Intelligent electric meter data transmission method and system based on dynamic key management

Abstract

The invention discloses an intelligent electric meter data transmission method and system based on dynamic key management, and the method comprises the steps: a master station generates a temporary private key through a quantum random number generator, and carries out the key negotiation with an intelligent electric meter through an improved Diffie-Hellman algorithm based on the temporary private key, so as to generate a dynamic master key; the intelligent electric meter generates an encryption key and a verification key through a one-way hash function according to the equipment identifier, the current timestamp and a dynamic master key issued by the master station, so as to encrypt and sign the fragmented user power consumption data to obtain fragmented encryption data and fragmented signature data; sending the fragmented encrypted data and the fragmented signature data to a master station through a dynamically selected base station; and the master station performs integrity verification on the fragmented signature data and decrypts the fragmented encrypted data to generate user power consumption data. The dynamic key management in the application improves the attack resistance, and ensures the high security of the data of the intelligent electric meter in the transmission process.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of smart meters, and particularly to a method and system for transmitting smart meter data based on dynamic key management. Background Art

[0002] In a smart grid, as a key terminal device, a smart meter not only has the basic metering function of a traditional electricity meter, but also has functions of data collection, remote communication, and control. In order to ensure the privacy, legality, and non-repudiation of the communication data interaction process when the smart meter communicates with the master station through a base station, its security key management is crucial. In the prior art, a static key management method is usually adopted to manage keys, but the static key management method has defects such as long-term unchanged keys, easy leakage, and update relying on manual intervention, which are difficult to cope with complex network attacks and cannot meet the high-security requirements of smart meter data transmission. Summary of the Invention

[0003] Embodiments of the present invention provide a method and system for transmitting smart meter data based on dynamic key management, aiming to solve the problem that the existing key management has poor anti-attack ability and cannot meet the high security requirements of smart meter data transmission.

[0004] In a first aspect, the present invention provides a method for transmitting smart meter data based on dynamic key management, including: The master station uses a quantum random number generator to generate a temporary private key, and based on the temporary private key, negotiates a key with the smart meter through an improved Diffie-Hellman algorithm to generate a dynamic master key, and sends the dynamic master key to the smart meter; The smart meter generates an encryption key through a one-way hash function according to the device identifier, the current timestamp, and the dynamic master key, and generates a verification key through the one-way hash function according to the encryption key; The smart meter encrypts the segmented user electricity consumption data according to the encryption key to obtain segmented encrypted data, signs the segmented encrypted data according to the verification key to obtain segmented signature data, and sends the segmented encrypted data and the segmented signature data to the master station through a dynamically selected base station; The master station performs integrity verification on the segmented signature data according to the encryption key and the verification key synchronized by the smart meter, and decrypts the segmented encrypted data to generate the user electricity consumption data.

[0005] In a second aspect, the present invention further provides a system for transmitting smart meter data based on dynamic key management, including: a first generation unit and a verification generation unit configured in the master station, and a second generation unit and an encryption and signature unit configured in the smart meter, wherein: The first generation unit is used for the master station to generate a temporary private key by using a quantum random number generator, and perform key negotiation with the smart meter based on the temporary private key through an improved Diffie-Hellman algorithm to generate a dynamic master key, and send the dynamic master key to the smart meter; The second generation unit is used for the smart meter to generate an encryption key through a one-way hash function according to the device identifier, the current timestamp, and the dynamic master key, and generate a verification key through the one-way hash function according to the encryption key; The encryption and signature unit is used for the smart meter to encrypt the sharded user electricity consumption data according to the encryption key to obtain sharded encrypted data, and sign the sharded encrypted data according to the verification key to obtain sharded signature data, and send the sharded encrypted data and the sharded signature data to the master station through a dynamically selected base station; The verification and generation unit is used for the master station to perform integrity verification on the sharded signature data and decrypt the sharded encrypted data to generate the user electricity consumption data according to the encryption key and the verification key synchronized by the smart meter.

