Completeness analysis method, device, equipment and medium for nuclear power plant support system

Abstract

The invention discloses a nuclear power plant support system completeness analysis method, device and equipment and a medium. The method comprises the following steps: screening security important support functions in the support system according to a preset criterion; analyzing a failure mode and a failure reason of the safety important support function by adopting a failure mode and influence analysis algorithm; analyzing a failure consequence of the safety important support function in a corresponding failure mode; performing failure frequency analysis on the failure mode with the failure consequence reaching the assumed originating event; and performing design benchmark analysis on the failure mode of which the failure frequency reaches the design benchmark accident frequency to verify the completeness of the support system. According to the method, systematic completeness analysis on configuration of the nuclear power plant support system is realized, reasonability and completeness of design of the nuclear power plant support system can be demonstrated, the method can also be used as an important basis for improvement of the nuclear power plant support system, and the method has important significance.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of nuclear power plant operation, and in particular to a method, device, equipment and medium for analyzing the completeness of a nuclear power plant support system. Background Art

[0002] The support system of a nuclear power plant refers to a system that does not directly perform safety functions but provides necessary power sources, gas sources, cold sources, etc. for equipment (such as pumps, valves, etc.) that perform safety functions. Due to the mutual cross - influence among support systems, the failure of a certain part of the support system may simultaneously lead to the failure of the unit transient response and multiple safety functions or support functions. Therefore, for newly designed nuclear power plants, it is necessary to evaluate the rationality and completeness of the configuration of their support systems. However, the prior art has not comprehensively analyzed the support system. Summary of the Invention

[0003] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a method, device, equipment and medium for analyzing the completeness of a nuclear power plant support system, aiming to solve the problem of the lack of systematic evaluation of the rationality and completeness of the configuration of the existing nuclear power plant support system.

[0004] In a first aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a method for analyzing the completeness of a nuclear power plant support system, including:

[0005] Screening the safety - important support functions in the support system according to preset criteria;

[0006] Analyzing the failure modes and failure causes of the safety - important support functions by using the failure mode and effects analysis algorithm;

[0007] Analyzing the failure consequences of the safety - important support functions in the corresponding failure modes;

[0008] Performing a failure frequency analysis on the failure modes whose failure consequences reach the assumed initiating event;

[0009] Performing a design - basis analysis on the failure modes whose failure frequencies reach the design - basis accident frequency to verify the completeness of the support system.

[0010] In a second aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a device for analyzing the completeness of a nuclear power plant support system, including:

[0011] A screening unit, configured to screen the safety - important support functions in the support system according to preset criteria;

[0012] A failure analysis unit, configured to analyze the failure modes and failure causes of the safety - important support functions according to the granularity, boundary and failure superposition principle of the safety - important support functions;

[0013] A consequence analysis unit, configured to analyze the failure consequences of the safety - important support function in corresponding failure modes;

[0014] A frequency statistics unit, configured to perform failure frequency analysis on failure modes whose failure consequences reach the assumed initiating event;

[0015] A design - basis analysis unit, configured to perform design - basis analysis on failure modes whose failure frequencies reach the design - basis accident frequency, so as to verify the completeness of the support system.

[0016] Thirdly, an embodiment of the present invention provides a device, which includes a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored on the memory and executable on the processor. When the processor executes the computer program, the method for analyzing the completeness of the nuclear - power - plant support system described in the first aspect above is implemented.

[0017] Fourthly, an embodiment of the present invention provides a computer - readable storage medium, where the computer - readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the processor is caused to execute the method for analyzing the completeness of the nuclear - power - plant support system described in the first aspect above.

[0018] The beneficial effects of the embodiments of the present invention are as follows: A complete set of methodologies is provided. Firstly, the support system is preliminarily screened according to preset criteria, and the safety - important support systems that need to be analyzed are screened out from the support system according to these principles; after screening out the safety - important support systems, the failure modes and failure causes of the safety - important support functions are analyzed, which not only ensures the integrity of the analysis but also saves a large amount of manpower; then the failure consequences are evaluated. If the evaluation result is acceptable, it indicates that the design of the support system of the power plant to be analyzed currently meets the safety requirements. If the evaluation result is unacceptable, the support system needs to be improved to meet the safety requirements. Thus, a systematic completeness analysis of the configuration of the nuclear - power - plant support system is realized, the rationality and completeness of the design of the nuclear - power - plant support system can be demonstrated, and it can also be used as an important basis for the improvement of the nuclear - power - plant support system, which has important significance. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0019] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the drawings required for the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings in the following description are some embodiments of the present invention. For those of ordinary skill in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative efforts.

