Method for detecting GNSS attacks and vehicle terminal therefor

Abstract

A method for detecting global navigation satellite system (GNSS) attacks and a vehicle terminal therefor are provided. The method includes: receiving, from an infrastructure device, first GNSS data derived based on one or more first GNSS signals received by the infrastructure device; identifying second GNSS data based on one or more second GNSS signals received by a GNSS receiver of the vehicle; and determining whether the vehicle is suffering from a GNSS attack based on a comparison between the first GNSS data and the second GNSS data.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present disclosure relates to a method for detecting a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) attack and a vehicle terminal therefor. Background Art

[0002] Hereinafter, the following contents merely provide background information related to the present embodiment and do not constitute prior art.

[0003] Autonomous driving systems or advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS) in vehicles use global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) for location recognition and path planning. A representative example of GNSS is the Global Positioning System (GPS). The efficient operation of vehicles depends heavily on the accuracy of GNSS signals. GNSS attacks (or GNSS jamming), which intentionally interfere with or manipulate GNSS signals, threaten the accuracy and reliability of vehicles.

[0004] Representative types of GNSS attacks include jamming and spoofing. In a jamming attack, a disturbance signal (e.g., noise) with a higher intensity than the GNSS signal is transmitted into the frequency band used by GNSS, thereby preventing GNSS receivers from detecting and interpreting legitimate GNSS signals from satellites. In a spoofing attack, a false signal similar to the GNSS signal is transmitted, causing the GNSS receiver to calculate incorrect position and time information.

[0005] Vehicles attacked by GNSS may lose their location information or misidentify their current location. For example, a vehicle traveling on a road with a 30 km / h speed limit might suddenly misidentify itself as being on a road with a 100 km / h speed limit due to a GNSS attack. This could cause the vehicle to travel at speeds far above the actual speed limit, increasing the risk of an accident. Conversely, a vehicle traveling on a road with a 100 km / h speed limit might suddenly misidentify itself as being on a road with a 30 km / h speed limit due to a GNSS attack. This could cause the vehicle to drastically reduce its speed, disrupting traffic, or even causing an accident.

[0006] Therefore, effectively detecting and defending against GNSS attacks is crucial to ensuring vehicle safety and maintaining the reliability of autonomous driving functions. Summary of the Invention

[0007]

Technical Issues

[0008] The present disclosure aims to provide a method for easily detecting whether a GNSS receiver of a vehicle is under attack, and to provide a vehicle terminal for this purpose.

[0009]

Technical Solution

[0010] According to one aspect of the present disclosure, a method for detecting a GNSS attack, performed by a vehicle terminal, is provided. The method includes: receiving first GNSS data derived from an infrastructure device based on one or more first GNSS signals received by the infrastructure device; identifying second GNSS data based on one or more second GNSS signals received by a GNSS receiver of the vehicle; and determining whether the vehicle is experiencing a GNSS attack based on a comparison between the first GNSS data and the second GNSS data.

[0011] In some embodiments, determining that the vehicle is experiencing a GNSS attack may include determining that the vehicle is experiencing a GNSS attack when the difference between the first GNSS data and the second GNSS data is greater than a predetermined threshold. For example, the threshold may be dynamically determined based on the vehicle's state. The vehicle's state may include the vehicle's current speed, the vehicle's current acceleration, the vehicle's acceleration capability, or a combination thereof. The vehicle's acceleration capability may include the time required for the vehicle to accelerate from a stationary state to a predetermined speed. As another example, the threshold may be received from the infrastructure device simultaneously with or at a different time than the second GNSS data.

[0012] In some embodiments, the second GNSS data may be sent periodically by the infrastructure equipment.

[0013] In some embodiments, the second GNSS data may include data identified from one or more second GNSS signals received from the infrastructure equipment.In additional or alternative embodiments, the second GNSS data may include predefined data indicative of a location of the infrastructure equipment.

[0014] In some embodiments, the infrastructure equipment may include infrastructure components of the environment in which the vehicle is traveling, or infrastructure components dedicated to detecting GNSS attacks.

[0015] In some embodiments, the GNSS attack may include a jamming attack, a spoofing attack, or a combination thereof.

[0016] According to another aspect of the present disclosure, a vehicle terminal for detecting a GNSS attack is provided. The vehicle terminal includes a memory storing instructions and at least one processor, wherein the at least one processor executes the instructions to perform the following steps: identifying first GNSS data based on one or more first GNSS signals received by a GNSS receiver of the vehicle; receiving second GNSS data from an infrastructure device; and determining whether the vehicle is experiencing a GNSS attack based on a comparison between the first GNSS data and the second GNSS data.