[0006] The present invention provides an intelligent meter data transmission method and system based on dynamic key management. The method includes: the master station uses a quantum random number generator to generate a temporary private key, and negotiates a key with the intelligent meter based on the temporary private key through an improved Diffie-Hellman algorithm to generate a dynamic master key, and sends the dynamic master key to the intelligent meter; the intelligent meter generates an encryption key according to the device identifier, the current timestamp, and the dynamic master key through a one-way hash function, and generates a verification key according to the encryption key through the one-way hash function; the intelligent meter encrypts the sliced user electricity consumption data according to the encryption key to obtain sliced encrypted data, and signs the sliced encrypted data according to the verification key to obtain sliced signature data, and sends the sliced encrypted data and the sliced signature data to the master station through a dynamically selected base station; the master station verifies the integrity of the sliced signature data according to the encryption key and the verification key synchronized by the intelligent meter, and decrypts the sliced encrypted data to generate the user electricity consumption data. This application uses a quantum random number generator to generate a temporary private key, and negotiates with the intelligent meter based on the temporary private key through an improved Diffie-Hellman algorithm to generate a dynamic master key, which can resist quantum attacks and ensure the security of the dynamic master key; and generates an encryption key and a verification key according to the device identifier, the current timestamp, and the dynamic master key through a one-way hash function, realizing "one-time one-key" for the key, preventing replay attacks, and improving the security of the encryption key and the verification key; encrypts and signs the sliced user electricity consumption data, and sends the encrypted sliced encrypted data and the signed sliced signature data to the master station through a dynamically selected base station. The master station generates the user electricity consumption data before slicing according to the encryption key and the verification key synchronized by the intelligent meter, ensuring high security of the intelligent meter data during the transmission process. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0007] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the following will briefly introduce the drawings required for the description of the embodiments. Obviously, the following drawings are some embodiments of the present invention. For those of ordinary skill in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative efforts.

[0008] Figure 1 Shows a schematic flowchart of the intelligent meter data transmission method based on dynamic key management according to an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 2 Shows a sub-flowchart of the intelligent meter data transmission method based on dynamic key management according to an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 3 Shows another sub-flowchart of the intelligent meter data transmission method based on dynamic key management according to an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 4 Shows another sub - process schematic diagram of the intelligent meter data transmission method based on dynamic key management according to an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 5 Shows a block schematic diagram of the intelligent meter data transmission system based on dynamic key management according to an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed implementation manners

[0009] Next, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described in conjunction with the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, rather than all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without creative efforts belong to the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0010] The direction terms mentioned in the present invention, such as "up", "down", "front", "rear", "left", "right", "inside", "outside", "side", etc., are only with reference to the directions in the attached drawings. Therefore, the direction terms used are for explaining and understanding the present invention, rather than for limiting the present invention. In addition, in the drawings, structures that are similar or the same are denoted by the same reference numerals.

[0011] An embodiment of the present invention proposes an intelligent meter data transmission method and system based on dynamic key management, which solves the problem that the existing key management has poor anti - attack ability and cannot meet the high security requirements of intelligent meter data transmission. In this embodiment, a quantum random number generator is used to generate a temporary private key, and based on the temporary private key, an improved Diffie - Hellman algorithm is used to negotiate with the intelligent meter to generate a dynamic master key, which can resist quantum attacks and ensure the security of the dynamic master key; and according to the device identifier, the current timestamp, and the dynamic master key, an encryption key and a verification key are generated through a one - way hash function, realizing "one - time - one - key" for the keys, preventing replay attacks, and improving the security of the encryption key and the verification key; the sharded user electricity consumption data is encrypted and signed, and the encrypted sharded encrypted data and the signed sharded signature data are sent to the master station through a dynamically selected base station. The master station generates the user electricity consumption data before sharding according to the encryption key and the verification key synchronized by the intelligent meter, ensuring the high security of the intelligent meter data during the transmission process.

[0012] In order to better understand the above - mentioned technical solutions, the above - mentioned technical solutions will be described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings of the specification and specific implementation manners.