[0020] Figure 1 It is a schematic flowchart of the method for analyzing the completeness of the nuclear - power - plant support system provided by the embodiment of the present invention.

[0021] Figure 2It is a schematic sub - process diagram of step S101 provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0022] Figure 3 It is a schematic sub - process diagram of step S102 provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0023] Figure 4 It is a schematic sub - process diagram of step S302 provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0024] Figure 5 It is a schematic sub - process diagram of step S103 provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0025] Figure 6 It is a schematic block diagram of a nuclear power plant support system completeness analysis device provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0026] Figure 7 It is a schematic block diagram of a device provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0027] Figure 8 It is a schematic block diagram of a safety - important support function failure mode analysis process provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0028] Figure 9 It is a functional process block diagram of the RRI system (column A) exemplified by an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed implementation manners

[0029] Next, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described in conjunction with the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, rather than all the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without creative efforts fall within the protection scope of the present invention.

[0030] It should be understood that when used in this specification and the appended claims, the terms "comprises" and "comprising" indicate the presence of the described features, wholes, steps, operations, elements, and / or components, but do not preclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, wholes, steps, operations, elements, components, and / or their combinations.

[0031] It should also be understood that the terms used in this specification of the present invention are only for the purpose of describing specific embodiments and are not intended to limit the present invention. As used in this specification of the present invention and the appended claims, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the singular forms "a", "an" and "the" are intended to include the plural forms.

[0032] It should be further understood that the term "and / or" used in the specification and appended claims of the present invention refers to any combination and all possible combinations of one or more of the associated listed items, and includes these combinations.

[0033] Please refer to Figure 1 , Figure 1 which is a schematic flowchart of the method for analyzing the completeness of the nuclear power plant support system provided by the embodiment of the present invention.

[0034] As Figure 1 shown, the method includes steps S101 to S105.

[0035] S101. Screen the safety-important support functions in the support system according to preset criteria;

[0036] In this step, the safety-important support function refers to the function of providing the required power source and environmental conditions for the equipment and systems required to achieve or maintain the unit safety.

[0037] S102. Analyze the failure modes and failure causes of the safety-important support functions by using the failure mode and effects analysis algorithm;

[0038] In this step, the failure mode and effects analysis algorithm is a systematic engineering method, which can be used to identify the failures of the safety-important support functions and evaluate the impacts of these failure modes, so as to identify potential problems and take measures to prevent or reduce the occurrence of these potential problems.

[0039] S103. Analyze the failure consequences of the safety-important support functions under the corresponding failure modes;

[0040] In this step, the failure consequences under the failure mode refer to the specific impacts on the support function and the unit state after the failure, and whether they are within the acceptable range.

[0041] S104. Conduct a failure frequency analysis on the failure modes whose failure consequences reach the assumed initiating event;

[0042] S105. Conduct a design basis analysis on the failure modes whose failure frequencies reach the design basis accident frequency to verify the completeness of the support system;

[0043] In steps S104 - S105, the assumed initiating event is an event that the predefined failure consequences can reach, which can represent the impact degree of the consequences; by conducting a failure frequency analysis on the failure modes that reach the assumed initiating event, it is determined whether to include this event in the design basis analysis; for example, when the failure frequency reaches frequent occurrence (such as the failure probability reaches the preset threshold), a diversity analysis is required, and the results of the failure frequency analysis will also be used to screen the sequences that require a diversity analysis.

