data has been tampered with or forged, which needs to trigger a security mechanism for processing. The reporting method can be to send an alarm message to the administrator or record logs for subsequent analysis.

[0044] Furthermore, this application also includes: when the verification hash value is the same as the hash value, generating a result indicating that the data has not been tampered with; calling the plaintext ID, ciphertext ID, and authentication result to perform a secondary comparison of the platform identity binding record to complete the comparison and verification.

[0045] Specifically, when the verification hash value matches the verification hash value, it indicates that the data has not been altered during transmission, thus generating a result indicating that the data has not been tampered with. The verification hash value is calculated by the service center using a hash algorithm based on the parsed plaintext ID, ciphertext ID, and authentication result. The root authentication center calculates and includes the hash value in the response packet it generates. If the two are the same, it means that the entire data stream remains consistent and has not been tampered with.

[0046] After confirming that the data has not been tampered with, a second comparison is performed using the plaintext ID, encrypted ID, and authentication result to verify the platform's identity binding record. This second comparison aims to ensure that the platform's identity matches the identity binding record in the database, preventing potential forgery or replay attacks. This step requires accessing the database to extract the plaintext ID and encrypted ID stored at the time of the platform's manufacture and matching them with the currently parsed data. If the match is successful, the platform's identity is considered trustworthy, and subsequent authentication processes can continue. If the match fails, the platform's identity is abnormal, potentially indicating an unauthorized platform attempting to impersonate a legitimate one.

[0047] Furthermore, such as Figure 2 As shown, S4 of this application includes: S41: The root authentication center uses the pre-stored private key to decrypt the encrypted ID to obtain the original unique ID; S42: The root authentication center uses the built-in DNA extraction module to extract its own hardware unique ID and compares it with the original unique ID. If the comparison results are consistent, an authentication result with a true verification result is generated.

[0048] Specifically, the root authentication authority (ROA) is responsible for verifying the authenticity of a platform and ensuring that its identity information has not been tampered with. The ROA consists of a highly secure hardware platform (such as an FPGA, TPM, or HSM) capable of performing critical operations such as encryption, decryption, and identity verification. After a platform submits an authentication request, the ROA uses a securely stored key to decrypt the request and verify the platform's uniqueness.

[0049] A pre-stored private key refers to a private key that is stored in advance within the root certification authority. The private key is used in pairs with the public key, exists only within the root certification authority, and cannot be accessed or tampered with externally.

[0050] The root authentication center uses the pre-stored private key to decrypt the ciphertext ID, uses the private key to perform reverse calculation on the ciphertext data to restore the original plaintext information, and then obtains the original unique ID. Since the ciphertext ID is encrypted by the public key, only the corresponding private key can complete the decryption process, ensuring the security of the platform identity information. The decryption process involves the elliptic curve encryption algorithm (ECC). In the decryption process, the root authentication center performs mathematical operations to convert the ciphertext back to the original data to verify the validity of the platform identity. The original unique ID refers to the unique identifier assigned to the platform at the factory without encryption, used to distinguish different platforms.

[0051] The root authentication center is implemented based on FPGA, trusted platform module (TPM) or dedicated hardware security module (HSM), and is built-in with multiple security function modules to support identity verification, encryption and decryption, and integrity verification. Since the main responsibility of the root authentication center is to ensure the uniqueness of the platform identity, it can read and verify the hardware identity information of the platform to prevent counterfeit or illegal platforms from accessing the system. The DNA extraction module is a special module inside the root authentication center, used to extract the unique hardware identification information of the platform. DNA extraction refers to a hardware feature extraction method based on physical unclonable function (PUF). PUF utilizes the tiny physical differences generated during the semiconductor manufacturing process to make each hardware unique. The DNA extraction module can read the hardware features and convert them into a unique hardware ID for identity verification.