[0017] Beneficial effects

[0018] According to one embodiment of the present disclosure, the location of a vehicle may be indirectly identified through vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication with infrastructure surrounding the environment in which the vehicle is traveling, thereby detecting and preventing attacks on the vehicle's GNSS receiver.

[0019] According to one embodiment of the present disclosure, it is possible to detect whether a GNSS receiver of a vehicle is under a jamming or spoofing attack without adding separate hardware to the vehicle.

[0020] According to one embodiment of the present disclosure, by effectively detecting GNSS attacks, the safety of a vehicle can be enhanced, and the accuracy of an autonomous driving system or an advanced driver assistance system can be improved.

[0021] Effects of the present disclosure are not limited to the above-mentioned effects, and other effects not mentioned can be clearly understood by those skilled in the art through the following description. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0022] Figure 1 is a conceptual diagram illustrating a vehicle environment in which the techniques of this disclosure may be used.

[0023] Figure 2 is a flowchart illustrating a method for detecting GNSS attacks according to one embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0024] Figure 3 1 is a flowchart illustrating an exemplary operation of a vehicle (specifically, a vehicle terminal) performing GNSS attack detection according to one embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0025] Figure 4 A simplified functional block diagram of an exemplary electronic device that can be used to implement methods according to the present disclosure is shown. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0026] Hereinafter, some exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. In the following description, like reference numerals represent like elements, but these elements appear in different drawings. In addition, in the following description of some embodiments, for the sake of clarity and brevity, detailed descriptions of known functions and configurations incorporated therein will be omitted.

[0027] In addition, various terms such as first, second, A, B, (a), (b), etc. are only used to distinguish one component from another, and do not imply or suggest the nature, order, or sequence of the components. Throughout the specification, when a component "includes" or "comprising" a component, the component is intended to further include other components, rather than exclude other components, unless otherwise explicitly stated. Terms such as "unit" and "module" refer to one or more units for processing at least one function or operation, and these units can be implemented by hardware, software, or a combination thereof.

[0028] In exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure, a vehicle may be understood as a concept based on various vehicles having network communication capabilities. In some cases, a vehicle may be understood as a concept based on various land vehicles traveling on roads (e.g., cars, motorcycles, trucks, and buses) and various vehicles (e.g., vertical take-off and landing aircraft (VTOL) for urban air mobility, drones, etc.).

[0029] The technology disclosed herein relates to a method for detecting GNSS attacks on a vehicle using vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication and a vehicle terminal using the method. The vehicle performs GNSS attack detection using data identified from a GNSS receiver and data received through network communication with surrounding infrastructure.

[0030] Figure 1 is a conceptual diagram illustrating a vehicle environment in which the techniques of this disclosure may be used.

[0031] The vehicle 100 is equipped with a vehicle terminal 110 that supports GNSS-based data communication and navigation. The vehicle terminal 110 can receive GNSS signals (eg, GPS signals) from one or more satellites 200 and analyze the received signals to perform location recognition and / or path planning.

[0032] The vehicle terminal 110 may support V2I communication. For example, the vehicle terminal 110 may receive predetermined data from and / or transmit predetermined data to surrounding infrastructure devices 300. The infrastructure devices 300 may be devices installed on infrastructure components in the environment in which the vehicle is traveling. For example, infrastructure components may include traffic lights, parking lots, cameras, vertical take-off and landing airports, etc. Additionally or alternatively, the infrastructure devices 300 may be devices provided in infrastructure components dedicated to the applications of the present disclosure (e.g., a GNSS station for transmitting reference GNSS data for detecting GNSS attacks, etc.).