[0013] An embodiment of the present invention proposes an intelligent meter data transmission method based on dynamic key management. This intelligent meter data transmission method based on dynamic key management can be used in an intelligent meter data transmission system based on dynamic key management. The intelligent meter data transmission system based on dynamic key management includes a master station and intelligent meters. The units configured in the master station and intelligent meters and the functions implemented within the units will be described in detail in the following embodiments. For simplicity of description, they will not be elaborated here. Please refer to Figure 1 , Figure 1 which shows a schematic flowchart of the intelligent meter data transmission method based on dynamic key management according to an embodiment of the present invention. As Figure 1 shown, the intelligent meter data transmission method based on dynamic key management includes steps: S110 - S140.

[0014] S110. The master station uses a quantum random number generator to generate a temporary private key, and based on the temporary private key, performs key negotiation with the intelligent meter through an improved Diffie - Hellman algorithm to generate a dynamic master key, and sends the dynamic master key to the intelligent meter.

[0015] In this embodiment, the master station uses a quantum random number generator to generate a temporary private key, avoiding the prediction of the pseudo - random number algorithm. After generating the temporary private key, the master station calculates the master station public key through elliptic curve scalar multiplication based on the temporary private key, and sends the master station public key to the intelligent meter, so that the intelligent meter uses the quantum random number generator to generate a quantum random private key, and calculates the meter public key through elliptic curve scalar multiplication based on the quantum random private key; the master station receives the meter public key returned by the intelligent meter, and generates a master station shared key based on the temporary private key and the meter public key, and negotiates a shared key with the intelligent meter based on the meter shared key generated by the intelligent meter according to the quantum random private key and the master station public key; the master station encrypts the shared key through NTRU public key to generate the dynamic master key. It should be noted that in this embodiment, through secondary encryption with NTRU public key, it can resist the attack of quantum computing on elliptic curves. It should also be noted that in this embodiment, even if an attacker intercepts the master station public key and the meter public key, due to the inability to crack the elliptic curve cryptography discrete logarithm problem and the NTRU encryption layer, the dynamic master key cannot be obtained. NTRU (Nth - degree Truncated Polynomial Ring Unit) is a public - key cryptosystem based on lattice cryptography. It can be understood that the improved Diffie - Hellman algorithm realizes dynamic key management with anti - quantum attack, forward security, and high randomness through a triple mechanism of temporary private key + key negotiation + NTRU secondary encryption, and is suitable for high - security - requirement scenarios such as intelligent meters.

[0016] S120. The smart meter generates an encryption key based on the device identifier, the current timestamp, and the dynamic master key through a one-way hash function, and generates a verification key based on the encryption key through the one-way hash function.

[0017] In this embodiment, after receiving the dynamic master key sent by the master station, the smart meter generates a verification key based on the device identifier, the current timestamp, and the dynamic master key through a one-way hash function, where the device identifier is the unique hardware identifier of the smart meter (such as a 128-bit unique code). It should be noted that in this embodiment, the one-way hash function is the SHA-3 hash function, and the SHA-3 hash function has strong resistance to quantum computing attacks. It should also be noted that in this embodiment, the current timestamp ensures that the generated key changes dynamically each time, that is, the generated verification key changes each time.

[0018] In one embodiment, such as this embodiment, as Figure 2 shown, step S120 specifically includes steps S121 - S125: S121. The smart meter splices the device identifier and the current timestamp to generate an identification time, and inputs the identification time into the one-way hash function to generate an initial hash value; S122. The smart meter decodes the dynamic master key through the NTRU private key to obtain the shared key, where the NTRU private key and the NTRU public key are a key pair; S123. The smart meter performs an exclusive OR calculation on the shared key and the initial hash value to obtain a target hash value; S124. The smart meter splices the target hash value and a first preset hash value to obtain a first spliced hash, and inputs the first spliced hash into the one-way hash function to obtain a first target hash; S125. The smart meter selects the value of the first preset bits of the first target hash as the encryption key.

