Reconstruction of trusted IP security for trusted no-3gpp access point (TNAP) mobility

Abstract

Aspects of the present disclosure relate to UE TNAP mobility. For example, the techniques may provide a UE TNAP mobility authentication and secure setup procedure, such as a procedure that refreshes with new input parameters and security keys during the authentication and secure setup procedure when the UE moves from a source TNAP to a target TNAP.

Description

[0001] CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

[0002] This application claims priority to U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 63 / 482,715, filed on February 1, 2023, entitled “RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF TRUSTED IP SECURITY FOR TRUSTED NON-3GPP ACCESS POINT (TNAP) MOBILITY,” the entire contents of which are incorporated herein by reference. Technical Field

[0003] The present disclosure relates to wireless communications, and more particularly to Trusted Non-3GPP Access Point (TNAP) mobility. Background Art

[0004] A wireless communication system may include one or more network communication devices (such as base stations), which may also be referred to as eNodeBs (eNBs), next generation NodeBs (gNBs), or other appropriate terms. Each network communication device (such as a base station) may support wireless communications for one or more user communication devices, which may also be referred to as user equipment (UEs) or other appropriate terms. A wireless communication system may support wireless communications with one or more user communication devices by utilizing resources of the wireless communication system (e.g., time resources (e.g., symbols, time slots, subframes, frames, etc.) or frequency resources (e.g., subcarriers, carriers)). Additionally, a wireless communication system may support wireless communications across various radio access technologies, including third generation (3G) radio access technology, fourth generation (4G) radio access technology, fifth generation (5G) radio access technology, and other appropriate radio access technologies beyond 5G (e.g., sixth generation (6G)).

[0005] The 5G network supports UE authentication for trusted non-3GPP access, where the UE connects (e.g., registers) to the 5G core network via a trusted non-3GPP access network (TNAN). For example, as described in Rel. 17, when the UE moves from a source TN access point (TNAP) to a target TNAP, the UE performs full authentication via the target TNAP to reconnect to the 5G network. Typically, full authentication involves all levels of security establishment, including access network security (e.g., security establishment between the UE and the access network or TNAN) and non-access layer security (e.g., security establishment between the UE and the 5G core network). Summary of the Invention

[0006] The present disclosure relates to methods, apparatus, and systems that support UE TNAP mobility authentication and security establishment procedures, such as procedures that utilize new input parameters and security key refresh during the authentication and security establishment procedures, and other techniques.

[0007] Some implementations of the methods and apparatus described herein may further include a Trusted Non-3GPP Gateway Function (TNGF), the TNGF comprising: a processor and a memory coupled to the processor, the processor configured to cause the TNGF to: derive a Trusted IP Security (TIPSec) key using a TGNF key, input parameters, and a reauthentication usage type specifier; receive a reauthentication identifier for a user equipment (UE) from the UE; identify the TIPSec key using the reauthentication identifier; and reestablish an IPSec security association (SA) based on the identified TIPSec key.

[0008] In some implementations of the methods and apparatus described herein, the reauthentication usage type specifier includes reauthentication IPSec / IPSec key refresh related usage type information, and wherein the input parameters include: length of the usage type specifier, TNGF Nonce (one-time random number), length of the TNGF Nonce, UE Nonce, length of the UE Nonce, reauthentication counter, length of the reauthentication counter, random number, length of the random number, and combinations thereof.

[0009] In some implementations of the methods and apparatus described herein, the TNGF sends a reauthentication identifier to the UE in response to receiving the reauthentication identifier from the UE.

[0010] In some implementations of the methods and apparatus described herein, the TNGF sends a reauthentication identifier to the UE during an Internet Key Exchange (IKE) authentication exchange.

[0011] In some implementations of the methods and apparatus described herein, the TNGF derives TIPSec keys during UE mobility from a previous TNAP to a target TNAP associated with the TNGF.

[0012] Some implementations of the methods and apparatus described herein may also include a method performed by a TNGF, the method comprising: deriving a Trusted IP Security (TIPSec) key using: a TGNF key, input parameters, and a reauthentication usage type specifier; receiving a reauthentication identifier for a user equipment (UE) from the UE; identifying the TIPSec key using the reauthentication identifier; and reestablishing an IPSec security association (SA) based on the identified TIPSec key.

[0013] In some implementations of the methods and apparatus described herein, the reauthentication usage type specifier includes reauthentication IPSec / IPSec key refresh related usage type information, and wherein the input parameters include: length of the usage type specifier, TNGF Nonce, length of the TNGF Nonce, UE Nonce, length of the UE Nonce, reauthentication counter, length of the reauthentication counter, random number, length of the random number, or a combination thereof.

[0014] In some implementations of the methods and apparatus described herein, the TNGF sends a reauthentication identifier to the UE in response to receiving the reauthentication identifier from the UE.

[0015] In some implementations of the methods and apparatus described herein, the TNGF sends a reauthentication identifier to the UE during an Internet Key Exchange (IKE) authentication exchange.

[0016] In some implementations of the methods and apparatus described herein, the TNGF derives the TIPSec keys in response to UE mobility from a previous TNAP to a target TNAP associated with the TNGF.

[0017] Some implementations of the methods and apparatus described herein may also include a UE comprising: a processor; and a memory coupled to the processor, the processor configured to cause the UE to: derive a TIPSec key using: a stored TNGF key, input parameters, and a reauthentication IPSec key refresh usage type specifier; and send a reauthentication identifier for the UE to the TNGF.

[0018] In some implementations of the methods and apparatus described herein, the UE sends a reauthentication identifier during an Internet Key Exchange (IKE) authentication exchange with the TNGF.

[0019] In some implementations of the methods and apparatus described herein, the UE sends a reauthentication identifier that was received from the TNGF during a previously successful full authentication procedure or reauthentication procedure between the UE and the TNGF.

[0020] In some implementations of the methods and apparatus described herein, the UE derives the IPSec key refresh usage type discriminator based on the stored TNGF key, the freshness parameter, and the reauthentication identity usage type discriminator.

[0021] In some implementations of the methods and apparatus described herein, the reauthentication identifier is part of a network access identifier (NAI) sent from the UE to the TNGF.

[0022] In some implementations of the methods and apparatus described herein, the reauthentication usage type specifier includes reauthentication identification / identifier related usage type information, and wherein the input parameters include: length of the usage type specifier, TNGFNonce, length of the TNGF Nonce, UE Nonce, length of the UE Nonce, reauthentication counter, length of the reauthentication counter, random number, length of the random number, or a combination thereof.

[0023] Some implementations of the methods and apparatus described herein may also include a method performed by a UE, the method comprising: deriving a TIPSec key using: a stored TNGF key, input parameters, and a reauthentication IPSec key refresh usage type specifier; and sending a reauthentication identifier for the UE to the TNGF.

[0024] In some implementations of the methods and apparatus described herein, the UE sends a reauthentication identifier during an Internet Key Exchange (IKE) authentication exchange with the TNGF.

[0025] In some implementations of the methods and apparatus described herein, the UE sends a reauthentication identifier that was received from the TNGF during a previously successful full authentication procedure or reauthentication procedure between the UE and the TNGF.

[0026] In some implementations of the methods and apparatus described herein, the UE derives the IPSec key refresh usage type discriminator based on the stored TNGF key, the freshness parameter, and the reauthentication identity usage type discriminator.

[0027] In some implementations of the methods and apparatus described herein, the reauthentication identifier is part of the NAI sent from the UE to the TNGF.

[0028] In some implementations of the methods and apparatus described herein, the reauthentication usage type specifier includes reauthentication identification / identifier related usage type information, and wherein the input parameters include: length of the usage type specifier, TNGFNonce, length of the TNGF Nonce, UE Nonce, length of the UE Nonce, reauthentication counter, length of the reauthentication counter, random number, length of the random number, or a combination thereof.

[0029] Some implementations of the methods and apparatus described herein may also include a processor for wireless communications, the processor comprising at least one controller coupled to at least one memory and configured to cause the processor to: derive a TIPSec key using a stored TNGF key, input parameters, and a reauthentication IPSec key refresh usage type specifier; and send a reauthentication identifier for the processor to the TNGF.

[0030] In some implementations of the methods and apparatus described herein, the controller is further configured to cause the processor to: send the reauthentication identifier during an IKE authentication exchange with the TNGF.

[0031] In some implementations of the methods and apparatus described herein, the controller is further configured to cause the processor to: send a reauthentication identifier received from the TNGF during a previously successful full authentication procedure or reauthentication procedure between the UE and the TNGF.

[0032] In some implementations of the methods and apparatus described herein, the controller is further configured to cause the processor to derive an IPSec key refresh usage type specifier based on the stored TNGF key, the freshness parameter, and the reauthentication identification usage type specifier. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0033] Figure 1 An example of a wireless communication system supporting TNAP mobility according to aspects of the present disclosure is illustrated.

[0034] Figure 2 Illustrated is an example of a diagram supporting UE mobility from a source TNAP to a target TNAP according to aspects of the present disclosure.