[0052] The root authentication center extracts its own hardware unique ID using the built-in DNA extraction module. The hardware unique ID is a natural and unchangeable identification code generated during the manufacturing process of each platform, which can be extracted in multiple ways, such as reading the fuse information stored in the chip, calculating the identity code using PUF technology, or generating a random sequence based on hardware circuit characteristics. The hardware unique ID is used to distinguish different platforms and cannot be tampered with by software.

[0053] The hardware unique ID is compared with the original unique ID stored in the database to determine whether they are consistent, and then the authenticity of the platform identity is confirmed. The comparison process is completed through hash operation or direct numerical comparison. If the comparison result is consistent, it means that the platform identity is legal, and the root authentication center will generate an authentication result that the platform is true and return it to the service center, indicating that the platform has passed the identity authentication. The authentication result is the final output of the platform authentication process, which determines whether the platform can run normally.

[0054] Further, the application also includes: if the comparison result is inconsistent, stop running.

[0055] Specifically, the hardware unique ID is compared with the original unique ID stored in the database. If the comparison result is inconsistent, it indicates that the platform identity information may be tampered with, or the platform is a fake platform. At this time, the root authentication center generates an authentication result that the verification result is false, and returns it to the service center. The service center will terminate the authentication process and prevent the platform from continuing to run to prevent illegal platforms from accessing the system.

[0056] Further, the application also includes that the pre-stored private key of the root authentication center is generated by a physically unclonable function, and the private key is only solidified in the encrypted storage area of the root authentication center and is prohibited from external reading and writing.

[0057] Specifically, the root authentication center is the core component of the identity authentication system, responsible for storing and managing the key keys for platform authentication. The pre-stored private key refers to the private key generated and stored when the root authentication center is initialized, used for decryption and signature verification of received data. The private key is paired with the public key and must be kept secret to ensure the security of identity authentication. The pre-stored private key means that the pre-stored private key has been generated before the platform is put into use, and will not be modified during normal operation. Physically unclonable function (PUF) is a security technology based on hardware physical characteristics, used to ensure the uniqueness and non-replicability of the private key. PUF utilizes the tiny physical differences produced during semiconductor manufacturing to make each chip have unique electrical characteristics that cannot be emulated or copied by software. Based on PUF technology, the root authentication center can randomly generate private keys at the hardware level without storing them in vulnerable storage platforms.

[0058] The private key is only solidified in the encrypted storage area of the root authentication center, which means that the private key will be stored in a dedicated secure area inside the platform after generation, and will not be stored in ordinary memory or external storage media. The encrypted storage area is the internal storage unit of the hardware security module (HSM), trusted platform module (TPM) or FPGA, which has tamper-proof, copy-proof and self-destruction mechanisms to ensure that the private key cannot be illegally read or modified.

[0059] Prohibiting external reading and writing means that once the private key is stored in the encrypted storage area, it cannot be accessed, read or modified by external systems. Even if the software or operating system of the platform fails, the private key cannot be extracted to prevent hackers or malicious software from stealing the key.

[0060] Further, the application also includes: the root authentication center is an FPGA, and the root authentication center is internally provided with an ECC algorithm module, a DNA module and a verification module, the ECC algorithm module is used for performing encryption, decryption and signature operations, the DNA module is used for extracting a unique ID of the FPGA through a hardware primitive, and the verification module is used for comparing consistency of the decrypted hardware unique ID and an original unique ID.

[0061] Specifically, the root authentication center is responsible for the final authentication of platform identity. The root authentication center adopts an FPGA as a hardware platform, and the FPGA is a programmable logic device that can be flexibly configured according to different needs, has reconfigurability, high performance and lower power consumption compared with a fixed logic chip. In the identity authentication process, the FPGA is responsible for performing key computing tasks, including encryption, decryption, identity verification and the like. Since the FPGA can process multiple computing tasks in parallel, the authentication efficiency can be improved when facing large-scale platform identity authentication.

