A method, apparatus, device, and storage medium for determining drone spoofing signals.

By acquiring the motion trajectory and state information of the UAV, a deception trajectory is generated. Combined with the estimated state information of the navigation and inertial navigation systems, the deception signal value is determined and a deception signal is generated, which solves the problem of the effectiveness of UAV navigation deception and improves the success rate of deception.

CN120539752BActive Publication Date: 2026-11-17XUZHOU XINDIAN HIGH TECH ELECTRIC CO LTD +1
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202510721446.1
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2025-05-30
Publication Date
2026-11-17
Estimated Expiration
2045-05-30

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing technologies cannot effectively deceive drone navigation, especially when drones use a combination of global navigation satellite systems and inertial navigation systems. The erroneous position in the deception signal deviates significantly from the position information received by the drone at the previous moment, making it difficult for the drone to detect navigation deception.

Method used

By acquiring the drone's motion trajectory and state information, a deception trajectory is generated. Combined with the estimated state information from the drone's navigation system and inertial navigation system, the deception signal value is determined, and a deception signal is generated to mislead the drone.

Benefits of technology

It improves the success rate of navigation spoofing, avoids drone identification navigation spoofing, and ensures that drones fly along false trajectories.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

This invention discloses a method, apparatus, device, and storage medium for determining a drone spoofing signal. The method includes: acquiring the motion trajectory information and state information of the drone to be spoofed; generating a spoofing trajectory based on the current position of the spoofing device and the motion trajectory information; determining first estimated state information and second estimated state information of the drone based on the state information and the spoofing trajectory; determining a spoofing signal value at the current moment based on the first estimated state information and the second estimated state information; and generating a spoofing signal based on the spoofing signal value. The first estimated state information is an estimated state based on the drone's navigation system, and the second estimated state information is an estimated state based on the drone's inertial navigation system. This method determines the spoofing signal value after estimating the drone's state and generates a spoofing signal based on the spoofing signal value, thereby enabling the spoofing of the drone's navigation based on the spoofing signal.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of navigation deception technology, and in particular to a method, apparatus, device, and storage medium for determining drone deception signals. Background Technology

[0002] Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are autonomous or radio-controlled aircraft with significant advantages such as ease of operation, low cost, high flexibility, and small size. Due to their cost advantage, UAVs are increasingly used in various fields, including power line inspection, pollution monitoring, aerial photography, and disaster prevention and mitigation. However, with the rapid increase in the number of UAVs, various safety incidents caused by unauthorized drone flights are also on the rise. Therefore, how to combat unauthorized drone flights, eliminate the various safety incidents caused by unauthorized drone flights, and ensure public safety remains a problem that needs to be solved.

[0003] In existing methods, Global Positioning System (GPS) spoofing has been widely used to combat unauthorized drone flights. This involves using a spoofing device to transmit a deceptive signal with incorrect location information, mirroring the structure of a genuine GPS signal. This causes the target drone's receiver to generate incorrect positioning information based on the received deceptive signal, thus placing itself in an incorrect location. Ideally, the drone is unaware that it has been jammed and is ultimately induced to complete the mission set by the fraudster. However, in reality, drones using a combination of GPS and inertial navigation systems for positioning and navigation are widely used. When the incorrect location in the deceptive signal deviates significantly from the location information received by the drone at the previous moment, such drones typically use their own inertial navigation system to detect deviations from their flight path and thus identify navigation spoofing.

[0004] Therefore, in this context, how to more effectively deceive drone navigation is an urgent problem to be solved. Summary of the Invention

[0005] This invention provides a method, apparatus, device, and storage medium for determining drone spoofing signals, in order to solve the problem that existing technologies cannot effectively spoof drone navigation.

[0006] According to one aspect of the present invention, a method for determining unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spoofing signals is provided, the method comprising:

[0007] Obtain the motion trajectory and status information of the drone to be deceived;

[0008] A deception trajectory is generated based on the current location of the deception device and the motion trajectory information;

[0009] Based on the state information and the deception trajectory, determine the first estimated state information and the second estimated state information of the UAV;

[0010] Based on the first estimated state information and the second estimated state information, the deception signal value at the current moment is determined;

[0011] A deception signal is generated based on the deception signal value;

[0012] The first estimated state information is the estimated state based on the UAV navigation system, and the second estimated state information is the estimated state based on the UAV inertial navigation system.

[0013] According to another aspect of the present invention, a device for determining drone spoofing signals is provided, the device comprising:

[0014] The acquisition module is used to acquire the motion trajectory and status information of the drone to be deceived;

[0015] The trajectory generation module is used to generate a deception trajectory based on the current position of the deception device and the motion trajectory information.

[0016] The first determining module is used to determine the first estimated state information and the second estimated state information of the UAV based on the state information and the deception trajectory.

[0017] The second determining module is used to determine the deception signal value at the current moment based on the first estimated state information and the second estimated state information;

[0018] The signal generation module is used to generate a deception signal based on the deception signal value;

[0019] The first estimated state information is the estimated state based on the UAV navigation system, and the second estimated state information is the estimated state based on the UAV inertial navigation system.

[0020] According to another aspect of the present invention, an electronic device is provided, the electronic device comprising: at least one processor; and

[0021] A memory communicatively connected to the at least one processor; wherein,

[0022] The memory stores a computer program that can be executed by the at least one processor, which enables the at least one processor to perform the drone spoofing signal determination method according to any embodiment of the present invention.