[0044] In this embodiment, steps S101 - S105 provide a complete set of methodologies. First, the support system is preliminarily screened according to preset criteria, and the safety - important support systems that need to be analyzed are screened out from the support system according to these principles; after screening out the safety - important support systems, the failure modes and failure causes of the safety - important support functions are analyzed, which not only ensures the integrity of the analysis but also saves a lot of manpower; then the failure consequences are evaluated. If the evaluation result is acceptable, it means that the design of the support system of the power plant to be analyzed currently meets the safety requirements. If the evaluation result is unacceptable, the support system needs to be improved to meet the safety requirements. Thus, a systematic and complete analysis of the configuration of the support system of the nuclear power plant is realized, which can demonstrate the rationality and completeness of the design of the support system of the nuclear power plant and can also be used as an important basis for the improvement of the support system of the nuclear power plant, having important significance.

[0045] In one embodiment, as Figure 2 shown, step S101 includes:

[0046] S201. Regarding the function in the support system that provides the power source necessary for the correct execution of the safety function as a safety - important support function;

[0047] S202. Regarding the function in the support system that maintains the environmental conditions required for the safety function as a safety - important support function;

[0048] S203. Regarding the function in the support system whose loss will cause the unit to be unable to maintain its current state as a safety - important support function.

[0049] In this embodiment, steps S201 - S203 are respectively three criteria in the exemplary preset criteria. It is judged whether each support function in the support system meets at least one of the three criteria. If it meets at least one of the criteria, it can be determined that the support function is a safety - important support function.

[0050] Exemplarily, a list of the analysis scope of some safety - important support functions taking the RRI system as an example is shown in Table 1.

[0051] Table 1

[0052]

[0053] In one embodiment, as Figure 3 shown, step S102 includes:

[0054] S301. According to the granularity, boundary, and failure superposition principles of the safety - important support function, materialize the safety - important support function into the support equipment that realizes it;

[0055] S302. Conduct hypothetical analyses from the two dimensions of single random failure and common cause failure of each support device respectively to obtain all existing failure modes and causes of failure.

[0056] S303. Combine the failure modes of multiple different safety - important support functions caused by the failure of the same support device into one failure mode.

[0057] In step S301, the granularity of the safety - important support function refers to the function that is relatively independent within its physical boundary in the support system and forms a whole to provide support externally. Therefore, when describing and analyzing support functions, the following principles should be followed:

[0058] If the support system implementing the safety - important support function is divided, the corresponding safety - important support functions should be described separately.

[0059] If the support devices implementing one or several safety - important support functions form a subsystem by themselves (i.e., relatively independent from other parts of the system), these support functions should be listed as a whole.

[0060] Taking the electrical system as an example, the entire electrical system performs functions as a whole. Therefore, the electrical system is not physically divided from the perspective of support functions, but the power - off mode (i.e., the failure mode) is analyzed from the perspective of power distribution equipment, and the granularity is a single power distribution equipment (i.e., the support device); the power - off modes and causes of power - off (i.e., the causes of failure) of a single electrical system (such as a switchboard) at the subsystem and component levels (such as chargers, batteries, etc.) do not directly cause the loss of power distribution functions. Therefore, they do not need to be considered when analyzing failure modes.

[0061] Similar to the electrical system, for the instrument control system, the minimum unit of analysis is the control cabinet, and the failures of the input and output cards of a single cabinet and a single control unit are not analyzed. These failures have been considered through the function allocation of the instrument control system or the failure analysis of the controlled equipment in the initial stage of design.

[0062] In step S301, the boundary of the safety - important support function is limited to a single support system, and the simultaneous failure of several safety - important support functions implemented by two or more support systems is not considered. However, there may be a situation where the failure of one support function causes the simultaneous failure of two unrelated safety - important support functions. The consequences of the simultaneous failure of multiple safety - important support functions in different support systems caused by the same reason are considered in the analysis of the consequences of the loss of the safety - important support function that leads to this event.

[0063] In step S301, the failure superposition principle of the safety - important support function is as follows:

[0064] Do not consider the superposition failure of independent safety - important support functions.

[0065] Consider the cascading failure of safety - important support functions caused by secondary failures, that is, the failure of the first mitigation measure of this support system caused by the failure of a single safety - important support function leads to the failure of other safety - important support functions of this support system;

[0066] Consider the common - cause failure of redundant safety - important support functions;

[0067] Consider the failures not caused by disasters. The failure modes and consequences of the unit support functions caused by internal and external disasters are completed by specific disaster analysis work.