[0033] The vehicle terminal 110 can detect whether the vehicle 100 is experiencing a GNSS attack by comparing first GNSS data identified from GNSS signals with second GNSS data received from the infrastructure device 300 via V2I communication. The first GNSS data and the second GNSS data may be data that directly or indirectly indicates the location of the vehicle 100 and the infrastructure device 300, respectively. The first GNSS data may include data identified from GNSS signals received from satellites 200 by a GNSS receiver mounted on the vehicle 100, and the second GNSS data may include data identified from GNSS signals received from satellites 200 by a GNSS receiver mounted on the infrastructure device 300. The data identified from the GNSS signals may include data extracted from the GNSS signals (e.g., signal frequency, C / A code, P(Y) code, etc.), data measured from the GNSS signals (e.g., reception strength, signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), etc.), and / or data estimated from the GNSS signals (e.g., latitude and longitude of the GNSS receiver, etc.). Additionally or alternatively, the second GNSS data may include predefined data stored in the infrastructure device 300. For example, when the infrastructure equipment 300 is installed on an infrastructure having a fixed physical location, the vehicle terminal 110 may receive fixed GNSS data (eg, latitude, longitude, etc.) indicating the location of the infrastructure from the infrastructure equipment 300 .

[0034] The vehicle terminal 110 may compare the difference between the first GNSS data and the second GNSS data with a predetermined threshold. When the difference between the two is greater than the threshold, the vehicle terminal 110 may determine that the vehicle 100 is undergoing a GNSS attack, and if not, it may be determined that the vehicle 100 is not undergoing a GNSS attack (i.e., a normal condition). The threshold may be a value set by the administrator or user of the vehicle 100, or may be automatically (or differently) set according to the state of the vehicle 100. The state of the vehicle 100 may include the current speed of the vehicle 100, the current acceleration of the vehicle 100, and / or the acceleration capability of the vehicle 100. The acceleration capability of the vehicle 100 may include the time required for the vehicle 100 to accelerate from a stationary state to a predetermined speed (e.g., 0-100 km / h acceleration time or 0-60 mi / h acceleration time).

[0035] The infrastructure device 300 can periodically or aperiodically send GNSS data identified in real time from GNSS signals and / or pre-stored GNSS data to the vehicle terminal 110. The infrastructure device 300 can send GNSS data to a specific vehicle, or broadcast GNSS data to multiple vehicles within a predetermined communication coverage. For example, the infrastructure device 300 can broadcast GNSS data according to a preset period. As another example, based on the identification of a vehicle in the surrounding area, the infrastructure device 300 can send GNSS data to the identified surrounding vehicles. As yet another example, based on the identification of one or more vehicles in the surrounding area, the infrastructure device 300 can broadcast GNSS data. For example, a speed camera can be configured to send GNSS data whenever the camera identifies a vehicle.

[0036] In some examples, the infrastructure device 300 may additionally transmit information regarding a threshold value used for comparison with the difference between the GNSS data. The infrastructure device 300 may transmit a threshold value set to reflect the characteristics of the location where the infrastructure device is installed to the vehicle terminal 110. For example, the threshold value may be set differently for a two-lane road and a six-lane road.

[0037] Figure 2 1 is a flowchart illustrating a method for detecting a GNSS attack according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. In the following description, operations performed in the vehicle terminal 110 are simply described as being performed by the vehicle 100 .

[0038] Vehicle 100 and infrastructure equipment 300 each receive GNSS signals from satellite 200 and identify GNSS data (S20 and S22). Vehicle 100 and infrastructure equipment 300 receive GNSS signals according to independently set periods and identify GNSS data based on the signals. In some embodiments, when infrastructure equipment 300 is installed on infrastructure with a fixed physical location, step S22 can be omitted. In this case, infrastructure equipment 300 may pre-store GNSS data that directly or indirectly indicates the location of the infrastructure equipment.

[0039] The infrastructure device 300 transmits GNSS data identified in real time from the GNSS signal or pre-stored GNSS data (S24). The transmission of GNSS data can be performed periodically or non-periodically based on the identification of vehicles in the surrounding area. The transmission of GNSS data can be performed in a broadcast manner.

[0040] The vehicle 100 compares the GNSS data identified in step S20 with the GNSS data received in step S24 (step S26). The vehicle 100 can check whether the difference between the two GNSS data is greater than a predetermined threshold. The threshold can be a value preset by the vehicle user or manager, or can be dynamically set according to the vehicle state (e.g., speed, acceleration, acceleration capability, etc.). As another example, the threshold can be a value received from the infrastructure device 300 at the same time as step S24 or at a different time. For example, the infrastructure device 300 can send the GNSS data and the threshold in the same signal. The infrastructure device 300 can send a threshold set to reflect the characteristics of the location where the device is installed. For example, different thresholds can be set for two-lane roads and six-lane roads.

[0041] Based on the comparison result of the GNSS data, the vehicle 100 determines whether the vehicle 100 is under a GNSS attack (S28). For example, if the difference between the GNSS data is greater than a threshold, it can be determined that the vehicle 100 is under a GNSS attack. Here, the GNSS attack on the vehicle 100 may include a jamming attack and / or a spoofing attack.