[0019] In this embodiment, the smart meter uses the identification time generated by concatenating the device identification and the current timestamp as the input seed value of the one-way hash function, ensuring the uniqueness of the seed value. The SHA-3 hash function is used to generate the initial hash value. Specifically, the SHA-3-256 hash function is used to generate the initial hash value. The one-way property of the SHA-3-256 hash function ensures that the input seed value cannot be deduced reversely from the initial hash value. It should be noted that the NTRU private key and the NTRU public key are a key pair in the NTRU algorithm. The smart meter performs an exclusive OR calculation on the shared key and the initial hash value to obtain the target hash value. Specifically, it performs a bitwise exclusive OR. The bitwise exclusive OR calculation can increase randomness and confusion, avoiding directly exposing the shared key. Moreover, the exclusive OR operation is very suitable for the resource-constrained environment of the smart meter due to its low computational complexity. It should also be noted that in this embodiment, the preset bit is 128 bits. In other embodiments, the preset bit is determined according to the actual situation.

[0020] Further, generating the verification key according to the encryption key through the one-way hash function includes: the smart meter concatenates the encryption key and a second preset hash value to obtain a second concatenated hash, and inputs the second concatenated hash into the one-way hash function to obtain a second target hash; the smart meter selects the value of the first preset bit of the second target hash as the verification key. It should be noted that in this embodiment, the first preset hash value and the second preset hash value are different constants, ensuring that the encryption key and the verification key are independent and uncorrelated.

[0021] S130. The smart meter encrypts the sharded user power consumption data according to the encryption key to obtain sharded encrypted data, signs the sharded encrypted data according to the verification key to obtain sharded signature data, and sends the sharded encrypted data and the sharded signature data to the master station through a dynamically selected base station.

[0022] In this embodiment, after the smart meter generates the encryption key and the verification key, it encrypts, signs, and sends the collected user power consumption data according to the encryption key and the verification key. Specifically, as Figure 3As shown in the figure, step S130 specifically includes steps S131 - S134: S131. The smart meter slices the collected user power consumption data to obtain multiple different sliced power consumption data, and encrypts the multiple different sliced power consumption data through the AES encryption algorithm according to the encryption key to obtain multiple different encrypted power consumption data, and uses the multiple different encrypted power consumption data as the sliced encrypted data; S132. The smart meter performs HMAC signature on the multiple different encrypted power consumption data according to the verification key to obtain multiple different signature data, and uses the multiple different signature data as the sliced signature data; S133. The smart meter scores the base station between the smart meter and the master station through a preset base station signal scoring model to obtain a scoring result, where the base station signal scoring model is established according to signal strength, base station load rate, and interference value; S134. The smart meter selects a target base station based on the scoring result, and sends the sliced encrypted data and the sliced signature data to the master station through the target base station. It should be noted that in this embodiment, for the convenience of understanding, it is assumed that the smart meter slices the collected user power consumption data D to obtain 3 different sliced power consumption data D1, D2, and D3, encrypts D1, D2, and D3 through the AES algorithm according to the encryption key to obtain encrypted power consumption data C1, C2, and C3, and performs HMAC signature on C1, C2, and C3 according to the verification key to obtain multiple different signature data H1, H2, and H3. Understandably, the user power consumption data D is divided into 3 different sliced power consumption data D1, D2, and D3. An attacker needs to obtain multiple slices at the same time to restore the data, which greatly improves the attack difficulty. Even if a certain slice is lost or damaged, the data can be restored through the remaining slices. The AES encryption algorithm takes into account both efficiency and security and is suitable for resource - constrained smart meters. The HMAC signature verifies that the slice has not been tampered with and is bound to the timestamp to prevent replay. It should also be noted that in this embodiment, the base station signal scoring model is Score = 0.5×RSSI + 0.3×(100% - load rate)+0.2×SINR, where RSSI is the signal strength, SINR is the interference value, the signal strength generally requires >80dB, the load rate requires <60% (to avoid congestion), and SINR is the channel interference - to - noise ratio, which needs to be higher than the threshold (such as 15dB). Understandably, in this embodiment, optimizing the path based on real - time signal quality can reduce the transmission delay and packet loss rate.