[0068] Specifically, as Figure 4 shown, step S302 includes:

[0069] S401. When any support device fails randomly, the situation where a single safety - important support function fails or multiple safety - important support functions fail simultaneously is regarded as one of the failure modes, and the failure cause is defined as a single random failure. For example, when a certain key support device in the support system fails randomly, it may cause a single safety - important support function to fail or multiple safety - important support functions to fail simultaneously, such as the misoperation or refusal of operation of a valve.

[0070] S402. When key components using the same principle or from the same manufacturer fail simultaneously, the situation where a single safety - important support function fails or multiple safety - important support functions fail simultaneously is regarded as one of the failure modes, and the failure cause is defined as a common - cause failure.

[0071] Based on the specific processes of the foregoing steps S301 - S303, the analysis of the failure modes and failure causes of safety - important support functions adopts the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis algorithm (i.e., the FMEA method). Draw a schematic block diagram of the safety - important support function failure mode analysis as Figure 8 shown, so as to materialize the safety - important support function to specific support devices and analyze the failure modes of safety - important support functions through the failure modes of support devices.

[0072] In specific applications, in order to analyze and realize the corresponding relationship between support devices and safety - important support functions, as well as the logical relationship between the failure of support devices and the failure of safety - important support functions, a functional flow block diagram of the support system can be drawn, and the following information needs to be highlighted in the figure: important devices, including pumps, valves, pipelines, heat exchangers, fans, water tanks, etc.; the series - parallel logical relationship between devices in the system process. Taking the RRI system functional process as an example, the RRI system uses the same surge tank, cooling pump, and heat exchanger to achieve functions such as A - train RIS and EHR cooling. Therefore, a functional flow block diagram can be drawn for all functions of the A - train. A specific example of the flow block diagram is as Figure 9 shown.

[0073] Based on the example as Figure 9 shown, in step S302, the list of RRI failure modes in column A shown in Table 2 can be obtained (only part of the failure list is shown):

[0074] Table 2

[0075]

[0076] Based on Figure 8 and Figure 9 , the failure mode merging in step S303 is simply Figure 8 the failure mode analysis of subsystem 2 and the functions it implements. Specifically, reference can be made to the functional flow block diagram of the RRI system (column A) shown in Figure 9 . The RRI in column A implements multiple safety - important support functions. The failure of the non - safety - level user switching valve of the RRI in column A can cause the simultaneous loss of cooling functions of multiple system parts such as REA, DER, and DEL in column A. Therefore, "the non - safety - level user cooling function of the RRI in column A is unavailable" should be used as a merged failure mode.

[0077] In an embodiment, as Figure 5 shown, step S103 includes:

[0078] S501. Confirm the unit status response of the safety - important support function in the corresponding failure mode;

[0079] S502. Determine whether the unit status response is a unit transient response; if yes, go to S503, if not, jump to S504;

[0080] S503. Analyze the impact of the safety - important support function on its supported functions and the abnormal unit status caused in the corresponding failure mode;

[0081] S504. End the failure consequence analysis in the corresponding failure mode.

[0082] In this embodiment, the response of the unit state refers to the degree of impact of the failure of a safety-important support function on the safety of a nuclear power plant. If the response of the unit state is a severe unit transient or accident state (i.e., reaching the assumed initiating event, such as a response being a series of rapid actions taken to maintain or restore the safety state of the reactor, like reactor scram, rapid closure of the main steam isolation valve, start-up of the safety injection system, and commissioning of the auxiliary feedwater system), it indicates that the failure of this safety-important support function may pose a greater threat to the safety of the nuclear power plant, and more stringent measures need to be taken to deal with it. On the contrary, if the response of the unit state is relatively minor, perhaps only routine monitoring and maintenance are required. By analyzing the degree of abnormality of the unit state response, the consequences of the failure of the safety-important support function can be more accurately evaluated, providing a basis for subsequent decision-making. Among them, the principles for analyzing the assumed initiating event caused by the loss of a safety-important support function are: a) The starting point of the analysis is the overall failure of the function; b) Any mitigation means are not considered.