[0042] Figure 3 FIG. 1 is a flowchart of an exemplary operation of a vehicle (specifically, a vehicle terminal) performing GNSS attack detection according to an embodiment of the present invention. In the following description, the operations performed by the vehicle terminal 110 will be simply described as being performed by the vehicle 100.

[0043] The vehicle 100 may receive a GNSS signal from the satellite 200 using a GNSS receiver and identify GNSS data based on the signal (S30). The identified GNSS data may directly or indirectly indicate the location of the vehicle 100. Step S30 may be performed periodically according to a preset cycle.

[0044] Vehicle 100 monitors whether infrastructure equipment 300 receives GNSS data. The received GNSS data may directly or indirectly indicate the location of infrastructure equipment 300. Depending on the embodiment, monitoring may also be configured to monitor whether GNSS data is received only when vehicle 100 is stopped or traveling at a speed below a predetermined speed.

[0045] When GNSS data is received from the infrastructure device 300 (S31), the vehicle 100 determines a threshold value to be compared with the GNSS data (S32). For example, the vehicle 100 may determine a value preset by a user or an administrator as the threshold value. As another example, the threshold value may be dynamically determined based on the state of the vehicle 100. For example, when the speed of the vehicle 100 is high, the acceleration is high, and / or the 0-100 km / h acceleration time is short, the threshold value may be set to be larger. As another example, the threshold value may be determined based on information about the environment in which the vehicle 100 is traveling. For example, when the road on which the vehicle 100 is traveling is a two-lane road, the threshold value may be determined to be smaller than the threshold value when the road is a six-lane road. As another example, the vehicle 100 may determine the threshold value based on information received simultaneously with or at a different time from the GNSS data from the infrastructure device 300.

[0046] The vehicle 100 checks whether the difference between the GNSS data identified in step S30 and the GNSS data received in step S31 is greater than a threshold value (S34). For example, the vehicle 100 may check whether the distance between the position of the vehicle 100 identified from the GNSS signal and the position of the infrastructure device 300 received from the infrastructure device 300 is greater than a threshold value.

[0047] When the difference between the GNSS data is greater than a threshold, the vehicle 100 may determine that a GNSS attack is occurring (S35). In other words, the vehicle 100 may determine that the GNSS receiver has received a GNSS signal perturbed by a jamming attack and / or a spoofing attack. In response to detecting a GNSS attack, the vehicle 100 may also execute predefined defensive measures.

[0048] When the difference between the GNSS data is less than the threshold, the vehicle 100 can determine that the GNSS signal received by the GNSS receiver is reliable. Therefore, the vehicle 100 can use the GNSS data identified from the GNSS signal according to its original purpose (S36). For example, the vehicle 100 can use the identified GNSS data to perform location recognition and / or route planning.

[0049] Figure 4 A simplified functional block diagram of an exemplary electronic device that can be used to implement methods according to the present disclosure is shown.

[0050] The electronic device 40 may be a vehicle terminal 110 installed on the vehicle 100, and / or a Figure 1 The infrastructure equipment 300 is shown. Figure 4As in the example shown, electronic device 40 may include all or part of a GNSS receiver 400 , an input device 402 , an output device 404 , control circuitry 406 , a central processing unit (CPU) 408 , memory 410 , program code 412 , and a transceiver 414 . Figure 4 The modules shown are exemplary components, and some modules may be added, modified, or deleted depending on the implementation. For example, if the electronic device 40 is used as an infrastructure device 300 for a fixed infrastructure whose physical location does not change, the GNSS receiver 400 may be omitted. In this case, the electronic device 40 may store GNSS data indicating the location of the infrastructure in the memory 410. In another example, the GNSS receiver 400 may be a standalone device capable of communicating with the electronic device 40.

[0051] The control circuit 406 executes the program code 412 in the memory 410 via the CPU 408 and controls the operation of the electronic device 40 accordingly. The control circuit 406 can interact with the user via the input device 402 and the output device 404, or exchange signals with other electronic control units / systems within the vehicle (or infrastructure). The transceiver 414 is used to receive and transmit wireless signals, thereby transmitting received signals to the control circuit 406 and wirelessly outputting signals generated by the control circuit 406.