[0023] According to another aspect of the present invention, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, the computer-readable storage medium storing computer instructions for causing a processor to execute and implement the UAV spoofing signal determination method according to any embodiment of the present invention.

[0024] This invention discloses a method, apparatus, device, and storage medium for determining a drone spoofing signal. The method includes: acquiring motion trajectory information and state information of the drone to be spoofed; generating a spoofing trajectory based on the current position of the spoofing device and the motion trajectory information; determining first estimated state information and second estimated state information of the drone based on the state information and the spoofing trajectory; determining a spoofing signal value at the current moment based on the first estimated state information and the second estimated state information; and generating a spoofing signal based on the spoofing signal value. The first estimated state information is an estimated state based on the drone's navigation system, and the second estimated state information is an estimated state based on the drone's inertial navigation system. This method determines the spoofing signal value after estimating the drone's state and generates a spoofing signal based on the spoofing signal value, thereby enabling the spoofing of drone navigation based on the spoofing signal, solving the problem in the prior art that it is impossible to effectively spoof drone navigation.

[0025] It should be understood that the description in this section is not intended to identify key or essential features of the embodiments of the present invention, nor is it intended to limit the scope of the invention. Other features of the invention will become readily apparent from the following description. Attached Figure Description

[0026] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention, the accompanying drawings used in the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the accompanying drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0027] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating a method for determining drone spoofing signals according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.

[0028] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the determination of acceleration control quantity according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0029] Figure 3 A schematic diagram illustrating the determination of the coordinates of a deception location point according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0030] Figure 4 A schematic diagram illustrating another method for determining the coordinates of a deception location point, provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0031] Figure 5This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a drone spoofing signal determination device provided in Embodiment 2 of the present invention;

[0032] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the electronic device used in the drone deception signal determination method according to an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0033] To enable those skilled in the art to better understand the present invention, the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are merely some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort should fall within the scope of protection of the present invention. It should be understood that the various steps described in the method embodiments of the present invention can be performed in different orders and / or in parallel. Furthermore, the method embodiments may include additional steps and / or omit the steps shown. The scope of the present invention is not limited in this respect.

[0034] The term "comprising" and its variations as used herein are open-ended inclusions, meaning "including but not limited to". The term "based on" means "at least partially based on". The term "one embodiment" means "at least one embodiment"; the term "another embodiment" means "at least one additional embodiment"; the term "some embodiments" means "at least some embodiments". Definitions of other terms will be given in the description below.

[0035] It should be noted that the terms "first," "second," etc., in the specification, claims, and accompanying drawings of this invention are used to distinguish similar objects and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequence. It should be understood that such data can be interchanged where appropriate so that the embodiments of the invention described herein can be implemented in orders other than those illustrated or described herein. Furthermore, any variations of the terms "comprising" and "having," etc., are intended to cover a non-exclusive inclusion; for example, a process, method, system, product, or apparatus that comprises a series of steps or units is not necessarily limited to those steps or units explicitly listed, but may include other steps or units not explicitly listed or inherent to such processes, methods, products, or apparatus.

[0036] It should be noted that the terms "a" and "a plurality of" used in this invention are illustrative rather than restrictive. Those skilled in the art should understand that, unless otherwise expressly indicated in the context, they should be understood as "one or more".

[0037] The names of the messages or information exchanged between the multiple devices in the embodiments of the present invention are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to limit the scope of these messages or information.

[0038] Example 1

[0039] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating a method for determining drone spoofing signals according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention. This method is applicable to situations where a spoofing signal for drone navigation is generated based on information about the drone and the spoofing device. This method can be executed by a drone spoofing signal determining device, which can be implemented by software and / or hardware and is generally integrated into an electronic device. In this embodiment, the electronic device includes, but is not limited to, a spoofing device or other computer devices.

[0040] like Figure 1 As shown, the method for determining drone spoofing signals provided in Embodiment 1 of the present invention includes the following steps:

[0041] S110: Obtain the motion trajectory and status information of the drone to be deceived.

[0042] The motion trajectory information can include the drone's position, speed, and target position, where the target position can be the location the drone intends to reach. The state information can be used to represent the drone's motion state, and can include the drone's position and speed information.

[0043] In this embodiment, the motion trajectory information and status information of the drone to be deceived can be obtained.

[0044] S120. Generate a deception trajectory based on the current location of the deception device and the motion trajectory information.

[0045] Deception devices can be used to interfere with or mislead the normal operation of other devices or systems by sending false signals or information. For example, a deception device can capture the navigation signal frequency band of a target drone, identify its satellite navigation system type, and then simulate the signal of a navigation satellite, covering the drone's receiving antenna with greater power, thus replacing the real navigation signal. By sending forged location information, it can mislead the drone into believing it is in a different location, causing it to deviate from its flight path, hover, or automatically return to home. The deception trajectory can be a false movement trajectory, which can be used to mislead the drone.

[0046] In this embodiment, a deception trajectory that can mislead the drone can be generated based on the current position and motion trajectory information of the deception device. For example, multiple deception point coordinates can be determined first based on the current position of the deception device and the motion trajectory information of the drone, and these multiple deception point coordinates can be used as the deception trajectory.