[0062] The root authentication center is internally provided with an ECC algorithm module, a DNA module and a verification module, each of which has a specific function. The ECC algorithm module is used for performing encryption, decryption and signature operations. ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) is a modern encryption algorithm, and compared with the RSA algorithm, the ECC algorithm has a shorter key length and smaller calculation amount under the condition of providing the same security, and is thus suitable for a platform environment with limited resources. Through the ECC algorithm module, the root authentication center can efficiently encrypt and decrypt platform identity information, and ensure data authenticity through digital signature.

[0063] The DNA module is used for extracting a unique ID of the FPGA through a hardware primitive. The unique ID of the FPGA is similar to the fingerprint of each person, and each FPGA has unique hardware characteristics when it is shipped, and these characteristics can be extracted through the DNA module to ensure the uniqueness of platform identity. The hardware primitive is a bottom-layer hardware characteristic, and different bit stream information is generated through subtle differences in circuit technology, thereby forming a unique platform identifier.

[0064] The function of the verification module is to compare consistency of the decrypted hardware unique ID and the original unique ID. In the authentication process, the root authentication center decrypts the original unique ID from the ciphertext ID, extracts the hardware unique ID of the current FPGA through the DNA module, and then compares the two IDs through the verification module. If the two IDs are completely consistent, it indicates that the identity of the FPGA has not changed, and the authentication can be passed normally; if the two IDs are inconsistent, it indicates that the platform identity may be tampered with or forged, and a security alarm needs to be triggered.

[0065] Further, the application further comprises: the hash value in the response packet is generated by the hash algorithm, and the hash value is generated based on the hash algorithm after the plaintext ID, the ciphertext ID and the authentication result are spliced according to a preset rule.

[0066] Specifically, the response packet refers to the data packet returned by the root authentication center to the service center after completing identity authentication, which contains key information for authentication. The hash value is an important field in the response packet, which is generated by the hash algorithm and can ensure data integrity. The hash value is a fixed-length data digest generated by mathematical transformation on input data. Any slight change in input data will cause a change in the hash value. Therefore, in the authentication process, the role of the hash value is to prevent data from being tampered with during transmission or storage.

[0067] The generation of the hash value depends on the hash algorithm, and the length and characteristics of the hash values generated by different hash algorithms are different. In the identity authentication process, it is crucial to choose the appropriate hash algorithm, because the collision resistance and computational efficiency of the hash algorithm will affect the security and performance of the authentication system.

[0068] Before generating the hash value, the plaintext ID, the ciphertext ID and the authentication result are spliced according to a preset rule. The plaintext ID is the unique identification information of the platform, which is stored and transmitted in plaintext form; the ciphertext ID is the unique identification after encryption, which is used to prevent identity information from being leaked; the authentication result is the result of the root authentication center verifying the platform identity, which is usually a flag indicating the success or failure of authentication. In order to ensure the consistency of hash calculation, these data need to be spliced according to the preset rule, which can be fixed order string connection, binary encoding format or other structured way.

[0069] Further, the application further comprises: the ciphertext ID and the plaintext ID are stored in the database in the form of key-value pairs.

[0070] Specifically, the ciphertext ID refers to the unique identifier processed by the encryption algorithm, that is, the unique ID of the platform is subjected to encryption operation before storage, generating irreversible ciphertext format. The role of the ciphertext ID is to protect the identity information of the platform, so that even if the database is attacked or leaked, the real identity of the platform will not be directly exposed. The encryption algorithm can use asymmetric encryption, symmetric encryption or hash algorithm, and different algorithms have different security and computational overhead. Compared with plaintext storage, ciphertext storage can effectively reduce the security risk caused by data leakage.

[0071] The plaintext ID refers to the original unique identifier of the platform, i.e., the unique ID that has not been encrypted. The plaintext ID is used for fast indexing and lookup, and querying plaintext data directly is more efficient than querying encrypted data. Although the plaintext ID is stored in the database, its access rights are usually strictly limited, and only authorized systems or modules can read it to prevent data from being illegally obtained or tampered with. The role of the plaintext ID is to provide reference information for identity binding, facilitating comparison and verification during the authentication process.