[0023] Further, step S134 specifically includes: if the scores in the scoring result vary greatly, the smart meter selects a preset number of base stations with higher scores in the scoring result as the target base stations, where the preset number is the same as the number of shards of the user power consumption data; if the scores in the scoring result do not vary greatly, the smart meter uses a random polling mechanism to use a preset number of base stations as the target base stations. It should be noted that in this embodiment, if the scores in the scoring result vary greatly, for example, the difference is greater than 5%, since the number of shards is 3, then the 3 base stations with the highest scores are selected, and the 3 base stations are B1, B2, and B3 respectively. If the difference is less than 5%, then a random polling mechanism is used to select 3 base stations from all base stations as the target base stations. For example, assume that there are a total of 6 base stations, namely B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, and B6. For the first time, B1, B2, and B3 are selected as the target base stations, and for the second time, B4, B5, and B6 are selected as the base stations. It should also be noted that in this embodiment, after determining the target base stations, the shard encrypted data and the shard signature data are sent to the master station through the target base stations. Specifically, C1 and H1 are sent to the base station B1 with the highest score, C2 and H3 are sent to the base station B2 with the second highest score, and C3 and H3 are sent to the base station B3 with the third highest score. Through the base stations B1, B2, and B3, the master station can receive C1, H1, C2, H2, C3, and H3.

[0024] S140. The master station performs integrity verification on the shard signature data according to the encryption key and the verification key synchronized by the smart meter, and decrypts the shard encrypted data to generate the user power consumption data.

[0025] In this embodiment, after the master station receives C1, H1, C2, H2, C3, and H3, it performs integrity verification on the shard signature data according to the encryption key and the verification key synchronized by the smart meter, and decrypts the shard encrypted data to generate the user power consumption data. Specifically, as Figure 4As shown, step S140 specifically includes steps S141 - S144: S141. The master station generates verification shard signature data by performing HMAC signature on the shard encrypted data according to the verification key synchronized by the smart meter; S142. Compare the verification shard signature data with the shard signature data; S143. If the verification shard signature data is the same as the shard signature data, decrypt the shard encrypted data according to the encryption key synchronized by the smart meter to generate shard power consumption data; S144. Generate the user power consumption data according to the shard power consumption data. Understandably, if the verification shard signature data is different from the shard signature data, it indicates that the signature is invalid and the shard power consumption data corresponding to the shard encrypted data has been tampered with, then an alarm is triggered and the shard power consumption data corresponding to the shard encrypted data is discarded. It should be noted that in this embodiment, the master station performs HMAC signature on the shard encrypted data C1, C2, and C3 according to the verification key synchronized by the smart meter to generate verification shard signature data S1, S2, and S3, compares S1 with H1, S2 with H2, and S3 with H3. If S1 is the same as H1, decrypt C1 to obtain D1. If S1 is different from H1, discard D1. Understandably, if S2 is the same as H2, decrypt C2 to obtain D2. If S2 is different from H2, discard D2; if S3 is the same as H3, decrypt C3 to obtain D3. If S3 is different from H3, discard D3.

[0026] Further, step S144 specifically includes: If the number of the shard power consumption data is the same as the number of shards of the user power consumption data, directly splice all the shard power consumption data to obtain the user power consumption data; if the number of the shard power consumption data is different from the number of shards, generate the user power consumption data according to the shard power consumption data using the XOR redundancy recovery mechanism. It should be noted that in this embodiment, if 3 shard power consumption data D1, D2, and D3 are obtained and the number of shard power consumption data 3 is the same as the number of shards 3, directly splice D1, D2, and D3 to generate the user power consumption data D. If 2 shard power consumption data, such as D1 and D2, are obtained and the number of shard power consumption data 2 is different from the number of shards 3, generate the user power consumption data D according to D1 and D2 using the XOR redundancy recovery mechanism.

[0027] In summary, in this embodiment, a quantum random number generator is used to generate a temporary private key. Based on the temporary private key, a dynamic master key is negotiated with the smart meter through an improved Diffie-Hellman algorithm, which can resist quantum attacks and ensure the security of the dynamic master key. According to the device identifier, the current timestamp, and the dynamic master key, an encryption key and a verification key are iteratively generated through a one-way hash function, realizing "one-time-one-key" for the keys, preventing replay attacks, and improving the security of the encryption key and the verification key. The user electricity consumption data is fragmented, and after fragmentation, it is encrypted and signed through the encryption key and the verification key. Then, the encrypted fragmented data and the signed fragmented signature data are sent to the master station through a dynamically selected base station. The master station generates the user electricity consumption data before fragmentation according to the encryption key and the verification key synchronized by the smart meter, greatly increasing the difficulty of attacks and ensuring the high security of the smart meter data during transmission.