[0047] For example, the location information A of the deception device and the current trajectory information of the unauthorized drone are obtained. The trajectory information includes location information P, velocity information v, and target position B. Based on the location information A and motion state information of the deception device, the coordinates P of multiple deception location points are obtained. t (x pt y pt ), to satisfy (x pt y pt Let (x) be the coordinates of the UAV at time t. pt-1 y pt-1 Let t be the coordinates of the UAV at time t-1. A preset deception trajectory can be obtained based on the coordinates of multiple deception points. in, Let t be the preset trajectory coordinates of the UAV. Let x and y be the x and y coordinates of the drone's trajectory position at time t, respectively. Let t be the velocity corresponding to the preset trajectory coordinates at time t. Let x and y be the velocity components corresponding to the preset trajectory coordinate position at time t. Let t be the acceleration corresponding to the preset trajectory coordinate position. Let x and y be the abscissa and ordinate components of the acceleration corresponding to the preset trajectory coordinate position at time t. Where t = 0, T, 2T, 3T, ..., nT.

[0048] S130. Determine the first estimated state information and the second estimated state information of the UAV based on the state information and the deception trajectory.

[0049] The first estimated state information is based on the estimated state of the UAV navigation system, and the second estimated state information is based on the estimated state of the UAV inertial navigation system. The UAV navigation system may include various subsystems such as satellite navigation, inertial navigation, visual navigation, or radio navigation. The UAV inertial navigation system may refer to a navigation system mainly composed of inertial measurement units.

[0050] In this embodiment, the first estimated state information and the second estimated state information of the UAV can be determined by the UAV's state information and the spoofed trajectory.

[0051] In one embodiment, determining the first estimated state information and the second estimated state information of the UAV based on the state information and the deception trajectory includes: determining the acceleration control quantity at the current moment based on the state information at the current moment, the deception trajectory, and the acceleration information of the UAV at the current moment; determining the first estimated state information of the UAV at the current moment based on the acceleration control quantity, the deception trajectory, and the first formula; and determining the second estimated state information of the UAV at the current moment based on the acceleration control quantity estimated at the previous moment, the second estimated state information corrected at the previous moment, and the second formula.

[0052] Among them, the acceleration control quantity can be the value desired by the deception device and can be used to estimate the state of the drone.

[0053] In this embodiment, the acceleration control quantity at the current moment can be determined based on the current state information, the deception trajectory, and the current acceleration information of the UAV. Using the acceleration control quantity, the deception trajectory, and the first formula, the first estimated state information of the UAV at the current moment can be determined. Based on the acceleration control quantity from the previous moment, the corrected second estimated state information from the previous moment, and the second formula, the second estimated state information of the UAV at the current moment can be determined. The corrected second estimated state information from the previous moment can be based on the first estimated state information calculated at the previous moment; for example, the first estimated state information calculated at time t can be used. As the second estimated state information after correction from the previous moment This yields the corrected inertial navigation system values.

[0054] For example, in this embodiment, the state information of the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) at time t can be obtained through a period T. And acceleration information a t Among them, status information Including the location information of the unauthorized drone at time t and speed information Let be the trajectory coordinates of the UAV at time t. Let x and y be the x and y coordinates of the UAV's trajectory at time t, respectively. Let be the velocity corresponding to the trajectory coordinates of the UAV at time t. This represents the x-coordinate and y-coordinate components of the velocity corresponding to the UAV's trajectory coordinates at time t. It also updates the UAV's first estimated state information. and the second estimated state information of the inertial navigation system in Let be the estimated position of the UAV at time t. Let t be the estimated velocity of the UAV at time t.

[0055] In one embodiment, determining the acceleration control quantity at the current moment based on the current state information, the deception trajectory, and the current acceleration information of the drone includes:

[0056] The current state information is used as the first estimated state information of the UAV that has not been updated at the current time.

[0057] Based on the unupdated first estimated state information, the deception trajectory, and the current acceleration information of the UAV, the acceleration control quantity 'a' at the current moment is determined using a proportional-differential algorithm. * :

[0058]

[0059] Among them, a t Let K be the acceleration of the drone at time t. p For the proportional gain of the proportional-differential algorithm, This is the first estimated state information at time t. Let be the deception trajectory at time t.

[0060] Among them, the proportional-derivative algorithm can refer to a control algorithm that determines the control quantity by calculating the current error of the system and the rate of change of the error, so as to achieve the purpose of quickly and accurately controlling the controlled object.

[0061] In this embodiment, the current state information can be used as the first estimated state information of the UAV that has not been updated at the current moment. For example, let... Then, the acceleration control quantity at the current moment can be determined using the first estimated state information (not yet updated), the deception trajectory, and the current acceleration information of the UAV, combined with a proportional-differential algorithm. For example, Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the determination of acceleration control quantities according to an embodiment of the present invention. The key to navigation deception is sending false signals to induce the drone to generate a signal similar to the one described above. The same acceleration. For example... Figure 2 As shown, deceptive signals can cause a drone employing a combined global navigation satellite system (GNSS) and inertial navigation system to change its state from its true state to an estimated state. This results in incorrect acceleration during drone control. This allows the drone to be controlled to approach the deceiving target state. The drone treats its estimated state as its true state, believing it has moved from its estimated state to its original target state. In reality, the drone will move from its true state position to the deceiving state position.

[0062] In one embodiment, the first formula is:

[0063]

[0064] in, The first estimated state information is given at time t. The location of the first estimated state information, The speed for the first estimated state information; To deceive the trajectory about its coordinates at time t, a * K is the acceleration control variable. p For the proportional gain of the proportional-differential algorithm, To deceive the velocity corresponding to the trajectory coordinate position at time t;

[0065] The second formula is:

[0066]

[0067] in, The second estimated state information is estimated at time t. T represents the period for acquiring UAV status information, I 2*2 It is a two-dimensional identity matrix, 0 2*2 It is a two-order zero matrix. The output of the corrected second estimated state information of the inertial navigation system estimated at time t-1. Let t-1 be the estimated value of the UAV's acceleration.