[0052] In addition, the operating process of the present invention can be implemented as computer-readable code on a computer-readable recording medium. The computer-readable recording medium may include all types of storage devices capable of storing computer-readable data. The computer-readable recording medium may be a non-transient medium, such as a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a compact disc ROM (CD-ROM), a magnetic tape, a floppy disk, or an optical data storage device. In addition, the computer-readable recording medium may be distributed on computer systems connected via a network, and the computer-readable program code may be stored and executed in a distributed manner.

[0053] In addition, the components of the present invention can utilize integrated circuit structures, such as memories, processors, logic circuits, lookup tables, etc. These integrated circuit structures perform the functions described herein under the control of one or more microprocessors or other control devices. In addition, the components of the present disclosure can be specifically implemented by parts of programs or codes, which contain one or more executable instructions for performing specific logical functions and are executed by one or more microprocessors or other control devices. In addition, the components of the present invention may include a central processing unit (CPU), a microprocessor, etc. that performs the corresponding functions, or be implemented thereby. In addition, the components of the present invention can store instructions executed by one or more processors in one or more memories.

[0054] Although exemplary embodiments have been described for illustrative purposes, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that various modifications, additions, and substitutions are possible without departing from the concept and scope of the claimed invention. Therefore, exemplary embodiments have been described for the sake of brevity and clarity. The scope of the technical concept of the present embodiment is not limited by the description. Therefore, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that the scope of the claimed invention is not limited by the embodiments explicitly described above, but by the claims and their equivalents.

[0055] CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

[0056] This application claims priority from Korean Patent Application No. 10-2023-0019677, filed on February 14, 2023, and Korean Patent Application No. 10-2024-0020301, filed on February 13, 2024, the disclosures of which are incorporated herein by reference in their entirety.

Claims

1. A method for detecting a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) attack performed by a vehicle terminal, the method comprising the following steps: identifying first GNSS data based on one or more first GNSS signals received by a GNSS receiver of the vehicle; receiving second GNSS data from the infrastructure device; as well as Based on a comparison between the first GNSS data and the second GNSS data, it is determined whether the vehicle is experiencing a GNSS attack.

2. The method according to claim 1, wherein The steps to determine include: When the difference between the first GNSS data and the second GNSS data is greater than a predetermined threshold, it is determined that the vehicle is suffering from a GNSS attack.

3. The method according to claim 2, wherein: The threshold is dynamically determined based on the state of the vehicle.

4. The method according to claim 3, wherein: The state of the vehicle includes the current speed of the vehicle, the current acceleration of the vehicle, the acceleration capability of the vehicle, or a combination thereof.

5. The method according to claim 4, wherein A vehicle's acceleration capability includes the time it takes to accelerate from a stationary state to a predetermined speed.

6. The method according to claim 2, wherein: The threshold value is received from the infrastructure device simultaneously with or at a different time than the second GNSS data.

7. The method according to claim 1, wherein The second GNSS data is periodically sent by the infrastructure equipment.

8. The method according to claim 1, wherein The second GNSS data includes data identified from one or more second GNSS signals received from the infrastructure equipment.

9. The method according to claim 1, wherein: The second GNSS data comprises predefined data indicative of a location of the infrastructure equipment.

10. The method according to claim 1, wherein The infrastructure device includes a device installed on an infrastructure component of an environment in which the vehicle is traveling, or a device installed on an infrastructure component specifically used to detect GNSS attacks.

11. The method according to claim 1, wherein The GNSS attack includes a jamming attack, a spoofing attack, or a combination thereof.

12. A vehicle terminal for detecting GNSS attacks, the vehicle terminal comprising: a memory for storing instructions; and at least one processor, The at least one processor executes the instructions to perform the following steps: identifying first GNSS data based on one or more first GNSS signals received by a GNSS receiver of the vehicle; receiving second GNSS data from the infrastructure equipment; and Based on a comparison between the first GNSS data and the second GNSS data, it is determined whether the vehicle is experiencing a GNSS attack.

13. The vehicle terminal according to claim 12, wherein: The at least one processor is configured to: When the difference between the first GNSS data and the second GNSS data is greater than a predetermined threshold, it is determined that the vehicle is suffering from a GNSS attack. The vehicle terminal according to claim 13 , wherein: The at least one processor is configured to: The threshold is determined dynamically based on the status of the vehicle.

15. The vehicle terminal according to claim 13, wherein The at least one processor is further configured to perform the following steps: The threshold is received, broadcast by the infrastructure equipment at the same time as or at a different time than the second GNSS data.

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