[0035] Figure 3 Illustrated is an example of a diagram supporting authentication and protocol data unit (PDU) session establishment for trusted non-3GPP access according to aspects of the present disclosure.

[0036] Figure 4 Illustrated is an example of a diagram supporting a security establishment procedure for TNAP mobility according to aspects of the present disclosure.

[0037] Figure 5 Illustrated is an example of a diagram supporting UE TNAP mobility procedures according to aspects of the present disclosure.

[0038] Figure 6 Illustrated is an example of a diagram using a Fast BSS (Basic Service Set) Transition (FT) protocol to support TNAP mobility according to aspects of the present disclosure.

[0039] Figure 7Illustrated is an example of a block diagram of a device supporting TNAP mobility according to aspects of the present disclosure.

[0040] Figure 8 A flowchart of a method for supporting establishment of an IPSec security association between a UE and a TGNF according to aspects of the present disclosure is illustrated.

[0041] Figure 9 A flow chart of a method of supporting authentication of a UE to a TGNF according to aspects of the present disclosure is illustrated.

[0042] Figure 10 A flowchart of a method supporting generation of a security context between a UE and a TNAP according to aspects of the present disclosure is illustrated.

[0043] Figure 11 A flowchart of a method supporting generation of a security context for a UE according to aspects of the present disclosure is illustrated. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0044] During UE TNAP mobility, the access network changes, while the core network remains unchanged. Therefore, the current process that causes the UE to perform a full authentication with the core network during TNAP mobility may result in inefficiencies, such as unnecessary multiple message exchanges between the UE and the core network. These message exchanges may lead to resource exhaustion and delays during the re-establishment of the connection between the UE and the core network.

[0045] In some cases, the 5G network can support both re-authentication and security establishment of the UE to the core network without performing a full authentication process, such as by enabling fresh TNAP key generation at the TNGF (Trusted Non-3GPP Gateway Function) associated with the target TNAP. However, some issues may arise, such as (1) reusing the same Trusted Access IP Security (TIPSec) key (K TIPSec ) to perform IKE_Auth messaging and secure connection establishment between the UE and the TNGF via the target TNAP, (2) since the same input of the key derivation function is used, the generated re-authentication ID (e.g., Re-auth ID) and new TNAP key (for the target TNAP) may result in the same output, which may lead to the exposure of the new TNAP key, as well as other disadvantages.

[0046] The techniques described herein adapt the UE TNAP mobility authentication and security establishment procedures to avoid reliance on full authentication during UE mobility between TNAPs, without the various issues described herein (eg, key reuse).

[0047] For example, the technology provides for reauthentication identity or identifier (ID) generation using new input parameters. The input parameters may include a usage type parameter, such as "reauthentication identity / identifier related usage type information," to distinguish the ID from other security keys generated from the same or shared root key (e.g., TNGF key).

[0048] In addition, the technology provides for TNAP key (K) authentication by UE and / or TNGF using TNGF keys, and other input parameters such as freshness parameters (e.g., Nonces, Counter, Random, etc.) and / or re-authentication TNAP / TNAP key refresh related usage type specifiers. TNAP )refresh.

[0049] This technology can also provide the TIPSec key (K TIPSec ) refresh mechanism to establish a secure connection (e.g., IPSec after IKE_Auth messaging between UE and TNGF).

[0050] Additionally, the technology may provide for the exchange of a reauthentication ID during the IKE_Auth message within the ID payload to indicate the UE context containing the UE TNAP mobility related reauthentication security context. TIPSec The reauthentication security context can identify and establish a secure connection (e.g., IPSec) between the UE and the TNGF.

[0051] Therefore, by utilizing the techniques described in this paper, 5G networks can support UE TNAP mobility without relying on a full authentication process, while avoiding the problem of security key reuse and related shortcomings.

[0052] Aspects of the present disclosure are described in the context of a wireless communication system.Aspects of the present disclosure are also illustrated and described with reference to device diagrams and flow charts.

[0053] Figure 1An example of a wireless communication system 100 supporting TNAP mobility according to aspects of the present disclosure is illustrated. The wireless communication system 100 may include one or more network entities 102, one or more UEs 104, a core network 106, and a packet data network 108. The wireless communication system 100 may support various radio access technologies. In some implementations, the wireless communication system 100 may be a 4G network, such as an LTE network or an Advanced LTE (LTE-A) network. In some other implementations, the wireless communication system 100 may be a 5G network, such as an NR network. In other implementations, the wireless communication system 100 may be a combination of a 4G network and a 5G network, or other suitable radio access technologies, including Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 (Wi-Fi), IEEE 802.16 (WiMAX), or IEEE 802.20. The wireless communication system 100 may support radio access technologies other than 5G. Additionally, the wireless communication system 100 may support technologies such as time division multiple access (TDMA), frequency division multiple access (FDMA), or code division multiple access (CDMA).

[0054] One or more network entities 102 may be dispersed throughout a geographic area to form a wireless communication system 100. One or more of the network entities 102 described herein may be, include, or be referred to as a network node, a base station, a network element, a radio access network (RAN), a base transceiver station, an access point, a NodeB, an eNodeB (eNB), a next generation NodeB (gNB), or other suitable terminology. The network entity 102 and the UE 104 may communicate via a communication link 110, which may be a wireless or wired connection. For example, the network entity 102 and the UE 104 may perform wireless communication (e.g., receive signaling, send signaling) over a Uu interface.

[0055] The network entity 102 may provide a geographic coverage area 112 for which it supports services (e.g., voice, video, packet data, messaging, broadcast, etc.) for one or more UEs 104 within the geographic coverage area 112. For example, the network entity 102 and the UEs 104 may support wireless communication of signals associated with the services (e.g., voice, video, packet data, messaging, broadcast, etc.) based on one or more radio access technologies. In some implementations, the network entity 102 may be mobile, such as a satellite associated with a non-terrestrial network. In some implementations, different geographic coverage areas 112 associated with the same or different radio access technologies may overlap, but different geographic coverage areas 112 may be associated with different network entities 102. The information and signals described herein may be represented using any of a variety of different technologies and techniques. For example, data, instructions, commands, information, signals, bits, symbols, and chips that may be referenced throughout the description may be represented by voltages, currents, electromagnetic waves, magnetic fields or particles, optical fields or particles, or any combination thereof.

[0056] One or more UEs 104 may be dispersed throughout the geographic area of ​​the wireless communication system 100. UE 104 may include or may be referred to as a mobile device, wireless device, remote device, remote unit, handheld device, subscriber device, or some other suitable terminology. In some implementations, UE 104 may be referred to as a unit, station, terminal, or client, etc. Additionally or alternatively, UE 104 may be referred to as an Internet of Things (IoT) device, an Internet of Everything (IoE) device, or a Machine Type Communication (MTC) device, etc. In some implementations, UE 104 may be stationary within the wireless communication system 100. In some other implementations, UE 104 may be mobile within the wireless communication system 100.

[0057] One or more UEs 104 may be devices of different forms or with different capabilities. Figure 1 Some examples of UE 104 are shown in FIG. Figure 1 As shown, the UE 104 is capable of communicating with various types of devices, such as a network entity 102, other UEs 104, or a network device (e.g., a core network 106, a packet data network 108, a relay device, an integrated access and backhaul (IAB) node, or another network device). Additionally or alternatively, the UE 104 can support communication with other network entities 102 or UEs 104 that can act as relays in the wireless communication system 100.

[0058] The UE 104 may also be capable of supporting wireless communications directly with other UEs 104 via a communication link 114. For example, the UE 104 may support wireless communications directly with another UE 104 via a device-to-device (D2D) communication link. In some implementations, such as vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) deployments, vehicle-to-everything (V2X) deployments, or cellular V2X deployments, the communication link 114 may be referred to as a sidelink. For example, the UE 104 may support wireless communications directly with another UE 104 via a PC5 interface.

[0059] The network entities 102 may support communication with the core network 106 or with another network entity 102, or both. For example, the network entities 102 may interface with the core network 106 via one or more backhaul links 116 (e.g., via S1, N2, N2, or another network interface). The network entities 102 may communicate with each other via the backhaul links 116 (e.g., via X2, Xn, or another network interface). In some implementations, the network entities 102 may communicate directly with each other (e.g., between the network entities 102). In some other implementations, the network entities 102 may communicate with each other or indirectly (e.g., via the core network 106). In some implementations, one or more network entities 102 may include subcomponents, such as an access network entity, which may be an example of an access node controller (ANC). The ANC may communicate with one or more UEs 104 via one or more other access network transport entities, which may be referred to as radio heads, smart radio heads, or transmission reception points (TRPs)).

[0060] In some implementations, the network entity 102 may be configured in a decomposed architecture that may be configured to utilize a protocol stack that is physically or logically distributed between two or more network entities 102, such as an integrated access backhaul (IAB) network, an open RAN (O-RAN) (e.g., a network configuration sponsored by the O-RAN Alliance), or a virtualized RAN (vRAN) (e.g., a cloud RAN (C-RAN)). For example, the network entity 102 may include one or more of the following: a central unit (CU), a distributed unit (DU), a radio unit (RU), a RAN intelligent controller (RIC) (e.g., a near real-time RIC (near RT RIC), a non-real-time RIC (non-RT RIC)), a service management and orchestration (SMO) system, or any combination thereof.