[0068] In this embodiment, the first and second estimated state information of the UAV can be updated in different ways. In this embodiment, the estimated value of the UAV's acceleration can be obtained by processing the relevant state data of the UAV acquired by the deception device through radar or other detection devices. The specific determination method is not limited in this embodiment. For example, based on its own "judgment" of the UAV's motion state or a preset interference strategy, the corresponding acceleration signal can be simulated using the built-in accelerometer, or the current attitude angle, throttle control amount, and other parameters of the UAV can be parsed from the signal. Then, based on these parameters and some kinematic models, the possible acceleration of the UAV can be estimated. Alternatively, the currently monitored UAV flight environment, attitude, and other features can be input into a trained model, and the corresponding acceleration estimate can be output by the model.

[0069] S140. Based on the first estimated state information and the second estimated state information, determine the deception signal value at the current moment.

[0070] Among them, the deception signal value can refer to the relevant parameter values ​​of the false signal generated and sent to the drone by the deception device. For example, the deception signal value may include false latitude and longitude coordinates, speed, acceleration and other parameters.

[0071] In this embodiment, the deception signal value at the current moment can be calculated based on the first estimated state information and the second estimated state information.

[0072] In one embodiment, determining the deception signal value at the current moment based on the first estimated state information and the second estimated state information includes:

[0073] The deception signal value at the current moment is calculated using the following formula.

[0074]

[0075] in, The second estimated state information is estimated at time t. K is the first estimated state information estimated at time t. p This is the proportional gain of the proportional-differential algorithm.

[0076] In this embodiment, the deception signal value can be calculated using a preset formula.

[0077] S150. Generate a deception signal based on the deception signal value.

[0078] In this embodiment, a deception signal can be generated using the deception signal value at the current time. The specific generation method can be set according to the actual situation, and this example does not limit it. For example, the deception signal value at time t can be used as a basis for generation. A deception signal is generated based on the known GPS structure signal to send a deception signal to an unauthorized drone. The known GPS structure signal can refer to the structure of the Global Positioning System signal in terms of its composition, format, encoding method, frequency characteristics, etc.

[0079] This invention provides a method for determining a drone spoofing signal, comprising: acquiring motion trajectory information and state information of the drone to be spoofed; generating a spoofing trajectory based on the current position of the spoofing device and the motion trajectory information; determining a first estimated state information and a second estimated state information of the drone based on the state information and the spoofing trajectory; determining a spoofing signal value at the current moment based on the first estimated state information and the second estimated state information; and generating a spoofing signal based on the spoofing signal value. The first estimated state information is an estimated state based on the drone's navigation system, and the second estimated state information is an estimated state based on the drone's inertial navigation system. This method determines the spoofing signal value after estimating the drone's state and generates a spoofing signal based on the spoofing signal value, thereby enabling the spoofing of drone navigation based on the spoofing signal, solving the problem in the prior art that it is impossible to effectively spoof drone navigation.

[0080] Based on the above embodiments, modified embodiments of the above embodiments are proposed. It should be noted that, in order to keep the description brief, only the differences from the above embodiments are described in the modified embodiments.

[0081] In one embodiment, the motion trajectory information includes the current position and current speed of the UAV. Accordingly, generating a deception trajectory based on the current position of the deception device and the motion trajectory information includes: determining a coordinate interval based on the current speed; selecting multiple coordinates from the line connecting the current position of the deception device and the current position of the UAV, using the coordinate interval as the interval between coordinate points, to obtain multiple deception position point coordinates; and generating a deception trajectory based on the multiple deception position point coordinates.

[0082] In this embodiment, the motion trajectory information may include the drone's current position and current speed. After obtaining the drone's motion trajectory information, the interval between the selected coordinate points can be determined based on the drone's current speed. For example, the speed value can be directly used as the coordinate interval, or a multiple of the speed can be used as the coordinate interval. After determining the coordinate interval, multiple coordinates can be selected from the line connecting the current position of the deception device and the current position of the drone. For example, coordinate points can be selected on either side of the line connecting the drone's current position, and a deception trajectory can be generated based on the coordinates of multiple deception position points. For example, the coordinates of the deception location point can be used as the trajectory coordinates. Trajectory coordinates corresponding speed and acceleration The settings can be adjusted according to the actual situation; this embodiment does not impose any limitations on this. For example, a navigation deception algorithm can be used to calculate the acceleration required to lure the drone to the target trajectory point. In this embodiment, the drone's altitude during flight can remain constant.

[0083] This embodiment obtains the motion state of the unauthorized drone, sets multiple deceptive positions with speed value intervals to form a deceptive trajectory, calculates the acceleration required to lure the drone to the target trajectory point through a navigation deception algorithm, generates a corresponding deception signal, and induces the drone navigation controller to output the corresponding acceleration. This avoids the drone from recognizing navigation deception due to a large deviation between the incorrect position in the set deception signal and the position information received by the drone at the previous moment, thus improving the success rate of navigation deception.