[0072] Storage in the form of key-value pairs means that the database uses a key-value (Key-Value) data structure to store information, i.e., each ciphertext ID as a key (Key) and the corresponding plaintext ID as a value (Value), forming a one-to-one correspondence. The advantage of the key-value pair storage structure is the efficient query and indexing capability, especially suitable for large-scale data storage scenarios. Compared with traditional relational databases, key-value databases can provide faster read speeds and adapt to dynamic expansion needs. When storing, the ciphertext ID serves as a unique index key to ensure that data in the database is not duplicated, while the plaintext ID serves as associated data, providing the original identity information of the platform.

[0073] The database is a system for storing, managing, and querying data, which can be a relational database (such as MySQL, PostgreSQL) or a non-relational database (such as Redis, MongoDB). In the context of platform identity management, the database needs to have high concurrent processing capability, strong consistency guarantee, and high availability to support a large number of platform identity storage and verification requests. The design of the database will consider data redundancy, distributed storage, and access control to ensure the security and scalability of the data. Table 1 is the latest platform encryption record.

[0074] Table 1: Latest Platform Encryption Record

[0075]

[0076]

[0077] Further, the present application also includes: the database is a distributed key-value database, and the database supports multi-node synchronization verification.

[0078] Specifically, a database is a system for storing, managing, and retrieving data. The database is used to store the identity information of the platform, including the ciphertext ID and the plaintext ID. The choice of the database affects the speed, reliability, and scalability of data access, so when it comes to large-scale platform management, it is necessary to choose the appropriate type of database. A distributed database is a data storage method characterized by the fact that data is not stored on a single server but is distributed across multiple physical or logical nodes. Compared to centralized databases, distributed databases have stronger scalability and can handle large-scale data storage requirements while improving data disaster recovery capabilities.

[0079] A key-value database is a database that stores data in the form of key-value pairs. The key uniquely identifies the data, and the value stores the specific content. The ciphertext ID is used as the key, and the plaintext ID is used as the value, which are stored in the database. Unlike relational databases, key-value databases have fast query speeds and are suitable for large-scale, high-concurrency scenarios, especially in identity authentication systems, where they can quickly find the identity information of the platform and improve authentication efficiency.

[0080] A distributed key-value database combines the features of distributed databases and key-value databases, providing large-scale storage capabilities while ensuring efficient data queries. In large-scale platform authentication systems, a single node's database may struggle to handle high concurrency, so a distributed architecture is needed to store data across multiple nodes to improve stability, even if a node fails, it will not affect the normal operation of the entire database.

[0081] Multi-node synchronization verification means that the data in the database is consistent across multiple nodes, that is, when the data of one node changes, the data of other nodes will also be updated synchronously to ensure data consistency and reliability. In the identity authentication scenario, if a node's database records the latest authentication status of the platform, but other nodes have not been updated synchronously, it may lead to incorrect authentication results. Therefore, multi-node synchronization verification can prevent security risks caused by inconsistent data.

[0082] In summary, the heterogeneous platform digital authentication method provided by the present application has the following technical effects: it achieves the technical goal of implementing a secure authentication mechanism based on high-strength encryption algorithms and hardware-level identity authentication, and achieves the technical effects of improving system security, enhancing platform credibility, protecting data integrity, and preventing malicious attacks.

[0083] The foregoing description of the disclosed embodiments enables a person skilled in the art to make or use the application. Numerous modifications to these embodiments will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art, and the generic principles defined herein can be applied to other embodiments without the use of the inventive faculty. Therefore, the present application is not intended to be limited to the embodiments shown herein but is to be accorded the widest scope consistent with the principles and novel features disclosed herein.