[0061] The RU may also be referred to as a radio head, smart radio head, remote radio head (RRH), remote radio unit (RRU), or transmission reception point (TRP). In a disaggregated RAN architecture, one or more components of the network entity 102 may be collocated, or one or more components of the network entity 102 may be located in distributed locations (e.g., separate physical locations). In some implementations, one or more network entities 102 of the disaggregated RAN architecture may be implemented as virtual units (e.g., virtual CU (VCU), virtual DU (VDU), virtual RU (VRU)).

[0062] The functional split between the CU, DU, and RU can be flexible, and different functions can be supported depending on the functions performed at the CU, DU, or RU (e.g., network layer functions, protocol layer functions, baseband functions, radio frequency functions, and any combination thereof). For example, a functional split of the protocol stack can be adopted between the CU and the DU, such that the CU can support one or more layers of the protocol stack, and the DU can support one or more different layers of the protocol stack. In some implementations, the CU can host higher protocol layer (e.g., Layer 3 (L3), Layer 2 (L2)) functions and signaling (e.g., Radio Resource Control (RRC), Service Data Adaptation Protocol (SDAP), Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP)). The CU can be connected to one or more DUs or RUs, and one or more DUs or RUs can host lower protocol layers, such as Layer 1 (L1) (e.g., physical (PHY) layer) or L2 (e.g., radio link control (RLC) layer, media access control (MAC) layer) functions and signaling, and each DU or RU can be at least partially controlled by the CU 160.

[0063] Additionally or alternatively, a functional split of the protocol stack may be employed between the DU and the RU such that the DU may support one or more layers of the protocol stack and the RU may support one or more different layers of the protocol stack. The DU may support one or more different cells (e.g., via one or more RUs). In some implementations, the functional split between the CU and the DU or between the DU and the RU may be within the protocol layer (e.g., some functions of the protocol layer may be performed by one of the CU, DU, or RU, while other functions of the protocol layer may be performed by different ones of the CU, DU, or RU).

[0064] The CU can be further functionally split into CU control plane (CU-CP) functions and CU user plane (CU-UP) functions. The CU can be connected to one or more DUs via a medium-range communication link (e.g., F1, F1-c, F1-u), and the DU can be connected to one or more RUs via a fronthaul communication link (e.g., an open fronthaul (FH) interface). In some implementations, the medium-range communication link or the fronthaul communication link can be implemented according to an interface (e.g., a channel) between layers of a protocol stack supported by the corresponding network entity 102 communicating via such a communication link.

[0065] The core network 106 may support user authentication, access authorization, tracking, connectivity, and other access, routing, or mobility functions. The core network 106 may be an evolved packet core (EPC) or a 5G core (5GC), which may include control plane entities that manage access and mobility (e.g., mobility management entity (MME), access and mobility management function (AMF)), and user plane entities that route packets or interconnections to external networks (e.g., serving gateway (S-GW), packet data network (PDN) gateway (P-GW), or user plane function (UPF)). In some implementations, the control plane entities may manage non-access stratum (NAS) functions, such as mobility, authentication, and bearer management (e.g., data bearer, signaling bearer, etc.) of one or more UEs 104 served by one or more network entities 102 associated with the core network 106.

[0066] The core network 106 can communicate with the packet data network 108 via one or more backhaul links 116 (e.g., via S1, N2, N2, or another network interface). The packet data network 108 can include an application server 118. In some implementations, one or more UEs 104 can communicate with the application server 118. The UE 104 can establish a session (e.g., a protocol data unit (PDU) session, etc.) with the core network 106 via the network entity 102. The core network 106 can use the established session (e.g., the established PDU session) to route traffic (e.g., control information, data, etc.) between the UE 104 and the application server 118. The PDU session can be an example of a logical connection between the UE 104 and the core network 106 (e.g., one or more network functions of the core network 106).

[0067] In the wireless communication system 100, the network entity 102 and the UE 104 may use the resources of the wireless communication system 100 (e.g., time resources (e.g., symbols, time slots, subframes, frames, etc.) or frequency resources (e.g., subcarriers, carriers)) to perform various operations (e.g., wireless communications). In some implementations, the network entity 102 and the UE 104 may support different resource structures. For example, the network entity 102 and the UE 104 may support different frame structures. In some implementations, such as in 4G, the network entity 102 and the UE 104 may support a single frame structure. In some other implementations, such as in 5G and other suitable radio access technologies, the network entity 102 and the UE 104 may support various frame structures (i.e., multiple frame structures). The network entity 102 and the UE 104 may support various frame structures based on one or more digital technologies.

[0068] One or more digital technologies may be supported in the wireless communication system 100, and the digital technologies may include subcarrier spacing and cyclic prefixes. A first digital technology (e.g., μ = 0) may be associated with a first subcarrier spacing (e.g., 15 kHz) and a normal cyclic prefix. In some implementations, the first digital technology (e.g., μ = 0) associated with the first subcarrier spacing (e.g., 15 kHz) may utilize one slot per subframe. A second digital technology (e.g., μ = 1) may be associated with a second subcarrier spacing (e.g., 30 kHz) and a normal cyclic prefix. A third digital technology (e.g., μ = 2) may be associated with a third subcarrier spacing (e.g., 60 kHz) and a normal cyclic prefix or an extended cyclic prefix. A fourth digital technology (e.g., μ = 3) may be associated with a fourth subcarrier spacing (e.g., 120 kHz) and a normal cyclic prefix. A fifth digital technology (e.g., μ = 4) may be associated with a fifth subcarrier spacing (e.g., 240 kHz) and a normal cyclic prefix.

[0069] The time intervals of resources (e.g., communication resources) can be organized according to frames (also referred to as radio frames). Each frame can have a duration, for example, a duration of 10 milliseconds (ms). In some implementations, each frame can include multiple subframes. For example, each frame can include 10 subframes, and each subframe can have a duration, for example, a duration of 1 ms. In some implementations, each frame can have the same duration. In some implementations, each subframe of a frame can have the same duration.

[0070] Additionally or alternatively, the time intervals of resources (e.g., communication resources) can be organized according to time slots. For example, a subframe can include a certain number (e.g., quantity) of time slots. The number of time slots in each subframe can also depend on one or more digital technologies supported in the wireless communication system 100. For example, a first digital technology, a second digital technology, a third digital technology, a fourth digital technology, and a fifth digital technology (i.e., μ=0, μ=1, μ=2, μ=3, μ=4) associated with corresponding subcarrier spacings of 15kHz, 30kHz, 60kHz, 120kHz, and 240kHz can utilize a single time slot per subframe, two time slots per subframe, four time slots per subframe, eight time slots per subframe, and 16 time slots per subframe, respectively. Each time slot can include a certain number (e.g., quantity) of symbols (e.g., OFDM symbols). In some implementations, the number (e.g., quantity) of time slots for a subframe can depend on the digital technology. For a conventional cyclic prefix, a time slot can include 14 symbols. For an extended cyclic prefix (e.g., for a 60 kHz subcarrier spacing), a slot may include 12 symbols. For both a normal cyclic prefix and an extended cyclic prefix, the relationship between the number of symbols per slot, the number of slots per subframe, and the number of slots per frame may depend on the digital technology. It should be understood that references to a first digital technology (e.g., μ = 0) associated with a first subcarrier spacing (e.g., 15 kHz) may be used interchangeably between subframes and slots.

[0071] In the wireless communication system 100, the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum can be divided into various categories, frequency bands, frequency channels, etc. based on frequency or wavelength. For example, the wireless communication system 100 can support one or more operating frequency bands, such as the frequency range designations FR1 (410 MHz-7.125 GHz), FR2 (24.25 GHz-52.6 GHz), FR3 (7.125 GHz-24.25 GHz), FR4 (52.6 GHz-114.25 GHz), FR4a or FR4-1 (52.6 GHz-71 GHz), and FR5 (114.25 GHz-300 GHz). In some implementations, the network entity 102 and the UE 104 can perform wireless communications on one or more operating frequency bands. In some implementations, FR1 can be used by the network entity 102 and the UE 104, as well as other devices or apparatuses, for cellular communication traffic (e.g., control information, data). In some implementations, FR2 can be used by the network entity 102 and the UE 104, as well as other devices or apparatuses, for short-range, high data rate capabilities.

[0072] FR1 may be associated with one or more digital technologies (e.g., at least three digital technologies). For example, FR1 may be associated with a first digital technology (e.g., μ = 0) including a subcarrier spacing of 15 kHz, a second digital technology (e.g., μ = 1) including a subcarrier spacing of 30 kHz, and a third digital technology (e.g., μ = 2) including a subcarrier spacing of 60 kHz. FR2 may be associated with one or more digital technologies (e.g., at least two digital technologies). For example, FR2 may be associated with a third digital technology (e.g., μ = 2) including a subcarrier spacing of 60 kHz, and a fourth digital technology (e.g., μ = 3) including a subcarrier spacing of 120 kHz.