[0084] For example, Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the determination of the coordinates of a deception location point according to an embodiment of the present invention, as shown below. Figure 3 As shown, the location information A of the deception device, the current location information P of the unauthorized drone, and the speed information v of the drone are obtained to obtain the AP direction vector. Along direction vector In the direction, On the extension line (or from) (Selecting coordinate points in the opposite direction), and using the magnitude of velocity v |v| as the interval, obtain multiple deception position coordinate points P1, P2, P3, ..., P t Because the deviation between two adjacent coordinate points is small, it can effectively avoid the erroneous position in the set deception signal from being identified by the drone as navigation deception due to a large deviation between the position information received by the drone at the previous moment, thus improving the success rate of navigation deception.

[0085] In one embodiment, the motion trajectory information includes the current position, current speed, and target position of the UAV. Correspondingly, generating a deception trajectory based on the current position of the deception device and the motion trajectory information includes: determining the radius of a circle based on the current speed; obtaining a circle corresponding to the UAV at its current position, centered on the current position of the UAV; determining the coordinates of the deception position point at the next moment based on the current position of the deception device and the coordinates of the tangent point corresponding to the straight line passing through the target position and tangent to the circle; regenerating a circle corresponding to the UAV at the next position based on the radius, using the coordinates of the deception position point at the next moment as the center; re-determining new deception position point coordinates based on the circle and the target position, until a preset number of deception position point coordinates are obtained; and generating a deception trajectory based on the preset number of deception position point coordinates.

[0086] In this embodiment, the motion trajectory information includes the drone's current position, current speed, and target position. The radius of the circle can be the value corresponding to the current speed, or a multiple of the current speed. Using the drone's current position as the center, a circle is generated at the drone's current position. The tangent line corresponding to the target position is determined, and this tangent line has two tangent point coordinates on the circle. One tangent point coordinate can be selected based on the current position of the deception device. For example, if the drone is to approach the deception device, a tangent point coordinate farther from the device's current position is selected; if the drone is to move away from the device, a tangent point coordinate closer to the device's current position is selected. The selected tangent point coordinates are used as the deception position coordinates for the next moment. Using these coordinates as the center, a new circle corresponding to the drone's next position is generated based on the radius. This process of determining new deception position coordinates based on the circle and target position is repeated until a preset number of deception position coordinates are obtained. A deception trajectory is then generated based on these preset number of deception position coordinates.

[0087] In this embodiment, the drone's altitude can remain constant during flight.

[0088] For example, Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram illustrating another method for determining the coordinates of a deception location point, as provided in an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 4 As shown, the following steps are taken: First, obtain the location information A of the deception device, the current location information P0 and velocity information v of the unauthorized drone, and the target location information B. Second, construct a circle with P0 as the center and v as the radius as the initial actual position of the drone. Third, obtain a straight line passing through the target location B and tangent to the circle. Use the coordinates of the tangency point P1 as the coordinates of the deception location point at the next moment. Fourth, construct a circle with P1 as the center and v as the radius. Repeat the above steps to obtain multiple deception location point coordinates P1, P2, P3, ..., P... t In this method, P0 represents the UAV's true position, and B is the UAV's destination. Without navigation deception, the UAV moves along the P0B direction. During navigation deception interference, the deceiter's goal is to make the UAV's movement direction deviate from P0B. When the deceited coordinates P1 are obtained, the UAV's positioning result is deceived into being P1. Because B is the UAV's target position, the UAV adjusts its direction to move along P1B. However, the UAV's true position is actually at P0, so it will move along the P0C direction, where P0C is parallel to P1B. When P0P1 is tangent to the ray starting from point B at the tangency point P1, the angle ∠BP1C of the UAV's movement deviation is maximized. This maximizes the UAV's deviation from its target position while effectively preventing navigation deception from being detected by the UAV.

[0089] This embodiment establishes a circle with the deception location point as the center and the radius as the tangent point of the circle v, which maximizes the angle of the drone's movement deviation. This can effectively prevent the drone from being identified by navigation deception and maximize the drone's deviation from the target position.

[0090] Example 2

[0091] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of a drone spoofing signal determination device provided in Embodiment 2 of the present invention. The device is applicable to generating spoofing signals for drone navigation based on information about the drone and the spoofing device. The device can be implemented by software and / or hardware and is generally integrated into an electronic device.

[0092] like Figure 5 As shown, the device includes:

[0093] The acquisition module 210 is used to acquire the motion trajectory information and status information of the drone to be deceived;

[0094] The trajectory generation module 220 is used to generate a deception trajectory based on the current position of the deception device and the motion trajectory information;

[0095] The first determining module 230 is used to determine the first estimated state information and the second estimated state information of the UAV based on the state information and the deception trajectory.

[0096] The second determining module 240 is used to determine the deception signal value at the current moment based on the first estimated state information and the second estimated state information;

[0097] Signal generation module 250 is used to generate a deception signal based on the deception signal value;

[0098] The first estimated state information is the estimated state based on the UAV navigation system, and the second estimated state information is the estimated state based on the UAV inertial navigation system.

[0099] This embodiment provides a device for determining a drone spoofing signal, comprising: an acquisition module for acquiring motion trajectory information and state information of the drone to be spoofed; a trajectory generation module for generating a spoofing trajectory based on the current position of the spoofing device and the motion trajectory information; a first determination module for determining first estimated state information and second estimated state information of the drone based on the state information and the spoofing trajectory; a second determination module for determining a spoofing signal value at the current moment based on the first estimated state information and the second estimated state information; and a signal generation module for generating a spoofing signal based on the spoofing signal value; wherein the first estimated state information is an estimated state based on the drone navigation system, and the second estimated state information is an estimated state based on the drone inertial navigation system. By estimating the state of the drone and determining the spoofing signal value, and generating a spoofing signal based on the spoofing signal value, the device can complete the spoofing task of drone navigation based on the spoofing signal, solving the problem that existing technologies cannot effectively spoof drone navigation.