[0083] Specifically, after step S503, it further includes: When the impacts of the support function and the abnormal state of the unit are enveloped by existing internal events, it is determined that the system consequences and the unit consequences are within the acceptable range; when the impacts of the support function and the abnormal state of the unit are not enveloped by internal events, a design basis analysis needs to be carried out to quantify the impacts on the reactor core and the radioactive consequences. If it is proven through the analysis that the impacts on the reactor core and the radioactive consequences exceed the requirements of the acceptance criteria, it is determined that the system consequences and the unit consequences exceed the acceptable range, and the existing design needs to be improved.

[0084] In one embodiment, step S104 includes:

[0085] Determine the failure mode whose failure consequence reaches the assumed initiating event;

[0086] Determine the occurrence conditions of the failure mode;

[0087] Integrate historical failure records, test data, or simulation results to obtain the statistical basis for the failure frequency of the failure mode;

[0088] Adopt a reliability method to quantify the statistical basis for the failure probability of the failure mode to construct a failure frequency model;

[0089] Input the operating parameters of the failure mode whose failure consequence reaches the assumed initiating event into the failure frequency model and output the corresponding failure frequency.

[0090] In this embodiment, by analyzing the output of the failure frequency model, it is possible to further identify which failure modes pose a greater threat to the safe operation of the nuclear power plant, thereby providing a basis for subsequent risk management and optimization. In addition, the failure frequency model can also be used to support the regular maintenance and overhaul plans of the nuclear power plant to ensure that key support functions always maintain high reliability and safety during service. In this way, a comprehensive, systematic, and scientific completeness analysis of the nuclear power plant support system can be achieved, providing a strong guarantee for the safe operation of the nuclear power plant.

[0091] In one embodiment, step S105 includes:

[0092] Performing a design basis analysis on the failure modes whose failure frequencies reach the design basis accident frequency by combining quantitative calculation and qualitative evaluation, wherein the design basis analysis includes at least one of system response ability assessment, load and stress analysis, safety margin verification, reliability analysis of the support system, environmental impact and mitigation measures.

[0093] In this embodiment, by combining quantitative calculation and qualitative evaluation, it is possible to more comprehensively evaluate the potential impact of failure modes on the safe operation of the nuclear power plant. The system response ability assessment aims to determine whether the response speed and effect of the nuclear power plant support system meet the design requirements under the failure mode. The load and stress analysis focuses on the actual loads and stresses generated by the failure mode on the system structure and components to verify whether they are within the acceptable range. The safety margin verification is to check the safety margin of the system under the design basis accident to ensure that the system has sufficient safety reserves. The reliability analysis of the support system is an important part of the design basis analysis. It quantifies the reliability of the system to determine the stability and reliability level of the system during long-term operation. The environmental impact and mitigation measures analysis focuses on the possible impact of the failure mode on the surrounding environment of the nuclear power plant and proposes corresponding mitigation measures to reduce the impact on the environment and personnel.

[0094] In this embodiment, by comprehensively considering the above analysis contents, a comprehensive assessment of the failure modes whose failure frequencies reach the design basis accident frequency can be achieved, providing more reliable support for the safe operation of the nuclear power plant.

[0095] The embodiment of the present invention also provides a nuclear power plant support system completeness analysis device, which is used to execute any embodiment of the foregoing nuclear power plant support system completeness analysis method. Specifically, please refer to Figure 6 , Figure 6 is a schematic block diagram of the nuclear power plant support system completeness analysis device provided by the embodiment of the present invention.

[0096] In one embodiment, in the failure frequency analysis of step S104, an event that causes the unit transient can be defined as a postulated initiating event. Failure frequency analysis shall be conducted for all postulated initiating events caused by the loss of all support functions. The failure frequency is used to determine whether to include the event in the design basis analysis. Diversification analysis shall be conducted for frequently occurring events, and the results of the failure frequency analysis will also be used to screen sequences that require diversification analysis.