[0073] As described in this article, 5G networks can utilize various techniques to provide authentication and security establishment between the UE and the core network during UE TNAP mobility without requiring a full authentication process for the UE. Figure 2 Illustrated is an example of a diagram 200 supporting UE mobility from a source TNAP to a target TNAP according to aspects of the present disclosure.

[0074] For example, a UE 210 connected to a 5G core network (such as a TNAN) 220 moves from a source TNAP 222 (e.g., TNAP-1) to a target TNAP 226 (e.g., TNAP-2). TNAP-1 and TNAP-2 are associated with a TNGF 224 of the TNAN 220. During UE mobility of the UE 210, the UE 210, having a secure connection 230 to the source TNAP 222, connects 235 to the target TNAP 226. As described herein, the UE 210 moves between access points (e.g., from TNAP-1 to TNAP-2), and thus the TNAN 220 can utilize the various authentication and security establishment procedures described herein to authenticate / establish the UE 210 to the target TNAP 226 without having to perform a full authentication (e.g., a procedure involving components of the core network itself).

[0075] In some embodiments, the TNGF (e.g., TNGF 224) can derive a unique reauthentication identity / identifier (e.g., reauthentication ID) to identify the security context associated with the UE (e.g., UE 210), which can derive and utilize any reauthentication specific security context.

[0076] Additionally, in some cases, the TNGF may generate fresh TNAP keys and / or TIPSec keys during UE TNAP mobility to re-establish a secure connection between the UE and a target TNAP (eg, target TNAP 226), as well as re-establish an IP security association between the UE and the TNGF during UE TNAP mobility.

[0077] The initial registration process (e.g., after successful authentication for access to NTAN 220) includes generating a reauthentication ID by the TNGF and / or the UE to enable identification of the UE context, thereby supporting UE TNAP mobility-related reauthentication and security establishment. In addition, the security establishment process can be adaptable to support UE movement from a source TNAP (e.g., TNAP-1) to a target TNAP (e.g., TNAP-2) during UE mobility.

[0078] Figure 3 An example of a diagram 300 is illustrated that supports authentication and protocol data unit (PDU) session establishment for trusted non-3GPP access according to aspects of the present disclosure. The process may include the following steps (and new adaptations):

[0079] Step 0: The UE 310 selects a PLMN and a TNAN 320 for connecting to the PLMN by using a trusted non-3GPP access network selection procedure. The UE 310 discovers a PLMN with which the TNAN 320 supports trusted connectivity (e.g., "5G connectivity").

[0080] Step 1: Establish a layer 2 connection between UE 310 and TNAP 325.

[0081] Step 2-10a: Initiate EAP authentication process. EAP messages should be encapsulated into layer 2 packets. Between TNAP 325 and TNGF 330, EAP packets are encapsulated into AAA messages. EAP-5G process is performed. During this process, authentication and key negotiation occur between UE 310 and the network. After successful authentication, K is created in UE 310 and AMF 340. TNGF Key. In step 10a, K TNGF Transmitted from the AMF 340 to the TNGF 330 .

[0082] Step 10b: TNGF 330 sends TNGF address and TNGF Nonce (TNonce) to UE 310 (eg, information required to generate re-authentication ID). TNAP 325 is a trusted entity. TNGF 330 can generate K TNAP (eg, a TNAP key), and in step 10b it is transmitted from the TNGF 330 to the TNAP 325 (within an AAA message).

[0083] Step 10c1: The UE sends a UE Nonce (UNonce) to the TNGF 330 (eg, information required to generate a re-authentication ID).

[0084] Step 10c2: UE 310 and TNGF 330 may use input parameters such as TNGF-ID / address, Nonce from TNGF, Nonce from UE and re-authentication identity / identifier related usage type information (e.g., 0x03) to derive a re-authentication ID for UE 310 based on the TNGF key.

[0085] According to K TNGF When deriving the reauthentication ID, the following parameters can be used to form the input S to the KDF:

[0086] FC=0xxx (e.g., any value);

[0087] P0 = Usage type specifier (i.e., re-authentication identity / identifier related usage type information).

[0088] Information (for example, 0x03);

[0089] L0 = length of the type specifier used (e.g., 0x00 0x01);

[0090] P0 = TNGF Nonce;

[0091] L0 = length of TNGF Nonce;

[0092] P0 = UE Nonce;

[0093] L0 = length of UE Nonce; and so on.

[0094] In some cases, the usage type specifier reauthentication identity / reauthentication identifier may also be referred to as a UE context identifier for UE TNAP mobility reauthentication.

[0095] In some cases, the usage type specifier related to UE TNAP mobility has the following values:

[0096] Using type specifiers value IPSec 0x01 TNAP 0x02 Recertification Logo / Recertification Identifier 0x03 Reauthenticate TNAP / rekey TNAP 0x04 Reauthenticate IPSec / refresh IPSec keys 0x05

[0097] Table 1: Use of type specifiers

[0098] Step 10d-e: TNGF 330 can generate K TNAP (TNAP key) (if not derived in step 10b), and transmit the key from TNGF 330 to TNAP 325 (within the AAA message). In addition, TNGF 330 may also send a message containing an EAP success packet.

[0099] Step 11: The public TNAP key is used by the UE 310 and the TNAP 325 to derive a security key based on the applied non-3GPP technology and establish a security association to protect all subsequent traffic. In the case of IEEE 802.11

[80] , K TNAP is a pairwise master key (PMK), and a 4-way handshake is performed (see IEEE 802.11

[80] ), which establishes a security context between the WLAN AP and the UE 310. This security context is used to protect over-the-air unicast and multicast traffic. From this step on, all messages between the UE 310 and the TNAP 325 are encrypted and integrity protected.

[0100] Step 12: UE 310 receives IP configuration from TNAN 320, for example using DHCP.

[0101] Step 13: UE 310 shall initiate an IKE_INIT exchange with TNGF 330. UE 310 has received the IP address of TNGF 330 during EAP-5G signaling in step 9b. Subsequently, UE 310 shall initiate an IKE_AUTH exchange and shall include the same UE ID (e.g., SUCI or 5G-GUTI) as provided in step 5. Public K TIPSec Used for mutual authentication. TIPSec Derived as specified in Annex A.22. NULL encryption is negotiated as specified in RFC 2410. After step 13c, an IPsec SA (security association) (e.g., NWt connection) is established between UE 310 and TNGF 330 and is used to transmit all subsequent NAS messages. This IPsec SA does not apply encryption, but only integrity protection.

[0102] Step 14: After the NWt connection is successfully established, the TNGF 330 responds to the AMF 340 with an N2 Initial Context Setup Response message.

[0103] Step 15: Finally, a NAS Registration Accept message is sent by the AMF 340 and forwarded to the UE 310 via the established NWt connection.

[0104] Steps 16-18: UE 310 initiates PDU session establishment. TNGF 330 may establish one or more IPSec sub-SAs for each PDU session.

[0105] Step 19: User plane data for the established PDU session is transmitted between the UE 310 and the TNGF 330 within the established IPSec sub-SA.

[0106] In some embodiments, UE TNAP mobility scenarios may include UE moving from one TNAP (e.g., TNAP-1) to another TNAP (e.g., TNAP-2) connected to or associated with the same TNGF (e.g., TNGF 224), or the TNAPs belong to the same TNGF domain. Figure 4 Illustrated is an example of a diagram 400 supporting a security establishment procedure for TNAP mobility according to aspects of the present disclosure.

[0107] The process may include the following steps (and new adaptations), where nonces and usage type specifiers may be input:

[0108] Step 1: UE 410 establishes a layer 2 (L2) connection with TNAP2 424 .

[0109] Step 2: TNAP2 424 typically initiates an EAP session by requesting the UE 410 identity.

[0110] Step 3: UE 410 provides a Network Access Identifier (NAI) containing Username=Reauth-ID and Domain=nai.5gc.tngf <tngf-id>.mnc <mnc>.mcc <mcc>.3gppnetwork.org.

[0111] When UE 410 is first connected to TNGF 426 of TNAN, for example, using initial registration via TNGF 426, Reauth-ID is derived as described herein and TNGF-ID is received. UE 410 provides Username=Reauthentication ID because UE 410 does not want to initiate NAS signaling with 5GC, but it wants to reauthenticate with TNGF 426.

[0112] Step 4: TNAP1 422 selects TNGF 426 based on the received TNG1-ID in the domain and forwards the NAI to TNGF 426 .

[0113] Step 5: TNGF 426 looks up a stored UE context containing the received reauthentication ID, therefore, it determines that UE 410 is a known UE requesting reauthentication. Therefore, it initiates the following steps. If TNGF 426 does not find a stored UE context containing the received reauthentication ID, then TNGF 426 sends an error response to UE 410, which initiates the signaling procedures associated with normal full authentication for trusted non-3GPP access, as described herein and in TS 33.501 clause 7A.2.1. In some cases, when UE 410 performs an initial registration via TNGF (see Figure 3 ), the UE context is created in TNGF 426.