[0100] Furthermore, the first determining module 230 includes:

[0101] Based on the current state information, the deception trajectory, and the current acceleration information of the UAV, determine the current acceleration control amount;

[0102] Based on the acceleration control quantity, the deception trajectory, and the first formula, the first estimated state information of the UAV at the current moment is determined;

[0103] Based on the acceleration control quantity estimated at the previous moment, the second estimated state information corrected at the previous moment, and the second formula, the second estimated state information of the UAV at the current moment is determined.

[0104] Furthermore, determining the acceleration control quantity at the current moment based on the current state information, the deception trajectory, and the current acceleration information of the drone includes:

[0105] The current state information is used as the first estimated state information of the UAV that has not been updated at the current time.

[0106] Based on the unupdated first estimated state information, the deception trajectory, and the current acceleration information of the UAV, the acceleration control quantity 'a' at the current moment is determined using a proportional-differential algorithm. * :

[0107]

[0108] Among them, a t Let K be the acceleration of the drone at time t. p For the proportional gain of the proportional-differential algorithm, This is the first estimated state information at time t. Let be the deception trajectory at time t.

[0109] Furthermore, the first formula is:

[0110]

[0111] in, The first estimated state information is given at time t. The location of the first estimated state information, The speed for the first estimated state information; To deceive the trajectory about its coordinates at time t, a * K is the acceleration control variable. p For the proportional gain of the proportional-differential algorithm, To deceive the velocity corresponding to the trajectory coordinate position at time t;

[0112] The second formula is:

[0113]

[0114] in, The second estimated state information is estimated at time t. T represents the period for acquiring UAV status information, I 2*2 It is a two-dimensional identity matrix, 0 2*2 It is a two-order zero matrix. The output of the corrected second estimated state information of the inertial navigation system estimated at time t-1. Let t-1 be the estimated value of the UAV's acceleration.

[0115] Furthermore, the second determining module 240 includes:

[0116] The deception signal value at the current moment is calculated using the following formula.

[0117]

[0118] in, The second estimated state information is estimated at time t. K is the first estimated state information estimated at time t. p This is the proportional gain of the proportional-differential algorithm.

[0119] Furthermore, the motion trajectory information includes the current position and current speed of the drone; correspondingly, the trajectory generation module 220 includes:

[0120] The coordinate interval is determined based on the current speed;

[0121] Using the coordinate interval as the interval between coordinate points, multiple coordinates are selected from the line connecting the current position of the deception device and the current position of the drone to obtain multiple deception position coordinates;

[0122] A deception trajectory is generated based on the coordinates of the multiple deception location points.

[0123] Furthermore, the motion trajectory information includes the drone's current position, current speed, and target position. Correspondingly, the trajectory generation module 220 includes:

[0124] The radius of the circle is determined based on the current speed, and the circle corresponding to the current position of the drone is obtained with the current position of the drone as the center.

[0125] Based on the current position of the deception device and the coordinates of the tangent point corresponding to the straight line that passes through the target position and is tangent to the circle, the coordinates of the deception position point at the next moment are determined.

[0126] Using the coordinates of the deception location point at the next moment as the center, a new circle corresponding to the drone's next position is generated based on the radius.

[0127] Based on the circle and the target position, new deception position coordinates are determined until a preset number of deception position coordinates are obtained, and a deception trajectory is generated based on the preset number of deception position coordinates.

[0128] The above-mentioned drone deception signal determination device can execute the drone deception signal determination method provided in any embodiment of the present invention, and has the corresponding functional modules and beneficial effects of the method.

[0129] Example 3

[0130] Figure 6 A schematic diagram of an electronic device 10 that can be used to implement embodiments of the present invention is shown. The electronic device is intended to represent various forms of digital computers, such as laptop computers, desktop computers, workstations, personal digital assistants, servers, blade servers, mainframe computers, and other suitable computers. The electronic device can also represent various forms of mobile devices, such as personal digital processors, cellular phones, smartphones, wearable devices (e.g., helmets, glasses, watches, etc.), and other similar computing devices. The components shown herein, their connections and relationships, and their functions are merely illustrative and are not intended to limit the implementation of the invention described and / or claimed herein.

[0131] like Figure 6As shown, the electronic device 10 includes at least one processor 11 and a memory, such as a read-only memory (ROM) 12 or a random access memory (RAM) 13, communicatively connected to the at least one processor 11. The memory stores computer programs executable by the at least one processor. The processor 11 can perform various appropriate actions and processes based on the computer program stored in the ROM 12 or loaded from storage unit 18 into the RAM 13. The RAM 13 may also store various programs and data required for the operation of the electronic device 10. The processor 11, ROM 12, and RAM 13 are interconnected via a bus 14. An input / output (I / O) interface 15 is also connected to the bus 14.

[0132] Multiple components in electronic device 10 are connected to I / O interface 15, including: input unit 16, such as keyboard, mouse, etc.; output unit 17, such as various types of displays, speakers, etc.; storage unit 18, such as disk, optical disk, etc.; and communication unit 19, such as network card, modem, wireless transceiver, etc. Communication unit 19 allows electronic device 10 to exchange information / data with other devices through computer networks such as the Internet and / or various telecommunications networks.