[0097] In one embodiment, in the design basis analysis of step S105, based on the failure frequency and failure consequence analysis conclusions of safety-significant support functions, any identified postulated initiating event should undergo design basis analysis. For initiating events identified as frequently occurring events, diversification analysis should be performed. The design basis analysis can be qualitative or quantitative. Qualitative analysis considers the scenarios that are most punishing to the transient and the most deteriorating failures, analyzes the mitigation strategies for the transient, to determine whether the failure of safety-significant support functions has an impact on the failure mitigation equipment. Quantitative analysis is applicable to the analysis of new initiating events identified by qualitative analysis, or cases where it is impossible to determine whether they are enveloped by the design basis operating conditions through qualitative analysis. In such cases, transient analysis is required to quantify the impact on the reactor core and the radioactive consequences, and at the same time verify the response and capabilities of the safety systems. The design basis analysis method for the loss of support systems uses general design basis accident analysis methods, including conservative basic assumptions and acceptance criteria for the corresponding event frequencies.

[0098] As Figure 6 shown, the nuclear power plant support system completeness analysis device 600 includes: a screening unit 601, a failure analysis unit 602, a consequence analysis unit 603, a frequency statistics unit 604, and a design basis analysis unit 605.

[0099] The screening unit 601 is used to screen safety-significant support functions in the support system according to preset criteria;

[0100] The failure analysis unit 602 is used to analyze the failure modes and failure causes of safety-significant support functions according to the granularity, boundary, and failure superposition principle of safety-significant support functions;

[0101] The consequence analysis unit 603 is used to analyze the failure consequences of safety-significant support functions in the corresponding failure modes;

[0102] The frequency statistics unit 604 is used to conduct failure frequency analysis on failure modes whose failure consequences reach postulated initiating events;

[0103] The design basis analysis unit 605 is used to conduct design basis analysis on failure modes whose failure frequencies reach the design basis accident frequency to verify the completeness of the support system.

[0104] The device first conducts a preliminary screening of the support system according to preset criteria, and selects the safety-important support systems that need to be analyzed from the support system according to these principles; after screening out the safety-important support systems, it analyzes the failure modes and failure causes of the safety-important support functions, which not only ensures the integrity of the analysis but also saves a large amount of manpower; then it evaluates the failure consequences. If the evaluation result is acceptable, it indicates that the design of the support system of the power plant to be analyzed currently meets the safety requirements. If the evaluation result is unacceptable, the support system needs to be improved to meet the safety requirements. Thus, a systematic and comprehensive analysis of the configuration of the nuclear power plant support system is realized, which can demonstrate the rationality and completeness of the design of the nuclear power plant support system, and can also serve as an important basis for the improvement of the nuclear power plant support system, having important significance.

[0105] Those skilled in the art can clearly understand that, for the convenience and conciseness of description, the specific working processes of the above-described device and unit can refer to the corresponding processes in the foregoing method embodiments, and will not be described herein again.

[0106] The above-mentioned nuclear power plant support system completeness analysis device can be implemented in the form of a computer program, and this computer program can run on a device as shown in Figure 7 shown.

[0107] Please refer to Figure 7 , Figure 7 which is a schematic block diagram of the device provided by an embodiment of the present invention. The device 700 is a server, and the server can be an independent server or a server cluster composed of multiple servers.

[0108] Refer to Figure 7 , the device 700 includes a processor 702, a memory, and a network interface 705 connected through a system bus 701. Among them, the memory can include a non-volatile storage medium 703 and an internal memory 704.

[0109] The non-volatile storage medium 703 can store an operating system 7031 and a computer program 7032. When the computer program 7032 is executed, the processor 702 can be made to execute the nuclear power plant support system completeness analysis method.

[0110] The processor 702 is used to provide computing and control capabilities to support the operation of the entire device 700.

[0111] The internal memory 704 provides an environment for the operation of the computer program 7032 in the non-volatile storage medium 703. When the computer program 7032 is executed by the processor 702, the processor 702 can be made to execute the nuclear power plant support system completeness analysis method.