[0114] Step 6: TNGF 426 sends a 5G challenge packet to UE 410 , which contains the TNonce value and a message authentication code 1 (MAC1) derived by using the TNGF key stored in TNGF 426 .

[0115] Step 7: UE 410 uses the TNGF key and TNonce stored in UE 410 to derive the expected MAC1 (XMAC1) and compares XMAC1 with the received MAC1. If they match, TNGF 426 is authenticated by UE 410.

[0116] Step 8: UE 410 generates UNonce and uses the TNGF key stored in UE 410 as well as UNonce and TNonce to derive MAC2.

[0117] Step 9: UE 410 responds with a 5G challenge containing UNonce, TNonce and MAC2.

[0118] Step 10: TNGF 426 uses TNGF along with UNonce and TNonce to derive the expected MAC2 (XMAC2). XMAC2 is compared with the received MAC2. If they match, UE 410 is authenticated by TNGF 426.

[0119] Step 11: The TNGF 426 derives a fresh re-authentication ID for the UE, for example, by using the TNGF key, TNGF-ID, TNonce, UNonce (exchanged in steps 6a, 6b, 9a, 9b) stored in the TNGF and the re-authentication identity / identifier related usage type information (e.g., 0x03). In addition, the TNGF 426 derives a new TNAP key by using the TNGF key, TNGF-ID, TNonce, UNonce value stored in the TNGF and the usage type specifier specific to re-authentication TNAP / TNAP key refresh.

[0120] According to K TNGF Get fresh K TNAP When , the following parameters can be used to form the input S to the KDF:

[0121] FC=0xxx (e.g., any value);

[0122] P0 = Usage type specifier (i.e., reauthentication TNAP / TNAP key refresh related

[0123] Use type information (e.g., 0x04);

[0124] L0 = length of the type specifier used (e.g., 0x00 0x01);

[0125] P0 = TNGF Nonce;

[0126] L0 = length of TNGF Nonce;

[0127] P0 = UE Nonce;

[0128] L0 = length of UE Nonce; and so on.

[0129] Furthermore, if the TNGF 426 determines or is configured to reestablish a secure connection with the UE 410 (eg, IPSec between the UE 410 and the TNGF 426) via a new target TNAP-2 (eg, TNAP2 424), the TNGF 426 may refresh the K TIPSec When according to K TNGF Get fresh K TIPSec When , the following parameters can be used to form the input S to the KDF:

[0130] FC=0xxx (e.g., any value);

[0131] P0 = Usage type specifier (i.e., re-authentication IPSec / IPSec key refresh related usage

[0132] Use type information (for example, 0x05);

[0133] L0 = length of the type specifier used (e.g., 0x00 0x01);

[0134] P0 = TNGF Nonce;

[0135] L0 = length of TNGF Nonce;

[0136] P0 = UE Nonce;

[0137] L0 = length of UE Nonce; and so on.

[0138] In some cases, the TNGF 426 stores the reauthentication ID (derived as described herein and received as the current reauthentication ID), as well as UE context, such as the TNGF key, new TNAP key, new TIPSec key, and the reauthentication ID (derived in step 11 as the future / new reauthentication ID).

[0139] Step 12: TNGF 426 completes the EAP-5G session by sending an EAP success packet to UE 410 and sending a new TNAP key to TNAP2 424.

[0140] Step 13: Similar to the TNGF (as described in step 11), UE 410 derives a new Reauthentication ID by using the TNGF key, TNGF-ID, TNonce, UNonce, and reauthentication identity / identifier related usage type information (e.g., 0x03) stored in the UE. If UE 410 and TNGF 426 share the same TNGF key, the Reauth-IDs independently derived in UE 410 and TNGF will be the same. In addition, similar to the TNGF (as described in step 11), UE 410 also uses the TNGF key, TNGF-ID, TNonce, UNonce, and a usage type specifier specific to reauthentication TNAP / TNAP key refresh (e.g., 0x04) stored in the UE to derive a new / fresh TNAP key. Additionally, similar to TNGF, UE 410 also uses the TNGF key stored in the UE, TNGF-ID, TNonce, UNonce, and a usage type specifier specific to reauthentication IPSec / IPSec key refresh (e.g., 0x05) to derive new / fresh TIPSec keys.

[0141] In some cases, the TNGF 426 provides the re-authentication ID generated in step 11 to the UE 410 in steps 12a and 12b. In addition, the UE may store the re-authentication ID (in Figure 3 and sent in step 4b as the current reauthentication ID), and UE context such as TNGF keys, new TNAP keys, new TIPSec keys, and the reauthentication ID (derived in step 13 or received in step 12b as the future / new reauthentication ID).

[0142] Steps 14a-b: Apply new TNAP keys to establish over-the-air security between UE 410 and TNAP2 424. In some cases, UE 410 may receive new IP configuration information from TNAN 420 (eg, a new IP address).

[0143] Steps 15a-c: UE 410 may initiate an IKE_INIT exchange with TNGF 426. UE 410 has already received the IP address of the TNGF in the previous step. Subsequently, the UE may initiate (in step 15b) an IKE_AUTH exchange, which may include an NAI containing the reauthentication ID (or Reauth-ID) in the UE Id provided in step 3. For the IKE_AUTH exchange portion in step 13a, the name in the ID payload may correspond to the key used to generate the AUTH payload. If UE 410 utilized the reauthentication ID-based NAI / reauthentication ID in step 5, then UE 410 should initiate an IKE_AUTH exchange and should include the reauthentication ID-based NAI / reauthentication ID in the ID payload. To help TNGF 426 identify the fresh K TIPSec , in step 13b, the NAI / re-authentication ID based on the re-authentication ID is used. The resulting fresh K TIPSec (derived by the TNGF in step 11 and by the UE in step 13) is used for mutual authentication. NULL encryption is negotiated as specified in RFC 2410. After step 15c, an IPsec SA (e.g., NWt connection) is established between UE 410 and TNGF 426 and used to transport all subsequent NAS messages. This IPsec SA applies integrity protection.

[0144] Step 16 : UE 410 resumes communication with TNGF 526 via TNAP2 424 .

[0145] In some embodiments, the TNGF (e.g., TNGF 224) can derive a unique re-identification authentication / identifier (e.g., a re-authentication ID) to identify the security context associated with the UE, thereby deriving and using any re-authentication specific security context. In addition, the TNGF can generate fresh TNAP keys and / or TIPSec keys during UE TNAP mobility to re-establish a secure connection between the UE and the target TNAP, and re-establish an IP security association between the UE and the TNGF during UE TNAP mobility.

[0146] Figure 5 An example of a diagram 500 supporting a UE TNAP mobility procedure according to aspects of the present disclosure is illustrated. The procedure may include the following steps (and new adaptations), where a random number, a counter, and / or a usage type specifier may be input:

[0147] Step 1: UE 510 is connected to TNAP#1 522 of TNAN 520 by performing authentication for trusted non-3GPP access with 5G system. After being authenticated, TNGF 526 of TNAN 520 sends re-authentication Id to UE 510 through a protected interface (e.g., Figure 3 The re-authentication ID may be generated as <plmnid><TNGF_ID><Temp Id>, where Temp Id can be equivalent to the TNGF nonce described herein. In some cases, TNGF 526 can include TNGF address (eg, FQDN) information.

[0148] Steps 2, 3: UE 510 decides to move from TNAP#1 522 to TNAP#2 524 and creates an L2 connection 524 with TNAP#2.

[0149] Steps 4, 5, 6: TNAP#2 524 sends an L2 EAP Request for the identity to UE 510, and UE 510 responds with an L2 EAP Response with the identity (e.g., reauthentication ID) and TNAP_Mobility_Indication flag. TNAP2 524 forwards the EAP Response with the reauthentication ID and TNAP_Mobility_Indication flag to TNGF 526.

[0150] Steps 7-8: Based on the reauthentication ID, TNGF 526 identifies UE 510 and retrieves the context and TNAP_Mobility_Indication. TNGF 526 checks whether the context stored in step 1 is valid and then derives the TNAP key as described herein. TNGF 526 responds back to TNAP #2 524 using the generated key RAND (random number) value and a MAC for the RAND value. The message authentication code (MAC) is derived using the TNGF key stored in TNGF 526. In TNAP #2 524, the newly received TNAP key is treated as a pairwise master key (PMK). In some cases, a counter can be used as a freshness parameter instead of RAND.

[0151] In some embodiments, deriving the key KTNAP' from the key KTNGF during mobility may include some or all of the following input parameters:

[0152] FC=0xWX;

[0153] P1=RAND / COUNTER;

[0154] L1 = length of RAND (e.g., 0x00 0x04);

[0155] P2 = Usage type specifier specific to reauthentication TNAP / TNAP key refresh;

[0156] L2 = length of the usage type specifier specific to Reauthentication TNAP / TNAP Key Refresh; etc.