[0133] Processor 11 can be a variety of general-purpose and / or special-purpose processing components with processing and computing capabilities. Some examples of processor 11 include, but are not limited to, a central processing unit (CPU), a graphics processing unit (GPU), various special-purpose artificial intelligence (AI) computing chips, various processors running machine learning model algorithms, a digital signal processor (DSP), and any suitable processor, controller, microcontroller, etc. Processor 11 performs the various methods and processes described above, such as drone spoofing signal determination methods.

[0134] In some embodiments, the drone spoofing signal determination method may be implemented as a computer program tangibly contained in a computer-readable storage medium, such as storage unit 18. In some embodiments, part or all of the computer program may be loaded and / or installed on electronic device 10 via ROM 12 and / or communication unit 19. When the computer program is loaded into RAM 13 and executed by processor 11, one or more steps of the drone spoofing signal determination method described above may be performed. Alternatively, in other embodiments, processor 11 may be configured to perform the drone spoofing signal determination method by any other suitable means (e.g., by means of firmware).

[0135] Various embodiments of the systems and techniques described above herein can be implemented in digital electronic circuit systems, integrated circuit systems, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), application-specific standard products (ASSPs), systems-on-a-chip (SoCs), payload-programmable logic devices (CPLDs), computer hardware, firmware, software, and / or combinations thereof. These various embodiments may include implementations in one or more computer programs that can be executed and / or interpreted on a programmable system including at least one programmable processor, which may be a dedicated or general-purpose programmable processor, capable of receiving data and instructions from a storage system, at least one input device, and at least one output device, and transmitting data and instructions to the storage system, the at least one input device, and the at least one output device.

[0136] Computer programs used to implement the methods of the present invention may be written in any combination of one or more programming languages. These computer programs may be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, or other programmable data processing device, such that when executed by the processor, the computer programs cause the functions / operations specified in the flowcharts and / or block diagrams to be performed. The computer programs may be executed entirely on a machine, partially on a machine, or as a standalone software package, partially on a machine and partially on a remote machine, or entirely on a remote machine or server.

[0137] In the context of this invention, a computer-readable storage medium can be a tangible medium that may contain or store a computer program for use by or in conjunction with an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device. A computer-readable storage medium may include, but is not limited to, electronic, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor systems, apparatus, or devices, or any suitable combination thereof. Alternatively, a computer-readable storage medium may be a machine-readable signal medium. More specific examples of machine-readable storage media include electrical connections based on one or more wires, portable computer disks, hard disks, random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), optical fibers, portable compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), optical storage devices, magnetic storage devices, or any suitable combination thereof.

[0138] To provide interaction with a user, the systems and techniques described herein can be implemented on an electronic device having: a display device (e.g., a CRT (cathode ray tube) or LCD (liquid crystal display) monitor) for displaying information to the user; and a keyboard and pointing device (e.g., a mouse or trackball) through which the user provides input to the electronic device. Other types of devices can also be used to provide interaction with the user; for example, feedback provided to the user can be any form of sensory feedback (e.g., visual feedback, auditory feedback, or tactile feedback); and input from the user can be received in any form (including sound input, voice input, or tactile input).

[0139] The systems and technologies described herein can be implemented in computing systems that include backend components (e.g., as data servers), or computing systems that include middleware components (e.g., application servers), or computing systems that include frontend components (e.g., user computers with graphical user interfaces or web browsers through which users can interact with implementations of the systems and technologies described herein), or any combination of such backend, middleware, or frontend components. The components of the system can be interconnected via digital data communication of any form or medium (e.g., communication networks). Examples of communication networks include local area networks (LANs), wide area networks (WANs), blockchain networks, and the Internet.

[0140] A computing system can include clients and servers. Clients and servers are generally located far apart and typically interact through communication networks. The client-server relationship is created by computer programs running on the respective computers and having a client-server relationship with each other. The server can be a cloud server, also known as a cloud computing server or cloud host, which is a hosting product within the cloud computing service system to address the shortcomings of traditional physical hosts and VPS services, such as high management difficulty and weak business scalability.

[0141] It should be understood that the various forms of processes shown above can be used, with steps reordered, added, or deleted. For example, the steps described in this invention can be executed in parallel, sequentially, or in different orders, as long as the desired result of the technical solution of this invention can be achieved, and this is not limited herein.

[0142] The specific embodiments described above do not constitute a limitation on the scope of protection of this invention. Those skilled in the art should understand that various modifications, combinations, sub-combinations, and substitutions can be made according to design requirements and other factors. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, and improvements made within the spirit and principles of this invention should be included within the scope of protection of this invention.