[0112] The network interface 705 is used for network communication, such as providing the transmission of data information, etc. Those skilled in the art can understand that Figure 7 The structure shown in Figure 7 is only a block diagram of some structures related to the solution of the present invention, and does not constitute a limitation on the device 700 to which the solution of the present invention is applied. The specific device 700 may include more or fewer components than those shown in the figure, or combine some components, or have different component arrangements.

[0113] Those skilled in the art can understand that Figure 7 The embodiments of the device shown in Figure 7 do not constitute a limitation on the specific composition of the device. In other embodiments, the device may include more or fewer components than those shown in the figure, or combine some components, or have different component arrangements. For example, in some embodiments, the device may only include a memory and a processor. In such an embodiment, the structures and functions of the memory and the processor are the same as those of Figure 7 the embodiment shown, and will not be described in detail here.

[0114] It should be understood that in the embodiment of the present invention, the processor 702 may be a central processing unit (CPU), and the processor 702 may also be other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSPs), application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, etc. Among them, the general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor or the processor may also be any conventional processor, etc.

[0115] In another embodiment of the present invention, a computer-readable storage medium is provided. The computer-readable storage medium may be a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium. The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the method for analyzing the completeness of the nuclear power plant support system in the embodiment of the present invention is implemented.

[0116] The storage medium is a physical and non-transitory storage medium, such as a USB flash drive, a mobile hard disk, a read-only memory (ROM), a magnetic disk or an optical disc, etc., which are all physical storage media that can store program codes.

[0117] Those skilled in the art can clearly understand that, for the convenience and brevity of description, the specific working processes of the above-described devices, apparatuses, and units can refer to the corresponding processes in the foregoing method embodiments, and will not be repeated here.

[0118] The above is only the specific implementation manner of the present invention, but the protection scope of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any person skilled in the art within the technical scope disclosed by the present invention can easily think of various equivalent modifications or substitutions, and these modifications or substitutions should be covered within the protection scope of the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the present invention shall be subject to the protection scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A method for analyzing the completeness of a nuclear power plant support system, characterized in that, Including: Screening the safety - important support functions in the support system according to preset criteria; Analyzing the failure modes and failure causes of the safety - important support functions by using a failure mode and effects analysis algorithm; Analyzing the failure consequences of the safety - important support functions in corresponding failure modes; Conducting a failure frequency analysis on the failure modes whose failure consequences reach the assumed initiating event; Conducting a design - basis analysis on the failure modes whose failure frequencies reach the design - basis accident frequency to verify the completeness of the support system.

2. The method for analyzing the completeness of a nuclear power plant support system according to claim 1, characterized in that, The screening of the safety - important support functions in the support system according to preset criteria includes: Regarding the function in the support system that provides the power source necessary for the correct execution of the safety function as a safety - important support function; Regarding the function in the support system that maintains the environmental conditions required for the safety function as a safety - important support function; Regarding the function in the support system whose loss will cause the unit to be unable to maintain its current state as a safety - important support function.

3. The method for analyzing the completeness of a nuclear power plant support system according to claim 1, characterized in that, The analysis of the failure modes and failure causes of the safety - important support functions by using a failure mode and effects analysis algorithm includes: Materializing the safety - important support functions into the support devices that implement them according to the granularity, boundary, and failure superposition principle of the safety - important support functions; Conducting hypothetical analyses from two dimensions of single random failure and common - cause failure of each support device to obtain all existing failure modes and failure causes; Combining the failure modes of multiple different safety - important support functions caused by the failure of the same support device into one failure mode.

4. The method for analyzing the completeness of the nuclear power plant support system according to claim 3, wherein: The granularity of the safety - important support function refers to the function that has a relatively independent physical boundary within the support system and forms a whole to provide support externally; The boundary of the safety - important support function is limited to a single support system; The failure superposition principle of the safety - important support functions includes: not considering the superposition failure of independent safety - important support functions, considering the superposition failure of safety - important support functions caused by secondary failures, and considering the common - cause failure of redundant safety - important support functions.