[0028] Figure 5 FIG. 4 is a schematic block diagram of a smart meter data transmission system 200 based on dynamic key management provided by an embodiment of the present invention. As Figure 5 shown, it corresponds to the smart meter data transmission method based on dynamic key management applied to the master station 10 and the smart meter 20 above. The smart meter data transmission system 200 based on dynamic key management includes units for executing the above smart meter data transmission method based on dynamic key management. Specifically, please refer to Figure 5 FIG. 4. The smart meter data transmission system 200 based on dynamic key management includes a first generation unit 101 and a verification generation unit 102 configured in the master station 10, and a second generation unit 201 and an encryption and signature unit 202 configured in the smart meter 20.

[0029] Among them, the first generation unit 101 is used for the master station to generate a temporary private key by using a quantum random number generator, and negotiate keys with the smart meter based on the temporary private key through an improved Diffie-Hellman algorithm to generate a dynamic master key, and send the dynamic master key to the smart meter; the second generation unit 201 is used for the smart meter to generate an encryption key according to the device identifier, the current timestamp, and the dynamic master key through a one-way hash function, and generate a verification key according to the encryption key through the one-way hash function; the encryption and signature unit 202 is used for the smart meter to encrypt the sharded user electricity consumption data according to the encryption key to obtain sharded encrypted data, and sign the sharded encrypted data according to the verification key to obtain sharded signature data, and send the sharded encrypted data and the sharded signature data to the master station through a dynamically selected base station; the verification generation unit 102 is used for the master station to perform integrity verification on the sharded signature data according to the encryption key and the verification key synchronized by the smart meter, and decrypt the sharded encrypted data to generate the user electricity consumption data.

[0030] In some embodiments, such as this embodiment, the first generation unit 101 is specifically used for: the master station calculates a master station public key through elliptic curve scalar multiplication according to the temporary private key, and sends the master station public key to the smart meter, so that the smart meter uses the quantum random number generator to generate a quantum random private key, and calculates an electric meter public key through the elliptic curve scalar multiplication according to the quantum random private key; the master station receives the electric meter public key returned by the smart meter, and generates a master station shared key according to the temporary private key and the electric meter public key, and negotiates a shared key based on the master station shared key and the electric meter shared key generated by the smart meter according to the quantum random private key and the master station public key; the master station encrypts the shared key through NTRU public key to generate the dynamic master key.

[0031] In some embodiments, such as this embodiment, the second generating unit 201 is specifically configured to: the smart meter splices the device identifier and the current timestamp to generate an identification time, and inputs the identification time into the one-way hash function to generate an initial hash value; the smart meter decodes the dynamic master key through the NTRU private key to obtain the shared key, where the NTRU private key and the NTRU public key are a key pair; the smart meter performs an exclusive OR calculation on the shared key and the initial hash value to obtain a target hash value; the smart meter splices the target hash value and a first preset hash value to obtain a first spliced hash, and inputs the first spliced hash into the one-way hash function to obtain a first target hash; the smart meter selects the value of a preset number of bits before the first target hash as the encryption key; the smart meter splices the encryption key and a second preset hash value to obtain a second spliced hash, inputs the second spliced hash into the one-way hash function to obtain a second target hash; the smart meter selects the value of a preset number of bits before the second target hash as the verification key.

[0032] In some embodiments, such as this embodiment, the encryption and signature unit 202 is specifically configured to: the smart meter slices the collected user power consumption data to obtain a plurality of different sliced power consumption data, and encrypts the plurality of different sliced power consumption data through the AES encryption algorithm according to the encryption key to obtain a plurality of different encrypted power consumption data, and uses the plurality of different encrypted power consumption data as the sliced encrypted data; the smart meter performs HMAC signature on the plurality of different encrypted power consumption data according to the verification key to obtain a plurality of different signature data, and uses the plurality of different signature data as the sliced signature data; the smart meter performs signal scoring on the base station between the smart meter and the master station through a preset base station signal scoring model to obtain a scoring result, where the base station signal scoring model is established according to signal strength, base station load rate, and interference value; the smart meter selects a target base station based on the scoring result, and sends the sliced encrypted data and the sliced signature data to the master station through the target base station.