Claims

1. A method for determining drone spoofing signals, characterized in that, The method includes: Obtain the motion trajectory and status information of the drone to be deceived; A deception trajectory is generated based on the current location of the deception device and the motion trajectory information; Based on the state information and the deception trajectory, determine the first estimated state information and the second estimated state information of the UAV; Based on the first estimated state information and the second estimated state information, the deception signal value at the current moment is determined; A deception signal is generated based on the deception signal value; The first estimated state information is the estimated state based on the UAV navigation system, and the second estimated state information is the estimated state based on the UAV inertial navigation system. The step of determining the first estimated state information and the second estimated state information of the UAV based on the state information and the deception trajectory includes: Based on the current state information, the deception trajectory, and the current acceleration information of the UAV, determine the current acceleration control amount; Based on the acceleration control quantity, the deception trajectory, and the first formula, the first estimated state information of the UAV at the current moment is determined; Based on the acceleration control quantity estimated at the previous moment, the second estimated state information corrected at the previous moment, and the second formula, the second estimated state information of the UAV at the current moment is determined; the second estimated state information corrected at the previous moment is corrected based on the first estimated state information calculated at the previous moment, and the first estimated state information calculated at the previous moment is used as the second estimated state information corrected at the previous moment. The first formula is: ; ; in, For a moment The first estimated state information, The location of the first estimated state information, The speed for the first estimated state information; To deceive the trajectory at any moment The trajectory coordinates position, For acceleration control, For the proportional gain of the proportional-differential algorithm, To deceive the trajectory at any moment The velocity corresponding to the trajectory coordinates; The second formula is: ; in, For a moment The estimated second estimated state information, , , The period for obtaining drone status information, It is a two-order identity matrix. It is a two-order zero matrix. For a moment The output of the corrected second estimated state information of the inertial navigation system. For a moment Estimated acceleration of the drone.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The determination of the acceleration control quantity at the current moment based on the current state information, the deception trajectory, and the current acceleration information of the UAV includes: The current state information is used as the first estimated state information of the UAV that has not been updated at the current time. Based on the unupdated first estimated state information, the deception trajectory, and the current acceleration information of the UAV, the acceleration control quantity at the current moment is determined using a proportional-differential algorithm. : ; ; in, For a moment The acceleration of the drone For the proportional gain of the proportional-differential algorithm, For a moment The first estimated state information, For a moment The trajectory of deception.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of determining the deception signal value at the current moment based on the first estimated state information and the second estimated state information includes: The deception signal value at the current moment is calculated using the following formula. : ; in, For a moment The estimated second estimated state information, For a moment The first estimated state information, This is the proportional gain of the proportional-differential algorithm.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The motion trajectory information includes the current position and current speed of the drone. Correspondingly, generating a deception trajectory based on the current position of the deception device and the motion trajectory information includes: The coordinate interval is determined based on the current speed; Using the coordinate interval as the interval between coordinate points, multiple coordinates are selected from the line connecting the current position of the deception device and the current position of the drone to obtain multiple deception position coordinates; A deception trajectory is generated based on the coordinates of the multiple deception location points.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The motion trajectory information includes the drone's current position, current speed, and target position. Correspondingly, generating a deception trajectory based on the deception device's current position and the motion trajectory information includes: The radius of the circle is determined based on the current speed, and the circle corresponding to the current position of the drone is obtained with the current position of the drone as the center. Based on the current position of the deception device and the coordinates of the tangent point corresponding to the straight line that passes through the target position and is tangent to the circle, the coordinates of the deception position point at the next moment are determined. Using the coordinates of the deception location point at the next moment as the center, a new circle corresponding to the drone's next position is generated based on the radius. Based on the circle and the target position, new deception position coordinates are determined until a preset number of deception position coordinates are obtained, and a deception trajectory is generated based on the preset number of deception position coordinates.

6. A device for determining drone spoofing signals, characterized in that, The device includes: The acquisition module is used to acquire the motion trajectory and status information of the drone to be deceived; The trajectory generation module is used to generate a deception trajectory based on the current position of the deception device and the motion trajectory information. The first determining module is used to determine the first estimated state information and the second estimated state information of the UAV based on the state information and the deception trajectory. The second determining module is used to determine the deception signal value at the current moment based on the first estimated state information and the second estimated state information; The signal generation module is used to generate a deception signal based on the deception signal value; The first estimated state information is the estimated state based on the UAV navigation system, and the second estimated state information is the estimated state based on the UAV inertial navigation system. The first determining module includes: Based on the current state information, the deception trajectory, and the current acceleration information of the UAV, determine the current acceleration control amount; Based on the acceleration control quantity, the deception trajectory, and the first formula, the first estimated state information of the UAV at the current moment is determined; Based on the acceleration control quantity estimated at the previous moment, the second estimated state information corrected at the previous moment, and the second formula, the second estimated state information of the UAV at the current moment is determined; the second estimated state information corrected at the previous moment is corrected based on the first estimated state information calculated at the previous moment, and the first estimated state information calculated at the previous moment is used as the second estimated state information corrected at the previous moment. The first formula is: ; ; in, For a moment The first estimated state information, The location of the first estimated state information, The speed for the first estimated state information; To deceive the trajectory at any moment The trajectory coordinates position, For acceleration control, For the proportional gain of the proportional-differential algorithm, To deceive the trajectory at any moment The velocity corresponding to the trajectory coordinates; The second formula is: ; in, For a moment The estimated second estimated state information, , , The period for obtaining drone status information, It is a two-order identity matrix. It is a two-order zero matrix. For a moment The output of the corrected second estimated state information of the inertial navigation system. For a moment Estimated acceleration of the drone.

7. An electronic device, characterized in that, The device includes: At least one processor; and A memory communicatively connected to the at least one processor; wherein, The memory stores a computer program that can be executed by the at least one processor, the computer program being executed by the at least one processor to enable the at least one processor to perform the drone spoofing signal determination method according to any one of claims 1-5.

8. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer-readable storage medium stores computer instructions that, when executed by a processor, implement the method for determining drone spoofing signals according to any one of claims 1-5.

Citation Information

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