[0157] The input key KEY may be KTNGF. When KTNAP' is derived in mobility, RAND / COUNTER may be generated and shared with UE 510. In addition, when TNGF 526 determines or is configured to reestablish a secure connection with UE 510 (e.g., IPSec between UE 510 and TNGF 526) via a new target TNAP#2 524, TNGF 526 may refresh K TIPSec For example, when according to K TNGF Get fresh K TIPSec When , the following parameters can be used to form the input S to the KDF:

[0158] FC=0xxx (e.g., any value);

[0159] P0 = Usage type specifier (e.g., reauthentication IPSec / IPSec key refresh related

[0160] Use type information (e.g., 0x05);

[0161] L0 = length of the reauthentication IPSec / IPSec key refresh specific usage type specifier (e.g., 0x000x01);

[0162] P0=RAND / COUNTER;

[0163] L0 = length of RAND / COUNTER; and so on.

[0164] TNGF 526 stores the reauthentication ID (derived here) and UE context such as TNGF key, new TNAP key, new TIPSec key and reauthentication ID (derived as future / new reauthentication ID in step 11). In some cases, the input key KEY should be KTNGF. In addition, when fresh K is derived in mobility TIPSec ', a RAND / COUNTER may be generated and shared with the UE 510.

[0165] Steps 9, 10, and 11: TNAP #2 524 sends an EAP notification back to UE 510 with the RAND value and MAC. If MAC verification succeeds, UE 510 derives a key based on the RAND value. A 4-way handshake (see IEEE 802.11) is performed, establishing a security context between the WLAN AP and UE 510. This security context is used to protect over-the-air unicast and multicast traffic. In some cases, a counter can be used instead of RAND.

[0166] After the process is completed, TNGF 526 sends a new re-authentication ID Id to UE 510 through a secure interface (e.g., in steps 17a-b or in any step after step 7), which UE 510 can use for the next interaction. The re-authentication ID can be derived similarly to step 1, but with a new TNGF Nonce or a new Temp ID. For example, the re-authentication ID can be generated as <plmnid><TNGF_ID><New Temp ID or New TNGF Nonce>.

[0167] In some cases, the hash / MAC of the new TNAP key generated in step 7 and the re-authentication ID related usage type specifier may be used as the new Temp ID in step 7 or subsequent steps to generate a new re-authentication ID.

[0168] Step 12: Apply the new TNAP key to establish over-the-air security between UE 510 and TNAP #2 524. If necessary, UE 510 may receive new IP configuration information (e.g., a new IP address) from TNAN 520. When UE 510 obtains the new IP configuration from TNAP #2 524, UE 510 uses the IKE message request "UPDATE_SA_ADDRESS" to update the SA address to TNGF 526 for further communication.

[0169] Steps 13a-c: UE 510 may initiate an IKE_INIT exchange with TNGF 526. UE 510 has already received the IP address of TNGF 526 in the previous step. Subsequently, UE 510 may initiate (in step 13b) an IKE_AUTH exchange which may include an NAI containing the Reauthentication ID or Re-auth ID in the UE Id provided in the previous step 3. For the IKE_AUTH exchange portion in step 13a, the name in the ID payload should correspond to the key used to generate the AUTH payload. If UE 510 utilized a NAI / Reauthentication ID based on the Reauthentication ID in step 5, then UE 510 should initiate an IKE_AUTH exchange and should include the NAI / Reauthentication ID based on the Reauthentication ID in the ID payload. To help TNGF identify the fresh K TIPSec , using the NAI / reauthentication ID based on the reauthentication ID in step 13b. The resulting fresh K TIPSec (derived by the TNGF in step 11 and by the UE in step 13) is used for mutual authentication. NULL encryption is negotiated as specified in RFC 2410.

[0170] After step 15c, an IPsec SA (eg, NWt connection) is established between the UE 510 and the TNGF 526, and this connection is used to transport all subsequent NAS messages. The IPsec SA applies integrity protection.

[0171] Step 16 : UE 510 resumes communication with TNGF 526 via TNAP#2 524 .

[0172] Step 17a-b: TNGF 526 sends the new reauthentication ID generated in the previous step to UE 510 via TNAP#2 524. In some cases, UE 510 may derive the new reauthentication ID derived by TNGF 526 (e.g., the reauthentication ID may be generated as <plmnid><TNGF_ID><New Temp Id>, where the hash / MAC of the new TNAP key generated in step 10 and the re-authentication ID related usage type specifier may be used as the new Temp ID.

[0173] In some embodiments, TNAP mobility can utilize the Fast BSS Transition Protocol. The FT key hierarchy is established based on the Master Session Key (MSK) by the R0 Key Holder (ROKH) collocated with the 802.1X Authenticator. To support fast BSS transition, the entity that will hold the root key can obtain a 256-bit key (K FT ), which is then used as the input key to create the FT key hierarchy.

[0174] Figure 6 An example of a diagram 600 illustrating the use of a Fast BSS (Basic Service Set) Transition (FT) protocol to support TNAP mobility according to aspects of the present disclosure is shown. FT Use fixed input according to K TNGF To derive, similar to the description in Annex A.22 of TS 33.501, the K TNGF To get K TNAP , but with a new usage type specifier, such as 0x03. Key K FT is used to create the FT key hierarchy specified in 802.11. Specifically, K FT is used as the master PMK (MPMK), which is used as the input key for the derivation of the R0 key data. Using the R0 key data, the FT key hierarchy is established. In fact, K FT The 5G key hierarchy and the FT key hierarchy are linked because it is derived from keys in the 5G key hierarchy and is used to create the FT key hierarchy.

[0175] When a UE switches to a new TNAP within the same mobility domain identified by a mobility domain identifier (MDID), the UE performs a fast BSS transition procedure. FT The entity acts as a PMK R0 key holder (ROKH) holding the key PMK-R0. R0KH derives PMK-R1 from PMK-R0 and provides it to the new AP (e.g., TNAP in TNAN) during the FT process.

[0176] In some cases (e.g., TNAP mobility using the Fast BSS Transition protocol), the steps for key handling during a TNAP change are as follows:

[0177] Step 1: Before the TNAP is changed, the following happens: the R0 key holder (R0KH) (the entity holding the FT root key) has received the K from the TNGF. FT , and has used this K FT PMK-R0 is derived and stored by R0KH to derive additional keys. UE is connected to TNAP.

[0178] Step 2: The UE contacts the new TNAP.

[0179] Step 3: The new TNAP contacts the R0KH to request the key for the UE. The R0KH calculates the key PMK-R1 based on PMK-R0 and sends PMK-R1 to the new TNAP.

[0180] Step 4: The UE and the new TNAP use PMK-R1 as the pairwise master key to protect the connection between the UE and the new TNSP.

[0181] like Figure 6 As shown, the 5G and FT key hierarchies are linked together. TNGF can send K to the entity holding the root key MSK of the FT key hierarchy. TNAP and K FT Both. TNGF sets MSK to K TNAP ||K FT , where MSK is 512 bits, and K TNAP and K FT The TNGF uses the existing mechanism to send the MSK.

[0182] In addition, the TNGF can send K to the entity holding the root key MSK of the FT key hierarchy. TNAP (e.g., the generated fresh TNAP key) and K FT Both. TNGF sets MSK to K TNAP ||K FT , where MSK is 512 bits, and K TNAP and K FT The TNGF uses the mechanism described in this document to send the MSK. In some cases, fresh TNAP key generation and use are based on various techniques described in this document.

[0183] Figure 7 An example of a block diagram 700 of a device 702 supporting UE TNAP mobility according to aspects of the present disclosure is illustrated. The device 702 may be an example of a network entity 102 as described herein. The device 702 may support wireless communications with one or more network entities 102, UEs 104, or any combination thereof. The device 702 may include components for bidirectional communication, including components for sending and receiving communications (such as a processor 704, a memory 706, a transceiver 708, and an I / O controller 710). These components may be in electronic communication or otherwise coupled (e.g., operatively, communicatively, functionally, electronically, electrically) via one or more interfaces (e.g., a bus).

[0184] The processor 704, memory 706, transceiver 708, or various combinations thereof, or various components thereof, may be examples of means for performing various aspects of the present disclosure described herein. For example, the processor 704, memory 706, transceiver 708, or various combinations thereof, or components thereof, may support a method for performing one or more of the operations described herein.

[0185] In some implementations, the processor 704, memory 706, transceiver 708, or various combinations or components thereof may be implemented in hardware (e.g., in a communications management circuit system). The hardware may include a processor, a digital signal processor (DSP), an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field programmable gate array (FPGA) or other programmable logic device, discrete gate or transistor logic, discrete hardware components, or any combination of components configured to or otherwise support the functions described in this disclosure. In some implementations, the processor 704 and the memory 706 coupled to the processor 704 may be configured to perform one or more functions described herein (e.g., execution of instructions stored in the memory 706 by the processor 704).