[0033] In some embodiments, such as this embodiment, the encryption and signature unit 202 is further configured to: if the scores in the scoring result vary greatly, the smart meter selects a preset number of base stations with higher scores in the scoring result as the target base stations, where the preset number is the same as the number of slices of the user power consumption data; if the scores in the scoring result do not vary greatly, the smart meter uses a random polling mechanism to use a preset number of base stations as the target base stations.

[0034] In some embodiments, such as this embodiment, the verification generation unit 102 is specifically configured to: the master station generates verification shard signature data by performing HMAC signature on the shard encrypted data according to the verification key synchronized by the smart meter; compare the verification shard signature data with the shard signature data; if the verification shard signature data is the same as the shard signature data, decrypt the shard encrypted data according to the encryption key synchronized by the smart meter to generate shard power consumption data; and generate the user power consumption data according to the shard power consumption data.

[0035] In some embodiments, such as this embodiment, the verification generation unit 102 is further configured to: if the number of the shard power consumption data is the same as the number of shards of the user power consumption data, directly splice all the shard power consumption data to obtain the user power consumption data; if the number of the shard power consumption data is different from the number of shards, generate the user power consumption data according to the shard power consumption data by using an exclusive-or redundancy recovery mechanism.

[0036] As described above, the above are only specific embodiments of the present invention, but the protection scope of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any person skilled in the art within the technical scope disclosed by the present invention can easily think of various equivalent modifications or substitutions, and these modifications or substitutions should all be covered within the protection scope of the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the present invention shall be subject to the protection scope of the claims.

Claims

1. An intelligent meter data transmission method based on dynamic key management, characterized in that, Including: The master station uses a quantum random number generator to generate a temporary private key, and based on the temporary private key, performs key negotiation with the smart meter through an improved Diffie-Hellman algorithm to generate a dynamic master key, and sends the dynamic master key to the smart meter; The smart meter generates an encryption key according to the device identifier, the current timestamp, and the dynamic master key through a one-way hash function, and generates a verification key according to the encryption key through the one-way hash function; The smart meter encrypts the sharded user electricity consumption data according to the encryption key to obtain sharded encrypted data, signs the sharded encrypted data according to the verification key to obtain sharded signature data, and sends the sharded encrypted data and the sharded signature data to the master station through a dynamically selected base station; The master station performs integrity verification on the sharded signature data according to the encryption key and the verification key synchronized by the smart meter, and decrypts the sharded encrypted data to generate the user electricity consumption data.

2. The method according to claim 1, wherein The performing key negotiation with the smart meter through an improved Diffie-Hellman algorithm based on the temporary private key to generate a dynamic master key includes: The master station calculates a master station public key through elliptic curve scalar multiplication according to the temporary private key, and sends the master station public key to the smart meter, so that the smart meter uses the quantum random number generator to generate a quantum random private key, and calculates an electric meter public key through the elliptic curve scalar multiplication according to the quantum random private key; The master station receives the electric meter public key returned by the smart meter, generates a master station shared key according to the temporary private key and the electric meter public key, and negotiates a shared key based on the master station shared key and the electric meter shared key generated by the smart meter according to the quantum random private key and the master station public key; The master station encrypts the shared key through NTRU public key to generate the dynamic master key.

3. The method according to claim 2, wherein The smart meter generates an encryption key according to the device identifier, the current timestamp, and the dynamic master key through a one-way hash function, including: The smart meter splices the device identifier and the current timestamp to generate an identification time, and inputs the identification time into the one-way hash function to generate an initial hash value; The smart meter decodes the dynamic master key through an NTRU private key to obtain the shared key, where the NTRU private key and the NTRU public key are a key pair; The smart meter performs exclusive OR calculation on the shared key and the initial hash value to obtain a target hash value; The smart meter splices the target hash value and a first preset hash value to obtain a first spliced hash, and inputs the first spliced hash into the one-way hash function to obtain a first target hash; The smart meter selects the value of the preset bits before the first target hash as the encryption key.