5. The method for analyzing the completeness of a nuclear power plant support system according to claim 3, wherein The conducting of hypothetical analyses from two dimensions of single random failure and common - cause failure of each support device to obtain all existing failure modes and failure causes includes: When any support device fails randomly, the situation where it causes the failure of a single safety - important support function or the simultaneous failure of a combination of multiple safety - important support functions is regarded as one of the failure modes, and the failure cause is defined as single random failure; When the key components using the same principle or from the same manufacturer fail simultaneously, the situation where it causes the failure of a single safety - important support function or the simultaneous failure of a combination of multiple safety - important support functions is regarded as one of the failure modes, and the failure cause is defined as common - cause failure.

6. The method for analyzing the completeness of a nuclear power plant support system according to claim 1, wherein The analysis of the failure consequences of the safety - important support functions in corresponding failure modes includes: Confirming the unit - state response of the safety - important support function in the corresponding failure mode; Determining whether the unit - state response is a unit transient response; For the transient response of the unit, analyze the impact of the safety - important support function on its support functions and the abnormal unit states caused by it under the corresponding failure modes; If it is not the transient response of the unit, the analysis of the failure consequences under the corresponding failure modes ends.

7. The method for analyzing the completeness of a nuclear power plant support system according to claim 6, characterized in that, The transient response of the unit of the nuclear power plant support system includes a series of rapid actions taken to maintain or restore the safe state of the reactor.

8. The method for analyzing the completeness of a nuclear power plant support system according to claim 6, wherein If the transient response of the unit is caused, after the step of analyzing the impact of the safety - important support function on its support functions and the abnormal unit states caused by it under the corresponding failure modes, it also includes: When the impact of the support function and the abnormal unit state are enveloped by existing internal events, it is determined that the system consequences and the unit consequences are within the acceptable range; When the impact of the support function and the abnormal unit state are not enveloped by internal events, a design - basis analysis is required to quantify the impact on the reactor core and the radioactive consequences. If it is proven through analysis that the impact on the reactor core and the radioactive consequences exceed the requirements of the acceptance criteria, it is determined that the system consequences and the unit consequences exceed the acceptable range, and the existing design needs to be improved.

9. The method for analyzing the completeness of a nuclear power plant support system according to claim 1, wherein The failure - frequency analysis of the failure modes whose failure consequences reach the assumed initiating event includes: Determine the failure modes whose failure consequences reach the assumed initiating event; Determine the occurrence conditions of the failure modes; Integrate historical failure records, test data, or simulation results to obtain the statistical basis of the failure frequency of the failure modes; Use reliability methods to quantify the statistical basis of the failure probability of the failure modes to construct a failure - frequency model; Input the operating parameters of the failure modes whose failure consequences reach the assumed initiating event into the failure - frequency model and output the corresponding failure frequency.

10. The method for analyzing the completeness of a nuclear power plant support system according to claim 1, wherein The design - basis analysis of the failure modes whose failure frequencies reach the design - basis accident frequency is carried out to verify the completeness of the support system, including: Use a method combining quantitative calculation and qualitative evaluation to carry out the design - basis analysis of the failure modes whose failure frequencies reach the design - basis accident frequency. Among them, the design - basis analysis includes at least one of system response - ability evaluation, load - and - stress analysis, safety - margin verification, reliability analysis of the support system, environmental impact and mitigation measures.

11. A device for analyzing the completeness of a nuclear power plant support system, characterized in that, It includes: A screening unit for screening the safety - important support functions in the support system according to preset criteria; A failure - analysis unit for analyzing the failure modes and failure causes of the safety - important support functions according to the granularity, boundary, and failure - superposition principle of the safety - important support functions; A consequence - analysis unit for analyzing the failure consequences of the safety - important support functions under the corresponding failure modes; A frequency - statistics unit for carrying out failure - frequency analysis on the failure modes whose failure consequences reach the assumed initiating event; A design - basis - analysis unit for carrying out design - basis analysis on the safety - important support functions whose failure frequencies reach the design - basis accident frequency to verify the completeness of the support system.

12. An apparatus, comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored on the memory and executable on the processor, wherein, When the processor executes the computer program, it implements the method for analyzing the completeness of the nuclear power plant support system as described in any one of claims 1 to 10.

13. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the processor is caused to execute the method for analyzing the completeness of a nuclear power plant support system according to any one of claims 1 to 10.

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