[0186] For example, according to examples disclosed herein, the processor 704 can support wireless communications at the device 702. The processor 704 can be configured to or otherwise support means for: deriving a TIPSec key using a TGNF key, input parameters, and a reauthentication usage type specifier; receiving a reauthentication identifier for the UE from the UE; identifying the TIPSec key using the reauthentication identifier; and reestablishing an IPSec SA based on the identified TIPSec key.

[0187] As another example, according to examples disclosed herein, the processor 704 can support wireless communications at the device 702. The processor 704 can be configured to or otherwise support means for: deriving a TIPSec key using a stored TNGF key, input parameters, and a reauthentication usage type specifier; and sending a reauthentication identifier for the UE to the TNGF.

[0188] As another example, according to examples disclosed herein, the processor 704 may support wireless communications at the device 702. The processor 704 may be configured to or otherwise support means for: generating a security context between the UE and the TNAP by: deriving a TNAP key using the TNGF key, the freshness parameter, and the TNAP key refresh usage type discriminator; deriving a reauthentication identifier using the TNGF key, the freshness parameter, and the reauthentication identity usage type discriminator; and sending the derived reauthentication identifier to the UE.

[0189] As another example, according to examples disclosed herein, the processor 704 can support wireless communications at the device 702. The processor 704 can be configured to or otherwise support components for: receiving information from the TNGF, the information including the TNGF information, the freshness parameter, and the reauthentication identifier; and refreshing the TNAP key using the information received from the TNGF and the TNAP / TNAP key refresh related usage type specifier.

[0190] The processor 704 may include an intelligent hardware device (e.g., a general-purpose processor, a DSP, a CPU, a microcontroller, an ASIC, an FPGA, a programmable logic device, discrete gate or transistor logic components, discrete hardware components, or any combination thereof). In some implementations, the processor 704 may be configured to operate a memory array using a memory controller. In some other implementations, the memory controller may be integrated into the processor 704. The processor 704 may be configured to execute computer-readable instructions stored in a memory (e.g., memory 706) to cause the device 702 to perform various functions of the present disclosure.

[0191] The memory 706 may include random access memory (RAM) and read-only memory (ROM). The memory 706 may store computer-readable computer executable code, which includes instructions that, when executed by the processor 704, cause the device 702 to perform the various functions described herein. The code may be stored in a non-transitory computer-readable medium such as system memory or another type of memory. In some implementations, the code may not be directly executed by the processor 704, but may cause a computer (e.g., when compiled and executed) to perform the functions described herein. In some implementations, the memory 706 may also include a basic I / O system (BIOS), which may control basic hardware or software operations, such as interaction with peripheral device components or devices.

[0192] The I / O controller 710 can manage input and output signals for the device 702. The I / O controller 710 can also manage peripheral devices that are not integrated into the device 2402. In some implementations, the I / O controller 710 can represent a physical connection or port to an external peripheral device. In some implementations, the I / O controller 710 can utilize an operating system, such as MS- MS or another known operating system. In some implementations, I / O controller 710 may be implemented as part of a processor such as processor 2404. In some implementations, a user may interact with device 702 via I / O controller 710 or via hardware components controlled by I / O controller 710.

[0193] In some implementations, the device 702 may include a single antenna 712. However, in some other implementations, the device 702 may have more than one antenna 712 (i.e., multiple antennas), including multiple antenna panels or antenna arrays, which are capable of concurrently sending or receiving multiple wireless transmissions. The transceiver 708 can communicate bidirectionally via one or more antennas 712, wired or wireless links, as described herein. For example, the transceiver 708 can represent a wireless transceiver and can communicate bidirectionally with another wireless transceiver. The transceiver 708 can also include a modem for modulating packets, providing the modulated packets to one or more antennas 712 for transmission, and demodulating packets received from the one or more antennas 712.

[0194] Figure 8 FIG2 illustrates a flow chart of a method 800 for supporting establishment of an IPSec security association between a UE and a TGNF according to aspects of the present disclosure. The operations of the method 800 may be implemented by the apparatus described herein or components thereof. For example, the operations of the method 800 may be implemented by reference to FIG2 . Figures 1 to 6 The network entity 102 (e.g., TGNF) described herein is executed. In some implementations, the device may execute a set of instructions to control the functional elements of the device to perform the described functions. Additionally or alternatively, the device may use dedicated hardware to perform aspects of the described functions.

[0195] At 805, the method may include deriving a TIPSec key using the TGNF key, the input parameters, and the reauthentication usage type specifier. The operations of 805 may be performed according to the examples described herein. In some implementations, aspects of the operations of 805 may be described with reference to Figure 1 The device is used to perform the above.

[0196] At 810, the method may include receiving a re-authentication identifier for the UE from the UE. The operations of 810 may be performed according to the examples described herein. In some implementations, aspects of the operations of 810 may be described with reference to Figure 1 The device is used to perform the above.

[0197] At 815, the method may include identifying the TIPSec key using the reauthentication identifier. The operations of 815 may be performed according to the examples described herein. In some implementations, aspects of the operations of 815 may be described with reference to Figure 1 The device is used to perform the above.

[0198] At 820, the method may include reestablishing the IPSec SA based on the identified TIPSec key. The operations of 820 may be performed according to the examples described herein. In some implementations, aspects of the operations of 820 may be described with reference to Figure 1 The device is used to perform the above.

[0199] Figure 9 FIG2 illustrates a flow chart of a method 900 for supporting authentication of a UE to a TGNF according to aspects of the present disclosure. The operations of the method 900 may be implemented by the apparatus described herein or components thereof. For example, the operations of the method 900 may be implemented by reference to FIG2 . Figures 1 to 6 The UE 104 described herein performs. In some implementations, the device may execute a set of instructions to control the functional elements of the device to perform the described functions. Additionally or alternatively, the device may use dedicated hardware to perform aspects of the described functions.

[0200] At 905, the method may include deriving a Trusted IP Security (TIPSec) key using the stored TNGF key, input parameters, and a reauthentication IPSec key refresh usage type specifier. The operations of 905 may be performed according to the examples described herein. In some implementations, aspects of the operations of 905 may be described with reference to Figure 1 The device is used to perform the above.

[0201] At 910, the method may include sending a re-authentication identifier for the UE to the TNGF. The operations of 910 may be performed according to the examples described herein. In some implementations, aspects of the operations of 910 may be described with reference to Figure 1 The device is used to perform the above.

[0202] Figure 10 A flowchart of a method 1000 for supporting the generation of a security context between a UE and a TNAP according to aspects of the present disclosure is illustrated. The operations of the method 1000 may be implemented by the apparatus described herein or components thereof. For example, the operations of the method 1000 may be implemented by reference to Figures 1 to 6 The network entity 102 (e.g., TGNF) described herein is executed. In some implementations, the device may execute a set of instructions to control the functional elements of the device to perform the described functions. Additionally or alternatively, the device may use dedicated hardware to perform aspects of the described functions.

[0203] At 1005, the method may include deriving a TNAP key using the TNGF key, the freshness parameter, and the TNAP key refresh usage type specifier. The operations of 1005 may be performed according to the examples described herein. In some implementations, aspects of the operations of 1005 may be described with reference to Figure 1 The device is used to perform the above.

[0204] At 1010, the method may include deriving a reauthentication identifier using the TNGF key, the freshness parameter, and the reauthentication identifier usage type specifier. The operations of 1010 may be performed according to the examples described herein. In some implementations, aspects of the operations of 1010 may be described with reference to Figure 1 The device is used to perform the above.

[0205] At 1015, the method may include sending the derived re-authentication identifier to the UE. The operations of 1015 may be performed according to the examples described herein. In some implementations, aspects of the operations of 1015 may be described with reference to Figure 1 The device is used to perform the above.

[0206] Figure 11 A flowchart of a method 1100 for supporting generation of a security context for a UE according to aspects of the present disclosure is illustrated. The operations of the method 1100 may be implemented by the apparatus described herein or components thereof. For example, the operations of the method 1000 may be implemented by reference to Figures 1 to 6 The UE 104 described herein performs. In some implementations, the device may execute a set of instructions to control the functional elements of the device to perform the described functions. Additionally or alternatively, the device may use dedicated hardware to perform aspects of the described functions.

[0207] At 1105, the method may include receiving information from the TNGF, the information including TNGF information, freshness parameters, and a re-authentication identifier. The operations of 1105 may be performed according to the examples described herein. In some implementations, aspects of the operations of 1105 may be described with reference to Figure 1 The device is used to perform the above.

[0208] At 1110, the method may include refreshing the TNAP key using the information received from the TNGF and the TNAP / TNAP key refresh related usage type specifier. The operations of 1110 may be performed according to the examples described herein. In some implementations, aspects of the operations of 1110 may be described with reference to Figure 1 The device is used to perform the above.

[0209] It should be noted that the methods described herein describe possible implementations, and that the operations and steps may be rearranged or otherwise modified, and other implementations are possible. Furthermore, aspects from two or more methods may be combined.