[0084] It will be readily apparent to one skilled in the art that varying substitutions and modifications can be made to the application disclosed herein without departing from the scope and spirit of the application. Moreover, it is the intent that all such variations and modifications be included within the scope of the application and present disclosure. The application is based on U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 60 / 775, 1 10, filed February 17, 2006, the contents of which are relied upon and incorporated herein by reference in their entirety.

Claims

1. A heterogeneous platform digital authentication method, characterized by, The method comprises: generating an ECC algorithm key pair by a service center and issuing a digital certificate, wherein the digital certificate and a private key are held by a manufacturer; each platform acquires a unique ID in a factory state and sends the unique ID to the service center, the service center encrypts the unique ID by using a public key in the digital certificate, destroys the public key, and stores the encrypted ID and the plaintext ID in a database to form a platform identity binding record; before running of software in a working state, the service center reads a plaintext ID of a platform to be authenticated and calls a corresponding encrypted ID from the database, and packs the read plaintext ID and the called encrypted ID into a verification request package; sending the verification request package to a root authentication center for authentication, and encapsulating the plaintext ID, the encrypted ID, an authentication result, a hash algorithm and a hash value into a response package and feeding back to the service center, the hash value being a hash value generated based on the plaintext ID, the encrypted ID and the authentication result, and the hash value being used for checking data integrity of the response package; after receiving the response package, the service center performs comparison and verification of the platform identity binding record in the database to generate an authentication result; the sending of the verification request package to the root authentication center for authentication comprises: the root authentication center uses a pre-stored private key to decrypt the encrypted ID to obtain an original unique ID; the root authentication center extracts a hardware unique ID of itself by using a built-in DNA extraction module and compares the hardware unique ID with the original unique ID, and if the comparison result is consistent, an authentication result of true is generated; the root authentication center extracts a hardware unique ID of itself by using a built-in DNA extraction module and compares the hardware unique ID with the original unique ID, and if the comparison result is inconsistent, the root authentication center stops running; the pre-stored private key of the root authentication center is generated by a physically unclonable function, and the private key is only solidified in an encrypted storage area of the root authentication center and is prohibited from being read and written externally.

2. The heterogeneous platform digital authentication method of claim 1, wherein, before the service center receives the response package and performs comparison and verification of the platform identity binding record in the database, it comprises: after analyzing the response package, a verification hash value is generated by using the analyzed hash algorithm to calculate a hash value based on the plaintext ID, the encrypted ID and the authentication result; it is judged whether the verification hash value is the same as the hash value, if the verification hash value is different from the hash value, a tampering exception is generated and a tampering exception is reported.

3. The heterogeneous platform digital authentication method of claim 2, wherein, the comparison and verification of the platform identity binding record in the database comprises: if the verification hash value is the same as the hash value, a data un-tampered result is generated; the plaintext ID, the encrypted ID and the authentication result are called for secondary comparison of the platform identity binding record to complete the comparison and verification.

4. The heterogeneous platform digital authentication method of claim 1, wherein, the root authentication center is an FPGA, and the root authentication center is built-in with an ECC algorithm module, a DNA module and a verification module, the ECC algorithm module is used for performing encryption, decryption and signature operation, the DNA module is used for extracting a unique ID of the FPGA through a hardware primitive, and the verification module is used for comparing consistency of the decrypted hardware unique ID and the original unique ID.

5. The heterogeneous platform digital authentication method of claim 1, wherein, The hash value in the response packet is generated by the hash algorithm, and the hash value is generated based on the hash algorithm after the plaintext ID, the ciphertext ID and the authentication result are spliced according to a preset rule.

6. The heterogeneous platform digital authentication method of claim 1, wherein, The ciphertext ID and the plaintext ID are stored in the database in the form of a key-value pair.

7. The heterogeneous platform digital authentication method of claim 1, wherein, The database is a distributed key-value database, and the database supports multi-node synchronization verification.

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