4. The method according to claim 1, wherein The generating a verification key according to the encryption key through the one-way hash function includes: The smart meter splices the encryption key and the second preset hash value to obtain a second spliced hash, and inputs the second spliced hash into the one-way hash function to obtain a second target hash; The smart meter selects the value of the preset bits before the second target hash as the verification key.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The smart meter encrypts the sharded user electricity consumption data according to the encryption key to obtain sharded encrypted data, and signs the sharded encrypted data according to the verification key to obtain sharded signature data, including: The smart meter shards the collected user electricity consumption data to obtain multiple different sharded electricity consumption data, and encrypts the multiple different sharded electricity consumption data according to the encryption key through the AES encryption algorithm to obtain multiple different encrypted electricity consumption data, and uses the multiple different encrypted electricity consumption data as the sharded encrypted data; The smart meter performs HMAC signature on the multiple different encrypted electricity consumption data according to the verification key to obtain multiple different signature data, and uses the multiple different signature data as the sharded signature data.

6. The method according to claim 1, wherein Sending the sharded encrypted data and the sharded signature data to the master station through a dynamically selected base station includes: The smart meter scores the base stations between the smart meter and the master station through a preset base station signal scoring model to obtain a scoring result, where the base station signal scoring model is established according to signal strength, base station load rate, and interference value; The smart meter selects a target base station based on the scoring result, and sends the sharded encrypted data and the sharded signature data to the master station through the target base station.

7. The method according to claim 6, wherein The smart meter selects a target base station based on the scoring result, including: If the scores in the scoring result vary greatly, the smart meter selects a preset number of base stations with higher scores in the scoring result as the target base stations, where the preset number is the same as the number of shards of the user electricity consumption data; If the scores in the scoring result do not vary much, the smart meter uses a random polling mechanism to use a preset number of base stations as the target base stations.

8. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The master station performs integrity verification on the sharded signature data and decrypts the sharded encrypted data according to the encryption key and the verification key synchronized by the smart meter to generate the user electricity consumption data, including: The master station performs HMAC signature on the sharded encrypted data according to the verification key synchronized by the smart meter to generate verification sharded signature data; Compare the verification sharded signature data with the sharded signature data; If the verification sharded signature data is the same as the sharded signature data, decrypt the sharded encrypted data according to the encryption key synchronized by the smart meter to generate sharded electricity consumption data; Generate the user electricity consumption data according to the sharded electricity consumption data.

9. The method according to claim 8, characterized in that, Generating the user electricity consumption data according to the sharded electricity consumption data includes: If the number of sharded electricity consumption data is the same as the number of shards of the user electricity consumption data, directly splice all the sharded electricity consumption data to obtain the user electricity consumption data; If the number of the sharded power consumption data is different from the number of the shards, the user power consumption data is generated according to the sharded power consumption data by using an exclusive-or redundancy recovery mechanism.

10. An intelligent electricity meter data transmission system based on dynamic key management, characterized in that, It includes: a first generation unit and a verification generation unit configured in the master station, and a second generation unit and an encryption signature unit configured in the smart meter, wherein: the first generation unit is used for the master station to generate a temporary private key by using a quantum random number generator, and perform key negotiation with the smart meter based on the temporary private key through an improved Diffie-Hellman algorithm to generate a dynamic master key, and send the dynamic master key to the smart meter; the second generation unit is used for the smart meter to generate an encryption key according to the device identifier, the current timestamp, and the dynamic master key through a one-way hash function, and generate a verification key according to the encryption key through the one-way hash function; the encryption signature unit is used for the smart meter to encrypt the sharded user power consumption data according to the encryption key to obtain sharded encrypted data, and sign the sharded encrypted data according to the verification key to obtain sharded signature data, and send the sharded encrypted data and the sharded signature data to the master station through a dynamically selected base station; the verification generation unit is used for the master station to perform integrity verification on the sharded signature data according to the encryption key and the verification key synchronized by the smart meter, and decrypt the sharded encrypted data to generate the user power consumption data.

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