[0210] The various illustrative blocks and components described in conjunction with the disclosure herein may be implemented or executed using a general purpose processor, a DSP, an ASIC, a CPU, an FPGA or other programmable logic device, discrete gate or transistor logic, discrete hardware components, or any combination thereof designed to perform the functions described herein. A general purpose processor may be a microprocessor, but in the alternative, the processor may be any processor, controller, microcontroller, or state machine. A processor may also be implemented as a combination of computing devices (e.g., a DSP and a microprocessor, a plurality of microprocessors, a combination of one or more microprocessors in conjunction with a DSP core, or any other such configuration).

[0211] The functions described herein may be implemented in hardware, software executed by a processor, firmware, or any combination thereof. If implemented in software executed by a processor, the functions may be stored on or transmitted via a computer-readable medium as one or more instructions or codes. Other examples and implementations are within the scope of this disclosure and the appended claims. For example, due to the nature of software, the functions described herein may be implemented using software executed by a processor, hardware, firmware, hardwiring, or any combination thereof. Features that implement the functions may also be physically located in various locations, including being distributed so that portions of the functions are implemented at different physical locations.

[0212] Computer readable medium includes non-transient computer storage medium and communication medium, and communication medium includes any medium that promotes that computer program is transferred from one place to another place.Non-transient storage medium can be any available medium that can be accessed by general-purpose or special-purpose computer.As an example and not limitation, non-transient computer readable medium can include RAM, ROM, electrically erasable programmable ROM (EEPROM), flash memory, compact disc (CD) ROM or other optical disc storage, disk storage or other magnetic storage device, or can be used for carrying or storing desired program code parts in the form of instruction or data structure and can be by general-purpose or special-purpose computer, or any other non-transient medium that general-purpose or special-purpose processor accesses.

[0213] Any connection may be appropriately referred to as a computer-readable medium. For example, if the software is sent from a website, server, or other remote source using a coaxial cable, fiber optic cable, twisted pair, digital subscriber line (DSL), or wireless technology (such as infrared, radio, and microwave), the coaxial cable, fiber optic cable, twisted pair, DSL, or wireless technology (such as infrared, radio, and microwave) is included in the definition of computer-readable medium. Disks and optical discs as used herein include CDs, laser discs, optical discs, digital versatile discs (DVDs), floppy disks, and Blu-ray discs, where disks typically reproduce data magnetically, while optical discs reproduce data optically using lasers. Combinations of the above are also included within the scope of computer-readable media.

[0214] As used herein (including in the claims), "or" used in a list of items (e.g., a list of items beginning with a phrase such as "at least one of" or "one or more of" or "one or both of") means an inclusive list so that, for example, a list of at least one of A, B, or C means A or B or C or AB or AC or BC or ABC (i.e., A and B and C). Furthermore, as used herein, the phrase "based on" should not be interpreted as a reference to a set of closed conditions. For example, an example step described as "based on condition A" could be based on both condition A and condition B without departing from the scope of this disclosure. In other words, as used herein, the phrase "based on" should be interpreted in the same manner as the phrase "based at least in part on." Furthermore, as used herein (including in the claims), a "set" may include one or more elements.

[0215] When referring to a network entity, the terms "send," "receive," or "transmit" may refer to any part of a network entity of the RAN (e.g., base station, CU, DU, RU) that communicates with another device (e.g., directly or via one or more other network entities).

[0216] The description herein, in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, describes example configurations and does not represent all possible examples that may be implemented or within the scope of the claims. The term "example" as used herein means "serving as an example, instance, or illustration," rather than "preferred" or "superior to other examples." The detailed description includes specific details for the purpose of providing an understanding of the described techniques. However, these techniques can be practiced without these specific details. In some cases, known structures and devices are shown in block diagram form to avoid obscuring the concepts of the described examples.

[0217] The description herein is provided to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make or use the present disclosure. Various modifications to the present disclosure will be readily apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art, and the general principles defined herein may be applied to other variations without departing from the scope of the present disclosure. Therefore, the present disclosure is not limited to the examples and designs described herein, but should be construed in the widest sense consistent with the principles and novel features disclosed herein.< / plmnid> < / plmnid> < / plmnid> < / mcc> < / mnc>

Claims

1. A Trusted Non-3GPP Gateway Function (TNGF), comprising: at least one memory; as well as at least one processor coupled to the at least one memory and configured to cause the TNGF to: Trusted IP Security (TIPSec) keys are derived using: TGNF key, Input parameters, and Recertification uses type specifiers; receiving, from a user equipment (UE), a re-authentication identifier for the UE; identifying the TIPSec key using the reauthentication identifier; as well as An IPSec security association (SA) is re-established based on the identified TIPSec key.

2. The TNGF according to claim 1, wherein the reauthentication usage type specifier includes reauthentication IPSec / IPSec key refresh related usage type information, and wherein the input parameters include: The length of the usage type specifier, TNGF Nonce, the length of the TNGF Nonce, UE Nonce, the length of the UE Nonce, re-authentication counter, the length of the re-authentication counter, random number, the length of the random number, and combinations thereof.

3. The TNGF according to claim 1, further comprising: In response to receiving the re-authentication identifier from the UE, sending the re-authentication identifier to the UE. 4 . The TNGF of claim 3 , wherein the TNGF sends the re-authentication identifier to the UE during an Internet Key Exchange (IKE) authentication exchange.

5. The TGNF of claim 1 , wherein the processor is further configured to cause the TNGF to: derive the TIPSec key during UE mobility from a previous Trusted Non-3GPP Gateway Function (TNAP) to a target TNAP associated with the TNGF.

6. A method performed by a Trusted Non-3GPP Gateway Function (TNGF), the method comprising: Trusted IP Security (TIPSec) keys are derived using: TGNF key, Input parameters, and Recertification uses type specifiers; receiving, from a user equipment (UE), a re-authentication identifier for the UE; identifying the TIPSec key using the reauthentication identifier; as well as An IPSec security association (SA) is re-established based on the identified TIPSec key.

7. The method of claim 6, wherein the reauthentication usage type specifier comprises reauthentication IPSec / IPSec key refresh related usage type information, and wherein the input parameters comprise: The length of the usage type specifier, the TNGF Nonce, the length of the TNGF Nonce, the UE Nonce, the length of the UE Nonce, the reauthentication counter, the length of the reauthentication counter, the random number, the length of the random number, or a combination thereof.

8. The method according to claim 6, further comprising: In response to receiving the re-authentication identifier from the UE, sending the re-authentication identifier to the UE.

9. The method of claim 8, wherein the TNGF sends the reauthentication identifier to the UE during an Internet Key Exchange (IKE) authentication exchange.

10. The method of claim 6, wherein the TNGF derives the TIPSec key in response to UE mobility from a previous Trusted Non-3GPP Gateway Function (TNAP) to a target TNAP associated with the TNGF.

11. A user equipment (UE), comprising: at least one memory; as well as at least one processor coupled to the at least one memory and configured to cause the UE to: Trusted IP Security (TIPSec) keys are derived using: The stored TNGF key, Input parameters, and Reauthenticate IPSec key refresh using the type specifier; and A re-authentication identifier for the UE is sent to a Trusted Non-3GPP Gateway Function (TNGF).

12. The UE of claim 11, wherein the processor is configured to cause the UE to: send the re-authentication identifier during an Internet Key Exchange (IKE) authentication exchange with the TNGF.

13. The UE of claim 12, wherein the processor is configured to cause the UE to: send a re-authentication identifier, the re-authentication identifier being received from the TNGF during a previously successful full authentication procedure or a re-authentication procedure between the UE and the TNGF.

14. The UE according to claim 12, wherein the processor is configured to cause the UE to derive the IPSec key refresh usage type discriminator according to a stored TNGF key, a freshness parameter, and a reauthentication identity usage type discriminator.

15. The UE of claim 12, wherein the re-authentication identifier is a part of a network access identifier (NAI) sent from the UE to the TNGF.

16. The UE according to claim 11, wherein the re-authentication usage type specifier comprises re-authentication identity / identifier related usage type information, and wherein the input parameters comprise: The length of the usage type specifier, TNGFNonce, the length of the TNGFNonce, UENonce, the length of the UENonce, reauthentication counter, the length of the reauthentication counter, random number, the length of the random number, or a combination thereof.

17. A processor for wireless communication, comprising: at least one controller coupled to the at least one memory and configured to cause the processor to: Trusted IP Security (TIPSec) keys are derived using: The stored TNGF key, Input parameters, and Reauthenticate IPSec key refresh using the type specifier; and A re-authentication identifier for the processor is sent to a Trusted Non-3GPP Gateway Function (TNGF).

18. The processor of claim 17, wherein the controller is further configured to cause the processor to: send the reauthentication identifier during an Internet Key Exchange (IKE) authentication exchange with the TNGF.

19. The processor of claim 18, wherein the controller is further configured to cause the processor to: send a re-authentication identifier, the re-authentication identifier being received from the TNGF during a previously successful full authentication process or a re-authentication process between the UE and the TNGF.

20. The processor of claim 18, wherein the controller is further configured to cause the processor to derive the IPSec key refresh usage type discriminator based on a stored TNGF key, a freshness parameter, and a reauthentication identification usage type discriminator.

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